Author: Карабас Барабас

American journalist Edgar Snow wrote back in January 1945 that Ukraine had “paid the bill” for the war. Today, this conversation is especially important for the Israeli audience: the price of Victory included not only Ukrainian fronts and destroyed cities but also the fates of many peoples who then inhabited Ukraine, including the Jews of Ukraine — victims of the Holocaust, soldiers, doctors, refugees, evacuees, and families whose memory was dissolved in Soviet statistics for decades.

The Price of War: How Ukraine Paid for Victory in World War II

Ukraine in World War II became a battlefield and a symbol of enormous sacrifices, the scale of which was long hushed up. Western journalists noted as early as 1945: the bill for the defeat of Nazism was paid primarily by the Ukrainian people.

This topic is important for the Israeli audience as well. Because Ukraine was not only a territory of the front, occupation, destroyed cities, and burned villages. It was home to many peoples — Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Russians, Crimean Tatars, Roma, Belarusians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, and other communities.

The price of Victory included the fates of all these people.

But modern Russia tries to present the multinational Victory as almost exclusively “Russian.” Thus, foreign blood, foreign destroyed cities, foreign graves, and foreign memory are turned into tools of imperial propaganda.

This article does not claim to be a complete analysis of all the forces that operated on the territory of modern Ukraine during World War II. Here were the Red Army, Soviet partisans, German occupation administration, Wehrmacht and SS structures, Ukrainian nationalist underground, OUN and UPA, local auxiliary police, collaborationist formations, Polish underground, Jewish resistance, ghettos, partisan groups, underground fighters, rescuers of Jews, Soviet repressive organs, and post-war anti-Soviet resistance.

This complex history requires a separate conversation because it included both the fight against Nazism and the fight against Stalin’s USSR, collaboration, saving people, and crimes against the civilian population.

What is important here is this: Ukraine became one of the main territories where a huge price was paid for Victory, and modern Russia tries to appropriate this Victory along with foreign grief and foreign memory.

Voice from the West: Edgar Snow and the Ukrainian War Bill

In January 1945, American journalist Edgar Snow, returning from the USSR, published an article in The Saturday Evening Post titled “The Ukraine Pays the Bill.” It was not a book but a magazine report, published on January 27, 1945.

Snow was one of the first in the West to loudly voice the scale of Ukrainian losses: at least 10 million lives — soldiers and civilians, as well as material damage of 30–40 billion dollars.

These data were reported to him by Ukrainian officials, such as the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for Agriculture Vasily Starchenko and the head of the State Planning Committee of the republic Vladimir Valuyev. They knew the real situation in the liberated territory and understood the scale of the destruction.

Snow noted an important difference: the territory of the RSFSR experienced German occupation only partially, whereas a significant part of Ukraine went through the front, occupation, looting, destruction, mass deaths, and demographic collapse. Soviet statistics, however, downplayed the tragedy.

In 1946, the magazine “Bolshevik” named the total losses of the USSR at 7 million people, concealing the disproportionate contribution of Ukraine. Even earlier, in May 1945, Joseph Stalin raised a toast to the “Russian people” as the “leading force” of the Soviet Union. Thus, the foundation of the myth that Snow effectively refuted was laid: the titanic struggle was not only “Russian glory” but to a large extent a Ukrainian war.

This does not mean that other peoples did not fight and die. They did. But the Ukrainian price of Victory was too high to be dissolved in someone else’s political formula.

Stalin’s Seizure of Western Ukraine and the Broken Map Before the War

An important context begins even before Germany’s attack on the USSR.

In 1939, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the joint division of Poland by Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR, the Soviet Union occupied the eastern territories of Poland, including Western Ukraine. Soviet propaganda called this “reunification,” but in essence, it was a Stalinist seizure and annexation of territories caught between two totalitarian regimes.

This sharply changed the map of Ukraine before the big war.

New lands, new cities, new communities, and new fates became part of the Ukrainian SSR. Together with Western Ukraine, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and other population groups who had previously lived in a different political system entered Soviet reality.

For people, this meant not only a change of flag. Sovietization came: arrests, deportations, nationalization of property, destruction of political and social structures, pressure on religious and cultural life. Part of the population experienced first Stalinist rule, then Nazi occupation, and then Soviet control again.

That is why, when we talk about the price of Ukraine in World War II, we cannot start only from 1941. For Western Ukraine, the catastrophe began earlier — with the division of Eastern Europe between Stalin and Hitler.

This is especially important for understanding Jewish statistics. Before the war, about 1.5 million Jews lived in Soviet Ukraine. After the inclusion of Western Ukrainian territories, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, the number of Jews in the expanded borders of Ukraine increased to about 2.4 million. That is, Stalin’s expansion of borders directly changed the demographic picture, which then came under the blow of the Nazi invasion.

The Scale of the Ukrainian Tragedy

Snow’s estimate of 10 million dead is close to modern Ukrainian memorial estimates: Ukraine’s losses in World War II are often called in the range of 8–10 million people. These losses include victims of battles, occupation, famine, repression, deportations, forced labor, diseases, the Holocaust, and the general destruction of life.

More cautious Western reference estimates may call 5–7 million dead. The difference is related to the methodology: whom exactly to count, in what borders, whether to consider natives of Ukraine who died outside the republic, prisoners of war, civilians, those who died from hunger and diseases, deported, victims of occupation and repression.

But the essence does not change: Ukraine was one of the main territories of human and material catastrophe of World War II.

If we take the estimate of 8–10 million dead and compare it with the modern estimate of the total losses of the USSR of about 26.6 million people, then Ukraine accounts for about 30–38% of this enormous tragedy.

This is not a secondary share.

This is almost a third or more of the entire Soviet price of the war.

The demographic blow was colossal — up to 14 million people. Estimates often indicate that the population of Ukraine decreased from about 41 million in 1941 to about 27 million by 1945. This is not only the dead. This also includes evacuees, mobilized, abducted, displaced, refugees, people who found themselves outside their former lives.

Material damage of 30–40 billion dollars by then calculations is not an abstract sum. These are destroyed cities, villages, factories, hospitals, schools, mines, bridges, railways, houses, farms, and entire regions.

Ukraine lost about 700 cities and towns, 28 thousand villages, a huge part of industry and agriculture. The Nazis plundered the country, exporting grain, equipment, livestock, raw materials, people, and even land.

And then came the famine of 1946–1947. Formally, the war was over, but for many families, death, poverty, and destruction continued even after Victory.

The economic losses of Ukraine amounted to about 42% of the damage inflicted on the entire USSR.

About 10 million people were left homeless or lived in destroyed premises.

Destroyed or seriously damaged were:

— about 18 thousand medical institutions;
— about 33 thousand educational institutions;
— about 16 thousand industrial enterprises.

Behind each such figure is not only state statistics. There are families, cities, villages, jobs, schools, hospitals, documents, cemeteries, memory, and life that had to be rebuilt anew.

Ukrainians and Other Peoples: Who Paid This Bill

The main “mistake” of Russian propaganda is turning the multinational price of war into a “Russian Victory.”

Ukraine in World War II was home to many peoples. Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Russians, Crimean Tatars, Roma, Belarusians, Moldovans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, German colonists, and other communities lived on this land.

Each group experienced the war in its own way. But they all found themselves inside a huge catastrophe.

Ukrainians formed the basis of the population of the Ukrainian SSR and suffered huge losses at the front and in the rear. Millions of Ukrainians served in the Red Army, died in battles, were captured, returned disabled, lost families and homes.

The civilian population suffered from occupation, punitive operations, burned villages, forced labor, hunger, diseases, deportations, and repressions.

This was not only a military history. It was a history of the destruction of society.

When after the war the Soviet authorities spoke only of the “Soviet people,” Ukrainian specifics disappeared. And when modern Russia speaks of a “Russian Victory,” it makes an even cruder substitution: it takes for itself foreign blood, foreign cities, foreign graves, and foreign grief.

Jews of Ukraine: A Separate Tragedy Within the General Price of War

For the Israeli audience, it is important to highlight this part separately, but not to turn the entire history of Ukraine into only a Jewish theme. The Jewish tragedy is part of the large Ukrainian catastrophe, not a replacement for the entire topic.

The Jews of Ukraine were part of the population of the country through which the war passed. They lived in Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Berdychiv, Uman, Medzhybizh, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rivne, Lutsk, and many other cities and towns.

Before the war, this was a huge map of Jewish life in Eastern Europe: families, synagogues, schools, cemeteries, crafts, trade, Yiddish, Hebrew, Hasidic tradition, Zionist ideas, secular culture.

After the German invasion, Jews became the target of the Holocaust — a separate Nazi policy of extermination.

But it is important to write accurately: the Jews of Ukraine were not only victims of mass shootings. They also fought in the Red Army, served as doctors, engineers, signalmen, worked in the rear, went into evacuation, ended up in ghettos, experienced hunger, diseases, forced labor, deportations, Soviet repressions, and the destruction of life, like other residents of Ukraine.

At the same time, precisely as Jews, they were under the threat of complete extermination.

Ukraine became one of the main territories of the “Holocaust by bullets.” Jews were often killed near their homes — in ravines, forests, fields, quarries, near anti-tank ditches, on the outskirts of cities and towns.

Babi Yar became the most famous symbol of this tragedy. On September 29–30, 1941, 33,771 Jews were shot in Kyiv. But Babi Yar was not the only place. There were hundreds of places of mass extermination on Ukrainian soil.

According to modern estimates, about 1.5 million Jews of Ukraine and Jews who found themselves on Ukrainian territory during the war died as a result of the Holocaust and Nazi occupation policy — from mass shootings, ghetto conditions, hunger, diseases, forced labor, deportations, and the entire system of Nazi extermination.

This figure is important, but it cannot be understood narrowly. The Jewish price of war included not only killings in ravines. It included the front, the rear, evacuation, hunger, diseases, forced labor, loss of families, destruction of communities, and subsequent Soviet erasure of memory.

If we compare approximately 1.5 million Jewish victims with the overall Ukrainian estimate of 8–10 million dead, this is about 15–19% of the Ukrainian price of war. At the same time, Jews made up about 5–6% of the population of Ukraine in expanded borders.

This shows the disproportion of the Jewish tragedy within the overall Ukrainian catastrophe. But this does not cancel the general theme of the article: Ukraine as a country and space of many peoples paid a huge price for Victory.

Soviet Memory: Ukrainians Dissolved, Jews Depersonalized

After the war, the Soviet authorities created a convenient formula: “the Soviet people won.”

There was a part of the truth in it. The victory was indeed common. People of different nationalities fought and died. But this formula often erased specifics.

The Ukrainian sacrifice was dissolved in the general Soviet statistics.

The Jewish sacrifice was dissolved in the words “Soviet citizens.”

This is especially noticeable at places of mass killings. Where the Nazis exterminated Jews precisely as Jews, Soviet memorial texts often simply wrote about citizens, residents, or peaceful people.

Formally, these people were indeed citizens. But the reason for their extermination — Jewish origin — disappeared.

Thus, memory became convenient for the state but incomplete for people.

Ukrainians were deprived of a separate conversation about the price of Ukraine.

Jews were deprived of the exact name of their tragedy.

And then modern Russia turned this Soviet construction into an even more rigid substitution: “Soviet Victory” became “Russian Victory.”

Truth Against Propaganda

Edgar Snow challenged the Soviet myth of the “united people,” but his words were hushed up. Millions of Ukrainians fought in the Red Army on key fronts, died at the front, in captivity, in occupation, and in the rear, yet their contribution was often downplayed or dissolved in the general Soviet formula.

Only after the collapse of the USSR did historians begin to more widely restore the truth: Ukraine paid for Victory with an exorbitant price, becoming a victim of two regimes — Nazi and Stalinist.

Snow’s words that Ukraine “paid the bill” remain relevant today. They remind us of the price of freedom and how easily imperial propaganda appropriates foreign sacrifices.

Modern Russia exploits the memory of World War II as a political resource. It talks about 26.6–27 million dead citizens of the USSR but often presents this tragedy as if it were almost exclusively a Russian sacrifice and Russian feat.

This is a historical lie.

Soviet losses were multinational. Among these millions were Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Russians, Kazakhs, Armenians, Georgians, Crimean Tatars, peoples of the Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia, and others.

Ukraine gave a huge part of this price. The Jews of Ukraine experienced a separate tragedy of the Holocaust. Western Ukraine before the war went through Stalin’s seizure, Sovietization, repressions, and then Nazi occupation.

But Russian propaganda pretends that this entire history belongs to Moscow.

It appropriates veterans of different peoples.

Appropriates Ukrainian cities and villages.

Appropriates the destroyed economy of Ukraine.

Appropriates Babi Yar.

Appropriates the memory of Jews, whom the Soviet system often called nameless “peaceful citizens.”

Appropriates the very right to speak on behalf of Victory.

It sounds especially cynical today when Russia, under the guise of fighting Nazism, is waging war against Ukraine — a country that itself paid a huge price for the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Why This Is Important for Israel

For Israel, this topic is not a distant history.

Many Israeli families have roots in Ukrainian cities and towns. For them, Ukraine is not only a modern country that is once again experiencing war today. It is also a map of family memory: Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Berdychiv, Uman, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Medzhybizh.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic as a matter of honest memory. You cannot talk about the price of Victory and forget Ukraine. You cannot talk about World War II and turn a multinational tragedy into a “Russian Victory.” You cannot talk about the Holocaust on Ukrainian soil and again hide Jews behind the impersonal formula “peaceful citizens.”

The victory was common.

But the bill was not the same.

Ukraine paid with millions of lives, destroyed cities, annihilated villages, hunger, occupation, forced labor, repressions, and broken demography.

Among the many peoples who then inhabited Ukraine, Jews paid a special price: as part of the population of a country that went through the war, and as a people against whom the Nazis waged a policy of complete extermination.

That is why the modern Russian attempt to appropriate Victory is not just a dispute about the past. It is an attempt to take away from other peoples their dead, their pain, and their right to speak in their own name.

Because when Russia appropriates Victory, it appropriates not only military glory. It appropriates Ukrainian ruins, Jewish graves, the fates of the deported, shot, those who died of hunger, and those whose names were hidden for decades behind the words “Soviet citizens.”

Victory cannot be privatized.

Grief cannot be appropriated.

Memory cannot be given to those who use the dead to justify a new war.

Sources and reference points

• Edgar Snow, “The Ukraine Pays the Bill”, The Saturday Evening Post, January 27, 1945.
• Ukrainian Institute of National Memory — assessments of Ukraine’s losses in World War II.
• Britannica — reference data on the destruction and losses of Ukraine in World War II.
• Yad Vashem — materials on the Jewish population of Ukraine, the Holocaust, and Babi Yar.
• United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and National WWII Museum — materials on the Holocaust in Ukraine and the ‘Holocaust by bullets’.

On the morning of July 30, 2026, the residents of Ceuta saw thousands of people on the streets of their city, crossing the border from Morocco in several waves, bypassing barriers by sea, walking around breakwaters near Tarajal beach, or attempting to swim to the Spanish shore.

By the morning of July 31, the death toll had reached at least 18 people. Some drowned, others died in a stampede near a narrow coastal area. Spain sent the army and additional police units to the city, and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska planned an urgent visit to Ceuta.

However, what is happening is not just another episode of the European migration crisis. Ceuta (here it is on the map – https://maps.app.goo.gl/hTUCguyf12fEjTrg9) is one of the most unusual territories in the world: a Spanish city located on the African continent, surrounded by Morocco and the Mediterranean Sea, but legally part of Spain.

That is why a person who crosses a few meters of the border line or bypasses a sea barrier finds themselves not just in a neighboring North African city. They find themselves on the territory of Spain and the European Union.

NANews — News of Israel examines what happened in Ceuta, why this small city has become one of the main migration points in Europe, and how its centuries-old history is connected to the current crisis.

Thousands of people crossed the sea and land border

According to Spanish state television TVE, between 2,000 and 3,000 people could have entered Ceuta on July 30. Most successful crossings occurred before noon, when border forces had not yet managed to block the main routes. Among the arrivals were predominantly young Moroccan citizens, but also people from sub-Saharan African countries, women, children, and entire families.

People moved in several ways. Some bypassed the border crossing via the breakwater near Tarajal, others entered the sea and swam along the coast, while others tried to break through gates and land barriers.

After the main approaches were blocked, thousands wishing to enter Ceuta remained in the Moroccan city of Fnideq. Some reached there on foot via mountain trails, trying to bypass police checkpoints. Moroccan security forces used water cannons and pushed people away from the border. During clashes, a bus and seven cars were set on fire.

Ceuta, with a population of about 85,000 people, is not physically prepared for the simultaneous arrival of several thousand migrants. Many minors and adults spent the night on the streets as there were not enough places in accommodation centers. Representatives of the Civil Guard called the situation a serious humanitarian crisis.

Spain deployed the military, but the city was not ‘captured’

Madrid sent 200 specially trained police officers and 60 military personnel to Ceuta. The army was supposed to help the Civil Guard restore control over the border, patrol the coast, and prevent new mass crossings.

Therefore, reports that migrants allegedly ‘captured Ceuta’ are an exaggeration. City authorities, police, the Civil Guard, and the Spanish army continued to work. However, for several hours, the border control system was indeed overloaded, and thousands of people managed to enter Spanish territory.

The Spanish Ministry of the Interior stated that human trafficking networks are using a recent court decision to spread rumors and encourage mass crossings. The ministry simultaneously emphasized cooperation with Morocco and reported that Moroccan forces prevented several thousand more attempts to cross the border. Madrid and Rabat agreed to strengthen coordination and expedite the return of people who illegally entered Ceuta.

The ultimate cause of such a sharp influx has not yet been established. It could be rumors of rule relaxation, actions of human traffickers, expectations of legalization in Spain, or a combination of several factors.

But the history of Ceuta shows: migration here has long been associated not only with poverty and the search for a better life but also with relations between Spain and Morocco.

Spanish city on the African shore

Ceuta is located at the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar — where the Mediterranean Sea connects with the Atlantic Ocean, and Africa almost touches Europe.

Strictly speaking, Ceuta is more accurately called a Spanish exclave: it is separated from the main territory of Spain and has a land border only with Morocco. However, in the media, the city is often called an enclave.

Together with Melilla (here it is on the map – https://maps.app.goo.gl/JgRGu39w2unA9ANY7), Ceuta forms the only land border of the European Union on the African continent. This is what turns a few kilometers of the city border into one of the most sensitive lines of the entire European migration system.

But the Spanish presence here did not arise during the European division of Africa in the 19th century. It is significantly older than modern Morocco, the Spanish protectorate, and the current borders of the region.

From the Phoenicians to the Roman city of Septem

The exact date of Ceuta’s founding is unknown. Archaeological and historical tradition links the first trading settlements in this area with the Phoenicians, who were exploring the western Mediterranean in the first millennium BC.

Later, the city was in the sphere of Carthage, and after its defeat, it came under Roman rule. The Romans called the city Septem Fratres, meaning ‘Seven Brothers,’ after the seven hills surrounding the settlement.

Gradually, the name was shortened to Septem or Septa. In Arabic, it turned into Sabta — Sebta, and then in Portuguese and Spanish tradition, it became known as Ceuta.

Roman Ceuta was a port, fortress, and trading center. Goods passed through it between North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. The city was also known for producing salted fish and fish sauces, supplied to various parts of the Roman Empire.

After the weakening of Rome, Ceuta came under the control of the Vandals, the Byzantine Empire, and possibly the Visigoths.

Seven centuries of a Muslim city

In the early 8th century, the city came under the control of Arab-Berber forces. Ceuta played an important role in the crossing of Muslim troops through the Strait of Gibraltar and the beginning of the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711.

In the following centuries, various Muslim states and dynasties that ruled North Africa and Al-Andalus fought for Ceuta. The city was controlled or contested by the Idrisids, Umayyads of Cordoba, Almoravids, Almohads, Marinids, and other regional powers.

It was a wealthy trading port through which gold, fabrics, grain, livestock, and goods from the interior regions of Africa entered the Mediterranean.

However, a unified modern Moroccan state within its current borders did not exist at that time. Control over Ceuta repeatedly shifted between states on both sides of the strait.

1415: Ceuta was conquered by Portugal

On August 21, 1415, the Portuguese fleet of King John I approached Ceuta. Portuguese troops landed and captured the city.

This happened 77 years before the fall of Muslim Granada and the completion of the Reconquista on the Iberian Peninsula. After the conquest, Ceuta remained a Portuguese-speaking city for over two centuries.

Portugal hoped to gain control over the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, African trade, and gold delivery routes. The conquest of Ceuta is also considered one of the first steps in Portuguese overseas expansion.

Economic expectations were only partially met. Trade routes began to bypass the Christian-occupied city, and maintaining the fortress and garrison required constant supplies from Europe. But the strategic importance of Ceuta compelled Portugal to hold onto it.

How Portuguese Ceuta became Spanish

In 1580, a dynastic crisis began in Portugal. The Portuguese crown was acquired by the Spanish King Philip II. Spain and Portugal retained separate laws and administrations but came under the rule of one monarch.

Ceuta formally remained a Portuguese possession, but its residents swore allegiance to the monarch ruling from Madrid.

In 1640, Portugal revolted against the Spanish Habsburg dynasty and restored independence. Most Portuguese territories recognized the new King John IV, but Ceuta refused to side with him and remained loyal to the Spanish King Philip IV.

In 1641, the city requested inclusion in the Castilian crown. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668 ended the war between Spain and Portugal: Spain recognized Portugal’s independence, and Portugal recognized Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta.

Thus, Ceuta became Spanish not as a result of Spain’s conquest of Morocco in the 20th century. The city was first conquered by Portugal, then independently remained loyal to the Spanish crown, and the transition was secured by an international treaty.

Traces of the Portuguese period have been preserved to this day. Ceuta’s flag is based on the black-and-white flag of Lisbon, and the city’s coat of arms has Portuguese origins.

Why Ceuta was not handed over to Morocco in 1956

In 1912, France and Spain established a protectorate over Morocco. The Spanish zone covered part of northern Morocco, including the Rif region.

However, Ceuta and Melilla were not legally part of the protectorate. They were considered separate Spanish possessions and only bordered Spanish-controlled Moroccan lands. Official materials from the Spanish Ministry of Defense explicitly state that the cities and other Spanish territories were not part of the protectorate.

When Morocco gained independence in 1956, Spain handed over the northern zone of the protectorate but retained Ceuta and Melilla.

For Madrid, these were not colonies subject to decolonization but parts of Spanish territory that had been under Spanish control long before the creation of the protectorate. Researchers of the Spanish-Moroccan border call this distinction one of the main reasons why both cities remained Spanish after 1956.

Morocco does not agree with this interpretation. Rabat claims rights to Ceuta and Melilla from the moment of gaining independence and considers them occupied Moroccan territories.

Modern Ceuta and the sovereignty dispute

In 1995, the Spanish parliament adopted the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta. The law defined the city as an integral part of the Spanish nation and granted it its own self-governing bodies.

Today, Ceuta has a local assembly and government, uses the euro, participates in Spain’s political system, and is under the protection of the Spanish armed forces.

At the same time, the city remains a constant subject of dispute between Madrid and Rabat.

Spain considers the issue of Ceuta’s ownership closed and refuses to discuss the transfer of the territory. Morocco avoids direct military confrontation but periodically uses the issue of the cities in domestic politics and diplomatic relations with Spain.

Migration as a tool of pressure

The most notable crisis occurred in May 2021. At that time, about 8,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta in two days after control was relaxed on the Moroccan side.

The events were linked to Spain’s decision to admit Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali, who advocates for the independence of Western Sahara, for treatment. Relations between Madrid and Rabat sharply deteriorated, and the migration flow was perceived as a form of political pressure.

The current situation is different so far. The Spanish government emphasizes cooperation with Morocco and thanks its security forces for preventing thousands of crossings. There is no direct evidence that Rabat intentionally organized the July 2026 crisis.

However, the experience of 2021 makes it necessary to closely monitor not only migration statistics but also the political relations between the two states. The Moroccan side’s control over approaches to Ceuta can drastically change the situation in just a few hours.

The border where different eras collided

Today’s crisis in Ceuta appears modern: social networks, human traffickers, court decisions, European migration rules, army units, and an internal EU dispute.

But the very reason for the city’s particular vulnerability arose centuries ago.

Ceuta became significant due to its location at the Strait of Gibraltar. It was contested by Phoenicians, Romans, Byzantines, Muslim dynasties, Portugal, Spain, and North African rulers. The city has always been a gateway between two seas and two continents.

Previously, Roman goods, African gold, Muslim armies, and Portuguese ships passed through these gates. Today, residents of Morocco and other African countries try to enter Europe through them.

That is why NANews — News of Israel views what happened not as an isolated attempt to breach a barrier. It is a new episode in the centuries-old struggle for control over the point where Africa meets Europe.

Ceuta remains Spanish territory, but its geography has not disappeared. A few kilometers of border continue to connect and simultaneously divide two continents, two political systems, and two completely different levels of life.

And the death of at least 18 people shows the cost of this border: behind historical treaties, questions of sovereignty, and European security are people who dared to enter the sea or rush into a stampede for a few meters of Spanish land.

#promotion – In Haifa, many people seek a cosmetologist not just for a “beauty procedure,” but because their skin has changed: wrinkles, acne, spots, dull complexion, sagging, or cellulite have appeared. Sol Clinics offers consultation, skin diagnostics, and personalized selection of face and body treatments.

Cosmetologist in Haifa: how Sol Clinics helps skin look fresher, younger, and more well-groomed

When someone types the query “cosmetologist Haifa” into Google, it almost always reflects more than just a desire to “do something for the face.”

More often, there is a specific problem behind it.

• The skin has become dull.
• Wrinkles have appeared.
• The facial contour has become less defined.
• Sun-induced pigment spots have become more noticeable.
• Acne persists, even though the teenage years are long gone.
• After acne, traces, scars, or uneven texture remain.
• The skin has lost density.
• A double chin has appeared.
• The body has become swollen, and cellulite is more noticeable.

At this moment, a person needs not a random salon or a “magic procedure,” but a specialist who will calmly assess the skin condition, explain what is happening, and offer a clear action plan.

This is the approach of Sol Clinics — a cosmetic center for face and body in Haifa.

Here, the focus is on cosmetologist consultation, computer skin diagnostics, hardware cosmetology, care procedures, and personalized program selection for face and body.

More about Sol Clinics: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

The center has been operating since 2016 and is located at: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check-Post.

Cosmetic center in Haifa: why it is important to start with skin diagnostics

The main mistake in cosmetology is choosing a procedure by name.

A friend did RF-lifting — so I need it too.

Someone praised IPL on Instagram — so it will solve any pigmentation.

The ad said “rejuvenation” — so the procedure suits everyone.

In practice, everyone’s skin is different.

One client has a problem related to age-related loss of tone.

Another has issues with acne and inflammation.

A third has pigmentation after sun exposure.

A fourth has sensitive skin, rosacea, or couperose.

A fifth has swelling, lymph issues, cellulite, and sagging body skin.

Therefore, a good cosmetologist in Haifa should start not with selling a procedure, but with the question: what exactly is happening with the skin and what result does the person want to achieve.

At Sol Clinics, the first visit revolves around consultation, computer skin diagnostics, and selecting an individual plan.

This is especially important for Israel, where the skin faces strong sun, humidity fluctuations, air conditioning, stress, hormonal changes, and aging processes daily.

Cosmetology in Haifa is not just about beauty.

It’s about proper care, prevention, recovery, skin tone, and a safe approach to procedures.

What problems most often lead to a cosmetologist

People rarely come to a cosmetologist with an abstract phrase: “I want to do something.”

Usually, the request is much more specific.

“What to do about wrinkles?”

“Why does my face look tired?”

“How to remove pigment spots?”

“Can the facial contour be tightened without surgery?”

“Why have pimples reappeared after 30?”

“What helps with post-acne?”

“How to remove a double chin?”

“Are there procedures for cellulite?”

“How to prepare the skin for summer?”

“Can IPL be done in Israel?”

On the Sol Clinics website, the main problems clients address include skin aging, pigmentation disorders, double chin, dull complexion, rosacea, dermatitis, wrinkles, acne, scars, blackheads, sagging skin, and cellulite.

These are exactly the requests most often sought by residents of Haifa, Kiryat, Nesher, Tirat Carmel, Akko, and northern Israel.

Hardware cosmetology in Haifa: when a cream is not enough

Home care is important.

Good cleansing, SPF, hydration, restoring the skin barrier, the right serums, and regularity really matter.

But there are conditions where home care alone is no longer enough.

If the skin has lost tone, pronounced wrinkles have appeared, pigmentation has become denser, acne has left marks, the facial contour has changed, and cellulite does not respond to creams, a person begins to seek hardware cosmetology in Haifa.

Sol Clinics offers various directions in aesthetic and hardware cosmetology: RF-lifting, IPL rejuvenation, IPL for acne, IPL for pigmentation, mesotherapy, MesoStrip, pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, cellulite therapy, working with skin tone of the face and body.

The main point of this approach is not to prescribe one trendy procedure to everyone.

The point is to select a method for a specific problem.

Problem	What is usually sought	What directions can be discussed during the consultation
Wrinkles, loss of tone, facial contour	RF-lifting Haifa, facial rejuvenation Haifa	RF-lifting, mesotherapy, care programs
Pigmentation, sun spots	IPL Haifa, pigmentation Haifa	IPL, brightening programs, home care, SPF
Acne, inflammation, post-acne	acne treatment Haifa, post-acne Haifa	IPL for acne, mesotherapy, care, working with inflammation
Dull complexion	facial care Haifa, facial cleansing Haifa	skin diagnostics, care procedures, mesotherapy
Cellulite and swelling	pressotherapy Haifa, lymphatic drainage Haifa	pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, anti-cellulite programs
Sagging body skin	hardware cosmetology Haifa	RF, lymphatic drainage, body programs

NAnews — Israel News notes: an advertising article about a cosmetic clinic should be useful for the reader. Therefore, it is important not just to list procedures, but to explain in which cases a person starts looking for a cosmetologist and what questions to ask before booking.

RF-lifting in Haifa: when the skin loses tone

One of the most frequent requests is RF-lifting Haifa or RF-lifting face in Haifa.

This procedure is often sought by people who notice that their skin has become less dense, the face looks tired, contours have softened, wrinkles, jowls, or a double chin have appeared.

RF-lifting is a hardware method used to work with skin tone, facial contour, and age-related changes.

Advertising texts often promise too much: “minus 10 years,” “lift without surgery,” “permanent result.”

Such writing is incorrect.

It is more accurate to say honestly: RF-lifting can be part of a rejuvenation and skin care program, but the number of procedures, frequency, areas of impact, and expected result should be determined after consultation.

Who RF-lifting may be relevant for:

• for women and men after 30–35 years;
• with reduced skin tone;
• with changes in facial contour;
• with fine and medium wrinkles;
• with a double chin;
• with sagging skin;
• with a desire to improve the appearance of the face without surgical intervention.

It is important to understand: RF-lifting is not a replacement for plastic surgery and not a universal solution for all age-related changes.

But for many clients, it is a convenient way to start systematic work on skin quality.

IPL rejuvenation in Haifa: pigmentation, vessels, and complexion

In Israel, the topic of pigmentation is especially relevant.

Sun, age, hormonal changes, pregnancy, post-acne, insufficient SPF protection — all this can lead to the appearance of spots on the face.

Therefore, queries like “IPL Haifa”, “IPL rejuvenation Haifa”, “pigmentation removal Haifa”, “facial pigmentation Israel”, and “how to remove sun spots” are very important for a cosmetic clinic.

IPL can be used in programs aimed at improving complexion, addressing signs of photoaging, pigmentation spots, and vascular manifestations.

But here it is especially important not to act randomly.

Pigmentation can vary.

Some spots are related to the sun.

Others are due to hormonal changes.

Still others are from acne scars.

Fourth ones can worsen with improper care or aggressive procedures.

Therefore, before IPL, it is important to understand the skin type, nature of pigmentation, season, contraindications, skin’s reaction to the sun, and home care.

For Israel, a separate question is whether procedures can be done in the summer.

The answer should not be universal.

It all depends on the specific procedure, skin condition, phototype, level of pigmentation, client’s lifestyle, and readiness to strictly use SPF.

That is why a consultation with a cosmetologist in Haifa is not a formality but an important step before the procedure.

Acne and post-acne: when a cosmetologist is needed, not random store-bought care

Acne is not just a teenage issue.

In adult women and men, inflammations can appear after 25, 30, 35, and even after 40 years.

The reasons can vary: hormonal changes, stress, diet, improper care, comedogenic cosmetics, skin barrier disruptions, climate, sweat, sunscreen, skin diseases.

Therefore, the query “acne treatment Haifa” or “cosmetologist for acne Haifa” often means: the person is already tired of trying pharmacy creams, TikTok advice, and random masks.

With acne, it is important not to traumatize the skin even more.

It is necessary to understand if there are active inflammations, comedones, enlarged pores, blackheads, painful elements, acne marks, scars, or post-acne.

At Sol Clinics, the directions include working with acne and IPL therapy for acne.

Such a topic requires a careful approach: it is impossible to promise “we will completely cure acne” because acne can have medical causes and sometimes requires a dermatologist’s involvement.

But a cosmetologist can help build a competent care routine, select procedures, reduce the severity of inflammations, work with acne consequences, and explain what should not be done at home.

What clients with acne usually fear:

• that it will get worse after cleaning;
• that the procedure will leave marks;
• that the skin will be overdried;
• that inflammations will intensify;
• that the cosmetologist will press everything indiscriminately;
• that no one will explain the cause of the problem.

Therefore, the article, page, and consultation should speak calmly to the person: first diagnosis, then plan, then careful work.

Pigmentation in Israel: why spots return

A separate big topic is pigmentation in Israel.

Even if a person has had a good procedure, spots can return if the skin is not protected from the sun.

That is why working with pigmentation is not just IPL or a cosmetic procedure.

It is also daily discipline: SPF, protection renewal, caution with actives, avoiding aggressive self-care, understanding seasonality.

Frequent queries:

• pigmentation Haifa
• pigmentation removal Haifa
• sun spots on the face
• melasma Israel
• how to remove brown spots on the face
• skin lightening Haifa
• IPL for pigmentation Haifa

These queries are especially important for the audience that has moved to Israel and faced a new climate.

Skin that previously reacted normally to the sun in another country may develop spots faster in Israel, lose moisture, and react to active products.

Therefore, a cosmetologist in Haifa must consider not only age and skin type but also the local climate.

Mesotherapy in Haifa: when the skin lacks freshness and recovery

The query “mesotherapy Haifa” is usually entered by people who notice that their skin has become duller, drier, thinner, or tired.

Mesotherapy can be discussed as part of a program to restore skin quality, improve appearance, work with dull complexion, fine wrinkles, dehydration, uneven texture, and age-related changes.

But here too, one should not approach it with a template.

One client needs mesotherapy.

Another needs skin barrier restoration first.

A third needs work with acne.

A fourth needs competent home care and SPF.

A fifth needs a combined program.

Therefore, Sol Clinics emphasizes selecting procedures after consultation.

For the client, this is especially important because they are not required to understand the difference between mesotherapy, RF lifting, IPL, or facial cleansing.

The specialist’s task is to explain in simple terms what is suitable for their situation.

Facial cleansing in Haifa: a basic procedure often where care begins

Many clients start not with RF or IPL, but with a simple query: “facial cleansing Haifa”.

This is an understandable and widespread entry into cosmetology.

A person sees blackheads, enlarged pores, comedones, dullness, uneven skin, a feeling of dirtiness, or a tired facial appearance.

But even facial cleansing should not be the same for everyone.

Skin can be dry, oily, sensitive, prone to inflammations, with couperose, with rosacea, with active acne, or with a disrupted barrier.

Therefore, it is important that the cosmetologist not just “cleans the face” but understands the skin condition and chooses the appropriate method.

Good facial cleansing is not aggression.

It is a careful procedure after which the person understands how to care for their skin further.

Pressotherapy and lymphatic drainage in Haifa: body, swelling, cellulite

The Sol Clinics website works not only with the face but also with the body.

And here, important queries are:

• pressotherapy Haifa
• lymphatic drainage Haifa
• cellulite Haifa
• anti-cellulite procedures Haifa
• flabby body skin
• cavitation Haifa
• cold laser lipolysis Haifa

Many people come to body procedures not because they want an “ideal figure” but because they feel swelling, heaviness, decreased tone, changes after weight gain, sedentary work, stress, low activity, or age-related changes.

Pressotherapy and lymphatic drainage can be part of a body care program aimed at a feeling of lightness, working with swelling, improving skin appearance, and supporting anti-cellulite programs.

It is important not to promise the impossible.

Cellulite is a complex aesthetic problem that depends on the structure of subcutaneous fat, hormonal background, metabolism, activity, diet, and skin condition.

But hardware procedures can be part of a comprehensive approach, especially if the person is ready to work with the body systematically.

Russian-speaking cosmetologist in Haifa: why language matters

For many residents of Israel, the query “Russian-speaking cosmetologist Haifa” is as important as the name of the procedure.

Cosmetology is an area where a person must clearly explain what bothers them.

When did the spots appear?

What procedures have already been done?

Was there an allergy?

How does the skin react to the sun?

What products are used at home?

Is there pregnancy, lactation, chronic diseases, medication intake, or skin sensitivity?

What is the person afraid of?

What result do they consider acceptable?

When the specialist and client speak a common language, the consultation becomes calmer and more precise.

That is why for the Russian-speaking audience of Haifa, Kiryat, Nesher, and northern Israel, Sol Clinics can be a convenient option: the person receives not only the procedure but also an explanation without a language barrier.

NAnews — Israel News notes: for Russian-speaking Israelis, services where you can receive a professional service and simultaneously understand what exactly is being done to you, why it is needed, and what limitations exist are especially important.

The first visit to a cosmetologist in Haifa: what is important to ask

The first visit is not just “to schedule a procedure”.

It is a moment when the client should get answers to important questions.

What is my skin type?

Why have wrinkles, spots, acne, or a dull complexion appeared?

What procedure do I really need?

Can it be done in the summer?

How many procedures will be needed?

When will the effect be visible?

Are there any contraindications?

What should not be done after the procedure?

What home care is needed?

Do I need to change SPF?

Can procedures be combined?

What to do if the skin is sensitive?

The Sol Clinics website currently lists a promotion: first visit — 268 shekels.

The first visit includes a cosmetologist consultation and computer skin diagnostics.

There is also an offer: bring a friend — and you both receive a gift.

It is better to check the current conditions directly on the website or by phone, as promotions may change.

Booking and details:

https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

Cosmetologist at Check Post: convenient for Haifa, Krayot, Nesher, and Tirat Carmel

For a cosmetology center, not only procedures, equipment, and specialists’ experience are important, but also the location.

Sol Clinics is located in Haifa at:

Histadrut, 44, Check Post

For Haifa residents, this is a clear and convenient city point.

Check Post is well known to those who live or work in different areas of the city: on Carmel, in Hadar, in Neve Sha’anan, in the Lower City, in the Mifratz Haifa area, and near industrial and commercial zones.

It is convenient to visit for a cosmetologist consultation, skin diagnostics, or a procedure without turning the visit into a separate half-day trip.

But the location of Sol Clinics is important not only for Haifa itself.

Check Post is located so that it is convenient to reach from nearby cities in northern Israel.

For residents of Krayot — Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, and Kiryat Ata — this can be a practical option when a nearby cosmetologist is needed, but you don’t want to go to the center of Haifa or look for a clinic far from the usual route.

For Nesher residents, Sol Clinics is also in an accessible area.

You can book a consultation, RF lifting, IPL, mesotherapy, facial cleansing, pressotherapy, or body procedure without a long journey across the north.

For residents of Tirat Carmel, Akko, Haifa suburbs, and the northern coast, Check Post also remains a convenient point: you can come after work, on the way for errands, before a meeting, or on a day when there is already a trip to Haifa.

This is especially important for those looking not just for a cosmetic procedure, but a place where you can calmly discuss skin condition and get a clear care plan.

Acne, pigmentation, wrinkles, post-acne, dull complexion, double chin, cellulite, swelling, or skin laxity — all these topics require not haste, but careful consultation.

For Russian-speaking clients, the language of communication is also important.

When a person can explain their problem without tension, talk about previous procedures, allergies, skin reactions to the sun, or home care, the consultation becomes more accurate and calm.

Therefore, Sol Clinics at Check Post can be considered a convenient cosmetology center not only for Haifa residents but also for those coming from Krayot, Nesher, Tirat Carmel, Akko, and other cities in northern Israel.

Address:

Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post

Website – https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

How to understand what procedure you need

You don’t need to choose between RF, IPL, mesotherapy, pressotherapy, or acne treatment on your own.

The best way is to start with diagnostics.

But you can understand the direction in advance.

If you are concerned about the face contour, double chin, skin laxity, and age-related changes — it is worth discussing RF lifting and rejuvenation programs.

If you are concerned about spots, uneven tone, sun marks, vascular manifestations — it is worth discussing IPL and pigmentation care.

If you are concerned about acne, comedones, inflammations, post-acne — it is worth discussing the acne treatment program.

If the skin is dull, dry, tired, dehydrated — it is worth discussing care procedures, mesotherapy, and home care.

If you are concerned about cellulite, swelling, heaviness, body laxity — it is worth discussing pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, and body hardware programs.

If a person does not know what they need, that’s normal.

That’s what a cosmetologist consultation is for.

Why Sol Clinics might be of interest to those looking for a cosmetologist in Haifa

Sol Clinics combines several important factors.

The center is located in Haifa, in the Check Post area.

It has been operating since 2016.

Offers procedures for face and body.

Focuses on consultation and skin diagnostics.

Works with age-related changes, acne, pigmentation, cellulite, dull complexion, skin laxity, and other aesthetic requests.

Offers hardware procedures: RF, IPL, pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, mesotherapy, and other directions.

For Russian-speaking clients, another important point: you can explain the problem clearly, without stress, and without feeling unheard.

In cosmetology, this matters.

Because it’s about the face, skin, appearance, and trust.

Contacts Sol Clinics

Sol Clinics — cosmetology center for face and body in Haifa

Address: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post

Website: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

Before booking, it is worth clarifying current promotions, schedule, procedure costs, and consultation availability.

FAQ: frequently asked questions about a cosmetologist in Haifa

How to choose a cosmetologist in Haifa?

It is important to look not only at the procedure price but also at the approach. A good cosmetologist starts with a consultation, assessing skin condition, contraindications, lifestyle, previous procedures, and client expectations. It is especially important that the specialist explains what exactly they offer and why.

Which is better: RF lifting or IPL?

These are different procedures for different tasks. RF lifting is more often discussed for loss of tone, changes in face contour, wrinkles, and skin laxity. IPL is more often associated with pigmentation, complexion, vascular manifestations, and photoaging. The choice depends on the skin condition.

Can IPL be done in the summer in Israel?

This question needs to be resolved individually. In Israel, the sun is active most of the year, so before IPL, consultation, skin assessment, understanding risks, and strict SPF protection are especially important. The procedure is not suitable for everyone and not always in the summer period.

How many RF lifting procedures are needed?

The number of procedures depends on age, skin condition, area, severity of changes, and client goals. The course should be selected by a cosmetologist after consultation.

Does a cosmetologist help with adult acne?

A cosmetologist can help build care, select procedures, work with inflammations, comedones, post-acne, and skin quality. But if acne is related to medical reasons, a dermatologist may be needed.

What to do with pigmentation spots after the sun?

First, you need to determine the type of pigmentation. After that, a cosmetologist can offer a care program, procedures, and a home scheme. In Israel, a mandatory part of working with pigmentation is regular SPF.

Can a double chin be removed without surgery?

In some cases, hardware procedures can help improve skin tone and the appearance of the chin area. But the result depends on the cause of the problem: skin, fat tissue, anatomy, age, and lifestyle.

What is pressotherapy?

Pressotherapy is a hardware procedure associated with lymphatic drainage and body impact using compressed air. It is often discussed for swelling, a feeling of heaviness, cellulite, and body care programs.

How much does the first visit to a cosmetologist in Haifa cost?

At the time of preparing the material, the Sol Clinics website lists a promotion: first visit — 268 shekels. It is better to clarify the current price and conditions before booking.

Where is Sol Clinics located?

Sol Clinics is located in Haifa at: Histadrut, 44, Check Post.

Is there a Russian-speaking cosmetologist in Haifa?

For Russian-speaking clients, Sol Clinics is convenient because you can discuss skin condition, procedures, contraindications, and expectations in a clear language.

What procedures help with a dull complexion?

It depends on the cause. Possible care procedures, mesotherapy, work with dehydration, skin renewal, home care, and SPF. The procedure should be selected after diagnostics.

What to do with post-acne?

Post-acne can manifest as spots, scars, uneven texture, and enlarged pores. A cosmetologist can offer a program that considers the type of traces, inflammation activity, and skin sensitivity.

What procedures help with cellulite?

Sol Clinics offers body directions, including pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, and hardware anti-cellulite programs. But cellulite requires a comprehensive approach, not one universal procedure.

How to book at Sol Clinics?

More about Sol Clinics: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

The center has been operating since 2016 and is located at: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post.

Google has made one of the most noticeable changes to Search Console in recent years. The service, which was previously used mainly for site analysis, now allows connecting YouTube channels, as well as Instagram, TikTok, and X profiles as separate resources.

Google did not give businesses an automatic promotion button. It provided the opportunity to see the part of search demand that was previously hidden between the site and social networks.

What exactly did Google change

On July 7, 2026, Google introduced a new type of resource in Search Console — platform property, meaning a social or video platform resource. Initially, the feature was rolled out gradually, and on July 29, Google announced its global launch for all users. Four platforms are supported:

• YouTube;
• Instagram;
• TikTok;
• X.

The account owner can now add a channel or profile to Search Console in much the same way as a site was added before. After authorization, Google begins to show how individual videos, posts, channel pages, and profiles perform in Google Search, Discover, and, when content appears there, in Google News.

This means that an entrepreneur will be able to see not only the statistics of their site but also how posts, videos, Shorts, and Reels appear directly in Google. The system will show which queries users entered, how many times the content was shown, how many clicks it received, and which materials attract more search traffic.

For small and medium businesses in Israel, this is not just an additional report. The update changes the very approach to promotion: the site, social networks, video, and Google Search are increasingly difficult to consider as independent channels.

More about how to combine a site, SEO, Google Ads, Google Maps, social networks, lead generation, and promotion in AI search for small and medium businesses in Israel: https://nikk.co.il/

What exactly changed in Google Search Console

Google officially introduced a new type of resource — platform property — on July 7, 2026. The feature is being rolled out gradually, so some account owners received it earlier, while others may get access later.

Currently, four platforms are supported:

• YouTube;
• Instagram;
• TikTok;
• X.

Each channel or profile is added to Search Console separately. To connect, you need to log into the corresponding account and confirm the right to manage it. If a company has several YouTube channels or Instagram profiles, a separate resource is created for each.

Previously, an entrepreneur could see search queries only for their site’s pages. Now similar information becomes available for content published on external platforms.

Google explains this by the fact that authors and companies interact with the audience not only through their own sites. People find information in different formats: in short videos, posts, discussions, regular videos, and profile pages. Moreover, to connect a new resource, the content creator does not necessarily need to have their own site.

What data will the business owner receive

After connecting a profile in Search Console, several reports appear.

The main Performance report allows you to study impressions, clicks, and other search metrics. Data can be filtered by queries, dates, countries, devices, and specific publication URLs.

The entrepreneur will be able to find out:

• which words people use to find their videos and posts;
• which videos get more impressions in Google;
• which materials lead to real clicks;
• in which countries the search audience is located;
• from which devices users open content;
• which posts are growing and which are starting to lose visibility;
• which format works better — for example, YouTube Shorts or regular videos.

The Insights report provides a simpler overview for the last 28 days. It shows the overall traffic dynamics, the most successful posts, and groups of queries by which users find the account.

In the Achievements section, Google notes new achievements, such as overcoming the next level of clicks from search over 28 days.

Data may relate to Google Search, Discover, and Google News — if the specific account’s posts appear in these services. At the same time, the new resource does not show internal views in YouTube, Instagram, or TikTok. For such information, you still need to use the analytics of the social platform itself.

Why this is important specifically for businesses in Israel

The Israeli market is characterized by linguistic diversity. A company can run a site in Hebrew, publish videos in Russian, use English service names, and simultaneously work with clients who formulate queries completely differently.

Before the appearance of the new resource, a business owner could see view statistics within YouTube or Instagram but did not always understand which specific queries in Google led users to these posts.

Now there is an opportunity to see the real language of demand.

Suppose a Russian-speaking lawyer in Haifa publishes a video about inheritance. The video itself is recorded in Russian, but Search Console may show that some users find it through queries in Hebrew or English. This is a signal that the business should prepare a separate description, subtitles, a video continuation, or a site page in another language.

A similar situation is possible for realtors, cosmetologists, doctors, construction companies, teachers, restaurants, online stores, and repair specialists.

Google does not tell the entrepreneur who exactly will make a purchase. But it shows the words that people entered before accessing the content. It is this data that allows for a more accurate understanding of the potential audience’s needs.

A social post becomes a separate entry point from Google

Previously, the common promotion model looked simple: a person enters a query, goes to the site, and leaves a request.

Today, the client’s path may start differently. The user sees a short video in Google, opens YouTube or Instagram, gets acquainted with the expert, watches other posts, and only then goes to the site or writes on WhatsApp.

The new report allows you to see the first stages of this path.

For example, an air conditioning service company may discover that an old video about an unpleasant smell from the indoor unit started getting impressions during the summer heat. After this, the business can:

• update the title and description of the video;
• shoot a continuation;
• add answers to frequently asked questions;
• prepare an article on the site;
• place a link to the service page;
• add a clear way to contact;
• spread the material in other social networks.

This is no longer a publication ‘for activity.’ Content becomes an element of the search funnel.

As noted by NAnews — Israel News, the update will be especially valuable for small companies that cannot create large articles daily but regularly publish photos, tips, short videos, and examples of completed work.

More about how to combine a site, SEO, Google Ads, Google Maps, social networks, lead generation, and promotion in AI search for small and medium businesses in Israel: https://nikk.co.il/

Quick check of new posts within 24 hours

A filter for the last 24 hours is available in Search Console. With its help, you can see if a new video has quickly started gaining impressions in Google.

If a post experiences unexpected growth, the business can quickly develop the topic: shoot an additional video, publish it on another platform, prepare material for the site, or add a more precise call to action.

Google provides an example where a TikTok account owner notices a sudden growth of a certain search query and uses it to plan new posts or promote the topic through Instagram.

For businesses, this is especially important in seasonal directions. The demand for air conditioner repair, apartment preparation for winter, holiday services, food delivery, tourist offers, or certain legal consultations can change very quickly.

Instead of guessing the topic of the next video, the company receives data from real search.

You can compare Shorts, Reels, and regular posts

Google allows comparing different content formats.

For YouTube, you can separately analyze the URLs of regular videos and Shorts. In Instagram — compare standard posts and Reels. You can also study the effectiveness of YouTube playlist pages.

Such analysis helps answer the practical question: which format works better not within the social network, but specifically in Google?

One company may have short videos that get many impressions but few clicks. Another may have detailed ten-minute instructions that attract a smaller audience but bring more interested users.

Google recommends using the data not only to evaluate already published materials but also to adjust the titles, captions, hashtags, and content of future videos.

What to do if there are many impressions but few clicks

A large number of impressions does not necessarily mean a good result.

If a post regularly appears in Google but receives almost no clicks, it is necessary to check:

• how clearly the title is formulated;
• whether the headline matches the content;
• whether the cover explains what the user will get;
• whether the city and service area are specified;
• whether a specific service is mentioned in the description;
• whether the language of the post matches the audience’s language;
• whether there is a clear next step.

For example, the title ‘Our new work’ explains almost nothing to Google and the potential client. The wording ‘Apartment painting in Haifa: wall preparation and work result’ describes the content much more accurately.

However, mechanically adding keywords should also be avoided. The title should remain clear, natural, and correspond to the video itself.

How to find ideas for new materials

In Insights, queries are grouped into thematic groups. You can see the most popular topics, as well as groups of queries whose interest is growing or declining.

If a business notices growing demand, a whole series of materials can be created from one query:

• a short answer for Reels or Shorts;
• a detailed video for YouTube;
• an instruction on the site;
• a page for a specific service;
• a post with examples;
• a section with frequently asked questions;
• an ad for Google Ads.

NAnews — Israel News points out that this is where the update goes beyond ordinary statistics. Search Console allows using social posts as a tool for demand research.

Google also suggests tracking unexpected growth of old videos. If the material becomes relevant again, it can be pinned in the profile, supplemented with new information, spread in other channels, or a second part can be filmed.

Why one YouTube or Instagram is still not enough

A social network can attract attention, but it is not always able to fully replace a site.

In a profile, it is difficult to comprehensively present all services, conditions, prices, service areas, documents, guarantees, and responses to objections. Moreover, social platform algorithms are constantly changing, and the account is not on the company’s own resource.

Therefore, the most effective model looks as follows:

search query — post or video — site — client contact.

The video introduces a person to the company and demonstrates competence. The site provides details, builds trust, and offers a specific action: call, write on WhatsApp, fill out a form, or order a service.

That is why social networks, Search Console, the site, Google Maps, Google Ads, and analytics should work not separately, but as a single system. Such a comprehensive approach to SEO, lead generation, and internet marketing for businesses in Israel is presented on the Nikk.Agency website. The page also describes promotion in Google Maps, ad setup, site improvements, and working with business presence in AI search.

Does connection provide direct growth in positions

Simply adding a YouTube channel or Instagram profile to Search Console is not a promotion button.

In Google’s official documentation, the new resource is described as a measurement and analysis tool. Google does not claim that connecting an account automatically improves publication positions.

Therefore, a direct ranking bonus should not be expected. The benefit lies elsewhere: the entrepreneur receives information with which they can improve content and more accurately respond to search demand.

It is also important to understand that Search Console does not show all user actions. It does not replace:

• YouTube Analytics;
• Instagram Insights;
• TikTok Analytics;
• Google Analytics;
• call tracking;
• WhatsApp message accounting;
• form and application analytics;
• Google Business Profile data.

To assess the commercial result, it is necessary to combine several sources of information.

How to connect a social resource

The process takes several steps.

You need to open Google Search Console, click on the list of resources, and select adding a new one. Then you should choose one of the available platforms — YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, or X — and go through authorization.

For YouTube, Google will show channels associated with the current account. After selecting a channel, the resource addition button will become active.

Data does not necessarily appear immediately. Google warns that it may take several days to fill reports. Ownership is also periodically rechecked. If external account authorization ends or is revoked, access to the resource may be temporarily suspended until re-confirmation.

New model of business search presence

The Search Console update shows that SEO can no longer be limited to website pages.

A potential client may first see the company in Google Maps, then open Instagram Reels, watch YouTube Shorts, go to the site, and only then send a message. Each of these elements influences the final decision.

Google has not created an automatic client attraction system. But it has made visible part of the path that previously remained between search and social networks.

For small and medium businesses in Israel, this is an opportunity to:

• find real audience queries;
• consider different search languages;
• understand which videos work in Google;
• timely notice growing topics;
• revive old content;
• create website pages based on confirmed demand;
• link publications with services and inquiries.

The main conclusion is that a social network post can now be not only a way to gather views and reactions. It becomes an independent entry point from Google, which can be measured, analyzed, and included in the overall promotion strategy.

Such services in Israel are provided by the project partner agency NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

In Israel, many people have the same practical problem: the main bank or credit card is literally linked to everything.

It is used to pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google, subscriptions to work services, hosting, domains, online stores, apps, trips, delivery, international platforms, and dozens of small regular payments.

As long as everything works, it’s convenient. But as soon as the advertising account charges more than expected, a subscription is automatically renewed, a foreign service rejects a payment, or the card needs to be reissued, it becomes clear: keeping all payments on one main card is not always wise.

Against this backdrop, more and more users are looking towards separate virtual cards. One of the services actively discussed in this topic is RedotPay.

It is often called a crypto card, but for the average user, cryptocurrency is not the only important thing.

RedotPay can be interesting as a separate payment tool: for online payments, advertising accounts, international services, mobile wallets, limits, as well as working with USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other supported digital assets.

Officially, RedotPay describes itself as a payment app and stablecoin-based card that connects digital assets with everyday payments, and the service’s help center states that to get a card, you need to download the app, register, pass identity verification, add crypto assets via on-chain deposit or buy crypto, and then apply for a virtual or physical card.

What is RedotPay in simple terms

RedotPay is not an ordinary bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on conditions, physical card.

It can be considered in several scenarios.

1. First scenario — RedotPay as a virtual card for online payments: advertising, subscriptions, stores, international services, work tools.
2. Second scenario — RedotPay as a card for payment via phone, it is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.
3. Third scenario — RedotPay as a crypto wallet and payment app, where the user can work with supported digital assets, top up the balance, transfer funds, buy crypto assets, and use them for payments.

In official descriptions, RedotPay mentions virtual and physical cards, payment with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets, mobile payments, the ability to pay online and in stores, as well as using the card with a large number of merchants worldwide.

But an important point: RedotPay should not be perceived as a “card without rules.” It is a financial payment tool with its limits, fees, identity verification, top-up rules, country restrictions, and possible questions about the origin of funds.

Why a separate virtual card is needed

The main benefit of a separate virtual card is control.

When the main bank card is linked to all sites and services, the user effectively opens access to their main payment tool to dozens of different platforms. This is not always dangerous, but often inconvenient.

For example, a small business owner launches advertising on Facebook and Google.

At the same time, he pays for domains, hosting, CRM, newsletters, design services, AI tools, Canva, Adobe, subscriptions, marketplaces, and apps. After a few months, it becomes difficult to understand where the business expenses are, where the personal payments are, where the advertising is, and where the automatic renewal of an old subscription is.

A separate virtual card RedotPay allows you to separate payments. One card can be used only for advertising. Another — for subscriptions. A third — for travel or online purchases. Even if something goes wrong, the main bank card will not be linked to every service in a row.

For users in Israel, this is especially relevant because many work with international platforms, pay for services abroad, run advertising accounts in different languages, and use services that do not always work perfectly with local cards.

Payment for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google

One of the main pains of business is advertising payments.

Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads charge money regularly. Sometimes the charge occurs after accumulating a certain amount, sometimes on a schedule, sometimes after changing limits in the advertising account. If the main card is linked to advertising, the advertising budget mixes with personal and other business expenses.

A separate RedotPay card can help bring order. It can be used only for advertising, topped up with the necessary amount, and control spending on the project.

RedotPay in the help center separately mentions that after activating the card, information is synchronized with platforms like PayPal, Google Pay, and Facebook, but this does not mean that every payment in every advertising account will always go through without rejections. Advertising platforms, banks, payment networks, and the service itself may have their own payment verification rules.

Therefore, the correct approach is this: first test small amounts, check how the card goes through in the desired advertising account, and only then use it for regular budgets.

Limits on one payment and per day

Another strong point of a separate card is the ability to limit expenses.

If the service allows setting a limit on a one-time payment and a daily limit, it is convenient for advertising, subscriptions, online purchases, and team expenses. The user can pre-limit the amount the card can spend at one time or per day.

This is important when the card is linked to an advertising account. For example, if you want to spend no more than a certain amount on an ad test, the limit helps reduce the risk of unexpected charges.

This is also useful for subscriptions. An old service will not be able to charge more than allowed by the limit. And if the card is used only for a specific project, expenses are easier to control.

In the help center RedotPay there are separate materials on card limits and fees, as well as a section on card usage, where among the questions is the setting of transaction limits. Before active use, you need to check the current limits in your account because conditions may differ by card type, country, verification level, and service rules.

Google Wallet and Apple Wallet: card in the phone

Many users no longer need plastic. They pay by phone: in stores, cafes, transport, apps, and services.

Therefore, an important question: can a virtual card be added to a mobile wallet?

RedotPay has separate instructions for linking a virtual card to Google Pay, as well as a help center section on digital wallets, where there are materials on Google Pay and Apple Pay. On the RedotPay website, there is also a separate page about RedotPay Card on Apple Pay.

For the reader, this means a simple thing: if the function is available for their card, country, device, and account, the virtual card can become a regular payment tool in the phone. For Israel – available.

But here you cannot promise too much. Before use, you need to check whether adding the card is supported specifically for you: in Israel (it can), on your device, with your account, with your card version, and in your mobile wallet.

If the card is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, it is convenient for regular purchases. If not, it can still be considered as a card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, and international services.

Crypto wallet inside RedotPay: not just a card

RedotPay is interesting not only as a virtual card. Inside the service, there is the logic of a wallet and working with digital assets.

The official app download page RedotPay lists among the possibilities Personal: Card, Send to bank & e-wallet, Send to RedotPay user, Multi-Currency Wallet, Credit, Earn, Swap, and P2P Marketplace. This shows that the service covers not one scenario, but several: card, wallet, transfers, exchange, and working with different payment functions.

For the user, this can be convenient if they already work with USDT or other assets. For example, they can top up the balance, use the supported asset to pay with the card, transfer funds within available functions, or buy crypto assets through the app.

But the more functions, the more responsibility. You need to understand fees, networks, limits, transfer rules, withdrawal conditions, and identity verification requirements.

USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other assets

RedotPay in app descriptions indicates support for payments with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. But the current list is always better to check inside the app because supported assets, networks, and conditions may change.

For most users, the most understandable scenario is USDT or USDC because these are stablecoins. But even here there is a risk of error: USDT can exist in different networks, and it needs to be transferred only to the correct address in the correct network.

Crypto top-up: where mistakes are most often made

In the RedotPay help center, a standard way to top up with cryptocurrency is described: open the app, go to Home > Deposit, select the currency, for example, USDT, and then choose the appropriate network for the selected currency.

The most dangerous mistake is thinking that “USDT is USDT everywhere.”

For the user, this can end in a problem. If you choose the wrong network or send the wrong asset, the deposit may not arrive. Therefore, before transferring a large amount, it is better to make a test transfer of a small amount and make sure that the address, network, and asset are chosen correctly.

This is especially important for people who have only used a regular bank card before and are not used to crypto wallets. In a bank, you can sometimes cancel or dispute a transaction. In crypto transfers, a network or address error can be much more complicated.

Top-up with a regular bank or credit card

For users from Israel, an important question sounds like this: can RedotPay be topped up not only by transferring cryptocurrency from an external wallet but through a regular bank or credit card?

In the RedotPay help center, it is stated that the user can buy supported cryptocurrencies in the app using a credit/debit card, as well as other available payment methods.

But for the Israeli user, this needs to be checked practically.

One card may pass and another may not. The bank may decline the transaction. The payment provider may charge a fee. There may be purchase limits, country restrictions, KYC requirements, or additional checks.

Therefore, the correct wording is this: RedotPay indicates the possibility of purchasing supported crypto assets with a credit/debit card, but before use, you need to check whether your specific Israeli bank or credit card passes, what fees apply, and whether there are any restrictions from the bank or service.

Transfers between wallets and users

Another scenario is transfers.

If the service allows sending funds to other RedotPay users, working with a multi-currency wallet, transfers to bank & e-wallet, or other functions, this can be convenient for those who often make international payments or separate business and personal funds.

But here again, it is important not to promise too much. Each function may have separate conditions: country, currency, fee, speed, limit, KYC, availability for a specific user.

Therefore, in the article, it is better to write not “everything is possible,” but “the app declares different functions for the card, wallet, transfers, and fund management; before using a specific operation, you need to check its availability and conditions.”

This approach is safer and more honest.

How RedotPay differs from a regular bank card

A regular bank card is linked to a bank account. RedotPay is a separate payment service.

There are advantages in this.

You can avoid linking the main bank card to all sites.

You can use a separate card for advertising.

You can separate business expenses from personal ones.

You can set limits.

You can use a virtual card for subscriptions and international services.

You can add the card to a mobile wallet if the function is available.

You can work with supported digital assets.

But there are also limitations.

It is not a bank in the usual sense.

There are service rules.

There are fees.

There is KYC.

There are limits.

There is a risk of payment rejections.

There is a risk of errors in crypto transfers.

There are tax and banking issues if significant amounts and digital assets are involved.

That is why RedotPay is better considered not as a replacement for an Israeli bank, but as an additional payment tool for specific tasks.

Who RedotPay can be useful for

RedotPay can be of interest to entrepreneurs, marketers, website owners, freelancers, digital specialists, and anyone who regularly pays for international services.

For example, if you launch advertising on Facebook, Instagram, or Google, a separate card helps separate the advertising budget from personal expenses.

If you pay for hosting, domains, SEO services, AI tools, CRM, newsletters, design platforms, and subscriptions, a virtual card helps avoid linking the main bank card to everything.

If you travel frequently or shop in foreign online stores, a separate card can be a convenient backup payment tool.

If you already have USDT, USDC, or other supported assets, RedotPay can be interesting as a link between digital assets and everyday payments.

If it is important for you to pay by phone, you should check the support of Google Wallet and Apple Wallet for your card and country.

Who should not rush

RedotPay should not be used on emotions.

Do not rush if you do not understand the difference between a bank, a card, a crypto wallet, an exchange, and a payment service.

Do not rush if you do not know what a transfer network is.

Do not rush if you think that USDT in any network can be sent to any USDT address.

Do not rush if you are looking for an “anonymous card,” “bank bypass,” or “payments without questions.”

Do not deposit large amounts until you have checked the fees, limits, support, withdrawal rules, and card operation on small payments.

And especially do not use such services for dubious operations. Any normal payment service operates with rules, checks, and restrictions.

What to check before registration

Before registering with RedotPay, a user from Israel should go through a small checklist.

Is the service available for your country and your document.

What documents are needed for identity verification.

What fees are there for issuing and using the card.

What limits are there for one payment and per day.

Can you set the necessary limits manually.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet.

Can the card be added to Apple Wallet.

Does the card work with Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads.

Is the card suitable for your subscriptions and online services.

Can you buy supported crypto assets with your bank or credit card.

What fees does the payment provider charge when purchasing with a card.

What crypto assets are supported.

What networks are available for USDT or other assets.

Can funds be transferred to other users.

Can the balance be withdrawn.

How does support work.

What to do in case of a disputed charge.

What to do if the deposit did not arrive.

What are the terms of the referral program.

This is not bureaucracy, but normal financial hygiene. The sooner the user checks these questions, the fewer surprises there will be later.

RedotPay referral program: how to speak honestly

RedotPay has a referral program. A user can invite another person via a link or code and receive a reward if the invitee fulfills the service conditions.

For media, it is important to present this transparently. There is no need to disguise the referral link as a “neutral recommendation.” The reader should understand that the author or editorial team may receive a reward.

A normal formulation looks like this:

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

Main risks to remember

The first risk is fees. The card, purchasing crypto assets, exchange, withdrawal, payments, or service may have different fees. They need to be checked before the operation, not after.

The second risk is limits. If a payment does not go through, the reason may not be the store, but the card limit, service limit, account settings, or payment network rules.

The third risk is KYC. RedotPay requires identity verification to obtain a card, and this is a normal part of the operation of such services. In the help center, obtaining a card is directly linked to identity verification.

The fourth risk is errors in crypto transfers. The wrong network, wrong asset, or wrong address can create a serious problem.

The fifth risk is payment rejections. Not every service is obliged to accept a specific card. Advertising accounts, subscriptions, stores, and payment systems may have their own rules.

The sixth risk is questions from the bank or tax specialist. If it concerns digital assets and significant amounts, it is important to keep a history of operations, purchase confirmations, transfers, statements, and documents about the origin of funds.

How to start more safely

The most sensible way is not to start with a large amount.

First, you need to download the app, study the terms, register, and check which functions are available specifically to you.

Then you can issue a virtual card, look at fees, limits, and security settings.

After that, it is worth making a small test payment: for example, in an online service or where you actually plan to use the card.

If you want to use the card for advertising, first test it on a small advertising budget.

If you want to top up with cryptocurrency, first make a test transfer of a small amount.

If you want to buy crypto with a regular bank or credit card, first check if your Israeli card goes through and what the final fee is.

If you want to pay by phone, check adding it to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.

This approach does not guarantee the absence of problems, but it significantly reduces the risk of unpleasant surprises.

Frequently asked questions

Is RedotPay a bank card?

No, it is not a regular bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on the conditions, a physical card.

Can RedotPay be used in Israel?

Before registration, you need to check the availability of the service, KYC, and functions specifically for users from Israel. Conditions may depend on the country, document, account, and internal service rules.

Can you pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google?

The card can be considered for advertising payments, but each advertising account needs to be tested separately. Payment may depend on the platform’s rules, card, limits, and verification.

Can you set a limit for one payment and per day?

RedotPay has reference materials on limits and card usage. Before use, you need to check what limits are available specifically in your account and whether they can be adjusted to your tasks.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet?

RedotPay has instructions for Google Pay and Apple Pay, but availability needs to be checked for your country, device, account, and specific card.

Can you pay in regular stores?

If the card is added to a mobile wallet and supported by a specific terminal, it can be used for contactless payment. But before that, you need to check the availability of the function and test the payment.

What crypto assets does RedotPay support?

The official app descriptions list BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. It is better to check the current list in the app.

Can RedotPay be topped up via USDT?

The RedotPay help center describes topping up via Deposit with a currency choice, such as USDT, and the corresponding network. The main thing is to choose the right network and not send a large amount without testing.

Can RedotPay be topped up with a regular bank or credit card?

RedotPay states that supported cryptocurrencies can be purchased in the app using a credit/debit card and other available payment methods. But a user from Israel needs to check if their specific card goes through, what fees apply, and if there are any bank restrictions.

Is this financial advice?

No. Such material should be an informational overview. The decision to register, top up, purchase digital assets, or use the card is made by the user independently.

Conclusion

RedotPay may be of interest to users in Israel not only as a crypto service but also as a separate virtual card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, international services, and phone payments.

Its practical value lies in separating expenses and control. The main bank card does not need to be linked to all sites. A separate payment tool can be used for advertising. Limits can be set for subscriptions. A separate card can be kept for online purchases. A wallet, top-up, and supported payment functions can be used for digital assets.

But RedotPay should not be perceived as a “simple card without questions.” It is a service with KYC, fees, limits, rules, supported countries, networks, payment conditions, and possible risks.

Before registration, it is worth calmly checking the conditions, testing a small amount, understanding the limits, understanding the top-up rules, ensuring the availability of Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, and not storing large amounts without understanding all the conditions.

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

In the fourteenth part, we will analyze platforms that help small businesses in Israel work with video, audio, RSS feeds, link collections, social profiles, the open web, and additional content distribution channels. This is no longer just “another social network,” but a broader system: somewhere the business shows videos, somewhere it collects materials, somewhere it offers subscriptions, somewhere it pins a profile, and somewhere it creates an additional entry point for the audience.

For small businesses, this is especially important. A client can see the company through Google, through video, through bookmarks, through RSS, through a social feed, through a profile on a media platform, or through an external catalog. If all these points are styled consistently and lead to a clear central page, trust grows.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how different platforms can support a single project. The project is related to Israel news, Ukraine topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same principle applies to small businesses: each external page should strengthen the brand, not live separately from it.

GreenCast: author’s page and additional publication channel

GreenCast is a publishing and authoring environment that can be used as an additional platform for placing materials, project profiles, and external presence. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it not as the main promotion channel, but as an additional page in the overall digital map.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful when it is necessary to secure a brand description, provide a link to the main site, publish materials, and show that the project exists not only in one social network. This is especially important for companies that work with content, media, services, consultations, culture, or educational materials.

The author’s page GreenCast — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional publication point for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how to expand presence not only through mass social networks but also through small external platforms.

Surf.social: open social web, RSS, and feeds from different sources

Surf.social is a tool from the open social web environment, associated with the idea of uniting different sources: RSS, blogs, profiles, videos, social publications, and thematic feeds. Its purpose is not to replace all social networks, but to gather different sources into a convenient feed.

For small businesses in Israel, this can be very useful. A company can create its own feed, add a website, RSS feed, YouTube channel, social profiles, blog publications, and external pages. As a result, the client receives not a chaotic set of links, but a more understandable stream of updates.

The profile Surf.social — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as part of such a system. For NAnews, this is especially logical because the project publishes materials on different platforms, and Surf helps present them as a single information feed.

Raindrop: bookmarks, collections, and a neat map of links

Raindrop is a service for saving and organizing bookmarks, links, collections, materials, and visual selections. It is used by individuals, teams, editors, marketers, designers, researchers, and businesses that need not just to save links, but to organize them by topics.

In its role, Raindrop is not a social network. It is a tool for structure. It helps gather important pages, articles, profiles, documents, videos, publications, and sources in one place. For businesses, this is especially useful if the company has many external profiles and needs to present them neatly.

For small businesses in Israel, Raindrop can become a public showcase of links: website, social networks, articles, videos, maps, reviews, partners, services, pages in different languages. Such a collection helps the client not get lost and quickly find the necessary entry.

The page Raindrop — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a neat catalog of external materials for the project.

Spotify: audio, playlists, and presence in the streaming world

Spotify is one of the largest global audio platforms. It has been operating since 2008 and has become an important service for music, podcasts, playlists, audio content, and author presence. For businesses, it is not only a music platform but also another way to be visible in the audio environment.

In the market, Spotify holds one of the leading positions in global audio streaming. It is used by musicians, podcasters, brands, media, playlist authors, educational projects, and people who work with voice, sound, or audio formats.

For small businesses in Israel, Spotify can be useful if there are podcasts, audio reviews, collections, music projects, event recordings, audio versions of materials, or branded playlists. For example, a cafe can create playlists for atmosphere, an educational project — audio lessons, media — podcasts, and an agency — short explanations for clients.

The profile Spotify — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an additional audio point for the project.

Dailymotion: video hosting and additional video archive

Dailymotion is a video platform launched in 2005. It has become one of the older international video hosting services and is still used for placing videos, news, entertainment content, sports clips, media materials, and video archives.

In the mass market, Dailymotion does not compete with YouTube in scale, but it maintains its niche as an alternative video hosting. It is used by media, brands, authors, video projects, and companies that need an additional video placement channel.

For small businesses in Israel, Dailymotion can be useful as a backup or additional video archive. If a company is already shooting videos for YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, or a website, some materials can be adapted for other video platforms. This increases the lifespan of the content and expands the digital footprint.

The profile Dailymotion — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

Nicovideo: Japanese video environment and international presence

Nicovideo, also known as Nico Nico Douga, is a Japanese video platform operating since 2006. It is known for its culture of comments, fan communities, music, anime, games, streams, and user content.

In global reach, Nicovideo does not replace YouTube or TikTok, but it has strong cultural significance in the Japanese internet environment. For international projects, it can be an interesting additional point, especially if there are videos, cultural materials, music, media, or an audience interested in Japanese digital platforms.

For small businesses in Israel, Nicovideo is not suitable for everyone. But if the business is related to culture, video, creativity, international projects, anime, music, education, or media, such a platform can expand presence beyond familiar Western platforms.

The profile Nicovideo — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional international video point for the project.

Trovo Live: live broadcasts and working with a live audience

Trovo Live is a platform for live broadcasts, especially known in the gaming and streaming environment. In format, it is closer to Twitch: broadcasts, channels, subscribers, chats, donations, reactions, and live communication.

In market share, Trovo Live is significantly smaller than Twitch, YouTube Live, or TikTok Live. But it can be considered a niche platform for additional broadcasts, especially if live broadcasts, discussions, events, gaming or youth communities are important to the project.

For small businesses in Israel, Trovo Live may not be useful for everyone. But if there is a format of live communication — consultations, analyses, events, lectures, creative broadcasts, gaming activities, educational broadcasts, or presentations — such a platform can become an additional contact channel.

Trovo Live — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be considered as a direction for future video presence if an active channel is created and designed.

FC2 Video: Japanese video platform and additional archive

FC2 Video is a video service in the FC2 ecosystem, a Japanese internet platform with various services for blogs, videos, hosting, and user content. FC2 Video can be used for placing videos and creating additional video presence.

In global scale, FC2 Video does not compete with YouTube or Dailymotion, but it has its niche, especially in the Japanese and international user environment. For a project that wants to have a wide map of video profiles, such a platform can be an additional archival channel.

For small businesses, this can be useful if there are already video materials and the task is to expand their availability. It is not worth building the main strategy around FC2 Video, but as an additional platform, it can strengthen the overall digital footprint.

The profile FC2 Video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be another video point for the project.

VHSky: video channels and presence in an alternative media environment

VHSky is a video platform with channels and user videos. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as a niche additional channel, rather than a replacement for YouTube, Vimeo, or Dailymotion.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful as a backup video archive. If a company shoots videos, interviews, explanations, announcements, or event fragments, they can be placed not only on one platform. This helps preserve content and increases the number of points where the brand can be found.

It is important not to turn such channels into empty pages. Even if the video platform is small, there should be a name, description, link to the main site, and a clear theme.

The channel VHSky — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video archive for the project.

Clip Place: short videos and additional content showcase

Clip Place is a video platform for channels and short visual materials. It can be used as an additional place for publishing videos, fragments, announcements, short explanations, and video covers.

In scale, Clip Place is not a competitor to YouTube or TikTok. But in a strategy of broad presence, such a platform can perform an auxiliary function: store videos, provide an additional brand page, support the project’s link map, and create another entry for the audience.

For small businesses in Israel, this is useful if the content is already created. One video can be used on several platforms: full format — on YouTube or Dailymotion, short version — on TikTok or Shorts, additional copy — on a niche video platform.

The page Clip Place — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be one of such additional video showcases for the project.

Bark.video: video channels and distribution of visual materials

Bark.video is another video platform with the ability to place channels and video materials. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as an additional niche platform.

For businesses, such platforms make sense if video is already part of the content system. If a company does not shoot anything, opening many video channels is pointless. But if there are videos, explanations, posters, event recordings, interviews, or short visual fragments, they can be distributed across different platforms.

This approach helps not to depend on one video service and creates more points of presence in search. The main thing is that all pages are linked to the main site and a unified brand description.

The channel Bark.video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

How to gather all this into a coherent system

The main mistake of small businesses is to open accounts and do nothing with them. If a company has GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video, but nowhere has a proper description, link to the site, and clear logic, the client will not see the benefit.

Each platform should have its own task. GreenCast — publication point. Surf.social — open feed and RSS. Raindrop — link map. Spotify — audio and playlists. Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video — video archives and additional channels. Trovo Live — live broadcasts and live communication.

For small businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is multilingual and makes decisions quickly. One client wants to watch a video, another — subscribe to updates, a third — open a link collection, a fourth — find a profile, a fifth — check the main site.

Why this is important specifically for Israel

The Israeli market is practical and fast. A client can watch a video, open a profile, check a site, view a link map, and write on WhatsApp in a few minutes. If everything looks connected, neat, and understandable, trust grows.

External platforms should not replace the main site. They should lead to it, strengthen it, and help a person see the brand in different formats: text, video, audio, RSS, collections, live broadcast, profile, archive.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even different platforms can work as parts of one system. A reader can find the project through Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, or Bark.video, but everywhere should understand: this is one project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the fourteenth part: GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, Trovo Live, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video help small businesses in Israel expand their presence through publications, RSS, bookmarks, audio, video, and live broadcasts. This is not a replacement for the main site, but an additional trust system that makes the brand more noticeable, understandable, and closer to the client.

July 29, 2026 The New York Times reported that Iran was considering a direct missile strike on Ukraine in response to an attack on an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea.

According to individuals familiar with intelligence data, Tehran discussed launching a ballistic missile with a relatively small warhead. The intended target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

Iranian leadership, as sources from the American publication claim, hoped to deliver a limited and mostly symbolic strike. The missile was meant to demonstrate that the attack on the Iranian ship did not go unanswered, while causing relatively minor damage.

The problem was that no one could guarantee a similarly limited reaction from Ukraine. Western officials warned that after the launch of an Iranian ballistic missile, Kyiv might perceive the event as the start of a direct war and retaliate.

Therefore, the events that unfolded over just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — brought Ukraine and Iran to the brink of open military confrontation.

July 25: Attack on the Anna ship in the Caspian Sea

The escalation began on Saturday, July 25, 2026.

On this day, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that a Ukrainian drone attacked an Iranian commercial ship in the Caspian Sea. The explosion resulted in the death of one sailor, and another person was injured.

Later, Iranian sources named the ship — Anna. According to Ahmad Heydarian, the Iranian Consul General in Russian Astrakhan, legal procedures were initiated after the attack.

Tehran claims that Anna was a civilian cargo ship and did not carry military products. Iranian representatives stated that rolled sheet steel was on board.

The Ukrainian version differed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces attacked a Russian warship and vessels used for transporting military cargo related to Iran in the Caspian Sea.

Thus, Iran called Anna a civilian ship, while Ukraine spoke of an operation against Russian-Iranian military logistics. There is no independent public confirmation of the cargo’s contents yet.

On the same day, July 25, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine in Tehran and delivered an official protest. In the Iranian statement, the attack was called a “hostile and criminal” act.

Tehran also stated that Kyiv was trying to expand the geography of Russia’s war against Ukraine and move it to the Caspian region.

July 26: Aragchi stated that the strike would not go unanswered

The next day, Sunday, July 26, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi moved to direct threats.

He stated that the attack on the Iranian ship “cannot go unanswered”. According to Aragchi, the incident allegedly violated the UN Charter and was aimed at expanding the war.

The Iranian minister also claimed that Ukraine acted in Israel’s interests and tried to draw European countries into the war between Iran and the United States.

It was after these statements that the threat stopped looking like mere diplomatic rhetoric. According to The New York Times, discussions began within Iran about specific military response options, including launching a ballistic missile at Ukraine.

July 26 Aragchi held separate phone conversations with the head of European diplomacy Kaja Kallas and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In the conversation with Kallas, he demanded a reaction from the European Union to the strike on the ship. With Lavrov, the Iranian Foreign Minister discussed the consequences of the attack and the assistance provided to the crew in Russia’s Astrakhan region.

Simultaneously, despite public threats, Aragchi spoke of diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing tensions.

July 26–28: Iran discussed a strike on a Ukrainian port

According to data published on July 29 by The New York Times, over the next two days, Iranian representatives considered the possibility of launching a single ballistic missile.

The discussion allegedly involved a missile with a small warhead to inflict limited damage and present the attack as a symbolic response.

Other sources reported that a likely target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The specific name of the port was not disclosed.

Iranian officials hoped that after one retaliatory launch, the confrontation would end. However, Western representatives warned that Tehran could not independently determine where the exchange of strikes would end.

If the Iranian missile hit port infrastructure, a civilian ship, or a residential area, Ukraine could respond with strikes on targets within Iran itself.

Mehdi Rahmati, an Iranian analyst close to government circles, said that there were different positions within the country. Some political figures demanded an immediate attack on Ukraine, while others advised restraint.

“Ukraine is not a small, insignificant country. It has experience in warfare and logistical support from America and Europe. We gain nothing by creating a new front,” Rahmati stated.

July 28: Conversation between Sibiga and Aragchi

The turning point came on Tuesday, July 28, 2026.

On this day, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga held a phone conversation with Abbas Aragchi. The talks took place after several days of public threats and diplomatic attempts to prevent a direct Iranian strike on Ukraine.

According to Aragchi, Sibiga assured him that the hit on the Iranian ship was unintentional and Ukraine did not seek escalation.

Aragchi replied that Iran also did not want to expand the confrontation. However, he demanded compensation for the damage caused to the ship and its crew.

The Iranian state agency IRNA reported on the phone conversation late in the evening of July 28, and Aragchi’s statement on the need for compensation was published after midnight — July 29, 2026.

The Ukrainian side emphasized differently. Sibiga stated that Ukraine’s actions were solely aimed at protecting the country from Russian aggression, and civilian ships and peaceful people were not targets.

He also warned Tehran of the need to refrain from any steps leading to escalation and demanded an end to support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

July 28: Israel discussed the Iranian threat with Ukraine

On the same day, July 28, 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar spoke with Andriy Sibiga.

Saar reported that the parties discussed the threats faced by Israel and Ukraine, including the threat from Iran. The Israeli minister also expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Ukraine.

This conversation was particularly important against the backdrop of Aragchi’s statements, attempting to portray the Caspian Sea attack as an operation carried out by Ukraine in Israel’s interest. Kyiv and Jerusalem did not confirm this version.

As noted by NANews — Israel News, the events of July 25–28 showed how quickly Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation could turn into a single theater of military operations.

Russian-Iranian connection

The escalation occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s long-term use of Iranian-designed drones for strikes on Ukraine.

Kyiv also claims that Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation extends to intelligence information. July 25 Zelensky stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite images of US military facilities and Gulf states.

According to the Ukrainian president, only on July 19 and 20, 2026, Russian satellites observed four military bases: two in Bahrain, one in Jordan, and one in Kuwait. Zelensky claimed that these images were subsequently used by Iran in preparation and assessment of strikes.

Thus, Ukraine views the Caspian routes not as ordinary trade between Iran and Russia, but as part of a military infrastructure working against Ukraine and Western states.

July 29: Threat temporarily reduced, but not eliminated

On the morning of July 29, 2026, it became known that active diplomatic contacts had so far managed to stabilize the situation.

However, the phrase “Iran refused to strike” would be inaccurate. Tehran has not officially announced a refusal of retaliatory actions.

Iran continues to demand compensation, conducts legal procedures in connection with the attack, and retains the right to respond. Ukraine, in turn, does not renounce the right to target routes and ships that, according to its data, are used for Russian military logistics.

Therefore, the immediate threat of a missile launch may have been postponed or removed from the current agenda after the conversation on July 28, but the political cause of the confrontation has not disappeared.

For NANews — Israel News, the main conclusion is that in just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — a strike on one ship almost led to the opening of a new front.

One Iranian missile on a Ukrainian Black Sea port could have been Tehran’s first direct strike on Ukrainian territory. And the further development of events would no longer depend solely on Iran’s intentions to make the attack “symbolic.”

July 29, 2026. Channel – Dmitry Doubov. What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? This episode thoroughly examines the possible developments around Iran, Israel, the USA, Ukraine, and Russia, analyzes hidden diplomatic signals, and assesses the likelihood of a major regional war.

 

 

Today, events in the Middle East and Ukraine are ceasing to be separate crises. After the meeting between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, new signals have emerged that could change the entire security architecture of the region.

Why did Trump publicly refrain from limiting Israel? What four scenarios for the development of the conflict around Iran are currently being considered? What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? And why might Ukraine’s strike on an Iranian vessel have consequences far beyond the Caspian Sea?

 

September 22, 1939 an event took place that they still try not to remember in Russia – a joint parade of Nazis and communists in Brest. It was a symbol of cooperation between two totalitarian regimes, which became a dark spot in the history of World War II.

It is especially important to realize that the alliance between the USSR and Nazi Germany in 1939 also contributed to one of the worst tragedies of the 20th century: HolocaustThe Nazis used the resources they received from the Soviet Union to wage war and establish control over territories where they would later begin the extermination of millions of Jews, Roma and other minorities.

The parade in Brest symbolized the victory over Poland, a country in which about 3 million Jews. This parade was just one of the scenes preceding the tragedy, when German troops would later occupy Polish territories and set up a system of concentration camps there, including Auschwitz And TreblinkaPoland itself, divided and oppressed by two regimes, witnessed the mass extermination of its citizens.

The Soviet Union, collaborating with the Nazis in the early years of the war, turned a blind eye to the repressions against Jews and other minorities. Moreover, after the war ended, it actively hushed up the Holocaust, promoting the version that the victims of the war were exclusively Soviet citizens, thereby ignoring the scale of the Nazi genocide.

Today, when some countries try to deny or distort historical facts, such as the Holocaust or the Soviet-Nazi alliance, it is important to remember the lessons of the Brest parade. Totalitarian regimes, if not stopped in time, can lead to irreversible tragedies, and cooperation for short-term gain can lead to large-scale catastrophes, as happened in 1939.

Meeting on the Bug

September 1, 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland, starting World War II. Seventeen days later, under the pretext of defending “blood brothers,” the Soviet Union joined the aggression. About 30-50% of the defenders of Brest were Ukrainians and Belarusians, who fought to the last, but soon both armies captured the city.

According to the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Brest was given to the USSR. However, before the German troops were to leave the city, the two regimes decided to demonstrate their brotherhood to the public by staging a joint parade – a parade that was to become a symbol of the alliance.

Friendship Parade

On September 22, 1939, at 2:00 p.m., in front of the flagpole with the Nazi flag, the commanders of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, General Guderian And Brigade Commander Krivosheincame out onto the wooden platform. The procession began with the passage of German equipment, followed by Soviet equipment.

After the parade, the command of the two armies held a banquet. Toasts to the health of Hitler and Stalin were loudly sung, and soldiers from both sides fraternized, smoked cigarettes and drank beer. They were united by the joy of the joint partition of Poland. The Nazi flag was replaced by the Soviet one, as a symbol of the new government.

However, the Germans did not leave for long. After just two years, June 29, 1941Brest was again captured by the Nazis, becoming a symbol that this “union” was temporary, and the friendship put on display concealed preparations for future betrayals.

The Forgotten Truth

Soviet historiography carefully avoids mentioning collaboration with the Nazis from 1939 to 1941. After all, the USSR not only became an accomplice in unleashing World War II, but also actively helped Nazi Germany, supplying it with oil, copper, grain and timber in huge quantities. During this period, the Soviet Union handed over to the Nazis 856 thousand tons of oil, 14 thousand tons of copper, 1.4 million tons of grain and more than a million tons of timber.

Parade or march?

The facts of the meeting of Soviet and Nazi troops are not in doubt, but there is disagreement over what to call this event – a parade or a march. Historian Alexander Dyukov insists that it was a “routine march” because military formalities were not observed. However, it is clear that it was a military show, demonstrating the alliance of two totalitarian regimes who wanted to show the world that they were acting in concert.

Brest historian Vasily Sarichev states: “If this is officially recognized as a parade, then this will be a sanctioned recognition that Hitler and Stalin, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, acted together, demonstrating their unity.”

Propaganda campaign

Soviet propaganda always tried to hush up or distort the events of September 22, 1939. In Germany itself, this parade was actively filmed by Nazi propagandists, making it a show for the domestic audience and a message for the West, especially for England and FranceThe moment when Nazi and Soviet troops marched together was supposed to be a clear signal: “We are allies.” However, the Soviet side preferred to call it a “ceremonial procession” or ignore the event altogether.

Yuri Tsurganoveditor-in-chief of the magazine “Posev”, emphasizes: “Modern Russian propaganda is trying to erase this episode from memory, because it destroys their myth about the Great Patriotic War, where the USSR is depicted as a liberator and a victim of aggression.”

Poland – a victim of two tyrannies

For Poland, the events of September 22 are just one episode in a series of tragedies that began with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to Andrzej Nowakprofessor at the Jagiellonian University, “September 17, 1939 is the day when the USSR stabbed the Polish army in the back, becoming an accomplice in the destruction of Poland.” This blow became the final step on the path to the liquidation of the Polish state.

Projection onto today’s realities: the union of two regimes

When one recalls the joint parade of Nazis and Soviets in Brest, one cannot help but see parallels with contemporary world events. Today, many authoritarian regimes, like those led by Hitler and Stalin, are seeking allies to consolidate their power and suppress freedom in other countries. These new coalitions, as in the past, are based on implicit support for totalitarianism, with the suppression of human rights and the destruction of democratic values ​​becoming a common goal.

In the 21st century, for example, Russia has close ties with countries such as Iran, China, and North Korea. These regimes, supporting each other, oppose Western democracies, seeking global influence through confrontation and destabilization of the international order. Russia, like the USSR in the past, is again playing a double game, participating in international conflicts, supporting authoritarian regimes, and interfering in the affairs of other states.

Iranwith its nuclear ambitions and anti-Semitic rhetoric, is similar to the Nazi regime in its aims and methods, while receiving support from Russia in the form of weapons and political support. Russia, unleashing a full-scale war in Ukraine and seeking geopolitical expansion, once again finds itself in the role of an aggressor, as in 1939. The parallels between how the USSR helped Germany then and how Russia now supports terrorist organizations and authoritarian regimes are obvious.

Modern parallels and the role of the international community

The parade in Brest is not just a historical fact, it is a warning that any alliances built on violence and suppression will sooner or later lead to disaster. The international community should not turn a blind eye to the emerging alliances of totalitarian regimes, as was the case in 1939. Every step, every concession to aggressors and dictators leads to new wars and new genocides.

Ukraine, which is now at the forefront of the fight for its independence, understands this lesson better than anyone. That is why it is fighting not only for its freedom, but also to ensure that the world does not repeat the mistakes of the past. Totalitarian regimes always seek allies to strengthen their influence, but it is international support for democracies, the alliance of Israel, Ukraine and the Western world that must become a bulwark against resurgent threats.

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Ukrainian strikes on ships and Russian military facilities in the Caspian Sea may prove to be a significantly more important event than the destruction of several individual targets. For the first time, Ukraine has delivered a direct strike on a route that connects the military and economic systems of Russia and Iran, and Tehran has officially announced the death of its citizen and threatened Kyiv with consequences.

The incident shows that Russia’s war against Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States can no longer be viewed as completely separate crises. The same states exchange weapons, technologies, intelligence data, and combat experience. Now the confrontation has gone beyond indirect support: Ukraine and Iran have become participants in direct military escalation in the Caspian Sea.

What happened in the Caspian Sea

On July 25, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced successful long-range strikes on Russian targets in the Caspian Sea area. According to him, Ukrainian forces hit ships used to transport military cargo related to Iran, as well as a Russian warship.

The Security Service of Ukraine announced an attack on a Russian missile boat of the Molniya project, cargo ships Port Olya 2 and Begey, a radar station, the Filanovsky oil platform, the Tor-M2 air defense system, and drone warehouses.

The Ukrainian side claims that Port Olya 2 and Begey were under international sanctions and were involved in transporting military cargo between Iran and Russia. There is no independent confirmation of the full list of affected targets and the damage inflicted on them yet.

Tehran presented its own version of the events. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the Ukrainian attack was directed against an Iranian commercial vessel. As a result of the explosion, one crew member was killed, and another was injured.

The temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. There, the incident was called a “hostile and criminal act,” and it was stated that Iran reserves the right to defend its national interests and respond to Kyiv’s actions.

Thus, the confirmed elements of the story are the strike itself, the death of the Iranian sailor, Tehran’s diplomatic protest, and Ukraine’s statements about the defeat of Russian-Iranian logistics. At the same time, the status of the specific Iranian vessel and the nature of its cargo remain disputed: Iran speaks of civilian shipping, Ukraine of a military supply chain.

Why the Caspian is so important for Russia and Iran

The Caspian Sea has long been perceived by Moscow and Tehran as a relatively safe internal space. It is not directly connected to ocean routes controlled by Western naval forces, and most of its coastline belongs to states not participating in the sanctions blockade of Russia and Iran.

Iranian ports in the southern Caspian Sea are connected by sea routes to the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Olya. From there, cargo can be sent via the Volga, railways, and roads to central regions of Russia.

Through this corridor, the following can potentially be transported:

• drones and components for them;
• ammunition and missile components;
• electronics and dual-use goods;
• equipment for the defense industry;
• oil and other sanctioned goods.

The northern route becomes especially significant when Iran faces military pressure in the Persian Gulf, and movement through the Strait of Hormuz becomes dangerous and unstable. In such a situation, the Caspian becomes not just a trade route for Tehran but a strategic reserve artery connecting Iran with Russia and Eurasia.

The Wall Street Journal characterized the Ukrainian operation as a strike on the supply line between Iran and Russia and as a point where two wars converged in the Caspian Sea.

Why Tehran reacted so sharply

The death of an Iranian sailor could itself provoke a diplomatic protest. However, the harshness of Tehran’s statements is likely explained by a more serious concern: Ukraine has shown that the Caspian Sea can no longer be considered a guaranteed safe rear.

One strike cannot completely block trade between Russia and Iran. But regular attacks can create a constant risk for ships, terminals, oil platforms, and port infrastructure.

Russia will have to strengthen air defense over a vast territory, redeploy air defense systems from other directions, change ship movement schedules, and complicate transportation. Insurance and logistics costs will rise, and secret military cargo will be harder to disguise as ordinary trade.

Thus, Ukraine creates a problem not only by physically destroying cargo. It undermines the very sense of security of the route.

For Iran, this is especially painful. Tehran supported the Russian military machine, expecting that Ukraine’s retaliatory actions would remain limited to its territory and Russian targets. Now it becomes clear: participation in supplying Russia can lead to strikes directly on Iranian interests and communications related to Iran.

Russia and Iran are no longer fighting separately

Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran has long gone beyond ordinary diplomatic relations. Russia widely uses drones and technologies of Iranian origin against Ukraine. At the same time, Russian specialists gain practical experience using these systems and improve them.

Iran, in turn, is interested in Russian military technologies, electronic warfare means, aviation, intelligence information, and political support.

Volodymyr Zelensky also stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite data on American and regional military facilities in the Middle East. According to the Ukrainian president, since early July, Russian satellites have been monitoring the states of the Persian Gulf and the American bases located there. He mentioned airbases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Public evidence of such a transfer has not yet been presented by Kyiv. However, the statement itself shows how Ukraine describes what is happening: not as two parallel wars, but as a single Russian-Iranian system in which Moscow helps Tehran in the Middle East, and Iran supports Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The second step towards a world war

The Financial Times views the events in the Caspian Sea as another stage in the escalation of regional wars into a global confrontation.

The first such step, the publication calls the direct involvement of North Korean military personnel in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Soldiers from the East Asian state have become involved in the European war on Moscow’s side.

The second step is the direct confrontation between Ukraine and Iran. Before this, Tehran helped Russia with weapons and technologies but formally did not fight against Ukraine. After the strike on the ship and the death of an Iranian citizen, the situation changed: Iran officially calls Kyiv’s actions hostile and promises to respond.

This does not yet mean that World War III has already begun. There is still no general officially declared military confrontation between the major powers. Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea have also not created a formal military alliance comparable to NATO.

But a system of interconnected fronts, in which the same states operate, is becoming increasingly apparent.

The formation of an “axis of adversaries”

In American political and analytical circles, the concept of an “axis of adversaries” is increasingly used. It includes Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea.

These countries do not have a unified command, a common army, or an obligation to automatically enter the war for each other. However, they consistently help partners resist the US and its allies.

State	Role in the emerging system
Russia	Wages war against Ukraine, cooperates with Iran and North Korea, receives foreign technologies and components
Iran	Supports the Russian military industry and opposes Israel and the US in the Middle East
North Korea	Transfers ammunition, weapons, and military personnel to Russia
China	Provides economic and technological resilience to Russia and Iran, avoiding direct involvement in wars

Each of these states has its own goals. Russia seeks to destroy Ukraine’s independence and restore its influence over former Soviet territories. Iran aims to oust the US from the Middle East and undermine Israel’s security. North Korea seeks military advantage over South Korea. China increases pressure on Taiwan and aims to change the balance of power in Asia.

But they share a common interest — weakening the US and the Western-created system of international alliances.

The Financial Times notes that the wars in Ukraine and Iran are already beginning to be perceived not as separate regional clashes but as parts of a broader confrontation.

China remains behind the line of direct confrontation

China is the strongest but at the same time the most cautious participant in the emerging system.

Beijing has not directly entered either Russia’s war against Ukraine or Iran’s war against the US and Israel. However, China’s economy, industry, and technological base help Russia and Iran recover losses and circumvent restrictions.

Russia receives electronics, industrial equipment, machinery, and dual-use goods from China. Iran uses Chinese components and navigation technologies to develop its missile and drone systems.

At the same time, China continues military pressure around Taiwan. If Beijing decides on a blockade or military operation, it could become the next and most dangerous stage of the globalization of current wars.

The US may then be forced to simultaneously support Ukraine in Europe, Israel and its partners in the Middle East, as well as Taiwan and regional allies in Asia.

This scenario could turn the system of interconnected regional conflicts into a full-fledged global confrontation.

Why Ukraine is expanding the front

For Ukraine, the strike on the Caspian has several levels of significance.

The first is immediate military. If the ships were indeed transporting weapons or components for the Russian military-industrial complex, their destruction reduces Moscow’s ability to strike Ukrainian cities.

The second is strategic. Ukraine shows that it can hit Russian targets at a great distance and create a threat to previously safe routes.

The third is diplomatic. Kyiv emphasizes that Russia and Iran are acting together, and therefore the defense of Ukraine is linked to the security of Israel, the US, the Persian Gulf states, and Europe.

Ukrainian actions in the Caspian Sea objectively coincide with the interests of states seeking to weaken Iran and limit its ability to circumvent sanctions. However, this does not prove the existence of a joint or secret operation by Ukraine, Israel, and the US.

A more cautious formulation is that Kyiv independently uses the coincidence of strategic interests and tries to show Washington: Ukraine can damage not only Russia but the entire Russian-Iranian military system.

The main weakness of the West

Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are not ideal allies. There are disagreements, competition, and mutual distrust between them. But they consistently help each other where it weakens their common adversaries.

The Western camp faces the opposite problem. The US, Europe, Ukraine, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have much greater combined economic and technological resources, but they often view each threat separately.

For part of Europe, Russia’s war remains exclusively a Ukrainian problem. Iran is perceived as a problem for Israel and the Persian Gulf states. Taiwan is considered a distant Asian issue. The threat of North Korea is a regional problem of the Korean Peninsula.

But the opposite side is already connecting these directions:

• Iranian drones attack Ukraine;
• North Korean military personnel help Russia;
• Russian combat experience and possibly intelligence data are used by Iran;
• Chinese components support Russian and Iranian production;
• Ukraine strikes Russian-Iranian communications in the Caspian Sea.

While democratic states discuss each war separately, authoritarian regimes create a common infrastructure of mutual support.

What might happen next

The further development of events will depend on Iran’s reaction.

Tehran may limit itself to diplomatic threats, as opening a new front against Ukraine will require additional resources and increase pressure on Iran itself.

But other scenarios are possible:

1. Iran may increase arms supplies to Russia.
2. Iranian intelligence services may attempt operations against Ukrainian interests outside Ukraine.
3. Russia and Iran may strengthen the protection of Caspian routes.
4. Moscow may more actively assist Tehran with intelligence data and technologies.
5. Ukraine may continue strikes on ships, ports, and infrastructure related to military transportation.

The most dangerous scenario is the formation of a sustainable cycle of retaliatory attacks, in which Ukraine will expand operations against Russian-Iranian logistics, and Tehran will begin to officially participate in actions against Kyiv.

Then Russia’s war against Ukraine will finally go beyond the European theater.

Not World War III — but no longer separate wars

It is premature to talk about the start of World War III. The US and China have not entered into direct military confrontation, Russia tries to avoid open war with NATO, and Iran, despite threats, has not yet declared itself a participant in Russian aggression against Ukraine.

But signs of globalization of the confrontation are already evident.

Wars are connected through weapons, people, technologies, satellite reconnaissance, supply routes, and sanctioned trade. Each new boundary becomes less distinct.

The Caspian strike showed that even a closed sea between Russia and Iran is no longer an isolated space. Ukraine has brought the fight to where Moscow receives resources to continue its aggression.

Conclusion for NANews

The Ukrainian operation in the Caspian Sea was a warning not only to Russia and Iran. It showed the whole world that the era of isolated regional wars is ending.

Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China already act as an interconnected system — albeit without an official alliance and common command. They exchange weapons, technologies, resources, and experience, simultaneously creating pressure on Ukraine, Israel, the US, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan.

In response, Western states and their allies must stop treating Russian aggression, Iranian terrorism, and Chinese pressure as separate problems.

Ukraine is not only defending its own territory. By destroying Russian-Iranian military logistics, it strikes at a system that simultaneously threatens Europe, Israel, and American interests in the Middle East.

For NANews — Israel News it is fundamentally important to emphasize: supporting Ukraine and countering Iran are not two different directions of foreign policy. These are parts of one struggle against the emerging axis of states that help each other wage wars, circumvent sanctions, and deplete the resources of the democratic world.

The strike in the Caspian Sea has not yet become the start of a world war. But it has become one of the clearest pieces of evidence that the Russian war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation are already beginning to merge into a single global front.