Category: nanews

On July 16, 2026, the first store of the Ukrainian DUNA network officially started operating in Rishon LeZion, Israel.

Israelis from Ukraine and just customers familiar with the brand can now purchase DUNA products directly in Israel, without waiting for parcels or asking acquaintances to bring the necessary items from Ukraine.

The new store is located at:

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street, 40

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street 40 – here on the map – https://maps.app.goo.gl/21cH2AvHRnZirm8c6

Official pages of Duna.Israel:

Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61591690269847

Instagram – https://www.instagram.com/duna_israel/

Before the opening, DUNA Israel announced that the first Israeli outlet would start operating on July 16. After the launch, a message appeared on the brand’s page in Hebrew: שלום ישראל! פתחנו באופן רשמי! — “Hello, Israel! We are officially open!”

Ukrainian industry publications also reported on DUNA’s entry into the Israeli market.

On July 15, the publication “Ukrainian network DUNA opens its first store in Israel” was posted by the Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers. The publication indicated that the store would open in Rishon LeZion on Rothschild Street, and DUNA belongs to the company “Duna-Vesta,” whose factory has been operating in the Lviv region since 1965.

On July 16, the material “DUNA network enters the Israeli market with its first store” was published by the Ukrainian publication AllRetail.ua, specializing in retail and the development of retail networks.

What is sold in the first Israeli DUNA store

DUNA Israel presents the new outlet as a family store of everyday textile products.

The first publications on the Israeli page announced:

• women’s, men’s, and children’s socks;
• tights for women and children;
• basic plain models;
• colored socks and items with patterns;
• children’s underwear;
• everyday and gift options.

In the opening announcement, the brand emphasized that the store would feature comfortable socks and tights for children and adults, as well as everyday models. After the opening, DUNA Israel announced a wide selection of products for the whole family.

Store opening hours:

Day	Working hours
Sunday — Thursday	09:30–19:30
Friday and holiday eves	09:00–14:00
Saturday	Not specified in the published schedule

The address and opening hours are published on the official DUNA Israel page.

It cannot yet be claimed that the entire Ukrainian DUNA catalog is presented in Rishon LeZion. The company’s official website also offers women’s and men’s underwear, pajamas, T-shirts and tank tops, thermal underwear, stockings, children’s items, and products for infants. The brand has not specified in detail which categories are already available in Israel.

DUNA immediately addressed the Israeli customer in Hebrew

The DUNA Israel page and advertising publications are predominantly in Hebrew.

This is an important detail: the store is targeting not only Israelis from Ukraine and people familiar with the brand from previous purchases. DUNA is trying to present itself to the wider Israeli audience as a family brand of comfortable socks, tights, and underwear.

For customers who already know DUNA, the appearance of the store means the opportunity to purchase familiar products near home. For those who have not encountered this brand before, the new outlet becomes the first direct acquaintance with the Ukrainian manufacturer.

Where DUNA is located: a busy commercial part of Rishon LeZion

For its first store in Israel, DUNA chose a section of Rothschild Street with a large number of retail outlets and service enterprises.

At the address Rothschild, 40, in addition to DUNA, Israeli business directories indicate the jewelry store Keter David — כתר דוד, a dog grooming salon “המספרים של עידו”, as well as offices and service enterprises. This is a commercial address around which there is already a constant flow of visitors.

In the neighboring building at Rothschild, 38, there is a shoe store Disco Rosso and Bukhari Bakery — a bakery with Bukharian pastries and dishes.

At the address Rothschild, 37, there are jewelry stores and workshops Mi ORO, Cami Designs, and Kisufim.

At the address Rothschild, 41, there is a lingerie and gift store Beit Hava — בית חוה and a jewelry store Pirov Diamonds — יהלומי פירוב.

Thus, DUNA opened in an already established commercial environment. Shoppers can combine a visit to the new store with buying shoes, lingerie, jewelry, groceries, or visiting a cafe and bakery.

Not far from DUNA, at the address Rothschild, 45, is the shopping center G Rothschild, which additionally makes the location convenient for shoppers.

Choosing such a place seems logical. Israelis from Ukraine and customers who already know DUNA can come purposefully, and the presence of other stores and G Rothschild nearby allows the brand to also count on the usual urban shopping flow.

What DUNA represents and how many stores the network operates

DUNA belongs to the Ukrainian company “Duna-Vesta”.

The factory is located in the city of Sheptytsky in the Lviv region and has been operating since 1965. The company calls itself a leader in the Ukrainian hosiery market and reports that it produces up to 1.2 million items monthly.

The declared production capacity of the enterprise is 15–20 million pairs per year. The products are tested in its own accredited laboratory, and the company reports working according to OEKO-TEX Standard 100 and ISO 9001:2015 standards.

In addition to the family brand DUNA, the company develops two more lines:

ACCENT — models with an emphasis on classic design, quality, and comfort;

FURIA — women’s tights and stockings.

The official DUNA website states that the network has more than 100 stores in 17 regions of Ukraine and expands annually by 5–8 outlets.

NAnews — Israel News separately recounted the addresses on the network’s official page. The catalog lists 105 address entries, but the store in Lutsk at Sobornosti Avenue, 22B is listed twice with the same phone number and schedule. Therefore, there are 104 unique addresses in Ukraine. The catalog also includes a section for Zaporizhzhia, but at the time of verification, no address was listed under it.

Most points are concentrated in Kyiv and the Kyiv region — 23, as well as in Lviv and nearby suburbs — 22. In Lutsk, seven unique stores are listed, in Dnipro — five, in Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, and Ternopil — four each, in Uzhhorod — three.

Two points are listed in Zhytomyr, Izmail, Mukachevo, Sambir, Khmelnytskyi, and Sheptytsky. Stores also operate in Berdychiv, Drohobych, Irpin, Kalush, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Kovel, Kolomyia, Kremenchuk, Poltava, Rivne, Stryi, Kharkiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi.

With the new store in Rishon LeZion, we can talk about at least 105 unique physical DUNA points in Ukraine and Israel. The Israeli address has not yet been added to the main catalog of stores on the company’s Ukrainian website.

The Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers also reported that DUNA management is considering development potential in Poland and Germany. According to CEO Serhiy Vyshnevskyi, the company planned to increase the Ukrainian network to more than 200 points within five years and was simultaneously preparing to enter foreign markets.

The store may operate with a local partner

The description of the Israeli DUNA profile contains the words שותפות | זכיינות, which translate as “partnership | franchise.”

This may indicate a partnership or franchise model of launch. However, the company has not yet publicly named the Israeli store operator or disclosed the legal structure of the project. Therefore, it is premature to talk about a specific owner or franchisee.

There is also no confirmed information in the public domain about the size of investments, store area, number of employees, prices in shekels, delivery across Israel, a separate online store, or plans to open subsequent points.

It is also unknown whether DUNA is considering Haifa, Ashdod, Netanya, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, or other cities for further expansion.

The opening in Rishon LeZion shows that the Ukrainian manufacturer has entered the regular Israeli retail market and is addressing the market in Hebrew from the very beginning.

For Israelis from Ukraine and those familiar with the brand, this is an opportunity to buy familiar products directly in Israel. For DUNA, it is a test of whether the well-known Ukrainian brand can interest a wider Israeli audience.

NAnews — Israel News will monitor the development of the first point and the possible expansion of the DUNA network in the country.

In 12 days of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation, Ukrainian drones, according to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, hit 159 vessels of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Azov and Black Seas. The campaign’s goal is not the mass sinking of tankers, but the paralysis of Russia’s maritime logistics, the supply of occupied Crimea, and the transportation of oil, fuel, and goods circumventing sanctions.

On July 17, 2026, the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar’, summarized the interim results of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation.

According to him, from July 6 to 17, Ukrainian units hit 159 vessels used in Russian maritime logistics:

• 117 vessels — in the Azov Sea;
• 42 vessels — in the Black Sea.

On the night of July 17 alone, 12 more vessels were attacked in the Black Sea: nine dry cargo ships, one tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat.

These figures are already being called one of the largest episodes of drone use against Russian maritime logistics. However, it is important to understand: 159 affected vessels do not mean 159 sunken ships.

What does the name of the operation ‘MoLoChKa’ mean

The name of the operation turned out to be an abbreviation.

On July 15, Robert Brovdi deciphered it as follows:

MLChK — ‘Moscow Will Lie Through Crimea’, meaning ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

According to the Ukrainian command’s plan, it is not about a single series of strikes, but a systematic campaign against the infrastructure that allows Russia to hold the occupied peninsula and use it as a military base.

It includes attacks on maritime transport, oil depots, energy facilities, railway hubs, bridges, substations, and other elements of supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine.

The strategy’s meaning is to gradually turn Crimea from a convenient military foothold into a territory whose maintenance requires more and more fuel, equipment, ships, air defense systems, and repair resources from Moscow.

Crimea holds not only military but also symbolic significance for the Kremlin. Its capture has been portrayed by Russian propaganda for many years as one of Putin’s main achievements. Therefore, the destruction of the peninsula’s logistical connections can simultaneously inflict military, economic, and political damage.

159 affected vessels — not 159 sunken ships

Headlines about ‘knocked out’ or ‘destroyed’ vessels can create the false impression that Ukrainian forces sent almost one and a half hundred ships to the bottom in 12 days.

The SBS command describes the operation’s goal differently.

Ukrainian drones are supposed to deprive the vessel of the ability to move normally, navigate, and maintain communication. Robert Brovdi stated that the task is to turn a self-propelled vessel into a drifting ‘blind and deaf’ barge.

At the same time, according to him, operators try not to pierce the hulls of tankers to prevent large-scale oil spills and pollution of the Azov and Black Seas.

Drones can hit:

• the captain’s bridge;
• radar equipment;
• satellite communication antennas;
• navigation systems;
• control elements;
• engine and steering mechanisms;
• equipment necessary for safe passage through straits and ports.

After such a strike, the vessel may not sink but lose the ability to continue the voyage independently. It has to be towed, repaired, have its crew changed, or be taken out of service for a long time.

That is why Ukrainian targets include not only tankers and dry cargo ships but also tugboats. Russia uses them for rescuing and evacuating already damaged vessels.

How the operation developed

The operation began on July 6 with attacks on vessels in the Azov Sea, after which Ukrainian units quickly increased the number of strikes.

Date	Declared result
July 6–7	First attacks on tankers transporting fuel towards occupied Crimea
July 10	Russia restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal
July 11	Ukraine reported dozens of affected tankers, dry cargo ships, tugboats, and other vessels
July 14	The number of affected vessels in the Azov Sea reached 116
July 15	The operation spread to the Black Sea
July 16	The total result increased to 147 vessels
July 17	It was announced that 12 more vessels were affected; the total result — 159

By July 14, the Ukrainian command reported 116 affected vessels in the Azov Sea. Reuters confirmed that maritime movement in the region was seriously disrupted, although the agency could not independently verify the condition of each vessel from the Ukrainian list.

After that, the operation moved to the Black Sea. In a few days there, according to SBS data, tankers, gas carriers, dry cargo ships, and tugboats were attacked, increasing the total to 159.

Why the Azov Sea is so important for Russia

The Azov Sea is one of the key links in Russia’s system for transporting oil, oil products, grain, and other goods.

Through the Don River and the Volga-Don Canal, it is connected to Russia’s internal waterways. Small ‘river-sea’ class tankers can pick up cargo in internal Russian ports, pass through the Don, and enter the Azov Sea.

Further, oil can be transshipped onto larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Large sea vessels cannot always enter Azov ports due to limited depth and large draft. Therefore, Russia needs an intermediate feeder fleet — relatively small tankers, dry cargo ships, and auxiliary vessels.

Strikes on this fleet disrupt several logistical chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine;
• transportation of oil and oil products;
• export of Russian goods through the Azov Sea;
• operation of ports and transshipment points;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• schemes to bypass international sanctions.

In NAnews — Israel News they note: the operation against vessels is not an isolated maritime campaign. It is connected with a broader Ukrainian strategy of strikes on oil refineries, oil depots, energy, and transport infrastructure of Russia.

If maritime delivery becomes too dangerous, Moscow is forced to transfer cargo to road and rail. But these routes are closer to the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.

What happened to shipping

The consequences of the operation are recorded not only in reports from the Ukrainian command.

Reuters reported that after the start of the strikes, Russia temporarily stopped or seriously restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal. This route connects the Don with the Azov Sea and is used for transporting oil, grain, and other goods.

Satellite images also showed a sharp decrease in the number of vessels near the Kerch Strait.

According to Reuters, in early June, more than 40 vessels were waiting to pass in the strait area. After a series of Ukrainian attacks, satellite images showed only a few noticeable vessels in the same zone.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that for Russian logistics, the Azov Sea is effectively turning into a closed water area. According to him, Russian vessels began moving to the Taman area and looking for safer anchorage spots.

But the concentration of dozens of vessels in a limited area creates new problems: they are easier to detect, harder to disperse, and more difficult to protect simultaneously with air defense and electronic warfare means.

Impact on oil, Crimea supply, and the Russian budget

Russian oil exports remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the budget, which finances the war against Ukraine.

Some vessels are used directly for delivering fuel to Crimea and occupied territories. Others are involved in transporting oil, oil products, and goods between Russian ports and external markets.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk called oil the ‘blood of war’ and the Russian economy. According to him, small Azov tankers delivered oil to large ships in the Black Sea, but now this scheme has been disrupted.

At the same time, the term ‘shadow fleet’ should be used cautiously.

The Ukrainian side applies it to vessels involved in Russian oil, sanction, and military logistics. However, not every affected vessel is necessarily under personal sanctions by the EU, USA, or UK.

Reuters previously checked part of the first attacked tankers and found that not all of them were officially listed in international sanctions lists. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of vessels that Ukraine refers to as the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ or the system supporting the Russian economy and military logistics.

Why the strikes affected the grain market

The Azov Sea is used not only for oil transportation.

A significant portion of Russian grain exports passes through this region. According to Reuters, routes through the Azov Sea and the Don-Azov Canal may be linked to up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports.

After shipping restrictions, European wheat futures rose by about 4% and reached their highest level in several weeks.

This shows that the Ukrainian operation can have consequences far beyond the combat zone.

Increased risks affect:

• freight costs;
• marine insurance;
• delivery times;
• global grain prices;
• the willingness of foreign companies to send ships to Russian ports;
• Russia’s ability to fulfill export contracts.

Russian authorities began considering redirecting part of the grain cargo to other ports in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, this increases distances, transportation costs, and the load on railway infrastructure.

Legality of strikes and Ukraine’s position

Russia called Ukrainian attacks ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’.

Ukraine rejects these accusations and states that the vessels are used to support the Russian army, supply occupied Crimea, and finance the war.

Dmytro Pletenchuk reminded that Crimea, according to international law, remains the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, vessels entering the ports of the occupied peninsula without Kyiv’s permission are considered violators by the Ukrainian side.

At the same time, there is no independent international legal assessment of each of the 159 episodes yet. Nor has a complete list of all vessels with their names, owners, flags, cargo nature, and damage degree been published.

What is confirmed, and what remains Ukraine’s statement

As of July 17, several levels of confirmation can be confidently stated.

The Ukrainian command stated:

• 159 ships affected;
• 117 targets were in the Sea of Azov;
• 42 — in the Black Sea;
• the task is to paralyze Russian logistics;
• ships are predominantly disabled, not sunk.

Independent sources confirm:

• a sharp reduction in ship movement;
• restrictions in the Kerch Strait and the Don-Azov Canal;
• concentration of ships in safer areas;
• disruption of Russian export routes;
• the impact of events on grain prices;
• the need to redirect cargo through other ports.

It is currently impossible to independently confirm:

• the exact damage to each of the 159 ships;
• the number of ships completely decommissioned;
• the number of ships that have already been towed and repaired;
• the affiliation of each ship to the internationally recognized ‘shadow fleet’;
• the full composition of the cargo they carry.

A new stage of the war at sea

Over several years, Ukraine, with virtually no classic large military fleet, managed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea with the help of sea and air drones.

Now this tactic is spreading to the Sea of Azov and the internal Russian transport system.

Operation ‘MoLoChKa’ shows a transition from single strikes on individual ships to the systematic destruction of the entire logistics chain: tanker, tugboat, port, oil depot, canal, railway, substation.

For Russia, the problem is not only the cost of damaged ships. Each new strike forces route changes, increased security, dispatch of tugs, equipment repairs, higher insurance costs, and delivery delays.

NAnews — News of Israel notes: even if most of the 159 ships remain afloat, the strategic effect of the operation is measured not by the number of sunken hulls. It is measured by how many Russian routes have ceased to function normally and how many additional resources Moscow is forced to spend on ensuring occupied Crimea.

The main result of the operation at the moment is not ‘159 sunken ships’, but the actual transformation of the Sea of Azov and the adjacent part of the Black Sea into a zone of constant risk for Russian logistics.

This is what lies behind Robert Brovdi’s formula: ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

The Historical and Toponymic Commission of the Odessa City Council unanimously supported the initiative to establish a monument-bust in the city to the outstanding Odessan, writer, poet, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, without whom it is impossible to imagine the political history of the future State of Israel.

The discussion is currently about supporting the idea itself: the final location has not yet been approved, and the final decision must be made by the city council deputies, reported Odessa media on May 15, 2026.

For Odessa, this is not just a question of urban sculpture. For Israel, it’s not just news from Ukraine. Jabotinsky was born in Odessa, formed in its multilingual and Jewish intellectual environment, and then became a figure whose legacy is directly connected with the history of Zionism, Jewish self-defense, and the future statehood of Israel.

Initiative from Odessa and Jerusalem

The proposal to install a bust of Vladimir Jabotinsky was submitted to the city hall by the World Club of Odessans and the Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem. This very connection shows that it is about a memory that has long gone beyond the boundaries of one city.

Odessa gave Jabotinsky language, character, urban optics, and literary memory. Israel received from his ideas one of the important lines of political Zionism, which influenced decades of Jewish history.

The initiators proposed placing the monument near the Odessa Opera House — in Palais-Royal or on Lanzheronovskaya Street. The argument was not accidental: it was in this area that the editorial office of the “Odessa Leaflet” was once located, where Jabotinsky worked. Moreover, his novel “The Five” begins at the Opera building — one of the main symbols of old Odessa.

However, it was the location that became the main subject of debate.

Why Palais-Royal raised questions

At the meeting of the historical and toponymic commission, some participants considered the proposed locations “unsuccessful.” Palais-Royal and the space near the Opera House are the historical core of the city, associated with the protected architectural environment of Odessa.

Despite the absolute support for the idea of creating the monument, the question of its exact location remains open. Members of the historical and toponymic commission voted to recommend alternative locations for the bust together with the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning.

The main argument of the opponents of such a location was not about Jabotinsky himself, but about preserving the historical appearance of the center. A new monument in this area may raise questions about the visual balance of the space, especially considering the status of Odessa’s historical center and the requirements for protecting the urban environment.

“We must approach this issue in a balanced way, considering Odessa’s status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site,” emphasized the relevant department.

Since the historical and toponymic commission is an advisory body, its decision is of a recommendatory nature. The final decision on the location and permission for the construction of the monument must be made by the deputies at a session of the Odessa City Council.

As a result, the commission supported the idea of the monument but recommended looking for other possible locations together with relevant city structures. That is, the political and cultural “yes” has already been voiced, but the architectural point on the map has not yet been set.

Why Jabotinsky is important for Odessa, Ukraine, and Israel

Vladimir, or Ze’ev, Jabotinsky was born in Odessa in 1880. He was a writer, journalist, translator, publicist, political thinker, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement. His name is associated with Revisionist Zionism, the idea of Jewish self-defense, and the creation of the Jewish Legion within the British Army.

For Israel, Jabotinsky is not a museum figure. His legacy continues to be part of the country’s political memory, especially in the right-wing Zionist camp. The Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem, as a participant in the initiative, makes this bridge between Odessa and Israel particularly noticeable.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this story in this context: Odessa is returning to the public space not just a famous compatriot, but a person whose ideas became part of the road to Jewish statehood.

For the Ukrainian context, this initiative is also important. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Odessa continues to rethink its urban space, deciding which names should be visible in the city center and which symbols of the past require reconsideration. The monument to Jabotinsky in this sense can become part of a broader work with memory — not imperial, but urban, Jewish, Ukrainian, and European.

Odessa in Jabotinsky’s biography

Jabotinsky always remained connected with Odessa, even when his life took place far beyond its borders. His novel “The Five” became one of the most famous literary texts about old Odessa, its Jewish environment, family memory, and the disappearing world of the early 20th century.

Therefore, the debate about the monument’s location does not cancel the main thing: the city has effectively recognized the need to return Jabotinsky to its visible historical space.

This is especially symbolic for Odessa, where Jewish history was not an external addition to the city’s image, but one of its foundations. Odessa’s Jews created newspapers, schools, theaters, literary circles, trade networks, political movements, and charitable structures. Jabotinsky grew up in this complex urban environment — multilingual, argumentative, ambitious, and very Odessan.

Memory has already been attempted to be preserved — and it has been destroyed

In Odessa, this is not the first attempt to perpetuate the memory of Jabotinsky. A commemorative bas-relief was installed on the house on Yevreyskaya Street, where he lived, back in 1997. Later it was damaged and then stolen by vandals. Currently, the city maintains a mural depicting Jabotinsky on Bazarnaya, 33 — in the house where he was born and raised.

This detail gives the new initiative additional meaning.

The monument to Jabotinsky is not only a question of bronze, pedestal, and city commission. It is a question of protecting memory. Especially in a region where Jewish heritage often exists between respect, oblivion, political disputes, and direct vandalism.

What will happen next

After the decision of the historical and toponymic commission, city structures need to select a suitable place for the monument. Then the issue must go through further procedures and be submitted for consideration by the deputies of the Odessa City Council.

It is not yet possible to say that the bust has already been installed or that the point near the Opera House has been finally approved. It is more accurate to formulate it this way: the commission supported the initiative to install a monument to Vladimir Jabotinsky in Odessa, but the location is still being agreed upon.

For Israel, this story is important already now.

It shows that Ukraine, despite the war, continues to work with historical memory not only through renaming streets and dismantling imperial symbols but also through the return of names associated with Jewish history, Zionism, and the future of Israel.

In the case of Jabotinsky, this is especially true. He was a son of Odessa and at the same time one of those people whose ideas became part of the great Jewish path to statehood.

Therefore, the future monument in Odessa is not just a bust of a famous native of the city. It is a sign that between Ukraine, Israel, and the Jewish people, there is a memory that cannot be reduced to diplomatic statements. It stands in biographies, books, streets, houses, stolen bas-reliefs, and new decisions of city commissions.

On July 15, 2026, a small USSR flag that participated in the historic Apollo 11 mission was sold at a Sotheby’s auction.

According to published data, a piece of red fabric approximately 10 by 15 centimeters was sold for 80 thousand dollars.

But the value of this item lies not in the sickle, hammer, or Soviet symbolism. The flag is a reminder of a time when two rival superpowers could simultaneously compete, converse, and leave room for gestures of goodwill.

Today the contrast looks especially sharp.

In 1969, an American astronaut voluntarily took the USSR flag to the Moon to emphasize that space exploration should unite humanity.

Decades later, Putin’s Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, cooperating with the Iranian regime, hosting representatives of Hamas in Moscow, politically shielding Hezbollah, and using international platforms to pressure Israel.

The story of the small flag became a story of what path could have been chosen — and where Putin’s Russia actually led.

The flag was a gesture, not a Soviet victory on the Moon

At the Sotheby’s auction, the item was listed as lot №45 under the title:

Flown to the Moon on Apollo 11 — Buzz Aldrin’s USSR Flag.

The flag belonged to Buzz Aldrin’s family trust. It retained the astronaut’s signature and a blue pen inscription:

FLOWN TO THE MOON ON APOLLO XI.

The preliminary estimate was 7–10 thousand dollars. Sotheby’s public card confirms that the auction ended on July 15, 2026, but the final result is available only to registered users.

It is important to understand: this was not a flag planted by Soviet cosmonauts on the lunar surface.

It was taken by Buzz Aldrin, one of the first two people to set foot on the Moon.

The flag was in his Personal Preference Kit — PPK, a small personal set of items allowed for each astronaut. Along with the Soviet flag, Aldrin took flags of the USA, Texas, and his native New Jersey.

In a letter accompanying the lot, Aldrin explained his choice as an act of diplomacy and a gesture of goodwill between the USA and the Soviet Union. According to him, he wanted to show that Apollo 11 was an achievement of humanity that transcended national borders.

The flag flew aboard the command module Columbia. It reached lunar orbit and returned to Earth, but there is no evidence of it being transferred to the lunar module and the Moon’s surface.

Thus, it is not about Soviet presence on the Moon, but about a personal gesture of an American astronaut towards his country’s main rival.

Even at the height of the Cold War, there was room for contact

The Apollo 11 mission was primarily an American victory in the space race.

The USSR was the first to launch an artificial satellite, the first to send a human into space, but the USA was the first to land people on the Moon.

Despite this, the American side tried to give the flight an international meaning.

On board were flags of American states, territories, and other countries. A silicon disk with messages from leaders of 73 countries was left on the Moon. A plaque with the words: “We came in peace for all mankind” was attached to the landing stage of the Eagle.

Six years later, symbolic gestures turned into real cooperation.

On July 17, 1975, the American Apollo spacecraft docked in orbit with the Soviet Soyuz. Astronaut Thomas Stafford and cosmonaut Alexei Leonov exchanged a historic handshake. The joined spacecraft remained together for about 47 hours, with crews visiting each other, conducting experiments, and practicing technologies for future joint missions.

The USA and the USSR did not cease to be adversaries.

They still had nuclear missiles, intelligence, propaganda, competition for allies, and fundamentally different political systems. But even in such conditions, they understood that there were areas where cooperation was necessary for the safety of the entire world.

Buzz Aldrin’s small Soviet flag was one of the first symbols of this possibility.

Putin’s Russia chose the opposite path

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia had a chance to become part of the system of international cooperation.

However, the Putin regime gradually built a state for which external aggression, blackmail, propaganda, and the search for enemies became a way to maintain power.

The culmination was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The Russian army began destroying Ukrainian cities, attacking residential buildings, hospitals, power plants, and other civilian infrastructure. In June 2026, the European Council again stated that Russia had intensified large-scale missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and energy facilities.

On November 23, 2022, the European Parliament recognized Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state using terrorist methods.

The decision was supported by 494 deputies. The European Parliament pointed to deliberate attacks by Russian forces on civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. This was a political resolution, not an inclusion in a pan-European legal list, as no such mechanism existed in the EU. But the assessment was crystal clear: the actions of the Russian regime are considered terrorism.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also recognized the Russian regime as terrorist and condemned Russia’s use of energy terrorism against the population.

Therefore, the expression “Russia is a terrorist” did not arise as an emotional slogan of social networks. It became a political and legal assessment of a state that turned missiles on cities into a tool of pressure.

The war tied Russia with Iran

For Israel, it is especially important who Putin’s Russia has built a new system of alliances with.

One of Moscow’s main partners became the Iranian regime.

Iran supplied Russia with drones, missiles, ammunition, and technologies related to their production for the war against Ukraine. The European Union repeatedly imposed sanctions against Iranian companies, military, and intermediaries involved in supplying weapons to the Russian army.

In January 2026, the EU imposed new restrictions, emphasizing that Iran’s military support for Russia continues and poses a direct threat to European security.

Cooperation works both ways.

According to the US State Department, in response to Iranian military assistance, Russia began offering Tehran an unprecedented level of defense cooperation — in the fields of missiles, electronics, and air defense. The British parliamentary committee also indicated that Moscow is likely helping Iran’s missile program in exchange for support in the war against Ukraine.

On January 17, 2025, Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a twenty-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The document provides for the development of military and military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, exchange of intelligence information, interaction in energy, finance, and nuclear technologies. It is not a treaty of unconditional mutual defense, but it consolidates the strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran.

For Israel, this is not a distant European problem.

Iran uses Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other armed formations for attacks on Israel and destabilization of the Middle East region. The European Council directly calls Hamas and Hezbollah part of the system of Iranian-supported terrorist and armed groups.

It turns out to be a vicious circle.

Iran helps Russia destroy Ukrainian cities.

Russia strengthens the regime that arms and finances Israel’s enemies.

Hamas gains political legitimacy in Moscow

Russia does not recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and has been receiving its leaders at the official level for many years.

Moscow’s behavior after the massacre on October 7, 2023 is particularly telling.

Already on October 26, 2023, less than three weeks after the attack on Israel, a Hamas delegation arrived in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed the visit. Simultaneously, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran was in the Russian capital.

In January 2024, the Russian Foreign Ministry again received a Hamas delegation. Moscow claimed it demanded the release of hostages, including Russian citizens, but the very fact of an official reception after the mass killing of Israelis provided the terrorist organization with an international platform and political legitimacy.

Contacts continued in 2025: a delegation led by Mousa Abu Marzouk again held talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.

There is no confirmed open-source data on direct Russian arms supplies to Hamas.

However, assistance is not only military.

Official meetings, refusal to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization, diplomatic protection, and providing a Moscow platform allow the group’s leaders to demonstrate that after October 7, they were not in complete international isolation.

Moscow protects Hezbollah too

The situation with Hezbollah is similar.

It was Iran that created and armed this organization for decades, turning it into one of the largest missile threats to Israel.

The Russian Foreign Ministry not only refused to take a tough stance against Hezbollah but also publicly emphasized its resilience.

In October 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that Hezbollah, including its military wing, retained control and demonstrated organization. Simultaneously, Moscow accused Israel and its Western partners of expanding the conflict.

This does not prove direct Russian financing of the organization.

But such rhetoric shows whose side the Kremlin’s political sympathy is on. Instead of unconditionally condemning the group that shelled northern Israel with rockets and drones, Russian officials effectively assessed its combat capability and blamed Israel.

At the same time, strengthening strategic partnership with Iran objectively strengthens the state that finances, arms, and directs Hezbollah.

In the UN, Russia systematically opposes Israel

The assertion that Russia votes against Israel in absolutely all cases would be inaccurate.

But Moscow’s overall line is clear: on international platforms, it systematically supports documents directed against Israel and resists attempts to hold Hamas accountable for the war.

In October 2023, Russia submitted its own draft resolution on Gaza to the UN Security Council. The text condemned violence against civilians, but Hamas was not mentioned at all, despite the massacre on October 7 and the hostage-taking. The project did not receive the necessary number of votes.

In June 2024, Russia was the only member of the Security Council to abstain from voting on Resolution №2735, which supported a ceasefire plan, the release of hostages, and a negotiation process. The other 14 members of the Security Council voted in favor.

Moscow seeks to present itself as a mediator, but its practical actions speak otherwise.

It receives Hamas, cooperates with Iran, politically shields Hezbollah, and uses the UN primarily to pressure Israel and oppose the USA.

This is no longer neutral mediation.

It is part of a broader strategy in which any force capable of weakening the West, Ukraine, or Israel is seen by the Kremlin as a useful partner.

What the sold flag really symbolizes

The Soviet flag that flew to the Moon with Apollo 11 does not remind of the greatness of the USSR.

It reminds of the possibility of dialogue between adversaries.

Buzz Aldrin did not support the Soviet regime. The USA did not abandon competition and did not forget the threat from Moscow. But the American astronaut considered it possible to take the symbol of a rival state on a flight as a sign that there are achievements belonging to all humanity.

In 1975, this gesture continued with a handshake between an American and a Soviet cosmonaut in orbit.

Today, Putin’s Russia offers a completely different symbolic series:

• rockets over Kyiv;
• Iranian drones over Ukrainian cities;
• agreements with a regime threatening Israel’s destruction;
• Hamas delegations in Moscow;
• political shielding of Hezbollah;
• and votes in the UN, where condemning Israel is almost always more important for the Kremlin than condemning the terrorists who attacked it.

For NAnews — Israel News, the story of the flag is important precisely because of this contrast.

Once, even during the Cold War, a small flag could become a sign of respect between rivals.

Putin, with his war against Ukraine, has turned modern Russia into a state that seeks not cooperation, but alliances with dictatorships, terrorist structures, and enemies of Israel.

Buzz Aldrin’s red flag remains an artifact of a lost opportunity.

And today’s Russia chose not a handshake in space, but rockets, terror, and partnership with those who fight against Ukraine and Israel.

On July 15, 2026, Israeli lawyer Alex Zernopolsky announced the conclusion of a case that his office had been handling for about three years: the Jerusalem District Court ordered the Population and Immigration Authority to grant permanent status to Liza K. and her mother Oksana K.

This decision comes after four years of struggle, numerous appeals, administrative procedures, and a court appeal. In 2022, Israeli authorities demanded that the mother and her minor daughter leave the country and return to Ukraine — at a time when their native Kherson was under Russian occupation.

Now the court has recognized that serious errors were made in the consideration of the case, and the family’s real connection to Israel was not properly assessed.

Deportation to Kherson during a full-scale war

Oksana K. first came to Israel in 2011. She later married an Israeli citizen, and in 2012 began the process of legalizing her status based on marriage. Her daughter Liza, who came to the country as a child, lived with her in Israel.

The family settled in Petah Tikva. Liza attended an Israeli school, spoke Hebrew fluently, and spent almost her entire conscious life in Israel.

Oksana’s husband died in August 2019. After his death, the usual procedure for obtaining status was halted, and the mother and daughter appealed to the Ministry of Interior to allow them to stay under special humanitarian circumstances.

The review was delayed.

On February 24, 2022, a few hours after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oksana and Liza attended a scheduled meeting at the Population Authority. They waited about six months for a response to their appeal.

In early September 2022, the Ministry of Interior reported that it did not consider their situation sufficient humanitarian grounds. The women were ordered to leave Israel within 14 days and return to Kherson, which was then under Russian control. Oksana’s eldest son was serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and participating in combat at that time.

At the time of the decision, Liza was still a minor. She was born on December 6, 2004, so in September 2022 she was 17 years old, not 15, as stated in some later retellings of this story.

Why the Ministry of Interior denied the family

The Population Authority argued that long-term residence in Israel alone is not sufficient reason to grant status.

In its official response, the agency stated that Oksana, besides her daughter, had no close relatives in Israel, while her son and sister remained in Ukraine. The Ministry of Interior also cited Oksana’s trips to Ukraine and questioned whether Israel was truly the center of the family’s life.

Some officials’ doubts concerned Oksana’s relationship with her deceased Israeli husband. According to the Population Authority, the legalization process was stopped and resumed several times, and the circumstances presented were insufficient to grant humanitarian status.

However, the agency’s formal approach almost did not take into account the daughter’s life.

Liza grew up in Israel, graduated from school here, spoke mainly in Hebrew, had friends, a team, coaches, and a professional future in the country. Ukraine remained her country of birth, but practically all her social and sports life was connected to Israel.

Israeli team — without Israeli status

Liza began playing handball shortly after arriving in the country. In the second grade, she enrolled in the Maccabi Petah Tikva sports school and later joined the youth and reserve teams of Israel.

The Israeli Handball Federation publicly supported the athlete back in September 2022. The women’s team coach, Reuven Yosfolski, described her as a tall, strong, and athletic handball player with serious technical capabilities and prospects in Israeli sports.

An absurd situation arose: Liza trained in the Israeli team uniform and was supposed to represent Israel in competitions, but the state itself refused to recognize her as a permanent resident.

Due to the lack of regulated status, she could not work normally, serve in the IDF, use regular medical insurance, or freely travel to international tournaments. In 2023, the athlete said she missed the European Championship, although she remained on the team until the last moment: the lack of documents prevented her from traveling with the team.

Liza also could not fulfill another dream — to undergo military conversion. Her school friends received draft notices and began service, while the girl who wanted to voluntarily serve Israel remained without official status.

Meanwhile, her sports career continued. Liza played for the adult team Maccabi Petah Tikva, was recognized as one of the breakthrough athletes of the season, and during her loan to Bnot Herzliya, participated in the club’s championship playoff matches.

Three years of administrative struggle

Alex Zernopolsky’s office got involved in the case at the stage of appealing the deportation decision.

After filing the appeal, the initial decision was overturned, and the mother and daughter’s application was sent for consideration by the interdepartmental humanitarian commission. However, this did not mean immediate receipt of documents.

According to Zernopolsky, the Ministry of Interior continued to delay the process. Family representatives were told that the police’s position was awaited, then claimed that the decision was under review by the central office. The internal appeal remained unanswered for a long time.

On July 31, 2023, the humanitarian commission reviewed the case again, but by September, a final decision had still not been made. The mother and daughter continued to live in Israel without regulated status, medical insurance, or certainty about the future.

The case then went through the Appeals Tribunal for Entry and Stay in Israel and reached the Jerusalem District Court.

What the Jerusalem District Court recognized

The final turn occurred on July 5, 2026.

Judge Tamar Bar-Asher of the Jerusalem District Court granted the administrative appeal of Liza K. and Oksana K. The court ruled that the Appeals Tribunal incorrectly assessed their connection to Israel.

The judge noted that Oksana’s trips to Ukraine could not automatically be used as evidence that the center of the family’s life was outside Israel. These trips needed to be considered in the context of her marriage, family situation, and many years of living in the country.

One of the key violations was that the Population Authority staff did not conduct a separate full interview with Liza. Her individual story — childhood in Israel, education, language, sports career, social connections, and desire to serve in the IDF — was not properly studied.

The court also took into account the conclusion of the representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, who recommended granting the mother and daughter’s request.

As a result, the court not only sent the case for another review but ordered the Population Authority to grant both women permanent resident status in Israel.

“As if I was released from prison”

After the decision, 21-year-old Liza told Israeli media that for the first time in many years, she felt solid ground under her feet.

She compared the years of uncertainty to being in detention and said she now finally feels part of the country. Obtaining permanent status allows her to voluntarily enlist in the IDF, begin the conversion process, and continue her professional sports career without previous restrictions.

Alex Zernopolsky called the decision the end of years of injustice against the widow of an Israeli citizen and her daughter — an athlete representing Israeli handball.

“I am glad that justice for the mother and daughter was achieved, even if delayed by several years,” the lawyer said after the court’s decision.

Why this decision is important for Israel

Liza K.’s story shows how serious the consequences of a formal approach to humanitarian cases can be.

A person can grow up in Israel, graduate from an Israeli school, speak Hebrew, represent the national team, aspire to serve in the IDF, and still remain a temporary foreigner to the state system for years.

The court’s position on minor children included in their parents’ immigration cases is especially important. Their circumstances cannot be considered only as an attachment to the mother’s or father’s documents. State bodies are obliged to separately assess where the child grew up, what language they speak, where they study, with which society they are connected, and which country they truly consider their home.

For Liza and Oksana K., the court decision ended almost four years of struggle against deportation.

For the Israeli system, this decision served as a reminder: humanitarian circumstances consist not only of passport stamps, entry and exit dates, or formal procedural stages. Behind each such case is a human life that cannot be put on hold for four years.

Page – Law Office of Alex Zernopolsky

In his native Buchach, a monument was erected in his honor, one of the city’s streets is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer is at the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

Shmuel Agnon (born July 17, 1888, Buchach, Ukraine) is a famous Jewish writer whose life and work are closely connected with Ukraine. The events of his most famous novels, “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, take place in his native Buchach and its surroundings.

In Ukrainian Buchach

To date, not many of Agnon’s works have been translated into Ukrainian, but interest in them is growing in Ukraine, which means that Ukrainian readers are in for an acquaintance with his books.

The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate of 1966 “For his profoundly original narrative art with motifs from Jewish folk tales.” He became the first laureate of one of the Nobel Prizes representing Israel. He wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish.

The influence of the Talmud on Shmuel Agnon’s work was significant. He was born as Shmuel Yosef Halevi Czaczkes in July 1887 in Buchach, now Chortkiv district of Ternopil region. His father, Shalom Mordechai Halevi Czaczkes, was a rabbi and fur trader, knowledgeable in the Torah and Talmud, and often explained them to the local Jewish community.

Shmuel’s mother, Esther Farb, and grandfather, Yehuda Farb, were also educated people. Shmuel attended a cheder and received a good home education, studying Yiddish, Hebrew, German, and Ukrainian languages, as well as the Talmud under his father’s guidance.

Starting to write early, at the age of 8, Shmuel published stories in local newspapers. At 19, he moved to Lviv and worked in a Jewish newspaper. In 1907, his first novella “Forsaken Wives” was published, which in Hebrew sounds like “Agnon,” becoming his pseudonym and official surname since 1924.

Palestine and Berlin

In the same year, Agnon went to Palestine, and then to Berlin, where he wrote, lectured, gave private Hebrew lessons, and published works in the newspaper Jude.

He was supported by patron Zalman Schocken, who provided a five-year scholarship for organizing an anthology of Jewish literature and writing new works. Agnon’s works were published in German at Schocken’s publishing house in Berlin.

Love Against All Odds

In Berlin, Shmuel Agnon found true love — Esther Marks, or “dear Esterlein,” as he called her. The girl’s father was against their marriage, but they married anyway, and the ceremony was conducted by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg.

They had a daughter, Emuna (“faith”), and a son, Shalom Mordechai, whom they called Hemdat (“soul’s desire”) at home.

Three Destroyed Homes

In 1924, the family moved to Jerusalem. The move was preceded by tragedy: the writer’s house in Hamburg burned down, destroying the library and manuscripts, including the novel “The Community of the Ever-Living.”

Agnon decided to return to the Promised Land. He moved to Jerusalem first, and a year later called for Esther and the children. In 1927, an earthquake occurred in Jerusalem.

“The disaster did not destroy our souls,” Agnon wrote, “only the house we lived in.”

Two years later, in 1929, the new Agnon home in Jerusalem was looted during Arab riots. “Esterlein,” he wrote to his wife, “we need to start everything anew: the house is ruined, things are stolen or broken. But… do not grieve and do not think about it.”

World Fame and the Nobel Prize

Agnon gained world fame in the late 1940s when his works began to be published in English. In 1966, Agnon became the first writer writing in Hebrew and Yiddish to receive the Nobel Prize for the novels “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night.”

In his speech, he noted that he draws inspiration from spiritual literature.

“Keep Quiet! Agnon is Working!”

Israel is proud of its Nobel laureate. When a construction site was opened in the Talpiot area, Mayor Teddy Kollek installed a sign saying: “Keep quiet! Agnon is working!” European critics compared him to Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and William Faulkner.

Agnon wrote in various genres but was wounded by the fact that many of his readers became victims of the Holocaust. His last novel, “Just Recently,” set in Palestine during the Second Aliyah, is dedicated to the catastrophe of European Jewry.

Memory of the Writer

Shmuel Agnon died of a heart attack on February 17, 1970, in Jerusalem at the age of 82. He was buried on the Mount of Olives, and his apartment became a memorial museum.

In his native Buchach, which he last visited in 1930, a monument was erected in his honor, a street is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer adorns the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

A series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ships in the Azov and Black Seas has escalated from isolated sabotage operations into a large-scale campaign against Russia’s military and economic logistics. The restriction of navigation, the destruction of an FSB ship, rising wheat prices, and the search for new routes for grain export have even led pro-Kremlin military bloggers to publicly question why Russian ports and the fleet have been left virtually defenseless.

There has been no literal uprising in Russia yet. There are no protesting sailors on the streets, and the Black Sea Fleet command has not turned against the Kremlin.

However, something unusual has happened in the Russian information system: pro-military Telegram channels, which for years justified the war against Ukraine, have begun openly accusing officials and military leadership of failing to protect their own fleet.

The trigger was a series of Ukrainian strikes conducted from July 6 to 15, 2026. Over nine days, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit 116 ships in the Azov Sea, after which the operation moved to the Black Sea, where on the night of July 14-15, another 20 Russian ships were struck.

Nine days that changed the situation in the Azov Sea

Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar,’ reported that Ukrainian units consistently attacked Russian tankers, bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, and other vessels involved in transportation between the Azov Sea, the Volga-Don Canal, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea.

The goal was not necessarily to sink every vessel. The Ukrainian side aimed to disable ships, force crews to abandon them, and leave damaged vessels adrift without the ability to continue operations.

Special attention was paid to the so-called feeder fleet — small and medium tankers that deliver petroleum products from Russian river and Azov ports to larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Strikes on such a system can disrupt several logistics chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian military facilities;
• export of petroleum products;
• transportation of grain and other agricultural cargo;
• movement of ships between the Don, Azov, and Black Seas.

Reuters notes that the exact location and timing of each strike shown by the Ukrainian military could not be independently verified. The number 116 is also based on Ukrainian command data and does not mean that all these ships were sunk. However, subsequent navigation restrictions, satellite images, and admissions by Russian regional authorities confirm that the operation had real consequences.

Russia itself closed key maritime routes

On July 10, 2026, Russian border services effectively halted passage through the Azov-Don Canal — a shipping route connecting the Don River with the Azov Sea.

Simultaneously, shipping companies received notification that applications for passage through the Kerch Strait from 18:10 local time would not be accepted. The Russian side did not specify the duration of the restrictions.

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime exit from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. The Azov-Don Canal, in turn, connects the Azov Sea with Russia’s internal waterways system.

As a result, commercial vessels could move within the Azov Sea but could not normally leave it through the Kerch Strait or go through the canal towards the Don and Volga. Russian authorities did not officially announce a complete closure of the area, but industry sources confirmed the presence of restrictions.

Satellite images show a sharp change in maritime traffic. On June 6, 2026, more than 40 ships were waiting to pass near the Kerch Strait. In images from July 11, only a few ships remained in the same area.

Reuters examined more than 30 satellite images and noted that before the start of the Ukrainian campaign, ship clusters near the strait were regularly observed. After the restrictions were introduced, the usual picture disappeared.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the number of Russian ships in the Azov Sea decreased from 267 on June 30 to approximately 120 by July 11 — about 55%. Some ships left before the routes were closed, some may have turned off their transponders, and damaged ships were sent for repair or remained in the area.

Russian grain exports were hit

The Azov Sea is important for Russia not only from a military standpoint.

Up to a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports pass through the ports and routes of this region. The Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai are among Russia’s main grain-producing regions, and nearby ports are used for exporting grain, sunflower oil, and other goods.

After information about navigation restrictions emerged, Euronext wheat prices rose by almost 4%, reaching a six-week high.

On July 14, 2026, the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Rostov region, Anna Kasyanenko, acknowledged that the region, along with exporters, began working on alternative routes for grain export due to ‘temporary difficulties’ with navigation in the Azov Sea.

The Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture simultaneously claimed that the events would supposedly not affect the domestic market and the country’s export capabilities. But the very fact of urgently seeking bypass routes shows that the problem has gone far beyond military reports.

Redirecting cargo to rail or distant ports means additional costs, a shortage of wagons, overloading of transport infrastructure, and increased delivery times. Even if Russia can partially restore exports, its cost inevitably rises.

The destruction of the ‘Izumrud’ and questions to Russian command

A separate symbol of this campaign was the destruction of the Russian border patrol ship of the second rank ‘Izumrud’, belonging to the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service.

The Ukrainian Navy reported that the ship was attacked near Novorossiysk by a marine drone Sargan-3000. According to Ukrainian data, there were casualties and injuries among the crew.

On July 14, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published a satellite image of the damaged ship near the quay wall. The Ukrainian side stated that the image confirms the destruction of the ‘Izumrud.’ Russia did not provide detailed official information about the ship’s condition.

This ship was already known in Ukraine.

On November 25, 2018, the ‘Izumrud’ participated in a Russian operation in the Kerch Strait when Russian forces attacked Ukrainian military boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol,’ as well as the tug ‘Yany Kapu.’ At that time, 24 Ukrainian sailors were captured.

Almost eight years later, the ship that participated in that operation itself became the target of a Ukrainian marine drone.

Even Kremlin supporters began asking questions

It was the strike on the FSB ship that caused an especially sharp reaction in the Russian pro-military community.

A military blogger associated with the Kremlin publicly asked why the entrance to the port was not blocked by protective nets and why Russian forces could not detect Ukrainian drones in advance.

He also accused officials of insufficient attention to protecting Russian ports from marine and aerial drones.

Another Russian milblogger posed an even more unpleasant question for the command: how did Ukrainian devices manage to approach the FSB ship unnoticed and strike near one of the most important basing areas of the Russian fleet.

The Institute for the Study of War notes that such criticism does not come from the Russian opposition but from people who support the war and demand that the Kremlin conduct it even more harshly. Therefore, their outrage cannot be considered an anti-war protest.

This is a different type of conflict — a clash between Russian propaganda, which for years told of the country’s complete security, and the reality in which Ukrainian drones reach ships, ports, and logistics facilities far from the front line.

The Black Sea became the next stage

After the active phase of the operation in the Azov Sea was completed, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces shifted strikes to the Black Sea.

On the night of July 14-15, 2026, according to Robert Brovdi, another 20 Russian ships were attacked:

• 17 oil tankers;
• two gas carriers;
• one tug.

Brovdi stated that the previous phase with 116 targets in the Azov Sea was completed, and the new phase will focus mainly on the Black Sea.

Thus, Russia faced not isolated attacks but a consistent campaign covering the entire connected maritime system: internal waterways, the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the attacks ‘terrorism’ and stated that Ukraine’s actions allegedly go beyond piracy.

The Ukrainian side responds that the targets are ships and vessels that support the Russian military machine, ensuring the transportation of fuel, petroleum products, and other resources used to continue the war.

Robert Brovdi responded to Lavrov with the phrase:

‘No piracy, Lavrov — just business. Your bloody business.’

Reuters quotes a source in the Russian shipping industry who compared the ships in the Azov Sea to targets before a firing squad and suggested that soon there may be almost no undamaged ships left in the area. Several grain carriers attacked on July 13 and 14, according to industry sources, caught fire.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, events in the Azov and Black Seas have not only military significance.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and sunflower oil. Any prolonged restrictions on maritime trade can affect global prices, insurance rates, freight costs, and supply routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The first consequences have already manifested in the European wheat market, although it is too early to assert that the July campaign will lead to a long-term increase in food prices in Israel.

The strategic aspect is no less important.

Ukraine demonstrates that relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can paralyze ship movement, force the enemy to close straits and canals, and pose a threat to a larger fleet without classical sea superiority.

For Israel, which simultaneously faces threats from drones, missiles, attacks on maritime routes, and attempts to disrupt trade through the Red Sea, the Ukrainian experience is of particular interest.

NANews — Israel News views the events not as a story of a sudden ‘rebellion’ by Russian propagandists, but as a sign of a deeper crisis.

The Kremlin promised that the war would not approach Russian cities and ports. Now Russian ships are burning in the Azov Sea, an FSB ship is destroyed near a base, exporters are seeking bypass routes, and war supporters are asking where the protection they were told about four years ago has gone.

The Ukrainian operation has not yet completely destroyed Russian maritime logistics. There is no independent confirmation of the defeat of each of the claimed 136 ships.

But the main result is already clear: Russia is forced to change routes, restrict its own navigation, and spend more resources on protecting ports that were recently considered a safe rear.

And the public panic of pro-military Russian channels shows that marine drones hit not only ships.

They destroy one of the Kremlin’s main myths — the myth of a state capable of controlling the sea, protecting its own territory, and continuing the war against Ukraine with impunity.

Representatives of Ukraine were among the participants of the international educational seminar of Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, which brought together 209 educators, teachers, and leaders of Jewish schools from 26 countries in Israel.

Over eight days, participants familiarized themselves with modern life in Israel, visited historical and natural sites, met with Israeli educators, local authorities, security personnel, and community members who have experienced difficult events in recent years.

The international program took place in Israel from July 7 to 14, 2026 under the leadership of the educational division of KKL — Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, also known as the Jewish National Fund.

Ukraine among 26 countries — but the names of the participants have not yet been announced

The Israeli publication Yeshuvnik reported that representatives from the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other countries participated in the annual seminar.

Thus, the participation of the Ukrainian delegation is officially confirmed by the organizers.

However, KKL and Israeli media have not yet reported how many educators came from Ukraine, which cities and educational institutions they represented, nor have they published their names.

It is only known that among the 209 participants were teachers, directors, and leaders of Jewish schools, as well as specialists in formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education.

For Ukraine, participation in such a seminar is of particular importance.

Ukrainian Jewish schools and communities continue to operate under conditions of full-scale war, air raids, forced family migration, and partial transition to distance learning.

Therefore, the opportunity for direct communication with colleagues from Israel and other countries becomes not only a professional exchange but also a way to maintain the connection of Ukrainian Jewish youth with Israel, Jewish history, and international communities.

The very fact of the presence of representatives from Ukraine shows that Ukrainian Jewish education remains part of the global Jewish space even under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression.

What was included in the educational program

The seminar was not an ordinary familiarization trip but a week-long educational program across different regions of Israel.

Participants visited natural, archaeological, and historical sites, learned about the work of KKL, met with educators, security personnel, municipal leaders, and local residents.

Special attention was paid to communities affected after the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war.

Educators were told not only about the consequences of the tragedy but also about the restoration of Israeli settlements, mutual assistance, the return of residents, and the work of educational institutions in crisis conditions.

The organizers aimed to show participants modern Israel not only through media reports and political debates but through direct meetings with people.

Educators were to see a country that simultaneously faces military, social, and educational challenges and continues to restore affected communities.

For many foreign teachers, such meetings become the basis for future lessons and conversations with students.

NANews — News of Israel notes that educators often become the main source of systematic knowledge about Israel for children in the diaspora.

The perception of Israel by the next generation of Jewish youth depends on the materials and personal stories they bring home.

Education after October 7

The official program of the American delegation allows for a more detailed understanding of the main directions of the international seminar.

Participants were offered lectures, discussions, and practical sessions dedicated to teaching Jewish history and Zionism after October 7.

The program also included familiarization with KKL educational materials, visits to Jewish National Fund sites, historical places of the Jewish people, and participation in volunteer work.

The issue of how to talk to children and teenagers about Israel in conditions of war, rising anti-Semitism, and harsh international debates was separately considered.

For educators, this is a challenging task.

They need to talk about the terrorist attack, hostages, casualties, and war, but at the same time not turn the study of Israel solely into a conversation about violence and tragedy.

That is why the organizers included topics of Israeli society’s resilience, mutual responsibility, community restoration, ecology, the country’s history, and modern educational work in the program.

KKL also provided educators with materials they could use after returning to their own schools.

American participants, for example, had previously committed to preparing educational projects for their educational institutions in collaboration with JNF-USA representatives.

They were expected to talk about the trip on social media, speak to their community, and incorporate the experience gained into school programs.

These conditions apply directly to the American delegation, but they show the general approach of the organizers: the seminar should continue in the form of lessons, events, and projects after the participants return home.

Educators are called ‘messengers of Israeli history’

KKL Chairman Eyal Ostrinsky stated that the decision of hundreds of Jewish educators to come to Israel during a difficult period is an expression of trust, responsibility, and shared destiny.

According to him, educators become a kind of ‘messengers of Israeli history’ in their communities.

Direct acquaintance with the country, its people, and the values of Zionism should provide them with tools for educating the next generation of the Jewish people.

KKL emphasizes that such educational programs help strengthen ties between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

The task is not only to transmit knowledge.

Participants from different countries get to know each other, discuss teaching methods, and have the opportunity to create joint educational programs.

After the seminar, they return to their countries with materials, personal impressions, and contacts of colleagues.

For representatives of Ukraine, this experience can be especially important, as Ukrainian Jewish schools are simultaneously part of Ukrainian society, the international Jewish space, and the system of relations between Ukraine and Israel.

Ukrainian educators participate in KKL programs not for the first time

The participation of the Ukrainian side in the KKL international seminar has a long history.

In July 2023, a similar program was attended by 250 educators from 22 countries and 27 educational institutions.

At that time, KKL separately reported that Ukraine was represented by 14 teachers.

One of the participants was Ukrainian educator Natala Androshenko.

She said that materials from previous KKL seminars were used in her school in geography, ecology, history, Jewish tradition lessons, and in the study of nature.

According to her, such classes helped students become closer to Israel and better understand Zionism.

Androshenko also noted the value of communication with directors and educators of Jewish schools from different countries.

There is no confirmation that she participated in the 2026 seminar.

However, her story shows how the knowledge gained by Ukrainian educators in Israel is subsequently used in working with children in Ukraine.

This practical result is one of the main meanings of the program.

Educators do not just visit Israel but return to their schools with ready-made methodological materials, new contacts, and personal stories.

For NANews — News of Israel, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the seminar is also important as an example of the ongoing dialogue between Israel and Ukraine at the level of education and Jewish communities.

Such connections do not always receive noticeable attention in major media, but they are the ones that form long-term relationships between countries.

Political statements change, governments argue, but the work of teachers with children continues for years.

What remains unknown

KKL confirmed the presence of representatives from Ukraine but did not publish the composition of the delegation.

At the time of publication, the following are unknown:

— the exact number of participants from Ukraine;

— their names and positions;

— the cities they represented;

— the names of Jewish schools and organizations;

— the separate program of the Ukrainian group;

— the topics or projects that Ukrainian educators plan to implement after returning.

Therefore, it cannot yet be asserted that a certain number of Ukrainian teachers or representatives of specific organizations arrived in Israel.

But the very fact of Ukrainian participation is confirmed by both the Israeli publication and the KKL announcement.

From July 7 to 14, 2026, representatives of Ukraine, along with educators from 25 other countries, studied Israel’s experience, exchanged educational practices, and discussed how to preserve the Jewish identity of the next generation in a world that has become even more complex and divided after October 7.

Ukrainian center Dmitry Skapintsev completed his performances for the basketball club Hapoel Jerusalem after one season in Israel. The contract with the 28-year-old basketball player was not extended, and now the former New York Knicks player has gained free agent status.

Hapoel Jerusalem officially announced the departure of the Ukrainian on July 14, 2026.

“Dima, thank you very much for your dedication, commitment, and fight in every minute spent on the court. We wish you great success in the future,” reads the farewell message from the Jerusalem club. The Israeli sports channel Sport5 emphasizes that Skapintsev leaves the team after one season and that his departure is another element of a large-scale roster overhaul.

At the same time, this is not about a scandal, disciplinary conflict, or early termination of the agreement.

In August 2025, Skapintsev signed a one-season contract with an option to extend for another year. Hapoel decided not to use the option provided by the agreement, so the cooperation ended after the first season.

From the NBA and G League to Jerusalem

Dmitry Skapintsev was born on May 12, 1998, in Cherkasy. The height of the Ukrainian basketball player is about 216 centimeters. He plays as a center and is capable of covering the position of a power forward.

Before moving to Israel, Skapintsev went through an unusual path for a Ukrainian basketball player.

He played in Ukraine and Lithuania, after which he went to the USA. Skapintsev spent most of his American career in the NBA G League, where he played for the farm teams of the New York Knicks, Boston Celtics, and Portland Trail Blazers.

On December 23, 2023, the New York Knicks signed a two-way contract with Skapintsev. The Ukrainian played two games in the NBA regular season, getting a few minutes of playing time, and then returned to the G League.

In the 2024/25 season, Skapintsev averaged 9 points, 7.9 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in the G League. At the time of his transition to Israel, he was considered a physically powerful center with experience in training and games in the North American basketball system.

Hapoel’s head coach Yonatan Alon noted his toughness, rebounding ability, decision-making under the basket, and potential to strengthen the team in the paint after signing the Ukrainian.

However, Skapintsev failed to become a stable player in the main rotation in Jerusalem.

“I don’t fully understand my role”

Problems with playing time became noticeable during the season.

In February 2026, Skapintsev admitted that he did not fully understand his role in Hapoel. According to the Ukrainian, at the beginning of the season, he received more minutes, but later his participation in games decreased.

The center explained that he tries to do everything he can to return to a stable rotation. At the same time, he noted that the head coach preferred players he had worked with for more than a year.

These words help to better understand the club’s subsequent decision.

Skapintsev’s departure cannot be called a surprise solely because of his statistics. The Ukrainian was useful in rebounding and rim protection but did not secure a stable role in the team and rarely spent significant stretches on the court.

At the same time, Hapoel did not officially name the player’s professional performance as the reason for not extending the contract. In the farewell message, the club, on the contrary, emphasized his attitude to work, dedication, and fight.

What the official statistics show

Ukrainian sports media publications presented different figures regarding Skapintsev’s performances in Israel.

Football24 reported that in 14 Israeli championship games, the Ukrainian averaged 6.1 points, 2.1 rebounds, and 0.6 assists.

However, the official statistics of the Israeli Basketball Super League show different results for the regular season:

• 14 games;
• 8 starts;
• 16.9 minutes on the court;
• 5.4 points;
• 5.8 rebounds;
• 0.5 assists;
• 1 block;
• 0.6 steals per game on average.

Skapintsev made 66.7% of his two-point shots and 71.4% of his free throws. In total, he scored 75 points and grabbed 81 rebounds in the regular season.

Thus, the figure of 2.1 rebounds provided by the initial Ukrainian source does not match the data from the Israeli league. Rebounding was one of the most noticeable strengths of the Ukrainian center.

In the playoffs, Skapintsev participated in two more games. On average, he scored 5.5 points and grabbed 3.5 rebounds in 13.5 minutes.

In the EuroCup, the Ukrainian played 15 games. His stats were 4.4 points, 3.2 rebounds, and 0.3 assists in about ten minutes of playing time.

Considering the Israeli championship, playoffs, EuroCup, and Winner Cup, Skapintsev played about 34 official games for the Jerusalem club.

Not a failure, but not a breakthrough

Skapintsev’s first season in Israel is hard to call a failure.

When the Ukrainian received playing time, he regularly helped the team in rebounding, created physical pressure under the basket, and used his height advantage. The figure of 5.8 rebounds in 16.9 minutes in the regular season confirms that the center remained quite effective in a limited stretch.

But the modern Hapoel, aiming for leading positions in Israel and Europe, needed a player who could either consistently play in the starting lineup or become a key element of the second unit.

Skapintsev found himself between these roles.

He started in eight regular-season games but spent less than 17 minutes on the court. In the EuroCup, his playing time was even less — about ten minutes. This meant that the coaching staff did not consider the Ukrainian as the team’s main center.

As noted by NAnews — News of Israel, in this case, it is more accurate to talk not about the failure of the Ukrainian basketball player, but about the mismatch of his playing qualities with the role the coaching staff was ready to offer him.

Hapoel began a major overhaul

The decision not to extend the contract with Skapintsev was made against the backdrop of significant changes in the Jerusalem club.

In the Israeli regular season, Hapoel finished third, winning 18 out of 26 games. In the playoffs, the team reached the semifinals, where they lost to Hapoel Tel Aviv in a series with a score of 0:3.

In the EuroCup, the Jerusalemites took first place in their group but ended their performances in the quarterfinals. In the decisive match, Hapoel lost to the Turkish Turk Telekom with a score of 90:91.

After the end of the season, Yonatan Alon, who had led Hapoel for three years, left the team.

Experienced Serbian specialist Sasha Obradovic was appointed as the new head coach. The club’s management announced its intention to build a team capable of competing for all Israeli titles and potentially entering the EuroLeague.

Against this backdrop, Skapintsev’s departure looks like part of the overall restructuring of the roster to meet the new coach’s requirements.

The club has already started signing new basketball players, including front-line players. Therefore, the decision to forgo the option in the Ukrainian’s contract is likely not related to one specific game or episode but to the formation of a new team model.

Hapoel has not officially confirmed this, so it is a conclusion drawn from the sequence of the club’s personnel decisions.

The Ukrainian stayed in Israel during the escalation

Skapintsev’s behavior during the security escalation in Israel deserves special attention.

In June 2026, several foreign basketball players from Hapoel decided to leave the country. Skapintsev was among the legionnaires who stayed in Israel after the club’s management provided players with additional security guarantees.

For the Ukrainian basketball player, the topic of war and security holds special significance.

Back in February, Skapintsev said that he studied the situation in Israel before moving. He emphasized that what was happening in the country at that time could not be compared to the full-scale war in Ukraine.

The decision to stay with the team in a difficult moment partially explains why Hapoel specifically mentioned the Ukrainian’s dedication, commitment, and fight in the farewell address.

One of the best matches for Ukraine — before leaving the club

It is symbolic that the announcement of Skapintsev’s departure from Hapoel came shortly after one of the center’s best matches for the Ukrainian national team.

On July 2, 2026, Ukraine defeated Georgia with a score of 95:76 in a nominally home match of the 2027 World Cup qualification held in Riga.

Skapintsev started in the starting five, scored 17 points, and grabbed 14 rebounds, achieving a double-double. Thanks to this victory, the Ukrainian national team advanced to the second stage of the World Cup qualification ahead of schedule.

This match showed that the Ukrainian remains capable of being a noticeable and productive basketball player with sufficient playing time and a clear role on the court.

Therefore, leaving Hapoel should not be perceived as the end of his career at a high level.

Skapintsev is 28 years old — for a center, this is an age when basketball players often reach the peak of their physical capabilities and professional stability.

What will happen next

After Hapoel’s refusal to use the extension option, Dmitry Skapintsev became a free agent.

At the moment, the new club of the Ukrainian center has not been officially announced.

Considering his NBA and G League experience, performances in the EuroCup, playing for the Ukrainian national team, and rare physical attributes for European basketball, Skapintsev may interest teams from the championships of Israel, Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, or other European countries.

The main question for the Ukrainian will be not only the level of the next club but also the role they can offer him.

The season in Jerusalem showed that Skapintsev is capable of effectively rebounding and protecting the space under the basket, but he needs stable minutes and the trust of the coaching staff.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is important not only as another transfer news.

Dmitry Skapintsev became one of the few Ukrainian basketball players in recent years to play simultaneously in a leading Israeli club, a European tournament, and the Ukrainian national team.

He leaves Jerusalem without scandal and public mutual claims. Hapoel thanked the Ukrainian for his professionalism and fight, and Skapintsev himself gets the opportunity to find a team where his height, experience, and play under the basket will be used much more actively.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry reminded that on November 10, 1975, the USSR achieved the adoption of Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism a “form of racism”. Today, Russia, relying on Iran and its allies, repeats the same rhetoric under the guise of “fighting Nazism” in Ukraine.

50 Years Later: A Reminder from Israeli Diplomacy

On November 10, 2025, the Israeli Foreign Ministry published a message:

“Today marks the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the disgraceful UN Resolution No. 3379 (XXX). On the night of November 10-11, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution by 72 votes in favor, 35 against, and 32 abstentions, declaring Zionism a form of racism.

The Soviet Union, with the support of Arab states, finally achieved its goal.”

For Israel, it was not just a diplomatic blow — it was a moment when the false Soviet myth received the UN’s seal.

In his speech, Israeli representative Chaim Herzog publicly tore up the text of the resolution, declaring that “persecutions will only strengthen Zionism.”

How Moscow Fabricated the Narrative

The Israeli Foreign Ministry directly reminded how Moscow laid the foundation of anti-Zionism:

“The first significant attempts to link Zionism with racism, and particularly with fascism (which in the USSR became synonymous with Nazism), on the international stage were made by Moscow in 1964. At that time, in response to a proposal to include condemnation of anti-Semitism in a resolution on racial discrimination, Soviet representatives unofficially threatened that they would be ‘forced’ to bring their amendment condemning Nazism, fascism, and Zionism to general discussion.”

Later, in 1965, the USSR fulfilled its threat and introduced an amendment to the UN equating anti-Semitism and Zionism:

“The Soviet Union, fulfilling its previous year’s threat, introduced the following amendment: ‘UN member states condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, as well as any manifestations of colonial policy and ideology, national and racial hatred, and pledge to do everything possible for their speedy elimination.’”

“Subsequent attempts to bring the condemnation of anti-Semitism to the UN General Assembly always encountered counter-attempts from the USSR to condemn Zionism,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry statement said.

From Ideological Campaign to Diplomatic Blackmail

The break in relations with Israel lifted all restrictions on comparing Zionism with racism, and the USSR embarked on large-scale propaganda.

“Over 8 years (1967–1975), more than 120 books and brochures were published, aimed at ‘revealing’ the racist nature of Zionism. Not only Marx but also Hitler and Goebbels were called as witnesses,” notes the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

In December 1973, with Moscow’s support, an amendment appeared in the UN condemning “Israeli Zionist imperialism,” and in 1975, the Third Committee of the UN supported an anti-Zionist resolution prepared by Arab countries.

“As a result, personal and state terror from Arab states, fueled by Moscow, bore fruit: on October 17, 1975, the Third Committee adopted resolution A/C.3/L.2519 condemning Zionism,” the Foreign Ministry publication states.

After the adoption of Resolution 3379, the USSR perceived it as international legitimization of its anti-Zionist line.
In Soviet propaganda of the 1970s-80s, a huge number of publications appeared where:

• “Zionism” was presented as an ideology of Jewish world domination, closely linked with US imperialism;
• Israel was depicted as a “racist military outpost” of the West in the Middle East;
• the term “Zionism” was used as a veiled form of anti-Semitism.

Propaganda was conducted through all channels — from films to academic works of the Academy of Sciences. In special publications, like the journal “Asia and Africa Today”, Israel was systematically equated with apartheid and colonialism.

For the USSR, it was not a fight against Israel but a tool for controlling the Middle East and Africa.
Under the slogan of “anti-racism,” the Soviet Union built political alliances and sold weapons to dozens of Arab regimes.

1991: Repeal Without Repentance

Only on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/86 repealed the assertion of “Zionism as a form of racism.”
But in Russia, anti-Zionist rhetoric survived the USSR.
In the newspapers of the 90s, they still wrote about the “Zionist lobby,” and in the UN, Moscow played the role of a “balancing factor,” using the old Soviet lexicon.

Nevertheless, at the level of rhetoric, nothing changed:

• Russian newspapers of the 1990s (especially of a patriotic and nationalist nature) continued to use the phrase “Zionist lobby”;
• in textbooks and media, the term “Zionism” was often presented as something “aggressive” and “anti-Arab”;
• some former Soviet diplomats and journalists continued to claim that “the repeal of the resolution was a mistake under US pressure.”

After 2022: “Zionism = Nazism” — A New Turn in Kremlin Rhetoric

With the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Moscow returned to the Soviet method of ideological inversion: accusing others of what it does itself.
Now the role of “global evil” in Kremlin narratives is shared by two targets — Ukraine and Israel.

The formula has changed, but the essence remains the same:

• Israel is accused of “double standards” and “supporting neo-Nazis in Kyiv”;
• the word “Zionism” is once again used in the rhetoric of Russia’s allies — Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorists — as a synonym for aggression;
• federal TV channels and propagandists broadcast claims like: “Israel copies Nazi methods”, substituting historical meanings and distorting the memory of the Holocaust.

In reality, the Kremlin itself is building around itself a axis of anti-Zionism and anti-Ukrainianism, where old Soviet narratives and new geopolitical alliances have merged.
Russia uses the UN and diplomatic platforms of the “Global South” to once again instill the myth: Israel is the “oppressor,” Ukraine is the “puppet,” the West is the “source of evil.”

This scheme works as an ideological weapon:
in the Arab world, it legitimizes an alliance with Iran and Hamas,
inside the country — justifies repression and anti-Western mobilization,
and in relation to Ukraine — creates a pseudo-historical justification for aggression.

Fifty years ago, on November 10, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the disgraceful Resolution No. 3379, declaring Zionism a form of racism. This lie, spread by the USSR and its allies, dealt a heavy blow to Jews worldwide and Israeli diplomacy. But the truth prevailed — in 1991, the resolution was repealed.

Today we must remember: anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.

This phrase today sounds like a warning: when lies become diplomacy, the path to aggression begins.
Exactly what Russia is doing in relation to Ukraine — accusing it of “Nazism” and “Russophobia” to justify occupation, destruction, and killings.
Thus, Moscow repeats the model of the USSR of the 1970s, when anti-Zionism was used as a shield for anti-Semitism, and now anti-Ukrainianism has become a cover for war crimes.

“New Slogans” of Old Ideology

Modern Russian anti-Zionist formulas almost literally repeat Soviet ones, but the mask has changed.
Then they spoke of “colonialism,” today — of “globalism.”
Then they fought against “Israeli imperialism,” now — against “Western neo-Nazism.”

The same method, the same addressee — the Arab world, African countries, and now also the “Global South.”
Russia tries to implant its agenda in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and African media, portraying Israel and Ukraine as part of a “Western conspiracy.”

Conclusion: Lies Do Not Die If Not Exposed

The USSR began by imposing the idea of “Zionism = racism” on the world.
Modern Russia, in alliance with Iran and anti-Israeli forces, continues to exploit the same narrative — only under new slogans:
now it is “fighting neo-Nazism,” “denazification,” and “protection of traditional values.”

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on — in the propaganda plots of Russian media, in the speeches of diplomats, and in the strategic alliance with Iran, which openly calls for the destruction of Israel.
What was once called “anti-Zionism” today returns as a policy of total denial of the right to exist — both for Israel and Ukraine.

Israel will always oppose attempts to once again defame Zionism and rewrite history. We remember and will not allow the past to be repeated.

That is why the Israeli reminder of the disgrace of 1975 is not just history.
It is a warning to both Kyiv and Jerusalem:
lies, not condemned in time, return in a new form,
and once again serve as justification for aggression.

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on in Moscow’s statements and in the Kremlin’s alliances with the same circle of states that were “warmed up by Moscow” half a century ago.