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Genetics does not prove myths and does not measure identity. But it shows that behind the millennia of Jewish history stand not only memory, faith, and culture, but also real traces of population past.

DNA and Jewish history: where myth ends and science begins

In the discussion about the origin of the Jewish people, there is always a risk of falling into one of two extremes. The first is to turn genetics into proof of ancient texts, as if a laboratory can confirm every line of the TANAKH. The second is to completely separate Jewish history from biology, as if two thousand years of diaspora, marriage norms, community life, and identity transmission could leave no trace in the genome.

Science does not confirm either of these extremes.

Modern population genetics speaks more cautiously and interestingly: many historical Jewish groups indeed retain a recognizable common component of origin, associated with ancient Middle Eastern populations. But this component is not a ‘pure line,’ does not negate mixing with surrounding peoples, and does not turn DNA into a test for Jewishness.

This is an important distinction.

The Jewish people are not a biological formula. Jewish identity is composed of religion, memory, law, culture, language, tradition, family history, and personal choice. Genetics cannot decide who is a ‘real Jew.’ It can only show how ancestral populations moved, where mixing occurred, which groups lived relatively isolated for a long time, and which demographic crises left a mark on heredity.

That is why the topic of Jewish DNA is so important. It does not replace history — it adds a new layer to it.

Common Middle Eastern signal: what studies have shown

In the early 21st century, major genetic studies changed the understanding of diaspora peoples. For a long time, it seemed logical that over two thousand years of migrations, relocations, expulsions, mixed marriages, and life among other peoples, any common biological trace should have almost disappeared.

But with Jews, the picture turned out to be more complex.

Studies have shown that Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and many Mizrahi Jewish groups are often genetically closer to each other than to most of the peoples among whom they lived for centuries. At the same time, they retain varying degrees of local admixture: European, North African, Middle Eastern, and others. Harry Ostrer’s review describes this not as a single ‘thread of origin,’ but as a ‘fabric’ of related genetic connections between different Jewish populations. No single line defines Jewish origin, but together they show a common population history.

In other words, Jewish communities were not completely isolated. But they also did not completely dissolve into the surrounding peoples.

This is explained not by mysticism, but by history. In many regions, Jews lived as separate communities, maintained religious marriage norms, passed on status within the family, upheld social boundaries, and often married within their group. Such practices over generations can preserve not only cultural identity but also genetic structure.

It is important to emphasize: this does not apply equally to all Jewish groups. For example, the genetic history of Ethiopian, Indian, and some other Jewish communities has its own characteristics. In some cases, they are closer to local surrounding populations while maintaining Jewish religious and historical identity.

Therefore, the scientifically correct formula sounds like this: many Jewish groups have retained a common component of origin associated with the Middle East, but each community has its own separate history of mixing, migrations, and development.

Cohanim: when a hereditary tradition became a subject of genetic testing

One of the most famous plots in Jewish population genetics is associated with the Cohanim — descendants of the priestly lineage, which, according to tradition, traces its origin through the male line from Aaron.

From a scientific point of view, this issue turned out to be verifiable not in a religious but in a genetic sense. If the status of Cohen was indeed passed down through the paternal line for centuries, then some men who identify as Cohanim might have retained close Y-chromosome lines.

The Y-chromosome is passed from father to son. It does not remain absolutely unchanged, but changes slowly enough to study male lines of origin.

Studies have indeed identified characteristic Y-chromosome variants in a significant portion of men who identify as Cohanim, including the so-called Cohen Modal Haplotype. Later works clarified the picture: it is not about one simple marker in all Cohanim, but about several related male lines, some of which have ancient Middle Eastern origins.

What does this prove?

Not that science ‘proved Aaron.’ Genetics cannot name a specific biblical character and confirm the literal accuracy of religious tradition.

But it shows something else: social and religious tradition could indeed maintain paternal continuity over a very long time. Traces of this continuity turned out to be noticeable in DNA.

And here arises an important scientific conclusion. Tradition did not ‘preserve biological information’ directly. It preserved status, memory, rules of inheritance, and marriage restrictions. And these cultural mechanisms, repeated from generation to generation, could leave a biologically measurable trace.

This is one of the most interesting examples of how culture and genetics intersect.

Ashkenazi bottleneck: what the story of ‘350 founders’ means

A special place in research is occupied by the history of Ashkenazi Jews. Today, people of Ashkenazi descent make up a significant part of the world’s Jewry, but genetics shows that in the past, this population went through a strong ‘bottleneck.’

In population genetics, a bottleneck is a moment when the size of an ancestral group sharply decreases, and then a large future population is restored from a small number of founders. Such an event leaves noticeable traces: increased genetic similarity, long segments of shared DNA, a higher frequency of some rare mutations.

The study by Shai Carmi and co-authors, published in Nature Communications in 2014, reconstructed the recent history of Ashkenazi Jews and concluded a strong bottleneck of about 350 people. It is important to understand: this is not necessarily a literal village of 350 people. It is a model estimate of the effective number of founders that best explains modern genetic data.

According to popular retellings, this refers to a period about 600–800 years ago, that is, medieval Europe.

This story helps explain why some hereditary diseases are more common among Ashkenazim. If a rare mutation was present in one or several founders, and then the group lived relatively endogamously for a long time, the frequency of such a mutation could increase.

But even here, simplification is not possible. Hereditary diseases are not explained by just one bottleneck. Their spread was influenced by genetic drift, marriage structure, population growth, migrations, and the specific history of each mutation.

For science, the important thing here is different: the history of the Ashkenazim shows how strongly demographic events can remain recorded in the genome. Medieval crises, relocations, and subsequent community recovery are not only pages of chronicles. They are also a trace in the DNA of millions of people.

Lemba: when oral tradition received genetic support

Another well-known example is the Lemba people in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For generations, the Lemba have preserved traditions of origin from people who came from the north, sometimes linking this story to Jewish or Middle Eastern roots.

For a long time, such traditions were perceived as a common origin legend. But genetic studies of the Y-chromosome showed that some Lemba men indeed have non-African male lines consistent with a Middle Eastern or Semitic contribution. Particularly discussed was one of the Lemba clans, which was found to have a high frequency of a variant associated with the Cohen Modal Haplotype.

But caution is needed here again.

Genetics does not prove that the entire Lemba people are Jews in a religious, halachic, or cultural sense. It does not confirm the entire legend literally. It shows that oral tradition might have preserved a real historical core: contact with Middle Eastern male lines.

This makes the Lemba example particularly important. It shows that oral memory is not always fantasy. Sometimes it can preserve traces of events that written history did not retain, and genetics through the centuries helps to see.

What genetics cannot say about Jews

In popular culture, genetics is often attributed more than it can provide. But in the matter of Jewish history, it is especially important to understand its boundaries.

Genetics can show kinship between populations. It can estimate the share of common origin, identify male and female lines, reconstruct approximate demographic scenarios, detect founder effects or ancient episodes of mixing.

But genetics cannot determine who is a Jew.

It does not replace religion, law, culture, self-identification, family memory, and community history. DNA does not give a person the right to belong and does not take it away. Jewishness has never been just a biological category. It included faith, nationality, community, tradition, language, trauma, memory, return, dispersion, and generational connection.

Therefore, any use of genetics for the idea of ‘purity’ of a people is scientifically incorrect and morally dangerous.

Science itself speaks of mixing. Jewish groups in different regions came into contact with surrounding peoples. Ashkenazim have a European component. Sephardim have their regional admixtures. Mizrahi groups have their own Middle Eastern history. Different communities have different male and female lines.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this: the value of genetic research is not in reducing Jewishness to biology, but in showing the depth of historical memory that survived exiles, migrations, catastrophes, and restoration.

Maternal lines and the complex picture of origin

Another important question is the origin of maternal lines, especially among Ashkenazi Jews. Here, the scientific picture is more complex than in popular retellings.

Mitochondrial DNA is passed down the maternal line. Studies have shown that part of the maternal lines of Ashkenazim may have European origins, and part a more complex or Middle Eastern history. On this issue, there have been different interpretations in the scientific literature.

This is important because male and female lines can tell different stories. For example, one model may suggest a Middle Eastern origin for some male lines and a stronger European contribution to maternal lines at certain stages of Ashkenazi population formation.

This should not be surprising. The history of peoples is rarely symmetrical. Migrations often occurred through male trade, religious, or military groups. Women could enter the community through marriage or conversion. In other cases, on the contrary, it was the maternal lines that preserved ancient connections.

Therefore, modern science does not say: ‘everything is clear.’ It says: ‘the picture is complex, but there are stable patterns in it.’

Why this topic is important for Israel and the Jewish world

For Israel, the conversation about the genetics of the Jewish people inevitably goes beyond the laboratory. It concerns the history of exile and return, the connection of the diaspora with the Land of Israel, debates about identity, memory of destroyed communities, and modern Jewish solidarity.

But that is why precision is especially needed here.

Genetics should not become a political slogan. It should not be used as a weapon against some Jews and in favor of others. It cannot say that one community is ‘more real’ and another ‘less real.’ Such an approach contradicts both science and Jewish historical reality.

The scientific meaning of research is different.

They show that Jewish history was not an abstract legend, but a real history of people, families, marriages, migrations, isolation, survival, and restoration. Communities could live in Morocco, Poland, Iraq, Yemen, Italy, or Lithuania — and at the same time retain traces of common origin. Not completely, not perfectly, not equally, but recognizably.

This does not negate culture. On the contrary, it shows the power of culture.

If religious norms, community life, and internal memory can influence even population structure over centuries, then identity is not just an idea in the head. It is a social practice that shapes the destinies of generations.

What remains if you remove the sensations

If you remove the loud words, a calm scientific conclusion remains.

Modern genetics has not proven the ‘purity’ of the Jewish people. It has not proven the literal history of every biblical character. It has not determined who has the right to be called a Jew. And it has not made DNA the main source of Jewish identity.

But it has shown something truly important.

Despite millennia of dispersion, many Jewish groups have retained a common component of origin. Despite mixing with surrounding peoples, traces of ancient connections have been preserved in the genome. Despite different languages, countries, and destinies, part of the population history of the Jewish people has become visible even through centuries.

This is not a story about ‘biological purity.’ It is a story about the survival of a complex identity.

The Jewish people were preserved not because they were completely isolated from the world. They were preserved because they had stable mechanisms of memory: family, community, tradition, law, texts, prayer language, calendar, prohibitions, holidays, mourning, and hope.

Genetics only adds another layer to this. It shows that historical memory sometimes leaves a trace not only in books and family stories but also in the structure of populations.

DNA indeed remembers a lot. But it needs to be understood carefully.

It does not speak instead of history. It speaks together with it.

Fair, Ukrainian culture, new acquaintances, and support for the military — on October 17, 2026, in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, the ‘Ukrainian Gathering of Gratitude’ will take place. The meeting is dedicated to the defenders of Ukraine and Israel, and the organizers invite everyone interested to attend. For those who want to do more than just be a guest, they offer the opportunity to get involved — to come to the fair with their project or join the volunteer team.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

The word ‘Zdybanka’ may be unfamiliar to an Israeli reader who does not speak Ukrainian. It comes from the Ukrainian ‘zdybatysia’ — to meet, to see. But in Israel, a recognizable format has already formed around this word: people gather together for Ukrainian culture, communication, music, books, initiatives, and projects that usually exist each in their own circle.

On October 17, 2026, such a meeting will take place in Jaffa — at Ha-Tsorfim, 29, near the Nothing: space.

It starts at 14:00 and ends at 19:00. The fair will operate until 18:00.

This time, the name was also chosen deliberately — ‘Ukrainian Gathering of Gratitude’, Zdybanka of Gratitude. It is dedicated to the people defending Ukraine and Israel.

And an important point: this is not a closed event ‘only for Ukrainians’. The organizers invite everyone interested — Israelis, new and long-time immigrants, friends of Ukraine, families, volunteers, people interested in Ukrainian culture, and those who just want to spend a few hours in a different atmosphere.

In Jaffa, they want to gather those who usually meet in different places.

In the announcement, the organizers used a very precise Ukrainian word — ‘rozvorushyty’. That is, to slightly stir up ‘Ukrainian life’ in Israel.

Not to reduce it to one concert or several official dates a year, but to give people a place where they can meet, see old acquaintances, find an interesting project, talk to masters, learn about the work of local initiatives — or propose something new themselves.

The specific program for October 17 is being revealed in parts. The organizers promise a lot of Ukrainian, new formats, meetings, and what guests already know from previous Zdybankas. Therefore, we will not invent a list of artists or performances before the team announcement.

However, the arrangement of the day itself is already clear. And it implies that a person can come as an ordinary visitor or find themselves inside the event — with their small business, public initiative, products for the fair, or a few hours of free time for volunteering.

Who are ‘Ukrainian Gatherings in Israel’

Behind the event is the community ‘Ukrainian Gatherings in Israel‘, which promotes the Ukrainian language, culture, and traditions in Israel. The team has different formats — from large meetings to chamber cultural events.

This is far from their first big Zdybanka. In the spring of 2025, the team, together with Nothing: and other Ukrainian projects, already held a large spring meeting with a cultural program and workshops at the same address Ha-Tsorfim, 29. And in August 2026, ‘Ukrainian Gatherings in Israel’ organized in Tel Aviv ‘Zdybanka of the Independent’ for the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence.

In other words, it is no longer a one-time party invented for one date. Gradually, a platform is forming around Zdybankas where Ukrainian cultural life meets ordinary Israeli life — without the need to choose between them.

The Nothing: space in Jaffa also fits into this logic. There are theatrical laboratories, musical and conversational events, including projects in the Ukrainian language; therefore, the address for such a meeting is not new.

Fair: you can come not only to buy

From 14:00 to 18:00, the fair will be operating at the Zdybanka. And now the organizers are recruiting its participants.

They invite masters, businesses, public initiatives, and organizations. That is, it’s not only about souvenir or food sellers: if a person has their own project and wants to present it to visitors, they can discuss participation with the organizers.

For those who will be directly selling goods at the fair, there is a condition — 30% of sales. Part of this amount will go towards expenses related to the event, the rest — to the collection for Ukrainian military.

The format is designed for one trading table and no more than two participants. The organizational conditions specifically state that the table must be brought with you.

Participation can be paid on the day of the Zdybanka — via Bit or in cash. Bit does not need to be introduced to Israelis, but for those who have recently arrived in the country, we clarify: it is one of the most common applications in Israel for instant money transfers. If a participant needs a receipt, they are asked to specify the necessary details in advance in the form.

The application for the fair must be submitted by October 8.

Registration of masters, businesses, initiatives, and organizations for the ‘Gathering of Gratitude’

If a company or public initiative wants to cooperate with the organizers but does not intend to trade at the fair, this option is also provided. The conditions in this case will be discussed individually after filling out the form.

Part of the money will go to the 47th Brigade’s signalers

The fair has a very specific address for assistance. Part of the collected funds, the organizers plan to transfer for the needs of the signalers of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

For the Israeli reader, it is worth explaining the terminology here. AFU — this is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the abbreviation SMB means a separate mechanized brigade. Signalers in such a brigade provide units with communication and information transmission — without this, normal management of people, equipment, and actions on the front is impossible.

This continues the already familiar practice for Israel, where assistance to Ukraine arises not separately from cultural life, but within it: at events, meetings, charitable projects, and initiatives of local communities.

The same connection between the two countries has long gone beyond cultural events. Recently, NANews reported how Israel and the Kyiv region discussed expanding rehabilitation programs after 57 Ukrainian specialists underwent Israeli training — we wrote more about this cooperation here.

Why Ukraine and Israel are side by side in the name

The wording ‘in honor of the defenders of Ukraine and Israel’ sounds much more understandable for the current Israeli reality than it might have a few years ago.

In Israel, there are people whose families are literally divided between two armies and two wars today. One relative may serve in the IDF, another — remain in Ukraine. Someone came to Israel after the Russian invasion and then experienced October 7 and the subsequent war here.

Therefore, the organizers connect Ukraine and Israel not for a beautiful phrase on a poster. For some visitors to the Zdybanka, this is their own family geography.

At the same time, the cultural connection between the countries is much older than the current wars. One of the recent examples is an expedition of researchers from Jerusalem who went to study the preserved Jewish heritage of Ukrainian Podolia. More than 30 synagogues in Ukraine were included in their study, about which NANews reported in detail in a separate material.

Ukrainian — the language of the event, Hebrew — the second working language

The Zdybanka will be Ukrainian-speaking, and the organizers ask fair participants and volunteers to communicate with visitors in Ukrainian or Hebrew.

For an Israeli who does not know Ukrainian, this is an important detail: you can come calmly. Hebrew is provided as the second language of the event, so the Ukrainian character of the Zdybanka does not turn it into a closed space.

It turns out to be quite an Israeli construction. Ukrainian remains the language of culture and the very idea of the meeting, and Hebrew allows including people who may not have Ukrainian roots at all.

You can come as a guest. Or you can help put it all together

A separate story — volunteers. The organizers are looking for people ready to join the preparation and conduct of one or several elements of the event.

The direction of work can be chosen in the form. Professional event organizing experience is not required here — a person is needed who is ready to properly fulfill what they have taken on, be attentive to guests, and work together with the rest of the team.

The organizers separately remind: a volunteer during the event becomes part of the team and represents the Ukrainian community of Israel. Therefore, people are expected to be friendly, responsible, and have a normal attitude towards each other.

For a few hours of work, of course, they are not going to leave a person without water and a sandwich. Volunteers are promised food and drinks during the event, good company, and a small souvenir gift.

There is also a strict rule: during volunteering, alcohol and any psychoactive substances are unacceptable. Communication within the event — in Ukrainian or Hebrew.

You can fill out a separate volunteer form here.

October 17: what is already known

So, ‘Ukrainian Gathering of Gratitude’ will take place on October 17, 2026, in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Ha-Tsorfim, 29, near the Nothing: space. It starts at 14:00, the fair operates until 18:00, the meeting itself — until 19:00.

Until October 8, registration of fair participants continues. In parallel, volunteers, partners, masters, business representatives, and public initiatives are being gathered.

And you can come on October 17 without your own project — the organizers invite everyone interested.

Someone will come for the Ukrainian atmosphere. Another — to see the fair. Someone will find people here they previously only knew through Facebook. And a few purchases at ordinary trading tables in Jaffa will eventually turn into support for the signalers of the Ukrainian brigade.

Perhaps, for a Zdybanka with the name ‘Gathering of Gratitude’, this is the most understandable program.

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Dear friends and readers,

On the evening of September 11, Rosh Hashanah 5787 — ראש השנה תשפ״ז begins. The Jewish New Year arrives at a time when both Israel and Ukraine are once again acutely aware of the value of simple words: home, family, security, life.

We wish that the year 5787 will be a year of return — to normal life, to our families, to home. A year with fewer funerals and sirens, fewer alarming messages in the night, less waiting for a call from the front.

May good be stronger than evil, peace stronger than war, and hope stronger than fear. May homes in Israel and Ukraine be filled with light, love, and blessings.

שנה טובה ומתוקה — A good and sweet year!

Israel: hostages have returned home, but the wound of war remains

A year ago, one of the main wishes for Rosh Hashanah was heard in almost every Israeli home: to bring back the hostages from Gaza.

Israel enters the year 5787 with a different reality. In January 2026, the last Israeli held in Gaza, Ran Gwili, was returned home. All living and deceased hostages were returned to Israel.

For the country, this marked the end of one of the most painful chapters of the tragedy that began on October 7, 2023. But the end of the hostage story does not mean its consequences have disappeared. The families of the deceased, those freed from captivity, the wounded, soldiers, and entire communities in the south and north will continue to live with what happened for a long time.

Therefore, the wish for this Rosh Hashanah is different: may Israel never have to bring its people back from such captivity again.

North, Iran, Houthis: the war has changed, the threats remain

Israel greets the year 5787 not in silence.

In the north, the confrontation with Hezbollah continues. On September 10, the IDF reported the destruction of a large underground complex of the organization in the Ali al-Taher area in southern Lebanon. The situation surrounding the disarmament of Hezbollah remains one of Israel’s main security issues.

Syria has changed after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and the entire regional security system has changed. But the northern border has not become a peaceful place because of this.

Iran remains. The forces supported by Tehran in the region remain. The Houthis in Yemen are once again expanding their presence along the Red Sea these days, posing a threat to one of the world’s most important maritime routes — through Bab-el-Mandeb.

In other words, the threat map has changed, but the sense of danger for Israel has not disappeared.

НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

And that is why this New Year we especially wish IDF soldiers to return home alive. Reservists — to once again become fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, students, doctors, programmers, and teachers, not people constantly waiting for a new צו 8.

Israel enters 5787 also on the eve of elections

This Rosh Hashanah will mark not only the beginning of a new year for Israel but also a very political autumn.

Elections to the Knesset are scheduled for October 27, 2026. The lists have already been submitted, and the decisive part of the campaign is beginning. Israeli society will once again debate — about security, responsibility for October 7, the future of Gaza, relations with neighbors, the economy, religion, and the state.

One can vote for different parties, see the future of the country in completely different ways, and argue until hoarse. But it would be desirable that in 5787 one question ceases to be a subject of dispute: Israel must remain a home where people feel safe.

Ukraine: the fifth year of the great war

For Ukraine, the new Jewish year also arrives under the sound of air raid sirens.

The full-scale war started by Russia in February 2022 has been ongoing for five years. The front line stretches approximately 1200 kilometers, and missiles and drones still reach far beyond its borders.

The beginning of September once again showed how far peace is. On September 8, Russia launched a heavy missile-drone attack on Kyiv and other regions. On September 11, the day Rosh Hashanah began, the capital of Ukraine woke up again after a Russian attack.

For Ukrainians, the war has long been measured not only by kilometers of the front. It is measured by the absence of people at the family table.

Some are now in the trenches. Others are in hospitals. Some remain in Russian captivity. Some are considered missing. Millions of Ukrainians continue to live outside their cities and outside their country, trying to build a new life while not losing connection with the old one.

Prisoners: the return continues

This is where Ukraine’s story is especially close to the Israeli reader.

Israel lived with the names of hostages for almost two and a half years. Their photos were on the streets, bus stops, squares, and in the windows of homes. Ukraine has been living with the names of its prisoners and missing for much longer.

Exchanges continue. Just in the summer of 2026, 466 Ukrainian defenders and 12 civilians returned home. On August 19, Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange — 103 servicemen from each side.

But behind these numbers are thousands of families who still have no answer to the question: when will he return? When will she return?

There are also civilian Ukrainians illegally held by Russia or missing in occupied territories. Therefore, one of our wishes for the year 5787 is also for them:

may they meet the next festive table at home.

Negotiations have resumed — peace is not yet here

In recent days, there has been another cautious hope.

American representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner once again visited Moscow and Kyiv, trying to bring negotiations to end the war into practical terms. After the meeting, Volodymyr Zelensky spoke about the ideas proposed by the American side, which could become the basis for further work.

But there is no breakthrough yet.

Moscow and Kyiv still fundamentally disagree on the issue of territories and the conditions for ending the war. Possible agreements on energy, grain trade, prisoner exchanges, and the future security system are being discussed.

Therefore, it would be wrong to greet the year 5787 with promises of imminent peace.

But we can wish for something else: that diplomacy finally begins to be measured not by the number of meetings but by the number of people who have stopped dying.

Israel and Ukraine: not the same wars, but feelings understood by each other

It is not necessary to claim that the wars of Israel and Ukraine are the same. They are different in history, opponents, geography, and circumstances.

But there are things that today an Israeli does not need to explain to a Ukrainian — and vice versa.

What a siren in the middle of the night is.

What it means to automatically look for the nearest shelter.

Why the message “I’m okay” is sometimes more important than a long conversation.

What parents of a person on the front feel.

What an empty place at the family table looks like.

How much a person can want not victory speeches, but just one ordinary morning when children go to school and no one checks the news immediately after waking up.

Perhaps this is where the connection between Israel and Ukraine exists today, which cannot be measured by official statements and diplomatic protocols.

Together towards the light

The editorial team of НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency thanks everyone who stays with us.

We continue to write about Haifa and Kyiv, Tel Aviv and Odessa, Jerusalem and Lviv. About people who help each other, fight, heal, save, return home, raise children, argue, make mistakes, and still continue to live.

Rosh Hashanah is not a promise that everything will suddenly be fine.

It is an opportunity to once again wish that the next year will be better than the previous one.

That there will be no new hostages in Israel.

That soldiers will return to their families.

That Ukraine will return its prisoners and its people.

That rockets and drones will stop determining the schedule of our lives.

That the word “home” will once again mean a place where it is safe.

שנה טובה ומתוקה! Happy New Year, friends!

May the year 5787 be a year of life, return, and peace.

May there be more reunions than farewells in Israel and Ukraine. More births, weddings, and family celebrations than reports of losses. More light in the windows — and less light from explosions in the night sky.

Peace to Israel. Peace to Ukraine. Health to our families. And may all those who are awaited at home return.

שנה טובה ומתוקה — A good and sweet 5787 year!

The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Reuven Asman reported on September 9, 2026, that he continues to work for the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war and is trying to use his contacts in Washington, Israel, and the Jewish world for this purpose. A few weeks ago, at the Central Synagogue of Ukraine in Kyiv, he met with representatives of the public organization “Voyatsky Vyzvil,” created by the families of prisoners of war and missing defenders of Mariupol and “Azovstal.”

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky

Asman is currently in the USA. And there is an important detail in his message that is easy to lose behind words about prayers and family support: he speaks specifically about trying to bring the issue of prisoners to where there are people capable of influencing decisions. Not just to tell once again about captivity, but to involve political, public, and Jewish contacts outside Ukraine in this story.

The rabbi himself formulates everything much more simply: behind every prisoner, there is a family that has been waiting for months, and some have been waiting since 2022. Many Ukrainian soldiers have indeed returned as a result of exchanges during this time. But hundreds of Mariupol defenders remain in Russian prisons and colonies for the fourth year.

And here the story stops being just another meeting of the rabbi with a public organization.

“Voyatsky Vyzvil”: families who went from pickets to Washington and Geneva

The public organization “Voyatsky Vyzvil” was created by relatives of Ukrainian servicemen who were captured or went missing after the battles for Mariupol. The organization works with the families of the city’s defenders, military unit 3057, and the Azov brigade, engages in finding information about people, legal support, international advocacy, and support for those who have returned from captivity.

Over four years, their work has changed significantly. Initially, families literally had to fight to at least be informed about where their husbands, sons, and daughters were. Then there were appeals, public actions, work with the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters. Now this campaign is increasingly reaching the international level.

In June 2026, representatives of “Voyatsky Vyzvil” worked on several such platforms at once. In The Hague, the head of the organization, Natalia Epifanova, participated in an event of the International Commission on Missing Persons — ICMP. Almost simultaneously, Natalia Kravtsova, the mother of a captured Azov fighter, participated in a conversation with the leadership of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

And on August 25, an American line appeared: a representative of the organization participated in a meeting with US Senator Richard Blumenthal. They talked about the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war, their conditions of detention, and the need to increase pressure on Russia.

That is, Washington appeared in this story even before the current statement by Moshe Asman. He is not starting the campaign from scratch. Rather, he is adding his own doors to the already existing network, which he can try to open.

That is why NANovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers the current statement not as a religious gesture of support. Here a very specific chain arises: families of prisoners — Ukrainian structures — international organizations — American politicians — Asman’s contacts in the USA, Israel, and among Jewish organizations.

700 in May and more than 600 in August — these are not different versions of the story

With the numbers of prisoners here, one must be especially careful. On May 19, 2026, at a press conference “Symbolic Prisoners of War: How to Return the Fighters of the Azov Brigade from Russian Captivity,” representatives of “Voyatsky Vyzvil” spoke of more than 700 servicemen of the unit who continued to be in Russian captivity.

But after that, exchanges continued. And on August 19, the commander of the 1st Corps of the National Guard “Azov” Denis Prokopenko reported already about more than 600 Azov fighters remaining in captivity.

This is an important clarification. You cannot take the 700 from May and present them as today’s figure, but you also cannot pretend that the problem has sharply decreased. Even after subsequent exchanges, it is still about hundreds of people.

The exchange on August 19 is particularly indicative. At that time, 103 servicemen returned to Ukraine, but according to Prokopenko, there was not a single Azov fighter among them, nor any National Guard servicemen who defended Mariupol.

Prokopenko then said something quite unpleasant: the existing strategy for returning this category of prisoners is exhausted, and Ukraine needs to look for other approaches.

A few weeks later, Asman talks about such an additional approach — using people and connections outside the usual negotiation circuit.

Why it is so difficult to return the defenders of Azovstal

For the Israeli reader, a small explanation is needed here. In the spring of 2022, the Ukrainian garrison held the surrounded Mariupol for several months, and the last major stronghold of resistance was the Azovstal metallurgical plant. Military and civilians were in its underground facilities. In May, the defenders of the enterprise ceased resistance by order of the Ukrainian command and went into captivity.

Among them were servicemen of different units, but “Azov” had long held a separate significance for Russian propaganda. This name has been used for years as one of the central elements of the Russian narrative about the supposedly necessary “denazification” of Ukraine. Therefore, Azov members became for Moscow not just part of the general pool of prisoners of war.

In May, relatives therefore called them “symbolic prisoners of war.”

Russia further complicated the mechanism of return by starting to conduct its own criminal processes over captured Ukrainian servicemen. Hundreds of fighters received various “sentences” in the Russian Federation. As a result, a person who, from the point of view of international humanitarian law, was captured as a combatant, within the Russian system, also becomes convicted in a criminal case.

This is no longer just a question of “who was included in the next list.” Moscow receives an additional tool for holding people and exerting pressure in negotiations.

Olenivka — the reason why families have long not believed in mere promises

There is also Olenivka.

After leaving Azovstal, some prisoners were held in a colony on the occupied territory of the Donetsk region. On the night of July 29, 2022, an explosion occurred in one of the premises, killing dozens of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

Russia and Ukraine presented opposing versions of what happened. The Ukrainian side considers the incident a deliberate murder of prisoners and a war crime.

But for the current story, another fact is especially important. In May 2026, a representative of the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters, Bohdan Okhrimenko, reported that some of the servicemen held in Olenivka were planned to be exchanged literally in a few days. Then the explosion happened.

That is why for relatives, the words “we are waiting for the next exchange” sound very different than for an outside observer. They already had an experience where there were only a few days between the expectation of return and catastrophe.

Israel appeared in the Azovstal story back in May 2022

The connection of Asman’s current appeal with Israel did not arise today.

Back on May 16, 2022, a Jewish serviceman of Azov, who was at the surrounded plant, recorded an appeal to then Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, the Knesset, and Israeli society. He asked Israel to help save people at Azovstal and separately reminded that among the surrounded defenders there are Jews.

NANovosti recently restored this appeal in full in the material “We ask you for salvation”: the appeal of a Jewish Azov fighter to the government of Israel.

At that time, Israel did not become a separate mediator for the fate of the garrison. But the appeal itself is important now, four years later: Ukrainian soldiers tried to reach out to Israeli society even before leaving the plant’s territory, and today some of those people are still waiting for their return.

Therefore, Asman’s current words about using connections specifically in Israel here sound not accidental.

What Asman really has, besides a loud title

Turning Moshe Asman into a person who can negotiate an exchange tomorrow would, of course, be incorrect. He does not have a state mandate from either Ukraine, Israel, or the USA. He does not determine exchange lists.

But it is also not worth treating his words as an empty declaration.

In recent years, Asman has regularly used his own contacts at the intersection of Ukraine, Israel, the USA, and international Jewish structures. In February 2026, he was already working in Washington during Ukrainian Week, participating in prayer breakfasts, events near the Capitol, and meetings with American political and religious figures.

In June, he met with a representative of the US State Department and discussed the situation of religious communities during the war.

There is also an Israeli direction. In July, Asman was in Israel and met with Natan Sharansky — a former Soviet political prisoner, Israeli minister, and one of the most famous international human rights activists in the Jewish world. NANovosti detailed the meeting of Moshe Asman with Natan Sharansky in Israel.

This does not mean that Sharansky is now dealing with the issue of Azov members. There is no such information. But the example shows what kind of circle of contacts is implied when Asman talks about Israel and the Jewish world.

Asman already has experience in such international advocacy

There is another useful example.

In February, Asman participated in the international Justice Conference in Kyiv, where one of the central issues was the return of Ukrainian children taken by Russia. At that time, he said that international sympathy alone is not enough and concrete actions are needed.

NANovosti wrote about this work in the material “The world needs more than sympathy — action is needed”: Moshe Asman at the Justice Conference.

The mechanism here is roughly the same. The rabbi cannot himself return a child or a serviceman across the border. His resource is different: bringing the topic to people who can take the next step — raise the issue to a political level, ensure a meeting, involve an organization, talk to officials, create additional public pressure.

Sometimes such chains end in nothing. Sometimes nothing starts without them at all.

Why the Israeli channel can matter

Here I would separate two things.

First — official Israel. As of September 10, there are no public grounds to assert that the Israeli government has begun separate mediation for the release of Azov fighters, that the Israeli Foreign Ministry has received a new mandate, or that Asman is negotiating with Russia on behalf of the state.

We do not know this and cannot write this.

Second — Israel and the Jewish world as a network of people and organizations. Here the space is much wider: politicians in the past and present, rabbis, human rights activists, public organizations, large Jewish structures in the USA, people with access to Congress and the administration.

Asman indeed has such connections. And it is about them that he speaks now.

For Israeli society, the very topic of captivity, unfortunately, also does not require a long explanation. Israel knows the price of years of waiting, negotiations through intermediaries, lists, informational uncertainty, and a situation where the fate of a specific person becomes an element of big politics.

The Ukrainian and Israeli cases cannot be mechanically compared. The wars are different, the sides are different, the negotiation mechanisms are different too. But a family that has not known for four years when their person will return home is understood without translation.

Not “the rabbi will free the prisoners,” but the search for another working channel

In this story, it is very easy to write a beautiful but incorrect headline: “The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine connected Israel to the release of Azov members.”

No. Not yet connected.

He stated that he uses his contacts in Israel, Washington, and the Jewish world to make the issue of Ukrainian prisoners sound louder among people capable of influencing decisions. This is already significant, but it is still a different formulation.

The boundary between these two things is the most important today.

The families of Mariupol defenders have been trying different mechanisms for four years. The International Red Cross, UN structures, the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters, exchange negotiations, public campaigns, The Hague, Geneva, meetings with American politicians. Somewhere it gives results, somewhere the door remains closed.

Now another door has appeared.

Asman himself wrote that he will do everything in his power until people return. The result of this work can be checked not by the number of meetings, photos, or loud statements. The criterion here is one and quite harsh — how many families will indeed wait for theirs next time.

For now, the last known point remains heavy: after the exchange on August 19, more than 600 Azov fighters still remained in Russian captivity.

And many of them have been there since 2022.

38 lists have been submitted for the 26th Knesset elections — from Likud, Eisenkot, and the Bennett-Lapid alliance to the Pirates, Paradise, and the candidate in a crown. But the main question is not about the exotic: several small parties are near the 3.25% threshold, and their results could change the composition of the next Israeli government.

Author: Lev Varshavsky

On September 8, 2026, the submission of lists for the 26th Knesset elections in Israel was completed. The Central Election Commission received 38 applications. Voting is scheduled for October 27, 2026, but it is too early to definitively speak of 38 participants: the CEC must verify the candidates, names, and letter designations of the lists. Final approval is expected on September 27.

The number 38 is not a record for Israel. In 2022, 40 lists were submitted, and in one of the 2019 elections — 47. Israel’s proportional system allows relatively small political projects to reach a national level, but to obtain mandates, it is necessary to overcome the 3.25% threshold.

If a party does not pass the threshold, its votes are not ‘transferred’ to the winners but are excluded from the calculation of the distribution of 120 mandates. In 2022, MERETZ received 150,793 votes, about 3.16%, and was left without seats in the Knesset. Therefore, a few tenths of a percent can change not only the fate of one party but also the balance of an entire political camp.

All 38 lists and who leads them

1. ביחד — ‘Together’. The list is headed by Naftali Bennett, with Yair Lapid as the second number. It is one of the largest new alliances of the campaign and one of the main competitors of Likud and Gadi Eisenkot’s party.

2. ישר! עם איזנקוט — ‘Straight! with Eisenkot’. Led by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. In recent polls, his project is among the campaign leaders and claims the first place in terms of mandates.

3. שרשר — לאהבה ואחדות העם — ‘Sharshar — for love and unity of the people’. Leader — Eitan Shvili, known as Sharshar. He came to submit documents in a blue robe and crown, and named the woman in the second position as his ‘queen’. Among the declared themes are helping people with post-traumatic syndrome and veterans.

4. השותפות לכולם — ‘Partnership for All’. The list is headed by Talal al-Krinawi from Rahat. It is one of several small Arab projects participating in the elections separately from RAAM and the Joint List.

5. הפיראטים צפים לטוב — ‘Pirates sail for the better’. The leadership of the list includes Ohad Shem-Tov and Noam Kozar. Israeli ‘Pirates’ are not participating in the elections for the first time, and in 2026, additional attention was drawn to them by behavioral economics professor Dan Ariely.

6. עמך ישראל — ‘Your People, Israel’. Leader — former IDF Brigadier General Ofer Winter. Yosef Haddad became the second number. Winter positions the project as a right-wing party and stated that he sees himself only in a right-wing government.

7. ישראל תחילה — ‘Israel First’. Led by Sharren Haskel. The project also joined a political structure associated with the ‘Ale Yarok’ movement.

8. גן עדן — ‘Paradise’. Leader — Yeshua Ben-David. He calls himself a candidate for Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, speaks of a state partially based on Halacha, promises debt and mortgage forgiveness, and declares a desire to become a priest in the Temple.

9. קול הנשים — ‘Voice of Women’. The list is headed by Dr. Mazal Shaul. The project is built around separate women’s political representation.

10. ביחד נצליח — ‘Together We Will Succeed’. The list is headed by entrepreneur Avi Shaked. It is an Arab-Jewish project, one of the creators of which was social activist Drar Americh from Tamra.

11. ישראל ביתנו — ‘Our Home Israel’. The leader remains Avigdor Lieberman. The party is once again running as an independent force and occupies a stable place in the opposition camp.

12. משפט צדק — ‘Fair Trial’. The list is headed by Dr. Larisa Amir-Trembovler. It is one of the small projects focusing on judicial and socio-political agendas.

13. שמע — ‘Listen’. Led by Naftali Goldman. The party is among the small religiously oriented lists of the current campaign.

14. עוצמה יהודית — ‘Jewish Power’. Leader — Itamar Ben-Gvir. In these elections, the party is running separately, despite attempts to consolidate the right-wing camp around other religious-national projects.

15. סדר חדש — ‘New Order’. The list is headed by lawyer Avital Ofek. He has already participated in previous election campaigns with ideas of political and state reform.

16. המילואימניקים והכלכלית — ‘Reservists and Economic Party’. The project is led by Yoaz Hendel and economist Yaron Zelekha. Former deputy Einat Wilf is the third number. In some polls, the union overcomes the threshold and receives four mandates.

17. הדמוקרטים — ‘Democrats’. Leader — Yair Golan. The party occupies the left and center-left segment and is one of the notable parliamentary forces of the opposition.

18. רע״ם — ‘United Arab List’. The list is headed by Mansour Abbas. The party is once again running independently and competes for the Arab voter with the Joint List and smaller Arab projects.

19. ש״ס — ‘Shas’. Leader — Aryeh Deri. It is one of the two largest Haredi parties in Israel and a traditional participant in coalition formation.

20. הציבור החרדי — ‘Haredi Public’. The list is headed by Moti Leitner. It is one of several small Haredi projects that have emerged alongside Shas and ‘Yahadut HaTorah’.

21. אני ואתה — מפלגת העם הישראלית — ‘You and I — Israeli People’s Party’. Led by lawyer and doctor Alon Giladi. The very name emphasizes the attempt to present the project as an alternative to traditional party structures.

22. ברית עולם לגאולת ישראל — ‘Eternal Alliance for the Redemption of Israel’. Leader — Ofer Lifshitz. The party’s name combines the ideas of eternal alliance and religious redemption of Israel.

23. תיקון שיטת הבחירות והממשל — ‘Reform of the Electoral System and Governance’. Moshe Salomovich is the first number. The political program is practically spelled out in the name: the main focus is on changing the rules of governance and elections.

24. הגוש התנ״כי — ‘Biblical Bloc’. Led by Dennis Lipkin. It is a separate religious-political project that is not part of Smotrich’s bloc or major Haredi parties.

25. בטח — ביטחון חברתי — ‘Social Security’. Leader — Semen Grafman. The party focuses on the social and economic security of citizens.

26. אורות השחר — ‘Light of Dawn’. The list is headed by Benayahu Har-Shemesh. The project positions itself as a separate right-wing social force.

27. ביטחון אישי — ‘Personal Security’. The first number is Michael Topchiashvili. The very name shows the project’s main focus — internal security and protection of citizens.

28. צבע שחור — מגן עולם התורה — ‘Black Color — Defender of the Torah World’. Led by Rabbi Eliyahu Boymrind. This is another small Haredi religious list in the current elections.

29. הליכוד — ‘Likud’. Leader — Benjamin Netanyahu. The party remains the main center of the current right-wing camp and one of the main contenders for forming the next government.

30. כחול לבן — ‘Blue and White’. The list is headed by Benny Gantz. The main problem for him now is the electoral threshold: some of the latest polls give the party a result noticeably below the required 3.25%.

31. הציונות הדתית וזהות — ‘Religious Zionism and Zehut’. The first number is Bezalel Smotrich, the second is Moshe Feiglin. The union is largely technical: the task is to reduce the risk of losing right-wing votes due to one of the parties not passing.

32. תנועת אח״י — ‘AHI Movement’. The list is headed by Rabbi Yuval Elimelech. It is another independent religious project among the numerous small lists of the campaign.

33. צומת — בית ישראל — ‘Junction — House of Israel’. The project unites Moshe Green and former deputy Gadi Yevarkan. It tries to occupy a separate niche in the right-wing and socially conservative field.

34. תקומה — ‘Revival’. Leader — Elkana Federman. On October 7, 2023, he was responsible for the security of the Nova festival, was injured, and participated in rescuing people. He enters politics with the idea of strengthening the representation of the generation of reservists and war participants.

35. הרשימה המשותפת — ‘Joint List’. HADASH, TAAL, and BALAD are once again performing together. The first number is Yousef Jabareen, the second is Ahmad Tibi, the third is Sami Abu Shehadeh.

36. הקהל — ‘Assembly’. Led by Rabbi Shlomo Elboim. It is a general Haredi list participating separately from the main ultra-Orthodox parties.

37. יהדות התורה — ‘Judaism of the Torah’. The first number is Yaakov Asher, followed by Yitzhak Goldknopf and Yitzhak Pindrus. The party remains one of the key Haredi forces and a traditional participant in coalition negotiations.

38. נעם לישראל — ‘Noam for Israel’. Leader — Avi Maoz. The party is running separately and occupies a strictly religious-conservative position.

Why small parties still matter

A list that failed to overcome the 3.25% threshold but received more than 1% of valid votes can claim one unit of state funding for the election campaign. In the 26th Knesset elections, the size of such a unit is about 1.835 million shekels.

This does not mean that the state pays millions just for registration. To receive compensation, it is necessary to gather a significant number of real votes. But the 1% threshold creates an intermediate goal for a party that does not expect to immediately receive four mandates.

In the 2026 elections, the rules for letter designations have also changed. Now a list can use a combination of up to three Hebrew letters. Therefore, the ballot includes options that form words, such as דרך — ‘path’, צדק — ‘justice’, and בקר — ‘morning’.

At the same time, disputes arose over separate designations. Several projects wanted to obtain the letter ב; combinations כן and בי were also in demand by more than one list. The CEC must consider the previous rights of parties and the consent of the holders of the designations, so the final appearance of the ballot will be determined after verification.

But for NANews — News of Israel the main storyline of this campaign is still not in the ‘Pirates’, Sharshar’s crown, or the name ‘Paradise’. Most of these projects will almost certainly remain far from the Knesset. The real threat to large camps is created by parties that receive about 2–4% and are a few tenths of a percent from the threshold.

That is why Smotrich preferred to unite with Feiglin, while Ben-Gvir and Ofer Winter are going independently. On the other flank, Gantz retained a separate list despite weak polls, while Hendel and Zelekha, on the contrary, united and in some studies already cross the threshold.

For the future coalition, this has direct significance. If a party receives 3.3%, it enters the Knesset with approximately four mandates. If the result falls to 3.2%, it receives zero. A difference of one-tenth of a percent can simultaneously remove one potential partner from parliament and increase the relative share of votes of all passing parties.

Therefore, after October 27, it will be important to look not only at the winner. Equally significant will be the sum of the votes of the parties that stopped just below 3.25%. It is there that tens or even hundreds of thousands of votes may disappear, which will then change the balance of power between the two blocs.

38 lists show a characteristic feature of Israeli politics: it is relatively easy to start national elections, but turning a political idea into seats in the Knesset is much more difficult. In one ballot, there are former prime ministers, generals, ultra-Orthodox parties, Arab movements, economists, ‘Pirates’, religious activists, and a man in a crown.

NANews — News of Israel will continue to monitor which lists the CEC will finally approve on September 27, what designations they will receive, and who will approach the critical mark of 3.25% on October 27.

The Jewish Detachment left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples.

In honor of the commander Solomon Laynberg, a street in Lviv was named after him.

In 2013, it was proposed to establish a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

The Jewish Detachment (official name – “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”) within the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) became an important element in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in 1919. This unit became a bright example of cooperation between two peoples — the Ukrainian and the Jewish, striving for freedom and independence during the war, and we are telling its story in our regular section Jews from Ukraine.

Political Situation and Jewish Involvement

At the beginning of the 20th century, Jews made up about a quarter of the population of Lviv, and most of them were actively involved in social and political life. Lviv had many Jewish lawyers, doctors, and students. Despite relative safety in Galicia, Jews still suffered from Polish discrimination, which forced them to cooperate with Ukrainians in the struggle for independence.

With the formation of UNR and ZUNR, Jews faced the necessity of deciding whether to support Ukraine’s fight for independence. Despite the cultural autonomy offered by these states, many Jews chose neutrality.

UNR (Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1917, sought Ukraine’s independence but faced numerous challenges — Bolsheviks, Whites, and Polish forces.

Meanwhile, ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1918 in Galicia, sought to preserve Ukrainian identity and independence but was quickly absorbed by Polish forces. Both of these states not only recognized cultural autonomy for Jewish communities but also gave them the opportunity to participate in state affairs.

The Union of UNR and ZUNR

Union, or the unification of UNR and ZUNR, took place on January 22, 1919, and became a symbol of the desire for unity of Ukrainian lands. This act was an important step toward the creation of a unified independent Ukrainian state. However, in practice, the union turned out to be complicated. ZUNR ultimately remained under Polish control, and Ukrainian authorities of UNR faced numerous internal problems, which prevented the Union from leading to a long-term consolidation. In 1920, Polish forces finally established control over Galicia, and ZUNR was integrated into the Polish state. Nevertheless, Union remained an important symbol of unity for the Ukrainian people and continued to influence Ukraine’s national ideology in the years to come.

Union was not instantaneous. After November 9, 1918, UNRada formed the Temporary State Secretariat headed by K. Levitsky, and the “Temporary Basic Constitution” on the state independence of Ukrainian lands from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, declaring ZUNR on the territory of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. On November 13, the new coat of arms — a golden lion on a blue background — and the flag — blue and yellow — were approved.

At the same time, against the backdrop of military actions and Polish aggression, on November 11, the ZUNR forces were forced to leave Przemysl, which became a base for Polish forces’ attack on Lviv. A few days later, in mid-November, Romanian troops captured Northern Bukovina, and on November 22, Polish forces took Lviv.

By December 1, the ZUNR delegation signed a preliminary agreement on union with UNR. On January 22, 1919, at Sofiyskaya Square in Kyiv, the act of reunion of UNR and ZUNR took place. However, in reality, the union was postponed until the convening of the Constituent Assembly (which never occurred).

The Fate of UNR After the Union

After Union in 1919, UNR continued the struggle for independence but faced serious internal and external challenges. The Ukrainian army actively fought the Bolsheviks and tried to hold its territories against Polish aggression. Poland, strengthening its control in Galicia, captured the territory of ZUNR, and in 1920, it completed its victory on this front.

In April 1918, after the German occupation, Pavlo Skoropadsky became the Hetman of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and declared the creation of Ukrainian State — an authoritarian monarchist state. His rule was supported by Germany but faced resistance from Ukrainian socialists and nationalists who opposed dependence on foreign powers. After the German capitulation in November 1918, Skoropadsky was overthrown, and power passed to the Directory.

Directory was formed in November 1918 in response to the overthrow of Skoropadsky. It was a collective executive body composed of five leaders, including Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, and other political figures.

Directory represented a more democratic and radical form of government, aimed at mass support among peasants and workers.

The main goal of the Directory was to create an independent Ukrainian state, without dependence on foreign powers such as Germany.

Directory faced several problems: internal disagreements among its leaders, an unstable political situation, and threats from Poland, Bolsheviks, and other external enemies.

However, it resisted both internal and external threats, despite military defeats.

Directory actively fought against Bolsheviks and Whites, trying to restore Ukraine’s independence.

However, in 1920, the Bolsheviks won, and Ukraine (UNR) became part of Soviet Russia.

Creation of the “Jewish Detachment”

“The Jewish Detachment”, officially known as “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”, was formed in June 1919 during the Chortkiv Offensive (operation). It became an independent operational military unit of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army and played an important role in defending Ukrainian territories from Polish and Bolshevik troops.

The creation of the detachment was supported by the Jewish National Council of Ternopil, which authorized Solomon Laynberg to approach Colonel Osip Mykytka, commander of the 1st Corps of the UGA, with a proposal to form a Jewish military unit. Laynberg suggested gathering several hundred Jews from Ternopil to create a fighting unit that would become part of the Galician army.

Colonel Mykytka agreed to this proposal, and an order to form the detachment was signed. Among the commanders of the unit, in addition to Jews, were also senior Ukrainian officers. Thus, the Jewish Detachment became a symbol of the union between two peoples — Ukrainians and Jews, who fought for Ukraine’s independence.

Formation and Training

The detachment was formed in the village of Ostapye, located in the Pidvolochysk district of Ternopil region. Intensive training of soldiers began here. The unit consisted of about 1200 fighters, including riflemen, officers, as well as sappers, telephone operators, and cavalry. A feature of the detachment was the large number of intellectuals and experienced soldiers among the fighters, which allowed for the formation of a combat-ready and disciplined unit.

It is also worth noting the engineering skills of the commander — Solomon Laynberg, who, using his knowledge, created a radio station for effective communication between army units, which significantly improved coordination in combat conditions.

Furthermore, the detachment was provided with all the necessary equipment — uniforms, weapons, ammunition, forage, and food — from the 1st Corps of the UGA, which indicates its importance in the context of military operations.

Combat Path of the Detachment

On July 14, 1919, the detachment participated in battles with Polish troops at places such as Maxymivka, Romanove Selo, and Zherebky, covering the retreat of Ukrainian troops across the Zbruch River. In the following days, the detachment actively participated in battles against the Bolsheviks. It captured Mikhaylpole, defended Proskuriv (now Khmelnytsky), Vinnytsia, Fastiv, and Berdiansk.

Despite heavy losses, the detachment continued its participation in military operations, taking part in the Kiev offensive in August 1919.

Reasons for Disbandment

“The Jewish Detachment” was disbanded at the end of 1919 for the following reasons:

1. Epidemic and Losses: The epidemic of typhus and shigellosis killed about 60% of the detachment’s personnel, weakening the unit.
2. Lack of Resources: After several military operations, there was a shortage of weapons, ammunition, and food, which made it impossible to continue fighting.
3. Military Reorganization: Due to changes in the strategy of the UGA, the detachment was integrated into other parts of the army.

Why Jews Joined the Ukrainian Army

Jews who joined the “Jewish Detachment” saw their role in defending Ukrainian independence for several reasons:

1. The Idea of National Liberation: Despite striving to create a Jewish state in Palestine, many Jews saw supporting Ukraine as a chance to ensure the security of Jewish communities.
2. Solidarity with Ukrainians: In Galicia, there was a close connection between the Jewish and Ukrainian people, which strengthened their alliance in the fight for independence.
3. Response to Pogroms: In response to the pogroms in Lviv in 1918, when Polish forces carried out mass reprisals against Jews, many Jews decided to join the ranks of the Ukrainian army to defend their land.

Legacy and Memory

“The Jewish Detachment” left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples. In honor of its commander Solomon Laynberg, a street was named in Lviv. In 2013, a proposal was made to install a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

Officially, the Jewish unit ceased to exist. On November 17, the UGA and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia signed a separate peace treaty. The Ukrainian army came under the command of Anton Denikin. The “Whites” were notorious for their extreme anti-Semitism. Some Jewish fighters refused to fight. Nearly a hundred soldiers broke through to Odessa, where, together with members of the local Jewish fighting group, they seized a ship and sailed to Palestine, where they continued to fight for a Jewish state.

Some stayed in Soviet Ukraine, while others returned to Galicia, which by then was under Polish control.

What happened to Solomon Laynberg afterwards is unknown. According to one version, he returned to Ternopil and was killed by the Poles the following year. According to another, he stayed in Soviet Ukraine, became a member of the Communist Party, served in the Red Army, and soon moved to Moscow. He was arrested twice. In 1938, he was executed in Leningrad.

The phenomenon of “The Jewish Detachment” can be compared to the Jewish Legion, which fought in the British army against the Turks in Palestine, with the difference that the Jewish fighters of the detachment fought not for their own country but for the independence of Ukraine.

NAnews and the “Jews from Ukraine” series

The article about “The Jewish Detachment” in the Ukrainian Galician Army highlights the important role of Jews in the fight for Ukraine’s independence. It is an example of solidarity and joint struggle between Ukrainians and Jews against external threats, where Jews actively participated in the creation of the Ukrainian state.

In the series “Jews from Ukraine“, we uncover the contribution of the Jewish community to Ukraine’s history, emphasizing their important role in the national struggle. NAnews – Israel News continues to cover these events, preserving the memory of solidarity and mutual understanding between the two peoples.

A Facebook post titled “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” about an alleged secret agreement between Ukraine and Syria and Mossad’s measures has gone viral. We have reconstructed the chain of publications and checked what is confirmed in this story and what remains, to put it mildly, a rumor.

Spoiler: The “news” first appeared in a Telegram channel with 9,000 subscribers.

Author: Pavel Shveiko | NANews

“Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” — this is the sensational question that begins the post, which appeared on Facebook on September 8, 20226, by … let’s call him “author” (why it’s written in lowercase will become clear after reading the article). The reader is then offered not a question, but an almost complete picture: Israel is allegedly alarmed by the “secret cooperation” between Ukraine and Syria, Kyiv is supposed to send UAV instructors, Turkey acts as a mediator, two training centers are being prepared in Yafur and Masyaf, and Mossad is supposedly already developing measures to disrupt the project and prevent Ukrainian specialists from entering Syria.

At the end, there is a link not to a document, statement, or well-known Israeli media, but a short attribution: “reports News of Israel.” This became the starting point of the investigation. We tried to find a publication from such an outlet, trace the text’s timeline, and separately verify each detail.

The “author” himself, judging by the text of the post, is not the source of the information. His post uses text that almost matches the Russian-language version, which by that time was already spreading on Telegram and websites, and he added his own headline “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” This historical framework connects modern Ukraine with the memory of mass violence against Jews during the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

None of the found NANews — News of Israel sources from which the story about Syria spread contains such wording.

How “News of Israel” reached Russian Telegram channels and media and then to the “author”

The earliest version of the story we found appeared on September 4 at 13:39 in the Israeli Telegram channel “ללא צנזורה חדשות ישראל בטלגרם” — “News of Israel without Censorship in Telegram”.

Almost all future elements of the story are found here: the alleged secret agreement between Kyiv and Damascus with Ankara’s mediation, Ukrainian UAV instructors, two sites — near Yafur and Masyaf — and possible Mossad actions.

But the original post contains important details that will later begin to change.

The channel does not write about a Mossad document or an Israeli intelligence statement, but about:

“a source whose data is stored in the editorial office, relying on Israeli intelligence reports.”

The publication contains neither the name of this person, nor the reports themselves, nor a second confirmation.

The geography is indicated correctly here: Masyaf is located in the Hama province.

And the wording about Mossad sounds like:

צעדי מניעה וסיכול אפשריים

meaning “possible preventive and thwarting measures”.

The Israeli channel does not report a planned attack on Ukrainians and does not use the expression “destabilizing measures.”

Three days later, the story emerges outside of Israel.

On the morning of September 7, at 08:20, the Azerbaijani Referans publishes material citing “News of Israel”. Here, one of the main “fingerprints” of the subsequent chain appears: Masyaf is already mistakenly located in the Homs province, not Hama.

In the evening, Musavat publishes a similar text. It also cites “News of Israel,” repeats Homs, and writes that Mossad is preparing “preventive and disrupting/thwarting measures” against the centers and the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

After this, we see a very rapid spread in the Russian-speaking space.

One of the first major nodes discovered is the Russian Telegram channel “Militarist”. On September 7 at 11:07, it publishes the text almost in the form that later reached Facebook:

“Yafur”;

“Masyaf in the Homs province”;

“a direct threat to national security”;

and finally:

“Mossad is developing possible preventive and destabilizing measures…”

At the end, the already familiar:

“reports News of Israel”.

The post received tens of thousands of views.

A few minutes later, this version begins to live its own life.

The Russian Telegram Win-Win publishes almost the same text but adds its own preface:

“Unexpected hint from Mossad”

and the question:

“Do we not know something?”

The error “Masyaf — Homs” is preserved, as are “preventive and destabilizing measures.”

This is an important stage: the message ceases to be just a retelling and receives a political interpretation.

Further, Win-Win begins to be quoted by other Russian-speaking channels.

For example, “First Kharkiv” directly shows the mark Forwarded from Win-Win and reproduces the entire construction — from “unexpected hint” to “News of Israel.”

Even more indicative is the reaction of the large Russian Z-channel “Blue Z Beard” with an audience of over 100,000 subscribers. It gives a direct link to the Win-Win publication and formulates the conclusion itself:

“Syria will develop the UAV direction through Ukraine”,

after which it adds reasoning that Russia has left Syria and “now it’s too late.”

That is, the unconfirmed message is already beginning to be used not as a rumor, but as evidence of the consequences of Russian policy in Syria and Ukrainian penetration there.

The same text appears in the Telegram channel StorMap, retaining all the characteristic features of the Russian version: Yafur, Masyaf in Homs, and the phrase about “preventive and destabilizing measures.”

By 14:20, the story goes beyond Telegram.

The Russian aggregator Pressa24 publishes the full text almost unchanged and, which is especially useful for tracing the chain, directly indicates the source — infantmilitario, that is, the Telegram channel “Militarist.”

Thus, the source can already be traced documentarily:

“Militarist” → Pressa24.

The spread does not end there.

On September 7 at 15:39, the Russian “Military Review” publishes an editorially rewritten news. The mysterious name “News of Israel” disappears, but all key unconfirmed theses are preserved as facts: secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors, two training centers, Masyaf again turns out to be in Homs, and Mossad is allegedly “developing possible measures” against their arrival.

After this, it is the “Military Review” version that begins to multiply on the network as a regular journalistic material.

VPK name reproduces it and directly indicates that the rights to the material belong to “Military Review”.

An almost identical text appears on the websites “Unity”, Nextwar, and other resources. In “Unity,” even the same author — Maxim Svetlyshev — and the same erroneous geography “Masyaf, Homs province” are preserved.

At 16:33, the message is published by the already registered Russian online media “Public News Service”. Here, the degree of confidence increases once again. If the initial Israeli Telegram spoke of an unnamed source, then the PNS begins the text with the words:

“Israeli intelligence agencies have identified secret military cooperation”,

and then reports the agreement as an established fact. The source for these claims is not provided to the reader. The error “Masyaf — Homs” is again preserved.

By evening, the text goes to forums and regional platforms. For example, on the Anapa resource, a user reproduces exactly the Win-Win version with the phrases “Unexpected hint from Mossad” and “Do we not know something?”

Later, another branch of distribution appears. The Telegram channel “World Events Now” at 22:49 publishes this story already with a reference to Storychase.

By this point, it is almost impossible for the reader to establish the original source: one resource refers to “News of Israel,” another — to “Militarist,” a third — to “Military Review,” a fourth — to Storychase.

But the error “Masyaf is located in Homs” allows seeing the kinship of these publications almost like a fingerprint.

In the earliest Israeli version we found — Hama.

In the Azerbaijani version — already Homs.

In “Militarist” — Homs.

In Win-Win — Homs.

In Pressa24 — Homs.

In “Military Review” — Homs.

In PNS — Homs.

If these editors independently received information from different Israeli intelligence sources, the mass reproduction of the same geographical error would be difficult to explain.

It is much simpler to explain that they are working with the same text chain or derivatives from it.

How the message then returned to Hebrew — more cautiously

Against this background, the publication of the Israeli Carmel News looks especially interesting.

There, the story reappears in Hebrew, but with noticeably more cautious wording.

The channel writes several times:

“according to reports”,

calls the cooperation a factor that “may pose a threat”, not an established “direct threat,” and only reports that Mossad:

“is considering possible steps”

to disrupt or thwart the creation of centers and prevent the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

And Masyaf is again in its real place — in the Hama province.

On September 7 at 23:30, the Arab research center Hadarat reprints exactly this cautious Carmel version and directly indicates the source as “the Jewish site Carmel News”. In the Arabic text, Hama is also correctly stated, and “according to reports” disclaimers are used.

A paradoxical picture emerges.

The story starts in a small Israeli Telegram channel as a message from an anonymous source.

After translation and several reprints, it becomes almost official information from Israeli intelligence in the Russian-speaking space.

Russian Telegram channels add emotional prefaces.

Russian sites turn it into full-fledged news publications.

And when the story returns to the Israeli information space through Carmel News, the wording becomes cautious again: “according to reports,” “may pose a threat,” “Mossad is considering possible steps”.

This is why the Facebook reference to the mysterious “News of Israel” creates a false impression of a much more serious source than the one we managed to find in reality.

At the moment, it is most likely that the name News of Israel arose as an English abbreviation or translation of one of the Israeli Telegram resources, rather than as a reference to a major Israeli editorial office with its own investigation.

But an important caveat remains: we managed to reconstruct the earliest available and indexable chain, not to prove that the post on September 4 was the moment of the story’s initial creation. Theoretically, the author of the Israeli Telegram channel could have had an earlier source, a closed chat, or a message that is not indexed now.

Public evidence of this source has not yet been provided.

This does not prove that the initial information was fabricated. But it shows the mechanism of distribution: an unconfirmed message with anonymous attribution is translated, shortened, and amplified several times until it begins to look like an established fact.

Why it is so easy to believe this rumor

Almost all the surrounding context is real.

On April 5, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky indeed made the first official visit to Syria and met in Damascus with President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Office of the President of Ukraine reported a “strong interest in exchanging military and security experience”. On the same day, a new trilateral format Ukraine–Syria–Turkey took place, where security was one of the central topics.

A few days later, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry called this triangle a promising mechanism linking the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Middle East.

Turkey is indeed involved in restructuring the Syrian armed forces. On August 13, 2025, the defense ministers of Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum on joint training and consulting. Reuters reported that the cooperation includes assistance to Syria with weapons, logistical equipment, and military training.

Ukraine has real experience in sending specialists on unmanned systems to the Middle East. In March 2026, Kyiv sent experts to the region’s states to help combat Iranian drones. Ukrainian specialists publicly worked in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.

There is also a Syrian episode.

In December 2024, the Washington Post, citing informed sources, reported that Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced operators and approximately 150 FPV drones to Syrian rebels shortly before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Reuters separately retold this message.

Thus, the very idea of the appearance of Ukrainian UAV specialists in Syria does not seem technically incredible. But plausibility is not yet proof of a specific secret agreement.

Why Yafur and Masyaf appeared in the story

Even two geographical names are chosen to make the story sound convincing.

In Yafur, about 30 kilometers west of Damascus, there really was a military training infrastructure. In September 2019, AFP was present at the base where Russian military advisors were training a new Syrian elite battalion: assault operations, working with weapons, demining, and other tasks.

Therefore, the use of a military facility in the Yafur area for the training of the new Syrian army is infrastructurally possible. But there is no open evidence that a Ukrainian-Syrian UAV center is currently being created there.

With Masyaf, the connection with drones is even more direct.

Masyaf is located in Hama province, not Homs. An investigation by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression states that since 2023, Syrian structures, together with Russian specialists, have been working on the development of FPV drones, and one of the involved facilities was a research center in Masyaf. The focus was on increasing the range, flight time, and payload of the devices.

This area is well known to Israeli intelligence services. Israel has repeatedly attacked the military infrastructure located there. In January 2025, the IDF officially confirmed that in September 2024, Israeli commandos conducted a complex operation in the Masyaf area against an underground precision missile production facility.

So the author of the original message did not name random points on the Syrian map. Both have a military history. This increases the plausibility of the rumor’s construction, but does not confirm its content.

And the conflict between Israel and Turkey is also real

The most convincing part of the overall background appeared literally a few weeks before the current story.

Reuters reported that on August 14, 2026, Mossad chief Roman Hoffman spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani. One of the main topics was the expanding Turkish military presence in Syria — weapons, drones, and the possibility of deploying Turkish forces.

After this, Israel struck the Syrian airbase Abu al-Duhur. The Israeli side expressed concerns that the facility could be used by Turkey. Ankara and Damascus denied the preparation of a permanent Turkish base and spoke of cooperation in training and experience sharing.

The US began promoting a mechanism to prevent direct confrontation between Israel, Turkey, and Syria.

Therefore, the assertion that Israel is closely monitoring Turkey’s military buildup in Syria has a serious factual basis.

It is this reality that allows the story of Ukrainian instructors to be integrated into it almost seamlessly.

What the check did not confirm

As of September 8, 2026, we have not been able to obtain independent confirmation of the five central claims of the disseminated message.

There is no confirmation that Kyiv and Damascus have indeed signed a separate secret agreement on UAVs.

There is no confirmation that the two specific facilities in Yafur and Masyaf are currently being converted specifically for a program involving Ukraine.

There is no confirmation that Ukrainian instructors have been ordered to arrive there.

There is no confirmation from official Israeli structures that Ukraine’s participation in the Syrian program is recognized as a ‘direct threat to national security.’

And finally, there is no independent confirmation that Mossad is developing operational measures specifically against the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.

We did not find such data in Reuters, major Israeli editorial offices, or official statements from Israel, Ukraine, or Turkey.

There is an Israeli Telegram post referencing an anonymous person allegedly relying on intelligence reports. After it, a chain of translations and reprints begins, in which geography, source, and the degree of categoricalness of the formulations change.

Therefore, calling the whole story a proven fake now would be as much an overstatement of the available evidence as calling it confirmed Mossad information.

More precisely: before us is an unconfirmed intelligence-looking throw-in, embedded in a completely real geopolitical context and noticeably amplified during dissemination.

And ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ have already appeared on Facebook. This headline does not add any document, source, or new fact to the story. It preemptively suggests to the reader to perceive the unconfirmed rumor as evidence of a Ukrainian threat to Israel — a conclusion that the data we found does not yet confirm.

Who needs this? The Russian trace that cannot be ignored

At this point, a question arises, without which the investigation would be incomplete: who benefits from convincing Israelis that Ukraine is secretly preparing people in Syria who will be able to launch drones against Israel tomorrow?

We have no evidence that this particular throw-in was launched by a Russian special service. But the Russian trace here cannot be considered a fantasy, if only because Moscow’s operations to influence Israel through information have already been documented by Israeli researchers themselves.

The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel — INSS — described in detail the Russian campaign Doppelganger back in 2024. Researchers found that Russia created copies of Israeli media, spread fake publications through networks, and artificially accelerated them with thousands of accounts on X and Facebook. After October 7, the intensity of Russian operations against the Israeli audience increased.

But for our story, another detail is especially important.

INSS directly wrote that before October 7, one of the goals of the Russian disinformation campaign in Israel was to convince Israeli society not to support Ukraine. Later, the topics expanded to internal Israeli conflicts, the war with Hamas, and Israel’s relations with the US.

In a separate INSS study, specific tools of Russian influence in Israel were analyzed: Doppelganger, promoting materials through Israeli media, and a Telegram group called ‘Ukrainazis’, spreading pro-Russian messages among the Israeli audience. The authors of the study called such activities an increase in the level of Russian hostile activity against Israel.

Another INSS analysis, based in part on materials from an American investigation of Russian influence operations, showed that Moscow sought to influence Israeli public opinion in support of the Russian position in the war against Ukraine. Digital media, social networks, and fabricated content were used for this.

The mechanism is very similar to what we are observing now.

It is not necessary to create a completely fictional story. It is much more effective to take several real elements:

Ukraine is indeed cooperating with the new Syria.

Turkey is indeed helping to rebuild the Syrian army.

Ukraine indeed has extensive experience in drone warfare.

Yafur was indeed used for training Syrian military personnel.

Military developments, including work with unmanned systems, indeed existed in Masyaf.

Israel is indeed concerned about the expansion of Turkish military presence in Syria.

And then one unproven connecting link is inserted between these facts: allegedly there is a secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors are already preparing to go to two specific centers, and Mossad considers their appearance a threat to Israel.

After this, the story begins to work on its own.

The reader no longer needs to write: ‘Ukraine is preparing Syria for war with Israel.’ He should come to this conclusion on his own.

That is why the Facebook post headline ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ is so important. It translates the story from the realm of modern politics into a historical emotional plane: Ukrainians — Khmelnytsky — pogroms — Jews — now again a threat to Israel.

From the point of view of information impact, the construction is almost perfect.

And here the case of Artem Kirpichenok appears

Against this background, it is impossible to completely ignore another story that is unfolding in Israel literally simultaneously.

Russian-Israeli historian and publicist Artem Kirpichenok was detained by the Shin Bet on August 2, 2026, after arriving at Ben Gurion Airport. On September 4, it became known that he was charged with serious state security offenses. Most of the case materials are under strict publication ban.

It was on September 4, that is, on the same day when the earliest Israeli publication we found about the ‘secret Ukrainian-Syrian agreement’ appeared, that the Israeli State Prosecutor’s Office announced another extremely unusual case.

According to the data allowed for publication, an Israeli citizen was involved by foreign intelligence structures and participated in foreign influence activity against the State of Israel. The Times of Israel reported this directly in the material about Kirpichenok, but emphasized: due to the publication ban, it is currently impossible to officially establish whether it is about him.

This is an extremely important boundary.

We cannot assert that Kirpichenok worked for Russia.

We also cannot yet assert that the foreign influence case announced by the prosecutor’s office on September 4 is exactly his case.

But there are additional circumstances that make the Russian direction a legitimate question for journalistic investigation.

A family representative of Kirpichenok told Meduza that, according to unofficial information available to the family, he is suspected of contacts with a representative of foreign intelligence. At the same time, the interlocutor separately stated:

‘nothing Arab is visible in the case’

and clarified that, according to their information, it is not about an agent from Iran or Lebanon. After this, the interlocutor himself raised the question of possible Russia.

Kirpichenok, meanwhile, is a citizen of Russia and Israel, has lived in Russia for many years. The Times of Israel also notes that he wrote about Israel and Turkey and that Haaretz characterized him as a participant in a small Russian leftist environment supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Israeli Russian-language publication Channel 9 has already brought this version directly to the headline: ‘Accused of espionage for Russia: Kirpichenok has already been brought to trial’. But this remains a media report, not a conclusion allowed for publication by the Shin Bet.

And here accuracy is especially important.

One might ask: if it were another Iranian agent network, why does the state maintain such a strict secrecy regime?

This question is logical, as Israel has repeatedly publicly disclosed cases of citizens accused of working for Iranian intelligence in recent years.

But the publication ban itself is not proof of a Russian trace. The Shin Bet and the court can classify a case for many reasons: intelligence methods, the identities of other figures, international cooperation, ongoing operational activities, or information, the disclosure of which could harm state security.

Therefore, the correct conclusion is different.

The version about Russia today looks significantly more serious than simple conspiracy, but remains a version until the publication ban is lifted.

Why these two stories should be considered together

It’s not that Kirpichenok is necessarily connected to the throw-in about Ukraine and Syria. There is currently no evidence of such a connection.

It’s about something else.

Russian influence operations have already been documented in Israel, including those aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.

In early September, the Shin Bet and the prosecutor’s office are simultaneously conducting a strictly classified case about a person who, according to information allowed for publication, foreign intelligence could have used in a foreign influence operation against Israel.

And it is precisely in these same days that a perfectly constructed story for Russian-speaking Israel begins to spread:

Ukraine cooperates with Israel’s enemies.
Ukrainians train the Syrian army.
Mossad is trying to stop them.
And on top — ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’

Who benefits from such a result?

Russia — quite obviously.

It simultaneously solves several tasks: worsens Israelis’ attitude towards Ukraine, creates the impression that Kyiv is acting against Israel’s security, uses historical Jewish trauma as an emotional amplifier, and shifts attention from Russian-Iranian military cooperation to a fictional or as yet unproven Ukrainian threat.

And this is especially noteworthy now, when Russia itself is deepening military-technical cooperation with Iran. The Financial Times in September 2026 revealed a secret Russian program to help Tehran develop supersonic cruise missiles — weapons potentially of direct significance to Israel’s security.

It turns out to be an almost mirror-like information construction.

Russia is really helping to arm Iran — a strategic adversary of Israel.

But another story is thrown into the information space:

the main potential problem for Israel suddenly becomes Ukrainians who are allegedly going to train Syrians.

We cannot yet prove that it was Moscow that launched this particular story.

But we can already say much more: such a throw-in fully corresponds to the known goals and methods of Russian influence operations against Israel and Ukraine, which Israeli specialists have previously documented.

Therefore, the question now is not only ‘is it true that Ukrainians are going to Masyaf?’.

There is a second question:

is someone trying again to make Israelis see an enemy in Ukraine — at a time when real Russian technologies, specialists, and weapons continue to strengthen Iran?

An additional screening of the documentary film ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’, dedicated to Andriy Kuzmenko — Kuzma Skryabin, will take place in Haifa. The new session is scheduled for October 4, 2026 at HOT CINEMA in Grand Canyon.

After the first screenings in Israel, the organizers opened ticket sales for an additional session in Haifa.

Tickets for the additional screening ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ in Haifa — October 4

Additional screening in Haifa — October 4

📍 October 4, 2026 (Sunday) — Haifa
HOT CINEMA, Hall No. 5, Grand Canyon
Derech Simcha Golan, 54
Film duration — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, subtitles — English
Doors open — 18:45
Screening starts — 19:00

Before the film, songs by the band ‘Skryabin’ will be performed by plus 380ID project.

Buy tickets for the additional screening on October 4 in Haifa

Previously, two screenings of the film were scheduled in Israel: August 30 in Tel Aviv and September 3 in Haifa. Now Israeli viewers have another opportunity to see the film on the big screen.

Who is Kuzma Skryabin

Kuzma Skryabin is the stage name of Andriy Kuzmenko. He was born on August 17, 1968, and became known primarily as the leader of the band ‘Skryabin’, whose history began in the late 1980s.

The group started with experimental electronic music, synth-pop, and underground sound, and later became one of the most popular musical projects in Ukraine.

Songs by ‘Skryabin’ were played on radio, television, concerts, and festivals, and Kuzma himself gradually became not only a musician but also one of the most recognizable figures in Ukrainian popular culture.

He was known as a person with sharp humor, strong self-irony, and the ability to talk about complex things without pathos. In songs and interviews, Kuzma reflected on love, loneliness, growing up, war, politics, human weaknesses, and ordinary life.

For many listeners, Andriy Kuzmenko was not just a performer of popular songs. He was perceived as a person who spoke with his own voice and did not try to fit into a convenient public image.

The musician died on February 2, 2015 in a car accident. He was 46 years old. After his death, songs, interviews, and archival recordings continued to live on, and interest in Kuzma’s personality only increased over time.

A film in which Kuzma tells about himself

The documentary drama ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ is built not only on the memories of the musician’s friends, relatives, and colleagues.

The main narrator of his own story is actually Andriy Kuzmenko himself.

Viewers will see his interviews, home videos, concert recordings, television performances, trips, communication with loved ones, and fragments of ordinary life.

The team of KNIFE! Films found and processed more than 400 hours of video and audio materials, as well as over 22 thousand photographs.

The authors collected materials from family archives, private collections, television funds, and people who knew Kuzma or worked with him.

This approach allows not just hearing another retelling of the musician’s biography, but seeing the living Andriy Kuzmenko again — during work, travels, rehearsals, conversations, and performances.

Rare recordings of the 1990s

A special place in the film is occupied by recordings from the 1990s — the period of the formation of the band ‘Skryabin’.

The wider audience is much more familiar with the later Kuzma — a popular singer, TV host, and author of sharp public statements. However, the early history of the group, its musical experiments, and first steps to fame remain much less known.

The creators of the film do not try to present Kuzma exclusively as an impeccable hero or turn the film into an official monument.

At the center of the story should be a living person — cheerful, sharp, vulnerable, contradictory, and sincere.

The Ukrainian premiere of the film took place in August 2026 — shortly before Andriy Kuzmenko’s birthday. In 2026, he would have turned 58 years old.

‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ is shown in more than 30 countries worldwide

The organizers of the international distribution announced that the film ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ will be shown in more than 30 countries worldwide. The published list included dozens of countries on several continents.

The international program included the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Moldova, Albania, Norway, Croatia, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Denmark, Israel, Turkey, Estonia, Australia, New Zealand, France, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Kenya, South Korea, and Japan.

Such a scale of international distribution shows that the film is aimed not only at the Ukrainian audience.

Through the story of Andriy Kuzmenko, the film allows us to see the changes that have occurred in Ukrainian music, culture, and society over several decades.

Why this film is important for the Israeli viewer

For the Israeli audience, this story has a separate significance. Many people from Ukraine live in Israel, who remember the songs of ‘Skryabin’ from their youth.

For some viewers, the film becomes a meeting with music and a person who remained part of their own history. For others, it is an opportunity to get acquainted for the first time with one of the most recognizable Ukrainian artists of recent decades.

The Israeli partner of the project is the company Created in Ukraine, which is engaged in screenings of Ukrainian cinema in Israel.

Previously, the company organized screenings in Israel of films ‘Mavka’, ‘Pamfir’, ‘Dovbush’, ’20 Days in Mariupol’, ‘I, ‘Pobeda’ and Berlin’ and other Ukrainian projects.

It also held Ukrainian Cinema Days in Israeli cinematheques and cooperated with the Ukrainian Cultural Center at the Embassy of Ukraine in Israel.

When and where to watch ‘Kuzma: Scary Funny’ in Haifa

The main current schedule for Israeli viewers now is the additional screening on October 4, 2026.

📍 Haifa — October 4, Sunday
HOT CINEMA, Hall No. 5, Grand Canyon
Derech Simcha Golan, 54

🎬 Duration — 2 hours 13 minutes
🇺🇦 Language — Ukrainian
🇬🇧 Subtitles — English
🚪 Doors open — 18:45
▶️ Start — 19:00

Before the start of the film, songs by ‘Skryabin’ will be performed by plus 380ID project.

BUY TICKETS — HAIFA, OCTOBER 4

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency continues to follow Ukrainian cultural events and screenings of Ukrainian cinema in Israel.

Several days of diplomacy ended with a new night of rockets and Shahed drones. Two people died in Kyiv, a market was destroyed near Odesa, and passengers on the Kyiv-Sumy train had to be urgently evacuated.

Author: Elena Gunko

On the night of September 8, 2026, Russian forces once again launched missiles and drones at Ukraine. Kyiv was one of the main targets. By morning, there were two fatalities and ten injured in the capital, with five hospitalized, two in serious condition. Residential buildings, warehouses, and garages were on fire, and a school and other civilian facilities were damaged.

But Kyiv was only part of that night. Near Odesa, the strike hit a market: trade pavilions were destroyed, and three people were injured. In the Sumy region, Russian forces attacked the locomotive of the Kyiv-Sumy passenger train. Passengers and the train crew were evacuated in time, and no one was injured.

All this happened shortly after Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner completed their trip to Kyiv. Before Ukraine, representatives of Donald Trump spent more than three hours in talks with Putin in Moscow, then discussed a new peace format with Volodymyr Zelensky. While the American guests were in the capital, the intensity of strikes on Kyiv sharply decreased. After their departure, the pause ended.

For NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, it is important not to turn coincidence into something proven. There is no confirmation that the timing of the Russian attack was chosen specifically because of Witkoff and Kushner’s departure. But the sequence of events is established: Moscow — Kyiv — talks about a new peace proposal — departure of the Americans — massive strike on the Ukrainian capital.

People had to be evacuated from damaged homes

In the Holosiivskyi district of Kyiv, a Russian attack damaged a residential building. Some people were trapped in apartments, and rescuers had to enter and evacuate residents. At another address, a garage caught fire, and the flames spread to a neighboring non-residential building and business center. A fire also broke out on the premises of an educational institution.

Another incident occurred at a 26-story non-residential building: damage was sustained on the upper floors. No fire broke out there, but the spread of consequences shows how little one line “the air defense worked” says about that night.

In the Solomianskyi district, three-story and five-story residential buildings were on fire. In the five-story building, people also could not get out on their own. Rescuers evacuated residents from the damaged building. In the early stages of dealing with the aftermath, emergency services reported 13 people rescued.

The numbers of the injured changed throughout the morning. Initially, authorities reported six injured, then seven, later ten, and two dead. These are not different versions of events: medics, rescuers, and police continued to inspect damaged sites and clarify people’s conditions.

In the Darnytskyi district, warehouse premises and a garage on the territory of a private house were on fire, and a car was damaged. In the Podilskyi district, fire engulfed warehouses, garage boxes, and cars. In the Shevchenkivskyi district, a fire also broke out on warehouse territory. In total, city authorities reported damage to civilian infrastructure at more than 16 locations.

The emotion of this night is hard to convey in interception percentages. In one place, firefighters extinguish a warehouse, in another, they break into an apartment where people remain. Two people did not survive until morning.

175 targets neutralized — and simultaneously 29 impact sites

The attack began on the evening of September 7. Russia used anti-ship Oniks, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, KN-23, and S-400 complex missiles, 32 air-launched Kh-101 cruise missiles, as well as 166 strike drones and decoy drones.

By 08:30, the Ukrainian Air Force reported 175 destroyed or suppressed targets. Air defense neutralized 31 of 32 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles, 142 of 166 drones, and two targets from the combined group of ballistic and anti-ship missiles.

There is an important data boundary here. From the morning report, it is impossible to conclude that only two ballistic missiles were launched or that the exact percentage of their interception is known: the total number of launches in this combined category was not named by the Air Force at that time. What is known is that Ukrainian authorities separately emphasize that ballistics remain the most challenging target.

And another figure changes the perception of the air defense result: missile and strike UAV hits were recorded at 29 locations. At nine additional sites, downed targets or their debris fell. Thus, a high share of intercepted cruise missiles and drones coexisted with dozens of real episodes on the ground.

Kyiv was attacked in several waves. First, drones approached the capital. Then the Air Force began warning about ballistic targets. After four in the morning, new warnings about ballistics appeared, followed by Kh-101 entering Ukraine’s airspace.

This is a specific mechanism of a combined strike: air defense does not receive one set of identical targets to destroy in a few minutes. It works for hours against drones, then against ballistics with a completely different reaction time, then against cruise missiles that can change routes and approach from different directions.

Market near Odesa and Kyiv-Sumy passenger train

The main directions of the strike were called the Kyiv and Odesa regions by the Ukrainian military. In the suburbs of Odesa, the Russian attack hit a market. Trade pavilions were damaged, and three people were injured.

The Russian side regularly claims to strike military, industrial, and logistical targets. On the morning of September 8, Ukrainian services simultaneously recorded consequences in residential buildings, on the premises of an educational institution, at the market, and near civilian transport.

In the Sumy region, the strike hit the locomotive of the Kyiv-Sumy passenger train. This is an important specification: not just an abstract “railway infrastructure,” but a train carrying ordinary passengers and operated by a train crew. People were evacuated from the train in time. This time, no one died.

The phrase “this time” is not accidental here. On August 13, NAnovosti reported on a strike on a passenger train in the Odesa region, where the driver and his assistant died, and hundreds of passengers were evacuated from the train. Strikes on railway infrastructure have long been not an episode for Ukraine but a constant risk for civilian communication.

Supermarkets and “Nova Poshta” do not directly relate to the attack on September 8 but to a broader series of Russian strikes in recent weeks — it is crucial not to mix them. On August 27–28, attacks destroyed Nova Poshta sorting centers and damaged commercial warehouses, retail facilities, and consumer logistics around Kyiv and in other regions.

NAnovosti has already compiled this chain of strikes on Ukraine’s civilian economy: postal centers, trade facilities, book warehouses, food and commercial logistics. The current market near Odesa and the Kyiv-Sumy train add two more types of infrastructure on which ordinary daily life depends.

Kushner and Witkoff left — the brief silence ended

The political context makes this attack particularly severe. Just two days before it, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were at the negotiating table in Kyiv. Before that, they met with Putin in the Kremlin. The Americans came with an attempt to launch a new stage of negotiations and after the meetings talked about the possibility of further work on a peace proposal.

On September 6, NAnovosti detailed the conclusion of the Kyiv negotiations. Zelensky even allowed himself dark humor, thanking the guests for “working better than Patriot” during their stay. Behind this joke was a very real meaning: Kyiv had several unusually calm hours.

The morning of September 8 made this phrase much less funny. As soon as the American diplomatic mission ended, the capital was again under ballistic, cruise missiles, and Shahed drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga directly linked the sequence of events with the question of how seriously Moscow takes the diplomatic process.

There is no confirmed data that Russia deliberately waited for the Americans to leave. However, it is known that even before their trip, Moscow was already increasing pressure: On September 5, Russia struck areas of Kyiv airports before Witkoff and Kushner’s route Moscow — Kyiv.

And already in the morning after the new strike, Sergey Lavrov stated that the West allegedly repeatedly prevented Ukraine from making peace, so with its “new ideas,” it should “not fuss too much.” In the same interview, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that there is currently no real negotiation process.

The contrast turned out without the need to add anything. Representatives of the US president come to Moscow and Kyiv to seek a path to a new negotiation format. Hours after their mission ends, residential buildings burn, a market is destroyed, and a passenger train is evacuated. And the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry suggests that the same Western mediators should not rush too much with peace initiatives.

Ballistics before winter remains the most dangerous part of the equation

After the attack, Zelensky separately spoke about the good result against cruise missiles and the significantly more difficult situation with ballistic targets. Ukraine is again asking partners to increase the supply of interceptor missiles.

The problem here is measured not only by tonight. There are several weeks left until winter. In previous autumn-winter seasons, Russia systematically struck Ukrainian energy — generation, substations, networks, and other critical infrastructure. Kyiv is already discussing a separate “winter package” with the US, where energy protection and air defense are central issues.

A ballistic missile gives significantly less time for detection and interception than an ordinary Shahed or cruise missile. Reliable protection requires specialized complexes and a sufficient stock of expensive interceptors. That is why one indicator — for example, 31 intercepted cruise missiles out of 32 — does not answer the question of how well the city is protected from the entire set of Russian means of destruction.

Ukraine is trying to cover two horizons simultaneously. The first is today: to receive additional missiles for existing Western complexes. The second is to create its own European-Ukrainian anti-ballistic contour. NAnovosti previously analyzed the FREYJA project and the Patriot deficit problem: its own interceptor is still in development and cannot replace the systems Kyiv needs this winter.

This is where the diplomatic conversation with the US becomes extremely practical. Peace plans, demarcation lines, and new negotiation formats can be discussed, but until the moment of real ceasefire, Ukraine needs physical interceptor missiles. Otherwise, Moscow will again be able to accompany the next negotiation initiative with a ballistic strike.

More than half of the Shahed were already reactive

The second systemic problem of this night is not the number of Shahed itself, but their change. The Air Force reported that more than half of the Shahed used by Russia were reactive.

An ordinary Shahed is relatively slow. This allows the use of mobile fire groups, anti-aircraft installations, aviation, electronic warfare, and increasingly cheap Ukrainian interceptor drones against it. A reactive device leaves significantly less time between detection and the moment it is over the target.

Russia has been using such drones not for the first time. On August 26, NAnovosti recorded reactive Shahed in another major attack, and on August 27–28, Ukrainian military again reported a large share of them. The night of September 8 shows that it is already difficult to consider them experimental single launches.

For Ukraine, a technological race is beginning. If a fast drone has to be destroyed by an expensive anti-aircraft missile, Russia gains a favorable cost exchange even with a successful interception. Therefore, Ukrainian companies are working on faster interceptor drones, which should close the gap between cheap mobile means and expensive classic air defense systems.

Zelensky held a separate meeting on reactive Shahed even before the current attack. Ukrainian manufacturers are already showing prototypes of high-speed interceptors, but the next problem is seriality: a single device does not change anything in a raid where dozens of reactive targets are launched.

This is the specific mechanism of the new threat: Russia is trying to make a cheap mass drone fast enough to push Ukraine into a more expensive layer of defense. Kyiv’s response is to make fast interception cheap and mass again.

Why this technology already concerns Israel

For the Israeli reader, the reactive Shahed is not an exotic detail of a war far in Eastern Europe. The Shahed family itself appeared in Iran. Then Russia received the Iranian technological base, deployed its own mass production, and began modifying the device for the war against Ukraine.

The reverse movement of technologies can also no longer be considered exclusively theoretical. In the spring, Zelensky publicly claimed that Russia supplies the Shahed it produces to Iran. Western intelligence structures also studied possible Russian assistance to Tehran in improving these devices, including navigation means and resistance to interference. The scale and full composition of such technological exchange are not publicly disclosed — this data boundary must be maintained.

But for Israel and the Gulf states, the risk is clear even without exaggerations. Ukraine receives daily what cannot be reproduced on a training ground: experience in dealing with massive waves of Shahed, route changes, new speeds, combining drones with ballistics, and attempts to overload the air defense system.

Israel, for its part, has one of the most developed layered air and missile defense architectures in the world. The Gulf countries have significant resources and themselves live next to the Iranian missile-drone threat. Ukraine knows what happens with Shahed after hundreds of real combat launches.

NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that this is where a practical field for much closer cooperation between Israel, Ukraine, and the Arab states of the region emerges: early detection, cheap interceptors, data exchange on new modifications, and joint testing of means to combat mass drones.

This does not mean that the Ukrainian system can simply be transferred to Israel or vice versa. Territory, air defense density, threat geography, and available complexes differ. Ukraine’s value lies in the accumulated statistics of real war. Israel’s value lies in a multi-layered system against different classes of missiles and drones.

And while diplomats argue about the next peace proposal, the technological race has not stopped for a single night. On September 8, more than half of the Russian Shahed, according to Ukrainian military data, were already reactive. For Kyiv, this is a problem of this morning. For countries threatened by Iran and its armed allies, these are data that are wiser to study before the next war, not after it begins.

The next specific diplomatic stage is also already outlined: Kyiv expects to continue discussing American proposals and the winter air defense package in the coming weeks, including on the sidelines of the September UN General Assembly. After the night of September 8, the question of interceptors for Ukraine has become not an appendix to these negotiations, but one of the conditions for how many people will survive the next Russian attack.