On October 12, 2026, US President Donald Trump stated that he does not believe in Iran receiving help from Russia and China. In his opinion, Moscow and Beijing are risking too much to support Tehran in the war against the US and Israel. However, in recent months, investigations have emerged about Russian military shipments, satellite images, Chinese anti-aircraft missiles, and alleged intelligence transfers that could have been used in strikes on American bases. One such strike claimed the lives of three US servicemen.
Author: Stas Shifer
For Israel, there is much more at stake in this story than just another controversial statement from Washington. If foreign states are helping Iran restore armaments, gather intelligence on targets, and circumvent sanctions, it directly affects Tehran’s ability to continue the war.
Moreover, the issue concerns not only military bases. Published intelligence materials mention Israeli energy infrastructure, cyberattacks, and Russian satellite surveillance of the country’s territory.
Trump says he doesn’t believe it. But what did his military say?
In a message published on the evening of October 12 in Truth Social, the American president lashed out at political opponents claiming that Moscow and Beijing are helping Iran. He called them “radical left idiots and lunatics,” and questioned the reports of assistance.
“If they are helping, it’s at a very low level, but I don’t believe it’s happening at all,” Trump wrote.
The president added that Russia and China “have too much to lose.” According to him, Washington would certainly have learned about serious support for Iran, and very quickly.
This position has an inconvenient backstory.
On July 21, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth spoke before the Senate Appropriations Committee, which was considering additional military operation expenses. Republican Senator John Hoeven asked him whether Russia and China were helping Iran and in what way.
Hegseth acknowledged that both countries were assisting some of Tehran’s actions to varying degrees. He refused to disclose details due to confidentiality. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Kane also declined to discuss available intelligence publicly.
This was not a statement that Moscow and Beijing were directly directing Iranian strikes. But American military officials did not confirm the absence of assistance either.
On July 24, Trump said he trusted the promises of Putin and Xi Jinping not to provide weapons to Iran. In case of violation of these promises, the president warned of serious consequences.
Almost three months have passed since then. During this time, new information about weapons, technologies, and financial mechanisms has emerged, and the war, which began on February 28 with joint American and Israeli strikes on Iran, has continued.
Russian satellites, American bases, and an intelligence agreement with Iran
On April 7, Reuters published an investigation into Russian intelligence support for Tehran, based on Ukrainian intelligence documents and interviews with Western and regional security sources.
According to the materials studied, from March 21 to 31, Russian satellites conducted at least 24 observations of areas with 46 military and infrastructure facilities in 11 countries and regions in the Middle East and adjacent territories.
Among the observation targets were American bases, airfields, oil facilities, and other important infrastructure.
Nine satellite observations concerned Saudi Arabia. In five cases, Russian devices surveyed the area of King Khalid Military City, where they presumably tried to locate American THAAD missile defense systems.
For Israel, this is a familiar category of armaments. THAAD is an American system for intercepting ballistic missiles at high altitudes, designed to counter threats of the class that Israeli air defense faces during Iranian missile attacks.
The documents also mentioned observations of facilities in Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain, as well as American military infrastructure on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.
Russian satellites also surveyed the Strait of Hormuz — a maritime passage between Iran and Oman, through which about a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed before the war. Since the start of hostilities, Tehran has sharply restricted shipping, creating an energy crisis far beyond the region.
A particularly interesting episode involves the American Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
Before the Iranian strike on March 27, a Russian satellite surveyed this facility. During the attack, a Boeing E-3 Sentry — an airborne early warning and control aircraft known as AWACS — was damaged. Such aircraft allow tracking of aerial threats over long distances and coordinating aviation actions. The next day, a Russian device again passed over the base area.
Ukrainian intelligence considered this sequence part of a broader pattern: some targets were subjected to Iranian strikes shortly after Russian satellite observations.
A Western military source and a separate regional security source confirmed to Reuters the intense activity of Russian reconnaissance satellites and the transfer of images to Iran. American company Kayhan Space independently established corresponding orbital passes but rightly clarified that the presence of a satellite over a specific object does not yet prove the execution of photography.
There is another document whose existence is not in doubt.
On January 17, 2025, Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a twenty-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement. It came into force on October 2 of the same year.
Article 4 of the agreement explicitly provides for the exchange of information and experience between the intelligence services of the two countries. Article 5 regulates military-technical cooperation, specialist training, and contacts between defense departments.
The agreement does not prove the transfer of coordinates for a specific strike on an American base. But the cooperation of Moscow and Tehran’s intelligence services is officially enshrined, long before Trump’s current statement.
Cyberattacks: How Russian-Iranian Cooperation Concerns Israel
The April Reuters investigation also contained information about the interaction of hacker groups associated with Russia and Iran.
According to Ukrainian intelligence materials, Russian Z-Pentest Alliance, NoName057(16), and DDoSia Project contacted Iranian Handala Hack through Telegram. After the war began, Iranian groups intensified operations against telecommunications companies and critical infrastructure facilities in the Gulf countries.
In March, Handala Hack and its associated participants warned of attacks on the information systems of Israeli energy companies. Simultaneously, Russian groups published credentials allegedly allowing access to the management systems of Israeli critical infrastructure.
The materials also mentioned Homeland Justice (UAC-0074) and Karmabelow80. Their methods, according to Ukrainian intelligence, indicated possible borrowing of technologies from Russian military hackers. The technical infrastructure was created using, among other things, ProfitServer — a virtual server provider from Russian Chelyabinsk.
On April 8, Russia rejected reports of joint cyber operations.
It should be noted that the publication of credentials, a hacker’s statement about an attack, and actual system penetration are different events. These reports do not contain independent confirmation of a large-scale takeover of Israeli energy facilities.
However, for Israel, the very possibility of such cooperation raises serious concerns. Disruption of the energy system or communication can affect hospitals, transport, water supply, and the civilian population even without a direct missile hit.
Military Cargoes via the Caspian and Russian Assistance to Iranian Missiles
In August, information emerged not only about intelligence.
On August 18, NBC News reported on Russian military supplies to Iran via the Caspian Sea. Journalists examined a European government document, the content of which was confirmed by a Western official. It mentioned drone components, ammunition, and trinitrotoluene — TNT, an explosive used in ammunition production.
According to materials reviewed by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, more than two dozen Russian ships carried shipments to the Iranian port of Amirabad.
The exact volumes of delivered weapons and the final recipients of all cargoes have not been publicly disclosed.
These shipments were already covered by NANews in the article “Russia Supplies Weapons to Iran via the Caspian”.
The route is well known. In 2023, according to The Wall Street Journal, more than 300,000 artillery shells and about a million other munitions were transported from Iran to Russia via the Caspian.
Now there is evidence of military cargo movement in the opposite direction.
The significance of this transport corridor was understood in Israel as well. On March 18, 2026, Israeli aviation struck Iranian fleet and military facilities in the Caspian port of Bandar Anzali. Among the targets were ships, command infrastructure, and ship repair facilities.
NANews thoroughly analyzed the IDF operation against the Caspian corridor Iran — Russia.
On July 25, Ukrainian forces also attacked ships associated with Russian-Iranian military shipments in the Caspian. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi then accused Kyiv of actions against an Iranian merchant ship and, without published evidence, claimed that Ukraine acted at Israel’s behest. There is no confirmation of a unified Israeli-Ukrainian operation.
Two more investigations are important for understanding what is happening.
On September 2, the Financial Times reported on a secret C430L program, in which Russian specialists helped Iran develop a ramjet engine for supersonic cruise missiles. The work began back in 2023 and, according to the documents studied, continued after the start of the current war.
On the Russian side, “Rosoboronexport” and NPO Mashinostroyenia were involved. Journalists examined correspondence, information about engineers’ trips, and patent documents. Among the specialists were Alexander Dergachyov, Alexander Chebakov, and Yuri Prokhorchuk, who worked on missile systems, aerodynamics, and engines. The contract negotiations were led by “Rosoboronexport” representative Vladislav Kuzmichev.
The alleged technology is primarily intended for anti-ship missiles and weapons capable of striking ground targets. According to the investigation, Iran built the engine and conducted flight tests, but there is no information about the adoption of the supersonic missile developed with Russian assistance.
On October 9, Bloomberg reported that Iran retains the ability to produce missiles and drones despite months of American and Israeli airstrikes. One Western official claimed that Russia continues to supply missiles to Tehran. Similar assessments appeared as early as June 12.
The types and quantities of the alleged October deliveries have not been publicly established. The Russian Ministry of Defense did not respond to Bloomberg’s request.
For Israel, the threat lies not only in the possible replenishment of ballistic missile stocks. Supersonic anti-ship systems can complicate fleet operations and shipping, and maintaining Iranian production allows Tehran to replenish losses after airstrikes.
Chinese Satellites and the Death of American Soldiers in Jordan
The second part of the story is related to China and the events of July 17.
On this day, Iran launched a missile strike on the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, used by American forces. One of the attacks hit the area where military personnel were stationed. Three American soldiers were killed, and four others were injured.
In total, according to American sources, the base was subjected to three missile attacks in one day.
On September 11, The Wall Street Journal reported that American officials link this operation to high-resolution satellite images obtained by Iran from Chinese structures before and after the strike.
It is assumed that the images allowed for the study of equipment and personnel placement and then assessed the damage inflicted. However, American sources did not name specific image suppliers and did not claim that the transfer was directly organized by the Chinese government.
Reuters could not independently confirm the entire chain of events.
NANews has already thoroughly examined this episode in the article “Chinese Eyes for Iranian Missiles”.
On September 13, journalists asked Trump if he planned to discuss this information with Xi Jinping. The president replied that China conducts intelligence against the US, and the US against China. He did not announce any harsh measures in connection with the report of satellite assistance.
But there is a fundamental difference between ordinary state surveillance of each other and the alleged use of transferred data in a strike that resulted in casualties.
A satellite image itself does not guide a missile to a target. Analysis, coordinate determination, planning, and an appropriate guidance system are necessary. Nevertheless, fresh images can significantly increase the accuracy of target selection.
The question of Chinese structures’ involvement in Iranian military operations arose before July. In April, the Financial Times reported that the aerospace forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gained access to the Chinese reconnaissance satellite TEE-01B, capable of taking images with a resolution of about half a meter. In May, Washington imposed sanctions against Chinese companies accused of transferring satellite data to Iran and assisting military programs.
This does not prove that the Chinese government sanctioned the July strike. But it explains why American intelligence agencies are studying not only direct arms supplies but also the activities of Chinese companies.
Chinese Anti-Aircraft Missiles and Billions of Dollars in Oil Settlements
On July 29, Reuters published an investigation into a planned sale of 300 to 400 Chinese portable anti-aircraft missile systems QW-12 and FN-16 to Iran, with a total cost of 60-70 million dollars.
According to three informed sources, the intermediary was the Hong Kong-registered Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment. The equipment was supposed to be sent from Urumqi, China, through Pakistan to Iran. Other land routes were also considered.
These are MANPADS — small missile systems that can be operated by one soldier or a small crew. Their task is to hit low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones. Such installations are significantly more mobile than stationary air defense, making them harder to detect and destroy.
China rejected reports of deliveries, and Pakistan denied involvement in transportation. Reuters also did not claim that all 400 systems had already been delivered to Iran.
But the trade in military technologies is only part of Beijing and Tehran’s relations.
On September 10, Reuters reported on a scheme that allowed Iran to convert oil sales revenues into payment for Chinese goods without transferring money through conventional international banks.
According to two senior Iranian sources and three other agency interlocutors, 2 to 2.5 billion dollars passed through such a mechanism in a year.
The investigation mentioned the financial structure ChuXin, through which funds related to Iranian oil purchases were directed to Chinese suppliers. About 70% of the money, according to sources, was used for infrastructure projects, while the rest went into a special settlement mechanism — SPV, intended for paying for imported goods.
Through this scheme, medicines, cars, and communication means were purchased. Sources also reported at least one case of using the mechanism for air defense equipment contracts worth millions of dollars.
Chinese authorities stated they were not familiar with the described scheme, and Reuters could not establish the full structure of intermediaries.
The economic basis of the relationship is obvious. In 2025, China bought more than 80% of Iran’s exported oil, according to Kpler estimates. For Chinese refiners, this is primarily oil at a significant discount, and for Tehran, it is an opportunity to receive foreign currency revenue, goods, and equipment despite sanctions.
After the start of the current war and shipping restrictions, export volumes changed sharply, but the significance of the Chinese market for the Iranian economy remains enormous.
Why Washington Doesn’t Want to Quarrel with Moscow and Beijing
On September 24, Xi Jinping arrived in the US on a state visit. The next day, US Ambassador to China David Perdue reported that Trump warned the Chinese leader about the inadmissibility of direct or indirect assistance to Iran.
According to the ambassador, Washington received corresponding assurances.
However, on the same day, a senior Iranian official told Reuters that the Chinese side promised Tehran the continuation of political, economic, and military relations despite American pressure.
It is impossible to publicly confirm the content of all these closed negotiations. China called for the parties to return to diplomatic settlement and criticized American strikes on Iran.
A separate story unfolded between Washington and Moscow.
On August 25, CIA Director John Ratcliffe unexpectedly visited the Russian capital and held talks with the leadership of the special services. He did not meet personally with Putin, but the Kremlin confirmed that the Russian president was briefed on the results of the contacts.
According to American media reports, one of the topics was a warning against possible escalation concerning NATO states, primarily Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russian support for Iran was also discussed.
NBC reported that the CIA chief asked Moscow not to transfer intelligence to Tehran that could be used against American forces.
NANews analyzed this trip in the article “CIA Director Warned Russia to Reduce Aid to Iran and Not Attack NATO”.
The very fact of such negotiations shows that concern about Russian ties with Iran existed at the level of American intelligence agencies, even if the president now publicly downplays the significance of the problem.
By October, an energy issue was added.
On October 9, Trump announced an agreement with Putin, according to which Russia was to immediately send more than 300,000 tons of diesel fuel to American and world markets. Further, additional deliveries of 500,000 tons in November and another million tons later were announced.
The American administration temporarily eased some restrictions on Russian fuel. The decision was criticized in Ukraine and among American lawmakers, who fear increasing Moscow’s revenues during the ongoing war.
Amid high energy prices and the midterm elections to Congress on November 3, Trump seeks to achieve a reduction in fuel costs. Simultaneously, he announced an agreement to stop strikes on the energy infrastructure of Ukraine and Russia.
Kyiv expressed readiness to support a real mutual cessation of such attacks, but subsequent Russian strikes cast doubt on statements about the achieved truce.
It can be assumed that the US president seeks to maintain space for negotiations with Moscow and Beijing and does not want to turn their assistance to Iran into a reason for a new large-scale crisis. But it cannot be asserted that this is precisely what explains his position without reliable information about closed negotiations.
How Two Wars Became Linked for Israel and Ukraine
The current story is clearer if we recall how Russian-Iranian military cooperation has developed since 2022.
Iran transferred Shahed strike drones to Russia, which were used against Ukrainian cities, power plants, and other targets. Later, Moscow deployed its own production of the Geran family of devices, using Iranian technologies and accumulated military experience.
On March 12, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Iranian operators participated in the first Shahed attacks on Ukraine, training Russian military personnel directly in combat conditions.
NANews previously published details of this statement by Zelensky.
For Ukraine, Iran has long ceased to be a distant state that simply trades weapons with Moscow. Its technologies have become part of the daily threat to the Ukrainian civilian population.
On September 25, a Russian drone struck a residential building in Kyiv. A 14-year-old Israeli citizen, Daniel Umansky, was killed, and his mother was injured. The family was connected to Israel, where the boy’s relatives were located.
The origin of the specific drone in this tragedy has not been established precisely enough to claim that the device was manufactured in Iran. But the history of Shahed and the Russian Geran demonstrates how military technologies, once transferred between states, continue to cause harm years later.
Now there is evidence of reverse transfer — Russian components, intelligence information, and missile technologies to Iran.
For Israel, it is especially important to understand that this is not about an abstract alliance of three states. The cooperation has various levels. Russia is capable of providing intelligence data and military developments, Chinese companies — equipment and satellite images, and Chinese trade — supporting Tehran’s financial capabilities.
At the same time, one should not confuse the actions of commercial intermediaries with a proven decision by the Chinese government to participate in the war. Similarly, the existence of a Russian-Iranian agreement does not mean that every Iranian strike is planned in Moscow.
This difference is important not for diplomatic caution. The accurate understanding of threats determines which measures are truly capable of limiting them: sanctions against intermediaries, control of transportation, protection of satellite information, cybersecurity, or actions against specific military productions.
It is at the intersection of these issues that NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency examines events in Ukraine and the Middle East. Wars remain different in causes and participants, but military technologies, transport routes, and state interests increasingly intersect.
What changes Trump’s statement and what to expect next
From the information known today, it cannot be concluded that China and Russia have officially entered the war on Iran’s side. Not all volumes of supplies, recipients of intelligence data, and the degree of participation of state leaders in individual operations have been disclosed.
But it is impossible to ignore what has already been published.
There is an official Russian-Iranian intelligence cooperation agreement. There is a Reuters investigation into satellite data and cyber operations, NBC reports on military cargo through the Caspian, Financial Times documents on the C430L missile program, Bloomberg information on ongoing missile supplies, and reports from American officials on Chinese satellite images before the strike in Jordan.
Added to this are US sanctions, Pete Hegseth’s acknowledgment of certain assistance to Iran, and the CIA director’s negotiations in Moscow.
Further development depends on how far Washington is willing to go in limiting such cooperation.
A scenario is possible in which the American administration continues closed negotiations, avoiding public confrontation. Tightening of sanctions is also possible if new evidence of supplies or intelligence assistance emerges. Meanwhile, trade through intermediaries, operations with dual-use goods, and technology exchange may continue even with increased diplomatic pressure.
For Israel, the consequences will be determined not by the wording of Trump’s statements, but by how many missiles, drones, and air defense systems Iran can restore, how much its intelligence capabilities improve, and whether its partners can bypass international restrictions.
The American president has the right to trust the assurances of Putin and Xi Jinping. But the trust of political leaders does not replace the verification of intelligence information.
Especially when this information involves specific military targets, destroyed infrastructure, and deceased people.
