Chronic pain is one of the main reasons people seek medical attention in Israel. Pain in the heel, knee, shoulder, or tendons can last for months or even years, limiting mobility and reducing quality of life. One of the most effective non-drug treatments for such conditions today is shockwave therapy.

In Israel, this method is actively used at the David Sendler Pain Treatment Clinic. Detailed information about the clinic’s approach, treatment directions, and appointment possibilities is available on the official website:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/.
This is where patients can get an initial understanding of the method and therapy possibilities.

Treatment Geography: Where Shockwave Therapy is Conducted in Israel

The David Sendler Pain Treatment Clinic works with patients throughout Israel, providing access to shockwave therapy in different regions of the country. The reception geography is structured so that patients can receive treatment as close to their place of residence as possible, without the need for long trips.

The main region of the clinic’s work is Haifa and the Krayot agglomeration. This area includes Kiryat Ata, Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, and Kiryat Haim. Here, patients with chronic pain in the heel, knee, shoulder, and tendons, who require a regular course of ESWT, are most often treated.

Special attention is given to patients from Nesher and Tirat Carmel. For residents of these cities, treatment is convenient as it does not require long commutes, and the clinic’s work format allows for an individual visit schedule considering the patient’s availability.

The clinic also accepts patients from Acre and Nahariya. In these cities, people often seek help for pain associated with prolonged stress, working on their feet, and the consequences of old injuries. Shockwave therapy in such cases is considered a way to reduce pain and restore mobility without surgery.

Residents of Afula and Yokneam often turn to the clinic with chronic pain syndromes of the musculoskeletal system. For this category of patients, comprehensive treatment is important, where ESWT is combined with recommendations on loads and lifestyle.

In the central regions of Israel, the clinic works with patients from Petah Tikva, Netanya, Hadera, and Kfar Saba. Here, shockwave therapy is often used for prolonged pain that did not yield results with standard medication or physiotherapy.

For patients with limited mobility or severe pain syndrome, a home demonstration of the procedure is possible — by prior arrangement. This format is especially convenient at the stage of initial acquaintance with the method and assessing the body’s reaction to therapy.

Regardless of the city of residence, each patient undergoes an individual assessment of their condition, after which the optimal course of shockwave therapy is selected, taking into account the diagnosis, duration of pain, and overall level of physical activity.

What is Shockwave Therapy and What is Its Essence

Shockwave therapy (ESWT) is a method of affecting tissues using high-energy acoustic waves. These impulses penetrate deep into the tissues and stimulate natural recovery processes without damaging healthy structures.

A detailed description of the technology, indications, and principles of ESWT devices is presented on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/ubt/.
It explains in detail why the shockwave triggers regeneration and reduces chronic inflammation.

A separate material is dedicated to the specific pain syndromes where the method is applied and which areas are treatable.
This information is collected on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/gde-udarno/,
where the most common clinical cases are described.

For patients who find it more convenient to receive information in English, a full English version of the site is provided:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/.
It is especially useful for new immigrants and foreign patients.

There is also a separate English section that explains in detail where exactly shockwave therapy is applied and in which conditions it is most effective:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/where-shockwave/.

Heel Pain and Heel Spur

Heel pain is one of the most common reasons for visiting a pain clinic. Complaints about sharp pain during the first steps in the morning or after prolonged sitting are especially characteristic. Most often, it is about plantar fasciitis or a heel spur.

On the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/bolit-pjatka/
the causes of heel pain, typical symptoms, and treatment approaches using ESWT are thoroughly analyzed.

A separate material is dedicated specifically to the heel spur and its treatment features in Israel.
It is available at
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/pjatochnaja-bol-i-pjatochnaja-shpora-v-izraile/,
where it is explained in detail why ESWT often allows avoiding surgeries.

Practical issues of assistance with heel pain while walking are covered on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/pomoshh-pri-boli-v-pjatke-pri-hodbe-uvt/.
Real treatment scenarios and patient expectations are considered there.

For English-speaking patients, similar information is presented on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/heel-pain-when-stepping/,
where the causes of heel pain and therapy possibilities are described.

A separate English material on heel spur and chronic heel pain is available at
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/heel-pain-and-heel-spurs/.

A practical guide for patients experiencing pain while walking is posted on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/help-with-heel-pain-when-walking-eswt/.

Knee Pain

The knee joint experiences significant stress daily. Knee pain can be associated with overloads, microtraumas, age-related changes, or the consequences of old injuries.

On the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/bol-v-kolene/
the main causes of knee pain are thoroughly examined, and it is explained in which cases ESWT can be an effective solution.

For the English-speaking audience, similar material is available here:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/knee-pain-why/.

Shoulder Pain

The shoulder joint is highly mobile, but for this reason, it often suffers from overloads and inflammatory processes. Chronic shoulder pain can limit movement and interfere with daily activities.

The causes of shoulder pain and treatment options are described on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/bolit-plecho/,
where the role of shockwave therapy is separately considered.

Additional material on chronic shoulder pain is available at
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/bol-v-pleche/.

For patients who prefer English, the information is posted on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/shoulder-pain/.

An analytical material on the causes of shoulder pain and treatment options is available here:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/shoulder-pain-why/.

Pain in the Achilles Tendon

The Achilles tendon is one of the most stressed structures of the musculoskeletal system. Chronic pain in this area is often found in people with an active lifestyle.

A detailed analysis of the problem is presented on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/bol-v-ahillovom/,
where symptoms and treatment possibilities using ESWT are described.

The English version of the material is available at
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/en/achilles-tendon/.

Clinic Geography and Treatment Organization

The David Sendler Pain Treatment Clinic accepts patients in different cities of Israel. Information about treatment in Haifa is available on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/klinika-boli-v-hajfe/,
where the reception conditions and therapy possibilities are described.

Patients from Petah Tikva can learn about the clinic’s work features via the link
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/klinika-boli-v-petah-tikve/.

A separate page for residents of Netanya is located here:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/klinika-boli-v-netanii/.

Information for patients from Hadera is available on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/klinika-boli-v-hadere/.

For residents of Kfar Saba, a separate section is created:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/klinika-boli-v-kfar-save/.

Confidentiality and Authorship

The clinic pays special attention to protecting patients’ personal data. A detailed privacy policy is published on the page
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/privacy-policy/.

Medical and informational materials on the site are published by the clinic’s official team.
Information about the author is available here:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/author/admins56ni9mns4/.

All articles on health and medicine are collected in the corresponding section:
https://uvt.nikk.co.il/category/medicina-i-zdorove/.

Contacts and Working Hours

David Sendler Pain Treatment Clinic
Phone: 055-951-4135
Contact via website: 24/7
Home visit by agreement

Working hours:
Sunday–Thursday: 10:00–19:00
Friday and pre-holiday days: 09:00–14:00
Saturday: closed

On June 14, 2026, Hamas announced that the day before, on June 13, it had delivered the response of the Palestinian factions to the roadmap for Gaza. The document is related to the implementation of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan and was prepared by Nikolay Mladenov, the high representative of the Peace Council for Gaza.

Formally, it is about moving to the second stage of the plan: a ceasefire, gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops, the launch of transitional Palestinian governance, and the restoration of the Gaza Strip. But for Israel, the central question remains the same: will Hamas truly be disarmed after October 7, 2023 — or is it again a political formula without real dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure?

Who delivered the response and where was it coordinated

The response was delivered by Hamas on behalf of the Palestinian factions after a series of consultations in Cairo. Representatives of Palestinian groups participated in the negotiations, with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey acting as mediators.

According to public reports, Nikolay Mladenov’s roadmap became part of an attempt to move the situation in Gaza to the second stage of Trump’s plan. Mladenov himself spoke on this topic at the UN Security Council on May 21, 2026, and by June, the Palestinian factions had formulated a unified response.

What did Hamas write in the response

In Hamas’s statement, it is said that the Palestinian factions approached the roadmap “responsibly and positively.” At the same time, they emphasized that the first stage of Trump’s plan, according to them, is not yet completed.

Among the demands of the Palestinian side are the increase of humanitarian aid supplies to the Gaza Strip, the opening of the Rafah crossing and other checkpoints, the cessation of Israeli military operations, the launch of a recovery program, and the start of work by a Palestinian technocrat committee.

For the Israeli audience, something else is important: in Hamas’s public response, there is no direct agreement to complete disarmament. The organization talks about transitional governance, aid, recovery, and political conditions, but does not pronounce the main formula for Israel — the dismantling of Hamas’s military machine.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this response as an attempt to shift the conversation from security to a humanitarian-political track. But after the massacre on October 7, Israel cannot afford an agreement where the issue of weapons is left “for later.”

Disarmament of Hamas: the point around which everything is stuck

Last week, Arab and international media reported that the disarmament of Hamas and other groups became the main contentious point in the Cairo negotiations. According to Reuters on June 11, 2026, the Palestinian factions agreed on 14 out of 15 points, with the unresolved issue being weapons.

Palestinian sources also reported that Hamas, for the first time since the start of the war in October 2023, allowed the principle of “restricted access to weapons.” But this does not mean complete disarmament. It is about a formula where weapons are supposedly to be controlled by the Palestinian administration or an agreed transitional government.

For Israel, such a construction is too dangerous. If armed structures associated with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or other groups remain in Gaza, the sector will not become demilitarized. It will simply receive a new sign, and the terrorist infrastructure may partially remain within local security mechanisms.

What conditions does Hamas put forward

Among the conditions that the Palestinian side associates with the issue of weapons are the arrival of sufficient humanitarian aid to Gaza, the opening of Rafah and other checkpoints, the start of the sector’s recovery, the launch of a Palestinian technocratic committee, and the linking of agreements to the timeline for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

Separately, there is a demand that future agreements do not deprive the Palestinian people of the right to “armed struggle.” For Israel, this effectively means maintaining the ideological justification for terror, even if part of the weapons is formally placed under the control of a future administration.

Another important point is personal firearms. Hamas is trying to make an exception for it, explaining it as “personal protection” and possible licensing by Palestinian authorities. But after October 7, such a scheme cannot be perceived in Israel as a security guarantee.

Israel demands guarantees, the U.S. seeks results

A senior Hamas representative, Taher al-Nunu, stated that controlling access to weapons through the Palestinian administration or an agreed government is supposedly meant to alleviate the concerns of the parties. According to him, no faction will be able to form armed militias, engage in military training, produce weapons, dig tunnels, or smuggle.

But in Israel, such promises are treated with extreme caution. It is too well known how terrorist groups in Gaza have used periods of calm for years to accumulate rockets, build tunnels, and prepare new attacks.

The U.S., judging by the diplomatic logic of Trump’s plan, is interested in a visible result: moving to the second stage, reducing the intensity of the war, restoring Gaza, and creating a manageable political framework. Israel, however, views the situation through a different lens — the security of the country’s south, the return of hostages, the prevention of another October 7, and the elimination of terrorist potential at its borders.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: the main dispute now is not about the word “disarmament,” but about its content. For Hamas, this may be restriction, licensing, and transferring control to “its” Palestinian structures. For Israel, it is the complete dismantling of military infrastructure, including weapons, tunnels, command networks, production, training, and smuggling.

What does Hamas’s response mean for Israel

Hamas’s response does not close the question of the second stage, but rather shows where the main fault line lies. The Palestinian factions are ready to talk about recovery, governance, and humanitarian mechanisms, but are not ready to publicly and directly renounce armed force as a tool of pressure.

For Israel, this means that any agreement without a strict control mechanism will be perceived as a temporary pause, not a new reality. The recovery of Gaza cannot proceed separately from demilitarization. Otherwise, international money, equipment, building materials, and transitional structures may again become part of a system that once led to the catastrophe of October 7.

Therefore, Hamas’s response to the Peace Council’s roadmap is not a breakthrough. It is a signal of bargaining. Hamas wants to move to the second stage, receive aid, open checkpoints, launch recovery, and maintain political maneuvering around weapons. Israel, on the other hand, will demand not beautiful formulations, but concrete guarantees: who controls Gaza, who holds the weapons, and can a terrorist organization once again turn the sector into a war platform.

Ose Haim – Ticketing Service in Israel, where you can purchase event tickets in English!

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Where to Buy Tickets for Concerts and Shows in Israel? Ose Haim Offers Service in English!

Israel is a country where culture unites people of different nationalities. Concerts, theatrical performances, festivals, film screenings, and educational events are available throughout the country. Now, you can easily purchase tickets using the convenient service Ose Haim, which also operates in English.

What is Ose Haim?

Ose Haim is a ticketing service that helps event organizers sell tickets and allows visitors to quickly and easily book their seats.

Main Features of Ose Haim:

• ✔️ Music Events – concerts of Israeli and international artists.
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• ✔️ Film Screenings – premieres and retrospectives of popular films.
• ✔️ Educational Programs – lectures, seminars, and courses.
• ✔️ Festivals and Cultural Events – large-scale events in various cities of Israel.

Now, all information about upcoming events is available in English, making the ticket booking process even more convenient.

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Why Are English-Language Services Important in Israel?

According to Israel’s Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, more than 15,000 immigrants have arrived in Israel since 2022. Additionally, about 14,000 temporary residents from different countries, including Ukraine, actively participate in the country’s cultural life.

The launch of businesses aimed at an English-speaking audience has become a key trend, and Ose Haim is one such service that eliminates language barriers.

“We see a growing demand for cultural events among English-speaking audiences. People need access to information in their native language, and we are happy to provide such a service,” – note the representatives of Ose Haim.

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How to Buy Tickets at Ose Haim?

The ticket booking process is extremely simple and takes only a few minutes:

1. 1️⃣ Select an event on the Ose Haim website.
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The Ose Haim ticket office is located in Rishon LeZion (Netanya St. 13), but all services are available online, allowing ticket purchases from anywhere in Israel.

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NAnews – News of Israel: Supporting Cultural Initiatives

NAnews – News of Israel regularly publishes information about key cultural events in Israel and supports businesses catering to English-speaking audiences.

Cultural events in Israel are not just entertainment but also a crucial way for new immigrants to integrate and communicate. Ose Haim is an example of a business that makes this process more comfortable and accessible.

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Conclusion

If you are looking for a **convenient way to buy tickets** for concerts, theater performances, film screenings, or educational events in Israel, Ose Haim offers a service in **English**, making the booking process easy and accessible.

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US President Donald Trump will participate in a working session of G7 leaders along with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in France. The meeting will take place at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains from June 15-17, 2026, and the Ukrainian issue is expected to be one of the central topics at the first working session.

For Israel, this news is important not only as another diplomatic episode of the war in Ukraine. At one summit, two lines of global security will be discussed: support for Ukraine against Russian aggression and the situation in the Middle East, including tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. This is a rare case where the European war and Middle Eastern security are not parallel topics but parts of a single conversation about power, alliances, and the cost of concessions to aggressors.

Why the meeting between Trump and Zelensky is important right now

According to Euractiv, citing a representative of the American administration, Trump will participate in a working session with G7 leaders and Zelensky. Reuters also reports that the summit will take place in Évian, France, where the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the UK, and EU representatives will discuss key crises in world politics.

The main question is not only whether Trump and Zelensky will be in the same room. More importantly, what position the G7 can formulate on Ukraine: will it be just a diplomatic phrase of support, or a signal that the West is not ready to change Europe’s borders under the pressure of the Russian army.

European leaders, according to publications before the summit, want to achieve a unified message in support of Ukraine. This is especially important against the backdrop of the US under the Trump administration halting bilateral military donations to Ukraine, with the main burden of military and financial assistance falling on Europe.

A separate meeting has not yet been confirmed

In the Ukrainian and international context, it will be closely monitored whether a separate conversation between Trump and Zelensky will take place on the sidelines of the summit. Initial reports allowed for such a possibility, but recent publications clarify: it is definitely about a joint working session, and a formal bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Trump is not yet on the confirmed list.

This is not a minor protocol detail. For Kyiv, a personal conversation with the US president is important as a channel of direct influence on the American position, especially if Washington will promote a negotiation logic with Moscow. For Europe, it is important that any negotiations do not turn into a conversation about Ukraine’s fate without Ukraine and without Europeans.

Europe wants to talk about negotiations, but not about capitulation

The French Élysée Palace, according to Euractiv, outlined one of the key questions of the summit as follows: under what conditions can G7 partners facilitate negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Special attention should be paid to the parameters of such a dialogue, including the territorial issue.

This is where the main risk appears. The Kremlin has been trying for years to sell the world the idea of ‘peace’ as the consolidation of captured territories. Ukraine, on the contrary, insists that negotiations cannot mean the legalization of Russian aggression. If the G7 wants to maintain its authority, it will have to talk not only about a ceasefire but also about principles: borders cannot be changed with missiles, occupation should not become the norm, and sanctions against Russia cannot be lifted when pressure still needs to be increased.

For the Israeli audience, this sounds familiar. Israel also lives in a reality where terrorist and hostile regimes test the boundaries of what is permissible: with missiles, drones, proxy groups, diplomatic pressure, and information campaigns. Therefore, the Ukrainian issue at the G7 is not a ‘distant European war,’ but part of a broader discussion about whether the aggressor will pay a price or receive a reward for violence.

In this sense, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the summit in Évian as a point where the interests of Ukraine, Europe, the US, and Israel intersect much more strongly than it seems at first glance. If the West weakens its position on Ukraine, it will be noticed not only in Moscow but also in Tehran, Beirut, Gaza, and Sana’a.

Sanctions against Russia remain a test of G7’s seriousness

European leaders, according to preliminary reports, intend to emphasize that now is not the time to lift sanctions on Russia. This is an important signal because sanctions policy remains one of the few tools of long-term pressure that does not require immediate military risk but affects the aggressor’s ability to continue the war.

For Ukraine, sanctions are not a symbol. It is a matter of missile production, access to technology, bypass schemes, banking operations, logistics, and the cost of war for the Russian economy. For Israel, this topic is also not abstract: the same mechanisms for circumventing restrictions are often used by authoritarian regimes and their partners, including players associated with the Iranian axis.

Middle East on the agenda: Hormuz, Arab leaders, and American signal

Ukraine will be important, but not the only topic. The summit will also discuss the situation in the Middle East and security in the Strait of Hormuz. According to Euractiv, leaders of Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE will participate in a working lunch with G7 leaders dedicated to regional security.

For Israel, this is one of the most sensitive blocks of the summit. The Strait of Hormuz is linked to global energy, Iranian influence, maritime security, and the ability of international coalitions to contain Tehran. If the G7 talks about the Middle East separately from Ukraine, the picture will be incomplete. The Iranian axis and Russian aggression exist in different geographies but in one logic: pressure on democratic states, use of proxies, betting on Western fatigue, and testing the boundaries of international reaction.

After the summit, Trump is reportedly set to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron for dinner at the Palace of Versailles on June 17. The Élysée Palace links this gesture to the 250th anniversary of US independence and the history of Franco-American relations, as it was in France that the 1783 treaty was signed, securing the independence of the United States.

What will be the main outcome

The main outcome of Évian will be understood not by photos of Trump and Zelensky, but by the formulations. If the G7 confirms support for Ukraine, the maintenance of sanctions pressure on Russia, and the inadmissibility of negotiations at the expense of Ukrainian territory, it will be a strong signal. If the text of the results is too soft, Moscow will perceive it as a window of opportunity.

For Israel, this language of strength and clarity is important. In a region where threats quickly transition from diplomatic statements to missiles and drone attacks, weak formulations are read by opponents as an invitation to the next step. Therefore, the G7 summit in Évian is not only about Ukraine, Trump, and Zelensky. It is a test of whether the democratic bloc can speak with one voice when both Europe and the Middle East are burning simultaneously.

On the eve of Passover in Jerusalem, one of the most unusual yet most formal ceremonies of the Israeli religious-state calendar took place again. On Tuesday, March 31, 2026, the chief rabbis of Israel formalized the sale of the state’s chametz to Hussein Jabar from Abu Ghosh — the very person who, for many years, becomes, on paper, the owner of the country’s leavened property during the holiday. The official statement emphasizes that this is not only about the state’s chametz as an abstraction, but also about the chametz of ministries, government agencies, and those citizens who have authorized the rabbinate in advance to sell it on their behalf through an online form.

From the outside, this can be taken as a beautiful Israeli tradition with a touch of a joke: a Muslim becomes the “owner of the country’s bread” for a week.

But in reality, this is not folklore, but a working halachic and legal mechanism, without which state institutions, large warehouses, departments, and private owners would find themselves in a much more complicated situation before Passover. That is why this ceremony is conducted not symbolically in a square, but through documents, powers, a deposit, and the formal transfer of rights.

Why does Israel sell chametz before Passover at all

The basic reason is simple, but not always obvious to an outside observer.

According to Jewish law, during Passover, it is forbidden not only to eat chametz but also to keep it in Jewish possession. Moreover, the problem does not disappear if you simply remove the products from sight: rabbinical practice’s specific clarifications directly indicate that chametz that was in Jewish possession during Passover is forbidden even after the holiday ends.

Hence the solution that Israel has brought to a state scale. Chametz is sold to a non-Jew before the prohibition begins, and after Passover, it is usually bought back. For individuals, this could be a home supply, bottles of whiskey, pasta, or flour. For the state, it’s a completely different level: departmental warehouses, supplies in supply systems, food, and other categories of leavened property that cannot simply be massively destroyed without absurdity and direct losses.

Why Hussein Jabar became the buyer again

The story of Hussein Jabar is a separate part of this Israeli construct.

Jabar, a native of Abu Ghosh and a long-time employee of the Ramada Jerusalem hotel, has been performing this role for decades; according to him, it all started in 1995 when the then-chief rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau asked him to take on the purchase of the state’s chametz. Since then, he has regularly become the figure through which the state conducts the Passover sale.

What exactly they sell and what is included in this deal

This is where the confusion usually begins.

They do not sell “Israel as a whole,” not ministerial buildings, and not land as such. They sell exactly chametz — that is, leavened products from five types of grain that fall under the Passover prohibition. Basic clarifications include bread, pastries, dry cereals, pasta, many types of alcohol, and other products made from fermented or leavened grain.

On a state scale, this means not just a box of cookies in some office.

The current official statement refers to the chametz of the state, ministries, government structures, and also the chametz of private individuals who have pre-authorized the rabbinate through the website. In earlier official statements from the Chief Rabbinate, specific objects such as state emergency reserves, police, and prison service were also listed. That is, we are talking about quite real food and warehouse remnants in large volumes.

And another important detail that is often overlooked. They sell not only the “contents of boxes” in the household sense. Classic forms of chametz sale provide that the entire chametz in specified storage locations is included in the deal, even small remnants that no one would buy separately, and to strengthen the legal force of the deal, the buyer is given rights to access the premises where this chametz is located. Traditional formulations refer to the transfer of keys and even temporary rental of the storage premises themselves, so the deal does not look like an empty declaration.

Hence the practical rule that the rabbinate repeats separately: the sold chametz must be placed in a closed and marked place until the end of Passover. This is necessary because after the sale, it should no longer be used by the former owner, even if it physically remains in the same kitchen, the same warehouse, or the same departmental premises.

Otherwise, the whole point of the procedure is blurred.

How the cost of this chametz is calculated and where the “billions” come from

In public retellings, they love the phrase about “chametz worth billions,” sometimes even tens and hundreds of billions. But within the procedure, the assessment is not arranged like a newspaper headline. Official statements from the rabbinate indicated that during the ceremony, the buyer makes a deposit — in recent years, it was about 20,000 shekels — and already after Passover, the cost of the state’s chametz is assessed by three appraisers.

Only after this can a final settlement theoretically be made.

So the figure “billions” is not a random metaphor, but also not always the final account to the last shekel right on the day of the ceremony. Halachic texts, on which the logic of the sale is built, separately explain that the benchmark is the fair market value. If necessary, it is clarified after measuring or weighing the goods.

In one of the classic examples of sale, it is directly stated that the price is actually understood as the value that could be obtained on the local market, and the mechanism itself is equivalent to an assessment by “three people.”

That is why this deal should not be just theater. In the same texts, the buyer is given the right to enter storage places, receive keys, and even resell chametz to other non-Jews during Passover if he wishes. In practice, this almost never happens in the dramatic form that the mass press loves, but the legal logic is important: the sale must be formalized as real, not as a joke, otherwise, it loses both religious and legal force.

This is the Israeli paradox, which from the outside looks almost like a national ritual surrealism. But NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency sees here not exoticism for the sake of a picture, but a point where an ancient prohibition, a modern state, digital services, and live Israeli bureaucracy unexpectedly work together — quite clearly, without unnecessary romance, and with a very specific practical meaning.

Where did this scheme come from and why hasn’t it disappeared

The roots of chametz sale are much older than the State of Israel.

One of the earliest mentions of such a practice is already found in the Tosefta: it describes a case with a Jew who went on a long journey and sold chametz to a non-Jew with the expectation that he could later buy back the remainder. Otherwise, after Passover, he risked being left without supplies.

On a small household level, this could still be solved simply — burn, throw away, eat in advance.

But as people acquired large stocks of grain, alcohol, flour, warehouse remnants, and commercial volumes, the complete destruction of goods began to mean serious economic damage. That is why the mechanism evolved: first as a private solution for merchants and stock owners, then as a standard procedure for communities, and in Israel — already as a formalized state practice.

Hence the answer to the main question that Israelis ask every year, especially those far from religious life: “Why not just throw it all away?” Because in reality, we are talking about a gigantic array of food and goods, partly state-owned, partly private, partly institutional.

The sale allows not to violate the Passover prohibition, not to destroy stocks unnecessarily, and not to turn holiday preparation into economic nonsense. That is why this strange-looking ceremony has such a stable status in Israel — and that is why it made the news again on March 31, 2026.

What is chametz, what exactly is included in it, and why is it treated so strictly on Passover

Chametz is not just “something flour-based,” but a very specific category according to Jewish law.

It refers to products from five types of grains — wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt — if they have come into contact with water and have fermented or started to leaven. In modern household examples, this is bread, rolls, cookies, grain-based alcohol (such as “Whiskey”), pasta, dry cereals, pizza, beer, and many other products that contain such grains or their derivatives.

Yes — ordinary vodka often falls into chametz, if it is made from grain: wheat, rye, barley, oats, or spelt. For Passover, this is considered a problem not because of the alcohol itself, but because of the raw material: if the alcohol is made from these grains, it is considered chametz.

But not all vodka is the same. Potato vodka is not chametz by itself, and vodka from corn or rice is not considered chametz, although for Ashkenazim, this may already touch on a separate custom regarding kitniyot. In any case, on Passover, such a bottle is taken only with a clear label Kosher for Passover, because additives, equipment, and the entire production process are also important.

Therefore, when in Israel they talk about selling chametz, it may not only be about a loaf of bread or a pack of spaghetti.

This category also includes larger stocks: flour from these grains, mixes, semi-finished products, warehouse remnants, grain-based alcohol, and industrial products where such components are present. It is important not to confuse chametz with kitniyot: rice, corn, legumes, lentils, and similar products are not considered chametz by themselves, although in Ashkenazi tradition many of them are also not eaten on Passover due to a separate custom, not because they are equated to chametz by the Torah.

In the Torah itself, the prohibition is directly and repeatedly prescribed. In the book of Exodus, it is said that before the holiday, leaven must be removed from homes, and during the seven days, chametz should not be in Jewish possession; it also says that chametz should not “be seen” and “be found” with you. In the book of Deuteronomy, the explanation of the meaning of matzah is added: it is the “bread of affliction,” eaten in memory of the hasty exodus from Egypt when the dough did not have time to rise.

This is where the answer to the question “why” comes from. On Passover, matzah becomes not just a permitted food, but a reminder of the Exodus and the fact that Jews left Egypt in haste. The prohibition of chametz is therefore connected not only with the kitchen but also with the memory of the event itself: Passover is arranged so that a person not only reads about liberation but literally experiences it through what is in their home and on their table.

Later halachic tradition has detailed what exactly to do with chametz before the holiday. Already the Mishnah in the tractate Pesachim begins the discussion with checking the house for chametz on the eve of the 14th of Nisan.

Then the Talmud develops these rules, Rambam in “Mishneh Torah” formulates the obligation to remove chametz before the prohibition moment, and the “Shulchan Aruch” establishes the practical order of checking and removing chametz from places where it can usually be found. So this is not only a biblical commandment but also a long, very specific legal tradition.

In practice, four main actions have grown out of this, familiar to religious and traditional Israel: chametz is searched for, removed, destroyed, or taken out of Jewish possession through sale to a non-Jew. That is why the state sale of chametz in Israel looks unusual only from the outside. Within Jewish legal logic, it is a continuation of an old norm: if chametz cannot be kept during Passover, it must either be destroyed or truly transferred to another owner.

Old wounds have been brought back to the stage.

There are disputes that cannot be resolved by shouting.

Ukraine and Poland have once again found themselves near a dangerous line: historical memory, Volyn, UPA, mutual claims, painful symbols, and political statements begin to sound not like a conversation about the past, but as pressure on the present. And this is happening at a time when Ukraine is fighting against the Russian army, and all of Eastern Europe is essentially living in a mode of testing for resilience.

Journalist Vitaly Portnikov said on the air of ‘Espreso’ what many do not want to hear directly: if Ukrainians and Poles start a real quarrel, the consequences could be catastrophic for both countries.

Not just a deterioration of relations.

Not just diplomatic coldness.

But a loss of stability, which Moscow has always enjoyed.

Portnikov reminded: states must look to the future, even if there was much hardship between peoples in the past. Ukrainians and Poles indeed have a painful history. But if this history is turned into a political club, it will hit not only the neighbor — it will hit both.

Polish politics is entering pre-election mode.

The escalation did not arise out of nowhere. In the Polish political scene, preparations for the 2027 parliamentary campaign are already being felt, and some politicians are once again pulling ‘historical’ claims against Ukraine from the past.

It’s a convenient topic.

It’s emotional, loud, understandable to the voter. It can quickly gather attention, show ‘toughness,’ talk about national pride, and not explain complex economic or political decisions. This is how not only Polish politics works — this is how any politics works when it needs a simple enemy and a quick effect.

Particularly noticeable has been the line of Polish President Karol Nawrocki. He promotes a tough approach to historical disputes and essentially ties them to the level of future partnership between Warsaw and Kyiv.

The sharpest example is the reaction to Ukraine’s decision to name one of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ‘Heroes of UPA.’ For some Polish elites, this became a reason for a new attack on Kyiv. Even the idea of considering stripping Volodymyr Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle — Poland’s highest state award, which the Ukrainian president received in 2023 — emerged in the public sphere.

The symbolism turned out to be heavy.

Ukraine is at war.

Poland is helping Ukraine.

And at the same time, within Polish politics, there is a signal: a historical dispute can become a condition for full partnership.

Portnikov warns: when Kyiv and Warsaw quarrel, Moscow wins.

Portnikov’s main thought is harsh but accurate: from the history of Ukraine and Poland, one can draw a common conclusion — when a big quarrel begins between Ukrainians and Poles, their states disappear from the political map or lose freedom.

He reminded of the sequence that cannot be attributed to chance.

First, the Russian Empire advanced on Ukrainian lands. Then Polish territories came under attack. Ukraine lost the chance for stable statehood after 1920. Poland was destroyed as an independent state in 1939. After 1945, Ukraine did not recover as a democratic sovereign country, and Poland found itself in the Soviet camp.

Then liberation also came almost synchronously.

The late 1980s.

The early 1990s.

Ukraine became independent, Poland — free.

This is not just a historical parallel. This is a map of regional security. The fates of Kyiv and Warsaw have moved too often side by side to pretend today that the weakening of Ukraine will not affect Poland.

If Ukraine is broken by Russian aggression, Poland will not become a calm island. It will become the next major line of pressure. Perhaps not immediately. Perhaps not with tanks the next day. But Moscow always returns where it sees weakness, fatigue, and division.

Why this dispute is seen in Israel.

For Israel, this is not a foreign European drama.

Israelis understand well that statehood is not a gift forever. It is protected by the army, alliances, memory, and the ability to distinguish a real enemy from a difficult neighbor in time.

Ukraine is currently defending itself against the Russian army. Israel is defending itself against the terrorist and Iranian axis. Poland, the Baltic countries, and other Eastern European states understand that the Russian threat does not end at the Ukrainian border.

All these are parts of one big picture.

When democratic countries start quarreling among themselves, authoritarian regimes gain space. When allies argue louder than they speak with the enemy, the enemy listens and smiles.

That is why NAnews —Israel News | Nikk.Agency looks at the Ukrainian-Polish escalation not as a local conflict of neighbors, but as an element of overall security. For the Israeli audience, the question here is not only about Volyn, UPA, or Polish domestic politics. The important question is: who wins if Kyiv and Warsaw stop trusting each other?

The answer is obvious.

Moscow.

History should remember, not blackmail.

Ukraine and Poland have already sought a formula for reconciliation. Back in the early 2000s, the presidents of the two countries signed joint statements related to the tragic events in Volyn. In 2023, Ukrainian and Polish church hierarchs signed a message and held a joint service in the spirit of the formula ‘we forgive and ask for forgiveness.’

This was not an attempt to erase the past.

On the contrary.

It was an attempt to keep the memory honest but not allow it to destroy the future. Because the memory of victims and political blackmail are different things. The first requires respect. The second destroys trust.

Today, part of Polish politics is effectively devaluing previous reconciliation work. If each new political escalation returns Kyiv and Warsaw to the point of mutual accusations, then a simple question arises: what declaration will be considered final at all? And will each subsequent campaign become a reason to demand new symbolic concessions from Ukraine again?

Ukraine’s European integration should not become a hostage to old grievances.

It is especially dangerous if historical claims begin to be tied to Ukraine’s European path.

Poland has the right to defend its interests in the EU. This is normal. Any country defends its economy, market, security, transport, agricultural sector, and political influence. But it’s one thing to talk about accession rules, standards, and reforms. Quite another to turn old historical disputes into a lever of pressure on a country that is now holding back the Russian army.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk states that Warsaw will not block the start of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. But at the same time, he makes it clear: there will be no easy path, and Poland will take into account its own benefit and security.

This can be understood.

But here the boundary is important. Modern EU, NATO, economic, and security issues should not be mixed with the emotional politics of the past. Otherwise, European integration turns not into a path to stability but into a field for mutual claims.

Kyiv chooses restraint — and this may be the right choice.

It is important for Ukraine not to break down now.

A loud response to every Polish statement will bring a quick emotional effect, but strategically it will play against Kyiv. This is exactly what those who want to turn Ukrainian-Polish relations into an open political fight are waiting for.

The best response is a cool head.

Cooperation in logistics.

Economy.

Defense.

Working directly with Polish society.

Joint memory projects without ultimatums.

And a firm understanding: real actions against Ukraine need to be answered, but it’s not worth rushing to every historical provocation.

Because Moscow works precisely with such cracks. Russian propaganda does not always create conflict from scratch. More often, it takes real pain, adds poison, amplifies extreme voices, and makes neighbors see each other not as allies but as threats.

Today, the Kremlin benefits from anything that distracts Europe from the main fact: Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. It destroys cities, kills civilians, threatens neighbors, and tries to return the region to the logic of imperial zones of influence.

If instead of a united position against the aggressor, Kyiv and Warsaw start measuring historical accounts, memory will not win.

Putin’s Russia will win.

The final conclusion here is simple and unpleasant. Ukraine and Poland can argue about the past, but they have no right to let this dispute destroy the future. Because history has already shown: when Ukrainians and Poles stop being allies, Moscow gets a chance to return.

And in 2026, such a chance is too expensive.

Haifa knows and honors a modest heroine — a native of Zolochiv (Lviv region, Ukraine). On February 12, 2025, she turned 90 years old.

In the Righteous Among the Nations Garden in Haifa, where 20 memorial stones bear the names of those who saved Jews and once lived in the city, Yaroslava Levytska remains the only one honored with a memorial plaque during her lifetime.

At the Latin Cemetery in Haifa, 11 Righteous Among the Nations are buried. In their honor, the Haifa municipality created a unique memorial garden in the Ramat Alon district.

On May 18, 2008, a solemn opening ceremony was held in Haifa’s Ramat Alon neighborhood for the “Haifa Residents’ Garden of the Righteous Among the Nations” (גן חסידי אומות העולם).

The garden features several paths with stone plaques engraved with names and brief descriptions of their heroic deeds. At the time of its opening, 19 Righteous Among the Nations were known to have lived in Haifa: 9 from Poland, 6 from Ukraine, and one each from Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Sweden. Later, a 20th plaque was added.

Only five of them were still alive at the time of the park’s opening.

Four were honored for their acts of bravery committed as children.

Yaroslava Levytska is the youngest person ever awarded this title for rescuing Jews.

At the park’s entrance, on an uneven stone, three symbols are engraved: the emblem of the Righteous, the Yad Vashem logo, and the emblem of the City of Haifa. Below them is a quote from the Talmud: “Whoever saves one Jewish life is as if they have saved the entire world.”

Memorial Stones of the Righteous Among the Nations in Haifa

The Righteous Garden in Haifa features plaques honoring those who saved Jews during the Holocaust. Here are brief summaries of their stories:

• Halina Lugovska (Poland): Hid a Jewish woman in her home for 32 weeks and later helped her find refuge with her family.
• Anna Hornung-Tomachak (Ukraine): Pretended to be the mother of a Jewish family to save them in the Ternopil region.
• Victoria Tsukrovych-Aichberger (Poland): Together with her sister, hid a Jew who was fleeing the Nazis.
• Pelagia Guchak-Springer (Poland): Saved 20 Jewish women and the family of a Jewish workshop owner.
• Yaroslava Levytska (Ukraine): As a teenager, brought food to the ghetto and hid Jewish children with her family.
• Jerzy Shelaga (Poland): Delivered food and letters to the Warsaw Ghetto, risking his life.
• Julia Kaldi-Ralbovska (Czechoslovakia): Hid a Jew and buried his mother to keep the hiding place secret.
• Elisabeta Nikopoi-Strul (Romania): Warned of a pogrom, sheltered and fed more than 15 Jews despite arrest and beatings.
• Tamara Maksymeniuk-Bromberg (Ukraine): Delivered food to the ghetto with her mother, rescued families, and organized shelters.
• Bela (Valya) Lipper (Ukraine): Hid her Jewish husband and six others for 19 months.
• Victor Melnyk (Ukraine): Hid Jews with his family, provided forged documents, and helped them escape.
• Zofia-Marta Avni (Poland): Hid six Jews in an attic in Warsaw with her family for a year and a half.
• Irena Yakira-Ziental (Poland): Hid 13 Jews with her mother in a specially prepared hiding place.
• Raoul Wallenberg (Sweden): Diplomat who saved thousands of Jews in Hungary; disappeared after being arrested by Soviet forces in 1945.
• Anna Dobrucka-Ezerska (Poland): Saved a family during the liquidation of the Tarnow Ghetto and later married one of those she rescued.
• Franya Dedek-Belska (Ukraine): Born in Nadvirna, rescued two Jewish boys and survived a displaced persons camp, the “Exodus” ship attempt, and eventually immigrated to Israel, where she converted to Judaism and became Fruma Belska.

Each name is a reminder of courage, humanity, and sacrifice. The Haifa memorial preserves the memory of those who risked everything to save others.

On February 12, 2025, students from the Bosmat School visited the “Beit Gil Zahav” nursing home in Kiryat Eliahu to congratulate Yaroslava Levytska on her 90th birthday and express their gratitude for her heroism. The event was part of the activities of Haifa’s Municipal Institute for Holocaust Studies, which works to preserve the memory of the Righteous Among the Nations and pass on Holocaust remembrance to future generations.

According to Yad Vashem, as reported by journalist Shimon Briman, Ukrainian native Yaroslava Levytska is the only Righteous Among the Nations currently living in Israel. She has lived in Haifa since the early 1990s and receives full support from the State of Israel.

Biography of Yaroslava Levytska: The Journey of a Righteous Among the Nations from Zolochiv to Haifa

Yaroslava Levytska, according to journalist Shimon Briman, was born in 1935 in the town of Zolochiv, which was then part of Poland and today is in Lviv Oblast, Ukraine. In July 1941, the German army occupied the region and began the systematic extermination of the Jewish population. A ghetto was established in Zolochiv, and Jews were stripped of their rights, food, and any chance of survival. It was during this time that the Levytsky family’s courageous acts became part of history.

The Heroism of the Levytsky Family: 29 Lives Saved

Yaroslava’s grandfather, Oleksandr Levytsky, began supplying food and medicine to his Jewish friends from the start of the occupation. In December 1942, when the Zolochiv Ghetto was officially created, he started sending supplies through his seven-year-old granddaughter Yaroslava. She walked two kilometers from their home to the ghetto each week for ten months. The risk was immense — German guards could have executed them. But Yaroslava carried out her task calmly and bravely.

Thanks to her actions, many Jewish families and children survived.

Yorek Shenker and Richards Feiring: Stories of the Rescued

One of the children saved was Yorek Shenker, only six years old, now known as Yoram Miron. To avoid suspicion, Yaroslava would play with him outside while he was in hiding. The family also sheltered Richards Feiring. Both boys survived the Holocaust thanks to the courage of Yaroslava and her family.

Additionally, for ten months, the Levytsky family provided food to a group of 25 Jews hiding in the basement of a destroyed building. Despite fear and fatigue, Yaroslava kept delivering food. This entire group survived until the Red Army liberated the area in July 1944.

Life After the War

After liberation, Yaroslava graduated from School No. 2 in Zolochiv in 1952 and went on to attend medical college. She worked as a feldsher and later as head of the infectious disease prevention department. She lived modestly and never sought any personal gain for her family’s heroism. Her father Petro Levytsky also played a key role in rescuing Jews but was not officially recognized by Yad Vashem — a fact that remains painful to this day.

Recognition and Immigration to Israel

On August 20, 1989, two of the people she rescued — Avraham Shapiro and Israel Fenster — submitted a petition to Yad Vashem to recognize Oleksandr, Kateryna, and Yaroslava Levytska as Righteous Among the Nations. On September 21, 1989, Yad Vashem officially awarded them the title. Yaroslava herself planted a tree in honor of her family in the Garden of the Righteous in Jerusalem.

In 1995, she permanently moved to Israel, where she was granted citizenship, a government pension, and an apartment. Later, she settled in the Beit Gil Zahav senior care facility in Haifa.

90 Years of Heroism and Humanity

On her 90th birthday, Yaroslava Levytska was honored by the Haifa Holocaust Education Municipal Institute, the Moriah-Haifa Rotary Club, and students of the “Basmat” school. She shared:

“I am happy to live here, in Israel. At 90, I want for nothing. This is a special country.”

Words of Gratitude from Israel

“Israel and the Jewish people will never forget the vital role played by the Righteous Among the Nations during World War II, when they took great risks to save the lives of thousands of Jews.”

Some of these heroes, like Yaroslava, chose Israel as their new home — and became part of its living history.

NAnews – Israel News continues to tell these stories to ensure the memory of Jewish-Ukrainian solidarity lives on and inspires future generations.

The Lessons of History and the Power of Memory

Today, Yaroslava Levytska’s name is engraved on a memorial stone in Haifa’s Righteous Garden — while she is still alive, a unique distinction. She is recognized, respected, and cared for.

Her story is a profound example of selfless humanity in the face of ultimate evil. It reminds us that children, adults, and the elderly alike can act with courage and conscience.

NAnews – Israel News believes that telling these stories is essential to preserving the bond between the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples. In an age of war and terrorism, when hatred rises again, these stories help us to see the human being in one another.

The deal with Iran may not be just about Iran

There is a lot of noise, leaks, contradictory statements, and political smoke surrounding the possible US-Iran deal. On the surface, everything looks familiar: Tehran’s nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, oil, missiles, Hezbollah, Hamas, Israel’s security.

But if you look more broadly, another question arises: is this deal part of a larger American strategy against China?

For Beijing, Iran has long been not just ‘another country under sanctions.’

It was an energy rear, a source of cheap oil, a land and sea hub in the Middle East, and an important element of the large anti-American alliance China — Russia — Iran. That is why a possible shift of Iran from a closed sanctions regime to a more transparent international field could hit not only Tehran but also the Chinese model of influence.

It is important to clarify immediately: it is not about Iran being ‘bought,’ China already ‘losing,’ and the US reshaping the Middle East with one memorandum. No. The deal has not yet become a final reality. Reuters reported on June 12, 2026, that Trump sharply rejected the Iranian version of the terms of a possible agreement, calling reports of conditions too favorable for Tehran unreliable. According to Reuters, the parties are discussing a memorandum, sanctions, frozen funds, the Strait of Hormuz, and nuclear restrictions, but the final picture remains controversial.

That is why it is more correct to talk not about a completed deal, but about a possible strategic plan.

Chinese oil from Iran: where the main nerve begins

China is the main buyer of Iranian oil. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinese purchases account for about 90% of exported Iranian oil, and these sales bring Tehran tens of billions of dollars a year. It is also noted that China and Iran signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2021, including economic, technological, and defense cooperation.

For Beijing, this was a convenient scheme.

Iran was under sanctions, meaning it sold oil cheaper. China could buy it through gray mechanisms, intermediaries, shadow tankers, and schemes that complicated Western control. Tehran received money, Beijing received energy resources at a discount, and the US saw that the sanctions regime was not fully working.

If the possible US-Iran deal indeed returns Iranian oil to a more legal international field, the logic of trade itself changes. Oil becomes more visible to banks, insurers, auditors, traders, and Western regulators. China may still be able to buy Iranian oil, but no longer as an almost exclusive buyer from the gray zone.

This does not mean that Washington is ‘taking oil from China.’ But it may mean something else: the US is trying to make Chinese access to Iranian oil less cheap, less closed, and less politically convenient.

For Israel, this is not an abstract economic detail. Money from Iranian oil is not only Tehran’s budget. It is missiles, drones, proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, military infrastructure in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. If Iran’s financial flows become more transparent, it potentially changes the security field around Israel.

Hormuz as a message to Beijing

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key energy passages. When Iran threatens Hormuz or actually restricts movement through it, it is not only a blow to the West. It is also a signal to China: your ally can influence global oil.

But now the US is trying to show the opposite.

Reuters reported on June 12, 2026, citing US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, that the US military is helping to move about 7 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf amid disruptions related to the conflict around Iran. Wright also stated that Iranian oil is not currently flowing through Hormuz, but Washington hopes for the resumption of the flow in case of a diplomatic agreement.

This is an important point. The US demonstrates that it can not only bomb, threaten, or impose sanctions but also administer the energy reality of the region itself. And if Hormuz opens not as a victory for Iran, but as part of an agreement on terms acceptable to Washington, this is already a signal not only to Tehran.

This is a signal to Beijing.

The meaning of this signal is simple: key sea routes should not become tools of Chinese proxies or partners. In the event of a major conflict around Taiwan or elsewhere in Asia, China understands its dependence on sea routes. The Strait of Malacca, Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean — these are not geography from a textbook, but the arteries of the Chinese economy.

Therefore, the American game around Iran can be read as follows: Washington shows that the rules in energy chokepoints will be set not only by the market but also by American military and diplomatic power.

IMEC versus China’s ‘Belt and Road’

There is another layer — routes.

For many years, China has been promoting the ‘One Belt, One Road,’ building an infrastructure network of influence from Asia to Europe, including the Middle East. In this scheme, Iran was an important hub: a country between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe.

But the US, together with India, Arab partners, Israel, and Europe, is promoting an alternative logic — the India — Middle East — Europe corridor, known as IMEC. The official description of the project speaks of a corridor that should connect trade and infrastructure of three regions — India, the Middle East, and Europe.

For Israel, this topic is especially important. In this architecture, Israel can be not a periphery, but one of the nodes of the new trade system: India — Gulf — Israel — Europe. This is not just economics. This is diplomacy, security, ports, railways, energy, technological chains.

But there is a problem: Iran, Hezbollah, Houthis, and the Russian-Iranian axis make such a route vulnerable. If the region constantly lives in a mode of missiles, blockades, sea attacks, and threats to straits, no corridor works as a normal business project.

Therefore, a possible American attempt to bring Iran out of the ‘besieged fortress’ regime may have not only a nuclear meaning. It may be part of clearing space for routes that compete with China’s ‘Belt and Road.’

NANews Israel News Nikk.Agency considers this topic precisely in the Israeli context: if the Middle East becomes not only a field of war but also a field of new logistics, then Israel gets a chance to strengthen its significance. But if Iran retains missiles, proxies, and nuclear potential, any corridor will remain a beautiful map on paper.

Why the US might want to split the China — Russia — Iran axis

For Washington, the strategic threat is not only China, Russia, and Iran separately. Their alliance is more dangerous.

Russia provides military and political support to the anti-Western camp. Iran provides proxies, missiles, drones, and pressure on Israel. China provides the economy, trade, oil purchases, technology, and diplomatic weight.

If Iran remains fully within this axis, the problem for the US and Israel becomes long-term. Tehran receives money from China, military and political support from Russia, and continues to pressure the region through Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Shiite groups.

But if the US offers Iran an economic way out of isolation, they can play on the internal contradiction of the Iranian system itself. Not everyone in Iran wants to be a junior partner of China and Russia. Parts of the elite need the economy, investments, access to markets, technological renewal, the ability to sell oil without constant risk.

Here the logic of ‘carrot and stick’ appears.

First, forceful pressure, strikes, blockade, demonstration of control over the sea. Then — a deal, money, sanction relief, international legalization. This is very similar to Trump’s style: not to build a long ideological doctrine, but to press until the other side starts to consider the deal a lesser evil.

However, this does not mean that the scheme will necessarily work.

Where in this version is the dangerous illusion

The weakest part of the optimistic scenario is the belief that Iran can simply be ‘bought.’

The Iranian system is not a company that was offered investments and changed its strategy. There is the IRGC, the ideology of the Islamic revolution, the nuclear program, the missile industry, proxy networks, the memory of the US withdrawal from the previous nuclear deal, and the fear that concessions will be perceived as weakness.

Moreover, China will not disappear from Iran even after a possible deal. It will remain a major buyer, investor, and political partner. Russia will also do everything to keep Tehran in the anti-Western orbit.

There is also an Israeli risk.

If the deal simply unfreezes money, partially lifts sanctions, and gives Iran a respite, but does not destroy the nuclear potential, does not limit missiles, and does not cut off proxy funding, then it will not be a blow to the axis, but a pause before the next war. Israel has already experienced similar situations when Western capitals rejoiced at diplomacy, and Tehran used the time to strengthen its capabilities.

Reuters reported on June 11 that US-Iran negotiations included discussions of billions of dollars of frozen Iranian funds, and the parties continued to exchange messages on the details of the memorandum amid ongoing confrontation.

That is why for Israel the question sounds tough: what exactly does Iran get and what exactly is it obliged to give?

Not to promise. Not to freeze for a while. Not to hide. But to really give.

Israel between chance and threat

For Israel, the possible US-Iran deal has two sides.

In a dangerous scenario, Iran gets money, oil returns to the markets, sanctions are weakened, and nuclear and missile infrastructure is preserved under diplomatic formulations. Then Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and other Iranian proxies get oxygen, and Israel faces an old threat in a new package.

In a favorable scenario, something else happens. Iranian flows become more transparent. China loses part of the exclusive access to Iranian oil. Russia gets a less reliable partner. Hormuz returns under stricter international control. Inside Iran, the conflict between economic pragmatists and military ideologues intensifies. And regional proxies get less freedom for war.

The difference between these two scenarios is huge.

In the first case, the deal is dangerous for Israel. In the second, it can become the beginning of a split in the axis that has been built against the US, Israel, and the West for years.

NANews Israel News Nikk.Agency believes that the Israeli audience should look at this topic not only through the question ‘will Iran be closer to the bomb.’ This is the main question, but not the only one. We need to look more broadly: who controls oil, money, straits, routes, ports, proxies, and future trade corridors.

Because it is there that the new architecture of the Middle East is being decided today.

The main addressee may not be Tehran

If the American strategy really exists in this form, then the Iranian deal is aimed not only at Tehran. Its main hidden addressee may be Beijing.

For many years, China has used Iran as an energy crutch, a sanctions partner, and a Middle Eastern hub of influence. If the US changes the rules and moves Iran from a closed gray zone to a controlled international field, Beijing loses part of its convenient shadow.

But this is still a hypothesis, not a proven finale.

The US may conceive a big game, but Iran may disrupt it. China may adapt. Russia may ignite neighboring fronts. Israel may not accept the deal if it leaves Tehran too many opportunities for a new war.

Therefore, the correct conclusion sounds cautious but tough: a possible US-Iran deal may not be a gift to Tehran, but an attempt to change the rules of the game for China. But for Israel, such a deal makes sense only in one case — if it really weakens the Iranian military machine, and not just buys a beautiful pause before the next explosion.

The question is not whether Iran will smile at the negotiating table.

The question is who will control the money, oil, missiles, and routes after the deal.

Video by Lev Dubinsky with Igor Salikov and Ivan Dolvich from June 11, 2026 — this is not just another conversation about PMC “Wagner”. This is material that directly concerns Israel’s security because it draws a connection between Russian military structures, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the war against Ukraine, and the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

The main question is harsh: could the Russian military and proxy system have been not a bystander, but part of a broader architecture of pressure on Israel?

The answers given in the interview require independent verification. But they cannot be ignored. Too many lines converge at one point: Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Gaza, Russian special forces, former Wagner structures, weapon routes, FPV drones, and the experience of the war against Ukraine.

Who speaks in this video and why it matters

Three people participate in the conversation.

Lev Dubinsky is the host of a YouTube channel, a former senior investigator of the “Russian department” of the Tel Aviv police. For the Israeli audience, this is an important detail: the conversation is conducted not in an abstract political space, but from within the Israeli context, where October 7 is not a topic for geopolitical games, but a national trauma, war, casualties, hostages, destroyed families, and an open wound.

Igor Salikov is presented as a former officer of the Russian GRU special forces and an instructor of PMC “Wagner”. In the interview, he speaks not as an external commentator, but as a person who, according to him, saw part of this system from the inside.

Ivan Dolvich is the co-author of a book about “Wagner”, a person with experience in private military structures, and an analyst who helps explain to the Western audience how Russian “Wagner” differs from a regular private military or security company.

This is what makes the video important. Its value is not that it “closes the question” and provides a ready legal verdict. No. Its significance lies elsewhere: it shows the possible internal logic of the connection between Russian military structures and Middle Eastern terrorist networks.

For Israel, this is fundamental. If Moscow, Tehran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are connected not only politically but also through military specialists, technologies, routes, and combat experience, then the old formula “Russia is a complex but separate player” no longer works.

Russian structures and October 7: what Salikov claims

One of the central episodes of the interview is Igor Salikov’s claim about the preparation of specialists in the spring and summer of 2023.

According to him, even before the Hamas attack on Israel, he encountered signs of activity related to the Middle East, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Homs province, and Sudan. After October 7, these fragments, as Salikov claims, formed for him a picture of possible involvement of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation in preparing groups associated with the attack on Israel.

This is an extremely serious statement.

It’s not just about Russia politically aligning with Iran. And not only about Moscow receiving Hamas delegations or playing against the West in the Middle East. The interview talks about a much more dangerous version: possible involvement of military specialists, preparation, coordination, and presence in combat formations during the October 7 attack.

Such accusations cannot be presented as an established fact without additional evidence. But they cannot be dismissed as mere political rhetoric. If even part of what is said is confirmed, Israel will face a new level of threat.

Because then October 7 will have to be considered not only as a Hamas operation supported by Iran but as part of a broader system where Russian experience in hybrid wars, special operations, and proxy structures could be used against Israeli citizens.

Why this changes the Israeli threat landscape

After October 7, Israel most often talks about three main sources of threat: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. This is correct, but no longer sufficient.

Dubinsky’s video adds a fourth level — Russian.

And this level is especially painful for Russian-speaking Israelis. For many years, part of society tried to separate: “Russia separately, the Middle East separately, Iran separately, Ukraine separately.” But the reality of recent years shows the opposite. Russia’s war against Ukraine, Iran’s strengthening, Houthi attacks, Hezbollah’s actions, and Hamas terror increasingly look not like different crises, but as interconnected elements of one anti-Western and anti-Israeli line.

For Israel, the question is no longer whether someone likes Putin or not. The question is different: can Russian military structures, directly or through proxies, participate in processes that ultimately kill Israelis?

If yes, then this is no longer a diplomatic problem. This is a national security issue.

“Wagner” as a tool of war, cleansing, and state control

A separate important part of the interview is the discussion about the origin of PMC “Wagner”.

Dolvich and Salikov explain that “Wagner” cannot be understood as an analogue of a Western private military company. In the Western model, private military and security companies often operate within a legal framework: guarding objects, escorting, security, contractual tasks. The Russian model, as they describe it, was arranged differently.

“Wagner” is presented not as an independent mercenary business, but as a hybrid tool of the state. It was needed where the Kremlin required force without direct official responsibility.

Salikov and Dolvich say that one of the first tasks of “Wagner” was the elimination of commanders of the so-called “Russian Spring” in Ukraine — people who could become an independent military and political force, uncontrolled by Moscow. This is an important point: in such logic, “Wagner” was created not only for external war but also for control over its own radical field structures.

So it’s not just an “army for Syria” or “mercenaries for Africa”.

It’s a mechanism that could perform tasks of war, killings, cleansing, pressure, covert participation, and political control.

For Israel, this has direct significance. If “Wagner” and related structures were an extension of the Russian state system, then their contacts in the Middle East cannot be dismissed as the private initiative of individual adventurers.

In other words, if people from this environment interacted with Iran, Hezbollah, or other radical forces, the question should be not “what did the mercenaries do?” but “what task was the Russian system solving?”

Ukraine as a testing ground, Iran as a recipient of experience, Israel as the next target

One of the most alarming blocks of the video concerns drones.

Salikov claims that Hezbollah and Iranian army specialists had the opportunity to study the experience of Ukrainians on the battlefield of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The interview separately mentions FPV drones and Russian specialists who were engaged in drone technologies, did not find support within the Russian Federation, and then, according to Salikov, ended up in Iran, where they received laboratories.

This fragment is especially important for the Israeli audience.

The war in Ukraine has become the largest testing ground for modern drone warfare. There, reconnaissance UAVs, strike drones, FPV drones, guidance systems, electronic warfare, new forms of interaction between infantry, artillery, and aerial reconnaissance were tested.

Iran closely watched this war. Russia received Shahed drones from Iran, and Iran gained access to a huge array of combat experience. In such a scheme, the exchange goes not only with hardware but also with knowledge: how to use drones, how to bypass defenses, how to find weak spots, how to cheapen the strike, how to saturate the front with cheap technologies.

Now part of this experience may return against Israel.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic as one of the key ones for understanding the new war: the Ukrainian front and the Israeli front are connected not by slogans, but by technologies, opponents, and military practice. What is being tested against Ukraine today may be used against the IDF tomorrow. What is being worked out against Israeli soldiers in the north may be part of the same school of war that Russia, Iran, and their allies have been developing for years.

FPV drones and a new threat to the IDF

The interview states that the appearance of FPV drones in Hezbollah was practically inevitable. Ivan Dolvich emphasizes: Iran does not have many partners who could teach how to work with such weapons, and cooperation with Russian structures, according to him, did not begin in 2023 but has been going on for almost ten years.

For Israel, this is not a theoretical question.

FPV drones change the nature of combat. They are dangerous for infantry, equipment, fortified positions, observation posts, antennas, warehouses, mobile groups, and even individual fighters. They are cheap, fast, flexible, and can be used en masse. An opponent who receives such technology along with combat experience becomes much more dangerous.

If behind the appearance of such capabilities in Hezbollah stands not only Iran but also Russian experience in the war against Ukraine, then Israel faces not a local threat from Lebanon. It faces an international military network where opponents learn from each other faster than politicians can recognize the new reality.

Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza: possible weapon routes

In the interview, Salikov talks about the routes of weapon supplies for the Gaza Strip. In this version, Syria, Homs province, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and tunnels into Gaza are mentioned. Representatives of Hamas who were on the territory of Lebanon and visited Syria are also mentioned.

This is an important block because it shows a possible logistical map.

It’s not about random contact and not about a single transfer. According to the version voiced in the interview, there was a system where Syria and Lebanon acted as intermediate zones for supply, coordination, and communication between different participants.

For Israel, Syria has long been not just a neighboring country. It is a territory through which Iran tried to build military infrastructure, transfer weapons to Hezbollah, strengthen its positions, and create additional pressure on Israel.

But if the Russian factor is added to this scheme, the picture becomes even more complicated.

Syria is a space where the interests of Moscow, Tehran, the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Palestinian groups, and various proxy structures intersect. The Russian military presence in Syria for years created an opportunity for Moscow to observe, influence, coordinate, negotiate, and turn a blind eye to what is beneficial at a particular moment.

That is why the question of weapon routes cannot be considered separately from the question of Russia’s political role in the Middle East.

Russia and Iranian proxies: an alliance that was underestimated for too long

Another important thought is voiced in the conversation: the cooperation of Russian structures with Iran and its associated forces did not start yesterday.

Dolvich draws attention to the paradox: Russian military and intelligence officers who once fought against Islamists in the Caucasus, after new orders, were ready to interact with Hezbollah and structures associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The interview even mentions Russian servicemen who wore Hezbollah patches and other Arabic-speaking units associated with the Iranian system.

This is not just a detail for military experts. This is a symptom.

When a state stops distinguishing between terrorism and allies in the anti-Western struggle, it quickly comes to a cynical formula: yesterday’s enemy becomes a partner if it helps to pressure the US, Europe, Ukraine, or Israel.

And here for Israel arises a difficult but necessary conclusion. Russian policy in the Middle East is not neutral. It can be flexible, covert, ambiguous, but its overall vector increasingly coincides with the interests of those who weaken Israel and the West.

Iran receives political protection, military experience, international maneuvering, and a sense that it is not alone from Russia. Russia receives weapons, drones, an anti-Western front, and an additional way to divert the world’s attention from Ukraine from Iran.

And Israel in this construction turns out to be not a bystander, but one of the targets of pressure.

What exactly requires verification

A strong article on this topic should not turn the interview into a final verdict. On the contrary, the more serious the accusations, the more carefully one needs to handle the facts.

The statements of Salikov and Dolvich require verification by journalists, researchers, intelligence services, and international structures.

It is necessary to verify not general emotions, but specifics.

Who exactly could have prepared the groups associated with the October 7 attack? Where did the preparation take place? Which Russian officers or structures could have been involved? What role could former or current GRU connections play? What weapon routes passed through Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Gaza? Who transferred the experience of working with FPV drones to Iran and Hezbollah? What contacts existed between Russian proxies and Iranian proxies after 2014?

The answers to these questions are important not only for historians and analysts. They are important for the families of Israeli soldiers, for the residents of northern Israel, for the victims of October 7, for politicians who are still trying to talk to Moscow as if nothing has changed.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that the Russian-speaking Israeli audience has the right to know not only who pulled the trigger but also who for years created the conditions, technologies, routes, and political cover for a new war against Israel.

Why this topic is important right now

The video was published on June 11, 2026, but its meaning goes far beyond a single video.

Israel is entering a period where old foreign policy formulas no longer work. You cannot simultaneously talk about the strategic threat of Iran and ignore the Russian-Iranian military rapprochement. You cannot talk about the security of the northern border and not analyze where Hezbollah gets new technologies. You cannot discuss October 7 only as a failure of local intelligence if broader international networks could have been behind the preparation, supply, and training.

There is also another aspect.

For many Israelis, the war in Ukraine remained a “foreign war” for a long time. But if the experience of this war is used by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas against Israel, then it is no longer foreign. If Russian specialists, technologies, or proxy structures help Israel’s enemies, then the Ukrainian front and the Israeli front become part of one threat map.

This does not mean that Ukraine and Israel can automatically be equated. Each country has its own war, its own pain, its own mistakes, and its own interests. But opponents increasingly intersect. And this can no longer be ignored.

Israel needs new honesty

The main conclusion from the interview with Dubinsky, Salikov, and Dolvich is not that tomorrow we need to announce final conclusions. The main conclusion is that Israel must honestly reassess its understanding of Russia’s role in the Middle East.

If Russia cooperates with Iran, if Russian military or proxy structures are connected with Hezbollah and Hamas, if the experience of the war against Ukraine is used against Israeli soldiers, then relations with Moscow cease to be just a diplomatic topic.

This is already part of the defense doctrine.

After October 7, Israel cannot afford convenient illusions. The threat is not limited to Gaza. It passes through Tehran, Beirut, Damascus, Moscow, the Ukrainian front, drone laboratories, weapon routes, and old intelligence connections.

Lev Dubinsky’s video is important precisely for this reason. It not only makes loud accusations. It shows the possible architecture of a new war against Israel.

Iran provides ideology, money, weapons, and a proxy network. Hamas and Hezbollah operate on the ground. Russian structures, if the information voiced in the interview is confirmed, could provide experience, technologies, logistics, and military expertise.

For Israel, this means one thing: October 7 was not an isolated Palestinian episode. It was part of a broader axis where Ukraine, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel increasingly find themselves on the same war map.

Link to the video

title – “PMC Wagner and GRU Special Forces: Axis of Terror? Connection with October 7 Revealed! Salikov Dolvich and Lev Dubinsky”
here it is – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aP0tsNFIWQ

June 11, 2026, video on the channel Lev Dubinsky – https://www.youtube.com/@LevDubinsky. “Wagner PMC and GRU Special Forces: Axis of Terror? Connection with October 7 revealed! Salikov Dolvich and Lev Dubinsky”. The truth that shocks. How are the GRU special forces and Wagner PMC mercenaries connected with the preparation of the terrorist attack by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel on October 7, 2023?

In this exclusive interview, the authors of the new investigative book — PMC insider Igor Salikov and co-author Ivan Dolvich — reveal the secret schemes, supply routes, and coordination that formed the new “Axis of Terror.” Watch until the end to find out which technologies and tactics were transferred to the militants and what role Russian special services played in this geopolitical game.

NANews Israel News Nikk.Agency.