Author: Карабас Барабас

After the announcement of two Kanye West concerts in St. Petersburg, train ticket orders for these dates increased 41 times. But the story has long gone beyond music: Ye publicly praised Hitler and used Nazi symbols, faced bans in Europe, tried to organize a performance in Israel, and now his Russian promoter talks about the artist’s ‘long-standing dream’ to meet Putin.

On the morning of August 18, 2026, a figure emerged around Kanye West’s two upcoming concerts in St. Petersburg that turned an ordinary showbiz news into a rather uncomfortable question about modern Russia. According to the travel service ‘Tutu’, only on August 17, the number of train ticket orders to St. Petersburg for October 9-11 increased 41 times. Airline tickets for the same dates were searched 16 times more often, and the same increase was recorded for hotel searches.

The reason for the excitement is known: Ye, whom the world still more often calls Kanye West, is supposed to perform at the ‘Gazprom Arena’ on October 10 and 11, 2026. Tickets were sold from 9 to 160 thousand rubles (approximately from 316 to 5,614 shekels), the cheapest seats disappeared in about an hour. Reuters notes that if the concerts take place, West will become one of the largest international music stars to visit Russia after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian dates are now also present in Ye’s official tour schedule.

This is where the simple story about a rapper and tickets ends for the author of NAnovosti Anton Pshedynsky. His materials are usually at the intersection of Israel, Ukraine, and Russian politics, and in the case of Ye, these lines literally converged on one stage.

The question is not about the musical tastes of tens of thousands of people and not about trying to declare every ticket buyer a supporter of the artist’s views.

Much more interesting is another: why public admiration for the real Adolf Hitler turned out to be quite compatible with huge demand in a state that has been justifying the war against Ukraine for the fifth year by the need for its ‘denazification’?

NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency monitors how Russian rhetoric about ‘Nazism’ is used far beyond the conversation about history. In the case of Kanye West, the dispute unexpectedly ceased to be theoretical: a man who truly glorified Hitler is coming not to a Russian TV studio for condemnation, but to one of the largest concert venues in the country.

From ‘death con 3’ to ‘Heil Hitler’: what exactly did Ye do

In the fall of 2022, Kanye West’s story with anti-Semitism became an international scandal. In October, he wrote that he was going to go ‘death con 3’ on Jews — intentionally or mistakenly playing on the American term DEFCON. After that, major partners began to abandon him; Adidas severed a highly profitable collaboration with Yeezy, and the CAA agency left him. Less than two months later, Ye was already publicly talking about seeing ‘good things’ in Hitler.

It is important to remind this now because the expression ‘praised Hitler’ in relation to West is not a political characterization by a journalist and not an exaggeration in a headline. His own statements led to the topic of Nazism becoming part of his public image for years.

Even the first noticeable apology did not close the problem. In December 2023, Ye posted an address to the Jewish community in Hebrew, expressing regret for the pain caused. The Anti-Defamation League then said that words could be the first step but reminded: actions are more important. The warning turned out to be not superfluous.

In 2025, West again crossed an almost demonstrative line. A T-shirt with a swastika appeared on his website, and in May he released the song Heil Hitler with Nazi imagery. Australian authorities later annulled his visa precisely after the release of this composition. Reuters and AP in 2026 materials directly characterize the song as a work promoting Nazism.

There is another date that cannot be hidden for the sake of a convenient journalistic construction. On January 26, 2026, Ye bought a full page in The Wall Street Journal for a new apology. He stated that he had lost touch with reality, talked about bipolar disorder and the consequences of a long-standing head injury, admitted previous admiration for Hitler and the use of the swastika, and separately wrote that he does not consider himself a Nazi or anti-Semite. The ADL called the apology long overdue but emphasized that it does not automatically erase years of anti-Semitic statements, hundreds of publications, swastikas, mentions of the Holocaust, and Heil Hitler.

One can believe in the sincerity of this repentance, one can doubt it. But its presence must be taken into account as honestly as what exactly Ye apologized for.

Europe closed doors, but fans did not disappear

In the spring of 2026, the price of previous statements became especially noticeable. On April 7, British authorities denied Ye entry, considering his presence not in the public interest. Because of this, the London Wireless Festival, where the rapper was supposed to perform for three evenings in front of an audience of about 150,000 people, was completely canceled. Sponsors, including Pepsi and Diageo, began to leave even before the final cancellation.

On April 15, Ye postponed a concert at the Marseille Stade Vélodrome. Before that, the French Minister of the Interior was looking for ways to prevent the show, and the mayor of Marseille, Benoît Payan, publicly said that he did not want to turn the city arena into a platform for a person promoting hatred and Nazism. Poland and Switzerland also lost planned performances, and later the concert was canceled in Italy.

But from this chronology, one cannot draw a convenient conclusion that the West rejected Ye, and the Russians alone were indifferent to his past. Reality is against such a scheme.

On May 30, 2026, at the Atatürk Olympic Stadium in Istanbul, Ye gathered about 118,000 people. Among the spectators, according to Anadolu, were fans from the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Russia, and the Middle East. His commercial appeal survived both anti-Semitic scandals and European cancellations.

Another example appeared literally ten days before the Russian announcement. On August 7, Ye performed at the Algarve Stadium in Portugal. Israeli Ambassador Oren Rosenblat asked to cancel the concert and reminded that the artist glorified Hitler, promoted anti-Semitism, and called himself a Nazi. The diplomat posed a rather simple question: if society is not ready to calmly accept hatred towards other groups, why should Jews be an exception?

The Portuguese organizer did not agree with this. The concert took place, and on August 8, Euronews reported about 34,000 spectators. Ye did not make scandalous political speeches from the stage that evening.

Therefore, the problem is not reduced to the national character of the Russians. A huge celebrity still has fans in many countries who can separate the music from the performer’s personality, accept his apologies, or not consider political statements a sufficient reason to refuse a concert.

However, Russia has one detail that neither Portugal nor Turkey has.

The country of ‘denazification’ gets a fan of Hitler

On February 24, 2022, Putin, announcing the start of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, named among Russia’s goals the ‘demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine’. This formula did not disappear after the first months of the war: the Russian authorities continued to use accusations of ‘Nazism’ as one of the central explanations for aggression.

NAnovosti recently analyzed in detail how Moscow continues to revive this construction even after four and a half years of war — now through Russian court decisions on Bandera, OUN, and UPA and a new round of conversation about Russian ‘denazification of Ukraine’. In another material, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to the same propaganda scheme through his own Jewish family and the history of the family of Ukraine’s Chief Rabbi Moshe Asman: ‘Jews do not fight for Nazi regimes’.

Against this background, Ye’s October concerts create an almost laboratory test of the meaning of the word itself.

If ‘Nazism’ is such a fundamental threat to the Russian authorities that they justify the invasion, occupation of foreign territory, and years-long war with it, the reaction to a person who truly admired Adolf Hitler should have been at least painful.

Reality so far looks different.

In Russia, they discuss prices, stadium seats, the road to St. Petersburg, hotels, and possible guests. State Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov did not demand to ban Ye at all. He suggested that the rapper get acquainted with Russian chanson and learn ‘Kupola’ or ‘What are you, fraer, backed down?’, to find a response among Russian listeners. At the same time, Milonov said that the concert should not be canceled.

There is also outrage within Russia, and it would be dishonest to erase it. Russian publications remind of Hitler and Ye’s anti-Semitism, calls to cancel performances are heard. So, it cannot be written that ‘Russians do not know’ or ‘all Russians do not care’.

Available figures allow us to say only what they really show: for a very large number of people wanting to attend the concert, these facts did not become a stop signal.

On August 17, cheap tickets were gone in about an hour. On the same day, a surge in transport orders began. For October 9-11, the average price of a one-way train ticket, according to ‘Tutu’, is 6.2 thousand rubles (about 218 shekels), from Moscow — 5.5 thousand rubles (about 193 shekels). The average plane ticket is 15.9 thousand rubles (about 558 shekels), and a night in a hotel is about 3.7 thousand rubles (approximately 130 shekels). People did not just click ‘interested’ on social media: part of the audience began planning the trip a month and a half before the show.

This is where Russian ‘denazification’ already faces not a historical dispute about Bandera, but a very much alive American rapper.

Israel Ye already tried to return — and received a completely different reaction

The Russian story looks even more noticeable if we recall the events of May 2026.

On May 12, i24NEWS, citing Mako, reported that Ye had agreed in principle to consider a concert in Israel and that the parties were discussing financial terms. The version looked especially symbolic: after Heil Hitler, the American rapper wanted to perform specifically in front of the Israeli audience and thus, according to assumptions from people in the music industry, confirm the seriousness of his repentance.

For Ye himself, Israel was not an unfamiliar territory. He had already performed there in September 2015 at the stadium in Ramat Gan. In November 2025, the musician met with Israeli Rabbi Yoshiyahu Pinto and expressed regret over his anti-Semitic statements.

However, the idea of returning did not cause delight in the Israeli music industry. Producer Gadi Oron told Walla that he received an offer to bring Ye about two months before the publication, studied the technical requirements, and refused. The show assumed a 360-degree stage configuration; the stadium in Ramat Gan was almost suitable for it, but there were no available dates, and other logistical problems arose. At the same time, Oron directly linked Ye’s interest in Israel with difficulties in the European part of the tour.

The owner of the Tel Aviv club Barbie, Shaul Mizrahi, spoke much more harshly: he considered a possible concert to be in bad taste and promised to call for a boycott of the producer who would undertake to organize it. In the end, no confirmed Israeli date appeared.

For the Israeli reader, this detail changes the perception of St. Petersburg. A few months ago, there was a debate here about whether it was even possible to return an artist to the stage after Heil Hitler. Now in Russia, the debate is mainly already about how two big shows will take place.

NAnovosti — News of Israel draws attention to this difference, not turning it into a competition of states for moral superiority. Portugal showed that the European audience is also capable of filling a stadium after the same scandals. But only the Russian state simultaneously made the word ‘denazification’ a justification for its own war.

‘Young Putin’: this sympathy appeared long before the current tours

There is another line that is easy to take for a promotional invention of the Russian promoter if you look only at the events of August 17. In fact, the history of Ye’s relationship with the image of the Russian president is noticeably older.

In November 2021, even before the full-scale Russian invasion, during Drink Champs, West compared himself to Putin and called himself ‘young Putin’. He talked about his own power over culture and drew a parallel between cultural influence and the resources available to a state leader.

In January 2022, Billboard, citing the rapper’s advisor Amir Sudan, reported that Ye planned a trip to Moscow, wanted to meet with Putin, hold a Sunday Service, and considered Russia almost as a ‘second home’. But even then, this story was contradictory: another representative of the artist called the reports completely fabricated. Therefore, old plans cannot be passed off as a confirmed agreement with the Kremlin.

However, the next Russian trip already took place. On June 30, 2024, when the full-scale war was in its third year, Ye flew to Moscow for the 40th birthday of Russian designer Gosha Rubchinskiy, with whom he collaborated. There were rumors about a concert in ‘Luzhniki’ around the trip, but the performance did not happen then. That is why the October 2026 concerts will be his first public concerts in Russia, not his first visit to the country.

Finally, on August 17, 2026, Say Agency CEO Anna Subcheva told RIA Novosti that meeting with Putin is Ye’s ‘long-standing dream’ and that the musician, according to her, has been demonstrating sympathy for the Russian president for many years. At the same time, she herself admitted that it is not yet known who exactly the artist will meet during the visit. There is no confirmed agreement with the Kremlin as of August 18.

It turns out to be an interesting sequence: ‘young Putin’ in 2021, talks about a meeting and ‘second home’ in January 2022, a real trip to Moscow in the summer of 2024, and now two stadium concerts and a new message about the desire to meet with the Russian president.

This can no longer be explained by one random phrase.

And what does Ukraine have to do with it if Ye did not say he hates Ukrainians?

Here it is important not to spoil a strong material with too strong a label. There is no sufficient confirmation that Ye publicly declared hatred for Ukrainians as a people. Calling him a ‘Ukrainophobe’ just for touring in Russia would be a substitution of fact for evaluation.

But the absence of such a statement does not make Russian concerts politically neutral.

Reuters separately places them in the context of the war: if the performances take place, Ye will be one of the largest international stars to visit Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, we are not talking about a private party, as in Moscow in 2024, but about two public stadiums with tickets up to 160 thousand rubles and tens of thousands of spectators.

Any such event has two photographs.

In the first — a fan who bought a ticket for Stronger and Runaway, does not intend to discuss the Kremlin, and wants to listen to his favorite artist for two hours.

In the second — a filled ‘Gazprom Arena’ during the fifth year of a big war, an American superstar on stage, and Russian headlines about the country still being able to bring in top-tier artists.

The first photograph does not cancel the second.

After 2022, the Russian concert market lost a significant part of major Western tours. In recent years, some American performers have begun to return, but the arrival of a figure of Ye’s scale still noticeably differs from most such visits. A filled stadium allows selling a simple picture inside Russia: cultural isolation supposedly does not exist, the world is returning, the West is not able to ‘cancel’ the country. Even if neither the organizer nor Ye himself utters a single political word from the stage, such an image works by itself.

And Ye in this construction turned out to be an especially convenient character. He is simultaneously known to almost everyone — and at the same time, part of European countries and venues refused him. Therefore, a plot easily arises around him: ‘The West banned — Russia allowed’.

Only the reason for Western problems spoils the beautiful formula.

He was banned and canceled not for friendship with Russia. Among the main reasons were anti-Semitism, the swastika, glorification of Hitler, and the song Heil Hitler.

Why Russians are still going

The answer ‘because they don’t know anything’ does not withstand scrutiny. Russian media themselves reminded of Hitler, anti-Semitism, and European cancellations. There are people within the country demanding to cancel the concerts. Information is available.

The answer ‘because Russians support Hitler’ is equally weak. We have no data on the views of tens of thousands of ticket buyers, and Ye’s mass concerts in Istanbul and Portugal show that the ability to separate the performer from his public statements exists far beyond Russia.

Much more plausible here simultaneously work several completely mundane things: Ye remains a huge music star; such a scale’s arrival in Russia is rare; part of the audience accepts the January apology; part believes that the artist and his views exist separately; some are indifferent to all this compared to the opportunity to see him live for the first time.

But the result from the motives of individual people does not change.

The person who truly praised Adolf Hitler did not turn out to be unacceptable for the mass Russian audience.

It is this fact that turns the story from a social chronicle into a political one.

For more than four years, Ukraine has been hearing accusations of ‘Nazism’ from Moscow. Israel and Jewish organizations have been demanding for years to treat anti-Semitism not as an eccentric celebrity stunt. And between these two realities, St. Petersburg sells out cheap tickets for Ye in a few hours and starts booking trains.

Russian propaganda is used to using the word ‘Nazi’ as a universal political accusation. Kanye West posed a much simpler test for this system: no search for ‘hidden Nazism’ is required here, the artist’s old words have long been recorded and published.

On October 10 and 11, a person who had to publicly apologize for his admiration for Hitler in January of this year is supposed to take the stage of a state that declared ‘denazification’ one of the goals of its war. And so far, the main measurable response of the Russian public to this contradiction remains a figure from the tourist service: the demand for train tickets to St. Petersburg increased 41 times.

The phrase “Ukraine is the homeland of Hasidism” sounds emotional, but it has a serious historical basis. Modern encyclopedic and academic sources indicate that Hasidism originated in the 18th century on the lands of present-day Western and Central Ukraine — primarily in Podolia and Volhynia, around the circle of Baal Shem Tov and his disciples. It is important to clarify: the formula of “37 main dynasties, of which 15 originate from the territory of present-day Ukraine” is more of a popularization scheme than a strict universally accepted academic standard. But the general conclusion does not change: the Ukrainian space was one of the main centers of the emergence and early development of the Hasidic world.

In Hasidism, they usually talk about courts or dynasties — lines of rebbes, which were most often named after their cities of origin. Over two and a half centuries, there have been many such lines: modern lists include dozens and hundreds of names, not a single canonical register. Therefore, when it comes to “37 main,” it is more correct to understand this as a conditional list of the most notable historical houses, rather than a definitive list that everyone equally recognizes.

Jews from Ukraine: Ukraine as the homeland of Hasidism – 37 main dynasties and their Ukrainian roots

The Ukrainian cradle of Hasidism and why there is a debate around the number “37”

The founder of Hasidism, Israel ben Eliezer, better known as Baal Shem Tov (circa 1700–1760), was associated with Podolia and Medzhybizh. After his death, the movement was systematized by Dov-Ber, the Maggid of Mezeritch (died in 1772), and his disciples spread the new religious impulse across Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. It was from here that large family dynasties later grew — the Chernobyl, Ruzhin, Kosov-Vizhnitz, Breslov, and others.

Therefore, the thesis that Ukraine is one of the main historical homelands of Hasidism is quite justified.

The fact is that the list of exactly 37 “main” dynasties is not a universally accepted scientific standard: old Jewish encyclopedias highlighted several key lines like Lubavitch, Chernobyl, Ruzhin-Sadigura, Lublin, and Kotzk, while modern reference books show a much more complex picture with many branches and offshoots.

Nevertheless, if we take a working list of the 37 most notable lines, the Ukrainian presence is indeed enormous. This circle usually includes dynasties that originated in Belz, Boyan, Breslov, Vizhnitz, Zvyagel, Makhnovka, Mukachevo, Nadvorna, Rakhmastrivka, Savran, Sadigura, Skvira, Skole, Chernobyl, as well as historical centers of Berdichev and Medzhybizh. Many of them, after the Holocaust and subsequent migrations, moved their living centers to Israel and the USA — primarily to Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Brooklyn, Monsey, Kiryas Joel, and New Square.

CHABAD: a separate line with a very strong Ukrainian connection

CHABAD-Lubavitch is usually not considered a Ukrainian dynasty in the narrow geographical sense, because its historical centers are primarily associated with Lyady and Lubavitch. The founder of the movement was Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745–1812), who created a special intellectual branch of Hasidism at the end of the 18th century; the name CHABAD itself comes from the words Chochma, Bina, Da’at.

But without CHABAD, the history of Ukrainian Hasidism would be incomplete. Shneur Zalman was a disciple of the Maggid of Mezeritch, which means the spiritual roots of the movement are directly connected with the Ukrainian environment, where early Hasidism received powerful development. Moreover, the founder of CHABAD himself is buried in Hadiach, in the Poltava region of Ukraine, and this place remains a point of pilgrimage.

here’s something interesting about this – “A “Cohen Bridge” was built in Ukraine for $1,000,000: in Hadiach, the CHABAD shrine was made accessible to the descendants of ancient priests — what it is and for what purpose”

In the 20th century, CHABAD turned into a global movement with its main living center in New York and a wide network of communities in Israel, the USA, Europe, and the countries of the former USSR. Therefore, in an article about the Hasidic dynasties of Ukraine, it is logical to highlight CHABAD separately: not as a Ukrainian dynasty by place of origin, but as a world movement closely connected with Ukraine spiritually and historically.

Ukrainian dynasties: from Podolia and Volhynia to Bnei Brak and New York

The earliest center of memory remains Medzhybizh — the city of Baal Shem Tov. Medzhybizh did not become a separate largest modern mass dynasty, but symbolically it is one of the main points of the entire Hasidic history. Berdichev is associated with the name of Levi Yitzchak of Berdichev (1740–1810), one of the most famous early righteous men of Hasidism. This is also more of a historical center and spiritual name than the largest modern court.

The Breslov dynasty, or Breslov, is associated with Rabbi Nachman of Breslov (1772–1810), the great-grandson of Baal Shem Tov. Its peculiarity is that after the death of Rabbi Nachman, no new continuous line of rebbes arose in the classical sense, but the movement did not disappear: on the contrary, it lives through his books, the teaching of personal prayer, and the famous pilgrimage to Uman. In the 21st century, Breslov is a global network of communities, especially noticeable in Israel and among pilgrims who annually come to Ukraine.

The Chernobyl dynasty is one of the most important overall. It was founded by Menachem Nachum Twersky of Chernobyl (circa 1730–1797), a disciple of both Baal Shem Tov and the Maggid of Mezeritch. It was from the Chernobyl house that a whole cluster of separate lines emerged: Skver, Rakhmastrivka, Tolna, Trisk, as well as genealogically related branches of Makhnovka. This is one of the main examples of how one Ukrainian dynasty turned into a whole family of world courts.

From the Chernobyl circle grew the Skver dynasty — today it is especially known for its closed community in New Square, New York. Rakhmastrivka originates from Rakhmastrivka and now has centers in Jerusalem and Brooklyn. Tolna comes from Talne, and Trisk — from Turisk in Volhynia. Makhnovka, originating from Makhnovka, today has its headquarters in Bnei Brak and remains a lively, notable line with thousands of families.

No less influential was the house of Ruzhin. It was founded by Rabbi Israel Friedman of Ruzhin (1796–1850), and it was this line that gave part of the Hasidic world the very “royal” style of the court. From the Ruzhin house came Boyan, Sadigura, Chortkov, Husiatyn, and other branches. The Boyan dynasty, formed in the 19th century, is today firmly associated with Jerusalem. The Sadigura line, originating from Bukovina, was the most important force in the region before the Holocaust, and today its continuation is also primarily associated with Israel.

The Vizhnitz dynasty originated in Bukovina. It is associated with Menachem Mendel Hager (1830–1884), and the line itself grew out of an earlier Kosov tradition. Today, Vizhnitz is one of the largest and most influential courts in Israel, with a strong presence in Bnei Brak, Jerusalem, and American communities. Next to it stands Nadvorna, founded by Mordechai Leifer (1835–1894) in Nadvorna; now it is not just one center, but a whole network of branches, especially noticeable in Bnei Brak and Jerusalem. Zvil, originating from Zvyagel, is not large in numbers, but remains a very respected name in Jerusalem.

The Ukrainian space is also associated with Belz, Mukachevo, Savran, and Skole. The Belz dynasty was founded by Shalom Rokeach (1779–1855) at the beginning of the 19th century, and today it is one of the largest Hasidic courts in the world, restored after the Holocaust in Israel. Munkacs / Mukachevo is associated with strict Carpathian traditionalism. Savran is an old Podolian line, and Skole today more often appears in international lists under the form Skole/Skolye, which is important for historical accuracy.

In the middle of this whole story, it is especially noticeable that NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency approaches the topic not as a museum exotic, but as a living bridge between Ukraine and Israel. Because for the Israeli audience, this is not an abstract history of Eastern Europe: a significant part of today’s centers of Ukrainian-origin dynasties is located precisely in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, and the pilgrimage to Uman, the memory of Chernobyl, Belz, Sadigura, and Vizhnitz have long become part of the modern Jewish religious world.

All 37 notable dynasties: names, dates, origins, and where their centers are now

If you compile a working list of the 37 most famous lines, it is more convenient to divide it into several large groups.

The first is the earliest system-forming centers: the circle of Baal Shem Tov in Medzhybizh, the school of the Maggid of Mezeritch, early Karlin-Stolin with Aaron of Karlin (1736–1772), Lubavitch/Chabad, founded by Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745–1812), as well as Polish intellectual lines Lublin, Pshiskha, and Kotzk. They are not always the most numerous today, but without them, it is impossible to understand how Hasidism turned from a spiritual movement into a system of hereditary courts. Chabad today is a global network with a center in New York; Karlin-Stolin maintains strong positions in Israel and the USA; Kotzk and Lublin live more as lines of influence in other dynasties.

The second large group is the Ukrainian-Bukovinian-Volhynian belt, which makes Ukraine so important in Hasidic history. This includes Berdichev, Medzhybizh, Breslov, Chernobyl, Skver, Rakhmastrivka, Tolna, Trisk, Ruzhin, Boyan, Sadigura, Vizhnitz, Kosov, Nadvorna, Makhnovka, Zvil, Belz, Mukachevo, Savran, Skole, and related lines. It is here that you can see how from the towns and villages of present-day Ukraine grew courts that today live in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Brooklyn, Monsey, London, and Antwerp.

The third group is Polish, Galician, Hungarian, and post-war world dynasties. Here, at the forefront are Ger, founded by Yitzchak Meir Alter (1798–1866), Alexander, Bobov, Sanz, Klausenburg, Sighet, Satmar, Pupa, Tosh, Modzitz, Radzyn-Izbica, Biala, Amshinov, as well as Jerusalem anti-Zionist circles like Shomer Emunim, Toldos Aharon, and Toldos Avrohom Yitzchok. There is already less Ukrainian origin here, but these lines determine the modern numbers and political-religious weight of the Hasidic world. Satmar, for example, formed as a separate force under Joel Teitelbaum (1887–1979), was restored in New York after the war and is today considered one of the largest Hasidic groups in the world. Ger is now one of the largest courts in Israel. Bobov and Klausenburg are especially noticeable in the USA and Israel.

A brief guide to the dynasties and their current status

• Chabad-Lubavitch — late 18th century, Shneur Zalman of Liadi, today a world center in New York.
• Breslov — turn of the 18th–19th centuries, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, the strongest center of memory — Uman, and living communities are especially noticeable in Israel.
• Belz — early 19th century, Shalom Rokeach, today the largest center in Jerusalem.
• Chernobyl — 18th century, Menachem Nachum Twersky, continues through many branches.
• Skver — Ukrainian origin, modern center in New Square, New York.
• Rakhmastrivka — Ukrainian branch, centers in Jerusalem and Brooklyn.
• Tolna and Trisk — old Volhynian lines, preserved as smaller but living branches.
• Ruzhin — mid-19th century, Israel Friedman, gave rise to the entire “house of Ruzhin”.
• Boyan — one of the Ruzhin branches, historically Bukovina, today center in Jerusalem.
• Sadigura — also a Ruzhin line, today primarily associated with Israel.
• Vizhnitz — 19th century, Hagers, one of the largest Israeli courts in Bnei Brak.
• Nadvorna — 19th century, Leifers, today a network of branches in Israel.
• Makhnovka — Ukrainian line, modern center in Bnei Brak.
• Zvil — historical Ukrainian court, especially respected in Jerusalem.
• Mukachevo — Carpathian line, played a significant role in Hungarian-Carpathian Hasidism.
• Savran — old Podolian line, today small but historically significant.
• Kosov — ancestor for Vizhnitz, Ukrainian by origin line.
• Ger — Polish dynasty, today one of the most influential courts in Israel.
• Alexander — very large Polish dynasty before the Holocaust, then restored.
• Bobov — Galician line, strong in Brooklyn.
• Sanz — 19th century, Chaim Halberstam, gave many offshoots.
• Klausenburg — post-war restoration, noticeable in Netanya and the USA.
• Sighet — important Hungarian-Romanian line, ancestor for Satmar.
• Satmar — largest anti-Zionist dynasty with centers in New York and Israel.
• Pupa, Tosh, Modzitz, Radzyn-Izbica, Biala, Amshinov — smaller but stable lines with centers mainly in Israel and North America.
• Shomer Emunim, Toldos Aharon, Toldos Avrohom Yitzchok — already largely Jerusalem dynastic circles, defining the appearance of the radically conservative part of the Haredim.

Why this history is important for Israel right now

For the Israeli reader, the history of the Hasidic dynasties of Ukraine is not just a story about the past.

It is an explanation of why Ukrainian cities and towns occupy such a place in the religious memory of Israel, why Uman gathers pilgrims annually, why the names Belz, Vizhnitz, Boyan, or Satmar are heard in the Knesset, in the religious press, in debates about the state, and in the everyday life of ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods.

Historical Ukraine did not give Hasidism a periphery, but one of its central foundations.

And if you remove the controversial number “37” as too rigid a formula, the picture becomes even stronger. Ukraine was not just one of the sites, but a space where Hasidism took shape as a mass movement, and then gave rise to entire families of dynasties, whose living centers are now located in Israel and the USA. From Medzhybizh and Breslov to Bnei Brak and Brooklyn — this is one long historical line that remains part of the Jewish world today.

The history of Ukraine and the Jews: why the conversation about Hasidism cannot be separated from the history of the country itself

The history of the Jews on the lands of present-day Ukraine began long before the appearance of Hasidism.

Encyclopedic sources indicate that Jewish settlements existed here even in ancient times — in Crimea and in the Greek colonies of the northern Black Sea coast. Later, Jewish life developed in the cities and towns of different historical eras — from Kievan Rus and the Lithuanian-Polish period to the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary.

Jewish life became especially noticeable in the early modern period, when on Ukrainian lands the very world of shtetls, markets, fairs, crafts, and religious scholarship was forming, which would later be called shtetl. It was in this environment that the human and cultural landscape was formed, from which both the Hasidic courts and the powerful tradition of Eastern European Jewry in general emerged.

The shtetl was one of the key forms of Jewish life in Eastern Europe, and the Ukrainian waves of pogroms in the 20th century and then the Holocaust became a catastrophe for this world.

At the same time, the history of the relationship between the Jews and the Ukrainian lands was never simple or linear.

There were periods of growth, trade, religious flourishing, and cultural coexistence, but there were also severe catastrophes. One of the early tragedies was the Khmelnytsky Uprising of 1648–1649, during which many Jewish communities in Ukraine were destroyed or devastated; this is recorded in reference articles on Podolia and in historical descriptions of individual cities.

And yet, after these upheavals, Jewish life on Ukrainian lands did not disappear, but began to grow again.

By the 18th century, there was already a dense network of communities here, and it was against this background that Hasidism arose. Hasidism became exceptionally popular precisely in Ukraine and in the first decades covered most of the traditional Jewish population of this region. In other words, Ukraine was not the periphery of this process, but one of its central stages.

In the 19th century, the significance of Ukrainian lands for the Jewish world was colossal. By the end of the 19th century, more than a quarter of the entire Jewish population of the world lived on ethnic Ukrainian territory. This means that the conversation about the history of Jews in Ukraine is not a narrow regional topic, but part of world Jewish history.

That is why names like Berdichev, Uman, Belz, Chernobyl, Breslov, Vizhnitz, or Sadigura still resonate far beyond Ukraine itself.

But the 20th century brought a new blow.

Waves of violence, civil war, pogroms of 1905 and especially 1918–1921 hit the Jewish communities of Ukraine hard. Then the Nazi occupation turned a significant part of this history into a history of destruction.

After the Holocaust and the Soviet period, Jewish life on Ukrainian lands could no longer return to its former scale. Many centers were destroyed, many families emigrated, religious life was under pressure for decades. But the memory did not disappear.

After the collapse of the USSR, in independent Ukraine, the revival of community, cultural, and religious life began; by the end of the 1990s, hundreds of Jewish organizations and community structures were operating in the country.

That is why the history of Jews in Ukraine is not only a history of tragedies. It is a history of deep rootedness, religious creativity, trade, the Yiddish language, shtetl civilization, pilgrimage, Hasidic dynasties, and then the severe ruptures caused by the violence of the 20th century.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important: many lines that today live in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Safed, Brooklyn, or Monsey trace their origins to the cities and towns of present-day Ukraine. In this sense, the connection between Ukraine and the Jewish world is not a museum topic, but a living part of modern Jewish memory.

Which cities in Ukraine today remain the main points of Hasidic life

If we talk not about old names on the map, but about real modern presence, then in Ukraine today we can highlight several main points of Hasidic life, memory, and pilgrimage.

In the first place, undoubtedly, is Uman. It is here that the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov is located, and the city remains the main center of Breslov pilgrimage. In 2025, Ukraine officially recognized the grave of Rabbi Nachman in Uman as a national heritage site, and the city continues to receive tens of thousands of pilgrims, primarily on Rosh Hashanah.

A separate place is occupied by Hadiach in the Poltava region. For CHABAD, this is one of the most important points on the map of Ukraine, because it is there that Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the founder of CHABAD-Lubavitch, is buried. Hadiach remains a place of pilgrimage and a symbolic connection of CHABAD with Ukrainian land.

If we talk about active community life, then important cities remain Kyiv, Dnipro, Odessa, Chernivtsi, and Kharkiv, where Jewish religious centers and structures continue to operate, including those associated with Hasidic and Chabad traditions. The European Jewish Congress directly notes the continued existence of Jewish communities in Ukraine, despite the war and migration.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand the difference between a historical center of a dynasty and a modern Hasidic court. Cities like Belz, Breslov, Chernobyl, Vizhnitz, Nadvorna, Skvira, Rakhmastrivka, Zvyagel, Mukachevo, and Skole remain extremely important as places of origin of dynasties and historical memory, but the main active dynastic headquarters of these lines today are mostly located in Israel and the USA. Therefore, the modern map of Hasidic Ukraine is primarily Uman, Hadiach, and major cities with living communities, rather than the return of old courts in their full classical form.

Read more in our regular section “Jews from Ukraine“.

Russia has once again used ballistic missiles against Ukraine, including North Korean KN-23s. But after the night of August 16, the main question is no longer just about the number of Russian missiles — Ukraine is increasingly vocal about Patriot interceptors, which allies have but are lacking near Ukrainian launch sites.

On the morning of August 16, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky wrote about the consequences of the night and morning Russian strikes on Ukraine. Emergency work was still ongoing in Kyiv, rescuers in Kryvyi Rih were dealing with the aftermath of a ballistic attack, and there was already a casualty in Sumy. The alarm, however, did not end: Russia launched a new wave of drones.

By this time, the figures looked like this: in Kryvyi Rih, two people were killed and 14 injured, six people were wounded in Kyiv and Kyiv region, and one person was killed in Sumy. Kremenchuk and Kryvyi Rih were under ballistic attacks. The Ukrainian Air Force separately reported that among the weapons used at night were North Korean KN-23 missiles.

But Zelensky wrote another thing that is more important for this story than the list of regions and types of missiles. In seven days, Russia used more than 1,550 strike drones, almost 1,560 aerial bombs, and 62 missiles against Ukraine. Most of the missiles are ballistic.

That is, the night of August 16 was not a separate heavy raid. It fell on the second consecutive weekly cycle in which Russia maintains almost the same intensity of air strikes.

For this article, Elena Gunko took Zelensky’s morning message from August 16 as a starting point and compared it with data from the Ukrainian Air Force, rescuers, regional authorities, Reuters, Financial Times, and statements from the European Commission. The task here is not to independently determine the type of missile from a photo of debris — the author does not engage in military expertise. What is more interesting is where the confirmed fact ends, what is really known about the KN-23 that night, and why the conversation about Russian ballistics unexpectedly hit the Patriot missile stockpiles in the US and Europe.

In Kyiv, the fire was extinguished quickly. The ballistic problem — no

In Kyiv, the consequences of the strike were recorded in the Obolonskyi and Holosiivskyi districts. In the Obolonskyi district, the market area was on fire, cars and non-residential buildings were damaged. In the Holosiivskyi district, a fire also broke out in a non-residential area.

In the capital itself, three people were injured. Another three, including a child, were wounded in the Kyiv region. This accounts for the six injured that Zelensky wrote about in the morning.

Rescuers extinguished the fires. The ballistic threat is not so easily dealt with.

The Russian calculation chooses the moment of launch, and for the Ukrainian air defense calculation, it is already too late to discuss the future aid package. The interceptor is either near the battery or it is not.

That is why the current discussion about Patriot is increasingly unlike the usual conversation about how many complexes allies are ready to “give to Ukraine.” The launcher itself does not destroy a ballistic missile. Each subsequent interception requires the next missile.

In Kryvyi Rih, the number of casualties changed several times in the morning

The first reports from Kryvyi Rih looked different from the final figure in Zelensky’s statement. Initially, local authorities spoke of one dead and several injured. Then the number of wounded increased.

The rescue operation was still ongoing.

In the morning, the body of the second deceased was retrieved from the rubble. The number of injured reached 14, 11 people were hospitalized. An industrial enterprise was damaged.

This is a useful detail for understanding how to read news in the first hours after such strikes. Reports of “one dead” and “two dead” did not mean that someone made a mistake or changed the version. The clearing of the rubble continued between them.

In Kremenchuk, the authorities of the Poltava region reported a ballistic strike. In Sumy, a Russian drone attacked a civilian car: a 59-year-old driver was killed, and a woman nearby was injured.

These episodes have different geography and different weapons. But for a person on the ground, the difference between a large international discussion about missile stockpiles and its absence can ultimately be very short — whether the air defense managed to fire or not.

KN-23s were in this attack. But which city received this particular missile is unknown

This place requires caution.

The Ukrainian Air Force included North Korean KN-23s in the list of ballistic weapons used by Russia during the August 16 attack. The same list included Iskander-M and S-400 missiles used for strikes on ground targets.

The very fact of using KN-23 that night is officially confirmed.

However, to claim that a specific house, enterprise, or area was hit by the KN-23, based on the information available in the morning, is not possible. The Air Force did not publish such a breakdown and did not report how many North Korean missiles were launched.

Social networks and monitoring channels have already come up with their own calculations. This is expected for a news feed. For an article that should remain reliable even months later, this is not enough.

Here, NANovosti has another reason not to rush with a catchy phrase. Just a few days earlier, we were analyzing the story of the allegedly destroyed train with North Korean KN-23 missiles. Around it, more confidence quickly arose than the published evidence allowed.

On August 16, the situation is different: the use of KN-23 is confirmed by the Air Force. But from confirming the type of weapon to confirming the specific place of its impact, there is still one more step. No one has officially taken it yet.

Two weeks — almost identical figures

One of the most indicative fragments of Zelensky’s morning message is easy to miss against the backdrop of casualties and destruction.

A week earlier, on August 9, the President of Ukraine reported 61 Russian missiles over seven days. 56 of them were moving along a ballistic trajectory. Russia also used more than 1,560 strike drones and about 1,540 aerial bombs.

Another week passed.

Now Zelensky names 62 missiles, more than 1,550 strike drones, and almost 1,560 aerial bombs. 13 regions were under attack. And again, most of the missiles are ballistic.

The numbers almost overlapped.

This changes the very question to Ukrainian air defense. In a single large attack, a significant stock of interceptors can be expended and then replenished. In such a mode, the next salvo must be withstood even before the previous political discussion about supplies is over.

Russia, in essence, forces counting not the Patriot batteries, but the rate of missile consumption.

And this indicator is much more unpleasant.

Ukraine asks not for a new symbol of assistance, but for ammunition

In recent years, the word Patriot has become almost a political designation for all Ukrainian missile defense. The news counts batteries, launchers, donor countries.

In the summer of 2026, Kyiv is increasingly talking about another number — the number of PAC-3s.

On August 15, the Financial Times described cases when Ukrainian Patriot calculations lacked interceptors during Russian ballistic attacks. According to the publication, Ukraine estimates the need before the winter period at about 300 PAC-3 missiles to cover critical infrastructure.

Two days before today’s attack, Zelensky publicly spoke about the share of American stockpiles. According to his estimate, receiving about 5% of American Patriot interceptor stockpiles would help Ukraine get through the winter. He associated a ten percent volume with the possibility of significantly closing the country from Russian ballistics.

There is an unpleasant detail for Kyiv here: allies count not only the Ukrainian need.

The US must maintain its own reserves. European armies, after many years of stockpile reductions, are also trying to restore air defense. The Middle East consumes interceptors in real combat operations. PAC-3 production cannot be politically increased overnight.

Therefore, the phrase “transfer Patriot to Ukraine” today can mean two completely different things. You can transfer another system and get a beautiful photo of a new battery. Or you can transfer several dozen interceptors to a system that is already in position and has nothing to respond to the next ballistic launch.

NANovosti — News of Israel has already separately analyzed the Ukrainian attempt to get out of this dependence and gain access not only to ready-made complexes but also to production, components, and a more sustainable supply model for Patriot. After two weeks in August, this conversation looks less theoretical than a month ago.

“Should not lie in warehouses”

In the morning message on August 16, Zelensky did not limit himself to thanking partners.

He specifically mentioned North Korean ballistics, which destroys infrastructure and kills people in Europe, after which he moved on to European interceptor stockpiles: according to him, they should not be left in warehouses.

The wording is harsh, but it appeared not only in Kyiv.

A few days before this, the European Commission reported that Kaja Kallas called on EU countries with missiles for Patriot to transfer them to Ukraine. That is, the dispute over national reserves is already taking place within Europe itself.

For the government of any country, this is not a simple decision. A missile sent to Ukraine indeed disappears from its own stockpile. The military has stockpile standards, mobilization plans, and its own war scenarios.

But the Ukrainian response now looks different than two years ago: a Russian ballistic missile is already flying over European territory and already destroying an object in a European country. Therefore, intercepting it over Ukraine is also the use of European missile defense resources against a real threat, not preparation for a hypothetical war in the future.

This is not a dispute about sympathy for Ukraine.

This is a dispute about where Europe considers the first line of its own defense.

And here Israel appears — not as a formal analogy

For the Israeli reader, the story of August 16 is important not because Kyiv can be mechanically compared to Tel Aviv.

Such a comparison would be too simplistic.

The connection goes through weapons and their production.

Russia uses North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. Iran, over the years of Russian aggression, has become one of the key sources of technologies and solutions for Russia’s mass drone warfare. The US must simultaneously consider the needs of Ukraine, its own armed forces, and the Middle East.

Each country has its own systems. PAC-3 is not Arrow and not David’s Sling. The Israeli air defense architecture differs from the Ukrainian one.

But the factory, production time, rocket engine, electronic component, and annual production volume no longer exist in political statements. They cannot be sent simultaneously to two customers.

That is why the connection between the Russian, Iranian, and Ukrainian theaters of war becomes a stable topic for NANovosti, not a reason to attach Israel to any news from Ukraine. In one case, Russia receives North Korean ballistics. In another, Western armies expend interceptors in the Middle East. In the third, Ukraine finds that a Patriot launcher can stand in position, but there is not enough missiles for it.

This is how the connection looks without a slogan.

Between a European warehouse and Kryvyi Rih

At 02:00, a defense department official may be contemplating the minimum national reserve of PAC-3. At the same time, a Ukrainian family hears a ballistic alarm.

These are two parts of one chain, although there are thousands of kilometers between them.

The decision to keep a hundred interceptors in stock has military logic for the country to which they belong. The decision to transfer twenty of them to Ukraine also has military logic. But the consequences of these two decisions become visible not in the defense ministry’s report.

In the morning, they may appear in the summary from Kryvyi Rih.

And here it is impossible to honestly write that specific people died on August 16 because Europe “did not give one Patriot missile.” We do not know the trajectories of all ballistic targets that night, we do not know the location of the batteries, the available ammunition, and whether a specific target could have been intercepted.

Such a conclusion would be convenient. And unconfirmed.

Another thing is confirmed.

For two consecutive weeks, Russia maintains an extremely high pace of air attacks. Ballistic missiles make up a significant part of the missile load. On August 16, North Korean KN-23s were among them again. Ukraine publicly reports a shortage of interceptors. European and American stockpiles exist, but their transfer remains a political and military decision.

Therefore, after this night, the question “how many Patriots does Ukraine have?” is indeed outdated.

Other numbers are needed: how many interceptors are near active batteries today, how many Ukraine uses per week, and how many new missiles arrive in the same period.

For now, it is Russia that sets the pace for this competition.

NANovosti — News of Israel will continue to compare this data not by the number of announced “packages,” but by whether Ukraine’s actual ability to survive the next week of the Russian ballistic campaign changes.

Sources: morning statement by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky on August 16, 2026; Ukrainian Air Force; State Emergency Service of Ukraine; Kyiv city and regional authorities; Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration; data from the authorities of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy region; Reuters; Financial Times; statements from the European Commission.

In October 2026, Israel will once again hear The Alibi Sisters — the duo of Anna and Angelina Zavalsky, Ukrainian sisters from Kyiv, who have journeyed from the popular group “Алібі” to a project where the Ukrainian scene, Jewish memory, Yiddish, klezmer, and retro aesthetics sound like one story.

The tour will take place from October 10 to 18, 2026, covering several cities in Israel: Nof HaGalil, Ashdod, Netanya, Ashkelon, Rishon LeZion, Petah Tikva, Be’er Sheva, and Haifa. All concerts are scheduled for 20:00, and tickets, according to the organizers Showman, range from 174 to 265 shekels in different cities.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

This is not just a tour of a Ukrainian duo.

For many Israelis, especially those whose family histories are connected with Kyiv, Podolia, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, or Uman, this concert may be a meeting with that cultural world that cannot always be explained in words. It lives in songs, intonations, old records, family recipes, Yiddish words, grandmother’s memories, and that special music where joy and sadness almost never exist separately.

Who are The Alibi Sisters

Anna and Angelina Zavalsky have been known to the Ukrainian public since the early 2000s as the group “Алібі”. The project appeared on April 6, 2001, and since 2021, the sisters have been performing as The Alibi Sisters. The group’s profile lists pop and klezmer genres, and among the languages of performance are Ukrainian, Russian, and Yiddish.

There is an important detail in the duo’s biography: the sisters were soloists of the folk ensemble “Strumochok” from the age of five, graduated from music school in 1997 with a focus on violin, and later moved on to the professional stage, television, albums, and a large Ukrainian audience. In 2012, “Алібі” ceased artistic activity, but in 2021 the project returned in a new form — with a different musical perspective, sound, and a deeper appeal to Ukrainian-Jewish heritage.

It is this transition that makes the current Israeli tour particularly interesting.

The Alibi Sisters are no longer just nostalgia for the Ukrainian pop scene of the 2000s. It is an attempt to hear anew that cultural layer where Ukrainian folk songs, Yiddish, klezmer, Jewish hits, theatricality, family memory, and the retro image of the 1950s–1960s merge into a cohesive stage form.

Why this concert is important specifically for Israel

In an interview with Ukrainian Jewish Encounter, published on May 15, 2025, Anna Zavalsky explained in detail that the Ukrainian-Jewish theme for the sisters is not a random stylization. She said that even on a household level in Ukraine, many people partially remain carriers of Jewish culture — through songs, dish names, words, family habits, and memory, which was not always openly passed on but often very deeply.

In the same interview, Anna recalled challah, stuffed fish, Yiddish words in family speech, and the song “Vi iz dos gesele,” which their grandmother sang to them in childhood. Such details are important because they show: for The Alibi Sisters, Yiddish and Jewish musical tradition are not museum exhibits but part of living memory that returns through voice, stage, and personal history.

For Israel, this resonates particularly accurately.

Here live people for whom Yiddish is the language of childhood, the language of parents or grandparents, the language of old songs, jokes, prayers, family conversations, and the Eastern European Jewish world. And even if someone no longer speaks Yiddish, music is often recognized faster than words.

Tour organizers describe the program as a concert with a live band, retro aesthetics, dance drive, klezmer spirit, and songs where Jewish hits, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian pop compositions, and world hits sound together. Among the announced Jewish songs are Bublitchki, Main Yiddishe Mamme, Papirossen, Ich Hob Dich Zifeel Lieb, and others.

You can listen on https://www.youtube.com/@TheAlibiSisters

NAnews — Israel News and sTDe | NAnews — event listings in Israel note: in this format, the concert becomes not only a musical event but also a cultural meeting. Here, not only the stage is important, but also who sits in the audience, what family associations arise for the viewers, and why the Ukrainian-Jewish theme sounds so attentively today.

The Berry Sisters, Kyiv, and a return to the Yiddish world

The Showman poster states that Anna and Angelina Zavalsky are inspired by the work of the legendary Berry Sisters. Organizers emphasize the retro atmosphere, live band, and the sense of a time when Yiddish was heard in apartments and on the streets, and Ukrainian and Jewish melodies could alternate at weddings and family celebrations.

In an interview with UJE, Anna Zavalsky also spoke about the connection with the Berry Sisters but clarified an important point: The Alibi Sisters do not try to be a copy of the legendary duo. They use the power of “sisterly thirds,” retro aesthetics, and recognizable vocal kinship while remaining an independent Ukrainian project.

This distinction is fundamental.

When Ukrainian artists sing in Yiddish in Israel, they do not just reproduce old melodies. They reconnect Kyiv, Podolia, the Ukrainian stage, Jewish musical memory, and the modern experience of war, emigration, loss, and return to roots.

In the same interview, Anna Zavalsky said that returning to the Yiddish world is impossible physically, but possible as memory, respect, and a form of cultural return. In her view, it is important to remember not only the tragedy but also life: laughter, food, conversations, love, Sholem Aleichem’s books, and the human warmth of a vanished world.

That is why the Israeli tour of The Alibi Sisters does not look like an ordinary poster for a week in October.

This is a concert for those who want to hear Ukraine not only through war news but through music, culture, voices, and those connections that have existed for centuries between Ukrainians and Jews.

Where and when The Alibi Sisters concerts will take place in Israel

According to Showman, The Alibi Sisters concert tour has been rescheduled to new dates and will take place in Israel from October 10 to 18, 2026.

Nof HaGalil — October 10, 2026

The concert in Nof HaGalil will take place on October 10, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Berkovich Cultural Center.

Address: Derech HaChativot 4.

Ticket prices: 175–235 ₪.

Ashdod — October 11, 2026

In Ashdod, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 11, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas Duna-Yud.

Address: Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St. 90.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Netanya — October 12, 2026

The concert in Netanya will take place on October 12, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Arik Einstein Auditorium.

Address: Beni Berman St. 6.

Ticket prices: 225–255 ₪.

Ashkelon — October 13, 2026

In Ashkelon, the concert is scheduled for October 13, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Matnas “Woldenberg”.

Address: Gruper St. 15.

Ticket prices: 174–225 ₪.

Rishon LeZion — October 14, 2026

In Rishon LeZion, The Alibi Sisters will perform on October 14, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Mofet” Hall.

Address: Rothschild St. 60.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Petah Tikva — October 15, 2026

The concert in Petah Tikva will take place on October 15, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Sharet” Hall.

Address: HaAliya HaShniya St. 1.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Be’er Sheva — October 17, 2026

In Be’er Sheva, the concert will take place on October 17, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: Tamuz — House of Music.

Address: Herzl St. 12.

Ticket prices: 235–265 ₪.

Haifa — October 18, 2026

The final concert of the Israeli tour is announced in Haifa on October 18, 2026, at 20:00.

Venue: “Rappaport” Hall.

Address: HaNasi Ave. 138.

Ticket prices: 195–255 ₪.

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

What will be featured in the program

A program with a live band is expected, where Jewish hits in Yiddish, Ukrainian folk songs, well-known Ukrainian compositions, and world retro classics will sound not as separate numbers but as one musical route. The organizers’ description highlights the klezmer spirit, dance energy, nostalgia, and stage theatricality.

For the Israeli audience, this may be particularly relatable: here, Ukrainian motifs do not conflict with Jewish ones but become part of a shared memory. And perhaps that is why The Alibi Sisters in Israel are perceived not as foreign performers but as artists who bring a familiar code — only in a new, bright, and stage-assembled form.

NAnews — Israel News will follow cultural events that connect Israel, Ukraine, and Jewish communities through music, history, and living human memory.

Tickets and tour schedule:

Tickets are already available on the Showman website. 

 

In August 2026, the feature-length documentary “Kuzma: Scarily Cheerful” is released internationally, dedicated to Andriy Kuzmenko — a Ukrainian singer, composer, writer, TV presenter, and founder of the band “Skryabin”.

Screening dates for the documentary film “Kuzma: Terribly Funny” in Israel 🇮🇱 — Tickets are available for the screenings — in Tel Aviv and Haifa on Showman.

📍 August 30 (Sunday) — Tel Aviv
9 Paamonit Street — Ennis Auditorium
Running time — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, with English subtitles
Doors open — 7:00 PM
Screening begins — 7:30 PM
At 9:45 PM — online Q&A with the film team

📍 September 3 (Thursday) — Haifa
HOT CINEMA, Hall 5, Grand Canyon
54 Derech Simha Golan
Running time — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, with English subtitles
Doors open — 6:45 PM
Screening begins — 7:00 PM

The film’s screenings are announced in more than 30 countries worldwide. Israel is also included in the international program, but the exact cities, cinemas, and screening dates have not yet been named. The Israeli partner of the project is the company Created in Ukraine, which is involved in showcasing Ukrainian cinema in Israel.

For those who listened to Kuzma Skryabin’s songs in their youth, the film may be a meeting with the artist whose music remained part of their personal history. For viewers who previously knew almost nothing about him, it is an opportunity to discover one of Ukraine’s most recognizable and unusual artists of recent decades.

Who is Kuzma Skryabin

Kuzma Skryabin is the stage name of Andriy Kuzmenko. He was born on August 17, 1968, and became known as the leader of the band “Skryabin,” which emerged in the late 1980s.

The group started with experimental electronic music, synth-pop, and underground sounds, later becoming one of Ukraine’s most popular musical projects. Skryabin’s songs were played on radio, television, concerts, and festivals, and Kuzma himself gradually became not only a musician but also a notable public figure.

He was known as a person with sharp humor, strong self-irony, and the ability to talk about complex things without pathos. In his songs and interviews, Kuzma reflected on love, loneliness, growing up, war, politics, human weaknesses, and everyday life.

For many listeners, he was not just a performer of popular songs. Andriy Kuzmenko was perceived as a person who spoke with his own voice and did not try to fit into a convenient image.

The musician died on February 2, 2015 in a car accident. He was 46 years old. After his death, his songs, interviews, and recordings continued to live on, and interest in Kuzma’s personality only increased over time.

A film in which Kuzma tells his own story

The documentary drama “Kuzma: Scarily Cheerful” is built not only on the memories of the musician’s friends, relatives, and colleagues.

The main narrator of his own story effectively becomes Andriy Kuzmenko himself. Viewers will see his interviews, home videos, concert recordings, television appearances, travels, interactions with loved ones, and fragments of ordinary life.

The team at KNIFE! Films found and processed over 400 hours of video and audio materials, as well as more than 22,000 photographs. The authors collected materials from family archives, private collections, television archives, and people who knew Kuzma or worked with him.

This approach allows not just another retelling of the musician’s biography, but to see the living Andriy Kuzmenko again — during work, travels, rehearsals, conversations, and performances.

A special place in the film is occupied by recordings from the 1990s — the period of the formation of the band “Skryabin.” The wider audience is much more familiar with the later Kuzma: a popular singer, TV presenter, and author of sharp public statements. However, the early history of the group, its musical experiments, and first steps to fame remain little known to many viewers.

The creators of the film do not try to present Kuzma exclusively as an impeccable hero or turn the film into an official monument. At the center of the story should be a living person — cheerful, sharp, vulnerable, contradictory, and sincere.

The Ukrainian premiere of the film is scheduled for August 13, 2026, four days before Andriy Kuzmenko’s birthday. In 2026, he would have turned 58 years old.

International screenings and Israel

Organizers have announced that the film “Kuzma: Scarily Cheerful” will be shown in more than 30 countries worldwide. However, the published list actually includes 37 countries.

The list includes the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Moldova, Albania, Norway, Croatia, Portugal, Cyprus, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Denmark, Israel, Turkey, Estonia, Australia, New Zealand, France, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Kenya, South Korea, and Japan.

Such a scale of international distribution shows that the film is aimed not only at a Ukrainian audience. The film may be of interest to viewers who want to better understand Ukrainian culture of the late 20th and early 21st centuries through the story of one of its most recognizable representatives.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important, as there are many people in Israel who remember Skryabin’s songs from their youth. At the same time, the film can interest those who were not previously familiar with Andriy Kuzmenko’s work.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency is monitoring the release of information about Israeli screenings. So far, it is only confirmed that Israel is included in the film’s international program.

Who organizes the screenings in Israel

The Israeli partner of the project is named as the company Created in Ukraine.

This is an Israeli production and distribution company that brings Ukrainian films to theaters, cinematheques, and cultural centers in the country.

Previously, the company organized screenings in Israel of films such as “Mavka,” “Pamfir,” “Dovbush,” “20 Days in Mariupol,” “I, ‘Pobeda’ and Berlin,” and other projects. It also held Ukrainian Film Days in the cinematheques of Jerusalem and Holon and collaborated with the Ukrainian Cultural Center at the Embassy of Ukraine in Israel.

Organizers have not yet announced:

• in which cities in Israel the film will be shown;
• which cinemas and cultural venues will participate;
• when ticket sales will begin;
• how much tickets will cost;
• in which language subtitles will be available;
• whether there will be special premiere screenings;
• whether representatives of the film crew will come to Israel.

It is possible that the film will appear in several Israeli cities at once, as Created in Ukraine collaborates with cinema networks, cinematheques, and cultural venues in the country.

However, until the official announcement, it is premature to name Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ashdod, or other cities.

Why this film could be an event

“Kuzma: Scarily Cheerful” is not just a biography of a famous musician. Through the fate of Andriy Kuzmenko, the film tells about the changes that occurred in Ukrainian music, culture, and society over several decades.

Viewers will be able to see the journey from the first musical experiments and underground recordings to immense popularity, television, concerts, and the status of an artist whose words continued to be discussed even years after his death.

For those who listened to Kuzma Skryabin’s songs in their youth, the film will be a meeting with a person whose music remained part of their personal history.

For all those who care, it is an opportunity to see the living Andriy Kuzmenko again, learn about his journey, and discover one of the brightest artists of recent decades.

Exact dates, cities, and screening schedules for the film “Kuzma: Scarily Cheerful” in Israel will be published after the official announcement by the organizers.

When and where

The Israeli partner of the project is named as the company Created in Ukraine – so stay tuned for updates.

Screening dates for the documentary film “Kuzma: Terribly Funny” in Israel 🇮🇱 — Tickets are available for the screenings

— in Tel Aviv and Haifa on Showman.

📍 August 30 (Sunday) — Tel Aviv
9 Paamonit Street — Ennis Auditorium
Running time — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, with English subtitles
Doors open — 7:00 PM
Screening begins — 7:30 PM
At 9:45 PM — online Q&A with the film team

📍 September 3 (Thursday) — Haifa
HOT CINEMA, Hall 5, Grand Canyon
54 Derech Simha Golan
Running time — 2 hours 13 minutes
Language — Ukrainian, with English subtitles
Doors open — 6:45 PM
Screening begins — 7:00 PM

August 11, 2026 The New York Times published an article by Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper about a troubling change in Iranian tactics. For five days in July, Iran attacked three American bases in Jordan with missiles and drones, forcing air defenses to expend more and more expensive interceptors. On the fifth day, one missile broke through: on July 17, three American servicemen were killed at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, and over a hundred were injured.

But for NANovosti, another question is more interesting here. Where did Iran get this ability to quickly change tactics — and why does Ukraine appear again in the American investigation?

Author Victoria Katsman is originally from Ukraine and writes for an Israeli audience about events that connect Ukrainian and Israeli realities. She is not a military expert and does not attempt to replace air defense specialists: for this material, Victoria compared the NYT publication with US Treasury documents, the text of the Russian-Iranian agreement, Reuters reports, and previous NANovosti publications. This boundary is important because part of what is happening is confirmed by open documents, and part by intelligence data that cannot be fully verified from open sources.

And the picture that emerges after such a comparison is significantly more unpleasant than the formula ‘Iran learns from Russia.’

Initially, Iran helped Russia learn to fight

In the fall of 2022, Ukrainian cities first faced mass attacks by Iranian Shahed drones. Later, this ceased to be a story about batches of ready-made weapons: Russia began localizing the production of the Iranian design and turning it into an industrial tool for a protracted war.

In April 2024, the US Treasury described this system quite specifically. According to its data, the Iranian Ministry of Defense cooperated with the Russian SEZ ‘Alabuga’ in financing and producing Iranian-designed strike drones under a contract worth $1.75 billion. The Russian side planned to produce thousands of units per year at this site, and the drones produced there were used against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilian targets.

This is why the story of Shahed is more important than the question of the country of origin of a particular part. Iran provided Russia with the model of a cheap mass long-range strike, and Russia had the opportunity to test it in real large-scale war conditions for several years.

NANovosti previously detailed a statement by Volodymyr Zelensky, according to which at the initial stage Iranian operators themselves participated in launching Shaheds against Ukraine. This is another detail that shows how close the cooperation was at an early stage.

Then came the missiles. In September 2024, the US Treasury announced that at the end of 2023, Russia and Iran signed a contract for the supply of hundreds of Iranian missiles, in the summer of 2024, Russian military personnel were trained in Iran to work with Project 360, and in early September, Russia received the first batch of these missiles. The European Union subsequently officially called the transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles a significant escalation of support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.

So the movement was clear: ready-made drones, training, production, components, then missiles, and increasingly close military-technical cooperation.

And then the direction of exchange began to change.

Ukraine gave Russia what cannot be bought by contract

Over four and a half years of full-scale aggression, Ukraine has become a territory of a vast, continuous, and human life-paid military experiment.

Russian military had the opportunity to test how Western air defense systems respond to different routes and altitudes, how to combine drones with cruise and ballistic missiles, how to stretch an attack over time, and how to force defenders to expend expensive missiles on significantly cheaper targets.

Each Russian mass strike provided new data. What was intercepted. What got through. Where overload occurred. How quickly the enemy moved air defenses. Which combinations work worse, and which force simultaneous responses to several fundamentally different threats.

The New York Times now writes that Iran is using exactly this experience. According to Seth Jones from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Tehran effectively used Russian tactics: a combination of different types of missiles and drones that forces air defenses to protect multiple objects at once and distribute limited ammunition between different threats.

This is no longer the export of a specific Shahed from one country to another. This is the export of the results of years of combat testing.

In May, Reza Pahlavi, speaking in Odessa, formulated a similar problem much more succinctly: ‘Shahed does not see the difference between Kharkiv and Tehran’. At that time, this phrase could be perceived as a political metaphor. The events of the following months increasingly turn it into a description of a real military system.

One day — about 50 Patriots

Figures from the new NYT investigation show another side of this war — the economy of air defense depletion.

According to the publication, citing people familiar with the state of American stocks, since the start of the war against Iran, the Pentagon has expended more than 1,500 Patriot interceptors, with less than 1,700 remaining in stock. Throughout 2025, the US produced about 600 such missiles. On one of the days of the July attacks, American forces in the Middle East fired about 50 Patriots, each costing approximately $4 million.

If these estimates are correct, just one day of defense meant an expenditure of approximately $200 million — and money is not even the main problem here. Money can be allocated by a Congressional decision. New interceptors cannot be instantly pulled from the budget: they still need to be produced.

Here lies the first serious inconsistency within the American story itself. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell publicly claims that reports of a shortage of American munitions are false. At the same time, the NYT provides data on more than 1,500 used Patriots and less than 1,700 remaining, and the Pentagon is demanding that manufacturers speed up the production of weapons.

Both positions cannot simply be glued into one convenient phrase. The exact sizes of American military stocks are classified, so independent verification of the figure of 1,700 is impossible. But the problem of the rate of expenditure of expensive interceptors already exists independently of the dispute over the specific number of missiles in stock.

For Israel, this is all too familiar mathematics. Tehran saw during the 12-day war in June 2025 how many resources Israel and the US have to spend to repel large missile-drone salvos. The NYT writes that the Iranian side clearly drew conclusions from this.

Two of the deceased were studying precisely the lessons of Ukraine

This story has a detail that cannot be reduced to a graph of ammunition expenditures.

After the start of the war, part of the American forces was relocated from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE to Jordan. The Muwaffaq Salti base was considered more remote from Iran and, accordingly, safer from missile and drone attacks.

On July 17, this assumption stopped working.

Among the three killed were 19-year-old Isabella Gonzalez and 28-year-old Angel Rampersad. Both served in units associated with the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command in Germany. The NYT reports that American specialists from these units had been studying Russian attacks against Ukraine for months and passing on the acquired experience to US Central Command.

There is almost unbearable military irony in this. American military personnel were studying how to defend against tactics that Russia was practicing in Ukraine — and died from an Iranian strike, which at the same time was learning from the Russian experience of that very war.

The third deceased, 25-year-old air defense officer Tyler Fihan, served in a unit in North Carolina. It is important here not to repeat the widespread inaccuracy: not all three of the deceased served in Germany.

Such details are more important for NANovosti — Israel News than the faceless formula ‘Air defense failed.’ Air defense intercepted almost everything. But modern warfare is arranged so that sometimes the enemy only needs one missile that gets through the system after dozens of successful interceptions.

F-15E for $60 million and drones as eyes

Another episode described by the NYT shows that Iranian adaptation now concerns not only massive bombardments.

In April, an American F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over southern Iran. Both crew members ejected; the pilot was evacuated quickly, while the weapons systems officer hid from Iranian forces for almost two days before being found by American special operations units.

According to a senior American military official, Iran deployed a group of drones in the area of American aviation penetration. They helped obtain data on the position, speed, and direction of the aircraft, after which the F-15E, costing about $60 million, was hit by a portable anti-aircraft complex. The NYT also provides the crew’s account of the extremely short warning time before the hit — this technical detail should be perceived precisely as a report from American military personnel, not an independently established fact.

The most important part here is not even the loss of an expensive aircraft.

A cheap drone no longer has to carry a warhead itself and destroy an expensive target. It can become a flying sensor, observer, element of a reconnaissance network — and the strike will be delivered by completely different weapons.

Ukraine has been living within this new logic of war for several years.

In January 2025, the exchange of experience was recorded in an agreement

On January 17, 2025, Russia and Iran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement. It does not include an automatic obligation to go to war for each other, so calling the document a Russian-Iranian equivalent of NATO’s Article 5 would be incorrect.

But the content of the agreement is hard to call symbolic.

Article 4 explicitly provides for the exchange of information and experience between the intelligence and security services of the two states. Article 5 provides for military cooperation, training of military personnel, exchange of military and expert delegations, and joint exercises. Article 6 enshrines the development of military-technical cooperation.

So by 2025, what started with Shahed was already embedded in an official state structure.

And a year later, this point of the agreement acquired a completely different meaning.

Russia helps Iran see American targets?

In March 2026, the first reports appeared that the direction of assistance had turned: now Moscow is helping Tehran directly in the Middle East.

On March 17, Reuters reported The Wall Street Journal’s message about providing Iran with Russian satellite images and advanced drone technologies. The next day, the Kremlin called this information ‘fake,’ and Reuters separately noted that it initially could not independently confirm the report.

The story did not end there.

On April 7, Reuters reviewed a Ukrainian intelligence assessment, according to which Russian satellites conducted at least 24 detailed surveys of 46 objects in 11 Middle Eastern countries from March 21 to 31. Among them were American military bases, airports, oil facilities, and air defense deployment areas.

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment itself is not yet independent proof. However, Reuters received confirmation of increased Russian satellite activity from a Western military source and a separate regional security source; both also reported that the images were transmitted to Iran. The space company Kayhan Space confirmed unusual Russian satellite activity over the region, although it rightly noted: the mere passage of a satellite over an object does not yet prove the fact of shooting or transmission of a specific image.

Here lies the second important inconsistency.

Moscow denies helping Iran in targeting strikes. But the agreement signed by Russia itself provides for the exchange of intelligence information and experience, and several Reuters sources speak of the actual transfer of satellite materials. This does not yet allow us to assert that every specific Iranian strike was targeted by Russian intelligence, but it can no longer be reduced to an unconfirmed single statement by Kyiv.

NANovosti previously detailed how the Caspian corridor Iran — Russia became part of the military infrastructure of the two regimes, and in July reported on Ukrainian strikes on Russian-Iranian military logistics. If systematic intelligence support has indeed been added to arms supplies, production, and maritime logistics, we are already talking about a much more mature military ecosystem.

A closed loop has formed

If we remove diplomatic formulations, the chain looks like this.

Iran gave Russia Shahed, technology, and a production model. Russia deployed mass production, used and modified this system in Ukraine for years, and simultaneously improved methods of combined missile-drone attacks. Now Iran is using methods in the Middle East that American specialists directly associate with Russian experience, and Moscow, according to Reuters and Ukrainian intelligence, is also helping Tehran with information about potential targets.

Iran → Russia → Ukraine → accumulated combat experience → back to Iran.

This is one of those cases where the arrows on the diagram are more important than diplomatic declarations.

This is why the wars of Russia against Ukraine and Iran against Israel and the USA are increasingly difficult to view as separate crises. Weapons, production technologies, intelligence data, specialists, logistics routes, and, most dangerously, real results of trial and error circulate between them.

Why Israel cannot consider Ukraine a foreign front

For Israel, the conclusion here is significantly more unpleasant than the usual phrase about ‘Russian-Iranian rapprochement.’

It’s not just about Moscow selling something to Tehran or diplomatically covering for it. Iran gains access to knowledge accumulated during years of Russian war against a state armed with Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T, and other Western systems.

Russia in Ukraine tests the limits of Western air defense in real-time. Iran does not have to start learning from scratch.

This is especially important for a small country with limited territory and critical infrastructure that cannot be endlessly ‘spread out’ over a vast space. For Israel, the cost of a mistake can be measured not only by the number of interceptors but by one power plant, one airfield, one communication node, or one missile that got through after dozens of successful interceptions.

Therefore, Reza Pahlavi’s words in Odessa about a unified Russian-Iranian threat today no longer look like a political slogan. Russian-Iranian cooperation has acquired a full cycle: production, logistics, combat experience, intelligence, and the reverse transfer of acquired knowledge.

And now Ukraine is teaching others to defend themselves

There is another twist to this story.

The country that was used for years as a territory for testing mass drone and missile warfare has itself accumulated unique experience in countering it. Ukraine knows Shahed not from exhibitions and manufacturer presentations — it disassembles their wreckage, changes the detection system, creates cheap interceptors, builds mobile fire groups, and constantly adapts to new Russian modifications.

In March, Volodymyr Zelensky spoke about helping Middle Eastern states counter Iranian drones. Kyiv hopes to turn this experience into long-term defense cooperation with regional states now facing the weapons and approaches that Ukrainians have been studying since 2022.

It turns out to be a cruel exchange of roles. First, Iran helped Russia attack Ukraine. Then Russia had the opportunity to perfect this war for years. Now Iran is using part of the accumulated experience against the US and its allies — and they have to turn to the knowledge of the country where this experience was gained.

Ukraine was not a ‘distant war.’ It was a warning

One can argue about the exact number of remaining Patriots. One can wait for new evidence of which specific satellite images Moscow transmitted to Tehran. One can separately discuss how much each Iranian technique is a direct copy of the Russian one, and how much both regimes simply come to the same solutions under the pressure of modern warfare.

But the main chain does not disappear because of this.

Iranian weapons ended up in Russia. Their production was localized and expanded. The Russian army tested new methods of mass strikes in Ukraine for several years. Iranian military studied this war. The Russian-Iranian agreement enshrined the exchange of intelligence experience and military-technical cooperation. Now American military personnel are recording Russian techniques already in Iran’s actions in the Middle East.

This is where the convenient illusion ends that Russia’s war against Ukraine is happening somewhere separate from Israel’s security.

Ukraine became a testing ground where authoritarian regimes had the opportunity to test weapons, tactics, the economy of air defense depletion, and the ability of democratic states to quickly adapt for years. These were cannibalistic experiments: their results were measured by Ukrainian destroyed homes, power plants, and human lives, not by neat test center reports.

The most dangerous mistake of democracies was not that they knew nothing. They saw this process almost live — launch after launch, winter after winter.

It’s just that dictatorships learned faster.

Now part of the accumulated knowledge has returned to the Middle East. Americans are already counting interceptors and burying servicemen. For Israel, the question has long been not whether the war in Ukraine is related to it.

The question is how much more will have to be paid for the lessons that Ukraine began paying for with its blood four years ago.

Editorial verification sources: The New York Times, August 11, 2026; U.S. Department of the Treasury, materials from April 25 and September 10, 2024; official text of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran from January 17, 2025; Reuters, materials from March–April 2026; Council of the European Union; previous NANovosti publications.

Reliable hosting for a website, including for an Israeli site, does not necessarily have to cost hundreds of shekels per month. We talk about the capabilities of the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”, compare prices with other providers, and explain why NANews – Israel news uses the ‘Business 4G’ plan.

An Israeli company’s website can be hosted on a server outside of Israel and still function properly in Hebrew, English, or multiple languages simultaneously. For visitors, the speed of page loading, stability, security, and accessibility of the site are important, not the country of registration of the hosting company.

One such international solution is the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”, operating on the domain Ukraine.com.ua.

It offers:

1. regular virtual hosting,
2. enhanced business plans,
3. VPS,
4. dedicated servers,
5. domain registration,
6. corporate email, and
7. cloud services.

The main reason we consider this service not as a random advertising recommendation is personal experience: the NANews site is hosted on the ‘Business 4G’ plan of the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”.

NANews is a multilingual news project on WordPress with a large number of publications, images, constant database updates, and regular visits by search robots. We use this plan ourselves and therefore recommend it to Israeli site owners based on real work, not just descriptions on the provider’s page.

What is known about the company “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”

The service’s history began in 2004 when the hosting infrastructure was launched for its own projects and client sites. Public hosting appeared in 2006, and in 2008 the company moved to the address Ukraine.com.ua and began actively promoting site hosting services.

In 2010, the number of servers serving the hosting exceeded 100. In 2013, the company opened a data center with 28 server racks with a calculated capacity of 240 kW, and in 2015 it received ICANN accreditation. By 2020, the number of servers exceeded 1000. In 2021, a second server with a capacity of 350 kW was launched.

The exact current number of clients is not published on the open page, so it would be incorrect to provide an unconfirmed figure. But the published history shows that this is not a newly created small project, but an infrastructure that has been developing for more than twenty years.

The company declares its own server infrastructure, server connections at 10 Gbps, and a total network bandwidth of 280 Gbps. NVMe disks, AMD EPYC and AMD Ryzen processors, ECC error-correcting memory, and IPv6 support are used.

The company calls its service the first fully automated hosting and domain registrar in Ukraine. Ordering services, activating hosting, registering domains, payments, and a significant part of technical operations are performed automatically. According to the company, the API covers 99% of the control panel functions.

This is hosting for any sites

The company’s name does not limit the geography of clients or the language of hosted sites.

On the servers, you can host:

• an Israeli company’s site;
• a project in Hebrew;
• a site in English;
• a multilingual portal;
• an online store;
• a news resource;
• a lawyer’s, realtor’s, or private clinic’s site;
• a blog;
• an educational platform;
• a corporate portal;
• an application in PHP, Python, or Node.js;
• several sites of a web studio.

The service interface and control panel are available in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. The site’s content can be in any language.

For Hebrew, the right-to-left text direction — RTL — is important. It depends not on the hosting, but on the WordPress theme, template, and CSS. Modern management systems use UTF-8 encoding, so Hebrew works correctly on the server just like English or any other language.

Why an Israeli site does not necessarily need to be hosted in Israel

The physical location of the server affects network latency but is not the only or even always the main factor in site speed.

WordPress loading is significantly affected by:

• the quality of the theme;
• the number and quality of plugins;
• the size of images;
• caching;
• the state of the database;
• third-party advertising scripts;
• connected fonts;
• video;
• the overall weight of the page.

A well-optimized site on an international server can load faster than a poorly configured site physically located in Israel.

For the Israeli audience, Cloudflare can also be connected. CDN stores the site’s static files in a distributed network and delivers them to the visitor from the nearest available node. This reduces the impact of the distance to the main server and simultaneously helps filter out some malicious traffic.

The company declares a direct connection of the data center to major international communication operators and the ability to move sites between servers without stopping their operation. The online migration technology has been used since 2009.

Regular hosting for small sites

For a business card site, blog, landing page, or small company, it is not necessary to immediately purchase a powerful business plan.

The minimum ‘Fast’ package provides:

• 10 GB on an NVMe disk;
• hosting for one site;
• 512 MB memory limit;
• free SSL;
• automatic backups;
• email on your domain;
• protection against malicious bots;
• antivirus check;
• five-day test.

The price starts from €4 per month with long-term payment. The monthly price is €7.

According to the official exchange rate of the Bank of Israel on July 31, 2026, one euro equals 3.5 shekels.

Therefore, €4 is approximately ₪14, and €7 is about ₪25 excluding the bank’s currency transaction fee.

The ‘Best’ plan provides 20 GB, allows hosting up to five sites, and increases the memory limit to 1 GB. The cost starts from €8 per month, and monthly payment is €13 — approximately from ₪28 to ₪46.

The ‘Quality’ plan provides 30 GB and a memory limit of up to 1.5 GB. It costs from €12 per month or €18 with monthly payment — approximately from ₪42 to ₪63.

The ‘from’ prices apply when a long payment period is selected. Before ordering, you need to check the final cost and the period for which the payment is deducted.

What is included in regular hosting

Even the minimum package provides not only space for files.

Among the declared features:

• NVMe disks;
• free SSL certificate;
• Apache and OpenLiteSpeed;
• MySQL 8.4 or 5.7;
• different PHP versions;
• SSH;
• Python;
• Git and SVN;
• Memcache and OPcache;
• IPv6;
• backup;
• antivirus;
• two-factor authentication;
• protection against CMS password guessing;
• email with POP3, IMAP, and SMTP;
• email virus and spam check;
• automatic installation of popular CMS.

Some additional features and cloud services may be paid separately. Therefore, before ordering a specific plan, you need to check the marks and notes in the current description.

WordPress, WooCommerce, and other systems

Through the control panel, you can automatically install WordPress, Joomla, OpenCart, Drupal, MODX, PrestaShop, Moodle, and other CMS.

For a regular company site or blog, the minimum plan is sufficient. For several projects, the ‘Best’ package is suitable. A small WooCommerce store can also start with regular hosting if the catalog is still small and there are not many heavy extensions on the site.

A more powerful solution will be needed when:

• traffic increases;
• the database grows;
• the WooCommerce cart slows down;
• many plugins are installed;
• the site regularly experiences sharp traffic spikes;
• several active projects are running simultaneously;
• the regular plan starts hitting CPU or memory limits.

Why did NANovosti choose the ‘Business 4G’ plan

NANovosti operates on the ‘Business 4G’ plan. This is the main practical argument for our recommendation.

A news project differs from a regular business card website. It constantly adds materials and images, updates plugins, supports multilingualism, search indexing, caching, backups, and additional WordPress features.

‘Business 4G’ provides:

• 32 GB on an NVMe disk;
• 4 GB of RAM;
• two CPU cores;
• PHP memory limit up to 4 GB;
• the ability to host multiple sites and subdomains within the resources;
• MySQL 8.4 or 5.7;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• PHP-FPM;
• Node.js;
• Python;
• Redis, Memcached, and OPcache;
• SSH;
• Git and SVN;
• free SSL;
• backups;
• email on a separate mail infrastructure;
• antivirus;
• two-factor authentication;
• protection against password guessing;
• a five-day trial period.

The current price of the plan is €38.44 per month. At the representative rate of the Bank of Israel, this is about ₪135 per month, before any possible Israeli bank commission.

Balance is important to us. The plan provides dedicated resources but does not require self-administering a full VPS.

How business hosting differs from a regular plan

On shared hosting, sites of different clients use common server resources and operate within set limits.

On business hosting, CPU cores and memory are allocated to a specific account. They do not have to be shared with neighboring sites. Additionally, there are no restrictions on the number of CPU minutes, the number of files, and the size of the database, although the total disk volume and allocated resources of the plan are maintained.

In terms of resource allocation, this is similar to a VPS. But VPS has an important complexity: the operating system, web server, security, and updates need to be maintained independently or by hiring an administrator.

On business hosting, management remains as simple as on a regular plan. Backups are stored separately, email does not consume hosting account resources, and DDoS protection and standard server settings are provided by the provider.

This is why ‘Business 4G’ turned out to be convenient for NANovosti: we received 4 GB of memory and two cores without the need to turn site maintenance into independent Linux server administration.

Comparison with similar Israeli hosting

Comparing ‘Business 4G’ with the cheapest Israeli shared hosting is incorrect. The closest class of services is a managed VPS or specialized powerful WordPress hosting with comparable CPU and memory.

One of the Israeli providers offers a fully managed WordPress VPS with two cores, 4 GB RAM, and 100 GB SSD for $145 per month. At the Bank of Israel rate on July 31, 2026, this is approximately ₪443 per month. The cost includes management, cPanel, LiteSpeed, protection, and backup infrastructure.

The same provider’s regular managed VPS with two cores, 4 GB RAM, and 100 GB SSD costs $53 per month — about ₪162. However, this is already a server service, the set of included features and the nature of management need to be checked separately.

Another Israeli provider offers a managed Linux server with 4 GB RAM, four cores, and 50 GB SSD for ₪357 per month before VAT. The price includes server management, support, and site transfer. After adding Israeli VAT, the cost becomes even higher.

Against this background, ‘Business 4G’ for approximately ₪135 per month looks significantly more affordable. This does not mean that all offers are completely identical: Israeli servers may have more disk space, more cores, local infrastructure, and support in Hebrew.

But for a site owner, the end result is important. If you need 4 GB RAM, two CPU cores, WordPress, SSL, backups, email, protection, and a simple panel without self-administration, the price of ‘Business 4G’ is noticeably lower than many comparable managed solutions in Israel.

How much can be saved

‘Business 4G’ costs about ₪135 per month, or approximately ₪1620 per year at the current representative rate.

The Israeli managed WordPress VPS from the comparison costs about ₪443 per month, that is, more than ₪5300 per year before considering possible additional payments.

The difference exceeds ₪3600 per year.

Even when compared to a cheaper Israeli VPS for about ₪162 per month, the ‘Business 4G’ plan remains cheaper, while simultaneously providing a ready hosting environment without the need to independently configure the operating system and server software.

For a small site, the savings on a regular plan can be even more noticeable. The minimum package of ‘Hosting “Ukraine”‘ starts at about ₪14 per month, while Israeli WordPress hosting often costs tens of shekels monthly.

Security and protection against attacks

For sites targeting Israel, protection against attacks is of particular importance. This concerns businesses, public organizations, media, and information projects.

The company claims HTTP flood filtering, UDP flood blocking at the router level, and the use of separate server infrastructure for handling SYN floods. Also applied are:

• antivirus scanning;
• malicious file detection;
• protection of login to admin panels;
• blocking of malicious bots;
• two-factor authentication;
• SSL;
• email protection;
• automatic backups.

No hosting can guarantee absolute invulnerability. A WordPress owner must still regularly update the core, theme, and plugins, remove unused extensions, and apply unique passwords.

Backup outside the main server

The company automatically creates backups of sites and allows users to create custom copies through the panel.

The official page states that a hosting copy is created once a week, and mailboxes are copied every two hours to servers in Germany. The company also claims to store backups in several countries.

This is especially important given that the main data center is located in Kyiv and continues to operate during Russian aggression.

At the same time, for a critically important project, it is advisable to adhere to the universal rule: keep another independent copy outside the main hosting. It can be stored in cloud storage, on a separate server, or a local device.

Domains for Israeli sites

The company registers hundreds of international and national domain zones and is ICANN accredited.

For example, a .com domain costs €19 per year — approximately ₪67 at the current rate. Prices for .com.ua, .in.ua, .shop, .store, .site, and other zones are also published on the main page.

Domain and hosting do not have to be purchased from the same company.

An Israeli .co.il domain can be registered with an accredited local registrar, and the site files can be hosted on ‘Hosting “Ukraine”‘. To do this, it is enough to point the domain’s DNS records to the server.

The visitor will see the usual .co.il address and will not know the hosting location from the site name.

Interface and management

The panel allows managing:

• sites;
• files;
• domains;
• databases;
• PHP versions;
• SSL certificates;
• mailboxes;
• backups;
• SSH access;
• resource statistics;
• security settings;
• temporary developer access.

The delegation function allows providing a programmer or SEO specialist with limited temporary access without sharing the main account password.

This is convenient for an Israeli business owner who orders site creation and promotion from an external specialist.

Which plan to choose

For one small company site, portfolio, landing page, or blog, the ‘Fast’ plan is usually sufficient.

When you need to host up to five projects, it is more reasonable to consider the ‘Best’ plan.

For a web studio or a larger site, there is the ‘Quality’ plan.

For an active online store, news resource, several loaded sites, or a project that no longer fits within regular limits, business hosting should be considered.

The ‘Business 4G’ plan is especially interesting for projects that need:

• 4 GB RAM;
• two dedicated cores;
• a large WordPress database;
• WooCommerce;
• multiple sites;
• Redis;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• PHP-FPM;
• increased stability under load;
• simple management without a separate system administrator.

It is on this plan that NANovosti operates.

When is it better to choose an Israeli provider

Local hosting may be preferable when:

• technical support in Hebrew is mandatory;
• the server must be physically located in Israel;
• the contract requires data storage in a specific jurisdiction;
• an Israeli tax document from the supplier is needed;
• minimal network latency is critical;
• the company requires fully individual server support on-site.

But for a regular business website, WordPress project, online store, or informational resource, these conditions are not always necessary.

Why we recommend “Hosting ‘Ukraine’”

Our recommendation is based on personal use.

NANovosti operates on the ‘Business 4G’ plan. For a multilingual news site, it provides sufficient memory and processor resources, while we do not have to maintain the VPS ourselves.

We received:

• dedicated resources;
• a clear control panel;
• WordPress;
• OpenLiteSpeed;
• backups;
• SSL;
• mail;
• protection;
• developer tools;
• the ability to increase resources as the site grows.

At a cost of about ₪135 per month, this plan is noticeably cheaper than many comparable managed solutions from Israeli providers.

For a small project, you can start with a regular plan from €4 per month. If the site grows, the transition to business hosting is automatic and, according to the company, seamless for visitors.

Reliable hosting for a site in Israel without overpaying

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October 7, 2025 The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP) published an official list of persons and events NOT containing “symbols of Russian imperial policy”.

This step became part of the state decolonization program — rethinking historical heritage, where the main goal is not to destroy, but to discern.

What is this list and why is it needed

In recent years, Ukraine has been actively cleansing public spaces of traces of its colonial past.

Streets are being renamed, monuments to imperial rulers and ideologists are being dismantled. But to avoid “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” a “white list” was created — names and events that can be preserved.

“The list is not exhaustive and will be supplemented in accordance with the special conclusions of the expert commission,” explained the UINP.
“Its goal is to help local governments implement the law on condemning imperial policy without losing genuine cultural heritage.”

What is UINP and where did the decolonization law come from

The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP) https://uinp.gov.ua/ is a state institution responsible for shaping the country’s historical policy. It is engaged in researching, preserving, and popularizing historical heritage, especially those periods where Soviet or Russian propaganda distorted facts.

After 2014, and especially after the start of the full-scale war, UINP became a key center for decommunization and decolonization.
These processes are based on the Ukrainian law “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonization of Toponymy”, which prohibits the use of imperial symbols, names, and monuments associated with the ideology of subjugating Ukraine.

The law does not ban Russian culture as such — it clearly distinguishes between culture and propaganda.
If a person lived in the Russian Empire but acted in the name of humanity, science, or art, their name is preserved.

Who was included in the list

“List No. 2

of persons and events of the Moscow Tsardom and the Russian Empire period, objects dedicated to which, according to paragraph 4 of part 1 of article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonization of Toponymy”, fall under exceptions and do not contain symbols of Russian imperial policy“

They are united by one thing — the absence of service to imperial ideology.
Many of them had Ukrainian roots, lived or created in Odesa, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kyiv, creating works that have long become part of Ukrainian identity.

Personalities and events, objects dedicated to which do not contain symbols of Russian imperial policy

1. Ivan Aivazovsky (1817–1900) — Russian painter of Armenian origin.
2. Mykola Arkas (1853–1909) — Ukrainian composer, poet, historian, public figure.
3. Mykola Benardos (1842–1909) — Ukrainian inventor, creator of arc welding.
4. Volodymyr Borovykovsky (1757–1825) — Ukrainian and Russian painter, academician of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts.
5. Karl Bryullov (1799–1852) — classicist and romantic painter, teacher of Taras Shevchenko.
6. Hryhoriy Vakulenchuk (1877–1905) — native of Zhytomyr region, petty officer of the Black Sea Fleet, one of the leaders of the uprising on the battleship “Potemkin”.
7. Mykhailo Vrubel (1856–1910) — symbolist painter of Polish origin.
8. Oleksandr Verkhovtsev (1837–1900) — Russian railway engineer, head of the Kateryninska Railway.
9. Alexander Herzen (1812–1870) — Russian writer, philosopher, publicist, supporter of Ukraine’s independence.
10. Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) — writer of Ukrainian origin, representative of the “Ukrainian school” of Russian literature.
11. Vladimir Dal (1801–1872) — writer, lexicographer, scientist.
12. Hryhoriy Danylevsky (1829–1890) — Ukrainian and Russian writer, ethnographer, historian.
13. Osip (Jose) Deribas (1751–1800) — Russian admiral of Spanish origin, founder and organizer of Odesa.
14. Vasyl Dokuchaev (1846–1903) — Russian scientist, founder of soil science, worked in Poltava.
15. Oleksandr Zasyadko (1779–1837) — Ukrainian specialist in rocket weaponry creation.
16. Vasyl Karazin (1773–1842) — Ukrainian scientist, inventor, founder of Kharkiv University.
17. Mykola Kybalchych (1853–1881) — Ukrainian engineer, creator of a rocket apparatus project, revolutionary.
18. Petro Kishka (1828–1882) — sailor of the Black Sea Fleet, hero of the Crimean War.
19. Thomas Cobley (1761–1833) — major general, governor of Odesa, fought the plague epidemic.
20. Volodymyr Korolenko (1853–1921) — writer and public figure.
21. Ivan Kramskoi (1837–1887) — portrait painter of Ukrainian origin.
22. Alexander Kuprin (1870–1938) — writer, journalist, advocated for people’s rights.
23. Louis de Langeron (1763–1831) — governor of Odesa, founder of the Richelieu Lyceum and Botanical Garden.
24. Andriy Levanidov (d. 1802) — governor of Sloboda Ukraine, philanthropist and collector of antiquities.
25. Nikolai Leskov (1831–1895) — writer and publicist, lived in Kyiv for a long time, actively used Ukrainian motifs.
26. Yuriy Lisianskyi (1773–1837) — Ukrainian navigator, one of the first circumnavigators.
27. Hryhoriy Marazli (1831–1907) — mayor of Odesa, philanthropist and reformer.
28. Levko Matsievich (1877–1910) — shipbuilding engineer, one of the first aviators.
29. Illya Mechnikov (1845–1916) — Ukrainian and French scientist, founder of immunology, Nobel laureate.
30. Apolon Mokrytskyi (1810–1870) — Ukrainian painter and teacher.
31. Hryhoriy Myasoyedov (1834–1911) — Russian and Ukrainian painter.
32. Ivan Myasoyedov (1881–1953) — Ukrainian artist and graphic artist.
33. Nikolai Nekrasov (1821–1878) — writer and publicist, criticized autocracy.
34. Klavdiy Nemeshaev (1849–1927) — railway engineer, education reformer.
35. Petro Nesterov (1887–1914) — Ukrainian aviator, inventor of the “loop-the-loop”.
36. Nikolai Novoselsky (1818–1892) — doctor, public figure, mayor of Odesa, founder of spa treatment.
37. Nikolai Pirogov (1810–1881) — scientist, surgeon, founder of field surgery.
38. Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) — physiologist, Nobel laureate.
39. Alexander Popov (1859–1906) — inventor and physicist, pioneer of radio communication.
40. Adrian Prakhov (1846–1916) — art historian, archaeologist, led the painting of the St. Vladimir’s Cathedral in Kyiv.
41. Emmanuel de Richelieu (1766–1822) — French and Russian statesman, first governor of Odesa.
42. Kondraty Ryleyev (1795–1826) — poet, Decembrist, supporter of Ukraine’s liberation.
43. Illya Repin (1844–1930) — artist of Ukrainian origin, author of “The Zaporozhians”.
44. Mykhailo Sazhin (1818–1887) — artist and graphic artist, author of Kyiv landscapes.
45. Nikolai Solovtsov (1857–1902) — actor and director, founder of the theater in Kyiv.
46. Konstantin Ushinsky (1823–1871) — educator of Ukrainian origin, founder of the public school.
47. Andriy Fabr (1789–1863) — governor of the Katerynoslav province, industrial reformer.
48. Mykhailo Falleev (1730–1792) — military figure, participated in the construction of Mykolaiv.
49. Anton Chekhov (1860–1904) — writer and playwright of Ukrainian origin, theater reformer.
50. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857–1935) — scientist, founder of astronautics.
51. Mykhailo Shchepkin (1788–1863) — actor, founder of stage realism, friend of Taras Shevchenko.

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The list is not final and will be supplemented with personalities and events from the RSFSR, USSR, and modern Russian Federation periods.

The main goal is to separate imperial and human heritage, preserving the memory of those who glorified Ukraine and the world with their work, not the ideology of subjugation.

Source:

• Official UINP page — List No. 2 (uinp.gov.ua)
• UINP press release from October 7, 2025

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Why this is important for Ukraine — and for Israel

For Ukraine, this document is a sign of maturity.
The country does not erase the past but has learned to distinguish the good from the oppressive.
This is a step towards its own cultural independence: respecting what is universal and rejecting what symbolizes enslavement.

For Israel, this is especially understandable.
Israeli society has also gone through the path of memory restoration: from rejecting colonial narratives to creating its own symbols, language, and historical identity.
Ukraine is now taking a similar step — measured, legal, cultural.

How the law works and why it is flexible

The main difference in the Ukrainian approach is that decisions are made by experts, not politicians.
Each name is reviewed by a commission: biographies, views, context, and place in history are checked.
If a person does not embody “imperial policy” — they remain in the cultural space.
Thus, the state shows that decolonization is not a fight against names, but a restoration of historical justice.

Reaction and significance for the diaspora

For Israelis of Ukrainian origin, this news is especially symbolic.
It reminds that memory is not a weapon, but a compass.
Just as Israel once reclaimed names forgotten for millennia, Ukraine today reclaims the right to determine who is ours and who is a symbol of foreign power.

Conclusions

The UINP list has become a document that teaches to see the difference between culture and ideology.
It helps build a future where artists, doctors, scientists are respected — but not those who justified the subjugation of peoples.
Ukraine tells the world: “We do not erase history — we cleanse it.”

There is also “List No. 1”: who is considered a bearer of imperial symbols

In addition to the “white list” (List No. 2), UINP also published List No. 1 — these are persons and events of the Moscow Tsardom and Russian Empire period, whose names/monuments are considered symbols of Russian imperial policy. The list is formed based on UINP expert conclusions and is not exhaustive: it will be supplemented, including with persons and events from the RSFSR, USSR, and modern RF periods.

What this means in practice:
objects dedicated to the persons and events listed below are subject to removal from the public space of Ukraine (renaming, dismantling, relocation, contextualization, etc.) according to the Law of Ukraine “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonization of Toponymy”.

List No. 1 (according to UINP data)

• Konstantin Aksakov (1817–1860) — publicist, ideologist of Slavophilism (“special Russian path”, “chosen by God”).
• Ivan Babushkin (1873–1906) — RSDLP(b) figure, Lenin’s associate.
• Pyotr Bagration (1765–1812) — general, participant in the 1812 war.
• Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) — political figure, ideologist of anarchism (anti-Semitic views).
• Nikolai Bauman (1873–1905) — RSDLP(b) figure, Lenin’s associate.
• Fabian (Faddey) Bellingshausen (1778–1852) — admiral, participant in the implementation of imperial policy.
• Vissarion Belinsky (1811–1848) — critic, glorified imperial policy.
• Alexander Bestuzhev (1797–1837) — Decembrist; participation in the conquest of the Caucasus.
• Battle of Borodino (1812) — event associated with the implementation of imperial policy.
• Ivan Bunin (1870–1953) — writer, glorification of imperial policy.
• Aleksey Butovsky (1838–1917) — general; participation in the suppression of the January Uprising of 1863.
• Vasily Buturlin (†1655) — military and diplomat; head of the delegation at the Pereyaslav Rada 1654.
• Aleksey Bestuzhev-Ryumin (1693–1768) — chancellor, field marshal.
• Mikhail Vorontsov (1782–1856) — field marshal, governor.
• Ilarion Vorontsov-Dashkov (1837–1916) — minister of the court, governor in the Caucasus.
• Mikhail Glinka (1804–1857) — composer, glorification of imperial policy.
• Aleksey Greig (1775–1845) — admiral, implementation of imperial policy.
• Alexander Griboyedov (1795–1829) — diplomat, implementation of imperial policy.
• Boris Godunov (1552–1605) — Moscow tsar.
• Semyon Dezhnev (1605–1673) — navigator, exploration in the interests of the empire.
• Decembrists (1825) — movement with centralizing goals; denial of the right of peoples to self-determination (majority).
• Gavriil Derzhavin (1743–1816) — poet, dignitary, panegyrics to the empire.
• Elizaveta Petrovna (1709–1762) — empress.
• Yermak Timofeyevich (1534–1585) — “conqueror of Siberia”, beginning of the conquest of Siberian Turkic lands.
• Vasily Zhukovsky (1783–1852) — poet, privy councilor, glorification of the empire.
• Pyotr Zaporozhets (1876–1905) — RSDLP(b) figure, Lenin’s associate.
• Vladimir Istomin (1809–1855) — rear admiral.
• Antioch Kantemir (1708–1744) — diplomat, poet; the name gave the name to the 4th Guards Tank Division of the Russian Federation.
• Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1824) — writer, historian; glorification of the empire.
• Paisiy Kaisarov (1783–1844) — general of infantry, senator.
• Catherine II (1729–1796) — empress.
• Vladimir Kornilov (1806–1854) — vice admiral.
• Caesar Cui (1835–1918) — composer, engineer-general.
• Mikhail Kutuzov (1745–1813) — field marshal.
• Viktor Kurnatovsky (1868–1912) — RSDLP(b) figure, Lenin’s associate.
• Lado Ketskhoveli (1876–1903) — RSDLP(b) figure, associate of Lenin and Stalin.
• Mikhail Lazarev (1788–1851) — vice admiral.
• Mikhail Lermontov (1814–1841) — poet; glorification of the empire.
• Mikhail Lomonosov (1711–1765) — scientist; glorification of the empire.
• Mikhail Miloradovich (1771–1825) — military and state figure.
• Kuzma Minin (1570–1616) — state and military figure of the Moscow Tsardom.
• Nicholas I (1796–1855) — emperor.
• Nicholas II (1868–1918) — emperor.
• Nikita Muravyov (1795–1843) — Decembrist, leader of the Northern Society.
• Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881) — composer (“Boris Godunov”).
• Pavel Nakhimov (1802–1855) — admiral.
• Alexander I (1777–1825) — emperor.
• Alexander II (1818–1881) — emperor.
• Alexander III (1845–1894) — emperor.
• Pavel I (1754–1801) — emperor.
• Vasily Panyutin (1788–1855) — major general.
• Ivan Paskevich (1782–1856) — field marshal; suppression of the Polish uprising, repressions.
• Pavel Pestel (1793–1826) — colonel, ideologist of the Decembrists.
• Peter I (1672–1725) — tsar/emperor.
• Dmitry Pozharsky (1578–1642) — state and military figure.
• Battle of Poltava (1709) — key event in the interests of the empire against Mazepa and Charles XII.
• Grigory Potemkin (1739–1793) — state and military figure, diplomat.
• Georgy Plekhanov (1856–1918) — political figure.
• Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837) — poet; glorification of the empire.
• Emelyan Pugachev (1742–1775) — leader of the peasant war, impostor.
• Stepan Razin (1630–1671) — ataman of the Don Cossacks, leader of campaigns.
• Nikolai Raevsky (1771–1829) — general.
• Romanovs — ruling house of the Moscow Tsardom and the Russian Empire.
• Grigory Romodanovsky (†1682) — state and military figure; participant in the Pereyaslav Rada.
• Dmitry Senyavin (1763–1831) — admiral, commander of the Baltic Fleet.
• Ivan Sinelnikov (1738–1788) — military and political figure of the empire.
• Mikhail Skobelev (1843–1882) — general, participant in Central Asian campaigns and Russo-Turkish wars.
• Alexander Suvorov (1729–1800) — generalissimo.
• Ivan Susanin — mythologized character of imperial propaganda.
• Vasily Surikov (1848–1916) — painter of historical canvases, glorification of the empire.
• Nikolai Sukhina — provincial secretary of the Poltava province (1812).
• Aleksey Teplov (1763–1826) — state figure.
• Ivan Turgenev (1818–1883) — writer; glorification of the empire.
• Vasily Tyapkin — ambassador of the Moscow Tsardom in the Hetmanate (1677–1680).
• Alexander Tsulukidze (1876–1905) — RSDLP(b) figure, Lenin’s associate.
• Fyodor Ushakov (1745–1817) — admiral.
• Pyotr Schmidt (1867–1906) — fleet officer; cult of Soviet propaganda.
• Ivan Gudovich (1741–1820) — field marshal.
• Ivan Sabaneev (1831–1909) — military figure.
• Alexander Stroganov (1795–1879) — governor-general of Novorossiya and Bessarabia.

List No. 1 is a decolonization tool: it helps local governments legally correctly remove imperial symbols from the urban environment while preserving cultural heritage that did not serve ideology (List No. 2).

On the night of August 13, 2026, the IDF demolished two illegal outposts in Samaria — one near the Palestinian village of Qusra south of Nablus, the second on the outskirts of neighboring Jalud. Equipment was confiscated, one Israeli was detained, and fighters from the 51st Battalion of the Golani Brigade were sent to the area. But the main political event of this story was not even the dismantling itself.

In the morning, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee called the actions of people surrounding Palestinian homes a “shocking act of terrorism” and used an even more unusual phrase for an American diplomat — “Israeli terrorists.” Huckabee specifically emphasized that the IDF and police arrived in Qusra at the request of the American side.

For NANews — News of Israel, this story is important not as another dispute between supporters and opponents of settlements. Victoria Katzman compared the chronology of events from August 9 to 13, IDF statements, reports from Israeli media, family testimonies, and Washington’s reaction to answer a more unpleasant question: why did it take several days and intervention at the highest diplomatic level for the situation to be effectively resolved.

At the same time, we do not substitute an investigation with a legal conclusion. The editorial team does not independently establish property rights to disputed plots and does not determine the legality of Palestinian structures: where such claims are made by conflict participants, they remain their claims. However, the sequence of actions by the army, the American ambassador, and the Israeli command can already be restored quite accurately.

What happened in Qusra and why did it come to be called a siege?

The story began on Sunday, August 9. A group of Israelis settled literally at the Palestinian homes on the outskirts of Qusra, set up temporary structures, and began blocking access. Later, the IDF itself identified the outpost created there as illegal and reported that it was located in zone B; an order was issued for a closed military zone in the area.

Residents claimed that for several days they could not normally enter or leave their homes. Channel 13 also reported on blocked access roads and the disconnection of homes from water and electricity.

The simplest everyday detail shows the scale of what was happening better than political slogans. In one family, a two-year-old girl fell ill — the child had a high fever and vomiting. An ambulance initially could not reach the house without hindrance; the mother and girls were able to be evacuated later.

In another house were relatives of Palestinian-American Louay Reedy. Reedy himself lives in Toledo, Ohio, but was born in Qusra and left for the US 23 years ago. His brother Qusay and 18-year-old nephew remained inside the house.

Reedy told The Times of Israel that he had already invested about a million dollars in the still unfinished building. He explained that it was not an investment project: he wanted to maintain a connection for his two daughters with the place where their family comes from. Through surveillance cameras in Ohio, he watched what was happening around the house for several days.

That is why the word “siege” appeared in this story not only in political rhetoric. People were indeed restricted in movement, medical assistance was hindered, and security forces could not completely remove the activists near the houses for several days.

Why did the first IDF attempt end in almost nothing?

On August 12, 2026, IDF and border police forces arrived in Qusra. The military dismantled a canopy set up near the houses, but after reports of a planned evacuation, additional activists arrived at the scene.

Clashes arose. Roads were blocked with stones, security forces used dispersal means, but a full evacuation did not occur then.

Reuters reported that after the military left, people near the houses tried to damage the gate of one of the buildings. Residents spoke of stones, swearing, and constant fear.

At this stage, the story became a problem not only for the police. The commander of the Central Command, Major General Avi Bluth, arrived in Qusra along with other high-ranking officers. The command stated that it takes the actions of Israeli citizens against the Palestinian family very seriously.

Another unpleasant episode appeared. Israeli soldiers were filmed praying next to the outpost participants instead of removing them from the territory. The IDF officially announced disciplinary measures against the involved soldiers.

This changes the meaning of the story. The question was no longer just whether a few dozen radical activists could set up a tent near a Palestinian home. The question was different: how quickly and consistently can the state itself enforce its own decision when the violators are Israeli citizens.

In the evening, Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir held a meeting on Qusra. According to Channel 13, he ordered the interruption of the rest and recovery period for Golani fighters, who were supposed to continue activities in Lebanon, and to send forces to Samaria.

At night, the 51st Battalion arrived there. The IDF reported that the soldiers would perform defensive tasks and patrol the area to maintain security.

Why are Mike Huckabee’s words much more important than usual US criticism here?

The figure of the American ambassador makes the entire episode politically unusual. It is hard to imagine Mike Huckabee as a traditional critic of the settlement movement. For many years, he held positions significantly closer to the Israeli right than most of the American diplomatic establishment.

NANews has already reported on Mike Huckabee’s statements about Israel’s right to Middle Eastern territories, which caused a sharp reaction from Arab states. That is why the current wording of the ambassador carries significantly more weight than similar words from an official known for his constant criticism of settlements.

This time Huckabee wrote that the actions against the family were “disgusting,” called what happened an act of terrorism intended to intimidate and persecute people, and added: there is no justification for such behavior.

But the most politically sensitive part of the statement was different.

The ambassador reported that Washington was “VERY involved” in attempts to stop what was happening. According to Huckabee, the IDF and police went to remove the “Israeli terrorists” there at the request of the American side.

This wording creates a problem for Israel that would not exist with ordinary diplomatic condemnation. The American ambassador did not just report that Washington was dissatisfied. He publicly linked the actions of Israeli security forces to an American request.

One of the houses, meanwhile, belongs to a US citizen. Israeli media reported that what was happening was discussed in the White House and that representatives of the American administration demanded explanations from the Israeli authorities as to why the situation continued.

A rather strange picture emerged. The Israeli state already considered the outpost illegal. Israeli military were already in the area. Israeli commanders already called what was happening serious. But at the same time, an ally had to publicly state that it was he who asked Israeli structures to intervene.

Did the US really force Israel to demolish the outpost?

Here it is especially important not to turn a beautiful political version into an established fact.

The chronology indeed looks very indicative: the siege began on August 9, the first operation did not solve the problem, then followed pressure from Washington, a meeting of the Chief of Staff, the transfer of Golani, and a new night operation. On the morning of August 13, the IDF already reported the dismantling of two outposts.

But the sequence of events itself does not prove that without the US, Israel would not have acted at all. We do not have a document, order, or official acknowledgment that allows us to write: “Washington ordered, Israel complied.”

There is something else — and it is no less significant.

The American ambassador himself confirmed the American request, and Israel indeed sharply increased the scale of the operation. Therefore, the correct question is not “did the US order Israel?”, but rather: why was the internal Israeli mechanism so slow that an ally had to intervene at all?

At night, security forces dismantled structures near Qusra and another illegal outpost near Jalud. Equipment was confiscated, one Israeli was detained.

Channel 13 published footage of the operation with a caption about the dismantling of outposts in zone B. After the demolition was completed, the army did not just leave: fighters from the 51st Battalion of Golani were left in the area, indicating concern about the activists’ return and new clashes.

The Chairman of the Judea and Samaria Settlement Council, Israel Gantz, also distanced himself from what happened. He stated that the events in Qusra are serious and “are not our way,” that one cannot independently decide to create an outpost in a home’s yard, and that there is no justification for violence against the uninvolved or security forces.

At the same time, Gantz continued to advocate for the expansion of organized Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria. This is an important distinction: even the leadership of the settlement movement is trying to draw a line between the policy of settlement expansion and the unauthorized creation of an outpost directly near other people’s homes.

Why was the American passport of one owner so important?

The story of Louay Reedy makes the question almost personal. He is 46 years old, grew up in Qusra, lives in Ohio, manages a network of gas stations and car washes, regularly visits his family, and is building a house in his native village.

According to him, he purchased the plot several years ago, received the necessary permits from the Palestinian Authority, and has documents for the land. We cannot verify the land dispute instead of the relevant authorities, so this remains the position of the owner himself.

But his American citizenship is an established and politically important part of the story.

Reedy sought help from the US embassy even before the incident became international news. According to him, he was initially told to contact Israeli authorities or the Palestinian Authority.

A few days later, the situation was already being discussed at a much higher level, and the US ambassador openly declared American intervention.

And here arises a question that cannot simply be dismissed: if there were no US citizen among the house owners, would the story have reached the White House, the ambassador, and the American Congress?

We cannot prove that the answer is “no.” But it is precisely the possibility of such an answer that makes Qusra a problem for Israel.

State protection of the law should not depend on whether the owner has an American passport. If the outpost is illegal, if the army has issued an order for a closed military zone, if its own commanders call what is happening unacceptable — the enforcement mechanism should work because it is the decision of the State of Israel, not because someone in Washington called the right person.

This is the Israeli part of the story, which is much broader than the reader’s attitude towards Palestinians or settlements.

Is Qusra a single scandal or a symptom of a larger problem?

A few days before the events in Qusra, data from Israeli security forces were published, making this story even more alarming.

According to data provided by the public broadcasting corporation Kan, in the first half of 2026, 660 serious episodes of nationalist violence by Jewish extremists were registered, compared to 405 for the same period in 2025. The increase is about 63%.

Israeli security forces classify such serious crimes as terrorism. The number of attacks on Israeli military and other security forces by radical settlers also increased: 45 such cases were registered in the first six months of 2026, about 50% more than a year earlier.

This does not mean that hundreds of thousands of settlement residents are involved in extremism. That is why Israel Gantz’s reaction is important here: replacing small radical groups with the entire settlement movement would be as wrong as ignoring the groups themselves and the scale of violence growth.

But the numbers explain why Qusra cannot be dismissed as just one tent and a few crazies.

When such episodes become regular, a question of state governance arises. For Israel, it is especially painful: the IDF and Shin Bet daily require society to trust them in the fight against Palestinian terrorism, intelligence, arrests, and attack prevention. These same institutions must have the ability to just as unequivocally suppress violence when its source is Jewish extremists.

There is also a direct security problem. Each attack on a Palestinian family creates new motives for revenge, facilitates the recruitment of radical organizations, and forces the IDF to spend resources not on preventing Palestinian attacks but on separating Palestinians and Israeli citizens.

And something else happened in Qusra.

One of the most settlement-friendly American diplomats publicly called the participants of the siege “Israeli terrorists”. The Israeli Chief of Staff deployed Golani. The IDF punished soldiers seen near the outpost participants. The head of the Settlement Council condemned unauthorized actions. Two outposts were eventually demolished.

And all this was required to end a story that began with a few temporary structures in front of residential homes.

Therefore, the main conclusion of Qusra is not in the convenient slogan “America forced Israel.” The sources do not allow this to be stated as a proven fact.

The problem is more serious. In four days, a small episode on the outskirts of a village went from the Chief of Staff, the Golani Battalion, the White House, and the American ambassador. And if the state needs to go through all this to implement its own decision, the question is no longer just about radical settlers.

The question is, who ultimately sets the rules in Judea and Samaria — the State of Israel or the one who first pitched a tent and managed to gather supporters around it.

In Dnipro, until August 27, 2026, the exhibition “Jerusalem — Dnipro. From A to Z” is taking place. It is hosted at the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine” in the “Menorah” complex, and the exhibition itself connects Jerusalem and Dnipro through graphics, digital art, painting, and two different alphabet systems.

The continuation of the exhibition was announced by the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine. The project was created with the participation of the Embassy of the State of Israel in Ukraine, the “Nativ” representation in Ukraine, the Honorary Consulate of the State of Israel in the Western region of Ukraine, and the museum itself. But if we only list these organizers, the main point is lost: this is not a one-time cultural event, but another point on a longer Israeli-Ukrainian route.

For Lev Varshavsky, this topic is part of a constant line of NAnews about the ties between Israel and Ukraine, where the important thing is not the mere fact of another event, but what it says about the relations between the two societies. In preparing the material, we compared the message from the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine with data from the museum, the Jewish community of Dnipro, information about previous stages of the project, and the official status of “Nativ.” Where it is no longer about the fact, but about the significance of the event, we separately indicate the editorial conclusion.

NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers this exhibition precisely in this context: as a cultural story in which behind the images of Jerusalem and Dnipro, people, state structures, memory, and a very concrete connection between the two countries are visible.

Why Dnipro is not a random stop

Before Dnipro, the project already connected Jerusalem with Kyiv, Odesa, and Chernivtsi. Therefore, the current exhibition continues a series in which the capital of Israel seems to engage in a separate conversation with each Ukrainian city — not trying to make them similar, but selecting a unique visual language for each.

Dnipro in this sequence is particularly indicative. It is one of the most important centers of modern Jewish life in Ukraine, home to the “Menorah” complex, a large Jewish community, and the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine.” At the opening, the director of the Jewish community of Dnipro, Zelig Brez, also reminded of the formula applied to the city — “Jerusalem of the Diaspora.”

This is not the first story where Dnipro becomes a platform for direct contact with Israel. NAnews has already written about the first MENORA MUSIC FEST, where Jewish culture and the Ukrainian environment were connected through music, as well as about the visit to Dnipro by the Chief Rabbi of Israel and the Minister of Religious Affairs. When looking at these events together, rather than individually, a more interesting picture emerges: the ties between Israel and Ukrainian Jewry here are supported not by one institution and not in one format.

That is why the current exhibition does not look like a decorative gesture. It fits into the already existing infrastructure of relations — the community, the museum, religious institutions, cultural projects, and personal connections between people from the two countries. This is an editorial conclusion of NAnews, not a formulation by the organizers.

Two alphabets instead of routine speeches

The title “From A to Z” here literally defines the structure of the exhibition. Jerusalem and Dnipro tell about themselves through letters, but they do it differently.

The Israeli part was prepared by the Ginzburgs’ City Cat art foundation with the participation of digital artists. Iconic places of Jerusalem are presented in a modern graphic form, with a golden visual palette referring simultaneously to Jerusalem stone and the familiar Israeli image of “Jerusalem of Gold.”

The Ukrainian part was created by artist Vanda Orlova, working under the name VANDA. In her work, Dnipro is laid out in 33 letters of the Ukrainian alphabet and 33 city stories: places, people, phenomena, and details that make up the local cultural code. An important detail is that when selecting some objects, the author was guided not only by formal writing but also by the recognizable Dnipro sound of the names.

A separate layer of the exhibition is the works of Olga Shipelik. They address the Land of Israel, family, labor, human life, and spirituality; some works use gold leaf. As a result, the exhibition is not reduced to a pair of tourist sets: here are the sights of Jerusalem, and here are the sights of Dnipro.

And here appears the first thing that cannot be seen from a short museum announcement. The alphabet works as a way not to compare cities by the principle of “who is more beautiful,” but to make each of them name their own words about themselves. The letters equally organize the narrative, but the content remains different — and that is why the conversation between the two cities turns out to be more interesting than routine speeches about friendship.

Mark Dovev: from Dnipro to Israel — and back already with Jerusalem

The project has another layer that does not fit into the formula “international exhibition” at all. The head of the “Nativ” representation in Ukraine and advisor to the Embassy of the State of Israel, Mark Dovev, called the opening in Dnipro a deeply personal event.

Dnipro is his hometown. It was from here that he once left for Israel, and many years later, his diplomatic period of work in Ukraine began here. Now he has returned to the city as a representative of Israel and one of the participants in the project, literally connecting Dnipro with Jerusalem.

This changes the perception of the entire exhibition. The connection between the two cities ceases to be just a curatorial metaphor: in the hall is a person whose own biography has practically followed the same line — Ukraine, Israel, Ukraine again. Dovev spoke about returning with the treasures of “two worlds” and separately named the Jewish community of Dnipro as a living bridge between Israel and Ukraine.

For an Israeli reader with Ukrainian roots, there is a recognizable plot here that goes far beyond the museum walls. One can live in Israel for decades, but the name of a Ukrainian city still remains not geography from someone else’s news, but part of a personal map. In Dovev’s case, this private map unexpectedly coincided with the state and cultural one.

Why the presence of “Nativ” changes the meaning of the exhibition

In publications about the opening, “Nativ” can easily be mistaken for yet another cultural organization in a long list of partners. But this is inaccurate: “Nativ” is a separate administrative unit under the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel and works with Jews and their family members in the former USSR, supporting their connection with the State of Israel.

Therefore, the participation of “Nativ” together with the Embassy of Israel changes the scale of the story. It is not about a private gallery that decided to hold a beautiful international project, but about a cultural initiative in which official Israeli structures are directly involved.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to declare one exhibition as proof of some sharp diplomatic turn between Israel and Ukraine. There are no such grounds. Its significance lies elsewhere: even when the political relations of the two countries go through disputes, disappointments, and mismatched interests, at the institutional and public level, work with Jewish memory, culture, cities, and people continues.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this is an important distinction. Cultural diplomacy does not cancel political disagreements and should not be used to mask them, but it shows which connections are capable of surviving changes in the governmental agenda and continuing to exist between societies.

There is also another detail. The exhibition is held not in a neutral exhibition center, but specifically in the museum of Jewish memory and the Holocaust. Therefore, several temporal layers are immediately adjacent: the destroyed Jewish world of Ukraine, the modern Jewish life of Dnipro, the state of Israel, and present-day Ukraine.

It is in this place that the name “Jerusalem — Dnipro” begins to mean more than geography.

What will remain after August 27

A museum exhibition is by definition temporary. “Jerusalem — Dnipro. From A to Z” will end on August 27, the works will be taken down from the walls, and the poster will give way to the next event. But the project’s route has already left behind Kyiv, Odesa, Chernivtsi, and Dnipro — four different attempts to articulate relations with Jerusalem not in the language of diplomatic notes, but through the urban cultural code.

And this is the most interesting result of the project. Israel in Ukraine is represented here not only by the state, war, repatriation, or diplomacy, but by Jerusalem as a living city; Ukraine for the Israeli side is not an abstract territory from the news feed, but specific cities with their Jewish history, contemporary art, and people who continue to maintain this connection.

You can visit the exhibition at the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine” in Dnipro, Sholom Aleichem St., 4/26, KDC “Menorah.” According to the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine:

• Wednesday and Sunday — 10:00–18:00;
• Tuesday and Thursday — visits by appointment;
• the last day of the exhibition — August 27, 2026.

Thus, the two alphabets turn out to be only the visible part of the project. Behind them remains a longer route — people who once left Ukraine for Israel, Jewish communities continuing to live in Ukrainian cities, Israeli state structures, and an attempt to talk to each other not only when another political crisis arises.

Source: Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine.
Additional information verified with materials from the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine,” the Jewish community of Dnipro, and official information from “Nativ.”