Author: Карабас Барабас

Jewish embroidery in the territory of modern Ukraine is not a myth and not an attempt to “invent a Jewish vyshyvanka.” It is a complex layer of culture where synagogue textiles, home rituals, women’s headwear, kippahs, bibs, belts, and festive clothing were intertwined with the history of Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Bukovina, and other regions.

Every year on the third Thursday of May, Ukraine and the world celebrate World Vyshyvanka Day. The history of Vyshyvanka Day began in 2006 at the Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University.  

Today, Vyshyvanka Day is celebrated not only in Ukraine. Ukrainian communities abroad, embassies, cultural centers, volunteers, schools, universities, public organizations, and people who cherish Ukrainian tradition join in. Vyshyvankas are worn in Europe, North America, Australia, Israel, and other countries.

After 2014, and especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this day gained even deeper meaning. For many people, the vyshyvanka became not just beautiful clothing but a symbol of dignity, resistance, memory, and the right of a people to remain themselves.

Why this issue is important right now

When in Ukraine they talk about embroidery, the first thing that comes to mind is the vyshyvanka. A shirt, ornament, regional patterns, family memory, festive clothing, symbolism of the land, kin, and resistance. In recent years, the Ukrainian vyshyvanka has become not only a cultural symbol but also a public language of identity.

However, on the same lands, Jewish communities lived for centuries. They existed in cities, shtetls, craft quarters, near fairs, synagogues, fabric markets, workshops, and houses of learning. Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv region, Bukovina, southern Ukraine — all these regions were not only Ukrainian but also Jewish spaces of memory.

And here arises a question that usually remains in the shadows: did embroidery exist in Jewish traditional art in the territory of modern Ukraine?

The answer is yes, it did exist. But precision is important.

It was not a “Jewish vyshyvanka” in the simple and direct sense, as a separate national shirt, completely analogous to the Ukrainian shirt. Jewish embroidery more often lived in another space: in synagogue textiles, Judaica items, home rituals, festive fabrics, headwear, bibs, belts, kippahs, dress trims, skirts, vests, and separate costume elements.

It must be honestly stated right away: this text is not an academic monograph and not a museum inventory catalog. NAnovosti writes in a popular science format, understandable to a wide audience. Therefore, one should not demand from such an article the language of a closed dissertation. But a beautiful legend instead of facts cannot be created here. The task is different: to carefully gather the picture and show that Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands was a real cultural phenomenon.

How Ukrainian and Jewish embroidery traditions influenced each other

When talking about Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands, it is important not to imagine the two traditions as completely isolated worlds. Jewish communities lived alongside Ukrainian, Polish, Romanian, Armenian, and other populations of the region. They bought fabrics at the same markets, ordered work from local craftsmen, traded materials, saw neighboring costumes, festive items, church and home textiles.

Therefore, influence was almost inevitable. But it needs to be understood carefully.

The Ukrainian vyshyvanka was primarily a clothing tradition: shirt, sleeves, collar, chest part, hem, regional ornament, connection with the village, family, ritual, and local identity. Jewish embroidery more often concentrated in another space — in the synagogue, prayer textiles, festive accessories, women’s bibs, kippahs, ataras, belts, and decorative costume details. So the contact was not in one tradition completely copying another, but in them living side by side and partially using a common craft environment.

What the Jewish tradition could take from the local environment

In regions like Galicia, Podolia, and Volhynia, Jewish craftsmen and craftswomen did not exist outside the local visual culture. They saw Ukrainian geometric ornaments, plant motifs, color combinations, embroidered shirts, rushnyks, festive fabrics. Through the market, neighborhood, orders, and craft contacts, these elements could influence the taste, composition, and technique of Jewish textile items.

But this does not mean that Jewish embroidery simply “became Ukrainian.” It adapted external forms to its own tasks. If in the Ukrainian vyshyvanka the ornament often lived on the shirt and denoted regional, family, or ritual affiliation, then in the Jewish environment a similar decorative energy could transition into a parochet, atara, women’s bib, kippah, festive cap, or belt.

Thus, not a copy was created, but a translation of the ornamental language into another cultural system.

What the Jewish tradition added to the overall textile culture of Ukraine

Jewish embroidery brought its own symbols and meanings into the overall Ukrainian cultural landscape: the crown of the Torah, lions of Judah, menorah, Magen David, Tablets of the Covenant, Hebrew letters, dedicatory inscriptions, dates according to the Jewish calendar, names of donors.

Even when similar materials or similar techniques were used — velvet, brocade, gold embroidery, appliqués, beads, pearls, metallic threads — the meaning of the item remained Jewish. A parochet did not become just a beautiful curtain. An atara was not just a decorative strip. A women’s bib was not a direct analogue of the Ukrainian vyshyvanka. These items lived within the Jewish religious, family, and communal logic.

Here the main point is visible: Ukrainian and Jewish traditions could intersect at the level of fabric, technique, color, market, and craft, but they retained different functions.

Why it is impossible to talk about simple borrowing

The phrase “Jews adopted the Ukrainian vyshyvanka” sounds too crude. It simplifies the complex history of neighborhood.

It is more accurate to say this: Jewish communities on Ukrainian lands existed within a common decorative-applied environment. They could perceive local ornamental solutions, use the same materials, turn to similar techniques, and work alongside Ukrainian craftsmen. But the result was not a “Jewish vyshyvanka” in the direct sense, but a Jewish textile language: synagogue fabrics, Judaica, ataras, kippahs, bibs, belts, festive caps, and costume elements.

That is, the influence was not mechanical, but cultural. Not “copying the shirt,” but the neighborhood of traditions, exchange of craft techniques, and adaptation of the visible world to one’s own memory, faith, and ritual.

Modern reverse process

Today, there is also a reverse movement. Ukrainian craftsmen and designers can turn to Jewish symbolism, combining the silhouette of the Ukrainian vyshyvanka with the Magen David, menorah, lions, grapevine, Hebrew letters, or motifs of Jerusalem.

But this is no longer a historical reconstruction of an ancient “Jewish vyshyvanka.” It is a modern cultural gesture — an attempt to show that Jewish history was part of Ukraine, not an external addition to it.

Therefore, the correct conclusion is this: Ukrainian embroidery and Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands were not the same tradition, but they existed in a common space. They could influence each other through materials, craftsmen, markets, ornaments, and festive culture. At the same time, each retained its own meaning: the Ukrainian vyshyvanka as a sign of folk and regional identity, Jewish embroidery as a language of Judaica, prayer, family memory, and communal textiles.

Two lines of Jewish embroidery: Judaica and everyday life

Jewish embroidery in the territory of Ukraine is conveniently viewed through two large lines.

The first is decorative-religious, that is, Judaica. These are synagogue and home-ritual items associated with the Torah, prayer, holidays, Shabbat, Passover, weddings, family memory, and communal gifts.

The second is everyday and clothing. These are costume elements, headwear, accessories, bib inserts, belts, kippahs, festive caps, collars, dress trims, skirts, corsets, men’s and children’s vests.

The most reliable field is precisely Judaica. Here we are talking about items that are better preserved in museum collections and more often appear in descriptions: parochets, Torah mantles, kaporets, ataras, tefillin cases, matzah bags, covers, chuppah, tallits, and kippahs.

The clothing line also exists, but it is more complex. There are fewer sources, attributions are more subtle, and the temptation to call all this “Jewish vyshyvanka” is too great. Therefore, caution is needed here: Jewish embroidered clothing existed, but a separate canonical type of “Jewish vyshyvanka” does not yet have such strong evidence.

Synagogue textiles: the heart of Jewish embroidery

The most vivid and best-documented manifestation of Jewish embroidery is synagogue textiles.

In the Jewish tradition, fabric could be more than just decoration. It became part of the sacred space. A parochet covered the Torah ark. A mantle protected the scroll. A cover on the bimah accompanied the reading of the Torah. An atara adorned the tallit. A case or bag for tefillin was associated with personal prayer practice. A matzah bag was part of the festive world of Passover.

In this sense, embroidery was not a decorative trifle, but a way to express respect for the sacred.

What items were used

In the synagogue and home-ritual tradition, various types of textiles were encountered:

• parochet — curtain before the Torah ark;
• kaporet — upper decorative part or valance of the synagogue curtain;
• mantle / torah mantle — cover or mantle for the Torah scroll;
• cover on the bimah;
• atara — decorative strip for the tallit;
• cases and bags for tefillin;
• matzah bags;
• festive covers;
• chuppah;
• Sabbath fabrics, including covers for challah;
• kippahs and separate elements of prayer clothing.

In different regional and museum descriptions, names may differ, and some terms are sometimes conveyed differently. But the system itself is clear: embroidered and decorated textiles served the synagogue, home, holiday, and prayer.

The creation of such items was often done by women, especially in the home and communal environment. At the same time, for individual items, authorship is far from always known: museum cards more often preserve the date, place, type of item, or name of the donor than the name of the craftswoman.

Techniques and materials

Jewish ritual textiles on Ukrainian lands could be very rich in execution. Velvet, silk, brocade, gold and silver embroidery, metallic threads, appliqués, passementerie, beads, pearls, sequins, fringe, decorative patches were used.

In Kyiv and Galician items, brocade, velvet, gold and silver thread, sequins, paper backing under embroidery, strips of complex metallic thread work are recorded.

Sometimes expensive fabrics received a second life. Old fragments of brocade, elite clothing, imported fabrics, or decorative strips could be reassembled into a synagogue item. This did not diminish its significance. On the contrary, in the Jewish tradition, the beauty of the item could become part of fulfilling the commandment — a respectful adornment of the sacred.

Symbolism: crown, lions, menorah, birds

On Jewish embroidered fabrics, stable motifs were found: the crown of the Torah, Tablets of the Covenant, lions of Judah, deer, birds, menorah, Magen David, hands of the kohanim, plant garlands, vases with flowers, pomegranates, rosettes, palmettes, wreaths, paschal lamb.

Equally important are inscriptions. These could be Hebrew letters, dedications, names of donors, dates according to the Jewish calendar, biblical or liturgical formulas.

Here the ornament was not “just a pattern.” It combined beauty, faith, memory, communal status, family donation, and connection with the text.

Galicia, Podolia, and Volhynia: space of cultural contact

Jewish embroidery in the territory of Ukraine was not formed in isolation.

It was a layer of culture at the intersection of Jewish canons and the decorative-applied art of Ukrainian lands.

Galicia, Podolia, and Volhynia are especially important. In these regions, large Jewish communities lived, craftsmen worked, fabric markets existed, fairs were held, fashions changed, techniques spread, different visual languages met.

Galicia provides the richest and most noticeable corpus. Lviv, Sasyv / Sasov, Zolochiv, and other shtetls are associated with parochets, torah mantles, ataras, tefillin cases, kippahs, brusttukh, Yom Kippur belts, and other items.

Podolia and Volhynia are important as regions of dense Jewish life. Here the topic requires further work with museum funds, photo archives, family albums, and local collections. Weak digital visibility does not mean the absence of tradition. Many items may not have been preserved, not digitized, or listed under too general names.

That is why in a popular science text, one can speak confidently about the tradition itself, but cautiously about the details of specific regional costumes.

Sasyv and the technique of shpanyer arbet

A special place is occupied by Sasyv in the Lviv region. It is associated with the technique of shpanyer arbet / spanier arbeit — a special metallic thread work where gold and silver threads, lace strips, decorative modules, plant and geometric motifs were used.

This technique is important because it connects synagogue textiles and clothing.

It was used for ataras, kippahs, women’s bibs, festive caps, collars, cuffs, belts, vests, dress and skirt trims.

Rosettes, flowers, rhombuses, heart-shaped motifs, elements reminiscent of “fish scales,” plant forms were encountered. This is not only the synagogue, but a visible festive culture: what a person could wear, show at a celebration, pass on in the family, preserve as a status item.

Everyday embroidery and clothing: was there a “Jewish vyshyvanka”?

Now the most sensitive question: can we talk about a “Jewish vyshyvanka”?

If by vyshyvanka we mean precisely the Ukrainian national shirt with a stable regional ornament system, then talking about a full Jewish analogue is still risky. In known digital catalogs, there is almost no separate type of “Jewish embroidered shirt” from the territory of modern Ukraine.

But if we speak more broadly — about embroidered clothing and clothing elements — the Jewish tradition is well confirmed.

These were women’s festive caps, kippahs, brusttukh / brustikhl — bib inserts, belts, jacket collars, ataras, caps, dress trims, skirts, corsets, men’s and children’s vests.

In the Ashkenazi tradition of Eastern Europe, the costume often maintained restraint. Decorativeness could concentrate in separate details: headwear, bib, belt, festive insert, metallic thread trim.

Bib instead of shirt

Particularly interesting is the brusttukh / brustikhl — a women’s bib or insert. It could cover the front part of the blouse and become the main decorative element.

The Ukrainian vyshyvanka carries the ornament on the shirt itself. In the Jewish Galician costume, a similar visual function could be transferred to a separate bib. This is a different principle of clothing, but it is also connected with the embroidered surface, body, and public image.

Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of a direct “Jewish vyshyvanka,” but of Jewish forms of embroidered costume, where the ornament lived in accessories and decorative inserts.

Restrained colors and local influences

There is reason to say that in the clothing of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, restraint and modesty were valued. Embroidery might not always be bright: monochrome solutions, white on white, black on black, restrained blue-white combinations were encountered.

The question of the influence of Ukrainian ornaments is especially interesting, but it cannot be presented crudely. In regions of dense neighborhood of Jewish and Ukrainian communities, the influence of the local decorative environment was natural: fabrics were bought at the same markets, craftsmen lived nearby, motifs circulated through fairs, clothing, household items, craft.

However, the formula “Jews simply adopted the Ukrainian vyshyvanka” oversimplifies reality.

It is more reliable to say this: the Jewish population could perceive local techniques, geometric ornaments, color solutions, and craft techniques, but adapted them to their own cultural, religious, and everyday needs.

Kyiv trace: museums, seizures, and preserved fragments

Kyiv is the second important node after the Galician massif.

In the museum collections of Kyiv, Jewish fabrics have been preserved, some of which ended up there in the 1920s-1930s after Soviet seizures from synagogues. This is a painful page of history: religious items were torn from the living communal space and turned into museum “cult objects” or “fabrics.”

But it is precisely thanks to museum storage that some items did not disappear completely.

In the Kyiv corpus, parochets, Torah mantles, chuppah, tallit, tefillin, kippahs are mentioned. Parochets with brocade, velvet, gold and silver thread, sequins, and complex embroidery construction are especially important.

The Kyiv trace shows: Jewish embroidery in the territory of Ukraine is not limited only to Western Ukraine. Galicia provides the richest material, but the capital and central lands are also important for understanding the museum fate of Judaica.

Bukovina, Chernivtsi, Sadgora, and southern Ukraine

Bukovina should not be turned into the center of the entire topic, but it cannot be excluded. Chernivtsi, Sadgora, and Bukovinian Jewish communities provide important evidence of synagogue textiles, rich parochets, and a special urban culture.

At the same time, the digital corpus on Bukovina is weaker than on Lviv and Kyiv. This speaks not so much about the lack of tradition as about the problems of preservation, description, and digitization.

The south of Ukraine, including Odessa, also requires a separate discussion. There, Jewish culture developed in a different urban, commercial, and port environment. For the topic of embroidery here, additional museum and archival searches are needed, especially for home textiles, clothing, and family collections.

Museums and modern heritage preservation

Today, traces of Jewish embroidery and Judaica can be sought in museum collections in Ukraine and beyond. Important are the Lviv collections, Kyiv funds, collections on the history of Jewish communities, as well as museums working with Ukrainian folk costumes and decorative arts.

In this topic, the Museum of the History of Jews in Ukraine in Dnipro, the Ivan Honchar Museum in Kyiv, Lviv museum funds, specialized Judaic centers, and projects related to Jewish crafts and memory are often mentioned.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic not as museum exotica, but as part of the overall Ukrainian-Jewish history. For the Israeli audience, this is especially important: many families in Israel have roots in Ukraine, Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Berdychiv, Medzhybizh, Brody, and dozens of other places where Jewish life was part of the local landscape.

And if today a person in Israel asks whether there was Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands, it is not an idle question. It is a question about family memory, about lost items, about what disappeared along with shtetls, synagogues, and pre-war communities.

Modern hybrid vyshyvankas: new memory, not old reconstruction

In modern Ukraine, there is an interest in hybrid forms: Ukrainian vyshyvanka is combined with Jewish symbols — the Star of David, menorah, lions, grapevine, Hebrew letters, motifs of Jerusalem.

This is an important phenomenon, but it needs to be understood correctly.

The modern “Jewish-Ukrainian vyshyvanka” is not necessarily a reconstruction of an ancient Jewish costume. More often, it is a new artistic work with identity. It says: the Jewish history of Ukraine was not an external history. It was an internal part of this land.

Such a synthesis can be very powerful, especially after 2022, when Ukrainian and Jewish memory were again linked through themes of war, destruction, resistance, exile, and return to roots.

But the past and the present need to be separated. Historical Jewish embroidery is primarily Judaica, ritual textiles, and individual clothing elements. The modern hybrid vyshyvanka is a new cultural gesture.

Why this topic does not argue with Ukrainian vyshyvanka

The discussion about Jewish embroidery does not take anything away from Ukrainian vyshyvanka.

On the contrary, it makes the Ukrainian cultural map deeper.

Historically, Ukraine has been a space of many peoples. Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Romanians, Armenians, Germans, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, and other communities created a complex fabric of the region. Sometimes they lived separately. Sometimes side by side. Sometimes in conflict. Sometimes in close craft and trade contact.

Ukrainian vyshyvanka is a powerful symbol of Ukrainian identity.

Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands is another layer. It does not have to resemble vyshyvanka to be important. It speaks of the synagogue, the home, prayer, celebration, the woman-craftswoman, family gift, craft environment, fabric that could be passed on, remade, saved, or lost.

These traditions can be studied side by side, without forcibly mixing them.

What can be confidently asserted

First: Jewish embroidery on the territory of modern Ukraine existed.

Second: it is most reliably confirmed in synagogue and ritual textiles — parochets, Torah mantles, kaporets, ataras, tefillin cases, matzah bags, coverings, chuppahs, festive fabrics.

Third: the clothing line also existed. Embroidery, metal thread trim, beads, pearls, and decorative elements were found in kippahs, women’s caps, brusttukh/brustikhl bibs, belts, collars, dresses, skirts, bodices, men’s and children’s vests.

Fourth: it is premature to speak of a full-fledged “Jewish vyshyvanka” as a separate stable analogue of the Ukrainian national shirt.

Fifth: it is not only possible but necessary to speak about the Jewish culture of embroidered textiles and embroidered clothing elements on Ukrainian lands.

Conclusion: not a myth, but a lost layer of culture

The existence of embroidery in Jewish traditional art on the territory of modern Ukraine can be confidently asserted. This embroidery did not always look as the modern reader, accustomed to the image of Ukrainian vyshyvanka, might expect.

Its main forms are parochets, Torah mantles, ataras, matzah bags, festive coverings, kippahs, bibs, belts, caps, clothing trim. Its materials are velvet, silk, brocade, gold and silver threads, beads, pearls, appliqués, metal thread work. Its symbols are the Torah crown, lions, menorah, Star of David, birds, deer, flowers, pomegranates, Hebrew letters, and dedications.

It was a culture of fabric, memory, and commandment.

It lived in the synagogue, in the home, at celebrations, in women’s needlework, in the workshop, in the shtetl, in the city, in the family. A significant part of this culture was destroyed by the Holocaust, Soviet confiscations, the dispersal of collections, and the loss of communal memory.

But the surviving items and descriptions allow us to see the main thing: Jewish embroidery on Ukrainian lands was not an accidental detail, but part of a large tradition.

It should not be called a “Jewish vyshyvanka” without reservations. But its existence cannot be denied.

The correct formula sounds like this: on the territory of modern Ukraine, there existed a developed Jewish culture of embroidered ritual textiles and embroidered clothing elements, connected with Judaica, everyday life, festive costume, craft, and the multinational history of Ukrainian lands.

It is this formula that restores dignity to the topic: without myth, without simplification, but also without oblivion.

Some interesting links on the topic

Below is not a complete academic list, but a working selection of links that can be used as additional support for the topic of Jewish embroidery, ritual textiles, and clothing elements on the territory of modern Ukraine. URL check: 22.05.2026.

The Lviv corpus is the best documented. It is precisely for Lviv and Eastern Galicia that there are state item cards, scientific publications with illustrations and descriptions of parochets, kaporets, tallits, ataras, women’s bibs, and Sasyv metal lace available in open access. Kyiv is represented differently: not so much by separate museum cards, but by educational-museum PDFs with captions for specific items, including a tefillin case and a Megilat Esther in a silver case. For Dnipro, it is currently easier to find official fund publications and Instagram posts in open access than full inventory cards.

It is important to consider the limitation of sources: the state register of museum funds of Ukraine operates unstably and is unevenly filled. Therefore, the absence of an item in the open catalog does not mean that such an item is not in the funds.

Lviv corpus: parochets, kaporets, tallits, ataras, and bibs

One of the main sources for the topic remains the Museum Fund of Ukraine, where item cards related to Jewish ritual textiles and clothing elements are published.

Parochet — a curtain for the Torah ark. This is one of the key items of synagogue textiles, important for the discussion of Jewish embroidery and decorative Judaica.

https://museum.mcsc.gov.ua/collections/parohet-105179

Kaporets — the upper decorative part or curtain associated with the Aron ha-Kodesh. Such a link is useful for explaining that Jewish embroidery often lived not in clothing, but in the synagogue space.

https://museum.mincult.gov.ua/collections/kaporet-105231

Tallit / talles gadol — a prayer shawl. For our topic, it is important not only as a religious item but also as part of the textile culture where decorative elements and ataras could appear.

https://museum.mincult.gov.ua/collections/talit-tales-gadol-153391

Atara — a decorative part of the tallit. Such items help show the connection between prayer practice, fabric, ornament, and Jewish traditional art.

https://museum.mcsc.gov.ua/collections/atara-skladova-do-talesu-gadolyu

Women’s Jewish bib — a particularly important example for the topic of embroidery on clothing. It shows that the Jewish decorative tradition could manifest not as a separate “Jewish vyshyvanka,” but as an embroidered or decorated costume element.

https://museum.mcsc.gov.ua/collections/nagrudnik-zhinochiy-vreyskiy-107499

Fragment of a women’s Jewish bib — another important card for a careful discussion about women’s clothing, decorative inserts, and Galician Jewish costume.

https://museum.mcsc.gov.ua/collections/nagrudnik-zhinochiy-vreyskiy-fragment-105275

Men’s Jewish kippah from 1990 with a menorah and the inscription FIROU. For the historical part, this is not an early example, but for the section on modern heritage and continuation of tradition, such a link is useful.

https://museum.mincult.gov.ua/collections/ubir-golovniy-cholovichiy-vreyskiy-kipa-1990-r-91659

Scientific publications on the Lviv collection and the Sasyv tradition

For more serious argumentation, not only item cards are important, but also articles where these items are considered in the context of Jewish art in Ukraine.

PDF on Jewish art in Ukraine, where there are parochets, kaporets, and Torah mantles from the Lviv collection. The captions to the illustrations include specific dates: 1690, 1698, 1800, 1808, 1819, 1848, as well as the 19th–20th centuries. This is one of the most useful links for the historical part of the article.

https://www.ksada.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/kotlyar_easternstudies_3_visnyk_hdadm8_jewish-art-in-ukraine1_2010.pdf

Article by Natalia Levkovych in “Visnyk LNAM” about Jewish lace ataras. It is important for the topic of Sasyv and the technique of Sasyv metal lace from the second half of the 19th — first third of the 20th century.

https://visnyk.lnam.edu.ua/visnyk/2022/48/nataliya-levkovych-59-66

Another article by Natalia Levkovych — about women’s bibs of Eastern Galicia from the 19th century from the collection of the Museum of Ethnography and Artistic Crafts in Lviv. This is an especially valuable link for the topic “embroidery on clothing,” because it takes us beyond synagogue textiles.

https://visnyk.lnam.edu.ua/visnyk/2022/49/nataliya-levkovych-15-25

Kyiv block: tefillin case and Megilat Esther

The Kyiv line is still less represented in the form of separate open cards, but there are museum-educational PDFs with specific items and captions.

In the PDF, a tefillin case from the late 19th century and a Megilat Esther in a silver case from the second half of the 19th century are recorded. These items are not necessarily embroidery in the narrow sense, but they are important for a broader discussion of Judaica, ritual items, and the material culture of Jews in Ukraine.

https://lib.iitta.gov.ua/id/eprint/717682/1/2_%D0%84%D0%92%D0%A0-%D0%9C%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%95%D0%A6%D0%A2%D0%92%D0%9E.indd%20FINAL-compressed.pdf

Dnipro: Jewish national costume from the museum’s funds

For Dnipro, more fund publications and social media posts are currently available in open access than full inventory cards.

Publication of the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine” about the Jewish national costume from the museum’s funds. It is important for the modern reader because it shows: the topic of Jewish clothing in Ukraine is not limited to theory, it is also present in museum communication.

https://www.instagram.com/p/DYmokfrCDKM/

The remark by Dolev Cohen about the Russian language caused a scandal even before the premiere of the new season of ‘Four Weddings’ on Kan 11. But behind the controversy over the unsuccessful TV promo lies a broader issue: Israelis simultaneously observe HAMAS in Moscow, Russian weapons with Hezbollah, Russia’s alliance with Iran, and Russian state symbols inside Israel and… Russian speech in their favorite supermarket.

On August 21, 2026, a few seconds from the advertisement for the new season of ‘Four Weddings’ on Kan 11 turned into a political scandal. 27-year-old Dolev Cohen from Ramla said to the camera: “Russians. I can’t hear this language. I can’t hear this language. I walk through the supermarket and various places, and it seeps into my brain.” In the same remark, she similarly mentioned Amharic once.

Original – “״Russians. I can’t hear the language. Can’t hear the language. I walk through the supermarket and places, and it seeps into my brain ״. ”

There were two days left before the season premiere. But the discussion was no longer about weddings. The fragment was reacted to by Avigdor Lieberman, Vladimir Bliak, and Evgeny Sova, the latter sent an official letter to the management of the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation. Then came a response from Kan 11, and on August 22, a defense from Dolev’s brother, Matan.

For me, Stas Shifer, this story is interesting not only because I write about politics, wars, and their impact on ordinary people. I was born in Ukraine, live in Israel, and understand too well one dangerous substitution: the attitude towards the state gradually transfers to the language, and from the language to the person. In the case of Russia, this substitution becomes especially noticeable today because Israelis receive a very contradictory set of signals daily.

On one hand, Moscow receives HAMAS, Russia has been deepening cooperation with Iran for years, and Hezbollah has Russian weapons found by the IDF. On the other hand, inside Israel, Russian diplomacy continues to talk about ‘Russian-speaking compatriots’, Russian flags appear, state holidays, familiar cultural visual series with the tricolor, ‘Russian’ treats, matryoshkas, and other symbols of Russia.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has written about this gap more than once. And therefore, the main question for me is not ‘Is Dolev Cohen a racist or not?’. It is much more interesting to understand, why Russian speech in Israel is beginning to acquire a political tint at all — and whether it is related to the fact that society sees Russian politics not as neutrally as it is still often presented by official Israeli diplomacy.

What exactly did Dolev Cohen say and why did the scandal go far beyond reality TV

‘Four Weddings’ is an entertainment reality show on Kan 11. Four brides visit each other’s weddings, evaluate them, discuss what they see, and the events are accompanied by humorous voice-over text. The new season is set to start on the evening of August 23.

Therefore, it is important to understand the origin of the scandalous video. This is not an old post by Dolev that someone dug up ten years later. Not a fragment of a secretly recorded conversation and not an accidental leak.

The remark was chosen for the official promo of the program.

And this makes Dolev’s story simultaneously the story of Kan 11. If a public television channel takes an emotionally charged phrase about the language of hundreds of thousands of residents of the country and makes it part of the new season’s advertisement, the responsibility for the result can no longer be left only to the reality show participant.

The reaction followed quickly. Avigdor Lieberman, chairman of ‘Our Home Israel’, accused the corporation of giving racism a place in prime time and emphasized that racism cannot be turned into entertainment. For Yisrael Beiteinu, the topic is especially sensitive: a significant part of its electoral history is connected with aliyah from the former USSR and the Russian-speaking audience of Israel.

Vladimir Bliak, a deputy from ‘Yesh Atid — Together’, went further. He demanded to remove Dolev from the screen and apologize, asking Kan 11 a rather unpleasant question: would the corporation allow itself the same television entertainment if it were about another group of Israeli society?

Evgeny Sova from Yisrael Beiteinu translated the dispute from Facebook and X into an official plane. He wrote to the general director of the public broadcasting corporation Golan Yochpaz and demanded the removal of the video, an internal investigation, and an explanation of how such material even passed editorial selection.

And here begins the part of the story that cannot be lost behind political statements.

Kan 11 responded that the corporation opposes any racist statements and itself works against racism in Israeli society. According to the channel’s explanation, the controversial remark was taken from a longer humorous episode where Dolev criticizes herself, her family, and her own wedding, and the program host directly reacts to her manner of expression.

This is an important context. But it leaves a completely different question.

If the full episode contains criticism of these words, why was the part where it is not yet present left in the promo?

It turns out to be a rather strange construction. Kan 11 simultaneously says: do not judge by a short fragment because the full context is different. But it was Kan 11 itself that offered this short fragment to the viewer as an advertisement.

On August 22, another twist appeared. Dolev’s brother Matan wrote to journalist Daniel Amram that people, in his opinion, ‘went out of proportion’: his sister is not a racist, loves everyone, but just doesn’t like some languages. As an analogy, he said that he himself cannot calmly hear Arabic speech because it causes him flashbacks from Gaza.

This is still Amram’s message from Matan’s words, not a separate public interview with Dolev. But it unexpectedly brings the conversation to a place where no one initially intended to go.

The brother suggests separating the person from the emotional reaction to the language.

And can they be separated at all?

We do not know why Dolev is irritated by the Russian language — and it is not permissible to invent a political biography for her.

The easiest way to protect Dolev now is to come up with a convenient explanation for her.

Russia is waging war against Ukraine. Russia supports Iran. Iran attacks Israel and has been building a network of armed organizations around it for decades. Russia receives representatives of HAMAS. So, perhaps, the young Israeli woman constantly sees all this in the news, after which the word ‘Russian’ begins to cause her a negative reaction.

This is psychologically possible.

But Dolev did not say this.

In the published fragment, there is no mention of Putin, Ukraine, war, HAMAS, Iran, or Russian politics. She talks about a domestic situation: hearing the Russian language in the supermarket and other places and not wanting to hear it.

Therefore, it would be unfair to first accuse her of racism based on a few seconds of video, and then just as baselessly justify it with Kremlin politics.

However, there is a question that does not depend on her personal motivation at all.

What has the ordinary Israeli seen next to the word ‘Russia’ in recent years?

For the answer, no secret Mossad reports or closed meetings of the military-political cabinet are needed. Most of the picture exists in open access.

Russia began a full-scale aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Iran supplied Russia with Shahed and helped develop a drone war against Ukrainian cities. Russia then deployed its own production of these systems. In March 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN that now Russian-made Shahed are being supplied back to Iran and used against the US and Israel. Reuters reported this statement with the caveat that the origin of each specific device is not always possible to establish.

In July, even more unpleasant information appeared. Reuters, citing American and Western officials, wrote about Russian technical assistance to Iran, improving the accuracy of Iranian drones, and checking the possible provision of targeting data by Moscow. There was no final conclusion on individual attacks, but the broader military-technical assistance from Russia to Tehran was already considered a reality.

And this already concerns not only Ukraine.

For Israel, the boundary between European and Middle Eastern wars is becoming less and less noticeable.

We recently wrote about how Russia and Iran are trying to influence Israelis themselves through social networks. There, it was not about the opinion of a Ukrainian activist, but about a special report by the State Comptroller of Israel on countering foreign influence.

There is another symptom. In July, the issue of Russian media presence unexpectedly began to be raised not only by Ukrainians and not only by opposition activists. Right-wing Israeli channels began to ask why the state practically does not react to Russian informational influence.

That is, irritation is already arising within that part of Israeli politics, which is difficult to accuse of special love for Ukraine or the desire to use Russia only as a tool in the fight against Netanyahu.

This shift seems much more important to me than a few seconds of reality TV.

HAMAS goes to Moscow, the IDF takes out Russian ‘Kornets’ from Lebanon, and Russia works more closely with Iran

On June 10, 2026, a meeting took place in Moscow that is difficult to overestimate for our topic.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Georgy Borisenko received Musa Abu Marzouk from the leadership of HAMAS. Gaza, ceasefire, humanitarian aid, the future of the region, and political settlement were discussed. Abu Marzouk thanked the Russian side for its diplomatic efforts.

For Moscow, this is a diplomatic channel.

For a person in Israel after October 7, the picture looks somewhat different.

HAMAS killed Israelis, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and held hostages. Israel has been trying to destroy the organization’s military infrastructure for years. And simultaneously, its high-ranking representative flies to the capital of Russia for an official meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Moreover, HAMAS would like to see Moscow as a mediator for Gaza. We separately analyzed HAMAS’s attempts to promote Russia as a mediator, against which Israel objects.

Now let’s add Lebanon.

At the end of December 2024, the IDF showed journalists thousands of units of weapons captured from Hezbollah during battles in the south of the country. Among approximately 6,840 rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles were 340 Russian anti-tank missiles ‘Kornet’.

Here, the fact cannot be replaced with a convenient accusation. The presence of a Russian missile with Hezbollah does not in itself prove a direct supply of a specific batch of weapons from Moscow to the group. Russian systems have been supplied to Syria for decades, could be transferred through Syrian depots, and reach Lebanon by various routes.

But an IDF soldier entering a Hezbollah position is not engaged in diplomatic genealogy of a specific ‘Kornet’ at that moment.

He sees Russian weapons with Israel’s enemy.

In May, NANews detailed Hezbollah’s trophies and the Russian trace among the weapons that the IDF took from Lebanon. There, Iran, Russia, China, and older Soviet systems were found nearby — practically a material map of where Israel’s opponents were armed from.

And above this entire structure is Tehran.

On January 17, 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. It covers security, defense cooperation, military-technical interaction, exercises, and ties between security structures.

Neither Russia nor Iran formally signed a mutual military defense agreement. This is important. But the absence of an article in the style of NATO does not negate how close the relations between the two states have become.

It is here that the first serious dissonance arises for an Israeli.

The Israeli government has been explaining to society for years that Iran is a strategic threat. Israel strikes Iranian targets, destroys Tehran’s military capabilities, prepares for new attacks, and demands from allies not to allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.

Regarding Russia, a completely different vocabulary is used.

Although at the other end of this chain is the same Iran.

In Moscow — HAMAS, and two days later in Tel Aviv — 600 square meters of the Russian flag

And now to the most visual episode.

On June 10, HAMAS meets with the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

On June 12, on Russia Day, in one of Tel Aviv’s parks, dozens of participants unfold a Russian tricolor with an area of more than 600 square meters. Russian state sources described the participants as Israelis and ‘Russian-speaking compatriots’.

We have already analyzed these two news items in one article — ‘Russian Tricolor in Tel Aviv and HAMAS in Moscow’.

It is precisely next to each other that they look especially unpleasant.

Formally, everything is completely legal and belongs to different worlds. The Russian Foreign Ministry conducts diplomatic negotiations. People in Tel Aviv celebrate the national day of the state with which they associate themselves. The embassy holds an official reception. The program includes familiar cultural symbols: Russian folk visual series, matryoshkas, national treats, music, flags, talks about common history, and ‘compatriots’.

But mass perception rarely sorts all this into folders.

An Israeli scrolls through the same feed.

There, a HAMAS representative sits in Moscow.

There, the IDF shows Russian ‘Kornets’ found with Hezbollah.

There, Russia signs a long-term strategic agreement with Iran.

There, reports of Russian assistance to Iranian drone technologies and possible information exchange appear.

And then — Tel Aviv, a huge Russian flag, the Russian embassy, Russian state holidays, and the wording ‘Russian-speaking compatriots’.

And here it is worth making an important stop.

Russian-speaking Israelis are not ‘compatriots of Russia’ as a single political category. This is a Russian diplomatic formula, not a description of Israeli reality.

In Israel, Russian is spoken by immigrants from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other countries of the former USSR. Many have lived here for decades. Their children serve in the IDF. Among them are supporters of Putin, his opponents, people with no relation to Russian politics, and Ukrainians whose homes were destroyed by the Russian army.

But to a person unfamiliar with post-Soviet history, Moscow’s diplomatic programs, and the differences between Russian-speaking communities, a completely different visual series is shown.

‘Russian-speaking compatriots’.

Russian ambassador.

Russian tricolor.

Russian holiday.

And the next day — again Russian language in the supermarket queue.

Thus, the cultural marker begins to dangerously approach the political one.

Moreover, the relations of the Russian state with Israel themselves are becoming less unambiguous. In June, we analyzed how the level of Russia Day in Israel has changed: once figures like Benjamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin attended such events, and in 2026 the main Israeli guest was Minister May Golan. This already shows a cooling.

But it is still not a break.

Russian diplomacy remains within the Israeli public space — and continues to work with the Russian-speaking environment in terms of its own state policy.

Israel calls Iran an enemy, but continues to speak much more cautiously about Russia

Here arises the second part of the dissonance.

Benjamin Netanyahu speaks about Tehran without diplomatic nuances. Iran is a threat to Israel’s existence, its nuclear program should not be restored, missile and drone capabilities should be limited, and the ‘axis of resistance’ should be weakened.

Russia, meanwhile, cooperates with the same Iran.

But the tone towards Moscow is different.

On December 8, 2025, Netanyahu said in the Knesset that he regularly talks with Putin, and long-standing personal relations with the Russian president serve ‘vital interests’ of Israel.

During the first years of the war against Ukraine, such caution had an understandable explanation. Russia controlled a significant part of Syrian airspace, and it was important for Israel to maintain the IDF’s freedom of action against Iranian arms supplies and infrastructure in Syria.

Since then, Syria has radically changed.

Russian presence has changed.

The war in the Middle East itself has changed.

Russia and Iran have become much closer than before February 2022.

Nevertheless, in July 2026, The Times of Israel diplomatic correspondent Lazar Berman still noted Netanyahu’s reluctance to seriously reconsider relations with Moscow, even in a situation where Ukraine and Israel are effectively confronting two sides of the same Russian-Iranian military alliance.

I see no evidence of the popular version that Netanyahu simply ‘banned talking about Russia.’ Such an order cannot be presented as an established fact.

But the observed fact is different: Israeli official rhetoric towards Moscow remains much more cautious than rhetoric towards Tehran.

And society notices this too.

Moreover, the issue is gradually emerging from the usual Russian-speaking or Ukrainian bubble. When NANews wrote about Russian journalist Sergey Pashkov and questions about Russian state media influence, the most interesting thing was not even Pashkov himself.

The question came from the right.

From an environment where they like to talk about national security, sovereignty, foreign influence, and the need to be tough on Israel’s enemies.

For such a voter, it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain one construction: Iran is dangerous; Hamas is dangerous; Hezbollah is dangerous; the Russian state media system and Moscow work closely with Iran and maintain contacts with Hamas — but for some reason, Russia should remain almost a separate topic.

Previously, this inconsistency was easier to attribute to the Ukrainian war and the Syrian necessity.

In 2026, it is more difficult to do so.

Especially since the State Comptroller of Israel has already separately raised the issue of Russian and Iranian influence in the digital space.

So it’s long been not just about the emotions of Ukrainians.

It’s already about Israeli security.

How the Kremlin turns into the Russian language — and why the wrong person starts paying for Russia’s policy

Now we can return to the Dolev supermarket.

Russia is far away.

The Kremlin is far away.

Putin appears in the news.

The strategic agreement with Iran is a document of dozens of pages. The transfer of technologies, diplomats’ negotiations, arms routes from Syria to Lebanon, intelligence contacts — these are complex things.

The Russian language next to the checkout does not seem complex.

And here the most primitive psychological transfer can work:

Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. Russia cooperates with Iran. Iran is at war against Israel and supports its enemies. Hamas comes to Moscow. Hezbollah finds Russian weapons. Russian diplomacy inside Israel talks about ‘Russian-speaking compatriots.’ Russian state flags appear at public events.

After this, the word ‘Russian’ for part of society begins to mean more than just a language.

The problem is right here.

Because the next step is already false.

Kremlin → Russia’s policy → the state of Russia → Russian language → Russian-speaking person.

There is no political connection between the fourth and fifth links.

A person near Dolev in the supermarket may be an Israeli from Kyiv.

Or from Odessa.

Or Kharkiv.

Or Riga.

Or Chisinau.

May be a person who left Russia itself precisely because they do not want to have anything to do with Putin’s regime. May serve in the IDF. May raise money for Ukraine. May have relatives under Russian missiles.

The Russian language does not issue a passport, political views, or attitude towards Israel.

This is the paradox of the current story.

Hatred of the Kremlin’s policy does not require irrational explanations. After Bucha, Mariupol, the war against Ukraine, Moscow’s contacts with Hamas, the strategic alliance with Iran, and Russian weapons with Israel’s opponents, there are more than enough reasons to critically view the Russian state.

But if this hatred transfers to a person just because they spoke Russian, the original political logic already disappears.

And therefore, I still do not want to end this story with a verdict on Dolev Cohen.

Maybe she really just doesn’t like the sound of the language.

Maybe there is personal experience behind this reaction.

Maybe political news has nothing to do with it.

Until Dolev herself explains this, everything else will be speculation.

But the scandal accidentally opened a more serious topic.

Israeli society increasingly sees Russia alongside those whom the state of Israel itself calls enemies. At the same time, official policy continues to treat Moscow much more cautiously than Tehran, and Russian diplomacy within Israel itself still actively associates the state of Russia with the concept of ‘Russian-speaking compatriots.’

Perhaps it is from such a contradiction that the very everyday transfer we saw in the Kan 11 promo video is born.

Not necessarily with Dolev personally.

But in society — quite possibly.

And if this really starts to happen, the problem is no longer in a few seconds of ‘Four Weddings.’

The problem is that the bill for the Kremlin’s actions may gradually begin to be presented to a person who simply speaks Russian in an Israeli supermarket.

And this will not be a victory of Israel over Russian influence.

It will be yet another consequence of Russian influence itself.

At 11:00 on July 9, on Pushkinska Street in Odesa, a memorial plaque to Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi will be unveiled – an actor, People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR, and Righteous Among the Nations. The event is organized by the Odesa Regional Association of Jews, the V. Vasylko Theatre, and the Odesa Holocaust Museum as a symbol of the unbreakable friendship between Israel and Ukraine.

Odesa’s Memorial to the Righteous: How Henrikh Ostashevskyi Saved Jewish Families and Earned Eternal Remembrance

Date and Time: July 9, 2025, 11:00

Location: opposite the Odesa Academic Ukrainian Theatre named after V. Vasylko (Italian Street, Odesa) (Pushkinska Street in Odesa no longer exists. As part of decommunization and derussification, it was renamed Italian Street in July 2024).

Organizers

• Odesa Regional Association of Jews — former ghetto and concentration camp prisoners
• Theatre named after V. Vasylko
• Odesa Holocaust Museum

Biography of Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi

Henrikh Romanovych Ostashevskyi (June 1, 1921, Odesa — February 3, 2004, Odesa) was a Ukrainian theatre and film actor, People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR.

From his life path:

• Studied at the Odesa Theatre School (1938–1941).
• After Odesa was liberated from Romanian occupation in 1944, he became an actor at the Odesa Young Spectator’s Theatre and worked there for 14 years.
• Since 1958, he performed at the Odesa Ukrainian Music and Drama Theatre named after the October Revolution.

Awards:

• Order of the Badge of Honor
• Title of People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR (1976)

Recognition and Commemoration

• For rescuing the Jewish population during World War II, he was recognized as a Righteous Among the Nations.
• His name is inscribed on the Wall of Honor in the Garden of the Righteous Among the Nations at the Yad Vashem memorial complex (Jerusalem, Israel).
• In 2001, the Alley of the Righteous Among the Nations was opened in Prokhorivsky Square in Odesa, where a birch tree was planted in his honor.
• His name is featured in the exhibition of the Odesa Holocaust Museum.

Timeline of Key Events

Year	Event
1938	Entered the Odesa Theatre School
1944	Started serving at the Odesa Young Spectator’s Theatre
1958	Moved to the Theatre named after the October Revolution
1976	Awarded the title of People’s Artist of the Ukrainian SSR
2001	Birch tree planted in the Alley of the Righteous

Filmography (15 Works)

“My Daughter” (1957), “A Tale of First Love” (1957), “The Blue Arrow” (1958), “Storm over the Fields” (1958), “If Stones Could Speak…” (1958), “The Return” (1960), “Human Blood Is Not Water” (1960), “Dmytro Horytsvit” (1961), “Keys to Heaven” (1964), “People Do Not Know Everything” (1964), “They Knew Them Only by Sight” (1966), “Rainbow Formula” (1966), “Dr. Absta’s Experiment” (1968), “Between the Tall Grains” (1970), “Fiery Roads” (1977–1984)

Organization and Preparation for the Ceremony

1. Historical Segment:
   • Outdoor photo gallery of rescued families
   • Exhibition of archival documents and photographs at the Odesa Holocaust Museum
2. Artistic Accompaniment:
   • Musical-poetic prologue by the Theatre named after V. Vasylko
   • Reading of letters and recollections from contemporaries
3. Official Part:
   • Speeches by the mayor, the rabbi, and organizers on the significance of July 9, 1944
   • Flower laying at the memorial and the birch tree
4. Final Screening:
   • Excerpt from the documentary film about Ostashevskyi
   • Chamber concert by young Odesa musicians

Righteous Among the Nations from Ukraine

To date, 2,707 citizens of Ukraine have been awarded the title of Righteous Among the Nations for their selfless rescue of Jews during the Holocaust — providing shelter, food assistance, and organizing safe passage under mortal threat.

The Importance of Preserving Memory

The installation of the memorial plaque to Henrikh Ostashevskyi is a token of eternal gratitude for humanity and heroism. The editorial board of NAnews – News of Israel calls to preserve the memory of the Righteous as a guarantee of peaceful relations between peoples.

#NAseo

NAnews presents a review of the podcast “BalachkI” with Michael Goldstein. The Ukrainian community in Israel and key topics — language, politics, volunteering, barriers for Russians, and relations between Ukraine and Israel.

The Ukrainian community in Israel: language, politics and breaking away from Russian narratives

NAnews presents a new review: premiere of the 4th episode of the podcast “BalachkI” (premiere August 15, 2025), dedicated to the Ukrainian community in Israel.

The main guest is Michael Goldstein, political scientist, volunteer, and activist. The focus of the conversation is the issue of language, independence from Russian cultural and political influence, and an emphasis on Ukraine and Israel as the foundation for self-identification.

Who participates

The podcast “BalachkI” is hosted by:

Danilo Tsyporukha — founder of the creative space and café “The Picnic Player” in Jaffa;

Ulyana Dryuchkova — co-founder of “Українські Здибанки в Ізраїлі” and author of the channel UDM Israel.

The language issue as a principle

One of the key ideas of the episode is the rejection of “Russian-speaking” identity and strengthening the Ukrainian language in Israel. According to Goldstein, language helps separate from the “Russian world” and forms the basis for cultural and political self-awareness. For the Ukrainian diaspora in Israel, this is an important step: speaking Ukrainian means remaining part of the nation, even thousands of kilometers away from home.

“Українські Здибанки в Ізраїлі”

Special attention is given to the project “Українські Здибанки в Ізраїлі”, which unites people through conversations, lectures, meetings, and cultural initiatives. The channel UDM Israel became a platform for sharing experiences and supporting the army through donations. Meetings turned into a hub for Israelis, the new wave of repatriates from Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees.

Cooperation with Russians: a dilemma

A sharp part of the conversation touched on whether the Ukrainian diaspora should cooperate with Russian “opposition forces.” Goldstein emphasized that true independence is possible only with complete rejection of such alliances. Otherwise, the Ukrainian agenda risks dissolving in “liberal” rhetoric, where Ukrainian interests are pushed “to the background.”

Politics, refugees and the Israeli context

Another block of the discussion was devoted to Ukrainian refugees in Israel. According to participants, the situation was paradoxical: in 2022, for every one Russian denied entry, up to five Ukrainians were refused. This was a real shock for the community. Israel, as the speakers stressed, “cares first of all about its own security and domestic policy.”

At the same time, the question was raised: can the Ukrainian community really influence Israeli politics? The answer was cautious: yes, if they unite, support pro-Ukrainian politicians, and form an agenda that Israel can understand.

Russian narratives and the “two chairs” policy

Goldstein focused separately on how Russian propaganda has taken root in Israeli media and politics. He noted that even after October 7, 2023, elements of “Russian explanatory schemes” remain in Israel. This is dangerous, as public opinion is vulnerable to manipulation.

Hence comes the phenomenon of the “two chairs policy” — attempts to balance simultaneously between Ukraine and Russia. For Israel, this may seem pragmatic, but for Ukraine, it is a painful blow.

Other important topics of the episode

Besides language and politics, the episode raised other issues:

• memories of the first years in Israel and the start of volunteering;
• the role of “Israeli Friends of Ukraine” in supporting Kyiv;
• the visit of Gideon Saar to Ukraine and the importance of pro-Ukrainian politicians;
• the “wall” in Israeli-Ukrainian relations;
• the Russian “occupation” of the Sergius Compound in Jerusalem;
• China’s influence on Israel’s foreign policy;
• the Russian trace in the attack on Israel on October 7, 2023;
• the activities of the “Israeli Anti-Nazi Front” (in the sense of “anti-Ukrainian”);
• what victory means for Ukraine and how to achieve it.

Conclusion and recommendation from NAnews

We at NAnews – Israel News present this episode as we understood it ourselves, relying on the highlights made by Michael Goldstein and the hosts. But the discussion turned out to be much broader: from personal stories to global geopolitics.

Recommendation: be sure to watch this and other episodes of the podcast on the channel UDM Israel. It is a living testimony of how the Ukrainian community in Israel seeks its place, defends its language and culture, supports Ukraine and Israel, and builds bridges with Israeli society.

Link to the video – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59lu7DHv2gI

By the way, everyone is invited — Ukrainian “Meeting under the Flags” in Tel Aviv-Jaffa on August 23, 2025, on Ukraine’s State Flag Day

 

 

The Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine on August 21, 2026, reported on the participation of Rabbi Yakov Sinyakov in an event marking the third anniversary of the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The event itself took place earlier — on July 17, 2026, in Dnipro. The date is not accidental: the command of the 7th Corps was established on July 17, 2023.

For a reader in Israel, the name of the corps commander or the number of the Ukrainian military unit may not mean much by themselves. However, the presence of Sinyakov changes the perspective. Before us is an Orthodox Jewish rabbi who did not come to the military as an honorary guest: he serves within this structure and heads its chaplaincy.

Sinyakov’s story speaks to a broader issue that is not always visible from Israel. Ukrainian Jews, along with other citizens of the country, found themselves inside the war against Russian aggression — some serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, some work as volunteers, helping the wounded and military families, some support the fighters as a rabbi or chaplain. Therefore, Sinyakov in the uniform of the 7th Corps is not an exotic detail of the ceremony. It is one example of how the Jewish community of Ukraine defends the country together with the entire Ukrainian society from the war started by Putin’s Russia.

Anton Pshedynsky writes for NANews – News of Israel about international security, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and how Ukrainian events intersect with the Israeli agenda. In this story, such an intersection is literally in one frame: Ukrainian paratroopers, the war in the east of the country, and a rabbi representing the Jewish community of Ukraine.

7th Air Assault Corps: three years from headquarters to battles for Pokrovsk

Air Assault Forces of Ukraine, a separate branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The corps is a larger structure that unites several combat units and provides unified command over them.

A direct parallel with the IDF should not be drawn here: the structure of the two armies differs. But the principle is understandable to the Israeli reader. This is the level at which separate brigades, artillery, reconnaissance, unmanned systems, communications, and logistics must work not each on its own, but as a single mechanism.

In three years, the 7th Corps has come a fairly rapid way. Its command was created in the summer of 2023, when the Ukrainian army was already living in a state of large-scale war. In 2024, it operated in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions. In the first half of 2025 — in the Novopavlovsk and part of the Pokrovsk direction.

Since July 2025, one of the key areas for the corps has been Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region.

This is important to explain separately. For a person who follows the war from Israel only through major headlines, Pokrovsk may look like another point on the map of Donbas. In fact, the area of the city has long remained one of the directions where Russia tries to advance at the cost of constant attacks and large resources.

At the anniversary, the corps commander, Brigadier General Yevhen Lasyichuk, summed up the past year. Dozens of servicemen received state and departmental awards, and the corps units were separately noted for their combat work.

Lasyichuk is a Hero of Ukraine. Before being appointed corps commander, he headed the 25th Separate Airborne Sicheslav Brigade and has been fighting against Russia since 2014.

The motto of the anniversary itself was in Ukrainian: «Робимо вітер» — «We make the wind».

Not the most headquarters-like formulation. But it quite accurately coincides with the image the corps is trying to build around itself.

FPV drones, robots, and “technodesant”

The 7th Corps uses its own concept — “technodesant”.

Behind it is not some separate new branch of the military. It’s about something else: airborne units are trying to integrate FPV drones, ground robotic systems, digital control systems, electronic warfare, and their own technical developments into regular combat work more quickly.

This is what Lasyichuk calls one of the directions of the corps’ development.

In 2026, an Innovation and Technology Center appeared within the unit. The corps also reported on developments related to the “friend or foe” recognition system, the use of radars, exoskeletons for specific artillery and logistics tasks, and its own digital solutions for combat management.

Here, a topic appears that is understandable to Israel without long explanations.

After October 7, the IDF also faced a war where a cheap drone, a small engineering team, or a quick software update can change the situation faster than the purchase of an expensive platform designed for years.

The Ukrainian experience is not identical to the Israeli one. The scale of the front is different, the enemy is different, the structure of the army is different.

But the problem is very similar: military bureaucracy simply does not have the right to move slower than technology.

Who is Yakov Sinyakov

Against this background, the figure of Yakov Sinyakov looks almost like a contrast.

Next to FPV, robots, and artillery systems — a rabbi.

But within the corps itself, no contradictions are seen here.

Yakov Sinyakov, religious name Yakov Pinchas, is associated with the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine. After the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, he traveled to Ukrainian servicemen as a volunteer, bringing aid and providing spiritual support.

In the summer of 2025, he received the official status of a military chaplain of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and later headed the chaplaincy of the 7th Corps.

NANews — News of Israel wrote about the appointment of Yakov Sinyakov back in October 2025. For Ukraine, it was an unusual appointment: an Orthodox Jewish rabbi received a regular role within a regular combat unit.

The very word “chaplain” in the Israeli context can also be easily misunderstood.

In the IDF, there is a Chief Military Rabbinate with a long-established system of religious support for the army. In Ukraine, military chaplaincy in its current form is much younger and has been developing especially rapidly after the Russian invasion.

Sinyakov, meanwhile, works not only with Jewish servicemen.

His work includes conversations with fighters, psychological and spiritual support, helping people after heavy combat episodes, and accompanying servicemen of different religious views.

During Passover, he came directly to the Ukrainian military.

In April 2026, NANews reported how Sinyakov brought everything necessary for Passover to the front line. For a small Jewish community within a multi-million warring country, this perhaps says more than any official formulation about “interfaith dialogue”.

Ukrainian Jews defend the same country they live in

For the Israeli reader, behind the name of the Ukrainian corps and military abbreviations, it is easy to miss the main point. Jews of Ukraine in this war are not bystanders and not a community existing separately from the rest of the country around synagogues, holidays, and humanitarian centers. They are part of Ukrainian society, and the Russian invasion entered their lives just as it did the lives of millions of other Ukrainian citizens.

Ukrainian Jews serve in the army, engage in volunteering, help evacuees and the wounded, support the families of servicemen. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine has been conducting extensive humanitarian work since the start of the full-scale war. Yakov Sinyakov shows another side of the same story — the direct presence of the Jewish community within the Ukrainian army.

He is not an invited rabbi who came to the paratroopers for one ceremony. Sinyakov wears the uniform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, works with servicemen, and heads the chaplaincy of the corps that participates in battles against the Russian army. Therefore, his presence at the third anniversary of the 7th Corps is not a symbolic gesture and not a beautiful photo for a report. For the unit itself, he is one of their own.

This is especially telling against the backdrop of Russian propaganda, which from the first days of the invasion justified the war by the need for some “denazification” of Ukraine. Meanwhile, representatives of the Jewish community of Ukraine themselves serve in the armed forces of the country that Russia allegedly intended to save from this “Nazism”.

This does not mean that all Ukrainian Jews have the same attitude towards the Ukrainian authorities or that the entire community participates in the war. People have different political views, life circumstances, and attitudes towards what is happening — just like in Israel. But a Russian missile or Shahed does not choose a victim by nationality and does not find out their attitude towards the government.

This is the essence of Sinyakov’s story. He remains a rabbi, a Jew, and a representative of his community while serving Ukraine. There is no contradiction here: for some Ukrainian Jews, defending the country and preserving Jewish identity have long become part of one life.

Why this is important specifically for Israel

The message from the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine is quite routine: the 7th Corps turned three years old, servicemen received awards, the commander spoke about the development of the unit, and Yakov Sinyakov was among the participants of the ceremony.

But for Israel, the human context of this photograph is important.

Israel often sees Ukraine through the lens of war, relations with Russia, arms supplies, diplomatic disputes, or political statements. Sinyakov’s story shows another Ukraine — one where Jewish life continues not only in the synagogues of Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipro. It exists within the army, in units that have been on the front line for months.

Behind the number “7th Corps” today stand the Pokrovsk direction, thousands of servicemen, FPV drones, robotic systems, their own engineering developments — and the chaplaincy headed by an Orthodox Jewish rabbi.

For Ukrainian soldiers, this is no longer a sensation, but part of the everyday reality of war.

And for the Israeli reader, this is perhaps the simplest way to understand the position of Ukrainian Jews today: they are not next to this war. They are inside a country that is at war, and together with other Ukrainians, they defend it from Russian aggression.

Sources: Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine; official materials of the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces of Ukraine; official materials of the Air Assault Forces of Ukraine.

On July 16, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR of the 12th convocation adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine — a crucial document that proclaimed the supremacy and independence of the Ukrainian republic within its territory.

The declaration did not immediately announce secession from the USSR but established the priority of Ukrainian laws, the right to its own armed forces, bank, currency, and a neutral, non-nuclear status. This was the first step toward Ukraine’s independence, which sparked broad public and international response.

This study is dedicated to the reaction to the declaration by the Jewish community of Ukraine, Jewish diasporas abroad (USA, Canada, and others), and the State of Israel.

We explore whether there were official or informal responses from Jewish organizations, consider the participation of Jewish deputies in drafting the document, evaluate the hopes and concerns of Ukraine’s Jewish population, and examine whether Jewish issues were addressed in the discussions and the text of the declaration.

Reaction of the Jewish Community in Ukraine

Inside Ukraine, the adoption of the sovereignty declaration was met with interest and support from emerging Jewish organizations and activists. The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by a national and cultural revival of Jewish life in Ukraine amid the weakening of Soviet censorship. By the end of 1990, 13 Jewish newspapers and magazines were being published in eight cities, along with cultural societies and Yiddish and Hebrew language circles.

Jewish community leaders saw democratization and Ukraine’s sovereignty as an opportunity to strengthen Jewish culture and civil rights. For example, the Jewish Cultural Society in Kyiv and similar organizations in other cities were actively involved in civic life and partnered with Ukrainian democratic movements.

A pivotal development was the creation of the Rukh Council of Nationalities within the People’s Movement of Ukraine (a mass democratic movement for reforms and sovereignty). One of the founders and leaders of this initiative was Kyiv Jewish activist Alexander Burakovsky, who became the council’s chairman (or co-chair).

The council leadership also included dissident and human rights defender Iosif Zisels, who later recalled:

“I was very active in Rukh — I created the Council of Nationalities within it.”

The council served as a bridge between the Ukrainian national-democratic movement and national minorities, including Jews. From the beginning, Rukh declared its commitment to multiethnic unity and opposition to antisemitism. At Rukh’s founding congress (September 1989), a resolution was adopted urging citizens to oppose all forms of ethnic hatred and antisemitism:

“We must stand in defense of the honor of the Jewish people, their culture, education, and religion.”

During the summer of 1990, as the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet debated the sovereignty declaration, Jewish representatives were not absent from the process. While no specific “Jewish amendments” were introduced, principles of equality and minority protection, championed in part by Jewish activists, were reflected in the document.

Following the declaration’s adoption, many Jewish community leaders in Ukraine publicly welcomed the move. For instance, the editor of the Lviv Jewish newspaper Shofar, Alexander Lizen, said that for him, as a Jew, participating in Ukraine’s national revival was

“a golden opportunity… to help Rukh awaken the nation — not just for Jews, but also for Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Hungarians, for everyone.”

He and several other activists — such as Borys Dobrivker in Odesa — consciously chose to stay in Ukraine rather than emigrate, because they believed in Ukraine’s democratic future and improvements in the status of Jews.

Jewish organizations began cooperating with Ukrainian ones

The Kyiv Jewish Cultural Society, for example, supported the initiatives of Rukh: in 1990, it called on Jews to join Rukh or at least take part in its activities. That same year, the organization contributed financially to the construction of a memorial in Kyiv to the victims of the 1932–33 Holodomor, thus showing solidarity with Ukrainian suffering.

In Lviv, the first joint Ukrainian-Israeli society “Ukraine–Israel” was established, initiating the installation of a monument to 136,000 Jews — victims of the Lviv ghetto.

These examples demonstrate that the reaction of the Jewish community of Ukraine to the declaration of sovereignty was mostly positive and proactive. Ukrainian Jews saw in the new political course a chance to revive their community and improve relations with the titular nation based on mutual respect.

As Alexander Burakovsky noted at the time, “Ukraine is now the only republic where Jews can live in peace,” emphasizing the positive changes.

Overall, the Jewish community of Ukraine greeted the declaration of sovereignty with enthusiasm and relief.

This was supported by public gestures from Ukrainian leaders. Just a year after the declaration, in the fall of 1991, the speaker of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, at a rally commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy, apologized on behalf of Ukraine to the Jewish people for instances of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis.

Such steps, unimaginable during Soviet times, were crucial in building trust. Prominent former dissidents — Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Ivan Dziuba, among others — openly wrote and spoke about the need for normalization of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, urging all political forces to adopt the view: “Ukraine must have normal relations with Israel and the entire Jewish world.”

These statements were widely published in the Ukrainian press and perceived by the Jewish community as a guarantee of their safety in the new Ukraine.

Reaction of the Jewish Diaspora and the State of Israel

In the Jewish diaspora outside the USSR, events in Ukraine were closely followed, although a unified position was not immediately developed.

In 1990, the main focus of foreign Jewish organizations was still on the general situation in the USSR—emigration of Soviet Jews, the fight against antisemitism, and reestablishing ties with Jewish communities across the Soviet republics.

Nevertheless, Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty was noticed and appreciated. The Ukrainian republican government declared its commitment to minority rights, which received positive feedback on the international stage.

Thus, the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reported in early 1992:

“Ukraine’s treatment of minorities is encouraging; unlike many former Soviet republics, Ukraine has largely avoided ethnic conflict. Interethnic peace has been maintained.”

The same report noted significant progress in Ukraine’s compliance with OSCE human rights obligations.

Notably, among the independent human rights observers in Ukraine in the early ’90s were members of the Jewish diaspora. The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ) established the Ukrainian-American Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, which monitored the situation in the newly independent Ukraine. These organizations reported in their bulletins that Ukraine’s official policy toward Jews had significantly improved—state antisemitism had disappeared, Jewish life was being revived, and the government pledged to support minority cultural rights.

Western media published reports on the status of Jews in Ukraine during its path to independence

For example, the Los Angeles Times in spring 1991 ran a feature titled “Changing Lifestyles: Some Jews Forgo Israel’s Promise and Elect to Stay in Ukraine.”

The article noted that the democratic Rukh movement had gained the trust of part of the Jewish population, and that many Soviet Jews “chose to stay and lead the revival of Jewish culture in Ukraine—for the first time in decades”, rather than emigrate. The article included emigration statistics: in 1990 alone, 58,528 Jews emigrated from Ukraine to Israel (according to ADL), but tens of thousands remained.

It also emphasized that Rukh condemned antisemitism and some Jewish organizations in Ukraine urged Jews to join Rukh, hoping to secure their rights through active participation in independence. This kind of reporting fostered a cautiously optimistic perception of Ukrainian sovereignty among the Jewish diaspora, especially in the U.S.—concerned about nationalism, but recognizing Ukraine’s commitment to tolerance.

In Israel, there were no major official statements in 1990 regarding Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty—at the time, Israel did not maintain diplomatic relations with individual Soviet republics. Still, Israeli circles monitored the developments closely.

Between 1990 and 1991, hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel, a significant portion of them from Ukraine.

Israel had a vested interest in ensuring that the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new states did not lead to instability for Jews. In this context, Ukraine appeared relatively stable. There were no major ethnic clashes, and overt antisemitism was marginal.

The Israeli press noted that, unlike some nationalist uprisings, Ukraine’s independence movement was moderate, civic in nature, and proclaimed protection of all communities. Israeli diplomats began informal contact with Ukrainian elites even before the USSR’s collapse.

According to accounts from that time, in 1991, Israeli embassy staff in Moscow regularly visited Kyiv and held informal discussions with Ukrainian MPs and journalists. They reported to Jerusalem that antisemitism was not being encouraged at the official level and that minorities seemed to feel safe.

Israel, however, took a cautious approach to recognizing the independence of Soviet republics—choosing to wait for the U.S. and international consensus first.

Once Ukraine held its referendum and declared full independence in December 1991, Israel was one of the first to establish diplomatic ties (on December 26, 1991).

Israeli leaders welcomed independent Ukraine, recognizing its importance as the homeland of a large aliyah population and a strategic partner in Eastern Europe. Israeli-Ukrainian relations quickly developed on the basis of mutual respect.

Notably, even before independence, Ukraine supported restoring Soviet-Israeli diplomatic ties and moved to deepen its own connection with Israel. (For example, the Ukraine-Israel Friendship Society was founded in Lviv in 1990.) All this shows that both the State of Israel and the global Jewish diaspora viewed Ukraine’s sovereignty declaration not with negativity—but with cautious hope.

Directly or indirectly, Jews abroad supported Ukraine’s aspiration for freedom, expecting the new republic to become a democratic and safe home for Jews.

Participation of Jewish Deputies in the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR

The Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR of the 12th convocation (elected in spring 1990) included many representatives of national minorities—Russians, Poles, Jews, Tatars, Armenians, and others. It is difficult to determine the exact number of Jewish deputies, as nationality was often not specified in official biographies.

Nevertheless, available sources confirm that Jews were indeed present in the Ukrainian SSR’s parliament and played an active role.

In Kyiv in 1990, there was an attempt to form an informal “Jewish Council of Ukraine”—an association of deputies and public figures of Jewish origin. According to archival data, it was intended to include about 20 People’s Deputies of Ukraine.

This suggests that at least about two dozen members of the Verkhovna Rada were of Jewish origin. A significant number of them were elected from major industrial cities and academic centers (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, etc.)—areas with traditionally large Jewish populations.

Some of the Jewish deputies belonged to the democratic opposition, while others were part of the communist majority. However, they ultimately stood united on the issue of sovereignty. On July 16, 1990, 355 deputies voted in favor of the Declaration of Sovereignty, with only 4 against—clearly, the Jewish deputies were among those who supported it.

Regarding the drafting of the declaration, the main author on behalf of the opposition was the lawyer Serhiy Holovaty (ethnically Ukrainian), while the leadership’s version came from the working group of the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

There were no direct representatives of the Jewish community in this group. Nevertheless, ideas important to the Jewish population were reflected in the final text, largely thanks to the cooperative atmosphere fostered in part by Jewish activists within the Rukh movement.

During parliamentary debates, the opposition’s “People’s Council” (125 democratic deputies) insisted on including principles of human rights and ethnic equality in the declaration. These provisions were also supported by many communist deputies, who believed it was necessary to assure all ethnic groups in Ukraine of their protected rights. As participants later recalled, the session was held under public pressure—people were protesting outside the parliament demanding sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the deputies almost unanimously approved language affirming civil equality.

In the preamble of the Declaration, it was stated that all power in the republic belongs to the people of Ukraine, and in the section on citizenship, it was declared: “All citizens are equal before the law, regardless of origin, social and property status, racial and national identity, gender, education, political beliefs, religious convictions…”.

It was further emphasized that citizens of all ethnicities together form the people of Ukraine. These principles directly aligned with the interests of the Jewish community: equality regardless of nationality or faith meant that the new Ukraine rejected any form of discrimination against Jews. It is no surprise that Jewish deputies supported these principles.

Thus, Jews in the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR were not excluded from the process of adopting this historic document. On the contrary, they voted in favor of the declaration and thus contributed to the establishment of Ukrainian sovereignty. Their political affiliations varied—some were communist reformers, others were in the democratic opposition. But the general consensus was that a sovereign Ukraine should become a state of equal opportunity for all nationalities—a view supported and promoted by Jewish parliamentarians.

Hopes and Concerns of Ukrainian Jews Regarding Sovereignty

For Ukraine’s Jewish population, the declaration of sovereignty was a moment that sparked mixed emotions—hope for positive change, but also uncertainty and concern about the future.

On the one hand, the declaration promised a solid legal foundation for protecting the rights of Jews as a national minority. For the first time in decades, principles of equality and freedom of conscience were proclaimed at such a high level. Ukrainian Jews, having just emerged from the era of state-sponsored antisemitism (such as the “Doctors’ Plot” and anti-Zionist propaganda of the 1970s–80s), saw it as a breath of fresh air.

These hopes were based on the belief that “Ukraine would no longer pursue discriminatory policies.” And indeed, soon after independence, the Ukrainian government passed concrete legislation building on the 1990 declaration: in November 1991—the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, and in June 1992—the Law on National Minorities, which provided broad guarantees for language, cultural, and religious rights. These steps demonstrated the seriousness of intentions outlined in 1990.

Jewish leaders noted that state antisemitism was fading into the past and that the highest officials were showing respect for Jewish heritage and memory (for example, by participating in Babyn Yar commemorations and initiating dialogue with Israel). This inspired optimism, especially among younger Jewish activists who saw Ukraine as their future home.

As mentioned earlier, part of the Jewish intelligentsia chose not to emigrate but instead to help build a new life within Ukraine. Many shared the hope that independent Ukraine could become a democratic home for people of all ethnicities. Indeed, in the early 1990s there was a true revival of Jewish life: Jewish schools, libraries, and theaters were opening; films and books on Jewish themes were being produced; and ties with global Jewry were strengthening. These changes were seen as fulfillment of the hopes sparked in 1990.

On the other hand, a large part of the Jewish population also had concerns rooted in historical experience and the uncertainty of 1990. First, the collapsing Soviet market pointed to looming economic and social crises.

Many Jews feared that such instability could provoke nationalist backlash or lead to Jews being scapegoated. As noted by Kyiv activist Burakovsky, the mass emigration of Jews at that time was driven not only by new opportunities but also by “political uncertainty, economic hardship, and environmental problems (like Chernobyl)”. In other words, many were leaving “just in case,” unsure whether Ukraine would remain stable.

Second, there was lingering distrust toward ordinary citizens (the mob mentality).

According to some Jews who stayed, “we trust Rukh, but we’re unsure about the general public,” whose reactions could be unpredictable. This fear came from memories of early 20th-century pogroms and WWII atrocities perpetrated by mobs with official indifference.

While the new Ukrainian leadership expressed support for Jews, the question remained—what did the people think? To prevent possible incidents, the democratic government took steps: it blocked the Russian ultranationalist group Pamyat from operating in Ukrainian cities; police guarded synagogues in response to anonymous threats, and more.

Fortunately, no significant antisemitic violence occurred in Ukraine during 1990–1991. Nevertheless, the sense of unease among parts of the Jewish population lingered, as evidenced by high emigration rates.

By the end of 1991—after the independence referendum—many of the Jewish community’s fears began to fade.

Ukraine was proving itself to be a relatively peaceful and tolerant state. In international reports from 1992, Ukraine was cited as a “model of interethnic harmony,” especially considering its large Russian and minority populations.

The Jewish community saw that their worst fears—such as a return to state-sponsored antisemitism—had not materialized. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that antisemitism in independent Ukraine was declining, both institutionally and socially.

According to the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, incidents of antisemitic discrimination by state agencies had ceased in the early 1990s; antisemitism became marginal, limited to fringe publications and individual extremists. This progress was rooted in the decisions of 1990–1991 that laid the foundation for equality. Thus, the hopes of Ukraine’s Jews linked to the declaration of sovereignty were largely fulfilled, while earlier fears gradually subsided.

Conclusion

The adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, was a turning point not only for the Ukrainian people but also for all national communities of the republic, including Jews. The analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• The official and unofficial response of Jewish organizations in Ukraine was generally positive. Jewish activists actively engaged in the processes of perestroika and sovereignty, seeing in them an opportunity to secure their rights. As early as 1990, Jewish communities (in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, and others) cooperated with the Rukh movement, jointly opposing antisemitism and defending democratic ideals. No major Jewish organization in Ukraine opposed the declaration; on the contrary, many publicly supported it. They viewed the declaration as a guarantee of equality. Abroad, major Jewish institutions (such as the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee) did not issue special statements on Ukraine in 1990, as their focus was broader—the entire USSR. However, indirectly, the reaction was positive: international Jewish human rights groups noted the absence of pogroms or persecution during the rise of the Ukrainian national movement. In 1990, the State of Israel maintained official neutrality, awaiting Ukraine’s formal independence. Yet immediately after the December 1, 1991 referendum, Israel was among the first to recognize the new Ukraine. This signaled trust: Israelis saw Ukraine as a friendly state where Jews were not persecuted.

• Jewish deputies participated in drafting and adopting the declaration, though there were no clearly identified Jewish authors. Jewish presence in the 12th convocation of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was significant—dozens of MPs were of Jewish origin. They represented various political factions but unanimously supported sovereignty. It can be said that the Jewish community’s contribution to the declaration’s ideology was evident in the proclamation of Ukraine as a multiethnic democratic state. Jewish deputies, alongside other minority representatives, acted as a kind of parliamentary conscience, reminding the majority of the value of tolerance.

• Ukraine’s Jewish population in 1990 viewed the event with both hope and concern, though optimism predominated. Many Ukrainian Jews saw the declaration as a long-awaited step toward freedom, promising cultural and religious revival. Jewish leaders spoke of a new era of cooperation between Ukrainians and Jews. At the same time, there were fears: historical trauma, economic instability, and rising extremism raised concerns that things could go wrong. These fears were compounded by ongoing emigration—over 58,000 Jews left for Israel in 1990 alone. Still, some 400,000 Jews remained in Ukraine, and by the end of 1991 it became clear that their situation was improving—the state committed to protecting minorities, there were no ethnic clashes, and antisemitism was openly condemned by major forces. Statements by Jewish activists from that time reflect a dominant tone of cautious optimism. The prevailing sentiment was: “Yes, there are risks, but we cannot miss this chance to live with dignity in our homeland.” History proved that this optimism was largely justified—Jews in independent Ukraine gained opportunities for development that were unthinkable in the Soviet Union.

• The “Jewish issue” was present in the declaration and its discussions indirectly, through general references to equality and freedoms. The Jewish people or antisemitism were not specifically mentioned—which made sense, given the declaration’s universal nature. Still, the spirit of the document—nation-building without discrimination and with guarantees for all cultures—implied that Jewish interests were considered. The declaration paved the way for further legislation on minority rights and freedom of religion. In parliamentary debates, democratic leaders repeatedly emphasized that independent Ukraine must exemplify interethnic harmony—especially in contrast to conflicts elsewhere in the USSR. This consensus helped avoid the notion of “special status” for the titular nation. Ukraine was proclaimed the common homeland of all its citizens—something vitally important for the Jewish population.

In conclusion, it is clear that Ukraine’s Jewish community welcomed the proclamation of sovereignty with support and active participation, seeing it as a path to democratic change and enhanced security.

Jewish diasporas abroad and the State of Israel, though not issuing immediate official responses, generally viewed Ukraine’s emergence as a sovereign state positively—especially admiring its leaders’ commitment to tolerance.

The event of July 16, 1990, was a turning point in the Jewish history of Ukraine: it marked the beginning of a new chapter in Ukrainian-Jewish relations, grounded in partnership and mutual respect—as confirmed both by the documents of the time and the subsequent development of independent Ukraine.

The third episode of the project “Know Ours” about Ukrainians in Israel.
“This video was filmed before October 7, 2023. But the war in Israel put our activities on pause.”

Kyrylo Karetniuk – a Ukrainian who moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician. Importantly, the interview is not about Kyrylo’s political sphere and is not of an agitational nature. The goal is to reveal the personality outside of political life and tell another story of an influential Ukrainian in Israel.

Host – Kateryna Trushyk.
Filming, editing, sound – Olena and Alex Ginzburg.
Haifa, Israel.

Kateryna Trushyk:

“The war in Israel has disrupted the plans of many people.

Elena Ginzburg, Alex Soundman Ginzburg, and I planned to develop our project about Ukrainians in Israel and Israelis helping to bring Ukraine closer to victory.
We had a list of heroes and heroines with whom we planned to record interesting interviews.

October 7, 2023, changed our plans.

We hope to still implement them and reveal and open many true heroes who do a lot of important work for both Ukraine and Israel.

The video that will be released today was recorded before October 7, 2023.

This is the third episode of the project “Know Ours”.

The hero of the interview is Kyrylo Karetniuk (קיריל קארטניק) – a Ukrainian who moved to Israel in 2009, served in the army, worked, and became a politician.
Importantly, our interview is not about Kyrylo’s political sphere and is not of an agitational nature.

Our goal is to reveal the personality outside of political life and tell another story of an influential Ukrainian in Israel.”

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On the night of August 20, 2026, Russia once again assembled over Ukraine what is conveniently referred to in reports as a “combined strike.” Behind this brief definition were 168 drones, several groups of cruise missiles, “Kalibrs,” ballistic missiles, “Oniks,” “Zircons.” The main direction was Kyiv and the Kyiv region.

By morning, the capital confirmed 12 dead, and another person died in the region. About 40 people were injured. In the Solomianskyi district, the upper floors of a nine-story building were destroyed, and neighboring buildings were damaged. Among the affected objects, the authorities mentioned a school and a children’s hospital. Tens of thousands of consumers remained without electricity.

The Air Forces reported 186 destroyed or suppressed targets. This number looks quite different from the photographs of the house in the Solomianskyi district.

Four days ago, Elena Gunko already analyzed for NANovosti another major Russian strike and the shortage of Patriot missiles. At that time, the discussion was mainly about how Ukraine increasingly faces not the number of launchers supplied, but the ammunition for them. On August 20, this conversation continued after another night with casualties.

Morning data of August 20	What was known
Deceased	12 in Kyiv, 1 in Kyiv region
Injured	about 40 in Kyiv and the region
Drones	168
Destroyed or suppressed air targets	186
Confirmed impact sites in Ukraine	28
Main direction of attack	Kyiv and Kyiv region

“We strike in volleys” — and what remained after this volley

The Russian Ministry of Defense reported in the morning about a “massive strike with high-precision weapons of ground, air, and sea-based.” Moscow claimed that the targets were enterprises related to the production of drone components, a military warehouse, and a logistics facility.

Almost simultaneously, the department’s official channel featured a missile launch with the caption “We strike in volleys.” Another formulation was: “We provide convincing arguments.” The media paid attention to these publications after reports of casualties in Kyiv appeared.

From the photographs of the destroyed high-rise building, it is impossible to determine which specific Russian missile hit there and what target it was assigned before launch. But it is not necessary to see the difference between the morning rhetoric of the Russian military department and what the rescuers were doing at that time.

The composition of the attack is also more interesting than the phrase “massive strike.” Russia did not send a hundred identical objects to Kyiv. In the air, there were simultaneously targets with different speeds, altitudes, and flight profiles. Among the 168 UAVs were reactive Shaheds. Separately, there were Kh-101, “Iskander-K,” Kh-59, eight “Kalibrs,” two “Banderols.” The Air Forces also reported launches of “Iskander-M,” “Oniks,” “Zircons,” and S-400 missiles at ground targets.

Ukraine handled part of this set very well. 145 drones, all eight “Kalibrs,” two “Banderols,” 31 Kh-101, “Iskander-K,” or Kh-59 missiles were destroyed or suppressed.

In the list of confirmed interceptions published by the Air Forces, there were no ballistic “Iskander-M,” “Zircons,” “Oniks,” and S-400 missiles. This does not automatically mean that none of them were intercepted: the Ukrainian report simply did not declare their destruction.

But after this attack, Volodymyr Zelensky was no longer talking about air defense in general. He was again talking about anti-ballistic defense.

Patriot has developed a strange problem: the battery may be there, but the protection is still insufficient

For the Israeli reader, it is important not to confuse several completely different things under the familiar word “air defense.” Intercepting a Shahed, a cruise missile, and a ballistic missile is not the same task. The faster the target and the less time remains after its detection, the narrower the set of systems that can really help.

In Ukraine, one of the main means against Russian ballistic missiles remains the Patriot, primarily with the corresponding PAC-3 interceptors. And for more than a month, the conversation around Patriot increasingly boils down to a rather prosaic question: are there missiles in the launcher.

After the strike on August 20, Zelensky said that the Russians had been preparing it for a long time, combining various types of ballistic and cruise missiles with drones. His next formulation was even more specific: as long as Ukraine has insufficient anti-ballistic capabilities, Russia, in his opinion, will not seriously think about peace.

This is Zelensky’s political assessment. And the shortage of interceptors is quite a material thing.

At the beginning of August, the Ukrainian president already talked about another episode when out of 27 ballistic missiles launched by Russia, only one was intercepted. He primarily linked the reason to the shortage of Patriot missiles. One can argue about how fully public statements reveal the real work of Ukrainian air defense, but the problem with interceptor stocks is confirmed by far more than just Kyiv.

NANovosti previously separately analyzed why it is difficult for Ukraine to quickly replace Patriot. Other systems exist, European developments also exist, but replacing already deployed capabilities in the required quantity and at the right moment is much more difficult than picking an analogue from a manufacturer’s catalog.

And here the Ukrainian story runs into the Middle East.

American air and missile defense missiles are needed not only by Kyiv. They are consumed by American forces, necessary for the US’s own reserve, and supplied to allies. After major Iranian attacks, the issue of the American ammunition stockpile ceased to be a professional discussion within the Pentagon.

CSIS in the summer estimated the American stockpile of Patriot interceptors at less than a thousand units, THAAD at about 250. This is not an official Pentagon inventory: exact stocks are classified. But the scale of the subsequent reaction shows well that the problem itself is considered real in Washington.

In August, the US signed an agreement worth more than $3 billion to sharply expand the production of Patriot and THAAD components. Patriot’s production capabilities are planned to be roughly tripled, THAAD’s increased by about four times.

For NANovosti — News of Israel, this part of the story is more important than another comparison of the characteristics of Russian missiles. Ukraine and the Middle East do not literally use the same box of ammunition, but they depend on the same Western industrial base, the same manufacturers, and very long production chains.

Iran found itself in this story not because it is convenient to place it next to Russia

Russian and Iranian military models differ. Israel has Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and other defense echelons; Ukraine builds its system on a completely different combination of Soviet, European, and American complexes. It would be too simple to draw an equal sign between Moscow and Tehran.

But one thing is common in these stories without any journalistic exaggeration. Both Russia and Iran know that an interceptor is a consumable.

No matter how many millions the system on the position costs, after its missile is launched, there is one less on the warehouse. If you simultaneously force the enemy to fend off drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, the question gradually shifts from the characteristics of the complexes to the pace of production of new ammunition.

Russia has been gaining such experience for several years in Ukraine. Iran — in direct confrontation with Israel and the US.

NANovosti — News of Israel previously analyzed the military link between Russia and Iran and how the Ukrainian war is becoming a source of experience for Tehran. This story began largely with Iranian Shaheds for Russia. Now the exchange of interests has long been not limited to the drone itself.

There is also the Strait of Hormuz. It seems like a completely different topic until you look at the method of pressure.

A significant share of the world’s oil trade passes through this route. Iran does not need to physically close the strait for months to create a problem. A stable risk for ships, insurers, and supplies is enough. In political journalism, such a model can quite be called racket on a key waterway: the safety of passage begins to be used as an argument in bargaining.

Russia does not control Hormuz and acts in a different way. It has been creating military pressure directly on a neighboring country for years, including massive strikes on its cities and infrastructure.

The similarity is not in geography, but in the cost of response.

FREYJA appeared after the problem became obvious

After the strike, Zelensky also reminded about the European-Ukrainian project FREYJA. This is a future system to counter ballistic missiles, the work on which Ukraine and a group of European countries officially launched in July 2026.

The project still exists primarily in plans, work distribution, and initial integration solutions. Ukraine expects to provide its own interceptor missile and launcher, European companies — radars, sensors, electronics, and other elements. Major European defense manufacturers are named among the project participants.

The first prototype is expected in the first half of 2027. There is also a declared goal to make the future Ukrainian interceptor significantly cheaper than existing American solutions — less than a million euros. For now, this is precisely the developers’ goal. There is no serial FREYJA with a confirmed price today.

The very fact of the project’s appearance says a lot about what is happening in European defense. Just a few years ago, the task of creating a new anti-ballistic system would have looked like a long-term defense-industrial program. Now developers are discussing a prototype less than a year after the start.

But August Kyiv cannot use the 2027 prototype.

The US is already increasing capacities for Patriot and THAAD. Europe has started its own anti-ballistic project. Ukraine is simultaneously developing cheaper means of destroying drones to avoid using missiles of another class where it can be avoided.

At the same time, new factory capacities have not yet reached the declared volumes. CSIS estimated the production cycles of some modern missiles and their components in dozens of months. Increasing the output of PAC-3 MSE to significantly larger volumes stretches American plans over the coming years.

On the morning of August 20, rescuers in Kyiv continued to clear the aftermath of the night attack. The capital confirmed 12 dead, and another person died in the Kyiv region. Zelensky again requested additional Patriot interceptors. The first FREYJA prototype, according to the current project plan, is expected in the first half of 2027.

For mobile internet abroad, it is no longer necessary to buy a plastic SIM card at the airport or automatically connect your operator’s roaming. NAnews explored what Airalo is, how eSIM works, and what should be checked before purchasing.

You arrive in Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, or another country. The plane is just taxiing to the terminal, and you already need the internet: to write to your family on WhatsApp, open Google Maps, call a taxi, find the hotel address.

Previously, the choice was quite clear: either use the roaming of your Israeli operator or look for a local SIM card after arrival. The eSIM technology added a third option — to purchase a mobile package in advance and load it onto the phone digitally.

This is exactly how Airalo works.

But here it is immediately worth separating two concepts that are often confused. eSIM is a technology. Airalo is a service through which you can purchase a mobile package for eSIM.

What is Airalo in simple terms

Airalo calls itself an international eSIM marketplace. In its terms, the company more precisely defines its role as an aggregator and platform for communication services: it collects offers from mobile connectivity providers and sells the corresponding eSIM packages to the user. Currently, the service offers connection options for more than 200 countries and destinations.

Therefore, perceiving Airalo as another Cellcom, Partner, or Pelephone is not quite correct.

The user opens the Airalo website or app, selects a country or region, buys a suitable package, and receives a digital eSIM that can be installed on a compatible smartphone. Already in the destination country, the phone uses this eSIM to connect to a supported mobile network.

No plastic card needs to be received.

For a person, it looks something like this:

country → internet package → payment → eSIM installation → network connection after arrival.

You can view available Airalo options for the travel country here:

https://airalo.pxf.io/QYWr76

And what is eSIM and where is it located?

A regular SIM card is familiar to almost everyone: a small plastic card with a chip that we insert into the phone.

With eSIM, the principle is different.

The necessary module is already built into a compatible device, so there is no need to change the physical card. After purchase, the user downloads a digital profile of the operator or service provider onto the smartphone. Airalo allows installing purchased eSIMs through the app, QR code, or manual data entry — the available method depends on the device and specific offer.

Have you ever seen the “Add eSIM” option in iPhone or Android settings and didn’t understand why it’s needed?

That’s exactly for such cases.

Moreover, your main Israeli SIM or eSIM can remain in the phone at the same time.

This makes the technology especially interesting for Israelis who travel a lot between Israel, Europe, and other countries.

How Airalo works: from purchase to internet appearance

Let’s go through the whole process without advertising shortcuts.

First, the user goes to Airalo and selects the destination. For example, they are flying from Israel to Poland.

Next, you need to choose a package. Offers may vary in the number of gigabytes, validity period, supported networks, and availability of additional services. Airalo offers both packages with a certain amount of data and some options with other conditions, so the characteristics need to be checked directly before purchase.

After payment, the eSIM appears in the user’s account. In most cases, it becomes available almost immediately, although Airalo warns that sometimes processing may take longer.

Then the eSIM is installed in the phone.

After arrival, you need to enable the corresponding line and select it for mobile data transmission. When the installed eSIM registers in the supported network of the destination country, the phone receives mobile internet within the purchased package.

That is, technically, Airalo does not create a separate Wi-Fi for the tourist. The phone still connects to a regular mobile network — just access to it is arranged through the downloaded eSIM.

And what will happen to my Israeli number?

This is one of the main questions for the Israeli user.

Suppose your permanent number from Partner, Cellcom, Pelephone, or another operator is in the phone. To use the tourist eSIM, it is not necessary to delete it.

If Dual SIM support is available, the phone can use different lines for different tasks. For example:

• leave the Israeli SIM active for your number, calls, and SMS;
• assign Airalo for mobile data transmission;
• WhatsApp and other internet applications will continue to work through mobile internet;
• the usual WhatsApp number does not automatically change from installing a new eSIM.

Airalo separately explains that when using a data-only eSIM, the user can leave another line active for voice communication and SMS.

But there is an important detail here.

If your Israeli SIM remains active abroad, the conditions for calls, SMS, and roaming on this line are determined by your Israeli operator. The presence of Airalo itself does not cancel possible expenses on the main SIM.

Therefore, before departure, it is worth checking not only the eSIM but also the settings of your own line.

For NAnews — Israel News readers, this is perhaps more important than promises of “internet in a few minutes”: a mistake in choosing the data transmission line can make all the savings meaningless.

You can view available Airalo options for the travel country here:

https://airalo.pxf.io/QYWr76

Does Airalo provide a new phone number?

Not necessarily.

Airalo has different types of packages. Some are intended only for mobile data — data-only. Through such an eSIM, you cannot make regular voice calls or send traditional SMS from this line. However, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, and other services using the internet work through mobile data.

There are also offers that include mobile data, calls, and text messages. For example, Airalo offers global options with data, calls, and texts, but the availability of such functions needs to be checked for a specific package before payment.

Therefore, the formula “bought Airalo — got a foreign number” is incorrect.

Sometimes a number or phone services are included in the package. Sometimes not.

If you need a local number, for example, for work, registration in a certain service, or for a long stay in the country, this parameter needs to be checked separately.

Local, Regional, or Global: why does Airalo have so many options

On Airalo, offers are divided into local, regional, and global eSIMs.

Local eSIM is designed for one country.

Flying from Israel only to Germany? Then it makes sense to first look at the package for Germany.

Regional eSIM covers several countries in a specific region.

Imagine the route:

Israel → Poland → Germany → Czech Republic.

Instead of a separate eSIM for each stop, you can check the European regional package and see if the necessary countries are included in the coverage.

Global eSIM is intended for trips across different countries and regions of the world. But the word Global does not automatically mean “works absolutely everywhere”: the list of supported countries needs to be checked for a specific offer.

Therefore, choosing a package only by its name is not worth it.

You can view available Airalo options for the travel country here:

https://airalo.pxf.io/QYWr76

What to check before clicking “Buy”

Here begins the most important part.

The mere fact that Airalo sells eSIM for your country does not mean that the first package you come across is right for you.

Before payment, NAnews — Israel News recommends checking at least the following parameters.

Does your phone support eSIM

Not all smartphones can work with eSIM. Moreover, support may depend not only on the model name but also on the specific version of the device and the market for which it was released. Airalo maintains a separate list of compatible devices and recommends checking compatibility before purchase.

Is the device locked to one operator

Airalo indicates that to install an eSIM, the device must be unlocked to work with other networks. If the smartphone is carrier-locked, this issue must first be resolved with your operator.

How much internet are you buying

1 GB for a few messages, maps, and checking mail is one story.

Work video calls, YouTube, uploading photos, and sharing the internet to a laptop is quite another.

You need to look not only at the price but also at the amount of data.

How many days is the package valid

Packages have a validity period. This can be, for example, 7, 15, or 30 days, although specific options vary.

When does the countdown start

This is especially important.

For most Airalo eSIMs, the validity period starts after activation, and activation usually occurs when the installed eSIM first connects to a supported network at the destination. But this is not a universal rule for absolutely every product: Airalo recommends opening Additional Information → Activation Policy and checking the conditions of a specific eSIM before purchase.

In other words, you cannot automatically assume: “I’ll buy today, and the 30 days will start counting only after the plane.”

First, we look at the Activation Policy.

Can you buy more internet later

For many eSIMs, additional Top Up packages are available, but the possibility of replenishment depends on the product. In the Airalo app, a corresponding function appears for compatible eSIMs.

Are there regular calls and SMS

If this is important — check before payment.

Not after.

Can you share the internet

Airalo reports that Personal Hotspot/Tethering can be used if supported by the device and the network used. Therefore, a person who needs the internet also for a laptop should better check this point separately.

What is cheaper: Airalo, local SIM, or Israeli roaming?

Here we deliberately will not write that Airalo eSIM is “always cheaper.”

There is no such universal rule.

Operator prices, roaming packages, and eSIM offers change. Moreover, for two people flying to one country, the optimal options may turn out to be different.

It is more correct to compare the three solutions before each trip.

Israeli operator roaming is convenient because the user practically does not need to install anything. But the cost depends on your operator and the purchased package.

Local SIM card may sometimes be more attractive in terms of data volume or conditions. However, it usually needs to be received or purchased from a local operator and go through the provided connection procedure.

Travel eSIM like Airalo is primarily interesting because the internet issue can be resolved before the trip and without removing the main SIM from the phone.

Therefore, the question should not be “what is always cheaper?”, but:

What exactly do I need on this trip and how much will it cost for each of the three options?

When Airalo can really be convenient

Let’s take a few situations familiar to the NAnews audience.

An Israeli arrives in Europe for only three to four days. He doesn’t need a local contract and a new number. He needs maps, WhatsApp, websites, taxis, and mail.

Another scenario: a person arrives in an unfamiliar country late in the evening. He doesn’t want to look for a mobile operator’s store and deal with local tariffs right after the airport.

The third option is a trip through several European countries at once. In this case, a regional eSIM can eliminate the need to buy a separate SIM at each stop. Airalo offers regional options for traveling through multiple countries.

Another scenario familiar to our audience is trips between Israel, Ukraine, and European countries. Communication is often needed not ‘tomorrow after I find a salon,’ but immediately: to write to family, open navigation, check a train, or order a car.

This is where the very idea of eSIM becomes clearer than any advertisement.

You can view available Airalo options for the country of your trip here:

https://airalo.pxf.io/QYWr76

When Airalo may not be the best option

There are also reverse cases.

If your phone doesn’t support eSIM at all, buying such a package is pointless.

If you need a full local phone number for several months, a local operator may be a more logical solution.

If a very large amount of mobile traffic is needed, offers should be compared — a local tariff may be more interesting.

If your Israeli operator already offers a suitable roaming package at a good price, installing an additional eSIM may simply not provide a noticeable advantage.

Finally, for someone who absolutely doesn’t want to deal with Dual SIM settings, it may sometimes be easier to activate a pre-purchased roaming package from their operator once.

Technology is convenient when it solves a problem. Not the other way around.

A few settings that are better done at home

If you still choose eSIM, don’t leave the first acquaintance with it for the moment of boarding the plane.

It is more reasonable to install the profile with stable internet access and according to the specific eSIM instructions.

After installation, give the lines clear names. For example:

Israel

Travel

or:

Partner

Airalo Europe

This way, there’s much less chance of confusing them later.

Before use, check which SIM is assigned for mobile data, which is for calls, and whether Data Roaming needs to be enabled for the tourist line according to your package instructions.

And one more point that is easy to underestimate: do not delete the eSIM just because you don’t need it right now. Airalo warns that eSIM usually cannot be reinstalled after deletion and recommends temporarily disabling the profile if further use is planned.

Disabling and deleting are not the same.

What NAnews checked before this publication

It is important to outline the boundaries of the material here.

The editorial team checked the instructions relevant as of August 2026 for purchasing and installing eSIM, device compatibility, operation of data-only packages, retention of the main SIM, activation times, and traffic replenishment. Official Airalo pages and the company’s help center were used for the material.

At the same time, we do not present this article as an independent test of Airalo’s mobile network quality in each country. Speed, 4G/5G availability, and coverage quality depend, among other things, on the specific package, partner network, location, and connection conditions.

The next level of verification is the actual purchase of an eSIM, installation on a specific smartphone, and testing during a trip. Such material already makes sense to do separately, with screenshots and actual results.

Pros and limitations of Airalo that are already visible

The main advantage of eSIM in travel is the absence of the need to change a physical card. Communication can be prepared in advance, and the main line can be left in the phone with a compatible device.

The second advantage is the choice between one country, a region, and broader international coverage.

The third is management through the app: Airalo allows you to purchase packages, see your eSIMs, and for supported options, buy additional traffic.

But the limitations are no less real.

A compatible and unlocked smartphone is needed.

Not every package provides a phone number and regular calls.

Different eSIMs have different validity periods and activation times.

And the cost still needs to be compared with alternatives directly before the trip.

So who makes sense to try Airalo?

First of all, a person who needs mobile internet immediately after arrival and who doesn’t want to change the main SIM card.

This option is especially understandable for short trips and routes through several countries.

Airalo is interesting here not as ‘another foreign operator,’ but as a way to buy access to the mobile network of the desired country in advance and load it directly into the phone.

But before paying, ask yourself five questions:

Does my phone support eSIM?

Which countries are covered?

How many gigabytes do I really need?

Do I need regular calls and SMS?

And is the specific package more advantageous than my operator’s offer?

If the answers fit — then you can choose eSIM.

Check available Airalo eSIMs for your trip’s country: https://airalo.pxf.io/QYWr76

In April-May 1948, Vasily Tarasenko led the Ukrainian SSR delegation at the special session of the UN General Assembly on the “Palestinian problem.” At this session, he played a decisive role in the creation of the State of Israel.

He is rightfully considered the creator of the State of Israel.

Ben-Gurion, through Moshe Sharett in a telephone conversation with him on the night of May 14-15, 1948 (on May 14, the independence of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv), conveyed to the Ukrainian diplomat his personal gratitude and that of the Israeli government for his speech at the session of the UN General Assembly, which played a significant role in Israel’s fate.

Moreover, Ben-Gurion instructed Moshe Sharett to obtain Tarasenko’s consent to award him the title of honorary citizen of Israel. As Moshe Sharett noted at the time, this would have been the first case of granting honorary citizenship to a representative of a foreign state. However, after discussing with Tarasenko the inevitable and quite predictable consequences for him personally and his family at that time, they decided it would be wise to refrain from such a step.

How it happened

Vasyl Yakymovych Tarasenko was the head of the Ukrainian delegation at the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly and played a decisive role in the vote on the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948.

According to Tarasenko himself, the attitude towards the idea of a Jewish state in the Soviet delegation was lukewarm, but there was a directive from Stalin to vote for the creation of Israel, and disobeying the “master” was unthinkable, despite dissatisfaction. Stalin supported the creation of a Jewish state, counting on several factors, including the hope for the socialist orientation of this country and the desire to weaken Britain’s position in the Middle East with its vast oil reserves.

As is known, the interests of the USSR and the USA coincided on this issue, so on November 29, 1947, two resolutions were submitted to the UN General Assembly:

one — British — on the creation of a single state of Palestine, where Jews would become a national minority (contrary to the famous Balfour Declaration, which the British government had “forgotten” by then),

and the other — Soviet-American — on the partition of Palestine into two independent states, Jewish and Arab.

The adoption of the second resolution was far from obvious, many countries were doubtful, the Arabs were categorically against it, and mobilizing a majority was difficult. The Americans had to specially bring representatives from the Philippines and Paraguay to the meeting, looking expressively into the eyes of the Philippine representative. In the end, two-thirds of the votes were gathered: 33 for the partition of Palestine, 13 against, 10 abstained.

And then the most interesting part began. The General Assembly decided that the adopted resolution would remain in force only if no other decision was made at the next session, scheduled for May 14, 1948, the day the British mandate ended. The repeat vote was to take place no later than 18:00.

Meanwhile, the “Cold War” and the arms race began, and by May 1948, the USA had changed its position 180 degrees, deciding to support Britain, whose influence seemed less dangerous than the growing influence of the Soviet Union. Thus, by May 14, 40 countries were against the partition of Palestine, and only the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were “for” it.

However, when the USA decided to support the British project, it seemed that the majority would vote for a united state.

The fate of Palestine was finally decided on May 14, 1948.

Everyone thought the vote was already predetermined.

Only 6 states were ready to vote for the USSR’s proposal. The final decision was to be made by 18:00 on May 14, 1948.

If the vote did not take place for any reason, the previous decision would come into force: the creation of two states — Arab and Jewish — on the territory of mandated Palestine.

20 minutes before the end of the session, the chairman, the representative of Argentina, interrupted the speech of the head of the Soviet delegation Andrei Gromyko and announced the start of voting on the resolution proposed by Britain.

Unexpectedly, bypassing all rules and regulations, the representative of Ukraine Vasyl Tarasenko, whose speech was not scheduled on the agenda, ran to the podium, shouting something in English. “I want to state my point of you,” he declared to the chairman, mistakenly using “point of you” instead of “point of view.”

The chairman, seeing a threat in the statement, ran out of the hall for the police, and Tarasenko began his speech. Delegates poorly understood his English and did not immediately realize that the Ukrainian diplomat was stalling for time. At the beginning of the seventh hour, Chairman Arce returned with the police and, looking at the clock, realized that putting the Palestine issue to a vote was impossible, as voting after 18:00 would be illegal.

When Arce was about to close the session, the head of the US delegation, General Osborne, requested the floor. He asked to continue the session to contact US President Harry Truman to discuss the situation. General Osborne’s proposal was accepted.

“Approximately 1.5-2 hours later,” Tarasenko recalls, “Osborne reported that the USA had revised its position on the Palestinian issue and agreed with the decision to create two independent states on the territory of Palestine: Jewish and Arab.”

Why then was Vasily Tarasenko not removed from the UN podium? Why did the shocked Dr. Arce run away? Why did those present, as if hypnotized, listen to his speech for half an hour and not demand a vote? Why did everyone literally freeze for half an hour? What force paralyzed them? And what force lifted Tarasenko himself from his seat and helped him accomplish what seemed impossible? He admitted that he could not explain it himself. Perhaps it was that very “ordinary miracle,” which, as a rule, is performed by only one force — the highest. The restoration of the State of Israel, as Eli Lichtenstein writes, is one of such miracles.

Two months before the end of his term, Vasily Tarasenko was sent on leave, and he did not return to America, being removed from work “for an active pro-Israel position and Ukrainian separatism.” For his pro-Israel position, he was personally scolded by Khrushchev: “What the hell did you climb onto the podium for?! Let Gromyko speak, but no, they found you — a fool.” Tarasenko naively replied that he did it on his own initiative, to which Khrushchev waved his hand and said: “The worse for you.”

However, no serious sanctions followed. Tarasenko returned to Kyiv and headed the Department of History of Foreign Countries at the university, where he remained in this position until 1982. He lost the department after speaking out against bribery. He lectured in Ukrainian, which at that time did not cause accusations of Bandera-ism.

He headed the public fund “Ukraine — Israel,” received letters from Benjamin Netanyahu and David Levy, the Israeli Minister of Internal Affairs in the 1990s. On the 50th anniversary of Israel, he visited Israel with his son and daughter, was impressed by what he saw, and hoped that Ukraine could repeat the “Israeli miracle.”

He died on March 22, 2001. He is buried at the Baikove Cemetery in the capital of Ukraine.

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