Author: Карабас Барабас

22 апреля 2026 года Израиль отмечает 78-ю годовщину своей Независимости. Именно на эту дату в 2026 году приходится 5 ияра 5786 по еврейскому календарю — день, который соответствует 5 ияра 5708, когда было провозглашено Государство Израиль. Исторически само провозглашение состоялось 14 мая 1948 года в Тель-Авиве.

Это не просто памятная дата в календаре. Речь идет о событии, которое стало поворотным моментом для еврейского народа после Катастрофы, британского мандата, международных споров о будущем Палестины и уже начавшегося вооруженного противостояния. После завершения Второй мировой войны и уничтожения почти трети еврейской общины Европы инициативы по созданию еврейского государства приобрели особое значение. В этот день было не только провозглашено государство, но и начался новый этап борьбы за суверенитет.

Как Израиль подошел к независимости

После Второй мировой войны вопрос о будущем еврейского населения в подмандатной Палестине уже невозможно было откладывать.

Британия продолжала ограничивать еврейскую репатриацию, несмотря на то что сотни тысяч переживших Холокост нуждались в убежище и новой жизни. Для еврейского ишува это означало, что борьба шла уже не только за политическое признание, но и за физическое и национальное выживание.

Ответом на британские ограничения стало создание «Еврейского движения сопротивления», целью которого была борьба с мандатной властью за открытие путей в Палестину. За четыре года, с 1944 по 1948-й, нелегально и тайно, несмотря на морскую блокаду, в страну было переправлено около 85 тысяч человек. Именно этот фон помогает понять, почему идея независимости воспринималась тогда не как дипломатическая абстракция, а как жизненная необходимость.

Переломным международным моментом стало решение Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН от 29 ноября 1947 года о разделе Палестины на еврейское и арабское государства. Однако это решение не принесло мира. Напротив, оно вызвало протесты со стороны арабских стран, а война между арабами и евреями фактически началась еще до окончания британского мандата и продолжалась вплоть до 14 мая 1948 года.

«С тех пор, как наши предки мечтали о возвращении на Землю Обетованную, эта мечта стала реальностью», — этими словами Давид Бен-Гурион выразил смысл исторического момента, в котором для еврейского народа соединились память, политическая воля и реальное восстановление государственности.

Как принимали Декларацию Независимости

14 мая 1948 года в 16:00 Давид Бен-Гурион открыл церемонию в Тель-Авивском музее и зачитал Декларацию Независимости. Документ был провозглашен в последние часы перед окончанием британского мандата. Время выбрали так, чтобы успеть до Шаббата, а сама церемония прошла быстро и в напряженной обстановке военного времени.

Здание для церемонии выбрали не случайно. Это был бывший дом Меира Дизенгофа на бульваре Ротшильда, где тогда располагался Тель-Авивский музей изобразительных искусств. Предпочтение отдали менее заметному месту, чтобы избежать религиозной или партийной подоплеки и одновременно учитывать риск возможной бомбежки. Приглашения были разосланы утром 14 мая с просьбой хранить событие в секрете.

Подготовка текста шла в последние дни буквально в авральном режиме. Декларацию рассматривали в течение пяти дней, начиная с 9 мая 1948 года. В ее подготовке участвовали Давид Бен-Гурион, Моше Шерток, Цви Беренсон и Пинхас Розен, а окончательная версия была утверждена на заседании Народного совета в 15:00 14 мая — всего за час до начала церемонии.

Во время обсуждения спорили не только о политических формулировках, но и о символическом языке документа.

Обсуждались вопросы границ, название будущего государства и упоминание Бога в заключительной части. Среди предлагавшихся вариантов названия были «Эрец-Исраэль» и «Сион», однако в итоге было принято название «Государство Израиль» — מְדִינַת יִשְׂרָאֵל, а в заключительной части текста использовали компромиссную формулу «Твердыня Израиля» — צוּר יִשְׂרָאֵל, приемлемую и для светских, и для религиозных кругов.

Есть в этой истории и почти кинематографическая деталь. Окончательный текст Декларации спешно отпечатали и доставили к месту церемонии в 15:59. По дороге машину, которая везла документ, остановила полиция за превышение скорости, но водитель, даже не имея прав, сумел избежать штрафа, объяснив, что иначе задержится провозглашение нового государства.

После зачтения Декларации документ подписали члены Народного совета. Важно помнить, что в зале лично расписались 25 человек, а еще 12 мест оставили для тех, кто не смог присутствовать, в том числе из-за осажденного Иерусалима. Таким образом, полный корпус подписантов насчитывал 37 человек. Церемония транслировалась радиостанцией «Коль Исраэль».

Декларация также предусматривала созыв Учредительного собрания, которое должно было принять конституцию. В январе 1949 года такое собрание действительно было избрано, а вскоре получило название Кнессет первого созыва. В дальнейшем было решено идти путем принятия основных законов, которые и должны были со временем составить основу формальной конституции государства.

Девять подписантов, родившихся на территории нынешней Украины

Особое место в этой истории занимает тот факт, что девять подписантов Декларации независимости родились на территории нынешней Украины. Это подчеркивает глубокую историческую связь между Израилем и еврейской жизнью на украинских землях.

Моше Шерток, впоследствии Шарет, родился в Херсоне и стал одним из ключевых создателей израильской дипломатии, а позже занял пост второго премьер-министра Израиля.

Ицхак Бен-Цви родился в Полтаве, был видным сионистским деятелем и историком, а затем стал вторым президентом Государства Израиль.

Кальман Кахана родился в Бродах, на территории нынешней Львовской области, и представлял религиозно-сионистское направление, сыграв заметную роль в политической жизни молодого государства.

Рахель Коэн-Каган родилась в Одессе и вошла в историю как одна из немногих женщин среди подписантов Декларации независимости, активно занимавшаяся вопросами прав женщин и общественной деятельности.

Голда Меирсон, ставшая позже Голдой Меир, родилась в Киеве и со временем превратилась в одну из самых известных фигур в истории Израиля, возглавив правительство страны.

Даниэль Остер родился в селе Княгини, которое сегодня является частью Ивано-Франковска, и стал известным общественным деятелем, а также первым еврейским мэром Иерусалима в период британского мандата.

Берл Репетур родился в Ружине на территории нынешней Житомирской области и был деятелем рабочего сионистского движения, участвовавшим в формировании государственных структур Израиля.

Мордехай Шатнер родился в Снятыне, в нынешней Ивано-Франковской области, был активистом сионистского движения и вошел в число подписантов документа о создании еврейского государства.

Бен-Цион Штернберг родился в Черновцах и принадлежал к поколению общественных деятелей, участвовавших в создании политического и общественного фундамента будущего Израиля.

Все подписанты Декларации независимости Израиля

Полный список подписантов показывает, что новое государство создавали представители разных политических и общественных течений еврейского ишува — от социалистов и общих сионистов до религиозных деятелей и представителей восточных общин.

• Бен-Гурион, Давид (דָּוִד בֶּן־גּוּרְיוֹן) — главный лидер ишува, зачитавший Декларацию и ставший первым премьер-министром Израиля.
• Бен-Цви, Ицхак (יִצְחָק בֶּן־צְבִי) — сионистский деятель, историк и будущий второй президент Израиля.
• Бентов, Мордехай (מָרְדֳּכַי בֶּנְטוֹב) — представитель левого сионистского лагеря и один из лидеров Мапам.
• Берлинье, Элиягу (אֵלִיָּהוּ בֶּרְלִינֶה) — ветеран общественной жизни ишува и один из старейших подписантов.
• Бернштейн, Фриц (פְרִיץ בֶּרְנְשְׁטֵיין) — политик и экономический деятель из лагеря общих сионистов.
• Варди, Герцль (הֶרְצְל וַרְדִּי) — журналист и общественный деятель.
• Варгафтиг, Зерах (זֶרַח וַרְהַפְטִיג) — юрист, религиозный сионистский политик и будущий министр.
• Вильнер, Меир (מֵאִיר וִילְנֶר) — самый молодой из подписантов и представитель коммунистического лагеря.
• Гольд, Вольф (ווֹלְף גּוֹלְד) — видный деятель религиозного сионизма.
• Грабовский, Меир (מֵאִיר גְּרַבּוֹבְסְקִי), позже Аргов — деятель рабочего движения и будущий парламентарий.
• Грановский, Авраам (אַבְרָהָם גְּרָנוֹבְסְקִי), позже Гранот — руководитель в сфере земельной политики и Еврейского национального фонда.
• Грюнбаум, Ицхак (יִצְחָק גְּרִינְבּוֹים) — один из заметных сионистских политиков довоенного и раннего израильского периода.
• Добкин, Элиягу (אֵלִיָּהוּ דוֹבְקִין) — один из руководителей национальных институтов ишува, занимавшийся вопросами репатриации и организации.
• Кахана, Кальман (קַלְמָן כַּהֲנָא) — представитель религиозно-сионистского направления и будущий израильский политик.
• Каплан, Элиэзер (אֱלִיעֶזֶר קַפְּלָן) — будущий первый министр финансов Израиля.
• Кацнельсон, Авраам (אַבְרָהָם כַּצְנֶלְסוֹן) — врач и общественный деятель рабочего сионизма.
• Кобаши, Саадия (סַעַדְיָה כֻּבָּאשִׁי) — представитель йеменской еврейской общины среди подписантов.
• Коль, Моше (מֹשֶׁה קוֹל) — общественный и политический деятель, позже министр.
• Коэн-Каган, Рахель (רָחֵל כֹּהֵן־כָּגָן) — общественная деятельница и одна из двух женщин среди подписантов.
• Левин, Ицхак-Меир (יִצְחָק־מֵאִיר לֵוִין) — лидер религиозного лагеря и представитель ортодоксального политического направления.
• Левенштейн, Меир Давид (מֵאִיר דָּוִד לוֶנְשְׁטֵיין) — религиозный общественный деятель, связанный с Агудат Исраэль.
• Лурия, Цви (צְבִי לוּרְיָא) — деятель рабочего сионистского движения и национальных институтов.
• Меирсон, Голда (גּוֹלְדָּה מֵאִירְסוֹן), позже Меир — будущий премьер-министр и одна из самых известных фигур в истории Израиля.
• Нир, Нахум (נַחוּם נִיר) — политический деятель рабочего лагеря, позже спикер Кнессета.
• Остер, Даниэль (דָּנִיֵּאל אוֹסְטֶר) — общественный деятель и первый еврейский мэр Иерусалима в подмандатный период.
• Пинкас, Давид-Цви (דָּוִד־צְבִי פִּנְקָס) — религиозный сионистский политик и будущий министр.
• Репетур, Берл (בֶּרֶל רֶפֶּטוּר) — деятель рабочего движения и участник формирования институтов нового государства.
• Ремез, Давид (דָּוִד רֶמֶז) — один из лидеров рабочего сионизма и государственный деятель раннего периода.
• Розенблют, Феликс (פֶּלִיקְס רוֹזֶנְבְּלוּת), позже Пинхас Розен — юрист и первый министр юстиции Израиля.
• Сегаль, Цви (צְבִי סֶגַל) — общественный деятель ишува и представитель национальных структур того времени.
• Шапира, Хаим-Моше (חַיִּים־מֹשֶׁה שַׁפִּירָא) — религиозный сионистский лидер и будущий министр в нескольких правительствах.
• Шатнер, Мордехай (מָרְדֳּכַי שַׁטְנֶר) — сионистский активист и участник государственного строительства раннего Израиля.
• Шерток, Моше (מֹשֶׁה שֶׁרְתוֹק), позже Шарет — один из архитекторов израильской дипломатии, будущий министр иностранных дел и премьер-министр.
• Шитрит, Бехор-Шалом (בְּכוֹר־שָׁלוֹם שִׁטְרִית) — будущий министр полиции и один из наиболее заметных сефардских подписантов.
• Штернберг, Бен-Цион (בֶּן־צִיּוֹן שְׁטֶרְנְבֶּרְג) — общественный деятель поколения основателей государства.
• Фишман, Иегуда-Лейб (יְהוּדָה־לֵיבּ פִישְׁמָן), Маймон — религиозный сионистский лидер и раввин.
• Цизлинг, Аарон (אַהֲרֹן צִיזְלִינְג) — лидер левого сионистского лагеря и будущий министр сельского хозяйства.

Где Декларация?

Во время церемонии 14 мая 1948 года Бен-Гурион фактически читал не с полностью готового свитка: каллиграф Отэ Валлиш не успел закончить весь текст к началу церемонии, поэтому готова была только нижняя часть, а полный свиток завершили позже, в июне 1948 года.

После этого Декларация стала одним из главных государственных документов Израиля. Оригинал хранится в Государственном архиве Израиля, причем в специальных условиях сохранности; архив также показывает оригинальный серебряный футляр для свитка. В некоторых описаниях архивной и музейной экспозиции подчеркивается, что свиток состоит из трех частей, которые позже были приведены к единому виду для сохранения документа.

Для публичного показа обычно используют копии или факсимиле, а не сам оригинал. Кнессет прямо указывает, что копию свитка можно увидеть у них, а оригинал связан с хранением в архиве.

Если же говорить не только о физическом свитке, а о юридической судьбе Декларации, то она не стала полноценной конституцией Израиля. В тексте был заложен замысел созвать Учредительное собрание и принять конституцию, но вместо этого Израиль пошел по пути принятия Основных законов. При этом сама Декларация осталась важнейшим учредительным и ценностным документом государства и регулярно используется как базовый исторический и интерпретационный ориентир.

Война началась сразу после провозглашения

Провозглашение государства не принесло немедленного мира. Практически сразу после этого на территорию нового Израиля вторглись армии пяти арабских стран, и началась война, которая продолжалась около пятнадцати месяцев. Для молодого государства это была не абстрактная борьба за статус, а вопрос выживания. В этой войне погибло более шести тысяч евреев, однако Израиль не только выстоял, но и начал путь к созданию мощной и процветающей страны.

Цена независимости оказалась очень высокой. Но именно эта война закрепила реальность израильской государственности. Израиль сумел создать основы армии, дипломатии, управления и национальной консолидации в условиях прямой угрозы уничтожения.

Почему эта годовщина важна в 2026 году

22 апреля 2026 года напоминает, что государственность Израиля родилась не в спокойной международной обстановке и не как результат формального дипломатического компромисса. Она возникла в момент, когда еврейский народ оказался перед необходимостью самостоятельно отвечать за свою судьбу, безопасность и будущее.

Именно поэтому годовщина независимости остается для Израиля не только праздничной датой, но и днем исторической памяти.

В ней соединяются радость восстановления государства, память о жертвах войны, опыт национального самоопределения и понимание того, какой ценой была достигнута независимость.

Особенно выразительно в этом контексте выглядит и украинское измерение этой истории. Среди подписантов Декларации независимости было немало людей, родившихся в Херсоне, Полтаве, Киеве, Одессе, Черновцах, Бродах, Снятине, Ружине и Княгини. Это еще одно напоминание о том, что история Израиля складывалась не в одном городе и не в одной стране, а через судьбы людей, чьи корни уходили в самые разные части еврейского мира.

14 мая стало для Израиля символом борьбы за достоинство и свободу, а память об этих событиях продолжает вдохновлять и сегодня. В израильском календаре эта историческая точка в 2026 году отмечается 22 апреля, и для многих она остается напоминанием о том, что независимость никогда не была подарком — она всегда требовала воли, жертвы и готовности защищать свое будущее. В более широком восточноевропейском контексте эта дата звучит и как напоминание о том, насколько тесно переплетены истории Израиля и Украины.

One of Donald Trump’s most influential supporters in the American MAGA movement traveled to Ukraine to personally verify Russia’s claims of ‘Nazism’ and persecution of Jews. After Bucha, an air raid alert, the damaged Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, and a conversation with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman, Laura Loomer publicly acknowledged that her previous beliefs were mistaken.

Laura Loomer came to verify Russian myths: after Bucha and a meeting with Moshe Asman, Trump’s ally admitted she was wrong.

On July 24, 2026, the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman received American political blogger Laura Loomer — one of the most prominent and controversial representatives of the MAGA movement, with direct access to the entourage of US President Donald Trump — at the Central Synagogue of Ukraine.

The visit marked another stage in Loomer’s unexpected change of position, who until recently opposed American aid to Ukraine, repeated Russian claims of alleged ‘Nazism’ in the country, and stated that the war did not concern her.

Now she says she was under the influence of Russian propaganda and did not understand what Ukrainians go through daily.

Moshe Asman told Loomer about the war and the life of Jews in Ukraine.

In a message published on July 24, 2026, Moshe Asman stated that the conversation at the Central Synagogue was candid. The Chief Rabbi of Ukraine explained to the American guest that Russian aggression is not an abstract dispute between states but daily shelling, dead children, destroyed cities, and personal tragedies of millions of Ukrainian families.

Asman also shared what he and the Jewish community had to endure during the years of full-scale war.

A separate topic was the situation of Jews in modern Ukraine. For many years, Russian propaganda tried to portray Ukraine as a state where Jews are allegedly persecuted and religious life is restricted. According to Asman, these claims previously caused concern for Laura Loomer.

The Rabbi told her that Ukrainian Jews openly practice their faith, hold services, restore synagogues, create schools, help those in need, and are an integral part of Ukrainian society.

“The Jewish community lives here openly, freely practices their faith, restores synagogues, builds Jewish schools, and helps people,” emphasized Moshe Asman.

As a memento of the meeting, he gave Loomer his book “Between Miracle and Reality”, dedicated to the life of the Jewish community, the events of the war, and the Rabbi’s personal experience.

Who is Laura Loomer and why her visit matters

Laura Loomer does not hold positions in the US administration and is not an official advisor to the White House. However, she cannot be considered an ordinary blogger.

The Associated Press calls her a staunch ally of Donald Trump. Nearly two million users follow Loomer’s publications, and her campaigns against individual American officials have repeatedly led to personnel consequences within the administration. Donald Trump publicly called her a patriot and confirmed that he listens to her statements.

Loomer is an American of Jewish descent, openly supports Israel, and calls herself a Zionist. At the same time, she remains a highly controversial figure: American and Israeli media characterize her as a representative of the far-right political wing and remind of her harsh statements regarding Muslims and migrants.

It is Loomer’s closeness to Trump and her popularity among MAGA supporters that make her change of attitude towards Ukraine politically significant. Her audience largely consists of people who have heard about the war for years through American conservative channels, often repeating narratives favorable to the Kremlin.

Bucha was the first serious shock

During the trip, Loomer visited Bucha — a city that became one of the main symbols of Russian crimes against civilians.

She visited the Church of the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called and saw the site of the mass burial of residents killed during the Russian occupation in 2022. Bucha Mayor Anatoliy Fedoruk reported that the American blogger was told stories of specific victims and shown evidence of Russian military crimes.

After visiting Bucha, Loomer admitted that for years she believed false claims about the nature of the war.

Previously, she called Ukraine a country allegedly filled with ‘Nazi supporters’ and opposed support for Ukrainian defense. The Associated Press notes that such statements coincided with one of the main propaganda justifications Russia uses to explain its aggression.

The air raid alert changed the perception of the war

While in Ukraine, Loomer personally experienced an air raid alert for the first time.

She wrote that she hears the sirens and now understands: for Ukrainians, such a threat is part of everyday life. Loomer reminded that she had repeatedly said before that what was happening in Ukraine did not concern her, and then admitted that such words were wrong.

“We need moral clarity,” she stated after experiencing the alert.

For NAnews — Israel News, the fact of acknowledging the mistake is important. Loomer decided not to delete previous publications so that they remain evidence of how strongly the Russian information campaign can influence even experienced political activists with a large audience.

She essentially admitted that she was discussing the war without seeing its consequences and without talking to people who live under the constant threat of Russian missiles and drones.

Visit to the damaged Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

The next important point of the trip was the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.

Loomer visited the Assumption Cathedral and other objects of the complex damaged by a Russian strike on June 15, 2026. She was accompanied by the First Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Serhiy Kyslytsia, Minister of Culture Tetyana Berezhna, and representatives of the national reserve.

After the strike, a fire broke out in the monastery complex, damaging the interior and exterior structures. Ukrainian authorities called the incident an attack on Christian cultural heritage. Russia denied responsibility and without evidence claimed that the destruction could allegedly have been caused by a Ukrainian air defense missile.

While inside the cathedral, Loomer criticized Putin’s statements about protecting Christianity. She stated that Russian authorities cannot portray themselves as defenders of the faith while simultaneously striking one of Ukraine’s most important Christian monuments.

Meeting with Zelensky and Trump’s reaction

On July 23, Laura Loomer met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Mariinsky Palace.

She recorded an interview with him for her program Loomer Unleashed. Among the topics discussed were Ukraine-US relations, a previous tense meeting at the White House, and the subsequent restoration of contact between Zelensky and Trump.

The President of Ukraine stated that an important moment was their brief conversation at the Vatican, which allowed changing the nature of relations in 15-20 minutes.

The Ukrainian side emphasizes that Loomer’s trip was initially not organized by state structures. Zelensky’s representative Dmytro Litvin reported that the President’s Office learned about her visit from social media.

After the publication of a photo of Loomer with Zelensky, Donald Trump reacted to the meeting with the words: “Very good!!!”

This brief reaction is significant. It shows that Trump did not perceive the rapprochement of one of his most prominent supporters with Ukraine as a manifestation of disloyalty.

Chronology of Laura Loomer’s trip

Date	Event
July 20-21, 2026	Loomer arrived in Ukraine and announced that she came to personally verify information about the war.
July 21	Visited Bucha, the site of mass burial, and acknowledged the influence of Russian propaganda.
July 22-23	Experienced an air raid alert in Kyiv and visited the damaged Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.
July 23	Held a meeting and interview with Volodymyr Zelensky.
July 24	Met with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman at the Central Synagogue of Ukraine.

Why the meeting with Moshe Asman was especially important

Bucha showed Loomer the consequences of Russian occupation. The air raid alert allowed her to feel the daily threat. The destruction at the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra demonstrated the inconsistency of Moscow’s claims about ‘protecting Christianity’.

The meeting with Moshe Asman shattered another Russian myth — about the allegedly ‘Nazi Ukraine’ where Jews are persecuted.

Loomer saw a functioning synagogue in the center of Kyiv, met with one of the most well-known Jewish leaders in the country, and heard about the development of religious life directly from a representative of the Ukrainian Jewish community.

For the Israeli reader, this part of the trip is of fundamental importance. Russia tried to use the memory of the Holocaust and the fear of anti-Semitism as a tool to justify aggression. But at the same time, Russian missiles and drones threaten Ukrainian Jews just as they do all other residents of the country.

Jewish schools are forced to equip shelters. Synagogues help evacuated families. Rabbis conduct funerals for fallen soldiers and civilians. Jewish communities collect humanitarian aid, support hospitals, and help elderly people survive the war.

Has the entire MAGA changed along with Loomer

It is premature to talk about a change in the position of the entire MAGA movement.

Among Trump’s supporters, there are still serious disagreements about military aid to Ukraine. Many influential American conservatives still believe that Washington should reduce its involvement in European security.

Laura Loomer also did not become a representative of the American government and did not receive the authority to negotiate on behalf of Trump.

But her trip can influence the informational discourse within the American right-wing movement. A person who previously repeated Russian narratives is now telling the same audience about Bucha, air raid alerts, destroyed churches, and the free life of Jews in Ukraine.

Moreover, Loomer links support for Ukraine with the security of Israel and the US. In her statements, she draws attention to Russia’s cooperation with Iran and claims that the Moscow-Tehran alliance makes Russian aggression part of a broader threat to Western countries.

Propaganda ends where personal experience begins

Laura Loomer’s trip does not negate her previous statements and does not remove questions about her political activities. However, the willingness to publicly admit a mistake remains a rare phenomenon in modern politics.

She came to Ukraine to verify Russian claims and discovered a reality opposite to the picture that had been spread for years among some American conservatives.

Bucha showed her the crimes of the Russian army. The air raid alert — the daily life of Ukrainians. The Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra — Russia’s strikes on Christian heritage. And the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman — the real situation of Jews in the country.

At the end of the meeting, Asman thanked Loomer for the courage to come to Ukraine despite the danger and wished her wisdom, health, protection, and the ability to always remain on the side of truth and justice.

For NAnews — Israel News, this story is a vivid example that Russian propaganda cannot be defeated by official statements alone. Sometimes a person needs to see a mass grave with their own eyes, hear the sirens, and talk to people whose lives they previously assessed based on social media publications.

American intelligence agencies are investigating whether Russia could have helped Iran carry out precise strikes on secret CIA facilities in the Middle East. At the center of the investigation are attacks by modified Iranian Shahed drones, allegedly equipped with the Russian protected navigation system ‘Kometa-M’.

At least two CIA-related facilities were hit in March 2026. One was located on the grounds of the US embassy in Riyadh, the other in eastern Iraq. One of the Western intelligence documents, the contents of which were reviewed by Reuters, concludes that Russia ‘likely’ played a certain role in providing data used for targeting the strikes. The US intelligence has not yet reached a final conclusion, but the precision of the attacks is prompting Washington to consider the most dangerous scenario.

Information specifically about possible Russian assistance to Iran in targeting CIA facilities became public on July 22, 2026. The Reuters exclusive was published at 18:31 UTC, which is approximately 21:31 Israeli time. Reuters emphasized that the investigation into possible Russian involvement in the attacks on CIA facilities had not been publicly disclosed before.

However, certain parts of this story were known earlier:

• On March 3, 2026, Reuters reported that a suspected Iranian drone hit a CIA station located at the US embassy in Riyadh. At that time, a source claimed that there were no signs of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA unit.
• Also in March 2026, reports emerged that Russia had transferred the protected satellite navigation system ‘Kometa-M’ to Iran and was providing Tehran with other technical and intelligence support.
• Only on July 22 were all the elements first linked together: strikes on several CIA facilities, Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa-M’, and the possible transfer of targeting data by Moscow.

If these suspicions are confirmed, this is no longer a typical Russian-Iranian partnership or another arms exchange deal. It would mean Moscow’s deliberate assistance in targeting American intelligence facilities — that is, the actual complicity of two regimes in direct attacks on US infrastructure.

For Israel, this story has direct military and political significance.

If Russia is indeed helping Iran not only to improve drones but also to obtain precise coordinates of closed American facilities, the same technologies and intelligence capabilities could be used against Israeli military bases, command centers, intelligence facilities, energy infrastructure, and defense industry enterprises.

Therefore, Jerusalem needs more than just to strengthen air defense: it is necessary to reconsider the political attitude towards Moscow. A state that supplies Iran with military technologies and possibly helps choose targets for strikes cannot continue to be perceived as a neutral mediator, with whom previous caution should be maintained at all costs.

Two drones and one breached wall

The strike on the American embassy in the capital of Saudi Arabia occurred on March 3, 2026. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense reported that the diplomatic complex was attacked by two drones. A limited fire broke out, the buildings sustained material damage, but there were no casualties or injuries. Immediately after the attack, a Reuters source emphasized that there was no evidence of intentional targeting specifically at the CIA station at that time.

However, later, additional information became available to Western intelligence structures.

According to Reuters sources, the attack might have been constructed in an unusual scheme: the first drone breached the outer structure of the building, after which the second drone entered through the resulting opening and exploded inside. Such a sequence requires not just approximate coordinates of a large diplomatic complex, but high precision, stable navigation, and an understanding of the target’s structure.

This episode raised a question among intelligence analysts: did Iran have precise data on where within the embassy complex the CIA unit was located?

Theoretically, the station could have been hit accidentally during an attack on the embassy as a whole. But when information simultaneously emerges about another CIA facility being hit in Iraq, the version of a simple coincidence begins to look significantly weaker.

Russia possesses satellite observation means, extensive electronic intelligence capabilities, and years of experience studying American military infrastructure. Moscow also has an obvious interest in weakening the US presence both in Europe and the Middle East.

American intelligence agencies now have to determine whether the Russian side limited itself to supplying equipment or transferred specific coordinates, satellite images, and other target information to Iran.

What is the Russian ‘Kometa-M’

At the center of the technical part of the investigation is the Russian satellite navigation system of the ‘Kometa-M’ family.

This is not a device that independently searches for a target or recognizes a CIA building. ‘Kometa-M’ is a protected navigation module that allows a drone to continue moving along pre-loaded coordinates under conditions of active satellite signal jamming.

The main advantage of such a system is increased resistance to electronic warfare. A regular Shahed may deviate from the route if the GPS signal or another satellite system is jammed or spoofed. The Russian module helps filter out interference and maintain accuracy on the final flight segment.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine documented various versions of Russian systems of the ‘Kometa’ family found in guided munitions and other types of Russian weapons. The Ukrainian component database, in particular, features the interference-resistant system ‘Kometa-M12’, manufactured by the Russian enterprise VNIIR-‘Progress’.

Intelligence sources cited by Reuters believe that Russia could have transferred more advanced navigation technology to Iran for upgrading Shahed. Such devices become significantly more dangerous: they do not turn into high-precision Western-level weapons but gain much more chances to reach the designated point directly.

This results in an extremely dangerous combination. Russia can provide coordinates and satellite information, Iran can prepare and launch drones, and the Russian navigation system can help them pass through jamming and approach the secret facility.

Each side can formally claim that it did not strike independently. But the result of such a division of roles remains the same explosion.

From Ukraine to the Persian Gulf

The connection between Russia’s war against Ukraine and current events in the Middle East is becoming increasingly evident.

Ukraine has become a huge testing ground for Russian developers, where Moscow has been testing Shahed for years, changing their design, improving navigation, complicating routes, and finding ways to bypass air defenses. Now, technologies created and tested on Ukrainian cities could allegedly have been transferred to Iran for attacks on American facilities.

This is the same technological conveyor of terror. Iran once transferred Shahed to Russia for strikes on Ukraine. Russia reworked these drones, improved individual systems, and gained combat experience in their mass use. Now, the upgraded solutions could return to Tehran — already with Russian intelligence capabilities.

European states warned Washington about this threat back in March 2026. According to Reuters, European ministers were planning to raise the issue of Russian support for Iran with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Intelligence sources reported that Moscow was transferring satellite images and technologies to Tehran, helping to select American and regional targets. Sergey Lavrov denied reports of intelligence transfers, although the Russian side did not hide the existence of military cooperation with Iran.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes: the threat concerns not only the US and Ukraine. Any technology that increases the accuracy of Iranian drones automatically creates additional danger for Israel, American bases in the region, facilities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Iraq.

Israel has already faced massive Iranian attacks. Therefore, the issue of Russian assistance to Tehran cannot be viewed as a distant episode of the Moscow-Washington confrontation. Russian navigation modules, satellite data, and experience in bypassing air defenses can ultimately be used against Israeli targets.

Americans are already dying

On July 17, 2026, two American servicemen were killed in Jordan while repelling an Iranian attack using ballistic missiles and drones. Another serviceman was initially considered missing. These data were officially confirmed by the US Central Command.

It is important to formulate the circumstances accurately: CENTCOM did not state that the military died solely from a direct hit by a ballistic missile. The official statement says they died during the defense against a combined missile-drone attack.

Nevertheless, after this episode, the question of Russia’s role became even sharper. Analysts are trying to understand whether Iran received Russian data only for the March attacks on CIA facilities or if Moscow could have helped Tehran in selecting American military targets in Jordan.

There is currently no public evidence of Russian involvement specifically in the July strike. But the very fact of such a question shows the depth of distrust that has arisen due to Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation.

This is no longer abstract geopolitics. American military personnel are dying, secret CIA facilities are being damaged, and drones created by Iran and improved with Russian technologies are becoming weapons of a common war against the West.

Washington talks to Moscow while intelligence checks its role

The ongoing diplomatic dialogue between the US and Russia makes the situation look particularly contradictory.

On July 23, 2026, Marco Rubio met with Sergey Lavrov in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The parties discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine, bilateral relations, and the possibility of resuming diplomatic efforts. At the same time, the American intelligence community continues to investigate whether Moscow helped Iran target CIA facilities.

Washington is trying to separate directions: talking to the Kremlin about Ukraine separately, fighting Iran separately, and investigating the transfer of intelligence data separately.

But Russia and Iran, apparently, have long not considered these conflicts separately.

For Moscow, the war in the Middle East can distract American resources from Ukraine, raise oil prices, create a rift between the US and allies, and increase the load on the Western air defense system. For Tehran, Russian assistance opens access to technologies that were improved during strikes on Ukrainian territory.

This creates a single front, even if its participants do not formalize an official military alliance.

What this threat means for Israel and how to respond

For Israel, the most dangerous aspect is not the mere fact that Iran has Russian navigation modules. The main threat arises when interference-protected navigation is combined with precise satellite images, intelligence data, and information about the internal structure of objects.

Iran has previously had coordinates of Israeli military bases, airfields, and enterprises. However, the ability to receive fresher data, refine the location of individual units, and program drones for sequential strikes significantly increases the danger. A scenario in which the first device damages the outer defense and the second is directed into the resulting gap is especially alarming for underground command posts, hangars, ammunition depots, radar stations, and protected communication facilities.

Israel needs to proceed from the fact that Russian-Iranian cooperation is no longer limited to the war against Ukraine. Technologies that Russia tested on Ukrainian cities can return to Iran in an improved form and then be used against Israel and American forces in the Middle East.

But technical measures alone are no longer sufficient. Israel must formulate a clear political position: assistance to Iran in increasing the accuracy of missile and drone strikes is a direct threat to Israel’s national security, regardless of which country these systems are used against today.

Jerusalem must officially demand explanations from Moscow regarding the transfer of navigation technologies, satellite information, and other means to Iran that can be used for target selection. If the American investigation confirms the transfer of CIA facility coordinates, Israel must publicly declare that Russia has ceased to be a neutral participant in the Middle Eastern confrontation and has effectively joined in strengthening Iran’s strike potential.

It is also necessary to abandon the policy where maintaining working relations with the Kremlin is automatically considered more important than publicly defending Israeli interests. Caution may have had an explanation while Russia posed a threat primarily through its presence in Syria. But if Moscow helps Iran improve weapons capable of striking secret facilities with increased accuracy, the previous model of relations becomes dangerous for Israel itself.

This does not mean that Israel is obliged to immediately sever diplomatic relations with Russia.

However, contacts with Moscow should depend on its actual behavior. Military-technical assistance to Iran should have a political price: reducing sensitive cooperation, restrictions on Russian structures associated with Iranian defense programs, and joining targeted sanctions against enterprises and specialists involved in the development of such systems.

The first practical task should be obtaining full intelligence information from the US about the March attacks on CIA facilities. It is important for Israel to know which versions of Shahed were used, which components were found in the wreckage, how accurately the devices maintained the route, and whether there are signs of coordinate loading with the participation of Russian specialists.

The second direction is the modernization of electronic protection. If ‘Kometa-M’ indeed increases the resistance of drones to conventional jamming, Israel will have to develop not only satellite signal suppression but also methods of navigation deception, control interception, physical destruction of drones at long ranges, and detection of devices before they enter Israeli airspace.

The third task is to revise the protection of strategic facilities. It is not enough to simply cover a base with an air defense system. It is necessary to consider the possibility of repeated strikes on one point, the use of several drones with different tasks, and attempts to hit an already damaged section of the building. Critical centers should have dispersed command posts, backup communication systems, and the ability to continue operating after a direct hit.

Israel should also significantly expand the exchange of experience with Ukraine. Ukrainian specialists have unique information about Russian versions of Shahed, ‘Kometa’ family modules, changes in drone design, and practical ways to counter them. Political distance from Kyiv in this area no longer looks like caution — it can turn into a refusal of information necessary for the protection of Israeli cities.

Cooperation with Ukraine should include regular exchange of technical data, joint analysis of wreckage, study of Russian navigation modules, and coordination of actions against companies supplying components for drone production. Israel should not wait until weapons tested against Ukraine are massively used against it.

At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen political coordination with the US and European states. If Moscow is indeed helping Tehran target American facilities, this creates a basis for a common sanctions and diplomatic response. Israel should participate in forming such a response, rather than trying to maintain separate relations with Russia in the hope that Moscow and Iran’s cooperation will not be directed against Israeli targets.

It is impossible to simultaneously consider Iran the main strategic adversary of Israel and turn a blind eye to the actions of a state that transfers technologies, intelligence capabilities, and combat experience to it. Such duality no longer protects Israel — it limits its ability to respond to the threat in advance.

If the investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Israel will have to reconsider its attitude towards Russia. A state that helps Iran increase the accuracy of strikes and choose secret targets becomes part of a hostile infrastructure, even if it does not formally launch missiles and drones independently.

The political conclusion must be crystal clear: relations with Moscow cannot be built as if Russian support for Iran does not concern Israel. It does — directly. Therefore, Israel needs to act before Russian intelligence data and navigation technologies are used for a strike on an Israeli facility, not after.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers it fundamentally important not to substitute the investigation with a ready-made verdict. American intelligence agencies have not yet presented public evidence that Russia transferred coordinates of the CIA station to Iran. It has not been established whether Russian specialists participated in programming routes or selecting targets.

But the already known circumstances look extremely alarming.

Two CIA facilities were hit. Iran used drones with unusually high precision. Russia provided Tehran with military technologies and, according to Western sources, satellite information. One of the intelligence documents concluded a likely Russian role in targeting the strikes.

If further investigation confirms the transfer of coordinates, Moscow will cross a qualitatively new line.

This will mean that Russia is not just selling or transferring weapons to Iran. It helps choose American targets, provides means for their destruction, and uses Tehran as an executor of attacks, retaining the ability to deny its own involvement.

And then the expression ‘Russian-Iranian partnership’ will become too mild.

It will be about the complicity of two terrorist regimes that have combined intelligence, technologies, and combat experience to strike Ukraine, Israel, American military personnel, and Western intelligence facilities.

The consequences of such a policy are already visible far beyond the European front. While some Western politicians continue to treat aid to Ukraine as an issue that can be postponed or used in negotiations, the technologies of the Russian war are spreading across the Middle East.

The war that was not stopped in Ukraine did not remain in Ukraine.

 

At one time, humorous images of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg wearing an embroidered shirt were popular on Ukrainian social networks.

The combination of American-Jewish Zuckerberg and a traditional Ukrainian shirt looks funny, although in fact it is possible. After all, the ancestors of FB’s “father” come from Ukraine, namely from the Lviv region.

Historians have found evidence of the Ukrainian-Jewish roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. As part of the study of archival records, it became known that his ancestors came from the city of Rozdol, Lviv region.

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Ukrainian-Jewish origins of Mark Zuckerberg’s family: archival finds

History of ancestors: discovery of archival documents

Historical research published on the website “JewishNews“, revealed that the roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg stretch to Western Ukraine. The discovery became possible thanks to the work of Ukrainian historian Oksana Lobko within the framework of the project “Mandri Rozdilski”. Archival records from Lviv and Warsaw showed that Zuckerberg’s ancestors lived in the city of Rozdol, located 40 kilometers from Lviv.

Road to America: how the Zuckerbergs left Ukraine

Research shows that Zuckerberg’s great-grandfather, Isaac Zuckerberg, was born in Rozdol in 1866. As JewishNews points out, his parents, Sender and Ruhel Grunshtein, were engaged in trading activities and had 11 children. The family bore the surname Zucker, which after emigrating to the United States was changed to Zuckerberg – which translates as “sugar mountain” (Ukrainian “tsukrova gora”, “sugar” in Ukrainian “tsukor”).

The family emigrated to America at the end of the 19th century, and according to archival data, Isaac left Europe at the age of 27, arriving in New York in 1893. At that time, the family had already adapted their surname to American pronunciation, which was one of the steps towards assimilation in the new country.

“Mark Zuckerberg’s ancestry in Ukrainian lands highlights the multifaceted history of the Jews of Ukraine and their contribution to world culture,” quote NAnews“.

Zuckerberg family tree

The path of the Zuckerberg family continued through a generation: one of Isaac’s sons, Max, married a native of the Ternopil region – Mana (Minni) Wiesenthal, a native of the village of Skala-Podilskaya. Their son Jack became Mark Zuckerberg’s grandfather.

Surname	Place of origin	Emigration date	Additional data
Zucker (later Zuckerberg)	Rozdol, Ukraine	1893	Isaac Zuckerberg moved to the USA from Bremen

Archival finds: evidence of Ukrainian roots

An important confirmation of the Ukrainian origin of the Zuckerberg family was an archival document found in the newspaper “Gazeta Lvivska”. He points out that in 1902, the district court of the city of Nikolaev tried to find Isaac Zuckerberg in connection with the death of his mother Ruhel Grunshtein. This recording became another significant evidence of the family ties of the founder of Facebook with Ukraine.

“These archival finds add a new layer to the historical picture of Jewish life in Ukraine and show how far and deep the roots of this culture go,” Jewish News emphasizes.

Possible connections with other cities

Historians have also hypothesized that the Zuckerberg family could be connected to other cities in Western Ukraine. In particular, it is assumed that the ancestors could have come from Drohobych, where the Zuckerbergs also lived. However, there is no exact confirmation of this information yet, and the research is ongoing.

The significance of the discovery for Ukrainian-Jewish history

The research, conducted with the participation of Oksana Lobko, opened an important page in the history of the Jewish people on Ukrainian soil. The story of Zuckerberg’s ancestors is not only an interesting fact about the famous entrepreneur, but also part of a larger picture showing the significant influence of the Jewish community in Ukraine.

What does he think? NAnewssuch finds help strengthen cultural ties and remind us of the centuries-old history of the Jewish presence on the territory of Ukraine.

Leave a comment in Telegram – NAnews channel↓

In Poland and the Baltic countries, there are warnings about a possible Russian operation aimed at attacking NATO infrastructure and attempting to blame Ukraine. Potential targets include energy facilities, oil terminals, and the German brigade base under construction in Lithuania.

On NATO’s eastern flank, there is growing concern about a possible Russian provocation that should be serious enough to cause a political crisis but not lead to an immediate large-scale war between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The alleged scenario revolves around a limited strike on critical or military infrastructure in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or another regional state. The operation may use Ukrainian drones captured by Russia, and the Kremlin will try to blame Kyiv for the incident.

There is no public evidence that Putin has already approved a specific operation. The exact timing, targets, and final format of a possible attack are unknown. However, warnings are coming not only from journalists or independent experts but also from the leaders of Poland and Lithuania, who cite intelligence data.

Lithuania received intelligence signals

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda confirmed on July 15, 2026, that the country’s intelligence structures received information about possible Russian provocations against Poland or the Baltic states. Their alleged goal may be to test NATO’s ability to maintain unity in the face of a limited and ambiguous attack.

Nausėda was not talking about a full-scale invasion but about targeted actions against critical infrastructure. These may include conventional military means, as well as sabotage, drones, cyberattacks, or other hybrid tools.

At the same time, the Lithuanian president emphasized separately: intelligence does not have specific information about the location and timing of a possible attack. According to him, Russian planning may still be ongoing, and the available data may only indicate the general goal of the operation.

This caveat is fundamentally important. It is not about a revealed plan for Russia’s war against NATO but about signs of preparing a limited operation capable of causing confusion, internal disputes, and a long discussion about who is responsible.

Russia may have accumulated Ukrainian drones

Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reported that Russian forces captured a significant number of Ukrainian drones. Some devices may have been intercepted or landed using electronic warfare means, after which they ended up in Russia’s possession.

According to the Polish minister’s assessment, such drones can be restored, equipped with explosives, and used for provocations against Poland or other states on NATO’s eastern flank. Warsaw believes that the threat also concerns Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Romania.

This creates an especially complex problem for investigation. The debris of the device, electronic components, markings, and part of the software may indeed have Ukrainian origins. However, the launch site, drone control, and modifications made to it may already indicate a Russian operation.

The calculation may be based precisely on the first hours after the strike when the public does not yet know all the circumstances, and social networks are filled with photos of Ukrainian parts and statements about an alleged attack by Kyiv.

How a false flag operation might look

According to the Polish publication Wirtualna Polska, sources in law enforcement agencies are considering several options for possible escalation. The most likely is the use of drones externally linked to Ukraine. In the maximum scenario, the use of missiles against NATO military targets is allowed.

The list of possible targets is not officially confirmed. It is based on assessments of unnamed interlocutors of Polish journalists and therefore should not be perceived as an established operational plan of the Kremlin.

Possible target	Why it matters	Status of information
Orlen infrastructure in the Mažeikiai area	A major center for processing and storing petroleum products in Lithuania	Version of Polish sources
Litgrid power networks	Connect Lithuania’s energy system with European countries	Version of Polish sources
Rudninkai military base	Being created for the permanent deployment of a German armored brigade	Version of Polish sources
Constanța port in Romania	The most important transport and military hub in the Black Sea region	Version of Polish sources

Special attention is paid to the Rudninkai military town, located approximately 20 kilometers from the Belarusian border. Infrastructure is being created there for the permanent deployment of the German 45th armored brigade.

The cost of the second phase of the project is estimated at about 1.3 billion euros, and the total area of the campus will be about 190 hectares. The first military personnel should begin to be stationed there in the fall of 2026, and full infrastructure for the German brigade should be ready by the end of 2027.

A possible strike on a not yet fully populated base would allow Russia to try to control the level of escalation: avoid a large number of casualties but simultaneously show that the deployment of German forces in Lithuania is associated with direct risk.

One of the political goals could be to pressure Berlin. The Kremlin is interested in making the German public perceive the permanent presence of the brigade in Lithuania not as a security guarantee but as a source of threat to German military personnel.

The informational groundwork is being prepared in advance

Russian state and pro-Kremlin information resources have already spread claims that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia provided Ukraine with air corridors for attacks on Russian oil facilities in the Baltic region.

The foreign ministers of the three Baltic states jointly stated on April 10, 2026, that they never allowed their territory or airspace to be used for Ukrainian attacks against Russia. On July 10, representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia reiterated this during a joint démarche at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Such an information campaign may be a preparatory stage. First, the Russian audience is convinced that the Baltic countries are already participating in Ukrainian operations. Then any explosion, drone crash, or object damage can be presented as a natural consequence of the allegedly existing cooperation.

As a result, Russia gains the opportunity to pursue several goals simultaneously: discredit Ukraine, sow distrust between Kyiv and its allies, confuse the investigation, and delay NATO’s decision-making.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that the main weapon in such an operation is not only the drone itself. Equally important are the first reports, photos of debris, statements from anonymous channels, and attempts to impose a ready-made version of events before the completion of technical expertise.

The Latvian border as another pressure point

Simultaneously, pressure on the Latvian border with Belarus has sharply increased. Its length is about 173 kilometers, with a significant part passing through forested and swampy areas, complicating control.

In 2025, Latvian authorities prevented 12,046 attempts of illegal border crossings. By mid-July 2026, about 8,000 such cases had been registered, with approximately a thousand occurring in the first two weeks of July alone.

For comparison: on the Polish-Belarusian border in the first half of 2026, slightly more than 260 attempts were recorded, while in Lithuania — 905. This indicates a noticeable shift in the main migration pressure towards Latvia.

The Polish Center for Eastern Studies believes that Latvian services are currently unable to independently eliminate all weaknesses on the external border of the European Union. Problems include limited resources, smuggler activities, and insufficient border infrastructure effectiveness.

There is no confirmed data on the mass penetration of sabotage groups disguised as migrants. However, the flow itself forces Latvia to distribute forces between border protection, infrastructure security, and airspace monitoring. For the organizer of a hybrid operation, this is already a beneficial result.

Lithuania has moved to practical protection of objects

Warnings did not remain only at the level of statements. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas authorized the involvement of military personnel in protecting the liquefied natural gas terminal in Klaipeda and other strategic facilities on July 17.

Additional security was sent to the LitPol Link electrical connection with Poland, the substation in Alytus, and the Kruonis pumped storage power plant. From July 19 to August 19, a unit of up to 30 military personnel, transport, and a military boat were involved in the operation.

Vilnius emphasizes that the formal threat level has not been raised. The strengthening of security is called a preventive measure. However, the choice of objects shows which infrastructure elements the authorities consider most sensitive: energy connections with Europe, the gas terminal, hydroelectric power plants, and transport hubs.

The main goal is to test NATO

The alleged operation does not necessarily have to lead to significant destruction. For the Kremlin, it is more important to create a situation where NATO states begin to argue about the origin of the attack, the degree of proven Russian responsibility, and the need for a collective response.

Especially dangerous is a strike that falls above the level of a regular sabotage but below an obvious full-scale military attack. It is in such a gray zone that disagreements arise: whether to consider the incident a technical error, an independent Ukrainian operation, a Russian provocation, or an armed attack on an Alliance state.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not automatically triggered after any airspace violation. Allies must establish whether an armed attack occurred, determine its source, and obtain the affected state’s consent for collective action.

At the same time, NATO explicitly states that major cyberattacks and other serious hybrid actions can be recognized as an armed attack. The decision is made separately in each case, considering the scale, consequences, and evidence of the adversary’s involvement.

The first reaction to an ambiguous incident is likely to include intercepting air targets, exchanging intelligence data, conducting a technical investigation, and consultations under Article 4. Delaying this process may be one of Russia’s goals.

The eastern flank is already being strengthened

Today, NATO has nine multinational battle groups on the eastern front — from Finland and the Baltic states to Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. The allies’ airspace is monitored around the clock as part of the Air Policing mission.

After Russian airspace violations in September 2025, the Alliance launched the Eastern Sentry operation. It includes additional fighters, helicopters, air defense systems, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aviation, and ships.

The Baltic Sea also hosts the Baltic Sentry mission, created to protect underwater cables and other critical infrastructure. NATO declares that it is ready to defend each ally and, if necessary, reinforce specific states with additional forces and air defense means.

The Kremlin rejects Lithuania’s statements and calls them an attempt to justify further militarization of the region. However, Russian denial does not negate the fact that the eastern flank states are already moving from warnings to practical protection of energy, transport, and military facilities.

Why this story is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, this scenario is important not only as a European problem. Russia may try to apply a model well known to countries that regularly face drones, proxy structures, denial of responsibility, and pre-prepared information versions.

The provocation technology consists of several sequential stages: choosing a vulnerable object, using a weapon with a confusing origin, instant information injection, pressure on public opinion, and an attempt to prevent a unified response from allies.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that the main question is not whether Putin will decide to start an open war against NATO. The danger of a limited strike, which the Kremlin will try to present as an accident, a Ukrainian mistake, or an unidentified incident, is much more realistic.

At the moment, there is no open evidence of an approved Russian plan. The named energy and military objects remain potential targets based on assessments of Polish sources.

But official statements from the leadership of Lithuania and Poland, the strengthening of infrastructure security, and the preparation of additional forces show: the risk is already perceived as serious enough for the region’s states to begin preparing for a possible provocation in advance.

In the incomplete July 2026, Russian strikes destroyed or seriously damaged more than 1.5 million copies of Ukrainian books. Behind this figure are burned children’s editions, fiction, destroyed warehouses, ruined printing houses, and hundreds of thousands of school textbooks that were already supposed to be sent to Ukrainian schools.

The Ukrainian Book Institute called the events a deliberate destruction of Ukrainian culture, knowledge, and memory. In just a few weeks, Russian attacks affected publishers BookChef, ‘Knigolav’, ‘Mamine Sonechko’, Mison, publishing house ARK.UA, and one of the largest Ukrainian printing houses — ‘Konvi’.

This is not a single accidental fire or a separate damaged warehouse. In July, strikes consistently destroyed different parts of the book industry: storage of finished editions, production, publishing offices, equipment, layouts of future books, and educational literature for children.

800 thousand books burned at the beginning of July

The first huge loss occurred on the night of July 2, 2026. A Russian strike destroyed the central warehouse of Denka Logistics — the logistics partner of BookChef publishing house.

The warehouse contained most of the publisher’s products. According to BookChef’s estimate, about 800 thousand books were lost in the fire, and the material damage exceeded 100 million hryvnias. Employees were not harmed, but the publisher lost a significant portion of already printed editions ready for sale and shipment to readers.

The destruction of such a number of books cannot be reduced only to the cost of paper, printing, and warehouse rent. Each edition involves acquired copyrights, the work of translators, editors, proofreaders, designers, printing houses, and logistics companies. Reproduction requires months of work and new financial investments.

Six days later, on July 8, a Russian attack destroyed the office of the Kyiv children’s publishing house ‘Mamine Sonechko’. The premises stored books, magazines, and other printed products for children. After the hit, a fire started, destroying part of the editions. The exact number of lost copies was not disclosed by the publisher.

Night of July 19: almost a million books in a few hours

The heaviest consequences for the Ukrainian book industry came from a massive strike on the night of July 19, 2026.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia used 166 air attack means: 41 missiles of various types and 125 drones. The main direction of the attack was Kyiv. Ukrainian air defense shot down or suppressed 18 missiles and 108 drones, but some targets reached the capital. One person died in Kyiv, and 16 were injured. Residential buildings, a dormitory, warehouses, cars, a metro station, and other civilian objects were damaged.

One of the hits was on the ‘Konvi’ printing house — a large full-cycle printing enterprise. Books, magazines, catalogs, and school textbooks for dozens of Ukrainian publishers were printed here.

After the hit by a Russian ballistic missile, the huge production workshops were left without a roof. Printing and binding equipment was destroyed or flooded during the fire extinguishing, and office premises were completely burned out. People working at the printing house were not harmed.

Inside were about 250 thousand textbooks for ninth-grade students. The books were fully printed, packed, and prepared for shipment to Ukrainian schools before the start of the new school year.

Approximately 350 thousand copies and printing blanks were seriously damaged. Among them were textbooks for fourth grades and books from publishers ‘Ranok’, ‘Hramota’, ‘Litera LTD’, ‘Linguist’, ‘Knigolav’, ‘Laboratory’, ‘Artbooks’, ASSA, ‘Kalamar’, ‘Atena’, ‘Aston’, BookChef, Mison, ‘Higher School’, ‘Medicine’, ‘Apriori’, and others.

On the same night, a Russian strike completely destroyed a warehouse of the ‘Knigolav’ publishing house located elsewhere. About 250 thousand books — the result of months of work by authors, publishers, and printing houses — burned in the fire. None of the employees were harmed, but the publisher warned of delays in fulfilling orders.

Thus, only on the night of July 19, the Ukrainian book industry lost about 250 thousand books at the ‘Konvi’ printing house, another 250 thousand at the ‘Knigolav’ warehouse, and approximately 350 thousand copies and unfinished editions were significantly damaged.

The general director of the ‘Ranok’ publishing house, Viktor Kruglov, estimated the total losses of that night at almost a million books. He stated that the destroyed textbooks would be reprinted despite the destruction of equipment and the urgent need to find free capacities at other enterprises.

A strike just before the school year

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine is still clarifying the exact number of destroyed textbooks. In 2026, the state planned to print about 8 million copies of educational literature for ninth-grade students.

The Ministry, together with publishers and the Institute for Modernization of Educational Content, must determine which textbooks need to be urgently reprinted so that schools receive them on time.

But restoring an edition does not mean simply pressing the print button again. This requires paper, ink, binding materials, funding, available equipment, employee work, and free production lines. At the same time, Ukrainian printing houses need to fulfill already planned orders from other publishers.

The head of the Ukrainian Book Institute, Oleksandra Koval, stated that to restore one million lost books, the government urgently needs to allocate approximately 150–200 million hryvnias.

To understand the scale: in the entire year of 2025, slightly more than 33 million copies of books and brochures were published in Ukraine. The loss of 1.5 million copies over several weeks in July is comparable to about 4.5% of the country’s total annual book circulation.

At the same time, the Ukrainian book market was already in a difficult position before the new destructions. The number of titles was increasing, but average print runs were decreasing, and the real income of publishers was practically not growing due to inflation. For many small publishers, the destruction of a warehouse or a large edition can mean the loss of a significant part of working capital and a threat to further existence.

From ‘Factor-Druk’ to ‘Konvi’

The current destructions continue a series of strikes that have already caused severe damage to Ukrainian book infrastructure.

On May 23, 2024, a Russian missile hit the Kharkiv printing house ‘Factor-Druk’, where books of many Ukrainian publishers were printed. Seven employees of the enterprise died then, and another 22 people were injured. Equipment and almost 50 thousand books were destroyed.

The strike on ‘Factor-Druk’ occurred on the first day of the International Book Fair in Warsaw. Burned Ukrainian books became one of the symbols of the destruction of Ukrainian culture during the war.

In subsequent years, bookstores, libraries, publishing warehouses, and other cultural institutions were damaged. As of the end of June 2026, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine recorded 1,949 damaged or destroyed cultural heritage objects and 2,576 cultural infrastructure objects.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has also destroyed or damaged more than 850 Ukrainian libraries. These figures remain incomplete, as some occupied territories are inaccessible for full documentation.

Among the destroyed editions could be books by Israeli authors and publications about Jewish history

The destruction of Ukrainian book warehouses and the ‘Konvi’ printing house affected publishers whose catalogs included books by Israeli authors, works about the Holocaust, Jewish resistance, Aliyah, the history of Israel, and the revival of Hebrew.

About 800 thousand books were lost at the warehouse of the logistics partner of the BookChef publishing house. The publisher released works by Israeli historian and professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Yuval Noah Harari in Ukrainian, including ‘Sapiens’, ‘Homo Deus’, and ’21 Lessons for the 21st Century’.

In the assortment associated with BookChef, there were also books by Israeli authors about Mossad activities, women in Israeli intelligence, and the story of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda — the man who played a key role in the revival of Hebrew as a modern spoken language.

The ‘Knigolav’ publishing house, which lost about 250 thousand books, published literature directly related to Jewish history. Among such publications were books about Jewish women in the resistance movement in Nazi ghettos, about Rudolf Vrba’s escape from Auschwitz, about the fates of Holocaust survivors and their resettlement in Israel.

The publisher’s catalog also included the novel ‘The Boy with the Star of David’, the plot of which is related to the rescue of Jewish children by the ‘Youth Aliyah’ organization, the Israeli fleet, and the history of the creation of the State of Israel.

There is also a separate connection with the destroyed ‘Konvi’ printing house. In previous years, the enterprise printed Ukrainian educational and methodological materials on teaching Hebrew, Jewish culture, and working with cultural texts in Hebrew lessons.

However, publishers have not yet published a complete list of all destroyed titles. Therefore, it is impossible to reliably state how many books by Israeli authors or publications on Jewish topics burned during the July attacks.

There is also no confirmation yet that among the destroyed 250 thousand school textbooks were separate editions for Jewish schools in Ukraine or Hebrew textbooks.

However, the already established facts show that Russian strikes affected the book infrastructure that distributed works by Israeli authors in Ukraine, preserved the memory of the Holocaust, told about Jewish resistance, and acquainted Ukrainian readers with the history of Israel and modern Hebrew.

Why the destruction of books is more than material damage

There are no investigation results yet that allow us to assert that each specific publisher or each book warehouse was pre-selected by the Russian military as a separate target.

However, the repetition of such strikes and the cumulative scale of destruction create an obvious picture: the Russian war is destroying the entire chain that ensures the existence of the Ukrainian book. Not only finished editions are burning. Printing presses, binding lines, warehouses, publishing computers, original layouts, offices, libraries, and educational institutions are being destroyed.

NAnews — Israel News notes: for Israeli society, it is especially clear why the destruction of books cannot be perceived solely as economic damage. A book preserves language, testimonies, names, family history, and national memory. By destroying book infrastructure, the aggressor strikes at the society’s ability to pass on its own history to future generations.

It is especially indicative that among the destroyed editions were textbooks prepared for schoolchildren. Their loss means that Ukrainian publishers and the state must, in wartime conditions, find money, materials, and equipment again so that children can start the school year with the necessary books.

But the July attacks showed something else. Just a few hours after the destructions, publishers announced that they would restore the editions. Printing houses are looking for opportunities to continue production, readers are ordering books from affected publishers, and employees are clearing debris and saving surviving products.

Russia can burn paper and destroy printing presses. But as long as Ukrainian books are being reprinted, bought, read, and passed on to children, it fails to destroy Ukrainian culture and memory.

Strikes on Wildberries logistics centers have become one of the most discussed episodes of the Ukrainian campaign to target facilities deep within Russia. For the first time, the target was not an oil refinery, a military airfield, or a defense industry enterprise, but infrastructure used daily by millions of ordinary Russians.

That is why the significance of these attacks goes far beyond the destroyed warehouse premises. Wildberries has long ceased to be just an online clothing store. It is the largest Russian marketplace, a vast transportation network, a goods storage system, a financial platform, and one of the main supply channels for Russian small businesses.

Through this same infrastructure pass electronics, communication means, equipment, and dual-use components that can be used by the Russian military and defense industry enterprises.

Four logistics centers in five days

The first series of strikes occurred on the night of July 18, 2026. Drones attacked Wildberries centers in Kotovsk, Tambov region, and Elektrostal, Moscow region.

At the Kotovsk warehouse, seven night shift employees were killed, and another 25 people were injured. In the Moscow region, where the Wildberries warehouse and an oil depot in Noginsk were simultaneously hit, Russian authorities reported 61 injured. One person later died from their injuries.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the strikes on two major logistics facilities. According to him, they were used for the supply of sanctioned components necessary for the production of Russian drones and navigation equipment. The Russian Kremlin denies this and insists that the warehouses served “exclusively the civilian market.”

However, already on July 22, 2026, the attacks continued. The new targets were Wildberries logistics centers in Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Territory.

In Krasnodar, a large warehouse complex caught fire after the strike. Russian authorities reported ten injured, and more than a hundred firefighters and a helicopter were involved in extinguishing the fire. Several people were also injured in Nevinnomyssk. Videos of the large-scale fires were verified by Reuters.

Thus, in five days, four facilities of one company, located in different parts of Russia, were hit: in the central region, Moscow region, Krasnodar Territory, and the North Caucasus.

This allows us to speak not of a random choice of targets, but of a systematic attempt to disrupt the operation of one of Russia’s largest logistics networks.

Why Wildberries is strategically important

These are not ordinary warehouses

The Wildberries logistics center is not a hangar with boxes, but a high-tech hub combining storage, sorting, automated order processing, and shipping goods to dozens of regions.

The center in Elektrostal was one of the company’s most important facilities in the Moscow region. Its area was estimated at about 250,000 square meters. The warehouse in Kotovsk occupied about 108,000 square meters and served a significant part of southern and central Russia.

The Kotovsk complex was opened only in May 2025. It could simultaneously store up to 54 million units of goods. The company planned to use it to reduce transportation costs, speed up delivery, and provide regional sellers with the opportunity to ship products throughout Russia.

According to the Russian publication “Kommersant,” the first strikes on Elektrostal and Kotovsk temporarily disabled about 7% of all Wildberries logistics capacities. The cost of restoring the buildings alone was estimated at $270–450 million — not including the destroyed equipment and sellers’ goods.

It is impossible to completely paralyze Wildberries with two or four strikes. The company has dozens of distribution and sorting centers and can redistribute part of the orders.

But the loss of even a few of the largest hubs creates a cascading effect: neighboring warehouses become overloaded, routes lengthen, transportation costs rise, and delivery times increase.

Dual-use goods pass through the marketplace

Wildberries indeed offers a wide range of products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

Among such goods are civilian drones, drop mechanisms, flight controllers, electric motors, batteries, video transmitters, fiber optic coils for FPV drones, radios, antennas, thermal imagers, bulletproof vests, helmets, and tactical equipment.

The mere fact of selling such products does not prove that every Wildberries warehouse is a military facility. There are also no publicly available documents confirming a direct contract between the marketplace and the Russian Ministry of Defense.

However, the modern Russian supply system for the front is built not only on state defense orders. Volunteer groups, regional organizations, private drone manufacturers, Russian army units, and relatives of servicemen play a significant role in it.

They purchase the necessary equipment through regular online stores and marketplaces. Therefore, the line between civilian trade and military supply is becoming increasingly blurred.

The Ukrainian side claims that the affected centers were used not just for selling individual goods, but as links in the supply of sanctioned components for the production of drones and navigation systems. Independent data on the exact contents of each warehouse is still insufficient, but the presence of dual-use goods in Wildberries’ assortment is confirmed by open catalogs and journalistic checks.

Wildberries — the backbone of the Russian internet market

Calling Wildberries an absolute monopolist of all Russian retail would be incorrect. But the level of market concentration around Wildberries and Ozon is indeed enormous.

According to Data Insight, in the second half of 2024, Wildberries accounted for about 56% of all online orders in Russia and approximately 30% of the monetary volume of internet sales. Ozon accounted for another 21% of orders and 23% of turnover. Together, the two platforms controlled about 77% of the number of orders and more than half of the monetary volume of Russian e-commerce.

Today, more than a million sellers work through Wildberries, and the platform itself can process over 20 million orders a day.

The total volume of Russian internet trade in 2025 reached 11.5 trillion rubles, increasing by 28% over the year. The Russian market for goods ordered online numbered about 7.7 billion parcels.

Therefore, a strike on Wildberries is an impact not on a single private company. It affects a vast ecosystem of sellers, banks, carriers, pickup points, packaging manufacturers, and regional entrepreneurs.

As noted by NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the economic strength of the marketplace simultaneously became its vulnerability: the more goods and financial flows are concentrated in one system, the more painful the loss of each major distribution center becomes.

Small business pays the consequences of war

The main damage is not only borne by the Wildberries management.

The goods in the warehouses belong to hundreds and thousands of sellers. For a large company, the loss of part of the products may mean a decrease in profits, but for a small entrepreneur, it could mean the destruction of all stocks purchased on credit.

After the first strikes, Wildberries began discussing compensation for the owners of lost goods. The Russian Association of E-commerce Market Participants asked the government to provide affected entrepreneurs with a six-month tax deferral.

Among the affected were not only Russian companies. The Turkish clothing seller Koton reported that part of its products was also located at the damaged Wildberries facilities.

It became clear after the attacks how vulnerable sellers remain. Many of them did not insure their goods against military risks, and the terms of the marketplaces allow limiting liability for property destroyed as a result of hostilities or drone strikes.

It is impossible to claim that the strikes will immediately lead to the bankruptcy of hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs. But for hundreds or thousands of sellers who stored a significant part of their stocks in the affected warehouses, the consequences could be critical.

Will the strikes drive up prices

In the short term, the attacks may increase the cost of delivering certain goods and cause delays in certain regions.

If such strikes continue, Wildberries and other Russian marketplaces will have to invest additional funds in security, anti-drone protection, insurance, construction of backup warehouses, and decentralization of stocks.

The company may partially pass these costs onto sellers through increased commissions, storage costs, and logistics tariffs. Sellers, in turn, will raise final prices.

There is currently no basis to claim that the attacks on four warehouses have already become an independent factor in nationwide inflation. But they create additional price pressure in an economy that is already bearing growing military expenses.

War has come to the Russian consumer rear

Kotovsk is located about 360 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Elektrostal is only 50 kilometers east of Moscow. The strikes on Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk expanded the geography of attacks even further.

From a military point of view, this forces Russia to protect not only airfields, oil refineries, and defense enterprises but also a vast network of commercial facilities.

It is impossible to install air defense systems near every warehouse, sorting center, railway hub, and industrial site. The more territories need to be covered, the more resources of the Russian air defense are dispersed.

But even more important is the psychological effect.

Damage to a military plant in a remote region may go unnoticed by most Russians. A strike on Wildberries immediately appears on the phone: the product disappears from sale, the order is delayed, the entrepreneur loses warehouse stocks, and the pickup point is left without supplies.

This is how war ceases to be a television story about events somewhere far away and becomes part of the everyday life of Russian society.

Reuters directly notes that the attacks on Wildberries may signify a new stage in the Ukrainian strategy: pressure on Russian military capabilities is simultaneously accompanied by an attempt to bring the consequences of the war into the lives of ordinary Russians.

Civilian object or part of military logistics

The question of the legality of such strikes cannot be resolved solely on the basis that Wildberries is a civilian company.

International humanitarian law defines a military target by two main criteria: the object must make an effective contribution to military actions, and its destruction must provide a definite military advantage. For dual-use objects, it is additionally necessary to consider possible harm to civilians and adhere to the principle of proportionality.

Therefore, the presence of bulletproof vests or drone parts on the marketplace does not in itself turn all the company’s warehouses into legitimate targets.

The decisive factors are intelligence data: what exactly was passing through a specific object, in what quantity, to whom it was intended, and how important its destruction was for disrupting military supply.

Publicly, Ukraine has disclosed only a general explanation — the supply of components for drones and navigation equipment. Full evidence allowing for an independent legal assessment of each strike is not yet available.

Meanwhile, since February 2022, Russia has repeatedly struck Ukrainian postal terminals, warehouses, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure.

This does not negate the need to assess each Ukrainian operation from the perspective of international law and does not make the death of warehouse workers any less tragic. But it is the full-scale Russian invasion that created a reality in which civilian logistics systems are increasingly integrated into war support.

Why these strikes are truly important

The destruction of individual warehouses will not destroy the Russian economy and will not stop Wildberries. The company has enough resources to temporarily redirect goods and restore part of its operations.

The strategic significance lies in the cumulative effect.

Each destroyed center means lost goods, damaged equipment, new security expenses, overloaded routes, and the need to build a more expensive decentralized system.

Each new attack forces Russian companies to consider that the deep rear is no longer guaranteed to be safe.

Each delayed batch of electronics, communication means, or dual-use components potentially complicates the work of Russian manufacturers and units dependent on fast commercial supplies.

And every entrepreneur who lost products in a warehouse faces the real cost of war, which the Russian leadership has tried for years to hide from the population behind the formulation of a “special military operation.”

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency emphasizes: Russia itself has turned its own economy, industry, and logistics into elements of a protracted war against Ukraine. Without the invasion, the killing of civilians, and the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cities, there would be no Ukrainian campaign of strikes on facilities deep within Russian territory.

Wildberries became a target not because it is a popular online store. It became vulnerable because in modern Russia, the largest civilian trade network simultaneously became a channel for the movement of goods, money, electronics, and equipment, some of which support the state’s ability to continue the war.

That is why burning Wildberries warehouses are not just lost parcels. They are evidence that the distance from the Ukrainian border no longer guarantees Russia economic, logistical, or psychological security.

Israel, from the very beginning of the full-scale war, took a cautious position regarding military assistance to Ukraine. Officially, Jerusalem refused to supply Kyiv with lethal weapons, fearing deterioration of relations with Moscow for a number of reasons — which are not the subject of this article.

Nevertheless, under pressure from Western allies and against the backdrop of the Iranian Shahed drone threat, Israel gradually softened its stance on “defense-related equipment”.

Export Licenses

In February 2023, according to Walla and Times of Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Galant and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen for the first time approved export licenses for two Israeli companies to supply Ukraine with electronic warfare systems against drones with a range of up to ~40 km. Officials emphasized that this was not a change in policy, but a one-time permit for “non-lethal, purely defensive systems that do not kill Russian soldiers”.

It is known that one of these systems was a multi-purpose radar produced by the Israeli company RADA (now part of the American Leonardo DRS). When making this decision, Israeli officials also considered their own interest: to obtain data on how their technology would perform against Iranian drones on the Ukrainian front.

Moscow reacted painfully to such plans: already in early February 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly warned Israel against supplying weapons to Ukraine. That is probably why Israel chose an indirect path of assistance.

It was announced that Israel would help Ukraine create an early warning system for missile and drone attacks (an analogue of the Israeli “Tzeva Adom”), which formally pertains to civil defense and not the transfer of weapons. In March 2023, meetings were reported between representatives of Israel’s Home Front Command and Ukrainian officers in Poland to implement this warning system. In May 2023, testing of the Israeli warning system began in Kyiv: it was supposed to start in the capital and then expand to other cities. Thus, Israel demonstrated its readiness to help protect Ukraine’s population from attacks, but not by supplying weapons directly.

As already known, “צבע אדום‎” — in the Kyiv region on July 24, 2025, the Israeli-provided alert system was activated for the first time against missile attacks.

At the same time, there were behind-the-scenes negotiations on supplying anti-drone systems via third countries. Already at the beginning of 2023, a group of Lithuanian NGOs (Blue/Yellow, Laisvės TV, and others) launched a campaign Radarom! to raise funds for tactical radars for Ukraine.

Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas stated that they “reached an agreement with Israeli manufacturers, the radars are ready – only money is needed”. In fact, Israel’s Ministry of Defense did not object to such radars being sold to Ukraine at the expense of Lithuanian donors. This unofficial supply channel allowed Jerusalem to formally maintain neutrality while responding to US calls to help Ukraine close its skies. The Israeli press noted that the deal became possible under allied pressure and was presented as an exception for humanitarian purposes — to protect civilians from shelling.

RADA RPS‑42: Technology and Capabilities

RADA RPS‑42 is a mobile multifunctional radar station with an active phased array antenna (AESA), designed to detect small UAVs, missiles, artillery shells, and other aerial targets at short and medium ranges. It has been produced by the Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries Ltd. since the early 2010s.
Since 2022, RADA has been part of the American defense holding Leonardo DRS. The station is widely used to protect military facilities and critical infrastructure in various countries, including Ukraine since 2023.

Technical specifications:

• Detection range for drones and artillery shells: up to 10–30 km (depending on target type)
• Detection of aerial targets (aircraft, helicopters): up to 100 km
• Weight of one radar panel: about 23 kg
• Deployment time: several minutes, can be installed on a vehicle, tripod, or stationary
• Technology: active phased array antenna (AESA), operates in the X-band
• Coverage: up to 360° (with four panels)
• Operating mode: stand-alone or integrated into complex defense systems

Purpose and applications:

• Detection and tracking of small and medium aerial targets: kamikaze drones, UAVs, rockets, and artillery shells, mortar bombs, missiles
• Protection of assets and troops from aerial threats: early warning of raids and missile attacks
• Integration into air defense and C-RAM systems (protection from artillery strikes)
• Application flexibility: suitable for protecting military convoys and bases as well as urban objects, infrastructure, and critical communications

RADA RPS‑42 is used in many armies around the world as part of modern anti-drone and counter-artillery complexes.

“Mobility, compactness, and multifunctionality — that’s why the RPS‑42 is so in demand in modern conflicts,” write analysts at Israel Defense (Israel Defense, July 2024).

Logistics and Supply Channels

The main channel through which Israeli RADA RPS-42 radars reached Ukraine was via Lithuania. On January 30, 2023, a large-scale fundraising campaign “RADAROM!” (“To the Radar!”) was launched in Vilnius to purchase tactical air target detection radars.

Within just a few weeks, Lithuanians raised about €14 million, enough to acquire 16 new-generation radar stations. The Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries (headquartered in Netanya) agreed to sell these radars. Officially, the transactions were processed through the American corporation Leonardo DRS, with which RADA merged in 2022.

This legally simplified re-export: in fact, the radars were supplied as products of the American branch (DRS RADA Technologies), and not directly from Israel. However, as Israel Defense emphasized, such transfers still required approval from Israel’s Ministry of Defense — which was obtained.

The Lithuanian side handled all the logistics.

In February–March 2023, Ukrainian military crews arrived for training on operating these radars: first in Lithuania, at ranges in Kaunas, and then part of the preparation took place in Poland together with Israeli specialists.

At the beginning of May 2023, the first stations arrived on Ukrainian soil.

On May 4, 2023, volunteers reported the delivery of the first three out of 16 radars to Ukraine.

The remaining sets were delivered as documents and equipment were prepared throughout May–June. Lithuanian TV channel LRT published footage of radar unloading and a joint photo of Ukrainian military and Radarom project volunteers in front of one of the stations. Ukrainian officials did not publicly disclose details of these deliveries (likely at Israel’s request), but Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda openly declared on February 24, 2023 that:

“Lithuania, to mark the anniversary of resistance, is buying modern radars for Ukraine.”

Thus, the delivery of RADA radars was carried out not directly by Israel, but through the acquisition by a third party (a NATO country) and transfer as a donation to Ukraine.

It is important to note that RADA RPS-42 radars are an integral part of the Israeli anti-drone system Drone Dome (by Rafael). The Drone Dome system uses up to four such radars for 360° coverage, electro-optical cameras, and electronic warfare equipment to suppress drones.

However, according to available information, Ukraine received specifically radar modules (RPS-42 and some newer ieMHR), without electronic warfare modules. They are integrated with other components of Ukrainian air defense.

According to reports, the company “Systems of Electronic Export” (SEE) — the Ukrainian radar integrator — together with Leonardo DRS representatives at the MSPO-2023 exhibition discussed equipping these radars with additional devices and integrating them into the national air defense system. Interestingly, SEE’s report noted: the delivered RPS-42s were regarded as “material and technical aid provided by the US government.”

Apparently, after the radar was purchased from Israel with Lithuanian money, their delivery and integration were coordinated with the US (possibly through the International Support Fund for Ukraine or directly via the Ukrainian Armed Forces command). In any case, by summer 2023 all 16 Israeli radars were in service with Ukraine.

Neither Israel nor Ukraine officially commented on this topic, but the presence of these advanced Israeli radars at the front became public knowledge thanks to volunteer reports and media publications. For example, the newspaper Haaretz on May 8, 2023 reported that “for the first time, Israeli anti-drone radars were deployed in Ukraine”, highlighting Lithuania’s role in their purchase. Walla reported that 16 units of RADA radars were acquired for Ukraine with Lithuanian funds to give citizens timely warnings of Russian attacks and provide the military with a chance to intercept threats.

Use of RPS-42 on the Ukrainian Front

After receiving the new Israeli radars, Ukrainian air defense forces quickly put them into service. According to the Lithuanian Blue/Yellow fund, the first RPS-42 units were “already deployed in their operational sectors” as of early May 2023.

According to open data, these radars are used both to cover major cities and strategic rear facilities, as well as directly on the front line. Their main function is detecting short-range air targets and issuing target designations. The multifunctional RADA radars can detect a wide spectrum of threats: from artillery mines and rockets to UAVs and aircraft. Under Ukrainian conditions, the main threats were Russian cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The RPS-42 stations were integrated into a unified air defense network for early detection of launches and flybys of such targets. The radar data allow operators to quickly calculate the trajectory and probable impact point of a missile, after which the warning system activates sirens precisely in those areas threatened by the attack. This sharply increases the effectiveness of civil defense: people get several extra minutes to seek shelter, and air defense units can better allocate resources.

There are photos showing Ukrainian crews training in Lithuania: a mobile RPS-42 radar on a tripod, soldiers learning to use the station interface. After training, these crews deployed radars in Ukraine.

According to OSINT observers, the first systems were installed in central regions of Ukraine in May 2023—likely to protect the capital region and energy infrastructure. Their geography later expanded.

RPS-42 radars are mobile: they can be towed on trailers, mounted on armored vehicles, or installed stationary on towers. Israeli sources note that these ground-based tactical radars can operate on the move and are adapted for field use (resistant to interference and portable). Walla reported that RADA radars can be quickly redeployed and used to protect maneuvering units on the front line. It is likely that some of the 16 systems were transferred specifically to the air defense units of ground brigades in key sectors—to detect enemy UAVs (recon and loitering munitions) as well as for counter-battery operations (detecting artillery fire).

RADA radars can detect mortar bombs and MLRS rockets at ranges up to 20–25 km, enabling rapid warning of their own units about incoming fire. Unsurprisingly, in official Ukrainian materials, these stations are referred to as “air and artillery reconnaissance radars”.

There is evidence that several RPS-42/ieMHR radars were integrated into some of Ukraine’s mobile anti-aircraft systems. For example, social networks discussed a mysterious Ukrainian counter-drone system based on a vehicle, using the Israeli radar together with Ukrainian or Western electronic warfare equipment. Details were not publicly disclosed, but logically, the targets detected by radar could be automatically handed off to fire or jamming assets (anti-aircraft guns, EW).

Ukrainian military and volunteers have repeatedly published photos and videos of RPS-42 in use.

In particular, on May 5, 2023, OSINT analyst OSINTdefender published images from central Ukraine showing the Israeli radar deployed and a Ukrainian soldier beside it. These images also appeared on Reddit and attracted wide attention. Lithuanian volunteers proudly noted that “all these radars were bought with donations from Lithuanians”, highlighting successful international cooperation.

Mobile radar reconnaissance posts allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to monitor the airspace around the clock: a typical tactic is to place the radar on a hill or forest edge, briefly turn it on to scan the area, and then quickly change position to avoid enemy strikes. The Russian side has confirmed the effectiveness of these measures: according to the ZALA concern, Ukrainians try to minimize radar operating time, “turning them on briefly, camouflaging or placing them on mobile platforms” to make detection harder. However, as will be shown below, Russian intelligence is actively hunting for these Israeli radars.

Israeli radar use at the front was also noted by officials. For example, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Korniychuk in June 2023 said that Ukraine had started piloting the Israeli warning system and “the same ‘Red Alert’ system that has protected Israel for years has been adapted to our realities”.

This system, being implemented in Kyiv, is based on a network of short-range radars (including RADA) and electro-optical sensors to detect missile and drone launches. Korniychuk stressed that Israeli technology allows for local activation of sirens, saving air defense resources. Thus, on the front line, the RPS-42 fulfills a dual mission—military (detecting and tracking targets for engagement) and humanitarian (warning civilians about incoming attacks).

Effectiveness and Role of RPS-42 in Air Defense

The appearance of Israeli radars significantly enhanced Ukraine’s ability to counter drones and missile strikes. These radars belong to the class of multifunctional 4D AESA radars with electronic scanning, capable of simultaneously tracking dozens of targets. Here are the key advantages noted in various sources:

• Detection of small targets. The RPS-42 can detect objects with a very low RCS—such as quadcopters or loitering munitions—at ranges around 10 km. Larger drones (the size of “Orlan”) are detected at 40–45 km, and airplanes or helicopters up to 100–150 km (in some cases up to 200 km in ideal conditions). Previously, Ukraine lacked such small tactical radars, so many enemy drones could approach at low altitude undetected. Now, a radar “cocoon” of RPS-42 units surrounds critical assets, covering the blind spots of larger radars.
• Integration with air defense systems. Data from RPS-42 feeds into the unified information space of Ukraine’s air defense. The stations work in real time, instantly relaying coordinates and trajectory data of detected targets. This allows anti-aircraft crews (MANPADS, ZU-23-2, Gepard, Hawk, etc.) to get advance targeting and prepare to engage the target on approach. According to Israel Hayom, RADA radars “are not intended for interception, but serve as targeting systems for short-range air defense”. In effect, RPS-42 became the “eyes” of anti-aircraft complexes, increasing their effectiveness.
• Reduction in expensive missile expenditure. Israeli experts note that an early warning system based on these radars helps conserve expensive munitions. For example, knowing the exact course and target of a missile, there’s no need to use a surface-to-air missile if the forecast shows it will fall in an uninhabited area. Israel’s “Iron Dome” operates similarly, ignoring rockets heading for empty spaces. Now, Ukraine’s air defense can manage ammunition more wisely, intercepting only truly dangerous targets. Amid Russia’s mass drone and missile barrages, this is a vital factor for air defense survivability.
• Increased survivability of forces and assets. As mentioned, RPS-42 units are integrated with local alert systems. They allow the impact point of an enemy missile or UAV to be determined in seconds, activating sirens only in the specific locality at risk. Previously, lack of such data meant that air raids would be declared across multiple regions (covering huge areas), even if the real threat was to a single city. Now, the warning zone is narrower, support services can respond more efficiently, and people don’t spend unnecessary hours in shelters. Estimates suggest that the Israeli system (including RADA radars and Israeli algorithms) has already saved many lives by giving timely warnings of missile attacks in autumn 2023. For example, during a massive strike on power infrastructure in October 2023, sirens and mobile alerts in Kyiv were triggered precisely and in advance—thanks to the new detection system.

Ukrainian military personnel highly value the Israeli radars they’ve received. At a meeting with Leonardo DRS representatives in September 2023, the Ukrainian side presented a detailed report on combat experience with RPS-42. This feedback, according to SEE, will help improve the systems to suit Ukraine’s specifics.

Discussions covered further equipping the radars (possibly with power supplies, anti-UAV protection, compatibility with national IFF systems, etc.). The parties also agreed to organize expanded overseas instructor training so more radar crews could be trained in Ukraine. All this demonstrates that RADA radars have been successfully integrated into Ukraine’s air defense and will be used for the long term. Moreover, further acquisitions of similar systems are being considered: for example, in July 2023, the Lithuanian government decided to purchase additional mobile radars for Ukraine worth €13.5 million under a pan-European air defense initiative. Some of these funds may go to new Israeli ieMHR (upgraded RPS-42 with extended range).

The RADA company itself (Leonardo DRS ISR Division) has indirectly confirmed a surge in demand due to the war in Ukraine. Its 2022–23 financial reports record a sharp rise in tactical radar orders. Israeli press noted that “RADA shares soared 30% on expectations that the war in Ukraine would bring the company major orders”. While there was no direct report of deliveries to Ukraine, investors clearly associated RADA’s success with this situation.

Russian Claims of Destruction: Truth or PR?

Russian military forces quickly perceived the threat posed by Israeli radars in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

From summer 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense and pro-government media began regularly claiming to have destroyed Israeli RADA RPS‑42 radar stations (or their export ieMHR variants) in the combat zone in Ukraine.

What exactly did the Russian side publish (some examples):

• July 14, 2024: The Russian Ministry of Defense press service announced the destruction of a RADA radar complex in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The official summary mentioned the strike location and claimed the station was hit by Russian artillery or a missile (TASS, 14.07.2024). No details—such as photos, videos, or coordinates—were provided.
• August 24, 2024: The ZALA media group published a video allegedly showing a Russian “Lancet” kamikaze drone striking an ieMHR radar complex. The video description did not include precise coordinates, and the clip lasts only a few seconds, making it impossible to clearly identify the object.
  The very next day, Israeli outlet Israel Defense published a review that explicitly pointed out: the video contains no convincing evidence, no characteristic details of the RADA casing, no geolocation, and it’s impossible to say whether an Israeli radar was really destroyed (Israel Defense, 25.08.2024).
• August 2, 2025: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed in its daily briefing to have destroyed two Israeli RADA complexes—one in Donbas, the other in Sumy region. As before, there were no photos, videos, serial numbers, or geolocation (Russian MoD, 02.08.2025; direct link unavailable, only reported through internal briefings and Russian-language MoD Telegram channels).

How did Western and Ukrainian sources react?

• All of these statements were rapidly spread across Russian and Belarusian Telegram channels, as well as various military blogs, where the mention of Israeli-made equipment was presented as proof of direct military cooperation between Israel and Ukraine.
• However, not a single independent source—neither Western OSINT analysts (such as OSINTdefender, Ukraine Weapons Tracker, GeoConfirmed) nor Ukrainian specialized media—has confirmed any of these alleged losses.
• According to widely accepted standards for military verification, confirming the destruction of equipment should include:
  1. geolocation of the strike site;
  2. photos or videos with clearly identifiable equipment details;
  3. time-stamped evidence;
  4. ideally—independent analysis from multiple experts.

In the case of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR, none of this was published:

• OSINT groups either did not attempt to analyze the Russian-reported footage due to low quality and impossibility of identification,
• or stated outright that they found no confirming materials (OSINTdefender, August 2025).

Why does this situation stand out compared to other battlefield losses?

• For Russian systems—such as S-300, S-400, etc.—in every high-profile case of destruction, Ukrainian forces and the OSINT community post photos and videos from the strike site, as well as satellite images and expert analysis of debris.
• Typically, such publications appear within a day of the incident, complete with geolocation, casing details, expert commentary, and wide discussion in open sources.
• With Israeli radars, this has never happened—all reports of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR losses exist only at the level of official Russian statements, without real proof.

Conclusion:
As of August 2025, none of Russia’s claimed losses of RADA RPS‑42 or ieMHR have been confirmed by independent analysts, OSINT groups, or Western media. Therefore, any such claims should be treated with maximum skepticism—unlike truly verified cases of Russian equipment losses, for which details and evidence are always available.

Overview of Sources and Media Coverage

The topic of Israeli radar deliveries to Ukraine attracted significant attention both in the West and in Israel, Russia, and Ukraine itself. English-language sources provided detailed coverage of the appearance of RPS-42s in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For example, The Kyiv Independent and Euromaidan Press reported on May 5, 2023, about the arrival of the first three radars, noting that the Radarom campaign had raised €14 million for 16 Israeli radars to protect Ukraine’s skies. Industry media (Army Recognition, Israel Defense) described technical details: what the system is, how the Israeli Red Alert works in Ukraine, what types of threats it can detect. Israeli press also actively covered the issue. Even before the delivery, Haaretz published an article, “For the First Time, Israeli Anti-Drone Radars Deployed in Ukraine”, describing the purchase of 16 systems through a Lithuanian organization. Popular publications like Israel Hayom and the site Walla ran stories on how Israel’s Defense Ministry approved the deal and how this affected the IAI state conglomerate’s radar monopoly. After reports of Israeli radar losses in Ukraine, Israeli media responded: for example, Israel Hayom in August 2024 wrote about the “Lancet” drone strike video on a RADA radar and mentioned the 16 radar deliveries to Ukraine in 2023. Thus, Israeli society was aware of these supplies, even if the government did not publicize them.

Russian media made the RPS-42 issue a part of their propaganda narrative.

Major agencies (RIA Novosti, TASS) regularly include phrases about the destruction of the “Israeli RADA radar” in their dispatches, sometimes to emphasize: look, Israel is secretly helping Kyiv, but we are destroying these “Western deliveries.” In October 2024, when the Russian army first “struck” an ieMHR radar, RIA “Novosti Krym” published a separate piece, “Israeli Radar Complex Destroyed for the First Time in the SVO Zone.” It described the radar’s characteristics in detail and even noted that RADA’s headquarters is in Israel with branches in the US.

This indicates an attempt by Russia to use the episode for diplomatic pressure—to signal to Israel that its equipment in Ukraine “will burn.”

In addition, pro-Kremlin military bloggers (Telegram channels) enthusiastically picked up the story: they posted footage of strikes on RPS-42s, called them “hunters of our drones and aircraft”, and praised “Lancets” for scoring a new high-profile target. Some of these videos later made it into Western platforms (Twitter/X, Reddit), adding to the overall picture.

Ukrainian officials do not directly comment on the Israeli radars in the media—likely due to the sensitivity for Israel. However, Ukrainian military regularly thank partners for strengthening air defenses. In Ukrainian Air Force briefings, mentions of “new tactical radars” appeared without details. Volunteers and journalists in Ukraine cover the subject more openly. For example, the Militarnyi portal reported in May 2023: “RADA ieMHR radars are on combat duty in Ukraine”, citing a report by Israeli volunteer N. Flyer. Ukrainian news sites (UP, Novoye Vremya) republished information from Haaretz and Lithuanian sources, explaining to readers what radars were received and why it matters.

Overall, the international reaction to the RPS-42 supply was positive. These radars were seen as “purely defensive assistance”, not causing direct harm to Russia, but saving Ukrainian lives. The US and allies approved Israel’s step.

Meanwhile, Israel tried to keep a balance: helping Ukraine within limits, while assuring Moscow that lethal weapons (such as missiles or the “Iron Dome”) would not be provided to Kyiv.

Nevertheless, a precedent was set—Israeli military technology on the Ukrainian front.

Their combat experience showed that RADA RPS-42/ieMHR radars have substantially strengthened Ukraine’s air defense, though they themselves have become a target in the high-tech duel of “radar versus drone.”

Ukraine received a much-needed tool for early threat detection, while Israel gained valuable experience and a real-world test for its systems amid modern drone and missile warfare.

Conclusion: Summary of the RADA RPS‑42 Issue

• Ukraine received 16 RADA RPS‑42 radars—all delivered via Lithuania with funding from Lithuanian citizens and companies, and with Israel’s formal approval.
• The complexes protect cities, infrastructure, and frontline positions, and are integrated into the national early warning system.
• No new deliveries have been recorded for 2025.
• Reports of radar losses come only from Russian sources and have not received any independent Western verification so far.

As of August 2025, despite some damage, at least eight to ten of the original sixteen radars remain in service with Ukrainian air defense, according to open sources. The remaining units continue to perform core missions—early detection of kamikaze drones, missiles, and artillery—minimizing civilian casualties and preserving critical infrastructure.

At the same time, international experts emphasize that Ukraine’s experience operating the RADA RPS‑42 has been valuable for the Israeli defense industry. Israel, despite isolated incidents, continues to adhere to a policy of limited defensive support for Ukraine and does not transfer offensive weapons.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor this topic and publish only data that can be genuinely confirmed by open sources.

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In Uman on July 20, 2026, a ceremonial event was held in honor of the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine, Michael Brodsky, who is concluding his diplomatic tenure after five years of service.

This is about the farewell to the diplomat in connection with the end of his term.

The event was hosted by the Breslov Center in Uman and the city’s chief rabbi, Yaakov Jan. Participants thanked Brodsky for strengthening relations between Israel and Ukraine, his attention to the Jewish community, and his work during the particularly difficult years of the full-scale war, – reported the Israeli bhol.co.il on July 20, 2026, and posted many photos from the ceremony.

Michael Brodsky continues to serve as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine. His diplomatic mission is expected to conclude in August 2026, but the exact date of the end of his term has not yet been publicly announced. The ceremony held in Uman on July 20 was a pre-arranged farewell to the diplomat before the end of his tenure.

Formally, the ambassador’s powers will cease after Israel notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine about the end of his mission. The appointment of a successor does not in itself terminate the powers of the current ambassador.

Who participated in the ceremony

Representatives of several Jewish communities, Israeli organizations, diplomatic structures, and the Uman municipality attended the meeting.

Among the participants were:

• Chief Rabbi of Uman Yaakov Jan;
• Chairman of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Rabbi Meir Stambler;
• Chief Rabbi of Vinnytsia Shaul Horowitz;
• Chabad emissary in Kyiv and head of the Simcha school, Rabbi Moti Levengartz;
• Representative of the Federation of Jewish Communities Levi Edri;
• Representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich;
• Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eli Ifrah;
• Israeli Consul in Moldova Sagi Rabovsky;
• Representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine Nahman Steinenberg;
• General Director of the Breslov Center Michael Pinto;
• Deputy Mayor of Uman Oleg Ganis;
• Public figure of Uman Shlomi Elisha.

During the ceremony, words of gratitude were expressed for Brodsky’s activities throughout his tenure, especially during the war. The meeting concluded with wishes of success to the diplomat and hope for further strengthening of relations between Israel, the Jews of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people.

What Brodsky was gifted and why

In a photo from the ceremony, it is seen that representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ presented Michael Brodsky with a silver model of an emergency medical vehicle encased in a transparent case, as well as a certificate of appreciation.

The certificate in Hebrew bears the diplomat’s name and reads:

“To Michael Brodsky — with gratitude and appreciation.”

The model of the vehicle symbolizes the work of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ — the Israeli volunteer emergency medical service. Its representatives, Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich, were among the official participants of the ceremony.

During the pilgrimage on Rosh Hashanah in Uman, tens of thousands of people are present simultaneously. Therefore, rescuers set up medical points, provide first aid, are on duty near prayer complexes, and interact with Ukrainian emergency services.

The original message does not state that the award is related to a specific rescue operation. Therefore, it is more accurate to explain it as a symbol of the long-term cooperation of the Israeli embassy with medical and rescue structures serving Israeli pilgrims.

Five years of Michael Brodsky in Ukraine

Michael Brodsky began his duties as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in August 2021.

On October 1, 2021, he presented his credentials to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. The meeting discussed bilateral relations, cooperation between Israel and Ukraine, the preservation of historical memory, and issues of Jewish life.

Brodsky was born on August 19, 1972. He graduated from Tel Aviv University with a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in diplomacy and national security.

From 2003 to 2006, he worked as the press attaché of the Israeli embassy in Moscow, and from 2006 to 2008, he was a political advisor there. From 2009 to 2013, he headed the public diplomacy direction at the Israeli embassy in the United Kingdom.

From 2015 to 2018, Brodsky was the Israeli ambassador to Kazakhstan and a non-resident ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, and from 2019 to 2021, he served as the director of the First Eurasian Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

February 24, 2022: the embassy’s work turned into evacuation

Most of Brodsky’s tenure coincided with the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.

The embassy was moved from Kyiv to Lviv a few days before the invasion. After February 24, 2022, the diplomats relocated to Poland and for several months operated essentially as an ’embassy in exile’.

According to Brodsky himself, at the start of the war, more than 10,000 Israeli citizens remained in Ukraine. Diplomats opened a hotline, received calls around the clock, and helped people leave by buses and cars through Ukraine’s western borders.

On March 4, 2022, Michael Brodsky was involved in a car accident in Poland on his way to Warsaw. He sustained minor injuries and was taken to Israel for treatment. Temporary leadership of the diplomatic work was assumed by Simona Galperin, who then headed the Eurasian direction of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After treatment, Brodsky returned to work.

On May 17, 2022, he arrived in Kyiv and raised the Israeli flag near the embassy building. Together with Deputy Yoav Bistritzky, he led the first group of Israeli diplomats to return to the Ukrainian capital after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Why the ceremony was held in Uman

Uman is one of the most challenging areas of work for the Israeli embassy in Ukraine.

Every year on Rosh Hashanah, tens of thousands of Jews, many of whom hold Israeli citizenship, come to the city. They head to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

After the closure of Ukrainian airspace in February 2022, pilgrims have to travel through Moldova, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and other neighboring countries.

The Israeli embassy has to coordinate work with the Ukrainian government, the State Border Guard Service, the National Police, the authorities of the Cherkasy region, the Uman municipality, and transit countries.

On July 22, 2022, Brodsky urged Israelis to refrain from traveling to Uman. He warned that Ukraine is at war, and the embassy would not be able to guarantee the safety of pilgrims or provide full consular assistance in the event of a large-scale emergency.

Despite the warnings, the pilgrimage continued.

On September 9–10, 2023, Brodsky held talks with the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Israel and Ukraine agreed on measures to facilitate the entry of tens of thousands of pilgrims through the borders of neighboring countries.

On September 14, 2023, Ukrainian authorities reported the round-the-clock operation of seven police posts in places of mass gathering of pilgrims. About 30,000 guests were expected in Uman, and Israeli police assisted Ukrainian law enforcement.

At the end of September 2024, Brodsky reported the arrival of another group of Israeli police in Uman. According to him, more than 30,000 pilgrims were expected, although the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs again recommended citizens refrain from traveling to the warring country.

Following the pilgrimage on October 2–4, 2024, Ukrainian officials reported that about 35,000 people arrived in Uman.

This is why the Breslov Center viewed Brodsky not just as an ambassador in Kyiv, but as the main official intermediary between Israel, the Ukrainian authorities, and tens of thousands of pilgrims.

Who are the Breslov Hasidim

Breslov, or Breslov Hasidim, are followers of the teachings of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

Rabbi Nachman was born in 1772 in Medzhybizh and was the great-grandson of the Baal Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism.

In September 1802, he moved to Breslov, a town in modern-day Vinnytsia region. The name of the movement comes from the name of Breslov. It should not be confused with Bratislava or the Polish Wrocław.

At the center of Rabbi Nachman’s teachings are personal prayer, spiritual joy, overcoming despair, and belief in a person’s ability to change their life.

One of the most well-known practices is hitbodedut — a solitary conversation with God in one’s own words.

Rabbi Nachman did not create a hereditary dynasty or appoint a successor. His closest disciple, Reb Natan Sternhartz of Nemirov, recorded and published the teachings of his mentor, supported the communities, and effectively led the movement, but did not proclaim himself the new rebbe.

Therefore, Breslov Hasidim still do not have a single supreme contemporary leader. There are different rabbis, communities, yeshivas, and organizations that recognize the spiritual authority of Rabbi Nachman.

Why they go to Uman

In the spring of 1810, the seriously ill Rabbi Nachman moved to Uman.

He spent the last months of his life there, addressed his followers on Rosh Hashanah 1810, and died on October 16, 1810, at the age of 38. He was buried in the old Jewish cemetery of Uman.

In the spring of 1811, Reb Natan organized an annual gathering of followers in Uman. Thus, the tradition of celebrating Rosh Hashanah near Rabbi Nachman’s grave began. In 1834, Reb Natan built a large synagogue for the gathering participants.

During the Soviet era, the pilgrimage was banned or conducted underground. Mass trips began to revive in the late 1980s and especially after Ukraine regained independence in 1991.

However, not every person who comes to Uman today is a Breslov Hasid in the strict sense. Among the guests are representatives of other religious directions, traditional Israelis, people who have returned to religious life, public figures, and those who perceive the trip as a one-time spiritual journey. Breslov sources also note that a significant portion of the pilgrims do not belong to the core of the movement.

Where they live and where they travel besides Uman

Most modern Breslov Hasidim do not live in Ukraine but in Israel.

The main communities and institutions operate in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Safed, and Yavneel. In Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, there are several thousand families that form the core of the movement. Synagogues, yeshivas, rabbinical educational institutions, and charitable foundations operate there.

Breslov centers and communities also exist in New York, Los Angeles, Lakewood, Montreal, London, and Paris. However, they do not have a single administrative structure that governs all the communities worldwide.

Uman is the main pilgrimage site for Rosh Hashanah, but Breslov Hasidim also visit:

• Breslov, where Rabbi Nachman lived and taught;
• Nemirov, associated with Reb Natan;
• Medzhybizh, where Rabbi Nachman was born and the Baal Shem Tov is buried;
• Berdychiv and other historical centers of Jewish life in Ukraine;
• Safed, Tiberias, and Mount Meron in Israel.

What is the Breslov Center in Uman

The Breslov Center in Uman, which hosted the ceremony in honor of Michael Brodsky, is a local religious, public, and coordination structure working with the Breslov community, pilgrims, Ukrainian authorities, and official representatives of Israel.

The origins of the organized activities of the center are linked to the work of Rabbi Yechiel Michel Dorfman. After leaving the USSR in 1969, he began preserving Rabbi Nachman’s grave, developing pilgrimage infrastructure, and building a large kloyz and mikvahs in Uman. This work was later continued by his students and representatives of Breslov communities.

The Israeli association ‘World Breslov Center’ was officially registered on June 24, 2003. It participated in maintaining the religious infrastructure of Uman, organizing pilgrimages, and negotiating with Ukrainian authorities.

The current ‘Breslov Center in Uman’, headed by the city’s chief rabbi Yaakov Jan and represented by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg, has been actively operating since at least 2024. However, open sources do not confirm that it is the direct legal successor of the association registered in 2003.

It is not the worldwide headquarters of Breslov Hasidism and does not own all the infrastructure near Rabbi Nachman’s grave. The center mainly deals with public relations, negotiations with authorities, pilgrimage preparation, coordination with police, diplomats, medics, and rescue organizations.

Who leads the center

The center operates under the leadership of the chief rabbi of Uman, Yaakov Jan.

Michael Pinto is listed as the general director of the Breslov Center. He is involved in organizational, public, and external work.

Nahman Steinenberg, a representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine, also participates in the leadership and organization of the center’s external contacts.

In July 2024, the Breslov Center organized the first official visit of Uman’s mayor, Iryna Pletneva, and her deputies to Israel.

The Ukrainian delegation met with Minister of Culture and Sports Miki Zohar, Minister of Religious Services Michael Malkieli, and Minister of Internal Affairs Moshe Arbel. They discussed Uman’s preparation for Rosh Hashanah, security, municipal cooperation, and the reception of tens of thousands of Israeli citizens. The visit was organized by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg.

Where the center is located and what is in the quarter

The center’s work is concentrated in the area of the Jewish pilgrimage quarter around Rabbi Nachman’s grave.

Officially, the grave is located at: Uman, Hryhoriya Kosynky Street, 1.

On July 2, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine elevated the status of the site and recognized Rabbi Nachman’s grave as a monument of national historical significance. Before that, it had the status of a local significance monument.

However, a confirmed separate postal address for the administration of the Breslov Center itself is not specified in open publications. The center is better perceived as a coordination organization rather than just a single building.

In the pilgrimage quarter, there are:

• Rabbi Nachman’s grave;
• Synagogues and prayer halls;
• A large Breslov kloyz — a house of prayer and study;
• Mikvahs for religious purification;
• Hotels, apartments, and hospitality houses;
• kosher kitchens and dining rooms;
• medical points;
• charitable organizations;
• bookstores and centers for the distribution of religious literature.

However, all this does not belong to one structure.

The complex directly near the grave is managed by a separate organization — “Ihud Breslov in Uman”, or Breslov Union.

On August 25, 2025, this organization announced a project to reconstruct the complex costing more than two million dollars. The plan includes separate prayer halls for Ashkenazi and Sephardic rites, a women’s section, a dance hall, new sanitary facilities, and rest areas.

According to the organizers, the annual maintenance of the complex exceeds 800 thousand dollars, and preparation for Rosh Hashanah alone costs more than 350 thousand dollars.

Thus, the “Breslov Center” Pinto and Jan is primarily engaged in public relations, coordination, and interaction with the authorities, while “Ihud Breslov” manages the grave complex itself. These are different structures, although they may cooperate.

How the center works before Rosh Hashanah

Before the annual pilgrimage, center representatives participate in negotiations on:

• border operations and transport routes;
• accommodation for tens of thousands of people;
• sanitary conditions;
• water and electricity supply;
• police and rescue operations;
• medical points;
• access to shelters;
• actions during air raids;
• consular assistance to Israeli citizens.

In 2024–2025, the center also interacted with “Ihud Hatzalah” in preparing medical units and volunteers for the mass arrival of pilgrims. Organization representatives named Yaakov Jan as one of the center’s leaders, Michael Pinto as the general director, and Nachman Steinenberg as the coordinator of relations with the authorities.

The center’s work is not limited to the pilgrimage.

On September 6, 2025, the Israeli international cooperation agency MASHAV announced the installation of a water purification system at the Central City Hospital in Uman. The project was implemented jointly with the Israeli embassy and is intended to provide clean drinking water to the hospital and residents of nearby areas.

Michael Brodsky personally opened the installation during a visit to Uman. Michael Pinto and Nachman Steinenberg also participated in the event.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that in this way, the center gradually transformed from a structure associated only with religious pilgrimage into a mediator between the Jewish community, the city of Uman, and Israeli governmental and public organizations.

How Brodsky was connected to the Breslov Center

Michael Brodsky did not publicly call himself a Breslov Hasid.

His connection with the center was diplomatic and practical.

Through the embassy, issues of entry for Israeli citizens, interaction with Ukrainian border guards, the arrival of Israeli police and medics, missile threat warnings, consular staff work, and contacts with the Uman municipality were resolved.

After the war began, these tasks became significantly more complicated. The pilgrimage effectively turned into an annual international operation involving the authorities of Ukraine, Israel, Moldova, and other transit countries.

Brodsky simultaneously warned citizens of the danger and continued negotiations, understanding that even after official recommendations, tens of thousands of people would still head to Uman.

That is why the Breslov Center organized a separate ceremony for him. For the center’s leadership, he was the main representative of Israel, with whom pilgrimage, security, medical, and humanitarian cooperation issues were resolved over five years.

The last weeks of the term and the new ambassador

Even before the ceremony in Uman, Michael Brodsky received official recognition from the Ukrainian capital.

On July 8, 2026, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko awarded him the “For the Defense of Kyiv” medal for supporting the Ukrainian capital during the war.

Klitschko thanked the diplomat for five years of service, open dialogue, partnership, and participation in joint projects. The parties discussed Israel’s assistance after the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Brodsky, for his part, recalled the support Ukraine expressed to Israel after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

The name of Brodsky’s successor has been known since the end of 2025.

On November 23, 2025, the Israeli government approved the appointment of career diplomat Roi Rosenblit as the new ambassador to Ukraine. Previously, Rosenblit was Israel’s ambassador to Senegal, worked as deputy head of diplomatic missions in Moscow and Cairo, and represented Israel in the Pacific region countries.

The formal transfer of powers is completed after diplomatic procedures and the presentation of credentials by the new ambassador to the Ukrainian side.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that Michael Brodsky’s term was one of the most challenging in the history of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ukraine.

He arrived in Kyiv in August 2021, when relations between the two countries were developing peacefully. Already six months later, the embassy had to evacuate citizens, leave the Ukrainian capital, and work from Poland.

Brodsky returned to Kyiv on May 17, 2022, continued working under air raid alerts, coordinated humanitarian projects, and simultaneously was responsible for the safety of tens of thousands of Israelis who annually come to Uman.

The ceremony on July 20, 2026 was not just a farewell to the ambassador. It summed up five years of cooperation, during which diplomacy was associated not only with negotiations between governments but also with the evacuation of people, medicine, community work, and citizen safety during the war.