Author: Карабас Барабас

In the tenth part, we will analyze platforms that help small businesses in Israel tackle several tasks at once: business reputation, publications, simple pages, mini-sites, digital showcases, blog archives, and additional profiles in various online environments.

At first glance, such platforms may seem different and even random. XING is associated with professional contacts, Academia.edu with the academic environment, Tistory with blogs, BigCartel with online stores, Mobirise with simple sites, and My Mail.ru or Mlife.by with the old Russian-speaking social environment. But for promoting small businesses, they can serve one common function: enhancing the brand’s digital footprint.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how different external pages can work around one central idea.

The project itself is related to Israel news, Ukraine topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. For small businesses, the principle is the same: each platform should help the client understand who you are, how you are useful, where the main site is, and why you can be trusted.

XING Page: business page for the European professional audience

XING is a professional social network founded in 2003 and particularly notable in the German-speaking region: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. In its role, XING is similar to LinkedIn but historically more closely connected to the DACH market, business contacts, careers, companies, recruiting, and professional profiles.

Globally, XING lags behind LinkedIn, but in its regional niche, it remains a recognizable platform. It is used by specialists, entrepreneurs, consultants, companies, recruiters, B2B projects, and organizations that value business connections in Europe.

For small businesses in Israel, XING can be useful if the company works with European partners, German-speaking clients, tourists, investors, B2B services, medical tourism, real estate, technology, consulting, or international projects.

The page XING Page — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can function as a business page of the project in the professional European environment. For small businesses, this is an example of how a brand can be taken beyond local social networks and presented in a more business context.

Litsy: books, culture, and the reading community

Litsy is a social platform for readers, books, quotes, notes, book recommendations, and literary communication. It can be considered a niche environment for people who love to read, discuss books, share impressions, and find new texts.

In terms of market share, Litsy does not compete with large social networks or major book services. But its value lies in its thematic focus: the audience is initially closer to reading, culture, literature, author notes, and intellectual content.

For small businesses in Israel, Litsy may not be useful for everyone. But if the business is related to books, education, culture, history, media, language courses, publishing projects, or author content, such a platform can become an additional point of trust.

The profile Litsy — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as a cultural and reader point of the project. For NAnews, this is especially logical because part of the materials is related to historical memory, books, culture, and human stories.

Mlife.by: niche social environment and additional profile

Mlife.by is a niche social platform from the Russian-speaking internet environment. There is little open data about its large market share, so it should not be considered the main promotion channel. But for the brand’s digital map, such platforms can be useful as additional profiles and points of presence.

The main task of such platforms is not to replace Facebook, Telegram, LinkedIn, or Google, but to secure the brand in yet another environment. For businesses, this can be especially important if they work with Russian-speaking audiences, local communities, media projects, culture, or services for repatriates.

For small businesses in Israel, Mlife.by can be an additional page: company description, website link, brief information about activities, news, or publications. Even if the platform does not bring many transitions, it helps expand the overall digital footprint.

The profile Mlife.by — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work exactly like this: as another point of presence for the project in the Russian-speaking online environment.

My Mail.ru: old social ecosystem and Russian-speaking audience

My Mail.ru is part of the large Russian-speaking internet ecosystem Mail.ru, associated with profiles, photos, blogs, groups, comments, and social activity. The platform was particularly notable in the era of old social networks and can still hold significance for part of the Russian-speaking audience.

In terms of market share, My Mail.ru today is not the main competitor to modern social networks and messengers. But its value lies elsewhere: it can provide access to an audience accustomed to old Russian-speaking services, profiles, groups, and personal pages.

For small businesses in Israel, such a platform can make sense if the company works with Russian-speaking clients, older audiences, cultural projects, local services, or materials in Russian. It is not the main channel for applications, but an additional layer of trust.

The profile My Mail.ru — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional Russian-speaking page of the project.

Academia.edu: expertise, research, and intellectual context

Academia.edu is a platform for researchers, authors, teachers, students, and people who publish or read academic and analytical materials. It is not a social network in the usual sense but works as a professional environment for texts, research, profiles, and scientific interests.

In the market, Academia.edu is in the niche of academic networking and research sharing. It is used by university teachers, independent researchers, article authors, students, analysts, historians, cultural experts, and specialists who want to showcase the intellectual or research side of their work.

For small businesses in Israel, Academia.edu can be useful if the company is related to education, analytics, history, culture, research, law, international relations, media, or consulting. Such a profile helps show that the project works not only with advertising and short posts but also with more serious content.

The profile Academia.edu — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an intellectual point of the project, especially for materials on historical memory, Jewish-Ukrainian connections, culture, politics, and social processes.

JustPaste.it: quick publications, notes, and external pages

JustPaste.it is a simple platform for quickly publishing text, images, links, and notes. It is used when you need to quickly create a page without complex registration, design, or technical setup. Essentially, it is a tool for quick publications and external text materials.

In terms of market share, JustPaste.it cannot be compared to Medium, WordPress, or Substack. Its task is different: to quickly publish material, share text, create a temporary or permanent page, place a project description, instruction, link collection, or information block.

For small businesses in Israel, JustPaste.it can be useful as an additional publication platform. For example, you can place a service description, FAQ, press release, brief presentation, client instruction, temporary event page, or link list.

The page JustPaste.it — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a simple external archive of project materials.

Tistory: blog platform and additional publication channel

Tistory is a blog platform from the Korean internet environment, suitable for publishing articles, notes, reviews, personal blogs, and thematic materials. It is not a global giant like WordPress or Medium but remains a notable blog platform in its niche.

For businesses, Tistory can be useful as an additional blog, especially if you need to create another external page with materials, project description, links to main language versions, articles, and context.

In promoting small businesses, such blogs are important not only because of direct traffic. They help search engines and people see that the brand is represented in different environments, knows how to publish explanations, and is not limited to one social page.

The blog Tistory — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional publication and project description channel.

DCMS: simple external page for the project

DCMS is a platform for creating a simple page or small site. Such tools are usually needed when a project requires quick external presence: brief description, links, sections, visual structure, and contact information.

In the mass market, DCMS should not be compared to Wix, WordPress, Webflow, or Tilda. Its role is more auxiliary: to provide another page that can be used as an entry into the project’s digital ecosystem.

For small businesses in Israel, such a page can be useful as an additional business card. For example, you can briefly tell about services, put a link to the main site, add language versions, explain the geography of work, and give a person a quick way to contact.

The page DCMS — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an external presentation point of the project.

BigCartel: small store and digital product showcase

BigCartel is a platform for small online stores, independent authors, artists, designers, brands, musicians, and projects that need a simple showcase for selling goods or digital materials. It has been operating since 2005 and has historically been popular among independent creators and small stores.

In the market, BigCartel does not compete with Shopify or WooCommerce in scale but occupies its niche: simple stores, small collections, author products, merch, art products, zines, digital publications, and independent projects.

For small businesses in Israel, BigCartel can be useful if there is a small assortment: books, guides, digital files, tickets, author products, merch, postcards, templates, consultations, or special publications. A large online store is not always needed — sometimes a simple showcase is enough.

The page BigCartel — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as a digital product showcase or project presentation. For businesses, this is an example of how content can be formatted not only as an article but also as a separate product.

Mobirise: offline builder and simple sites without complex CMS

Mobirise is a website builder that differs from many cloud platforms in that it works as an offline website builder. It is used to create simple sites, landing pages, portfolios, company pages, presentations, and small projects without programming.

In terms of market share, Mobirise is not the main competitor to WordPress, Wix, or Shopify. But it has its niche: users who need a visual builder, control over files, simple structure, and the ability to build a site without constant work in a large online CMS.

For small businesses in Israel, Mobirise can be useful as a tool for quick landing pages. For example, you can create a page for a separate service, event, project, promotion, language audience, or temporary campaign.

The page Mobirise — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as another external page of the project, enhancing the overall digital footprint.

How to use these platforms without chaos

The main mistake of small businesses is creating profiles and pages without a common logic. If a company has XING, Litsy, Mlife.by, My Mail.ru, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, and Mobirise, but nowhere has a proper description, link to the main site, and clear direction, the client will simply get lost.

Each platform should have its task.

• XING — professional reputation.
• Litsy — books and cultural audience.
• Mlife.by and My Mail.ru — Russian-speaking digital footprint.
• Academia.edu — expertise and research.
• JustPaste.it — quick publications.
• Tistory — blog.
• DCMS and Mobirise — simple external pages.
• BigCartel — showcase of digital products or small goods.

For businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is diverse. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English, a fourth in Ukrainian. One wants to see a business profile, another a blog, a third a store page, a fourth a short description and a link to the main site.

Why this is important for small businesses in Israel

The Israeli market is fast and practical. A client can check the site, social networks, reviews, map, profile, publications, and the brand’s external footprint in a few minutes. If they see empty pages and random names, trust decreases. If they see a neat system, the likelihood of engagement increases.

Additional platforms do not replace the main site but help it work stronger. They create more entry points, expand visibility, show different audiences different sides of the business, and help a person be convinced that the company is real, active, and understandable.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even diverse platforms can lead to one logic. A reader can find the project through XING, Litsy, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, or Mobirise, but everywhere they should understand: this is one project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real engagements: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site transitions, and clients from the desired city or region.

The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the tenth part: XING Page, Litsy, Mlife.by, My Mail.ru, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, and Mobirise help small businesses in Israel expand their digital footprint, showcase expertise, publish materials, create simple pages, and design digital showcases. This is not a replacement for the main site, but an additional system of trust around it.

US President Donald Trump faced a choice that could determine the further course of the war with Iran and change the situation throughout the Middle East. American and Israeli officials believe that Washington has two realistic paths left: agree to a ten-day ceasefire proposed by mediators or move with Israel to a significantly larger military campaign against Tehran.

A final decision has not yet been made in the White House. However, Axios sources claim that a choice may be made in the next few days. The possibility of continuing the current exhausting war without a clear political goal is diminishing: American airstrikes have failed to restore normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran continues to attack commercial ships and American facilities, and the region’s economy is suffering increasingly heavy losses.

At the same time, Washington is acting on two fronts. The Trump administration is considering a diplomatic proposal from Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and other mediators, but is simultaneously deploying dozens of combat aircraft and aerial refuelers to the region. Israeli sources report that the IDF is on high alert in case the war expands into a full-scale coordinated operation.

Two scenarios Trump is choosing between

The first option involves a temporary halt to hostilities for ten days. During this time, the US and Iran must restore movement through the Strait of Hormuz and attempt to salvage a temporary agreement previously reached but effectively destroyed after new attacks on commercial ships and the resumption of American strikes.

The second scenario is a transition to a large joint campaign by the US and Israel. According to Axios, this is not about isolated retaliatory strikes, but an attempt to inflict such military damage on Iran that the country’s leadership will accept American terms. However, neither the White House, the Pentagon, nor the Israeli government has officially announced a decision to start such an operation. Reports of campaign preparations are based on information from American and Israeli officials, some of whom speak on condition of anonymity.

Possible scenario	Main goal	Primary risk
Ten-day ceasefire	Open the Strait of Hormuz and return parties to negotiations	Iran and the US may use the pause to regroup, after which hostilities will resume
Joint US-Israel operation	Use military pressure to force Tehran to accept Washington’s terms	Expansion of the war to Israel, Gulf countries, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Red Sea
Continuation of the current campaign	Weaken Iran without sharply expanding the war	Protracted conflict, new losses, rising oil prices, and lack of clear results

American officials acknowledge that the space for a third option—a prolonged war of medium intensity—is practically disappearing. For ten consecutive nights, American planes have struck Iran, but Tehran has retained the ability to restrict movement through the Strait of Hormuz and attack ships.

For Trump, this is becoming not only a military but also a domestic political problem. He has repeatedly stated that the United States has achieved victory over Iran, but ongoing attacks, the death of American servicemen, and rising fuel prices contradict claims of a completed campaign.

What regional mediators propose

The proposal for a ten-day ceasefire was conveyed to Washington and Tehran by representatives of Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and other regional states. Reuters confirmed that Iran received the relevant document and is considering the possibility of a temporary halt to the war to restore the agreement reached in the previous month.

The plan provides for the cessation of attacks, the resumption of movement along two main routes of the Strait of Hormuz, and the start of negotiations on a long-term shipping order.

The southern route passes through the territorial waters of Oman. Under the proposed scheme, Iran must cease attacks on ships using this corridor. The northern route is closer to the Iranian coast. To open it, the US must ease or lift the naval blockade imposed against Iran.

Within ten days, the parties must agree on the rules for the further passage of commercial ships. One of the options being considered provides for allowing Iran to receive limited fees for specific services—security, environmental control, and navigational support.

This is fundamentally different from Tehran’s demands to charge a general fee for passage through the strait. As a possible model, mediators are considering the Strait of Malacca, where coastal states receive money for separate services but do not impose a transit fee. The creation of a joint fund with the participation of the International Maritime Organization is also being discussed.

Diplomatic efforts involve Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari envoy Ali Al-Tawadi, Pakistan’s army commander Field Marshal Asim Munir, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty, and Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi.

Why the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz is almost insoluble

The main contradiction is not just about shipping safety, but about who will actually control the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends.

Washington demands that Tehran publicly declare that the strait is open for international shipping and that commercial ships will no longer be attacked. The Iranian side, on the contrary, insists that the opening of the strait, its demining, and regulation of movement should be exclusively within Iran’s competence.

Iran’s representative to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, stated that attempts by external states to establish their own order of management of the strait would violate the temporary agreement and lead to further tension. Tehran also promotes the idea of charging passing ships, although for decades the Strait of Hormuz has been considered by the international community as a crucial international maritime route.

Before the war began, about one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas trade passed through Hormuz. After the effective halt of a significant portion of shipping, energy prices have sharply increased, and Gulf countries have begun seeking alternative export routes.

NANews — Israel News notes that the dispute over the strait has gradually turned into a struggle for the future security architecture of the entire Persian Gulf. If the US agrees to a special role for Iran, Tehran will be able to present this as recognition of its regional power. If Washington tries to completely deprive Iran of control, achieving this without a prolonged military operation will be extremely difficult.

Why the previous ceasefire collapsed

The United States and Iran have already reached temporary agreements. In April, Trump agreed to a two-week ceasefire, which was then extended. In June, the parties signed another preliminary agreement providing for the cessation of war and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, a permanent peace treaty was not concluded.

After new attacks on ships, Trump declared the previous ceasefire over, although he agreed to continue negotiations. The American side claimed that the attacks could have been organized by a radical group within the Iranian system, not fully controlled by the central leadership. For the White House, this explanation was not a reason to refrain from retaliatory strikes.

The situation highlights another problem: even if Iranian negotiators sign an agreement, Washington doubts that all regime structures, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, will comply with it.

Iranian Foreign Ministry representative Esmail Baghaei confirmed receiving new proposals through mediators but refused to disclose their content. At the same time, he stated that the Iranian armed forces would continue to respond to American strikes. Thus, Tehran has not yet demonstrated a willingness to cease fire without additional political and economic guarantees.

The US is building up forces, Israel is preparing for war expansion

Simultaneously with diplomatic negotiations, the United States is strengthening its military presence in the Middle East. According to Axios, dozens of fighters and refueling aircraft have been sent to the region. Reuters separately confirmed that the deployment of additional aviation forces began even before the latest Iranian attacks on American servicemen.

Refueling aircraft are of particular importance. They allow American fighters and bombers to stay in the air longer, strike targets deep within Iran’s territory, and conduct prolonged operations without the need to station all aviation directly near the combat zone.

The US Central Command stated that the latest series of strikes targeted Iran’s military command centers, naval forces, missile and drone launch positions, and air defense systems. The goal of the operation, Washington says, is to protect commercial shipping and punish the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units for attacks on American servicemen.

However, after ten consecutive nights of strikes, Iran retained the ability to attack ships. On July 21, Iranian forces struck a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, forcing the crew to abandon the ship. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for two more attacks on ships carried out the day before.

This poses an unpleasant question for the Trump administration: can an air campaign alone force Iran to relinquish control over the strait? So far, the results of the strikes show that destroying individual radars, launchers, and command posts does not guarantee the restoration of safe shipping.

US losses increase pressure on the White House

An additional factor has been the losses of the American army. As a result of Iranian attacks in Jordan, two American servicemen were killed, and another went missing. Separately, it was reported that a serviceman died in Iraq while defusing a munition left from a downed Iranian drone.

Since the resumption of American strikes on July 7, nearly 100 US servicemen have been injured. A Pentagon representative claims that most of the injured suffered mild concussions, and 96% have already returned to duty. Since the start of the war on February 28, 17 American military personnel have died.

Trump stated that for every American soldier killed, Iran will pay “many times more.” According to Axios, the advancement of the truce project slowed down precisely after the strike on Americans in Jordan. One official reported that the president has not yet completed retaliatory actions and may continue strikes before returning to serious discussions of a ceasefire.

For Israel, the situation means the need to prepare for several options at once. If Washington chooses negotiations, the Israeli leadership will try to secure guarantees that the truce will not allow Iran to restore its military infrastructure. If Trump decides to expand the operation, Israel may become a full participant in the new campaign and simultaneously the main target for retaliatory Iranian missile and drone strikes.

Axios sources claim that the IDF is on high combat readiness and can transition to a full-scale coordinated campaign within a few days. However, there is no official announcement of the start of such an operation.

The war could engulf the entire region

The risk of conflict expansion is not limited to Israel and the Persian Gulf. Yemeni Houthis have declared a naval blockade of Saudi ports and threatened to attack ships in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait area, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.

This creates a threat of simultaneous disruption of movement on two of the world’s most important energy routes. The Strait of Hormuz provides the exit of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf, while Bab-el-Mandeb is used by ships heading through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia has begun to use the oil pipeline to the Red Sea coast more actively to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthi threat puts pressure on this alternative route as well. Saudi military officials stated that they intend to ensure freedom of navigation and will consider attacks on ships as acts of maritime piracy.

Iran has also struck states where American forces are stationed. Reports have been made of attacks against facilities or airspace in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Jordanian military officials reported on July 21 about intercepting five Iranian drones.

Thus, the new phase of the war could quickly spread to countries that formally do not seek to become participants in the conflict but provide the US with military bases, airspace, or logistical infrastructure.

The economic cost of a protracted war

Military escalation is already affecting global energy markets. On July 21, the price of Brent oil remained above $88 per barrel, and earlier briefly exceeded $90. The average gasoline price in the US reached about four dollars per gallon.

The rise in fuel costs creates additional pressure on Trump ahead of the midterm elections in Congress. The president built his political position on the promise not to drag the US into prolonged Middle Eastern wars, but the conflict with Iran is becoming increasingly large-scale, expensive, and difficult to end.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes that the economic factor may be as important as the military one. Even if American strikes continue to destroy Iranian infrastructure, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will harm US allies, global markets, and American consumers themselves.

A decision has not yet been made, but time is running out

Currently, the existence of a proposal for a ten-day ceasefire, the diplomatic activity of Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman, the deployment of American aviation, and Israel’s heightened readiness have been confirmed.

However, the assertion that Trump has already chosen a large-scale joint operation with Israel is premature. The White House continues to explore the diplomatic option and urges the Israeli leadership not to take actions that could completely close the window for negotiations. Simultaneously, the US is demonstrating to Tehran that it is ready to move to a much heavier military campaign if mediation efforts fail.

In the coming days, three key signals are possible. The first will be the official agreement of Iran and the US to a ceasefire. The second will be a real reduction in the number of attacks on commercial ships and American facilities. The third will be the further deployment of aviation and Israel’s transition from heightened readiness to open strikes.

The main problem is that the parties are trying to improve their positions directly before possible negotiations. The US continues bombings, trying to force Iran to make concessions. Tehran attacks ships and military facilities, showing that air pressure cannot deprive it of influence over the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why the ten-day pause could become either the first step towards ending the war or a short respite before its most dangerous phase. If diplomacy fails, Trump may face the necessity to fulfill threats and move to a campaign whose consequences will affect not only Iran and Israel but the entire Middle East.

“Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” continues its project about famous Israelis of Ukrainian origin – Natan Sharansky.

Today, Natan Sharansky remains a good friend of Ukrainians at the level of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel. His clear stance on international support for Ukraine after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion became a call for the Israeli government to decisively condemn the attack on Ukraine. Natan Sharansky firmly emphasized that Israel must unwaveringly stand on the side of the Ukrainians.

Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky (b. 1948) is one of the most prominent human rights activists, a well-known Israeli political figure of Ukrainian-Jewish origin.

In addition, he actively participated in the Jewish movement in the USSR, demonstrations, and protests. In 1977, Natan Sharansky was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation, and the following year he was sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of espionage for the USA.

Only thanks to numerous petitions from influential world politicians and demonstrations in 1986, through an agreement between the USSR and the USA, Natan Sharansky was freed from the repressive grip: he was exchanged for one of the Soviet spies arrested in the West. Immediately after the exchange, Natan was honorably received by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yitzhak Shamir.

In the same year, Sharansky founded the public organization “Zionist Forum,” which aimed to unite repatriates from the Soviet Union, and already in 1995, he started the political party “Israel for Aliyah.” In Israel, Natan Sharansky continued his active human rights activities, gaining experience as a recognized, influential Israeli politician. He was a member of the Knesset for a long period and also had experience working as a minister and deputy prime minister in the Israeli governments, chaired the executive council of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the supervisory board of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center.

In January 2023, Natan Sharansky turned 75 years old. He dedicated almost his entire conscious life to active human rights struggle, the protection of human rights, political activity, as well as the development of close diplomatic and interethnic ties between Israel and Ukraine.

 

Many Russian-speaking Israelis hear the word “pension” and immediately think of Bituach Leumi. This is understandable: it is the state old-age benefit that is most often discussed in families, social groups, and conversations with those who have already gone through the paperwork. But in Israel, “pension” is not always the same payment, and confusion between Bituach Leumi and the pension fund can cost a person money, time, and peace of mind.

One person is waiting for the old-age benefit and thinks that until then, nothing needs to be done with the pension fund. Another is sure that if he has pension savings through work, then Bituach Leumi is no longer so important. A third continues to work after 60 and does not even know that the pension fund in some cases should be checked separately — even before the official age for receiving benefits from Bituach Leumi.

In practice, these are two different systems.

1. Bituach Leumi — the state part.
2. Pension fund — savings accumulated through work.

They may meet in one family budget, but they do not replace each other and are not automatically processed by one action.

We have covered this topic in detail in a separate material:

Are you 60+ in Israel and still working? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money – https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

Bituach Leumi: state old-age benefit

Bituach Leumi is Israel’s national insurance system. The old-age benefit is paid not because a person has a pension fund, but because they meet the conditions of the state system: age, insurance record, resident status, income in a certain period, and other criteria.

It is important to understand: the old-age benefit does not always start being paid automatically. To receive it, you need to apply to Bituach Leumi, and the right to payment at retirement age may depend on an income check. If a person does not pass such an income check, the right to the full benefit usually comes at age 70.

For men, the retirement age in Israel is usually 67, and for women, it depends on the date of birth and gradually ranges from 62 to 65. But it is important not to confuse “retirement age” with “age that gives the right to an old-age benefit without an income check.” These are different points in the system, and because of this, many people incorrectly assess when and what money they will be able to receive.

Why the benefit from Bituach Leumi is not the entire pension

The old-age benefit can be an important part of income, especially for people with small savings or incomplete work records. But it does not show the entire pension picture. A person may have pension funds, old programs from previous employers, Bituach Menahalim, Kupat Gemel, Keren Hishtalmut, pitzuyim, and other savings that need to be checked separately.

If a person looks only at Bituach Leumi, they see only the state part. They may not know where their savings are, what commissions they pay, what happens with pitzuyim, and what monthly payment they can receive from the pension fund. As a result, the family plans the future budget based on one figure, although the real picture may be broader — or, conversely, weaker than it seems.

For Russian-speaking Israelis, this is a particularly sensitive topic. Many are accustomed to the idea that a pension is primarily a state payment. But in Israel, a working person forms a separate pension capital over the years, and this capital requires attention even before a letter arrives from Bituach Leumi.

Pension fund: savings through work

Pension fund is not the same as Bituach Leumi. These are the funds created through employment relationships: part was withheld from the salary, part was transferred by the employer. In the payslip, these amounts may look like familiar lines, but behind them stands the future income of a person after stopping work.

The size of the future payment depends not only on how much money is accumulated. Commissions, the pension route, the age of starting payments, pitzuyim, tax decisions, and family conditions that a person chooses before starting to receive a pension are important. Sometimes even a small misunderstanding of documents leads to a person making a decision “by eye,” although the consequences will affect them for many years.

In some pension funds, you can start receiving payments from the age of 60. This does not cancel the rules of Bituach Leumi and does not mean that everyone needs to urgently start receiving money, but it shows an important thing: the pension fund should be checked separately, not waiting for the age of the state benefit.

Why people over 60 may miss an opportunity

A separate situation arises for people 60+, who continue to work. They receive a salary, see pension deductions, but often believe that until dismissal or official retirement age, “the pension fund is still not touched.” Sometimes this is true, sometimes not — that is why a check is needed.

If you are already 60+ and continue to work, it is worth separately checking whether the pension fund can already give a monthly payment and how it will affect the future. We have covered this topic in detail in a separate article:

We have covered this topic in detail in a separate material:

Are you 60+ in Israel and still working? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money – https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

It is important here not to create false expectations. The possibility of receiving payments from the pension fund after 60 is not a universal recommendation. For one person, it may increase the current family income, while for another, it may reduce future pension, change the tax picture, or affect payments to a spouse.

Where the most expensive confusion arises

The first mistake is to think that Bituach Leumi will show the entire pension picture. It does not. Bituach Leumi is responsible for the state benefit but does not collect all pension funds for a person, does not check commissions, does not evaluate pitzuyim, and does not explain whether it is beneficial to start payments from the pension fund now.

The second mistake is to think that the pension fund will automatically solve everything when a person “reaches the age.” In practice, a person needs to understand where the money is, which programs are active, which old funds may have remained from previous employers, and what documents will be needed before starting payments.

The third mistake is to look at the pension only as a matter of age. In Israel, age is important, but it is not the only factor. Income, insurance record, work after 60, pitzuyim, taxes, and marital status can change the picture. Even at the same age, two people can get different answers.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency writes about this topic precisely because for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel, the pension system often looks like a set of disparate words: Bituach Leumi, ktsvat zikna, pension fund, pitzuyim, tlush, old programs, taxes. But behind these words are real family money, and they cannot be put together “by eye.”

What needs to be checked separately

Before retiring or after 60, it is important to understand whether a person has the right to a benefit from Bituach Leumi, when it can start, and whether it depends on an income check. But at the same time, it is necessary to separately check pension savings: in which funds they are located, how much money is there, what commissions are withheld, and what the forecast of the monthly payment is.

You need to see what is happening with pitzuyim. This money cannot be perceived simply as an amount that can be withdrawn without consequences. In some situations, pitzuyim are related to future pensions, taxes, and the size of the monthly payment.

It is also worth checking if there are old funds from previous employers. For people who have worked in Israel for many years, changed jobs, or were self-employed for part of their lives, the pension history may be scattered across several programs.

Why you need to see the whole picture first

The pension decision should not start with the phrase “I was told.” It should start with documents, calculation, and understanding. Where is the state part? Where is the savings part? What can already be received? What is better not to touch? What will happen with taxes? What decision will protect not only the person themselves but also their family?

Sometimes a check shows that with Bituach Leumi you need to wait, but the pension fund should already be studied. Sometimes the opposite: a person should deal with the state benefit, and pension payments from the fund are better not to start yet. Sometimes the main thing is not to touch pitzuyim. Sometimes it is to find old savings that the family did not even know about.

Therefore, the most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision here:

Pension in Israel is not a single payment and not a single age. It is several systems that need to be put together into one understandable map before signing documents or postponing the decision “for later.”

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision and get competent advice – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

Russia may be preparing a new large-scale mobilization after the September elections to the State Duma. According to the Ukrainian side, it could involve at least 500,000 people, some of whom the Russian command plans to send to the most difficult sections of the front with almost no preparation.

There is no official decree on new mobilization yet. The Kremlin publicly avoids this topic, and Russian officials continue to claim that the army’s needs are supposedly covered by contract soldiers. However, growing losses, a decrease in voluntary enlistment, and the prepared system of electronic summonses indicate that the ability to continue the war by previous methods is gradually being exhausted.

The most dangerous period may begin after the voting scheduled for September 18–20, 2026. The main day of the State Duma elections will be September 20, but the Russian Central Election Commission decided to hold the voting for three consecutive days.

Why mobilization is expected in the fall

On July 18, Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, reported on the possible mobilization of at least 500,000 people.

According to his information, part of the mobilized may be sent to the front by the Russian command within the first two weeks. These people are intended to be used for urgent replenishment of units that have suffered significant losses in eastern Ukraine. Another part may be prepared for about a month to strengthen existing groups or form forces in a new direction.

However, the figure of 500,000 remains an estimate by the Ukrainian side. It is not confirmed by a published Russian document or an officially announced mobilization plan. Therefore, it is premature to talk about the inevitable conscription of exactly this number of people.

However, the likelihood of a new wave of mobilization is recognized not only by the Center for Countering Disinformation.

Andrey Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, stated that the Kremlin will avoid any discussions about mobilization as much as possible before the elections. It is not advantageous for the Russian authorities to inform the population about mass conscription in advance, as this may cause fear, discontent, and a new wave of attempts to leave the country.

According to the GUR, the likelihood of such a decision being made after the elections remains. The Russian army does not need to build a large number of new training centers: existing ranges and military infrastructure are sufficient for the mass reception of recruits, especially if it involves shortened training.

The political logic of the Kremlin in this case is quite clear. Until September 20, Putin is interested in maintaining at least an external sense of stability. After the voting is completed, the need to consider the mood of voters will significantly decrease, and the next federal campaign will not create immediate restrictions.

That is why the elections may become a kind of starting point for a new stage of the war.

Why Russia needs another 500,000 people

The main reason is the huge losses of the Russian army, which are increasingly difficult to compensate with money and the recruitment of contract soldiers.

According to the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, from February 2022 to June 2026, Russian troops may have lost about 1.4 million people killed, wounded, and missing. Researchers estimate the number of dead at 400,000–450,000 people.

In 2026, Russian losses exceeded 30,000 people per month, while the average recruitment of new servicemen was estimated at about 27,000 people. Thus, even with the maintenance of an expensive payment system, Moscow does not have time to fully compensate for the outgoing personnel.

Separate studies based on data from the Russian Ministry of Finance indicate that in the first quarter of 2026, the rate of recruitment of contract soldiers decreased by approximately 20% compared to the same period in 2025. Independent Russian publications also reported that the issue of new mobilization is being discussed at various levels of government, although a final decision is allegedly not yet made.

Until recently, the Kremlin tried to buy people for the war. Regional authorities increased one-time payments, conducted aggressive advertising campaigns, and increased pressure on debtors, prisoners, migrants, and residents of economically disadvantaged regions.

But the financial resource has a limit. The fewer people willing to voluntarily go to the front, the higher the cost of a new contract soldier must become. At the same time, Russian regions face budget problems, a shortage of workers, and the need to pay compensation to the families of the deceased.

NAnews — Israel News notes that potential mobilization does not necessarily mean the creation of a new army of 500,000 people. The Kremlin may stretch the draft over several months, conduct it by regions, and call what is happening “additional staffing,” “military gatherings,” or an expansion of contract recruitment.

For the Russian system, it is important not only to get people but also to hide the scale of the operation as much as possible.

Where the mobilized may be sent

It is most likely that the first groups will be sent not to a completely new direction, but to already existing Russian units in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The Russian army continues to use small infantry groups that try to penetrate between Ukrainian positions, identify firing points, and gradually deplete the defense. Such actions are supported by FPV drones, artillery, guided aerial bombs, and reconnaissance drones.

This tactic allows for constant pressure but requires a huge amount of infantry. Poorly trained assault groups suffer high losses, after which they need to be regularly replenished.

CSIS notes that in the first half of 2026, Russian offensive actions on a number of key directions advanced extremely slowly — on average, tens of meters per day. Researchers associate high losses with the Russian strategy of attrition warfare, poor training, ineffective interaction of different branches of the military, and the use of soldiers to identify Ukrainian positions.

Therefore, the main directions for the use of the mobilized may be:

• Donetsk region and areas around the Ukrainian defensive belt;
• Zaporizhzhia direction;
• the border of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions;
• northeast Ukraine;
• formation of reserves for a possible new offensive;
• protection of rear facilities and occupied territories, allowing more prepared units to be freed up.

It cannot be ruled out that an attempt may be made to create a threat in a new direction. But for a large-scale offensive operation, the mobilized alone are not enough. Equipment, ammunition, transport, commanders, engineering units, communication means, field hospitals, and months of preparation are needed.

If people are indeed sent to the front line two weeks after the draft, this will primarily mean an attempt to quickly cover losses, rather than creating a qualitatively new strike force.

What is known about the threat from Belarus

Special attention is paid to the northern direction and the possible use of Belarusian territory.

As of mid-July, Ukrainian military intelligence did not observe signs of the formation of a new Russian strike force there. GUR representative Andrey Chernyak spoke of about 50,000 Belarusian army servicemen and Russian support units, but no threatening concentration of Russian forces was recorded.

At the same time, Russia is capable of transferring additional troops to Belarus within a few weeks. Therefore, the absence of a large grouping today does not mean that it cannot appear later.

The northern direction can be used not only for a real offensive. Even a demonstrative transfer of troops will force Ukraine to hold additional forces near the border, strengthen the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, and divert reserves from the eastern front.

For the Kremlin, this may already be an independent military goal.

Does mobilization mean preparation for an attack on NATO

In the Ukrainian and European information space, the possibility is also being discussed that the new Russian mobilization will be connected not only with the war against Ukraine but also with preparations for provocations against the Baltic countries or Poland.

Such a threat cannot be completely ruled out, but there is no direct evidence yet that the supposed 500,000 people are intended for an attack on NATO.

A large-scale war against the Alliance would require Russia to deploy a large grouping, move aviation, air defense systems, warehouses, field hospitals, engineering equipment, and command posts. Such preparations are difficult to completely hide from satellite and electronic intelligence.

In the short term, hybrid operations remain more likely: sabotage, cyberattacks, airspace violations, border provocations, strikes on critical infrastructure, and attempts to test how quickly and coherently NATO countries are ready to respond.

The Alliance has already significantly strengthened the eastern flank. As of June 2026, NATO multinational battle groups are deployed in nine countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

In addition, NATO is developing air and missile defense, round-the-clock airspace patrols, protection of underwater infrastructure, and a system for the rapid transfer of reinforcements. In September 2025, the Alliance launched a multi-level operation Eastern Sentry, strengthening the eastern direction with fighters, helicopters, surveillance aircraft, ships, and air defense systems.

For Russia, this means that even a limited military provocation against Poland or the Baltic countries carries the risk of unpredictable escalation.

How Ukraine can respond to new Russian mobilization

Ukraine cannot prevent the Kremlin from announcing a draft, but it can make the use of the mobilized as costly and ineffective as possible.

This primarily involves strengthening defense, expanding drone production, saturating the front with reconnaissance means, striking Russian training centers, warehouses, railway hubs, headquarters, and troop concentration sites.

It is equally important to destroy Russian reserves before they reach the front line. The longer the path from the military enlistment office to the front and the more problems arise with preparation, transport, and supply, the less military value the mass draft has.

The experience of recent years has shown that numerical superiority alone does not guarantee a rapid offensive. On a drone-saturated battlefield, large concentrations of people and equipment become noticeable targets. Poorly trained infantry without stable communication, engineering support, and competent command can increase pressure but simultaneously sharply increase the losses of the attacking side.

At the same time, 500,000 potential recruits should not be underestimated. Even low-quality training can be partially compensated by quantity, especially if Russia uses people in waves, trying to constantly deplete Ukrainian units.

NAnews — Israel News notes that for Ukraine, the key will be not only the availability of its own reserves but also the stability of Western supplies: ammunition, air defense systems, electronic warfare means, long-range weapons, equipment, and components for drone production.

Russia’s mobilization resource can be stopped not by one decision, but by a combination of defense, technology, intelligence, strikes on logistics, and political pressure on the Kremlin.

Why mobilization is dangerous for Russia itself

A new wave of conscription will be a serious internal test for the Russian regime.

The first “partial mobilization” was announced on September 21, 2022. At that time, the Russian authorities announced the conscription of 300,000 people. The decision caused queues at the borders, a sharp rise in air ticket prices, and a mass departure of men.

Since then, the Kremlin has significantly expanded control capabilities. Electronic registers have been created, electronic summonses and restrictions for citizens trying to evade appearance have been introduced.

This reduces the likelihood of a mass escape on the previous scale but does not eliminate the economic consequences. The conscription of hundreds of thousands of men will exacerbate the labor shortage, increase the burden on regional budgets, and create new obligations for payments to the military and the families of the deceased.

In addition, mobilization destroys one of the main unspoken principles on which Putin built the Russian society’s attitude towards the war: the state conducts military operations, but most residents of large cities can continue their usual lives.

As long as mainly contract soldiers, prisoners, residents of poor regions, and people attracted by high payments were sent to the front, a significant part of Russian society perceived the war as a distant television event.

Mass forced conscription can bring the war directly into Russian families.

Main points

As of July 21, 2026, the decision to mobilize 500,000 people has not been officially announced. This figure is based on information from Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, and media reports about discussions within the Russian government.

However, the prerequisites for such a decision do exist. Russia is suffering losses that may exceed the current rate of contract recruitment. At the same time, elections to the State Duma are approaching, after which political risks for the Kremlin will temporarily decrease.

The most likely goal of the new mobilization will be to continue the war of attrition against Ukraine: replenishing battered units, creating reserves, and increasing pressure on the eastern and southern directions.

A full-scale attack on NATO does not yet seem to be the main scenario, but the increase in the size of the Russian army could raise the threat of hybrid provocations and force the Alliance to further strengthen the eastern flank.

Autumn and winter 2026 may become a new difficult stage of the war. And the main question is not only whether Putin will announce mobilization, but whether Ukraine and its partners will have time to prepare for the appearance of hundreds of thousands of new soldiers in Russia.

The Israeli government unanimously recognized the Armenian genocide, but parliamentary approval did not occur. According to Haaretz and Maariv, Azerbaijan engaged in direct contacts with Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and influenced ultra-Orthodox parties.

On June 28, 2026, the Israeli government unanimously supported Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s proposal for the official recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Sa’ar called this step a moral and historical duty of the Jewish state, but less than a month later, it became clear that the decision could not be secured by a Knesset vote.

The issue was removed from the parliamentary agenda twice, after which the vote ultimately did not take place. Israeli media link this not to a usual lack of time, but to active pressure from Azerbaijan — one of Israel’s most important strategic, energy, and military partners.

Publications by Haaretz and Maariv reveal two parallel channels of influence on the Israeli leadership. The first went through the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the second through deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, without whose support the government could not guarantee a majority in the Knesset.

What exactly did the Israeli cabinet decide

At the meeting on June 28, the Israeli government unanimously recognized the mass extermination of the Armenian people as genocide. Materials prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that systematic persecution began on April 24, 1915, with the arrests of representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia, clergy, and social elite in Constantinople.

After the destruction or deportation of the Armenian community leaders, the Ottoman authorities began mass expulsion of the population. Men were separated from their families, sent to forced labor, and killed, while women, children, and the elderly were driven towards the Syrian desert, where many died from hunger, thirst, disease, and violence.

According to the most common historical estimates, about 1.5 million Armenians became victims of this policy. Gideon Sa’ar stated that Israel must call what happened by its name, as the Jewish people cannot demand recognition of their own tragedy while simultaneously avoiding recognition of crimes against other peoples.

The Foreign Minister also emphasized that the decision is not revenge against Turkey for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s hostile policy. According to him, the recognition is based not on current political circumstances but on historical facts and Israel’s moral responsibility.

After the meeting, it was reported that the government’s position should receive confirmation from the Knesset. It was at this stage that the process stopped, although the cabinet’s decision was not officially canceled.

Why the dispute over the status of recognition arose

The Israeli government presented the resolution on June 28 as official recognition of the Armenian genocide. At the same time, several media outlets reported that a separate Knesset vote was required to complete the political procedure, which would give the decision parliamentary legitimacy and make it less dependent on the position of a specific government.

Moreover, there were separate initiatives in parliament to recognize the genocide and establish an official day of remembrance. None of them had previously passed all the necessary stages, so the cabinet’s decision became Israel’s most serious step on this issue in the state’s history.

The difference between a government resolution and a parliamentary decision has not only legal but also political significance. The cabinet can change or revise its position, whereas Knesset support would turn recognition into a more stable state line.

Therefore, claiming that Israel completely abandoned recognition after pressure from Baku is incorrect. The government’s decision remains in force, but its parliamentary consolidation was halted.

Azerbaijan demanded a review of the decision

On June 29, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan officially expressed dissatisfaction with Israel’s position. In Baku’s statement, the recognition was called a ‘distortion of historical facts,’ and the expression ‘Armenian genocide’ was replaced with the phrase ‘events of 1915.’

The Azerbaijani side claimed that such decisions allegedly hinder reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and complicate the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. Baku openly called on Israel to reconsider the decision made by the government of Gideon Sa’ar and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Such a reaction was expected, as Azerbaijan traditionally supports Turkey’s position, which refuses to recognize the extermination of Armenians as genocide. However, judging by Israeli media publications, the official statement did not limit diplomatic pressure.

Baku’s contact with Netanyahu’s office

On July 19, Haaretz reported that Hikmet Hajiyev, the Azerbaijani president’s foreign policy advisor, contacted the Israeli Prime Minister’s office. According to an unnamed Israeli source, after this, Netanyahu ordered not to bring the issue to a Knesset vote.

However, there is no confirmation of a personal conversation between Netanyahu and Hajiyev. It is more accurate to say that the Azerbaijani representative approached the head of government’s office, after which a political decision was made to stop the parliamentary procedure.

According to Haaretz, the Israeli side assured Baku representatives that the vote would not take place. Netanyahu’s office and Hikmet Hajiyev did not publicly confirm this information, so it remains a media report based on sources within the Israeli political system.

However, a Maariv publication that appeared on July 20 supplemented this version and explained why Netanyahu might indeed have had problems with the majority.

Pressure through Shas and United Torah Judaism

According to Maariv political observer Anna Barsky, representatives of the Azerbaijani Jewish community approached deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. They were persuaded that recognizing the Armenian genocide at the Knesset level would harm relations between Israel and Azerbaijan.

During these contacts, the strategic ties between the two states, security cooperation, Azerbaijan’s proximity to Iran’s northern border, and Israel’s dependence on Azerbaijani oil were emphasized. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, these arguments apparently proved significant enough.

Representatives of Shas and United Torah Judaism informed the Likud leadership that they would not support recognition and might vote against it. After this, Netanyahu’s advisors concluded that there was no guaranteed majority for the decision in the Knesset.

The issue was removed from the agenda twice. As a result, the Prime Minister decided not to risk a public defeat and to limit himself to the already adopted government resolution.

For Netanyahu, losing the vote could have been worse than its complete absence. If the Knesset rejected the cabinet’s position, it would look like an official refusal by the Israeli parliament to recognize the Armenian genocide, despite the unanimous decision of the ministers.

NAnews — News of Israel notes that the versions of Haaretz and Maariv do not contradict each other. Most likely, pressure was exerted simultaneously on several levels: through direct contacts between Baku and the Prime Minister’s office and through work with parties on which the parliamentary majority depended.

Oil, weapons, and the border with Iran

The importance of Azerbaijan for Israel is hard to overestimate. According to Reuters, in 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for about 46.4% of all Israeli oil imports, the highest figure in the last decade.

Oil is delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and then shipped by sea from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Supplies continued even after Turkish authorities announced the cessation of trade with Israel.

Azerbaijan is also a major buyer of Israeli weapons. Israel supplied Baku with drones, missile systems, reconnaissance technologies, and other military equipment that played a significant role in the conflicts around Nagorno-Karabakh.

For Jerusalem, the geographical location of Azerbaijan, which borders Iran, is also significant. For many years, relations between the two countries have been viewed in Israel as part of a regional system to contain Tehran.

That is why the issue of historical memory collided with specific interests of energy and national security. Recognizing the Armenian genocide was capable of jeopardizing relations that the Israeli leadership considers strategic.

Reaction of Turkey and Armenia

Turkey sharply condemned the decision made by Israel. Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the definition of the events of 1915 as genocide and accused Israel of trying to use historical tragedy in the current political confrontation.

Ankara continues to assert that Armenians died in conditions of war, unrest, and interethnic clashes, not as a result of a pre-planned policy of extermination. This position contradicts the conclusions of most genocide researchers and documents indicating the systematic nature of deportations and killings.

Unexpectedly restrained was the reaction of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He stated that he does not want to participate in using the memory of the Armenian genocide as a political tool.

This position is related to the Armenian government’s attempts to normalize relations with Turkey and complete the peace process with Azerbaijan. Yerevan fears that recognition by third countries may be used not for historical justice but as a means of pressure in regional politics.

Why Israel avoided recognition for decades

The issue of the Armenian genocide has been repeatedly discussed in Israel. Over the years, corresponding initiatives have been supported by deputies of various parties, historians, public figures, and representatives of the Armenian community in Jerusalem.

In 2016, the Knesset’s Education, Culture, and Sports Committee recognized the genocide and called on the government to follow its example. However, the parliamentary committee’s decision did not become the official position of the entire state.

In 2018, another initiative reached discussion in the Knesset, but the vote was not completed. Bills submitted later also did not receive the necessary support.

The main reason for Israel’s caution for a long time was its relations with Turkey. After the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations, Azerbaijan came to the forefront, becoming Israel’s most important oil supplier, arms buyer, and partner in countering Iran.

In August 2025, Netanyahu personally stated in an interview with American host Patrick Bet-David that he recognizes the Armenian genocide. However, this statement was not an official state decision, and the Prime Minister mistakenly assumed that the Knesset had already adopted the corresponding resolution.

The government’s decision on June 28, 2026, became Israel’s most serious advancement on this issue. Nevertheless, it again stalled at the last political stage.

What is known as of July 20

The government decision to recognize the Armenian genocide has not been officially canceled. There are no reports that the cabinet has reviewed the June 28 resolution or abandoned the formulations contained in it.

At the same time, the Knesset did not approve the decision, no new voting date has been set, and the issue was removed from the agenda twice. Therefore, there is still no parliamentary or legislative consolidation of recognition in Israel.

The phrase ‘Azerbaijan forced Israel to abandon recognition of the Armenian genocide’ simplifies the situation. It is more accurate to say that Baku, according to Haaretz and Maariv, managed to stop the recognition’s approval in the Knesset but did not achieve the cancellation of the government’s decision.

NAnews — News of Israel considers it important to separate these two levels. The Israeli cabinet did indeed recognize the Armenian genocide, but strategic interests, oil dependence, and domestic political calculations did not allow this recognition to become a stable position of the parliament.

Gideon Sa’ar stated that recognition is Israel’s moral and historical duty. But when this moral duty collided with oil, arms contracts, relations with Azerbaijan, and opposition to Iran, the Israeli leadership preferred not to bring the decision to a final parliamentary vote.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine confirmed the death of at least 293 civilians during June 2026. Another 1,990 people were injured.

The total number of confirmed civilian casualties for one month reached 2,283 people. This is the highest monthly death and injury toll among civilians since April 2022. The corresponding UN report was published on July 14, 2026.

It is important to understand the wording of the report accurately. June was not necessarily the deadliest month solely by the number of deaths, but the most severe by the combined number of killed and injured civilians.

According to the UN, in April 2022, 842 deaths and 1,905 injuries were confirmed. After that, for more than four years, the monthly figure did not reach the June 2026 level.

Losses continue to grow for the second consecutive month

In May 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 282 and injuries to 1,794 civilians. Thus, the June figure was 10% higher.

Compared to June 2025, the increase was 37%. A year earlier, during the same month, 249 deaths and 1,416 injuries were confirmed.

Period	Killed	Injured	Total
June 2026	293	1 990	2 283
May 2026	282	1 794	2 076
June 2025	249	1 416	1 665

The statistics for the first half of the year look particularly alarming.

From January to June 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 1,396 civilians and injuries to another 7,978 people. In total, over six months, at least 9,374 civilians were killed or injured.

This figure is 37% higher than the data for the first half of 2025 and 114% higher than the results for the same period in 2024.

The head of the UN Monitoring Mission, Danielle Bell, called the situation a worrying escalation. According to her, the increase in losses is associated with the more intensive use of powerful types of weapons, which are especially dangerous when used in densely populated urban areas.

Missiles and long-range drones became the main cause of losses

Almost half of all civilian casualties in June were related to the use of long-range weapons.

Russian missiles and long-range strike drones killed 126 civilians and injured 907. In total, this type of weapon accounted for about 45% of all confirmed losses for the month.

The most severe consequences of such attacks were observed not near the front line, but in large cities, including Kyiv and Dnipro.

The number of civilian casualties from long-range Russian attacks in the first half of 2026 increased by 60% compared to the first six months of 2025.

This means that the danger to residents of Ukrainian cities is determined not only by proximity to the ground combat zone. Russian missiles and drones allow strikes on residential areas, transport infrastructure, and other targets at a significant distance from the front.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, this detail is especially important. Air alerts, the presence of air defense systems, and the city’s distance from the front do not mean a complete absence of threat. However, the Ukrainian situation has its own scale and specifics: the country’s territory is vast, and the ability to completely close the sky over all cities remains limited.

Frontline areas have turned into a zone of constant hunting

Another factor in the sharp increase in losses was the strike drones of a small radius, which Russian troops systematically use near the front line.

In June, such drones killed 89 people and injured 588. This is the highest monthly figure of civilian casualties from close-range strike drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

According to Danielle Bell, residents of frontline settlements increasingly tell UN staff that they feel like targets of hunting.

People are attacked during ordinary daily activities: when going for groceries, riding a bicycle, working in the yard, walking the dog, or trying to leave a dangerous area.

Such tactics change the very nature of life near the front. Previously, the main threat was artillery shelling and air bombs, the use of which could at least partially be assessed by the direction of hostilities. Small drones can observe roads, yards, and individuals for a long time, then deliver a pinpoint strike.

Aerial bombs, artillery, and mines

Long-range attacks and close-range drones were not the only causes of civilian losses.

In June, the UN recorded:

• 44 deaths and 280 injuries as a result of aerial bombs;
• 27 deaths and 171 injuries due to artillery shelling and attacks by multiple launch rocket systems;
• 7 deaths and 44 injuries from mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Mines and unexploded ordnance remain a long-term threat. They continue to kill people even where the intensity of hostilities has decreased or the front line has shifted.

Which regions suffered the most

In June, civilians were killed or injured in 13 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv.

The highest number of confirmed losses was recorded by the UN in four regions:

• Zaporizhzhia region — 23 deaths and 229 injuries;
• Kherson region — 18 deaths and 236 injuries;
• Dnipropetrovsk region — 25 deaths and 77 injuries;
• Kyiv — 11 deaths and 112 injuries.

The overwhelming majority of victims were in territory controlled by the Ukrainian government.

Of the 2,283 killed and injured, 2,226 people were affected in Ukraine-controlled territory. Another 57 confirmed cases occurred in territories occupied by the Russian Federation.

Therefore, the assertion that the main cause of the record increase in losses was precisely Russian strikes is based not only on the overall context of the war but also on the geography of UN-confirmed incidents.

UN statistics do not reflect the full scale of the tragedy

The figures presented are not final.

The UN includes a case in the official statistics only after verifying the information. Confirmation is based on interviews with witnesses and victims, medical documents, investigation materials, photographs, videos, information from local administrations, and other available data.

Some cases can be confirmed weeks or months later. Therefore, figures for previous periods may be revised in subsequent reports.

At the same time, the actual number of dead and injured is likely significantly higher. It is especially difficult to obtain verifiable information from occupied cities and areas where international observers do not have full access.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, the UN has confirmed the death of at least 16,431 civilians, including 803 children.

Another 48,613 civilians, including 2,960 children, were injured.

Thus, the total number of confirmed dead and injured civilians exceeded 65,000 people. However, even this huge figure reflects only those cases that the UN was able to independently verify.

June became a warning of a new phase of the war

The statistics for June 2026 show that the war is not becoming less dangerous for the civilian population.

Russia is expanding the use of long-range missiles and drones against cities, and in frontline areas, small strike drones are turning civilian daily life into a constant risk.

The increase in casualties is not occurring in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion when the front was rapidly moving, but after more than four years of war. This is what makes the UN’s conclusions particularly alarming.

NAnews — News of Israel highlights: behind the dry numbers of the report are people who died in their own apartments, on the streets, in cars, and during evacuation attempts. June 2026 showed that the scale of danger for the civilian population of Ukraine continues to increase, and the Russian war increasingly affects cities and people far from the immediate line of combat.

Steven Spielberg is one of the most famous directors in human history! Category 🔯 — Jews from Ukraine #jewsukraine

📍 Born: 12/18/1946, Cincinnati 🇺🇸

💙💛 Spielberg’s grandparents were Jews from Kamenets-Podolsky and Sudilkov, Khmelnitsky region. Ukraine

🔯 His mother ran a kosher halawi (dairy) restaurant. All of his immediate family were religious Jews. Stephen attended Hebrew school and also celebrated his bar mitzvah. His family was involved in the synagogue and had many Jewish friends.

🤔Spielberg had a hard time accepting his heritage

“I hate to admit it… but as a child, God forgive me, I was ashamed because we were Orthodox Jews. I was ashamed of the external perception.”

At school, anti-Semites broke his nose twice. “It was terrible.”

💍Spielberg met actress Kate Capshaw when he filmed her in the film Indiana Jones. They married in 1991, and the bride converted to Judaism at the time of their marriage.

Stephen said:

“Kate is a Protestant and she insisted on converting to Judaism. She spent a year studying, doing the mikveh, all of this. She decided to convert completely before our marriage. This, more than anything else, brought me back to Judaism. This shiksa (non-Jewish in Yiddish) made me a better Jew than my parents.”

🕯About the Holocaust, he said that his parents “talked about it all the time, and so it was always in my mind.”. His father lost at least 16 relatives in the Holocaust. In 1993, Spielberg directed Schindler’s List about a businessman who helped save 1,100 Jews from the Holocaust. The film was included in all major ratings of the best films in history.

🇮🇱 Spielberg’s Munich (2005) tells the story of the Israeli government’s retaliation against Arab terrorists after 11 Israeli Olympians were kidnapped and killed during the 1972 Olympics.

📝 The Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive is dedicated to the preservation and research of Jewish documentaries. The archive is run by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the World Zionist Organization. The archive contains more than 16,000 pieces of content.

🕎 Together with Victor Pinchuk (Ukraine), he produced the documentary film “Say Your Name”. The film tells about the survivors of Babi Yar, and was filmed based on the testimony of the Holocaust Survivors Foundation. The fund contains 55,000 video testimonies in 43 languages ​​from 65 countries, making it the largest archive of its kind in the world.

🇺🇦In 2006, Spielberg visited Ukraine for the first time in his life at the premiere of this film. The film had a significant impact on Ukrainian-Jewish relations and changed the understanding of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

👾In Spielberg’s film “War of the Worlds” the events of the alien attack begin with anomalies in Ukraine.

🤝 In addition to cultural influence, Spielberg has repeatedly supported Israel and Ukraine:
❤️Donated $1 million to help Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War
❤️His sister Nancy is the founder and director of the Children of Chernobyl charity organization. Stephen also supports this company.
❤️In 2022, in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he and his wife donated $1 million to Ukrainian refugees.
❤️ In 2023, following the Hamas attack on Israel, the Shoah Foundation, founded by Spielberg, collected more than 100 video testimonies from survivors of the October 7 attacks to add to the Holocaust Survivors collection. He said: “I never thought I would see such unspeakable barbarity against the Jews in my lifetime.”

🏆 Spielberg is one of the most awarded cinema figures and officially the most commercially successful director in history. He alone has received a Best Director nomination for six consecutive decades:

• Oscar: 3 awards / 23 nominations
• Emmy: 12 / 27
• Golden Globe: 9/24
• BAFTA: 2 / 14
• And hundreds more.
• He also received a special medal from the President of Israel 🥇

🎬 Featured films:

• Jaws;
• Alien;
• Indiana Jones film series;
• Jurassic Park;
• Schindler’s List;
• Saving Private Ryan;
• Catch me if you can;
• Terminal;
• Munich.
  —

This article was prepared specifically for the site NAnews — Israel News, where you will find even more interesting stories about prominent Jews from Ukraine, such as Steven Spielberg.

Veda section @davidkrutonog — Jew from Ukraine and founder of a marketing agency tlv.agency

#jewsukraine

Leave a comment on Telegram – channel NAnews ↓ — Israel News

On July 16, 2026, the first store of the Ukrainian DUNA network officially started operating in Rishon LeZion, Israel.

Israelis from Ukraine and just customers familiar with the brand can now purchase DUNA products directly in Israel, without waiting for parcels or asking acquaintances to bring the necessary items from Ukraine.

The new store is located at:

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street, 40

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street 40 – here on the map – https://maps.app.goo.gl/21cH2AvHRnZirm8c6

Official pages of Duna.Israel:

Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61591690269847

Instagram – https://www.instagram.com/duna_israel/

Before the opening, DUNA Israel announced that the first Israeli outlet would start operating on July 16. After the launch, a message appeared on the brand’s page in Hebrew: שלום ישראל! פתחנו באופן רשמי! — “Hello, Israel! We are officially open!”

Ukrainian industry publications also reported on DUNA’s entry into the Israeli market.

On July 15, the publication “Ukrainian network DUNA opens its first store in Israel” was posted by the Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers. The publication indicated that the store would open in Rishon LeZion on Rothschild Street, and DUNA belongs to the company “Duna-Vesta,” whose factory has been operating in the Lviv region since 1965.

On July 16, the material “DUNA network enters the Israeli market with its first store” was published by the Ukrainian publication AllRetail.ua, specializing in retail and the development of retail networks.

What is sold in the first Israeli DUNA store

DUNA Israel presents the new outlet as a family store of everyday textile products.

The first publications on the Israeli page announced:

• women’s, men’s, and children’s socks;
• tights for women and children;
• basic plain models;
• colored socks and items with patterns;
• children’s underwear;
• everyday and gift options.

In the opening announcement, the brand emphasized that the store would feature comfortable socks and tights for children and adults, as well as everyday models. After the opening, DUNA Israel announced a wide selection of products for the whole family.

Store opening hours:

Day	Working hours
Sunday — Thursday	09:30–19:30
Friday and holiday eves	09:00–14:00
Saturday	Not specified in the published schedule

The address and opening hours are published on the official DUNA Israel page.

It cannot yet be claimed that the entire Ukrainian DUNA catalog is presented in Rishon LeZion. The company’s official website also offers women’s and men’s underwear, pajamas, T-shirts and tank tops, thermal underwear, stockings, children’s items, and products for infants. The brand has not specified in detail which categories are already available in Israel.

DUNA immediately addressed the Israeli customer in Hebrew

The DUNA Israel page and advertising publications are predominantly in Hebrew.

This is an important detail: the store is targeting not only Israelis from Ukraine and people familiar with the brand from previous purchases. DUNA is trying to present itself to the wider Israeli audience as a family brand of comfortable socks, tights, and underwear.

For customers who already know DUNA, the appearance of the store means the opportunity to purchase familiar products near home. For those who have not encountered this brand before, the new outlet becomes the first direct acquaintance with the Ukrainian manufacturer.

Where DUNA is located: a busy commercial part of Rishon LeZion

For its first store in Israel, DUNA chose a section of Rothschild Street with a large number of retail outlets and service enterprises.

At the address Rothschild, 40, in addition to DUNA, Israeli business directories indicate the jewelry store Keter David — כתר דוד, a dog grooming salon “המספרים של עידו”, as well as offices and service enterprises. This is a commercial address around which there is already a constant flow of visitors.

In the neighboring building at Rothschild, 38, there is a shoe store Disco Rosso and Bukhari Bakery — a bakery with Bukharian pastries and dishes.

At the address Rothschild, 37, there are jewelry stores and workshops Mi ORO, Cami Designs, and Kisufim.

At the address Rothschild, 41, there is a lingerie and gift store Beit Hava — בית חוה and a jewelry store Pirov Diamonds — יהלומי פירוב.

Thus, DUNA opened in an already established commercial environment. Shoppers can combine a visit to the new store with buying shoes, lingerie, jewelry, groceries, or visiting a cafe and bakery.

Not far from DUNA, at the address Rothschild, 45, is the shopping center G Rothschild, which additionally makes the location convenient for shoppers.

Choosing such a place seems logical. Israelis from Ukraine and customers who already know DUNA can come purposefully, and the presence of other stores and G Rothschild nearby allows the brand to also count on the usual urban shopping flow.

What DUNA represents and how many stores the network operates

DUNA belongs to the Ukrainian company “Duna-Vesta”.

The factory is located in the city of Sheptytsky in the Lviv region and has been operating since 1965. The company calls itself a leader in the Ukrainian hosiery market and reports that it produces up to 1.2 million items monthly.

The declared production capacity of the enterprise is 15–20 million pairs per year. The products are tested in its own accredited laboratory, and the company reports working according to OEKO-TEX Standard 100 and ISO 9001:2015 standards.

In addition to the family brand DUNA, the company develops two more lines:

ACCENT — models with an emphasis on classic design, quality, and comfort;

FURIA — women’s tights and stockings.

The official DUNA website states that the network has more than 100 stores in 17 regions of Ukraine and expands annually by 5–8 outlets.

NAnews — Israel News separately recounted the addresses on the network’s official page. The catalog lists 105 address entries, but the store in Lutsk at Sobornosti Avenue, 22B is listed twice with the same phone number and schedule. Therefore, there are 104 unique addresses in Ukraine. The catalog also includes a section for Zaporizhzhia, but at the time of verification, no address was listed under it.

Most points are concentrated in Kyiv and the Kyiv region — 23, as well as in Lviv and nearby suburbs — 22. In Lutsk, seven unique stores are listed, in Dnipro — five, in Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, and Ternopil — four each, in Uzhhorod — three.

Two points are listed in Zhytomyr, Izmail, Mukachevo, Sambir, Khmelnytskyi, and Sheptytsky. Stores also operate in Berdychiv, Drohobych, Irpin, Kalush, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Kovel, Kolomyia, Kremenchuk, Poltava, Rivne, Stryi, Kharkiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi.

With the new store in Rishon LeZion, we can talk about at least 105 unique physical DUNA points in Ukraine and Israel. The Israeli address has not yet been added to the main catalog of stores on the company’s Ukrainian website.

The Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers also reported that DUNA management is considering development potential in Poland and Germany. According to CEO Serhiy Vyshnevskyi, the company planned to increase the Ukrainian network to more than 200 points within five years and was simultaneously preparing to enter foreign markets.

The store may operate with a local partner

The description of the Israeli DUNA profile contains the words שותפות | זכיינות, which translate as “partnership | franchise.”

This may indicate a partnership or franchise model of launch. However, the company has not yet publicly named the Israeli store operator or disclosed the legal structure of the project. Therefore, it is premature to talk about a specific owner or franchisee.

There is also no confirmed information in the public domain about the size of investments, store area, number of employees, prices in shekels, delivery across Israel, a separate online store, or plans to open subsequent points.

It is also unknown whether DUNA is considering Haifa, Ashdod, Netanya, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, or other cities for further expansion.

The opening in Rishon LeZion shows that the Ukrainian manufacturer has entered the regular Israeli retail market and is addressing the market in Hebrew from the very beginning.

For Israelis from Ukraine and those familiar with the brand, this is an opportunity to buy familiar products directly in Israel. For DUNA, it is a test of whether the well-known Ukrainian brand can interest a wider Israeli audience.

NAnews — Israel News will monitor the development of the first point and the possible expansion of the DUNA network in the country.

In 12 days of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation, Ukrainian drones, according to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, hit 159 vessels of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Azov and Black Seas. The campaign’s goal is not the mass sinking of tankers, but the paralysis of Russia’s maritime logistics, the supply of occupied Crimea, and the transportation of oil, fuel, and goods circumventing sanctions.

On July 17, 2026, the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar’, summarized the interim results of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation.

According to him, from July 6 to 17, Ukrainian units hit 159 vessels used in Russian maritime logistics:

• 117 vessels — in the Azov Sea;
• 42 vessels — in the Black Sea.

On the night of July 17 alone, 12 more vessels were attacked in the Black Sea: nine dry cargo ships, one tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat.

These figures are already being called one of the largest episodes of drone use against Russian maritime logistics. However, it is important to understand: 159 affected vessels do not mean 159 sunken ships.

What does the name of the operation ‘MoLoChKa’ mean

The name of the operation turned out to be an abbreviation.

On July 15, Robert Brovdi deciphered it as follows:

MLChK — ‘Moscow Will Lie Through Crimea’, meaning ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

According to the Ukrainian command’s plan, it is not about a single series of strikes, but a systematic campaign against the infrastructure that allows Russia to hold the occupied peninsula and use it as a military base.

It includes attacks on maritime transport, oil depots, energy facilities, railway hubs, bridges, substations, and other elements of supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine.

The strategy’s meaning is to gradually turn Crimea from a convenient military foothold into a territory whose maintenance requires more and more fuel, equipment, ships, air defense systems, and repair resources from Moscow.

Crimea holds not only military but also symbolic significance for the Kremlin. Its capture has been portrayed by Russian propaganda for many years as one of Putin’s main achievements. Therefore, the destruction of the peninsula’s logistical connections can simultaneously inflict military, economic, and political damage.

159 affected vessels — not 159 sunken ships

Headlines about ‘knocked out’ or ‘destroyed’ vessels can create the false impression that Ukrainian forces sent almost one and a half hundred ships to the bottom in 12 days.

The SBS command describes the operation’s goal differently.

Ukrainian drones are supposed to deprive the vessel of the ability to move normally, navigate, and maintain communication. Robert Brovdi stated that the task is to turn a self-propelled vessel into a drifting ‘blind and deaf’ barge.

At the same time, according to him, operators try not to pierce the hulls of tankers to prevent large-scale oil spills and pollution of the Azov and Black Seas.

Drones can hit:

• the captain’s bridge;
• radar equipment;
• satellite communication antennas;
• navigation systems;
• control elements;
• engine and steering mechanisms;
• equipment necessary for safe passage through straits and ports.

After such a strike, the vessel may not sink but lose the ability to continue the voyage independently. It has to be towed, repaired, have its crew changed, or be taken out of service for a long time.

That is why Ukrainian targets include not only tankers and dry cargo ships but also tugboats. Russia uses them for rescuing and evacuating already damaged vessels.

How the operation developed

The operation began on July 6 with attacks on vessels in the Azov Sea, after which Ukrainian units quickly increased the number of strikes.

Date	Declared result
July 6–7	First attacks on tankers transporting fuel towards occupied Crimea
July 10	Russia restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal
July 11	Ukraine reported dozens of affected tankers, dry cargo ships, tugboats, and other vessels
July 14	The number of affected vessels in the Azov Sea reached 116
July 15	The operation spread to the Black Sea
July 16	The total result increased to 147 vessels
July 17	It was announced that 12 more vessels were affected; the total result — 159

By July 14, the Ukrainian command reported 116 affected vessels in the Azov Sea. Reuters confirmed that maritime movement in the region was seriously disrupted, although the agency could not independently verify the condition of each vessel from the Ukrainian list.

After that, the operation moved to the Black Sea. In a few days there, according to SBS data, tankers, gas carriers, dry cargo ships, and tugboats were attacked, increasing the total to 159.

Why the Azov Sea is so important for Russia

The Azov Sea is one of the key links in Russia’s system for transporting oil, oil products, grain, and other goods.

Through the Don River and the Volga-Don Canal, it is connected to Russia’s internal waterways. Small ‘river-sea’ class tankers can pick up cargo in internal Russian ports, pass through the Don, and enter the Azov Sea.

Further, oil can be transshipped onto larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Large sea vessels cannot always enter Azov ports due to limited depth and large draft. Therefore, Russia needs an intermediate feeder fleet — relatively small tankers, dry cargo ships, and auxiliary vessels.

Strikes on this fleet disrupt several logistical chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine;
• transportation of oil and oil products;
• export of Russian goods through the Azov Sea;
• operation of ports and transshipment points;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• schemes to bypass international sanctions.

In NAnews — Israel News they note: the operation against vessels is not an isolated maritime campaign. It is connected with a broader Ukrainian strategy of strikes on oil refineries, oil depots, energy, and transport infrastructure of Russia.

If maritime delivery becomes too dangerous, Moscow is forced to transfer cargo to road and rail. But these routes are closer to the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.

What happened to shipping

The consequences of the operation are recorded not only in reports from the Ukrainian command.

Reuters reported that after the start of the strikes, Russia temporarily stopped or seriously restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal. This route connects the Don with the Azov Sea and is used for transporting oil, grain, and other goods.

Satellite images also showed a sharp decrease in the number of vessels near the Kerch Strait.

According to Reuters, in early June, more than 40 vessels were waiting to pass in the strait area. After a series of Ukrainian attacks, satellite images showed only a few noticeable vessels in the same zone.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that for Russian logistics, the Azov Sea is effectively turning into a closed water area. According to him, Russian vessels began moving to the Taman area and looking for safer anchorage spots.

But the concentration of dozens of vessels in a limited area creates new problems: they are easier to detect, harder to disperse, and more difficult to protect simultaneously with air defense and electronic warfare means.

Impact on oil, Crimea supply, and the Russian budget

Russian oil exports remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the budget, which finances the war against Ukraine.

Some vessels are used directly for delivering fuel to Crimea and occupied territories. Others are involved in transporting oil, oil products, and goods between Russian ports and external markets.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk called oil the ‘blood of war’ and the Russian economy. According to him, small Azov tankers delivered oil to large ships in the Black Sea, but now this scheme has been disrupted.

At the same time, the term ‘shadow fleet’ should be used cautiously.

The Ukrainian side applies it to vessels involved in Russian oil, sanction, and military logistics. However, not every affected vessel is necessarily under personal sanctions by the EU, USA, or UK.

Reuters previously checked part of the first attacked tankers and found that not all of them were officially listed in international sanctions lists. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of vessels that Ukraine refers to as the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ or the system supporting the Russian economy and military logistics.

Why the strikes affected the grain market

The Azov Sea is used not only for oil transportation.

A significant portion of Russian grain exports passes through this region. According to Reuters, routes through the Azov Sea and the Don-Azov Canal may be linked to up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports.

After shipping restrictions, European wheat futures rose by about 4% and reached their highest level in several weeks.

This shows that the Ukrainian operation can have consequences far beyond the combat zone.

Increased risks affect:

• freight costs;
• marine insurance;
• delivery times;
• global grain prices;
• the willingness of foreign companies to send ships to Russian ports;
• Russia’s ability to fulfill export contracts.

Russian authorities began considering redirecting part of the grain cargo to other ports in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, this increases distances, transportation costs, and the load on railway infrastructure.

Legality of strikes and Ukraine’s position

Russia called Ukrainian attacks ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’.

Ukraine rejects these accusations and states that the vessels are used to support the Russian army, supply occupied Crimea, and finance the war.

Dmytro Pletenchuk reminded that Crimea, according to international law, remains the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, vessels entering the ports of the occupied peninsula without Kyiv’s permission are considered violators by the Ukrainian side.

At the same time, there is no independent international legal assessment of each of the 159 episodes yet. Nor has a complete list of all vessels with their names, owners, flags, cargo nature, and damage degree been published.

What is confirmed, and what remains Ukraine’s statement

As of July 17, several levels of confirmation can be confidently stated.

The Ukrainian command stated:

• 159 ships affected;
• 117 targets were in the Sea of Azov;
• 42 — in the Black Sea;
• the task is to paralyze Russian logistics;
• ships are predominantly disabled, not sunk.

Independent sources confirm:

• a sharp reduction in ship movement;
• restrictions in the Kerch Strait and the Don-Azov Canal;
• concentration of ships in safer areas;
• disruption of Russian export routes;
• the impact of events on grain prices;
• the need to redirect cargo through other ports.

It is currently impossible to independently confirm:

• the exact damage to each of the 159 ships;
• the number of ships completely decommissioned;
• the number of ships that have already been towed and repaired;
• the affiliation of each ship to the internationally recognized ‘shadow fleet’;
• the full composition of the cargo they carry.

A new stage of the war at sea

Over several years, Ukraine, with virtually no classic large military fleet, managed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea with the help of sea and air drones.

Now this tactic is spreading to the Sea of Azov and the internal Russian transport system.

Operation ‘MoLoChKa’ shows a transition from single strikes on individual ships to the systematic destruction of the entire logistics chain: tanker, tugboat, port, oil depot, canal, railway, substation.

For Russia, the problem is not only the cost of damaged ships. Each new strike forces route changes, increased security, dispatch of tugs, equipment repairs, higher insurance costs, and delivery delays.

NAnews — News of Israel notes: even if most of the 159 ships remain afloat, the strategic effect of the operation is measured not by the number of sunken hulls. It is measured by how many Russian routes have ceased to function normally and how many additional resources Moscow is forced to spend on ensuring occupied Crimea.

The main result of the operation at the moment is not ‘159 sunken ships’, but the actual transformation of the Sea of Azov and the adjacent part of the Black Sea into a zone of constant risk for Russian logistics.

This is what lies behind Robert Brovdi’s formula: ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.