Israel News

In the seventh part, we will analyze another layer of digital presence: landing pages, bookmark profiles, CRM platforms, professional networks, federated social networks, communities, messenger groups, and alternative platforms. For small businesses in Israel, such tools may seem secondary, but they often create the “trust trail” that a client sees before the first contact.

Today, a person rarely makes a decision after one post. They might see a business in search, open LinkedIn, check the page on HubSpot, enter a Discord community, see a profile on Mastodon, find a collection of links on Diigo, and then go to the main site. If everything is neatly arranged and leads to one logic, the brand looks alive and professional.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how such platforms can work together. The project itself is related to Israeli news, Ukrainian topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same scheme is suitable for small businesses: each external platform should explain who you are, how you are useful, where the main site is, and how to contact you.

Protopage: landing page, RSS, and convenient link hub

Protopage is a personal start page, RSS reader, and web portal. The platform has been operating since 2005 and was originally built around the idea of gathering news, RSS feeds, bookmarks, notes, widgets, and useful links in one place. It is not a social network in the classic sense, but rather an informational desktop.

In terms of market share, Protopage cannot be compared to Facebook, LinkedIn, or Telegram. Its niche is personal panels, RSS aggregation, informational hubs, internal portals, and pages with structured links. It is used by people and small teams who need to see different sources and materials on one page.

For small businesses in Israel, Protopage can be useful as a public or working link center: site, social networks, RSS, blog, video, contact pages, maps, partner materials, and important publications. This is especially convenient when a company has many channels and needs to gather them into a clear map.

The page Protopage — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional hub for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how not just to open another profile, but to gather different digital points into one understandable system.

Diigo Profile: bookmarks, sources, and research base

Diigo is a service for saving bookmarks, annotations, tags, notes, and research materials. It appeared in 2005 as a social bookmarking tool and later became a useful platform for those working with a large number of sources: journalists, teachers, students, marketers, analysts, editors, and teams.

In terms of market share, Diigo does not compete with large social networks. Its role is different: not coverage at any cost, but saving, structuring, and explaining links. It is a tool for those who want to show that the project is backed by normal work with materials and sources, not random publications.

For small businesses in Israel, Diigo can be unexpectedly useful. An agency can collect cases, research, useful articles, and links on promotion. A lawyer can gather materials on legal topics. An educational project can collect sources for students. Media can gather publications on countries, topics, events, and historical memory.

The profile Diigo Profile — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a library of important links for the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how even bookmarks can enhance brand trust.

HubSpot: CRM, marketing, and landing pages

HubSpot is a large platform for CRM, marketing, sales, service support, content, and automation. The company was founded in 2006 in Boston and grew from marketing software into a full-fledged customer platform. It is used by small and medium businesses, B2B teams, SaaS companies, agencies, sales, marketing, and customer service departments.

In the market, HubSpot is not related to ordinary social networks but to the class of business platforms. It is compared with CRM and marketing automation solutions: Salesforce, Zoho, Pipedrive, Mailchimp, ActiveCampaign, and other tools for working with clients and leads. HubSpot’s strength is the connection of the site, forms, email, CRM, content, analytics, and marketing processes.

For small businesses in Israel, HubSpot can be useful if you need not just to publish posts but to manage inquiries: who wrote, where they came from, what they asked, at what stage the deal is, what emails were sent, which pages work better. This is especially important for services where the client does not buy immediately but goes through several touches.

The page HubSpot — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional landing page for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how an external landing can be connected not only with publication but also with marketing logic and applications.

LinkedIn: professional network and B2B trust

LinkedIn is a professional social network launched in 2003. Its main role is business connections, companies, vacancies, expert publications, corporate pages, B2B communication, recruiting, and professional reputation. Unlike entertainment social networks, LinkedIn is perceived as a place where business shows its competence.

In terms of scale, LinkedIn remains one of the main professional networks in the world. International companies, startups, universities, media, funds, technology brands, agencies, executives, HR specialists, journalists, consultants, and experts are present there. For the B2B segment, it is one of the key channels of trust.

For small businesses in Israel, LinkedIn is especially important if the company works with corporate clients, international audiences, technology, marketing, legal services, consulting, education, real estate, investments, or expert services. There you can show not only services but also a professional position.

The page LinkedIn — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a professional representation of the project. For small businesses, this is an example of how a brand becomes visible not only to clients but also to partners, journalists, specialists, and organizations.

Mastodon: federated network and independent presence

Mastodon is a federated social network that publicly appeared in 2016. Its feature is that it is not built around one central site. There are different servers, or instances, that are connected through the Fediverse. A user of one server can read and discuss publications of users from other servers.

In terms of market share, Mastodon is much smaller than X, Facebook, or Threads. But its value is not in mass coverage, but in an independent environment, open code, the absence of a single corporate center, and an audience often consisting of IT specialists, journalists, researchers, authors, activists, and people interested in privacy.

For small businesses, Mastodon can be useful if the company works with an international audience, technology, media, education, analytics, culture, or independent communities. It is not a channel for quick sales but a good signal of modern digital literacy.

The profile Mastodon — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional point for publishing materials and links. For small businesses, this is an example of presence not only on large centralized platforms but also in a freer federated environment.

Discord: communities, discussions, and closed audience

Discord is a platform for voice, video, and text communication, launched in 2015. Initially, it became known among gamers, but later expanded significantly: now it is used by educational projects, crypto and Web3 communities, music groups, startups, authors, fan clubs, IT teams, courses, and closed communities.

In the market, Discord holds a strong place in the niche of community platforms and real-time communication. It is not a classic social network with an open feed but a space of servers, channels, roles, chats, voice rooms, and constant communication. Therefore, its value is in retaining the audience, not just attracting new people.

For small businesses in Israel, Discord can be useful if a community can be created around the company: a training course, a client club, technical support, a creative group, a project for youth, a gaming or IT direction, an educational program, closed discussions, or events.

The server Discord — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional communication space around the project. For businesses, this is an example of how you can not only publish but also gather people into a separate community.

MeWe: privacy and an alternative to large social networks

MeWe is a social network that grew out of the Sgrouples project, founded in 2012. The platform positions itself as a more private alternative to large social networks. It is often described with an emphasis on personal data, groups, communities, the absence of the usual advertising model, and an attempt to create a more controlled communication environment.

In terms of market share, MeWe is much smaller than Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or X. But it has its niche: users who value privacy, alternative communities, interest groups, and less dependence on the largest platforms. Open data on its audience has changed, but the platform claimed tens of millions of users worldwide.

For small businesses, MeWe can be useful if the company works with interest groups, communities, author projects, culture, family audiences, educational topics, or international connections. It is not the main sales channel but an additional layer of presence.

The profile MeWe — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another social point of the project. For businesses, this is an example of working with an audience that is not always found in ordinary mass networks.

Plurk: microblogging, short thoughts, and niche communities

Plurk is a microblogging platform launched in 2008. It is known for its horizontal timeline, short messages, and culture of quick publications. Over the years, Plurk has been particularly noticeable in some Asian internet communities, as well as among users who liked the alternative format of microblogging.

In terms of market share, Plurk does not compete with X, Facebook, or Telegram. It is a niche platform where the value is not in a huge audience but in an additional digital footprint, short publications, and presence in non-standard environments. For some brands, such platforms help expand recognition beyond familiar networks.

For small businesses, Plurk can be an additional channel for short updates, thoughts, links, announcements, and quick notes. Do not expect it to be the main flow of applications, but as part of the overall presence system, it can work.

The page Plurk — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be such a short microblogging channel for the project.

Societas: federated social environment and additional profile

Societas is one of the niche federated social platforms associated with the idea of independent profiles and alternative social networks. Such platforms usually do not have a large market share, but they are important as part of the broader Fediverse environment and independent web.

Unlike Facebook or LinkedIn, such platforms do not provide instant coverage. Their role is to show that the project is present not only in commercial social networks but also in distributed, independent, or alternative digital spaces. This is especially interesting for media, authors, IT projects, cultural initiatives, and people who value digital autonomy.

For small businesses in Israel, Societas can be useful as an additional point of presence if the brand works with technological, international, independent, or media audiences. It is not a mandatory platform for everyone, but a good element of a wide link map.

The profile Societas — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as another federated profile of the project.

Diaspora Psyco: distributed social network and data control

Diaspora is a distributed social network that appeared in 2010 as an alternative to centralized platforms. Its idea is not one main site but a network of independent servers called pods. The user chooses a pod, and the network itself does not belong to one corporate center.

In terms of the mass market, Diaspora did not become a competitor to Facebook, but it is important historically and ideologically: as one of the early projects that raised the question of user control over data, distributed architecture, independence from large platforms, and open code.

For small businesses, such a platform is not suitable for everyone. But for media, technological projects, public initiatives, cultural organizations, and authors, it can be an additional signal: the project is present in an environment where independence, privacy, and distributed communication are important.

The profile Diaspora Psyco — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as another point of presence for the project in the distributed social network.

How to use these platforms without chaos

The main mistake of small businesses is to perceive external platforms as a random set of links.

If a company has Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora, but nowhere is it explained who they are and where to contact, there will be little benefit.

Each platform should have its role. Protopage — link hub and RSS. Diigo — bookmark and source base. HubSpot — landing pages and CRM logic. LinkedIn — professional reputation. Mastodon, Societas, and Diaspora — federated presence. Discord — community and communication. MeWe — alternative social network. Plurk — short messages and additional microblog.

For small businesses in Israel, it is important that all these pages lead to one center: the main site, a clear description of services, contacts, and a clear action. The client should not guess what the company does. They should quickly understand: who you are, where you work, how you are useful, and how to contact you.

Why this is important for promotion in Israel

The Israeli market is fast and multilingual. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English or Ukrainian. One checks Google, another looks at LinkedIn, a third opens Telegram or Discord, a fourth just looks for additional confirmations that the business is real.

Therefore, promotion should not depend on one platform. The main site remains the center, but around it should work social networks, blogs, profiles, communities, maps, RSS hubs, professional pages, and additional publication platforms.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that digital presence can be built as a system. A reader can find the project through Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, or Diaspora, but everywhere they should see the same logic: this is a project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — event poster of Israel.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the seventh part: Protopage, Diigo, HubSpot, LinkedIn, Mastodon, Discord, MeWe, Plurk, Societas, and Diaspora do not replace the main site but enhance it. They help small businesses in Israel look more professional, create more trust points, work with different audiences, and lead the client to a clear inquiry.

On the night of July 13, 2026, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit another 15 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov. Simultaneously, the ‘Crimean Switch’ operation continued: energy nodes of occupied Crimea, the Russian S-400 system, Tor air defense systems, and radar complexes were targeted.

Over eight days — from July 6 to July 13, 2026 — Ukrainian drone operators, according to the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, with the call sign ‘Madyar’, hit 105 Russian vessels.

These include tankers, bulk carriers, ferries, tugs, and special vessels involved in supplying occupied Crimea and operating Russian port infrastructure in the Sea of Azov.

On the night of July 12 to 13 alone, Ukrainian drones attacked 15 vessels:

• seven tankers;
• five bulk carriers;
• one ferry;
• two tugs.

Brovdi stated that Ukrainian units continue the ‘battle for fuel for Crimea’, gradually depriving the Russian group of stable maritime logistics.

What happened on the night of July 13

According to the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, strikes were carried out on Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov.

Their exact location at the time of the attack, names, and registration details of most targets were not publicly disclosed. However, it is known that these are vessels used for transporting fuel, cargo, and servicing ports that supply Russian troops in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.

After the night attack, the total result of the operation, according to Brovdi’s calculations, increased from 90 to 105 hit vessels.

The commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces also stated that the intensity of the strikes has already affected movement through the Kerch Strait, unloading of vessels, and the operation of transshipment infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

There is no independent confirmation of a complete halt to shipping through the Kerch Strait yet. However, earlier, Reuters, citing sources, reported a suspension of movement through the Azov-Don Canal after a series of attacks on vessels.

How Ukraine counted 105 hit vessels

The arithmetic declared by the Unmanned Systems Forces consists of several consecutive night operations.

July 6–10: the first 48 targets

The main phase of the strikes began on July 6.

In the following days, the Ukrainian side reported daily on new hits on Russian tankers and auxiliary vessels.

On the night of July 7, Unmanned Systems Forces units claimed an attack on tankers, a bulk carrier, and a ferry. On the night of July 8, nine more tankers were hit, and on July 9, 14 vessels, including 12 tankers, a bulk carrier, and a tug.

On the night of July 10, the list was supplemented by another 13 vessels:

• ten tankers;
• one bulk carrier;
• one ferry;
• one sea tug.

After this, Brovdi reported 48 hit vessels in the first five days of the operation.

July 11: immediately 28 vessels

The largest night attack in terms of the number of targets occurred on July 11.

According to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit 28 Russian vessels:

• 21 tankers;
• four tugs;
• two bulk carriers;
• one dredger or special vessel.

After this operation, the total number of hit vessels increased to 76 units.

The Ukrainian side claimed that the vessels were used for military logistics, cargo transportation, and supporting the activities of Russian port infrastructure.

July 12: another 14 targets

On the night of July 12, the Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit:

• ten tankers;
• four ferries.

The total result for the period from July 6 to July 12 reached 90 vessels. Information about the attacks on vessels was also mentioned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

July 13: the result increased to 105

After the attack on seven tankers, five bulk carriers, a ferry, and two tugs, the number of declared hits reached 105.

Thus, the sequence published by the Ukrainian side looks like this:

Date	Declared hit vessels	Total result
July 6–10	48	48
July 11	28	76
July 12	14	90
July 13	15	105

Why these vessels are called the ‘shadow fleet’

The term ‘shadow fleet’ is usually applied to tankers used by Russia to export oil and petroleum products bypassing sanctions, insurance restrictions, and the price cap set by Western countries.

However, in Brovdi’s statements, this concept is used more broadly.

He includes not only large oil tankers in the ‘shadow fleet’ but also bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, dredgers, and other auxiliary vessels involved in Russian logistics in the Sea of Azov.

These vessels can perform several tasks:

• deliver gasoline and diesel fuel to occupied Crimea;
• transport cargo for Russian troops;
• service ports and piers;
• ensure ferry communication;
• support movement in sea channels;
• participate in the transshipment of fuel and other cargo.

Therefore, the goal of the Ukrainian campaign is not only an individual tanker but the entire transport system connecting Russian ports with the occupied peninsula.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that strikes on maritime logistics have significance far beyond the Sea of Azov. Russia is forced to spend additional resources on guarding vessels, seeking new supply routes, strengthening port air defenses, and redistributing cargo to the Crimean Bridge and the land corridor through the occupied south of Ukraine.

‘Crimean Switch’: strikes on the peninsula’s energy

Simultaneously with the hunt for Russian vessels, the Unmanned Systems Forces continue an operation called ‘Crimean Switch off’.

On the night of July 13, according to Brovdi, Ukrainian drones hit nine energy nodes and substations of various capacities in the occupied territories.

A strategic electricity transfer point of the Kuban-Crimea energy bridge, designated as the ‘Crimea’ node, was also hit.

Brovdi claims that this object was attacked for the second time in 48 hours.

The energy bridge from the Krasnodar region was built after the Russian occupation of Crimea and became one of the key sources of electricity supply to the peninsula.

Strikes on substations and electricity distribution nodes can create problems not only for civilian infrastructure but also for Russian military facilities, airfields, radar stations, ports, warehouses, and repair enterprises.

Earlier, on July 3, the Unmanned Systems Forces reported hitting ten energy facilities in occupied Crimea. At that time, the Ukrainian side claimed that in just one night, drones attacked 48 different targets.

S-400, ‘Tor’, and two radar stations

In addition to energy facilities, on the night of July 13, Ukrainian units claimed to have hit four elements of the Russian air defense system.

According to Brovdi, the following were destroyed:

• a launcher of the S-400 ‘Triumph’ air defense missile system;
• a ‘Tor’ air defense missile system;
• two radar complexes.

The S-400 is one of the main long-range systems of the Russian air defense. The complex is designed to detect and hit aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial targets.

The ‘Tor’ air defense system is used at shorter distances and is supposed to cover military facilities and units from drones, guided bombs, and missiles.

The loss of radar stations creates an additional problem: even the remaining launchers become less effective if the Russian system cannot timely detect a target and transmit data for its destruction.

Earlier in July, the Unmanned Systems Forces also claimed strikes on two S-400 launchers and a ‘Nebo-U’ radar station. According to Ukrainian data, one of the launchers was located near Glazovka in occupied Crimea, and the other in the Kosyonki area of the Bryansk region of Russia.

The battle for fuel for occupied Crimea

Brovdi calls the disruption of fuel supplies the key task of the series of strikes.

Crimea depends on several supply routes:

• sea transportation through the Sea of Azov;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• rail and road communication via the Crimean Bridge;
• a land corridor through the occupied areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions;
• an energy bridge from the Krasnodar region.

If tankers and ferries stop going to sea or are forced to undergo repairs, the load shifts to land routes.

This increases transportation costs, creates queues, and makes logistics more vulnerable to subsequent strikes.

Even damage to a vessel without its complete destruction can take it out of operation for weeks or months. The shipowner needs to find a safe port, inspect the hull and equipment, replace damaged elements, and obtain permission for further operation.

Moreover, regular attacks increase risks for crews, insurers, and companies that agree to work on routes associated with occupied Crimea.

What the stoppage of the Kerch Strait means

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime route connecting the Azov and Black Seas.

Through it pass vessels heading to the Russian ports of Azov, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Yeysk, and Temryuk, as well as to the ports of occupied Crimea.

Even a temporary halt in movement creates a chain reaction:

• vessels accumulate waiting for permission to pass;
• the schedule for fuel delivery is disrupted;
• freight costs are rising;
• ports are not receiving cargo on time;
• there are delays in the removal of products;
• Russian military are forced to seek alternative routes.

Brovdi suggested that movement through the strait could have been stopped after the large-scale attacks on July 11.

The Russian side has not officially confirmed a complete and prolonged blockade of the strait. Therefore, it is premature to assert that shipping has completely ceased.

However, reports of temporary movement restrictions and the suspension of the Azov-Don Canal indicate that the strikes have already begun to affect Russian maritime logistics.

Affected does not mean sunk

The figure 105 must be interpreted correctly.

The Ukrainian side claims 105 affected vessels, but this does not mean that all of them were sunk or completely destroyed.

The military term ‘affected’ can mean:

• direct hit;
• hull damage;
• fire;
• engine failure;
• damage to navigation equipment;
• loss of ability to move independently;
• need for long-term repair;
• temporary suspension of operation.

The full list of names of the 105 vessels, detailed photographs of the damage, and an independent assessment of the condition of each vessel have not yet been published.

There is also no independent confirmation of the destruction of all the declared air defense systems and energy facilities.

Therefore, the most accurate wording is: The Ukrainian drone forces claimed to have affected 105 Russian vessels from July 6 to 13, 2026.

Why this operation is important

In eight days, Ukrainian drones, according to the statements of the SBS command, moved from individual strikes to a systematic campaign against Russian maritime, energy, and military infrastructure.

Simultaneously, ships, ports, substations, energy bridges, air defense systems, and radar stations are being attacked.

This approach forces Russia to defend several types of objects at once and stretch limited air defense resources over a large area.

While Russian complexes try to cover energy nodes, ports and ships become more vulnerable. If air defense is transferred to the coast, the risk to airfields, warehouses, and other objects deep in the occupied peninsula increases.

This is the logic of the ‘Crimean Switch’: not a one-time strike, but a gradual destruction of the system that ensures the Russian military presence in Crimea.

The declared 105 affected vessels in eight days still require full independent confirmation. But even if some targets received relatively minor damage, the intensity of the attacks itself shows that the Sea of Azov has ceased to be a safe internal water area for the Russian fleet and transport companies.

If you want to see the Israeli-Ukrainian agenda without the Russian optics — add NANews to Google.
https://www.google.com/preferences/source?q=news.nikk.co.il

Ukrainian long-range drones are turning Russia’s oil refining industry from a familiar source of income into one of the Kremlin’s main vulnerabilities. The consequences of the strikes are already extending beyond individual enterprises, affecting fuel production, domestic logistics, and the ability of Russian authorities to conceal the scale of the problems that have arisen.

Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Israel to Russia, head of the Russia Studies Program at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies, Arkady Milman considers the situation a serious crisis for the entire Russian Federation.

In his assessment, this crisis becomes especially painful personally for Putin, as the fuel shortage and disruptions cannot be completely hidden behind statements from Russian propaganda. The diplomat expressed his position on the air of the project “Studio West” on the “Espresso” TV channel.

A problem that the Kremlin finds difficult to deny

Arkady Milman draws attention to an unusual situation for the Russian authorities: Putin has to publicly acknowledge the existence of problems with fuel and logistics. Usually, the Kremlin continues to talk about the advancement of the Russian army and the approaching “victory,” even when the real situation contradicts this. However, stoppages and damage to oil refining capacities directly affect the supply of regions. In such a case, television statements alone are no longer sufficient.

It’s not just about remote Russian cities, where authorities are used to ignoring public discontent. According to Milman, the consequences of the strikes are also felt in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the emergence of fuel difficulties in the capital takes on a completely different political weight for the Kremlin.

Why gasoline has become a political weapon

An oil refinery is not just an energy infrastructure facility.

Its operation depends on the supply of gasoline and diesel fuel, the transportation of military cargo, the supply of enterprises, agriculture, and the usual movement of transport within the country.

When one large enterprise falls out, the load has to be redistributed among other plants and regions. If the strikes are repeated, Russia faces not just a single fire, but a chain of problems that cannot be quickly eliminated by repairing one damaged workshop.

For the Israeli audience, Milman’s assessment is especially interesting not only because of his diplomatic experience. The former Israeli ambassador is well acquainted with the Russian power system and understands how sensitive crises that affect Moscow and the daily lives of Russians become for the Kremlin.

The strike on the Omsk refinery changed the scale of the campaign

One of the most notable episodes was the strike on the Omsk oil refinery on the night of July 6, 2026. According to published information, Ukrainian drones covered about 2,500 kilometers, making the operation one of the longest-range strikes since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. The target was the primary oil processing unit ELOU-AVT-11 — a key node supplying raw materials to other production lines. Reports of the plant’s shutdown appeared as early as July 7.

The Omsk refinery is considered the largest oil refinery in Russia and one of the main producers of automotive fuel. That is why its damage may be significantly more serious than strikes on less powerful facilities located closer to Moscow.

Strategic initiative shifts to Ukraine

Arkady Milman believes that the events of recent weeks indicate a shift in strategic initiative to Ukraine. This is an expert assessment, but it is based on a noticeable change in the nature of Ukrainian operations: Russian enterprises are being hit at distances that were recently considered inaccessible.

In the Kremlin, according to the Israeli diplomat, they realize the danger, despite attempts by propaganda to present the situation as controlled. Russia is forced to defend a vast territory, oil pipelines, terminals, and dozens of large plants, while the Ukrainian side can choose the most vulnerable technological nodes.

In the midst of this discussion, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to an important detail: strikes on oil refining are not symbolic actions. They impact the war economy, complicate transportation, reduce available fuel reserves, and force Russia to spend additional resources on air defense of facilities located deep in the rear.

Milman hopes that the Ukrainian Defense Forces will continue operations against Russian refineries. According to his forecast, if a significant part of the Russian Federation’s refining capacities is threatened, the accumulated damage could cause a full-fledged fuel and logistics crisis.

For Putin, the danger lies not only in the lost volumes of gasoline. The Kremlin model is based on the belief that the war is far from Moscow and almost does not affect the usual life inside Russia, but strikes on refineries gradually destroy this construct. The closer the consequences of the war approach the Russian capitals, the harder it is for the authorities to maintain the illusion of stability.

If you want to see the Israeli-Ukrainian agenda without the Russian lens — add NAnews to Google.

https://www.google.com/preferences/source?q=news.nikk.co.il

On the night of July 11, 2026, the Ukrainian Defense Forces conducted a new large-scale operation against the Russian fleet in the waters of the Sea of Azov. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, among the targets hit was 21 Russian tanker involved in the transportation of oil and petroleum products.

These vessels were part of a system allowing Russia to bypass international sanctions and maintain revenue from energy exports. The funds received are used by the Russian regime to continue the war against Ukraine, purchase weapons, and support the military industry.

Tankers, tugs, and bulk carriers were hit.

Ukraine attacked Russia’s maritime logistics.

In addition to 21 tankers, Ukrainian forces hit four tugs, two bulk carriers, and a dredger. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, these vessels serviced Russian military logistics, transported cargo, and supported port infrastructure operations.

The exact scale of the damage is still being determined. However, the number of vessels attacked indicates that this is not a single strike but a systematic operation against the Russian presence in the Sea of Azov.

For Moscow, the loss or prolonged withdrawal from service of even part of this fleet means the need to change routes, find other vessels, and strengthen port security. All this increases transportation costs and creates additional problems for Russian oil exports.

A series of attacks has changed the situation in the Sea of Azov.

Dozens of Russian vessels were hit in a few days.

The new operation continued a series of Ukrainian attacks that began earlier in July. Before the strike on July 11, it was reported that 35 Russian tankers, bulk carriers, and special vessels were hit.

The night of July 9 was particularly successful, when Ukrainian drones hit 12 tankers, one bulk carrier, and one tug. In total, from July 6 to 9, 25 tankers, six bulk carriers, one ferry, and one tug were hit.

Thus, in a few days, Ukraine launched a series of strikes on infrastructure that was previously considered relatively protected. Russian vessels were vulnerable not only in ports but also on routes within the Sea of Azov.

Amid the attacks, Russia temporarily suspended navigation through the Don-Azov Canal, which connects the Don River with the Sea of Azov. New applications for passage through the Kerch Strait between the Azov and Black Seas were also halted.

Why this operation is important for Israel.

Strikes on tankers affect more than just the front.

For the Israeli audience, it is important to view the events as more than just another episode of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Russia finances its military machine with oil and gas revenues, and bypassing sanctions through the tanker fleet allows it to maintain exports even under international restrictions.

The defeat of vessels transporting Russian oil increases pressure on the entire supply system. This can affect routes in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, insurance costs for vessels, and the behavior of companies that continue to work with Russian cargo.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such operations in the context of the connection between war, energy, and security. For Israel, located near the main maritime transport routes of the Eastern Mediterranean, changes in Russian oil logistics have not only political but also economic significance.

Ukraine consistently shifts pressure from the front line to objects that finance the Russian war with money, fuel, and transportation. Strikes on tankers show that vessels involved in bypassing sanctions and servicing Russian military infrastructure can no longer consider the Sea of Azov a safe zone.

If you want to see the Israeli-Ukrainian agenda without the Russian lens — add NAnews to Google.

https://www.google.com/preferences/source?q=news.nikk.co.il

Humanity has already proven that planets beyond the Solar System exist by the thousands. Now science faces a more complex task: to understand if there is life on them and whether our civilization will have enough time to discover it.

The question of the existence of planets around other stars was recently almost in the realm of science fiction. Today, this debate is practically over: planets are widespread throughout our galaxy, and the Solar System no longer appears to be the only known island of worlds in the Universe.

According to NASA’s exoplanet archive, by July 2026, scientists have confirmed the existence of more than 6,300 planets beyond the Solar System. Most of them were discovered not through direct photographs, but through indirect signs — for example, by the dimming of a star’s brightness during a planet’s transit in front of it or by barely noticeable wobbles of the star itself under the influence of the planet’s gravity.

This scientific revolution is partly due to the work of Swiss astrophysicist Didier Queloz. In 1995, he, along with Michel Mayor, announced the discovery of 51 Pegasi b — the first confirmed planet orbiting a sun-like star. The discovery changed astronomers’ understanding of planetary system formation and in 2019 earned Queloz and Mayor the Nobel Prize in Physics.

In an interview with TSN, recorded during the 75th meeting of Nobel laureates in Lindau, Germany, Queloz suggested looking at the problem of extraterrestrial life more broadly. He is no longer worried about whether science will be able to create the necessary tools.

The scientist is almost certain that such technologies will appear.

The real question is much more worrying: will human society be able to last long enough to use them.

Planets have been found. Now science is looking not for worlds, but for life.

The discovery of 51 Pegasi b was groundbreaking not because this planet is similar to Earth. On the contrary, it turned out to be a huge gas world located extremely close to its star. Such objects have been called “hot Jupiters.”

Before the discovery by Queloz and Mayor, many models suggested that large gas planets should be far from their stars, like Jupiter and Saturn in the Solar System. 51 Pegasi b showed that the arrangement of planetary systems can be much more diverse than previously thought.

Today, researchers face a different question. Planets exist — this is proven. But how often among them are worlds where water, complex chemistry, and living organisms could have appeared?

Finding a planet in the so-called habitable zone is not enough. This is just the area around a star where the temperature theoretically allows for the existence of liquid water. The real habitability of a world also depends on its mass, atmosphere, magnetic field, star activity, surface composition, and internal geology.

A planet may be at the perfect distance from its star but lack an atmosphere. Or have such a dense gas envelope that a destructive greenhouse effect arises on the surface. Stellar flares can gradually destroy the atmosphere, and the absence of geological activity can disrupt the long-term cycle of substances.

That is why modern astronomy is gradually moving from simply counting planets to studying their atmospheres and climates.

Queloz reminds us how limited human knowledge is even about the nearest celestial bodies. We have been exploring Mars for decades, sending orbiters and rovers there, but we still know almost nothing about what lies at a shallow depth beneath its surface.

The scientist proposes a thought experiment: if an alien probe landed in the Sahara or the Atacama Desert, its creators might mistakenly conclude that the entire Earth is a lifeless desert. A few landing points do not provide a complete picture of an entire planet.

Therefore, the absence of detected life on Mars does not yet prove that it never existed there or that simple organisms have not survived beneath the surface.

NANews — Israel News notes: the search for extraterrestrial life has already ceased to be a hunt for sensation or an attempt to catch an artificial radio signal. It is systematic work at the intersection of astronomy, chemistry, geology, climatology, and biology.

Queloz heads the Center for Life in the Universe at Cambridge, where researchers from different specialties try to understand not only where to look for life but also what exactly should be considered life. Scientists still find it difficult to formulate a universal definition that would suit both terrestrial organisms and potentially other biological systems.

Why extraterrestrial life may turn out to be very different from what we expect

Human imagination usually depicts either intelligent beings or a planet similar to Earth. But the first discovery of extraterrestrial life is most likely to look much more modest.

It could be an unusual combination of gases in the atmosphere of a distant planet, which is difficult to explain without biological processes. Another possible option is organic compounds, traces of ancient microbial activity, or surface changes that repeat seasonally.

However, even a potential biosignature will not become instant proof. Methane, oxygen, and other substances can arise both as a result of organism activity and due to non-biological chemical and geological processes.

Every loud discovery will have to be repeatedly verified by different telescopes and methods. It may take years between the first suspicion and the recognition of the existence of extraterrestrial life.

Artificial intelligence will not replace the scientist

Modern telescopes produce huge arrays of information. The volume of data is already so large that a researcher is physically unable to independently review every signal, spectrum, or change in star brightness.

Artificial intelligence helps find patterns, sort observations, identify anomalies, and select the most interesting objects. But Didier Queloz does not believe that an algorithm can replace scientific thinking.

According to him, a good researcher should not automatically trust the telescope, measuring instrument, or computer model. It is especially necessary to be cautious when the system shows something unusual.

In the history of astronomy, there have already been cases where technical defects were mistaken for planets.

An instrument could create a spike in the data, and a researcher expecting a certain result saw it as confirmation of their hypothesis.

Therefore, the task of the scientist is not to accept a beautiful result but to try to disprove it. The observation is checked with another instrument, repeated under different conditions, and alternative explanations are considered.

Queloz calls artificial intelligence a wonderful tool and compares its emergence to the spread of computers, phones, and photography. Each of these technologies changed the usual way of life but did not destroy human creativity.

Photography did not lead to the disappearance of painting. Computers did not stop people from writing. Similarly, artificial intelligence can free researchers from administrative routine and mechanical data processing but cannot independently decide which question is truly important.

It is the person who determines the direction of research, doubts the result, and understands its significance.

The main threat is not in space

The strongest thought in Queloz’s interview is not related to distant planets or even artificial intelligence.

The scientist believes that the technologies necessary for the search for extraterrestrial life will be created sooner or later. But creating a telescope, spacecraft, or new algorithm can take decades. Scientific results require stable universities, long-term funding, international cooperation, and the training of new generations of researchers.

Politicians live by electoral cycles, companies by quarterly reports, and fundamental science is forced to plan work decades ahead.

Queloz sharply criticizes the reduction of research funding in the USA. In his opinion, by limiting support for science, the American authorities primarily reduce America’s influence. He characterizes such a policy as an attempt to “shoot oneself in the foot,” especially when political pressure affects climate and global warming research.

Science will not stop because of this. If one country reduces investments, the center of attraction for researchers and technologies gradually shifts to where funding is growing. Queloz expects the strengthening of scientific positions in China, India, and Southeast Asian countries.

Nobel Prizes usually reflect research conducted many years or even decades ago. Therefore, today’s reduction in university programs may not be immediately noticeable. Its consequences will manifest later — in a decrease in the number of discoveries, specialists, and new technologies.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, Queloz’s conversation has direct significance. The country has strong universities, technology companies, and a developed system of defense and space developments, but its scientific advantage also depends on continuous funding and international connections.

The Israel Space Agency supports exoplanet research, planetology, the development of scientific equipment, and deep space observations. The agency collaborates with NASA, the European Space Agency, and other international organizations.

At the Weizmann Institute, new telescopes and methods for processing astronomical data are being developed. The complex located in the Negev is used, among other things, for the search for exoplanets and the study of their atmospheres.

Researchers at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem study the climate of distant worlds. One of the works was dedicated to the impact of ozone on the atmosphere of Proxima Centauri b — a planet near the closest star to the Sun. Modeling showed that the chemical composition of the atmosphere can significantly affect the distribution of temperature and winds, and therefore the potential habitability of the planet.

Such projects show that the search for life in the Universe is not an abstract topic for a few major space powers. Israeli scientists are already participating in the creation of knowledge and technologies on which the future answer may depend.

For NANews — Israel News, Queloz’s words are especially important for the connection between scientific freedom and societal stability. A state may have talented researchers and advanced technologies but lose its advantage if universities are constantly struggling for survival and long-term programs become hostages of political crises.

Humanity has approached one of the most important discoveries in its history. We already know that Earth is not the only planet. We have learned to determine the sizes of distant worlds, measure their mass, and obtain the first information about their atmospheres.

But the final answer will require patience.

Perhaps signs of life will be found in a few years. Perhaps it will take decades. And it is likely that the discovery will not be an impressive message from an intelligent civilization but a faint chemical signal that will need to be verified for a long time.

Didier Queloz is confident in science’s ability to create the necessary tools. His doubt relates to humanity itself.

“The question is only whether we will have time.”

This is no longer just a question of astronomy. It is a question of whether modern societies can protect education, science, and the freedom of research long enough to one day find out: are we alone in the Universe.

Many residents of Israel approach the age of 60 with the feeling that retirement is something distant, complicated, and almost inevitably bureaucratic. As long as there is work, a salary, and a familiar rhythm of life, it seems that dealing with pension funds can be postponed: closer to 67 years, after dismissal, or already when Bituach Leumi sends some documents.

But in reality, this approach often becomes the most costly mistake.

In Israel, the pension system is arranged so that a person can have several different sources of future income: state old-age benefits, a pension fund, Bituach Menahalim, Kupat Gemel, Keren Hishtalmut, severance pay, old savings from previous employers, and additional insurance or pension programs. Some of this money people remember, some they have long forgotten, and some programs they only learn about after a professional review.

And here arises the main question for those who have already turned 60 or are approaching this age: can one already start receiving a pension from the pension fund and continue working?

The answer may be unexpected. In some cases — yes, this possibility is indeed worth checking. But this does not mean that everyone over 60 should urgently start receiving payments. For one person, such a step may increase family income today, while for another — decrease future pension, affect taxes, or create problems for the family in the future.

Therefore, the right question is not “am I entitled to a pension?” but rather: what is beneficial in my specific situation?

Pension in Israel is not a single button and not a single payment

For many Russian-speaking Israelis, the word “pension” sounds like something singular: reached the age, submitted documents, started receiving money. But in Israel, everything is more complicated, and because of this, people often get confused.

There is an old-age benefit from Bituach Leumi. This is a state payment that depends on age, insurance record, income, and other conditions.

There is a pension fund — money that has been accumulated over the years from employee and employer contributions. These funds are not the same as the Bituach Leumi benefit and operate under different rules.

There is severance pay — a compensatory part that may be related to dismissal, job change, and pension savings. Sometimes a person perceives this money as a “free amount” that can simply be taken, but such a decision can affect the future monthly pension.

There is Keren Hishtalmut, Kupat Gemel, old pension programs, additional insurances, and savings that may have remained from previous workplaces. This is especially common for people who have changed employers several times in their lives, worked part-time, were self-employed, or moved between cities and fields of employment.

That is why before retiring, it is important not just to ask an acquaintance “how was it for you?” but to gather a complete picture.

• How many pension programs do you have?
• Where are the savings located?
• What amount is already there?
• What commissions do you pay?
• What is the forecast for the monthly pension?
• What will happen if you start receiving payments now?
• What will change if you wait a few more years?
• How is all this related to taxes, spouse, heirs, and future living standards?

Until these questions are answered, any decision will be more of a guess than planning.

Why the age of 60+ requires a separate check

In Israel, there is the concept of early retirement age. For many pension issues, the age of 60 becomes an important point because it is after this age that in some cases, one can consider starting to receive payments from the pension fund.

But this is not an automatic right “for everyone” and not a universal advice.

Imagine a typical family in Israel. The husband is 63 years old, the wife is 59. The husband continues to work, receives a salary, and the family is used to planning expenses around the current income. They know that there will be a pension someday, but are not sure when exactly to start the process, what documents are needed, and whether it makes sense to check something in advance.

After a professional review, it may turn out that the pension fund already allows considering a monthly payment, even if the person continues to work. For the family, this may mean additional income now: money for current expenses, helping children, treatment, rent, mortgage, trips, or just a more peaceful life.

But for another family with a similar age and similar salary, the calculation may show the opposite. If you start receiving money too early, the future pension may become lower. If you incorrectly handle severance pay, you can worsen the long-term picture. If you do not consider the tax, the amount “on paper” will not be the same amount that actually comes to the account.

That’s why the topic of 60+ is so sensitive: you can’t work by template here.

The same question — “receive now or wait?” — can have two different correct answers for two people.

The pension fund is not Bituach Leumi

One of the most common confusions arises between Bituach Leumi and the pension fund. People say “pension,” but mean completely different things.

Bituach Leumi is the national insurance system. The old-age benefit is related to state rules, age of entitlement, income checks in certain periods, and insurance record.

The pension fund is savings that were formed through work. Money was transferred there from the salary and employer contributions. These funds may be related to pension payments, severance pay, insurance part, and the chosen pension route.

If a person mixes these two topics, they may incorrectly assess their situation. For example, they may think: “I am not yet receiving Bituach Leumi, so there can be no pension yet.” Or vice versa: “Since I am soon entitled to an old-age benefit, the pension fund will do everything itself.”

In practice, it doesn’t work that way.

Bituach Leumi benefits and payments from the pension fund need to be considered separately, and then look at the overall picture of family income. Only then can you understand how much money a person can actually receive per month, what amounts will be gross, what net, what will happen with the tax, and how income will change after stopping work.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency regularly raises such topics precisely because for Russian-speaking families in Israel, this is not an abstract financial theory, but a question of everyday life: paying for housing, maintaining income levels, not losing rights, and not signing documents whose consequences will be difficult to correct later.

Where people most often lose money

The most common mistake is not checking pension savings at all. A person sees deductions in the payslip, knows that “something is there,” but does not understand in which fund the money is, what investment route is chosen, how much maintenance costs, and what the forecast for the future pension is.

The second mistake is waiting for dismissal or official retirement age to open documents for the first time. By this time, some decisions may already be less flexible, and there is much less time left for calm preparation.

The third mistake is withdrawing severance pay without calculation. At first glance, this seems logical: the money is accumulated, so it can be used now. But in Israel’s pension system, the compensatory part is often linked to the future pension, and its withdrawal can significantly reduce the monthly payment in old age. Sometimes a person receives a lump sum today but loses much more in the future.

The fourth mistake is looking only at the “gross” amount. The pension payment may look attractive in calculation, but after taxes and other conditions, the real amount will be different. Therefore, it is important to understand not only the size of the possible pension but also how much a person will actually see in the bank account.

The fifth mistake is not considering the spouse. When starting to receive a pension, a person can choose conditions that will affect what their spouse will receive after their death. This is not a technical detail, but one of the most important family decisions in pension planning.

There is another serious problem: many people rely on someone else’s experience.

Someone says: “I started receiving — and everything is great.” Another says: “Don’t touch anything until 67.” A third advises withdrawing severance pay because “money should be in hand.” But someone else’s story does not replace calculation because each person has different savings, record, income, spouse’s age, health, tax situation, and work plans.

What you need to know before making a decision

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, the first thing to do is not to urgently submit documents and not withdraw money, but to check the whole picture.

You need to understand how many pension programs are open in your name.

Sometimes a person has an active fund from the last employer and one or more old funds that they have long forgotten about. It happens that money is in different places, and without checking, it is impossible to see the full amount.

It is important to find out what monthly payment can be received now and what the forecast will be if you wait a few years. The difference can be significant, especially if the person continues to work and contributions to the pension fund continue to be made.

Separately, you need to check severance pay. This is one of the most sensitive blocks because the decision on compensations can affect future pension, tax benefits, and the overall structure of payments.

The tax issue is no less important. Pension in Israel can have tax consequences, and before starting payments, it is worth understanding what exemptions or benefits may be available, what documents need to be prepared, and how not to create unnecessary tax burden.

It is also necessary to discuss the family part in advance. What will the spouse receive? What guaranteed payments can be chosen? What will happen to the money if the person starts receiving a pension and then passes away in a few years or even earlier? These questions are unpleasant to discuss, but they protect the family from severe financial surprises.

A good pension review should give a person not a beautiful advertising phrase, but a clear answer: what options are there, what are the advantages, what are the risks, and what is more beneficial right now.

Can you work and receive a pension at the same time

In some situations, a person can indeed continue to work and simultaneously receive payments from the pension fund. For Russian-speaking Israelis, this often becomes a revelation because many are sure: the pension starts only after dismissal.

However, it is important not to confuse possibility with recommendation.

If the pension fund allows starting the payment, this does not mean that the decision is automatically beneficial. You need to look at how much money is accumulated, what the size of the monthly payment will be, whether pension contributions from the current work will continue, how the future pension will change, what will happen with taxes, and how it will affect the family.

Sometimes it may indeed be beneficial for a person to start receiving part of the pension income now. For example, if the family needs additional monthly income, if there are large expenses, or if the calculation shows that waiting does not give a significant advantage.

But sometimes it is better to wait. Especially if the person earns well, continues to actively save, does not need additional payments now, or can get a stronger pension picture in a few years.

The main thing is not to make a decision based on emotions.

Pension after 60 in Israel is not a question of “can or cannot.” It is a question of balance between today’s money and future stability.

Why an article on this topic is important specifically for Russian-speaking Israelis

The Russian-speaking audience in Israel often faces several barriers at once.

One barrier is language. Even if a person speaks Hebrew, pension documents, tax forms, and fund explanations can be written in such a way that it is difficult to understand the meaning without a specialist.

The second barrier is the habit of comparing the Israeli system with the country from which the person came. But the Israeli pension system works differently, and old ideas can hinder here.

The third barrier is distrust. People are afraid that they will be “sold something,” so sometimes they do not check anything at all. As a result, instead of caution, there is inaction, and inaction in the pension topic can also cost money.

The fourth barrier is a late start. Many begin to deal with the pension only when they are tired of working, have fallen ill, lost their job, or faced a sharp drop in income. But pension decisions are better made not under pressure, but in advance, calmly, and with calculation.

Therefore, the goal of such a review is not to force a person to urgently sign something. The goal is different: to see the facts.

Where is the money?

How much is there?

What rights are there?

What risks are there?

What actions are better not to take without calculation?

And what option might be reasonable for this family?

When a check is especially needed

It is worth checking pension savings if you are already 60 years old, continue to work, and do not know if you can receive payments from the fund alongside your salary.

This is also important if you have changed jobs several times, are not sure where old pension programs are located, do not know if you have severance pay, or have never looked at a pension forecast.

It is worth checking the situation separately if you are thinking of quitting, retiring early, withdrawing compensation payments, helping children with a large sum, or paying off debts with pension money.

Such decisions may be understandable on a human level, but financially they require calculation. Money that seems “free” today may turn out to be part of future monthly income.

A check is also needed for those who help parents. Very often, it is the children who seek information for mom or dad because parents do not want to deal with personal accounts, are afraid of Hebrew, or do not understand what documents are needed.

If parents are 60+, they work or have recently worked, they may have pension rights that the family simply does not know about.

What to do now

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, do not wait until the situation becomes urgent. It is much more reasonable to find out in advance what pension savings you have, whether you can already consider a monthly payment, how it will affect the future pension, and what tax issues need to be checked before signing documents.

It is important to emphasize: it is not about everyone immediately starting to receive a pension. It is about not living blindly.

Sometimes a check shows that a person can increase monthly income now.

Sometimes it shows that it is better to wait.

Sometimes it helps find old savings.

Sometimes it warns of a mistake with severance pay.

Sometimes it just gives the family peace of mind: now it is clear what is there, what is not, and what to prepare for.

In detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, severance pay, and important checks before making a decision can be read here: https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

For a person 60+, such information may not just be a useful article, but the beginning of a normal financial review before an important life stage.

Pension in Israel is not just about age. It is about documents, savings, taxes, family, work, and decisions that can affect income for many years.

Therefore, the most reasonable first step is not to guess, but to check.

 

“When purchasing a ticket, you can add 20 shekels. These funds will go towards funding discounted tickets for Ukrainian refugees in Israel due to the war. Ukrainian refugees wishing to receive a discounted ticket can contact the organizers. The initiative is in cooperation with ASSAF, an organization helping refugees and asylum seekers in Israel.

If you are serving mandatory service in Israel or have served in the reserves for more than 10 days this year, you are entitled to a free ticket. Contact the organizers for details. Part of the evening’s proceeds will be donated to support volunteer initiatives in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in Israel”.

Organizer – “Nezalezhna – Ukrainian Party“.

On August 24, 2026, Ukraine will celebrate the 35th anniversary of the restoration of its state independence.

In 1991, on this day, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. The document declared Ukraine an independent democratic state, and its territory indivisible and inviolable. The historic decision was a response not only to the collapse of the Soviet system but also to the long-standing aspiration of Ukrainians to regain their statehood.

35 years later, Ukraine’s Independence Day can no longer be perceived solely as a festive date on the calendar.

Today, Ukraine continues to defend that decision with arms in hand — against Russian aggression, attempts to destroy Ukrainian statehood, culture, language, and the right of Ukrainians to determine their own future.

For millions of Ukrainians inside the country and abroad, August 24 has become simultaneously a day of pride, memory, resistance, and hope.

In Israel, the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence will be celebrated with a large “Ukrainian” party “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, which will take place on August 21, 2026, in Tel Aviv.

What happened on August 24, 1991

The decision on independence was made after the failure of the coup in Moscow, whose participants tried to preserve the Soviet Union and restore strict control of the communist center over the union republics.

On the evening of August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament supported the Act of Declaration of Independence. It explicitly stated that henceforth only the Constitution and laws of Ukraine have force on the territory of Ukraine.

However, the final word had to be said by the citizens.

On December 1, 1991, a nationwide referendum was held, in which more than 90% of participants voted for independence. Importantly, the majority spoke in favor of an independent Ukrainian state in all regions of the country, including Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Crimea, and Sevastopol.

Thus, Ukraine’s independence was not a “gift from Moscow,” a “random consequence of the USSR’s collapse,” or a “decision of a narrow group of politicians.”

It was confirmed by the will of the Ukrainian people.

Ukrainian statehood did not begin in 1991. Modern Ukraine is a continuation of a much longer struggle — from the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the declaration of independence in 1918 to the dissident movement, resistance to Soviet repressions, and preservation of language and national memory.

Independence that has to be defended every day

Since 2014, and especially after February 24, 2022, the words “Independence Day” have taken on an even more literal meaning for Ukraine.

Independence today is not only the state flag, anthem, and festive events.

It is Ukrainian soldiers on the front line, air defense units, medics, volunteers, rescuers, energy workers, and ordinary citizens who continue to live and work under the threat of Russian missile and drone attacks.

It is cities that restore power supply after strikes.

It is families waiting for the return of soldiers and prisoners.

It is people who have lost their homes but have not given up on Ukraine.

In 2026, the war continues for the fifth year after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. Russia retains the ability to launch massive strikes on Ukrainian cities, while Ukraine develops its own weapons production and conducts long-range operations against military and energy facilities on the territory of the aggressor state.

Therefore, the 35th anniversary of independence is not just an anniversary.

It is a reminder of the price Ukraine pays for the right to exist.

NAnovosti — News of Israel considers this date an important part of the life of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. For people who are far from Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, or Zaporizhzhia, “Ukrainian” events become a way to maintain a connection with their country, support each other, and show that Ukraine remains a part of their lives.

“NEZALEZHNA 2026” in the center of Tel Aviv

The main festive event of the “Ukrainian” community will take place on Friday, August 21, 2026, three days before the official Independence Day.

The organizers invite Ukrainians and friends of Ukraine, as well as everyone interested, to a large party “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, dedicated to the 35th anniversary of the country’s independence.

This year, the event moves to a new venue in the very center of Tel Aviv:

CALLAS TLV
Menachem Begin Road 37, Tel Aviv-Yafo

The organizers promise a program for the entire evening and all night — until the very morning.

“We don’t promise a quiet sit-down“,” says the event announcement.

According to organizer Daniel Lutin, the event is created with the participation of many representatives of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. It is not only a club party but also a large gathering of people united by Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, and the desire to celebrate an important date for Ukraine together.

Who will perform at “NEZALEZHNA 2026”

Joining the celebration are:

Anya and the restaurant “SHO?!”, representing modern Ukrainian cuisine in Israel;

Olya Yaros, who will be the host of the evening;

Anton Shevchenko — a comedian and artist, participating in the event for the first time;

DJs Sasha RAZME, Den DOMINIC, and Daniel LOUTIQUE.

The special guest of the evening will be DJ LUMARE from Lviv.

Her arrival creates a direct cultural connection between the modern Ukrainian music scene and the “Ukrainian community” in Israel. The party will unite Ukrainian music, electronic sound, humor, gastronomy, and the atmosphere of Tel Aviv’s nightlife.

Also during “NEZALEZHNA 2026”, the premiere of a new remix by Daniel LOUTIQUE on a song by Iryna Bilyk is expected.

The organizer wants to pass the composition to the singer herself and has reached out to representatives of the “Ukrainian community” to help establish contact so that the remix definitely reaches the artist.

The door opens at 19:00.
The program starts at 20:00.

Dress code: festive, cocktail, or Ukrainian.

From the organizers:

“The best is to combine an elegant look with a Ukrainian accent. Until midnight, you will have a festive program with MC OLYA Y (Olya Yaros), and comedian and artist Anton Shevchenko.
It will be loud, fun, festive, with contests and cool prizes 🎁 And most importantly: this time “NEZALEZHNA 2026” continues until the very morning.
This is an event for the entire evening and all night. This year we heard you.
On the dance floor, there will be Ukrainian music, modern world hits, legendary favorite songs, new remixes, and premieres from our DJs, which will be heard for the first time at “NEZALEZHNA 2026″”.

“One ticket for the entire evening and all night. The ticket price includes:
• entry to the main festive part of “NEZALEZHNA 2026”;
• entry to the night disco after midnight;
• welcome drink at the beginning of the evening;
• buffet snacks, vegetables, and fruits from SHO;
• a large Ukrainian atmosphere that we create together. There will be a bar with special prices on location, where you can purchase drinks throughout the evening and night 🍸
Tickets can be purchased at the entrance, but pre-purchase is cheaper and helps us better prepare for the event.”

Why the Motherland Monument appeared against the backdrop of the Azrieli Towers

The event poster sparked separate discussions.

It depicts the Ukrainian Motherland Monument against the backdrop of one of Tel Aviv’s most recognizable landscapes — the Azrieli Towers.

One user asked the organizers what connection the Ukrainian monument has to Tel Aviv.

Daniel Lutin, who acted as the event organizer and poster designer, explained that it is a conscious artistic composition.

According to him, the authors did not try to present Kyiv and Tel Aviv as one place. They combined Ukrainian symbols with the city where the “Ukrainian community” will celebrate Ukraine’s Independence Day.

“For me, it is a symbol that Ukraine lives in the hearts of people, wherever they are,” explained the organizer.

People can work in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ashdod, or Be’er Sheva, speak Hebrew, and build their lives in Israel, but at the same time maintain their Ukrainian identity, follow events in Ukraine, help the army, volunteers, and those affected by the war.

A celebration far from home, but together with Ukraine

Ukrainian events abroad during the war inevitably have a dual meaning.

People come to listen to music, dance, and meet friends. But behind the festive atmosphere remains the understanding that in Ukraine itself, air raids, shelling, and heavy fighting continue.

This does not negate the right to celebrate.

On the contrary, the ability to preserve culture, music, humor, and a sense of community becomes one of the forms of resistance to Russia’s attempt to portray Ukraine as a country without an independent history and identity.

NAnovosti — News of Israel continues to report on the events of the “Ukrainian community” in Israel, as such initiatives show: Ukraine is present in Israel not only in political statements and news about the war.

It is present in language, music, cuisine, charity, public projects, and the personal stories of thousands of people.

Date, address, and tickets

Event: “NEZALEZHNA 2026”
Occasion: 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence
Date: August 21, 2026
Place: CALLAS TLV
Address: Menachem Begin Road 37, Tel Aviv-Yafo
Format: Ukrainian party for the entire evening and until morning
Special guest: DJ LUMARE, Lviv

When purchasing a ticket, you can add 20 shekels. These funds will go towards funding discounted tickets for Ukrainian refugees in Israel due to the war. Ukrainian refugees wishing to receive a discounted ticket can contact the organizers. The initiative is in cooperation with ASSAF, an organization helping refugees and asylum seekers in Israel.

If you are serving mandatory service in Israel or have served in the reserves for more than 10 days this year, you are entitled to a free ticket. Contact the organizers for details. Part of the evening’s proceeds will be donated to support volunteer initiatives in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in Israel.

Organizer – “Nezalezhna – Ukrainian Party“.

Organizers advise purchasing tickets in advance, as the number of places at the new venue is limited.

Tickets: https://selector.org.il/e/jK4ZMvUNqa-

On August 24, 2026, Ukraine will celebrate 35 years of independence…

 

American consent for the licensed production of Patriot missiles could become one of the most important decisions for Ukraine’s defense independence. However, between the political promise and the first missile rolling off the Ukrainian production line lie years of negotiations, technology transfer, factory construction, and the creation of a secure supply chain.

U.S. President Donald Trump, during a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky at the NATO summit in Ankara, announced his readiness to grant Ukraine a license to produce ammunition for Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems.

For Ukraine, this statement has enormous strategic significance.

Patriot remains one of the few Western systems capable of effectively countering Russian ballistic missiles, including the Iskander-M, as well as aeroballistic missiles like the Kinzhal. This is why the shortage of interceptors has turned into not just a military problem but a matter of survival for Ukrainian cities.

But the German publication WELT points out the main drawback of the American proposal: a license does not mean that Ukraine will be able to start mass production of missiles in a few months.

According to experts, creating a full-fledged production line could take several years. In the initial stage, Ukraine will still have to rely on ready-made missiles stored in the U.S. and European allies’ warehouses.

What exactly did Trump promise

The meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump took place in Ankara on July 8, 2026.

The Office of the President of Ukraine reported that the parties discussed strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, further military support, and decisions that could enhance Ukraine’s positions.

As early as July 6, Volodymyr Zelensky publicly stated that Ukraine is ready to produce Patriot missiles independently if the U.S. provides the necessary licenses. According to him, Ukrainian enterprises are capable of creating volumes sufficient not only for Ukraine’s defense but also to assist other partners.

However, Trump’s statement remains a political promise rather than a ready industrial contract.

The American president acknowledged that the issue has not yet been agreed upon with the companies involved in the production of various types of missiles for Patriot, primarily Lockheed Martin and RTX, which includes Raytheon.

This is fundamentally important.

The U.S. government can authorize the transfer of technology and export of the license, but the organization of production, transfer of documentation, certification of parts, and quality control must be carried out by the manufacturing companies.

Without their participation, the political decision will not turn into a working production line.

Patriot is not just one missile

When politicians talk about ‘Patriot missiles,’ it may create the impression that it is a single standard munition.

In reality, the system can employ several types of interceptors with different tasks.

PAC-2 GEM-T, produced by Raytheon, is primarily intended for destroying aircraft, cruise missiles, and some tactical ballistic threats.

PAC-3 MSE, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is a more modern and significantly more complex interceptor. It is primarily used against ballistic missiles and destroys the target through direct kinetic impact.

For Ukraine, the PAC-3 MSE is of particular importance, as the Russian army regularly uses ballistic missiles, against which the capabilities of most other air defense systems are limited.

Washington has not yet specified which interceptor license Ukraine might receive.

This issue could completely change the significance of the future agreement.

Production of PAC-2 GEM-T would allow Ukraine to increase its stockpile of missiles to combat cruise missiles and other aerial targets. Obtaining PAC-3 MSE technology would represent a qualitatively different level of cooperation — the transfer of one of the most sensitive American missile defense technologies.

Why the plant cannot be launched in a few months

Ukraine has proven capable of extremely quickly developing and scaling the production of drones, long-range missiles, and other weapons.

However, Patriot belongs to a different category of weapons.

It’s not about simply assembling a missile from several imported blocks.

To start production, it will be necessary to:

• conclude a licensing agreement;
• determine the list of technologies allowed for transfer;
• create a certified enterprise;
• install specialized American equipment;
• train personnel;
• organize the production or import of components;
• create a quality control system;
• ensure the physical protection of the enterprise;
• conduct tests and certification of finished missiles.

An interceptor missile must detect, calculate the trajectory, and destroy another missile in the air at tremendous speed. An error in software, electronics, engine, or guidance system could mean not just the loss of an expensive munition but the destruction of the city it was supposed to protect.

Therefore, production processes in this industry are strictly controlled, and each component undergoes multi-stage verification.

German missile analyst Markus Schiller emphasized in a comment to WELT that creating such production is significantly more complex than it might seem after political statements.

Even countries with developed industries and decades of cooperation with the U.S. have launched licensed lines over the years.

Experience of Japan and Germany

Japan is cited as one example.

The country has a powerful high-tech industry, a close military-political alliance with the U.S., and extensive experience in licensed production of American weapons. However, deploying Patriot missile production there took about five years.

Germany also could not instantly launch a new European line.

Back in 2024, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain agreed to purchase up to 1,000 GEM-T missiles. For their production, a joint company COMLOG, owned by Raytheon and MBDA Deutschland, is being established.

Production at the German site is expected to begin at the end of 2026, but serial deliveries are expected later. Previously, the main delivery period was named as 2027–2033.

Even in Germany, the plant is being built on NATO territory, far from the immediate combat zone.

The Ukrainian enterprise will have to be created under the constant threat of Russian missile and drone attacks.

Russia will try to destroy the production

The location of the Patriot plant will become one of Ukraine’s most closely guarded state secrets.

Russia is likely to use satellite reconnaissance, espionage, cyberattacks, and airstrikes to detect and destroy the enterprise even before the start of serial production.

Therefore, the most realistic option may be not one large plant but a distributed production model.

Separate components may be produced at several enterprises in different regions of Ukraine or beyond its borders. Final assembly may also be divided among several sites.

Another option is the creation of a Ukrainian-American production in one of the NATO countries with subsequent transfer of finished missiles to Ukraine.

This model is already used in the Ukrainian defense industry. Some types of Ukrainian weapons are produced jointly with European partners at enterprises protected by NATO territory.

However, in this case, Ukraine will not receive a fully independent production chain on its territory.

Global shortage of Patriot

The main problem is not only the absence of a Ukrainian plant.

There is a physical shortage of Patriot missiles for everyone.

Demand sharply increased after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the escalation of threats in the Middle East, and the massive use of ballistic missiles by Iran and its allies.

In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered over 600 PAC-3 MSE missiles. This was a record figure and approximately 20% higher than the previous year’s production.

In January 2026, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin agreed on a long-term program to increase annual production capacity from approximately 600 to 2,000 missiles.

But achieving this figure will take several years. The company must build new lines, expand its supplier network, and increase production of engines, electronics, and other critical components.

Even with a threefold increase in production, the U.S. will have to distribute missiles between its own army and numerous allies.

Patriot is used by Germany, Poland, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and other countries.

At the same time, the decision on who and when will receive the produced missiles is made by the American government, not Lockheed Martin itself.

In June 2026, the company acknowledged that it could not guarantee allies specific delivery times for PAC-3 MSE due to the global shortage and Washington’s decisions on distribution priorities.

Why Ukraine needs missiles now

Creating its own production can solve the strategic problem in a few years.

But Russian missiles are flying over Ukrainian cities today.

Therefore, a license cannot replace immediate deliveries of ready interceptors.

Until the Ukrainian line is launched, Kyiv will have to continue seeking the transfer of missiles from U.S. and European warehouses, as well as asking allies to temporarily give up their places in the production queue for Ukraine.

This is where the main political question arises.

Western states recognize that Ukraine is defending not only itself but the entire European security system. However, many governments simultaneously fear reducing their own missile defense stocks.

After new wars and crises in the Middle East, this competition has become even tougher.

NAnews — Israel News notes that the shortage of interceptors affects not only Ukraine.

Israel’s experience shows how quickly air and missile defense missiles can be expended during massive combined attacks.

Even a high-tech air defense system depends not only on radars and launchers but also on a constant flow of expensive munitions.

Therefore, the Ukrainian idea of producing Patriot is part of a broader process: Western states are beginning to realize that existing factories and pre-war production volumes do not match the reality of modern missile wars.

What Ukraine can get in the first stage

Most likely, cooperation will develop gradually.

First, a center for the repair and maintenance of Patriot missiles may appear in Ukraine or one of the neighboring countries.

The U.S. is already discussing the creation of a European PAC-3 service center with Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Such a site should reduce the time needed to send missiles for repair to the United States.

The next step could be the production of individual components.

Ukrainian enterprises are capable of producing casings, mechanical parts, ground equipment elements, and some electronic systems under the control of the American manufacturer.

Then local assembly of missiles from kits produced in the U.S. and Europe is possible.

And only after that can deep localization begin, including the manufacture of key elements directly by Ukrainian enterprises.

This sequence looks slower than loud political promises, but this is how complex defense productions are usually created.

Why the license is still a breakthrough

Long terms do not mean that the decision is insignificant.

Until now, Ukraine was almost entirely dependent on the political will of partners. Each batch of missiles required separate negotiations, funding, and decisions by American authorities.

Own or joint production will gradually change this model.

Ukraine will be able to plan stocks for years ahead, train specialists, repair missiles closer to their place of use, and integrate into the Western defense industry not only as a recipient of aid but also as a manufacturer.

Moreover, Ukrainian enterprises have unique experience in operating air defense systems in conditions of constant war.

No NATO country faces such a number of combined attacks with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones.

This experience can be used to upgrade missiles, improve software, and create new air defense systems.

Volodymyr Zelensky claims that Ukrainian enterprises, after receiving licenses, are capable of meeting not only their own needs but also helping partners.

Today, this statement looks ambitious. But the Ukrainian industry has already shown how quickly it can transition from small experimental batches of drones to mass production of millions of devices.

A solution for the future does not cancel responsibility today

An American license could become the foundation of Ukrainian missile defense in the next decade.

However, it will not protect Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, or Odesa tonight.

Between the promise and the first serial missile, there remains a dangerous time gap.

This can only be filled by transferring existing interceptors to Ukraine, increasing production in the US and Europe, joint purchases by allies, and creating a transparent system of priorities.

Ukraine has the necessary enterprises, engineers, and military experience.

The United States controls the technologies.

Europe has the funding and territories where part of the production can be more safely located.

Combining these capabilities can transform Ukraine from a dependent recipient of missiles into one of the centers of European missile defense.

But for this, Donald Trump’s political statement must turn into signed contracts, a specific list of transferred technologies, funding, and an approved construction schedule.

NAnews — News of Israel emphasizes: the Patriot license is not a ready-made missile and not an immediately closed Ukrainian sky.

It is a chance to build a system where, in a few years, the security of Ukrainian cities will depend not on the next political decision across the ocean, but on a constantly operating production line.

That is why Ukraine simultaneously needs two solutions: ready-made missiles — today and its own production — for the future.

Israel has provided the United States with new intelligence data, which, according to the Israeli side, indicates Iran’s preparation of another plan to assassinate US President Donald Trump. This was reported by The Wall Street Journal on July 9, 2026, citing people familiar with the contents of the warning.

Public evidence of the existence of a new conspiracy has not yet been presented. The names of the alleged organizers, the possible location of the assassination, the method of its execution, and the readiness of the perpetrators have not been disclosed. However, the message cannot be considered an isolated rumor: in recent years, American law enforcement agencies have indeed uncovered several Iran-related plans to assassinate Trump, former US officials, American citizens, and Israelis.

The new information emerged amid a sharp escalation between Washington and Tehran, the resumption of American strikes on Iran, and the Iranian regime’s longstanding promises to avenge Trump for the elimination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

What Israel reported to the United States

According to The Wall Street Journal, Israel recently shared intelligence information with the American side about a new Iranian plan to physically eliminate Donald Trump.

Sources of the publication claim that this information was not previously in the field of view of American intelligence services in this form and is now being verified by US authorities. The White House did not comment in detail on the content of the intelligence and referred journalists to recent public statements by the president himself. The Israeli embassy and the Iranian mission to the UN also did not provide substantive comments.

It is fundamentally important that WSJ reports specifically on the assessment provided by Israel. It is currently impossible to independently confirm whether it is a developed operational plan, preliminary discussions within Iranian structures, or an intelligence signal that still requires additional verification.

There is also no report of the detention of alleged participants in the new conspiracy.

Nevertheless, Washington has reasons to take the warning seriously. The US Department of Justice previously published materials of criminal cases in which representatives or individuals associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attempted to organize political assassinations on US soil.

Trump spoke about the threat on July 8 in Ankara

A day before the WSJ publication, on July 8, 2026, Donald Trump raised the issue of threats to his life during a conversation with journalists at the NATO summit in Ankara.

The US president stated that he is the top target of the Iranian leadership:

“They want to eliminate the leader of the United States — me. I am on all their lists. This morning I saw that I am literally on every one of them. So far, I think I’ve been a bit lucky, but this may not last very long.”

The fact of Trump’s speech in Ankara and his statement that he is Iran’s main target is confirmed by materials from American media and photographs from the Associated Press at the president’s press conference on July 8.

Publicly, Trump did not specify which lists he was shown in the morning and whether his words were directly related to the new intelligence information received from Israel.

It was also reported that during the return from Turkey, additional security measures were taken, including changing the plane used by the president. However, the White House did not publish an official detailed explanation of these decisions.

Why Iran considers Trump a personal target

The main reason for the longstanding threats remains the American operation against General Qasem Soleimani.

On the night of January 3, 2020, an American drone strike in the area of Baghdad International Airport killed Soleimani, who led the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the deputy head of the Iraqi Shiite militia Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

The operation was carried out on the orders of Donald Trump during his first presidential term.

The Pentagon stated that Soleimani was developing plans for attacks on American diplomats and military personnel in Iraq and other countries in the region. The US Department of Defense called the strike’s goal the prevention of future Iranian attacks.

Tehran, for its part, declared Soleimani’s elimination a crime and promised to punish those involved in the decision. After that, threats were made not only against Trump but also against former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, and other representatives of Trump’s first administration.

Thus, it is not just political rhetoric that arose during a new round of war. The Iranian campaign of revenge has been ongoing since January 2020 and has already become the subject of specific criminal investigations in the US.

The Trump assassination plan revealed in 2024

One of the most serious episodes was made public by the US Department of Justice on November 8, 2024.

American authorities charged Iranian citizen Farhad Shakeri and two New York residents — Carlisle Rivera and Jonathan Loadholt.

According to the case materials, Shakeri informed law enforcement officers that on October 7, 2024, an IRGC representative instructed him to develop a plan to assassinate Donald Trump.

The US Department of Justice claimed that Shakeri was supposed to present the corresponding plan within a set timeframe. The accused himself told investigators that he did not intend to fulfill the assignment within the given deadlines. He remained in Iran and was not arrested.

American investigators also stated that Shakeri received assignments to surveil two American Jews in New York. Allegedly, $500,000 was offered for the murder of one of them. Additionally, the case materials mentioned a possible attack on Israeli tourists in Sri Lanka.

However, the charge does not automatically mean proven guilt of all the defendants, and part of the information was based on Shakeri’s own testimony. But the case confirms that American authorities officially considered the Iranian plan to assassinate Trump as a concrete threat back in 2024, not just a propaganda statement.

Iranian operative and plan for political assassinations in the US

Another case is related to Pakistani Asif Merchant, whom American authorities called a trained operative working in the interests of the IRGC.

In April 2024, Merchant arrived in the United States, and in June, he met with people he believed to be hired killers. In reality, they were cooperating with American law enforcement agencies.

According to the indictment, Merchant discussed political assassinations on US soil. He was arrested in July 2024 before leaving the country, and on March 6, 2026, a federal jury in Brooklyn found him guilty of organizing murder for hire and attempting to commit a transnational terrorist act.

The case materials initially did not name a single specific target. American media reported that Donald Trump and Joe Biden were among the possible targets.

This case demonstrates a scheme that American intelligence services consider characteristic of Iranian operations: a middleman arrives in the US, seeks executors among local criminal circles, discusses surveillance of the target, and transfers money without revealing the role of Iranian state structures to all participants.

Attempt on John Bolton for $300,000

Long before the Shakeri and Merchant cases, American authorities uncovered a plan to assassinate former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton.

On August 10, 2022, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Iranian Shahram Poursafi, whom they called a member of the IRGC.

According to the investigation, since October 2021, Poursafi attempted to hire someone to kill Bolton in Washington or Maryland. The proposed reward increased from $250,000 to $300,000.

American authorities believed that the alleged murder was intended as revenge for Soleimani’s elimination. Poursafi also mentioned another assignment worth one million dollars.

The investigation established that the organizer provided the alleged executor with the address of Bolton’s office, information about his schedule, and demanded to expedite the preparation of the attack. Poursafi remained in Iran.

This episode is particularly important for understanding the current warning from Israel: American agencies have already documented attempts by individuals associated with the IRGC to translate threats of revenge for Soleimani into a practical operation on US soil.

The threat concerns not only American politicians

Materials from the US Department of Justice show that Iran’s potential targets are not limited to Trump and members of his administration.

In recent years’ investigations, the following were mentioned:

• American officials;
• Iranian opposition members in exile;
• journalists;
• American citizens of Jewish descent;
• Israeli tourists abroad.

In January 2026, a US court sentenced Carlisle Rivera to 15 years in prison for participating in a plan to kill Iranian-American journalist and activist Masih Alinejad. According to the Department of Justice, group members conducted surveillance, discussed weapons, and attempted to determine a convenient time for the attack.

Therefore, the new information from Israel may be part of a broader picture: Tehran is accused of using agents, intermediaries, and criminal executors to attack regime opponents in different countries.

Why Israel’s warning appeared now

The WSJ report was published during a new military escalation between the US and Iran.

On July 7–8, 2026, Washington and Tehran exchanged strikes again after attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz area and the de facto cessation of a brief truce.

Trump stated in Ankara that agreements with Iran are no longer in effect and warned of new American strikes. The American command reported attacks on Iranian military infrastructure, after which Iran launched retaliatory strikes on targets in Bahrain and Kuwait, where American troops are stationed.

In this situation, a possible assassination plan for the US president becomes not only a matter of Trump’s personal safety. It can influence Washington’s decision on the duration of the military operation, the scale of strikes, and the conditions of any future negotiations with Tehran.

For Israel, providing intelligence also has strategic significance. Jerusalem seeks to convince Washington that the Iranian threat does not end with missiles, the nuclear program, or attacks by regional proxies. It can be directed directly against the top leadership of the United States.

What remains unknown

As of July 10, 2026, it is impossible to establish from open sources:

• who exactly developed the alleged new plan;
• whether it was sanctioned by Iran’s top leadership;
• whether the alleged executors were in the US;
• whether a date or location for the attack was chosen;
• whether American services discovered independent confirmations;
• whether the plan is related to current US strikes on Iran or was developed earlier;
• whether specific attempts were made to approach the president.

The WSJ publication also does not mention new charges or arrests. Therefore, it is premature to assert that the assassination was already at the stage of direct execution.

Israel’s intelligence may change Washington’s decisions

The new warning appears at a time when relations between the US, Israel, and Iran are simultaneously defined by military strikes, negotiations, and mutual threats.

For Trump, the situation is personal. He sanctioned Soleimani’s elimination on January 3, 2020, and the Iranian regime has repeatedly named him as one of the main targets for retribution.

For Israel, this is an opportunity to once again show the American administration that Iran acts not only through the regular army, missiles, and controlled groups. There are also secret networks, intermediaries, and plans for political assassinations outside the Middle East.

NAnews — Israel News notes: so far, the public is only aware of the assessment of Israeli intelligence provided to the American side. The details of the new plan remain classified, and independent confirmation of its preparation stage is absent.

But previous US Department of Justice cases show that the threat is not purely rhetorical. Iranian agents and associated individuals have already been accused of attempting to organize assassinations of American officials, regime opponents, Jews, and Israelis.

The new signal from Israel could lead to increased security for the president, expanded cooperation between American and Israeli intelligence services, and a tougher stance by Washington towards Tehran.

The main question now is not only whether there was another plan to assassinate Trump, but also how far its alleged organizers managed to advance before Washington received the information.

 

The primary source is a special report by the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, titled “ההתמודדות הלאומית עם השפעה זרה במרחב הדיגיטלי” (“National Counteraction to Foreign Influence in the Digital Space”), published on July 7, 2026 in the official publication library of the Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel.

This document is important not only for intelligence agencies, lawyers, or cybersecurity specialists.

It is important for every Israeli who reads news on their phone, receives messages on WhatsApp, argues on Facebook, watches short videos, forwards “urgent warnings” to relatives, or sees an account on X that looks like an ordinary Israeli resident.

The report shows: the digital space has become a full-fledged front.

Iran is identified as a direct and specific source of threat through influence campaigns, false messages, attempts to incite panic, and affect the perception of war.

Russia in this article should be considered differently: not as a separate detailed case of the report, but as part of the same category of foreign state actors from which Israel must build protection. The main conclusion of the State Comptroller is precisely this: Israel has seen the threat of foreign influence in the digital space for almost nine years but has not created a national system capable of countering such operations as a class of threats.

Foreign influence is no longer just “fakes,” but a threat to the state.

The State Comptroller’s report does not talk about random mistakes on social networks or everyday rumors.

It is about covert and organized activities of foreign players who use digital platforms to harm Israel’s national interests.

This may include disinformation, fake accounts, bots, fake identities, manipulative campaigns, artificial promotion of topics, spreading panic, and increasingly active use of artificial intelligence.

The goal of such actions is not just to spread lies.

The goal is to influence public opinion, deepen internal divisions, reduce trust in state institutions, and affect democratic processes, especially during war, crisis, and elections.

For Israel, this is especially dangerous.

The country simultaneously lives in a state of war, debates about hostages, the army, responsibility for October 7, relations with the USA, political future, the 2026 elections, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran.

A foreign player does not need to create a split from scratch.

It is enough to take an existing pain and amplify it.

Fear turns into panic.

Political debate turns into hatred.

Distrust of a single official turns into distrust of the entire state.

War fatigue turns into demoralization.

And a foreign policy issue becomes a convenient tool for those who want to weaken Israel’s ties with allies and confuse society with foreign narratives.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency points out: the State Comptroller’s report is important precisely because it translates the topic of social networks from the category of “internet noise” to the category of national security.

Iran is named directly: SMS panic, “Hezbollah,” and the war for perception.

The Iranian direction in the report is revealed most specifically.

One of the most illustrative episodes is the mass sending of false SMS to Israelis.

In September 2024, about 5 million messages were sent to Israeli citizens. They urged people to immediately enter a protected space. Some messages looked as if they were sent on behalf of official structures, including the Home Front Command. Following an investigation by the National Cyber Directorate, it was stated that Iran and “Hezbollah” were behind the distribution.

This is not just disinformation.

This is a psychological attack.

A person receives an “urgent warning,” gets scared, wakes up the children, calls relatives, forwards the message further. Even if it turns out a few minutes later that the alarm is false, the effect has already been achieved: fear is spread, trust is undermined, society becomes even more tense.

This is what a modern influence attack looks like.

It may not physically destroy a house.

But it hits the nervous system of society.

The report also mentions campaigns related to the “Iron Swords” war. Already in the first days after October 7, an Iranian campaign was identified, trying to establish an accusatory narrative against Israel in the digital space, including the topic of “genocide in Gaza.”

This is an important detail.

The war is not only for territory and not only for military results.

The war is for the language with which the world describes events.

If an external player imposes words, emotions, and explanations of what is happening on society, they are already beginning to control the perception of reality.

The “Isnad” network: thousands of messages and hundreds of fake profiles.

One of the central cases of the report is the foreign influence network “Isnad”.

According to the data presented in the report materials, this network operated in 2024 and tried to influence Israeli public opinion by promoting the cessation of the war in Gaza on terms favorable to Hamas.

From December 2023 to August 2024, thousands of messages were prepared as part of this campaign.

Between 300 to 1000 fake profiles operated on X.

This is no longer one propagandist and not one Telegram channel.

This is a network.

It creates the artificial impression that a certain position is massively coming from within Israeli society itself.

One account writes.

Others pick it up.

Thirds argue.

Fourths spread it further.

Then real people, journalists, activists, families of hostages, politicians, and protest participants see it.

At some point, a foreign operation begins to look like “public sentiment.”

This is where the danger lies.

An Israeli thinks they are arguing with a neighbor.

But they may be arguing with part of a foreign campaign.

Where is Russia here?

To be factually accurate, it is important to say directly: the State Comptroller’s report does not build a separate large chapter on the Russian operation against Israel.

But that does not mean the Russian direction should be excluded.

On the contrary.

The main conclusion of the report is that Israel has not built protection against foreign influence as a phenomenon. It is not just about one enemy and not just about one campaign. It is about the ability of foreign states and external structures to use social networks, bots, fake identities, artificial intelligence, and digital platforms to pressure Israeli society.

Iran, Russia, and other external players fall into this framework.

Iran is shown in the report through specific cases: SMS, “Hezbollah,” campaigns around the war, “Isnad,” pressure on the perception of events.

Russia should be named as part of the same external threat because for Israel, the problem is not limited to one Iranian campaign. The state must have a system capable of responding to any foreign digital operation — Iranian, Russian, Islamist, or otherwise.

This is especially important for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel.

The Russian propaganda environment has been working for years with topics of Ukraine, the West, the USA, democracy, war, and trust in institutions. In Israel, these topics intersect with internal politics, security, and the issue of foreign alliances.

This is how Russia and Iran should stand side by side — not as equally detailed cases of the report, but as two external directions against which the state needs unified protection.

The state knew about the threat since 2017.

The most alarming part of the report is not the fake campaigns themselves.

They are expected.

Iran will try to pressure Israel.

Hamas will try to influence the war agenda.

“Hezbollah” will use citizens’ fear.

Russia and other external players will look for weak spots in Israeli society.

The most alarming is something else: the state knew about the threat for a long time but did not create a full-fledged response system.

According to the report, since 2017 various Israeli structures have already pointed to the threat of foreign influence in the digital space and the need for an interagency response. Among them are the Shin Bet, the National Security Council, the National Cyber Directorate, and other structures. However, initiatives that were supposed to turn into national policy were not brought to a working system.

By March 2026, almost nine years after the threat was identified, Israel still does not have:

• a unified national policy against foreign influence;
• a state body that conducts interagency work;
• an approved permanent mechanism;
• sufficient coordination between structures;
• a clear system of interaction with digital platforms;
• a clear channel for messages from civil society;
• full preparation of the population to recognize fakes, bots, and manipulations.

The State Comptroller essentially describes a recurring pattern: the threat is raised on the agenda, structures begin discussions, initiatives appear, but then the work does not turn into mandatory national policy.

For Israel, this sounds especially strange.

The country knows how to intercept missiles.

The country knows how to build cyber defense.

The country knows how to work in the most complex intelligence environment.

But in the sphere of foreign influence on social networks, the state system turned out to be fragmented and delayed.

There was an action plan, but it was not advanced.

After the start of the “Iron Swords” war, the National Cyber Directorate indicated that the Israeli audience is the target of influence and disinformation efforts.

In August 2024, the head of the Cyber Directorate presented the threat of foreign influence in the digital space to the Prime Minister.

In September 2024, an action program was submitted.

But, according to the report, this program was not considered for a long time. Only after the appeal of the State Comptroller’s office was it submitted for consideration by the National Security Council. At the same time, the necessary resources and practical implementation remained a problem.

That is, the state had a threat.

Had understanding.

Had a prepared program.

But did not turn it into a working mechanism.

And this happened not in a calm time, but after October 7, during the war, when digital influence operations became part of the overall picture of pressure on Israel.

The 2026 elections — the most sensitive point.

A separate block of the report concerns the elections.

Israel is approaching the 2026 elections in a state of severe internal tension.

Society is debating war, hostages, the responsibility of politicians and security forces, relations with allies, the judicial system, the economy, security, and the future of the country.

Such periods are most convenient for foreign influence campaigns.

The State Comptroller warns that the election period could become a “fertile ground” for attempts to influence the agenda, perception of reality, and decision-making. The potential damage could reach the point of undermining public trust in election results and the democratic process.

The Central Election Commission has identified several risk scenarios.

The first is a blow to public trust in the electoral system, for example, through reports of alleged fraud.

The second is creating chaos on election day, for example, through false publications that elections are canceled or a specific polling station is closed.

The third is deceiving voters through fake information about candidates, including deepfakes and reports that a candidate has allegedly withdrawn from the elections.

This is no longer fiction.

These are scenarios that state structures consider real.

That is why the issue of foreign influence before elections is not a technical topic.

It is a matter of sovereignty.

If a citizen stops trusting elections, the voting result, the commission, the vote count, and the democratic process itself, an external player has already achieved a strategic effect.

Even if not a single ballot was changed.

Artificial intelligence accelerates the threat.

The report separately warns about the role of artificial intelligence.

AI allows for the rapid creation of convincing texts, images, audio, video, and fake personalities.

It helps overcome language and cultural barriers, imitate real people, scale campaigns, and complicate the detection of foreign networks.

Previously, a foreign operation needed people, editors, translators, time, and money.

Now you can quickly create an “Israeli” with good Hebrew, a photo, a history, political views, and emotional posts.

You can make a fake video.

You can launch a fake news story.

You can imitate a local discussion.

You can create a sense of mass outrage.

And then social media algorithms themselves help spread conflict content because fear, hatred, scandal, and anxiety get more attention.

For Iran, this is an opportunity to attack Israelis not only with missiles and proxies but also through the phone.

For Russia and other foreign players, this is an opportunity to work with the Israeli agenda through distrust, polarization, foreign policy fears, and manipulations around Ukraine, the USA, Europe, and security.

There is no single responsible party — which means there is no full protection.

The report shows: in Israel, there is no single “owner” of this topic.

There is the Shin Bet.

There is the National Cyber Directorate.

There is the National Security Council.

There is the Ministry of Justice.

There is the Central Election Commission.

There is the Prime Minister’s Office.

There are structures that work with digital platforms.

But there is no single body that holds the whole picture, is responsible for strategy, coordinates departments, works with civil society, interacts with platforms, and has an approved budget.

The State Comptroller’s audit was conducted from July 2024 to January 2026 and covered, among other things, the National Security Council, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Shin Bet, the National Cyber Directorate, the Central Election Commission, and the cyber division of the prosecutor’s office. Some findings were classified for security reasons.

This is an important detail.

The problem is not in one weak department.

The problem is systemic.

The state sees the threat, but the response remains fragmented.

A citizen sees a suspicious account but does not always understand where to report it.

A public organization may identify a network, but there is no transparent channel through which the state systematically receives and processes such information.

Platforms remove some content, but the state does not always have a sufficient picture to assess the effectiveness of this work.

As a result, the Israeli is left alone with a digital influence operation.

He receives a message.

He sees a post.

He forwards an alarming “news”.

He argues with a fake account.

He gets angry, afraid, loses trust.

And the state system is still deciding who should be in charge.

What needs to change

The State Comptroller’s report essentially demands that Israel move from random reaction to a permanent system.

A unified national policy against foreign influence is needed.

A central body is needed to coordinate the fight against this threat.

An approved budget is needed.

Constant work with digital platforms is needed.

A channel is needed for reports from citizens, journalists, researchers, and civil society organizations.

More data on content removal requests needs to be published so that society understands the scale of the problem.

Educational work is needed — not only for adults but also for schoolchildren.

Because digital literacy today is not an additional skill.

It is part of civil security.

An Israeli must understand that a fake account can look like a real neighbor.

That a false SMS can be part of an enemy campaign.

That a video can be generated.

That “mass public opinion” is sometimes created by hundreds of artificial profiles.

That a foreign operation does not always speak a foreign language.

Sometimes it speaks good Hebrew.

Sometimes in Russian.

Sometimes in Arabic.

Sometimes in English.

Sometimes in exactly the language a person trusts the most.

Conclusion

The State Comptroller’s report shows: Israel is not facing a future threat, but an already active front.

On this front, Iran acts directly and aggressively — through influence campaigns, false SMS, “Hezbollah”, fake narratives, and attempts to sow panic.

Russia should be considered part of a broader category of foreign players against which Israel must build defense: states using digital space to pressure democratic societies, divide alliances, undermine trust, and promote a favorable worldview.

The main problem is not that Israel’s enemies are trying to influence Israelis.

This is expected.

The main problem is that Israel has known about the threat for almost nine years but still has not created a full-fledged protection system.

A missile is visible on the radar.

A fake account is more difficult.

But sometimes it is the first to launch panic, discord, and distrust.

And if the state does not learn to protect citizens in the digital space, the next attack may start not with a siren, but with a message that someone forwarded in a family WhatsApp.