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At one time, humorous images of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg wearing an embroidered shirt were popular on Ukrainian social networks.

The combination of American-Jewish Zuckerberg and a traditional Ukrainian shirt looks funny, although in fact it is possible. After all, the ancestors of FB’s “father” come from Ukraine, namely from the Lviv region.

Historians have found evidence of the Ukrainian-Jewish roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. As part of the study of archival records, it became known that his ancestors came from the city of Rozdol, Lviv region.

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Ukrainian-Jewish origins of Mark Zuckerberg’s family: archival finds

History of ancestors: discovery of archival documents

Historical research published on the website “JewishNews“, revealed that the roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg stretch to Western Ukraine. The discovery became possible thanks to the work of Ukrainian historian Oksana Lobko within the framework of the project “Mandri Rozdilski”. Archival records from Lviv and Warsaw showed that Zuckerberg’s ancestors lived in the city of Rozdol, located 40 kilometers from Lviv.

Road to America: how the Zuckerbergs left Ukraine

Research shows that Zuckerberg’s great-grandfather, Isaac Zuckerberg, was born in Rozdol in 1866. As JewishNews points out, his parents, Sender and Ruhel Grunshtein, were engaged in trading activities and had 11 children. The family bore the surname Zucker, which after emigrating to the United States was changed to Zuckerberg – which translates as “sugar mountain” (Ukrainian “tsukrova gora”, “sugar” in Ukrainian “tsukor”).

The family emigrated to America at the end of the 19th century, and according to archival data, Isaac left Europe at the age of 27, arriving in New York in 1893. At that time, the family had already adapted their surname to American pronunciation, which was one of the steps towards assimilation in the new country.

“Mark Zuckerberg’s ancestry in Ukrainian lands highlights the multifaceted history of the Jews of Ukraine and their contribution to world culture,” quote NAnews“.

Zuckerberg family tree

The path of the Zuckerberg family continued through a generation: one of Isaac’s sons, Max, married a native of the Ternopil region – Mana (Minni) Wiesenthal, a native of the village of Skala-Podilskaya. Their son Jack became Mark Zuckerberg’s grandfather.

Surname	Place of origin	Emigration date	Additional data
Zucker (later Zuckerberg)	Rozdol, Ukraine	1893	Isaac Zuckerberg moved to the USA from Bremen

Archival finds: evidence of Ukrainian roots

An important confirmation of the Ukrainian origin of the Zuckerberg family was an archival document found in the newspaper “Gazeta Lvivska”. He points out that in 1902, the district court of the city of Nikolaev tried to find Isaac Zuckerberg in connection with the death of his mother Ruhel Grunshtein. This recording became another significant evidence of the family ties of the founder of Facebook with Ukraine.

“These archival finds add a new layer to the historical picture of Jewish life in Ukraine and show how far and deep the roots of this culture go,” Jewish News emphasizes.

Possible connections with other cities

Historians have also hypothesized that the Zuckerberg family could be connected to other cities in Western Ukraine. In particular, it is assumed that the ancestors could have come from Drohobych, where the Zuckerbergs also lived. However, there is no exact confirmation of this information yet, and the research is ongoing.

The significance of the discovery for Ukrainian-Jewish history

The research, conducted with the participation of Oksana Lobko, opened an important page in the history of the Jewish people on Ukrainian soil. The story of Zuckerberg’s ancestors is not only an interesting fact about the famous entrepreneur, but also part of a larger picture showing the significant influence of the Jewish community in Ukraine.

What does he think? NAnewssuch finds help strengthen cultural ties and remind us of the centuries-old history of the Jewish presence on the territory of Ukraine.

Leave a comment in Telegram – NAnews channel↓

In Poland and the Baltic countries, there are warnings about a possible Russian operation aimed at attacking NATO infrastructure and attempting to blame Ukraine. Potential targets include energy facilities, oil terminals, and the German brigade base under construction in Lithuania.

On NATO’s eastern flank, there is growing concern about a possible Russian provocation that should be serious enough to cause a political crisis but not lead to an immediate large-scale war between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The alleged scenario revolves around a limited strike on critical or military infrastructure in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or another regional state. The operation may use Ukrainian drones captured by Russia, and the Kremlin will try to blame Kyiv for the incident.

There is no public evidence that Putin has already approved a specific operation. The exact timing, targets, and final format of a possible attack are unknown. However, warnings are coming not only from journalists or independent experts but also from the leaders of Poland and Lithuania, who cite intelligence data.

Lithuania received intelligence signals

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda confirmed on July 15, 2026, that the country’s intelligence structures received information about possible Russian provocations against Poland or the Baltic states. Their alleged goal may be to test NATO’s ability to maintain unity in the face of a limited and ambiguous attack.

Nausėda was not talking about a full-scale invasion but about targeted actions against critical infrastructure. These may include conventional military means, as well as sabotage, drones, cyberattacks, or other hybrid tools.

At the same time, the Lithuanian president emphasized separately: intelligence does not have specific information about the location and timing of a possible attack. According to him, Russian planning may still be ongoing, and the available data may only indicate the general goal of the operation.

This caveat is fundamentally important. It is not about a revealed plan for Russia’s war against NATO but about signs of preparing a limited operation capable of causing confusion, internal disputes, and a long discussion about who is responsible.

Russia may have accumulated Ukrainian drones

Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reported that Russian forces captured a significant number of Ukrainian drones. Some devices may have been intercepted or landed using electronic warfare means, after which they ended up in Russia’s possession.

According to the Polish minister’s assessment, such drones can be restored, equipped with explosives, and used for provocations against Poland or other states on NATO’s eastern flank. Warsaw believes that the threat also concerns Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Romania.

This creates an especially complex problem for investigation. The debris of the device, electronic components, markings, and part of the software may indeed have Ukrainian origins. However, the launch site, drone control, and modifications made to it may already indicate a Russian operation.

The calculation may be based precisely on the first hours after the strike when the public does not yet know all the circumstances, and social networks are filled with photos of Ukrainian parts and statements about an alleged attack by Kyiv.

How a false flag operation might look

According to the Polish publication Wirtualna Polska, sources in law enforcement agencies are considering several options for possible escalation. The most likely is the use of drones externally linked to Ukraine. In the maximum scenario, the use of missiles against NATO military targets is allowed.

The list of possible targets is not officially confirmed. It is based on assessments of unnamed interlocutors of Polish journalists and therefore should not be perceived as an established operational plan of the Kremlin.

Possible target	Why it matters	Status of information
Orlen infrastructure in the Mažeikiai area	A major center for processing and storing petroleum products in Lithuania	Version of Polish sources
Litgrid power networks	Connect Lithuania’s energy system with European countries	Version of Polish sources
Rudninkai military base	Being created for the permanent deployment of a German armored brigade	Version of Polish sources
Constanța port in Romania	The most important transport and military hub in the Black Sea region	Version of Polish sources

Special attention is paid to the Rudninkai military town, located approximately 20 kilometers from the Belarusian border. Infrastructure is being created there for the permanent deployment of the German 45th armored brigade.

The cost of the second phase of the project is estimated at about 1.3 billion euros, and the total area of the campus will be about 190 hectares. The first military personnel should begin to be stationed there in the fall of 2026, and full infrastructure for the German brigade should be ready by the end of 2027.

A possible strike on a not yet fully populated base would allow Russia to try to control the level of escalation: avoid a large number of casualties but simultaneously show that the deployment of German forces in Lithuania is associated with direct risk.

One of the political goals could be to pressure Berlin. The Kremlin is interested in making the German public perceive the permanent presence of the brigade in Lithuania not as a security guarantee but as a source of threat to German military personnel.

The informational groundwork is being prepared in advance

Russian state and pro-Kremlin information resources have already spread claims that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia provided Ukraine with air corridors for attacks on Russian oil facilities in the Baltic region.

The foreign ministers of the three Baltic states jointly stated on April 10, 2026, that they never allowed their territory or airspace to be used for Ukrainian attacks against Russia. On July 10, representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia reiterated this during a joint démarche at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Such an information campaign may be a preparatory stage. First, the Russian audience is convinced that the Baltic countries are already participating in Ukrainian operations. Then any explosion, drone crash, or object damage can be presented as a natural consequence of the allegedly existing cooperation.

As a result, Russia gains the opportunity to pursue several goals simultaneously: discredit Ukraine, sow distrust between Kyiv and its allies, confuse the investigation, and delay NATO’s decision-making.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that the main weapon in such an operation is not only the drone itself. Equally important are the first reports, photos of debris, statements from anonymous channels, and attempts to impose a ready-made version of events before the completion of technical expertise.

The Latvian border as another pressure point

Simultaneously, pressure on the Latvian border with Belarus has sharply increased. Its length is about 173 kilometers, with a significant part passing through forested and swampy areas, complicating control.

In 2025, Latvian authorities prevented 12,046 attempts of illegal border crossings. By mid-July 2026, about 8,000 such cases had been registered, with approximately a thousand occurring in the first two weeks of July alone.

For comparison: on the Polish-Belarusian border in the first half of 2026, slightly more than 260 attempts were recorded, while in Lithuania — 905. This indicates a noticeable shift in the main migration pressure towards Latvia.

The Polish Center for Eastern Studies believes that Latvian services are currently unable to independently eliminate all weaknesses on the external border of the European Union. Problems include limited resources, smuggler activities, and insufficient border infrastructure effectiveness.

There is no confirmed data on the mass penetration of sabotage groups disguised as migrants. However, the flow itself forces Latvia to distribute forces between border protection, infrastructure security, and airspace monitoring. For the organizer of a hybrid operation, this is already a beneficial result.

Lithuania has moved to practical protection of objects

Warnings did not remain only at the level of statements. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas authorized the involvement of military personnel in protecting the liquefied natural gas terminal in Klaipeda and other strategic facilities on July 17.

Additional security was sent to the LitPol Link electrical connection with Poland, the substation in Alytus, and the Kruonis pumped storage power plant. From July 19 to August 19, a unit of up to 30 military personnel, transport, and a military boat were involved in the operation.

Vilnius emphasizes that the formal threat level has not been raised. The strengthening of security is called a preventive measure. However, the choice of objects shows which infrastructure elements the authorities consider most sensitive: energy connections with Europe, the gas terminal, hydroelectric power plants, and transport hubs.

The main goal is to test NATO

The alleged operation does not necessarily have to lead to significant destruction. For the Kremlin, it is more important to create a situation where NATO states begin to argue about the origin of the attack, the degree of proven Russian responsibility, and the need for a collective response.

Especially dangerous is a strike that falls above the level of a regular sabotage but below an obvious full-scale military attack. It is in such a gray zone that disagreements arise: whether to consider the incident a technical error, an independent Ukrainian operation, a Russian provocation, or an armed attack on an Alliance state.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not automatically triggered after any airspace violation. Allies must establish whether an armed attack occurred, determine its source, and obtain the affected state’s consent for collective action.

At the same time, NATO explicitly states that major cyberattacks and other serious hybrid actions can be recognized as an armed attack. The decision is made separately in each case, considering the scale, consequences, and evidence of the adversary’s involvement.

The first reaction to an ambiguous incident is likely to include intercepting air targets, exchanging intelligence data, conducting a technical investigation, and consultations under Article 4. Delaying this process may be one of Russia’s goals.

The eastern flank is already being strengthened

Today, NATO has nine multinational battle groups on the eastern front — from Finland and the Baltic states to Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. The allies’ airspace is monitored around the clock as part of the Air Policing mission.

After Russian airspace violations in September 2025, the Alliance launched the Eastern Sentry operation. It includes additional fighters, helicopters, air defense systems, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aviation, and ships.

The Baltic Sea also hosts the Baltic Sentry mission, created to protect underwater cables and other critical infrastructure. NATO declares that it is ready to defend each ally and, if necessary, reinforce specific states with additional forces and air defense means.

The Kremlin rejects Lithuania’s statements and calls them an attempt to justify further militarization of the region. However, Russian denial does not negate the fact that the eastern flank states are already moving from warnings to practical protection of energy, transport, and military facilities.

Why this story is important for Israel

For the Israeli audience, this scenario is important not only as a European problem. Russia may try to apply a model well known to countries that regularly face drones, proxy structures, denial of responsibility, and pre-prepared information versions.

The provocation technology consists of several sequential stages: choosing a vulnerable object, using a weapon with a confusing origin, instant information injection, pressure on public opinion, and an attempt to prevent a unified response from allies.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency believes that the main question is not whether Putin will decide to start an open war against NATO. The danger of a limited strike, which the Kremlin will try to present as an accident, a Ukrainian mistake, or an unidentified incident, is much more realistic.

At the moment, there is no open evidence of an approved Russian plan. The named energy and military objects remain potential targets based on assessments of Polish sources.

But official statements from the leadership of Lithuania and Poland, the strengthening of infrastructure security, and the preparation of additional forces show: the risk is already perceived as serious enough for the region’s states to begin preparing for a possible provocation in advance.

In the incomplete July 2026, Russian strikes destroyed or seriously damaged more than 1.5 million copies of Ukrainian books. Behind this figure are burned children’s editions, fiction, destroyed warehouses, ruined printing houses, and hundreds of thousands of school textbooks that were already supposed to be sent to Ukrainian schools.

The Ukrainian Book Institute called the events a deliberate destruction of Ukrainian culture, knowledge, and memory. In just a few weeks, Russian attacks affected publishers BookChef, ‘Knigolav’, ‘Mamine Sonechko’, Mison, publishing house ARK.UA, and one of the largest Ukrainian printing houses — ‘Konvi’.

This is not a single accidental fire or a separate damaged warehouse. In July, strikes consistently destroyed different parts of the book industry: storage of finished editions, production, publishing offices, equipment, layouts of future books, and educational literature for children.

800 thousand books burned at the beginning of July

The first huge loss occurred on the night of July 2, 2026. A Russian strike destroyed the central warehouse of Denka Logistics — the logistics partner of BookChef publishing house.

The warehouse contained most of the publisher’s products. According to BookChef’s estimate, about 800 thousand books were lost in the fire, and the material damage exceeded 100 million hryvnias. Employees were not harmed, but the publisher lost a significant portion of already printed editions ready for sale and shipment to readers.

The destruction of such a number of books cannot be reduced only to the cost of paper, printing, and warehouse rent. Each edition involves acquired copyrights, the work of translators, editors, proofreaders, designers, printing houses, and logistics companies. Reproduction requires months of work and new financial investments.

Six days later, on July 8, a Russian attack destroyed the office of the Kyiv children’s publishing house ‘Mamine Sonechko’. The premises stored books, magazines, and other printed products for children. After the hit, a fire started, destroying part of the editions. The exact number of lost copies was not disclosed by the publisher.

Night of July 19: almost a million books in a few hours

The heaviest consequences for the Ukrainian book industry came from a massive strike on the night of July 19, 2026.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia used 166 air attack means: 41 missiles of various types and 125 drones. The main direction of the attack was Kyiv. Ukrainian air defense shot down or suppressed 18 missiles and 108 drones, but some targets reached the capital. One person died in Kyiv, and 16 were injured. Residential buildings, a dormitory, warehouses, cars, a metro station, and other civilian objects were damaged.

One of the hits was on the ‘Konvi’ printing house — a large full-cycle printing enterprise. Books, magazines, catalogs, and school textbooks for dozens of Ukrainian publishers were printed here.

After the hit by a Russian ballistic missile, the huge production workshops were left without a roof. Printing and binding equipment was destroyed or flooded during the fire extinguishing, and office premises were completely burned out. People working at the printing house were not harmed.

Inside were about 250 thousand textbooks for ninth-grade students. The books were fully printed, packed, and prepared for shipment to Ukrainian schools before the start of the new school year.

Approximately 350 thousand copies and printing blanks were seriously damaged. Among them were textbooks for fourth grades and books from publishers ‘Ranok’, ‘Hramota’, ‘Litera LTD’, ‘Linguist’, ‘Knigolav’, ‘Laboratory’, ‘Artbooks’, ASSA, ‘Kalamar’, ‘Atena’, ‘Aston’, BookChef, Mison, ‘Higher School’, ‘Medicine’, ‘Apriori’, and others.

On the same night, a Russian strike completely destroyed a warehouse of the ‘Knigolav’ publishing house located elsewhere. About 250 thousand books — the result of months of work by authors, publishers, and printing houses — burned in the fire. None of the employees were harmed, but the publisher warned of delays in fulfilling orders.

Thus, only on the night of July 19, the Ukrainian book industry lost about 250 thousand books at the ‘Konvi’ printing house, another 250 thousand at the ‘Knigolav’ warehouse, and approximately 350 thousand copies and unfinished editions were significantly damaged.

The general director of the ‘Ranok’ publishing house, Viktor Kruglov, estimated the total losses of that night at almost a million books. He stated that the destroyed textbooks would be reprinted despite the destruction of equipment and the urgent need to find free capacities at other enterprises.

A strike just before the school year

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine is still clarifying the exact number of destroyed textbooks. In 2026, the state planned to print about 8 million copies of educational literature for ninth-grade students.

The Ministry, together with publishers and the Institute for Modernization of Educational Content, must determine which textbooks need to be urgently reprinted so that schools receive them on time.

But restoring an edition does not mean simply pressing the print button again. This requires paper, ink, binding materials, funding, available equipment, employee work, and free production lines. At the same time, Ukrainian printing houses need to fulfill already planned orders from other publishers.

The head of the Ukrainian Book Institute, Oleksandra Koval, stated that to restore one million lost books, the government urgently needs to allocate approximately 150–200 million hryvnias.

To understand the scale: in the entire year of 2025, slightly more than 33 million copies of books and brochures were published in Ukraine. The loss of 1.5 million copies over several weeks in July is comparable to about 4.5% of the country’s total annual book circulation.

At the same time, the Ukrainian book market was already in a difficult position before the new destructions. The number of titles was increasing, but average print runs were decreasing, and the real income of publishers was practically not growing due to inflation. For many small publishers, the destruction of a warehouse or a large edition can mean the loss of a significant part of working capital and a threat to further existence.

From ‘Factor-Druk’ to ‘Konvi’

The current destructions continue a series of strikes that have already caused severe damage to Ukrainian book infrastructure.

On May 23, 2024, a Russian missile hit the Kharkiv printing house ‘Factor-Druk’, where books of many Ukrainian publishers were printed. Seven employees of the enterprise died then, and another 22 people were injured. Equipment and almost 50 thousand books were destroyed.

The strike on ‘Factor-Druk’ occurred on the first day of the International Book Fair in Warsaw. Burned Ukrainian books became one of the symbols of the destruction of Ukrainian culture during the war.

In subsequent years, bookstores, libraries, publishing warehouses, and other cultural institutions were damaged. As of the end of June 2026, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine recorded 1,949 damaged or destroyed cultural heritage objects and 2,576 cultural infrastructure objects.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has also destroyed or damaged more than 850 Ukrainian libraries. These figures remain incomplete, as some occupied territories are inaccessible for full documentation.

Among the destroyed editions could be books by Israeli authors and publications about Jewish history

The destruction of Ukrainian book warehouses and the ‘Konvi’ printing house affected publishers whose catalogs included books by Israeli authors, works about the Holocaust, Jewish resistance, Aliyah, the history of Israel, and the revival of Hebrew.

About 800 thousand books were lost at the warehouse of the logistics partner of the BookChef publishing house. The publisher released works by Israeli historian and professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Yuval Noah Harari in Ukrainian, including ‘Sapiens’, ‘Homo Deus’, and ’21 Lessons for the 21st Century’.

In the assortment associated with BookChef, there were also books by Israeli authors about Mossad activities, women in Israeli intelligence, and the story of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda — the man who played a key role in the revival of Hebrew as a modern spoken language.

The ‘Knigolav’ publishing house, which lost about 250 thousand books, published literature directly related to Jewish history. Among such publications were books about Jewish women in the resistance movement in Nazi ghettos, about Rudolf Vrba’s escape from Auschwitz, about the fates of Holocaust survivors and their resettlement in Israel.

The publisher’s catalog also included the novel ‘The Boy with the Star of David’, the plot of which is related to the rescue of Jewish children by the ‘Youth Aliyah’ organization, the Israeli fleet, and the history of the creation of the State of Israel.

There is also a separate connection with the destroyed ‘Konvi’ printing house. In previous years, the enterprise printed Ukrainian educational and methodological materials on teaching Hebrew, Jewish culture, and working with cultural texts in Hebrew lessons.

However, publishers have not yet published a complete list of all destroyed titles. Therefore, it is impossible to reliably state how many books by Israeli authors or publications on Jewish topics burned during the July attacks.

There is also no confirmation yet that among the destroyed 250 thousand school textbooks were separate editions for Jewish schools in Ukraine or Hebrew textbooks.

However, the already established facts show that Russian strikes affected the book infrastructure that distributed works by Israeli authors in Ukraine, preserved the memory of the Holocaust, told about Jewish resistance, and acquainted Ukrainian readers with the history of Israel and modern Hebrew.

Why the destruction of books is more than material damage

There are no investigation results yet that allow us to assert that each specific publisher or each book warehouse was pre-selected by the Russian military as a separate target.

However, the repetition of such strikes and the cumulative scale of destruction create an obvious picture: the Russian war is destroying the entire chain that ensures the existence of the Ukrainian book. Not only finished editions are burning. Printing presses, binding lines, warehouses, publishing computers, original layouts, offices, libraries, and educational institutions are being destroyed.

NAnews — Israel News notes: for Israeli society, it is especially clear why the destruction of books cannot be perceived solely as economic damage. A book preserves language, testimonies, names, family history, and national memory. By destroying book infrastructure, the aggressor strikes at the society’s ability to pass on its own history to future generations.

It is especially indicative that among the destroyed editions were textbooks prepared for schoolchildren. Their loss means that Ukrainian publishers and the state must, in wartime conditions, find money, materials, and equipment again so that children can start the school year with the necessary books.

But the July attacks showed something else. Just a few hours after the destructions, publishers announced that they would restore the editions. Printing houses are looking for opportunities to continue production, readers are ordering books from affected publishers, and employees are clearing debris and saving surviving products.

Russia can burn paper and destroy printing presses. But as long as Ukrainian books are being reprinted, bought, read, and passed on to children, it fails to destroy Ukrainian culture and memory.

Strikes on Wildberries logistics centers have become one of the most discussed episodes of the Ukrainian campaign to target facilities deep within Russia. For the first time, the target was not an oil refinery, a military airfield, or a defense industry enterprise, but infrastructure used daily by millions of ordinary Russians.

That is why the significance of these attacks goes far beyond the destroyed warehouse premises. Wildberries has long ceased to be just an online clothing store. It is the largest Russian marketplace, a vast transportation network, a goods storage system, a financial platform, and one of the main supply channels for Russian small businesses.

Through this same infrastructure pass electronics, communication means, equipment, and dual-use components that can be used by the Russian military and defense industry enterprises.

Four logistics centers in five days

The first series of strikes occurred on the night of July 18, 2026. Drones attacked Wildberries centers in Kotovsk, Tambov region, and Elektrostal, Moscow region.

At the Kotovsk warehouse, seven night shift employees were killed, and another 25 people were injured. In the Moscow region, where the Wildberries warehouse and an oil depot in Noginsk were simultaneously hit, Russian authorities reported 61 injured. One person later died from their injuries.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the strikes on two major logistics facilities. According to him, they were used for the supply of sanctioned components necessary for the production of Russian drones and navigation equipment. The Russian Kremlin denies this and insists that the warehouses served “exclusively the civilian market.”

However, already on July 22, 2026, the attacks continued. The new targets were Wildberries logistics centers in Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Territory.

In Krasnodar, a large warehouse complex caught fire after the strike. Russian authorities reported ten injured, and more than a hundred firefighters and a helicopter were involved in extinguishing the fire. Several people were also injured in Nevinnomyssk. Videos of the large-scale fires were verified by Reuters.

Thus, in five days, four facilities of one company, located in different parts of Russia, were hit: in the central region, Moscow region, Krasnodar Territory, and the North Caucasus.

This allows us to speak not of a random choice of targets, but of a systematic attempt to disrupt the operation of one of Russia’s largest logistics networks.

Why Wildberries is strategically important

These are not ordinary warehouses

The Wildberries logistics center is not a hangar with boxes, but a high-tech hub combining storage, sorting, automated order processing, and shipping goods to dozens of regions.

The center in Elektrostal was one of the company’s most important facilities in the Moscow region. Its area was estimated at about 250,000 square meters. The warehouse in Kotovsk occupied about 108,000 square meters and served a significant part of southern and central Russia.

The Kotovsk complex was opened only in May 2025. It could simultaneously store up to 54 million units of goods. The company planned to use it to reduce transportation costs, speed up delivery, and provide regional sellers with the opportunity to ship products throughout Russia.

According to the Russian publication “Kommersant,” the first strikes on Elektrostal and Kotovsk temporarily disabled about 7% of all Wildberries logistics capacities. The cost of restoring the buildings alone was estimated at $270–450 million — not including the destroyed equipment and sellers’ goods.

It is impossible to completely paralyze Wildberries with two or four strikes. The company has dozens of distribution and sorting centers and can redistribute part of the orders.

But the loss of even a few of the largest hubs creates a cascading effect: neighboring warehouses become overloaded, routes lengthen, transportation costs rise, and delivery times increase.

Dual-use goods pass through the marketplace

Wildberries indeed offers a wide range of products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

Among such goods are civilian drones, drop mechanisms, flight controllers, electric motors, batteries, video transmitters, fiber optic coils for FPV drones, radios, antennas, thermal imagers, bulletproof vests, helmets, and tactical equipment.

The mere fact of selling such products does not prove that every Wildberries warehouse is a military facility. There are also no publicly available documents confirming a direct contract between the marketplace and the Russian Ministry of Defense.

However, the modern Russian supply system for the front is built not only on state defense orders. Volunteer groups, regional organizations, private drone manufacturers, Russian army units, and relatives of servicemen play a significant role in it.

They purchase the necessary equipment through regular online stores and marketplaces. Therefore, the line between civilian trade and military supply is becoming increasingly blurred.

The Ukrainian side claims that the affected centers were used not just for selling individual goods, but as links in the supply of sanctioned components for the production of drones and navigation systems. Independent data on the exact contents of each warehouse is still insufficient, but the presence of dual-use goods in Wildberries’ assortment is confirmed by open catalogs and journalistic checks.

Wildberries — the backbone of the Russian internet market

Calling Wildberries an absolute monopolist of all Russian retail would be incorrect. But the level of market concentration around Wildberries and Ozon is indeed enormous.

According to Data Insight, in the second half of 2024, Wildberries accounted for about 56% of all online orders in Russia and approximately 30% of the monetary volume of internet sales. Ozon accounted for another 21% of orders and 23% of turnover. Together, the two platforms controlled about 77% of the number of orders and more than half of the monetary volume of Russian e-commerce.

Today, more than a million sellers work through Wildberries, and the platform itself can process over 20 million orders a day.

The total volume of Russian internet trade in 2025 reached 11.5 trillion rubles, increasing by 28% over the year. The Russian market for goods ordered online numbered about 7.7 billion parcels.

Therefore, a strike on Wildberries is an impact not on a single private company. It affects a vast ecosystem of sellers, banks, carriers, pickup points, packaging manufacturers, and regional entrepreneurs.

As noted by NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, the economic strength of the marketplace simultaneously became its vulnerability: the more goods and financial flows are concentrated in one system, the more painful the loss of each major distribution center becomes.

Small business pays the consequences of war

The main damage is not only borne by the Wildberries management.

The goods in the warehouses belong to hundreds and thousands of sellers. For a large company, the loss of part of the products may mean a decrease in profits, but for a small entrepreneur, it could mean the destruction of all stocks purchased on credit.

After the first strikes, Wildberries began discussing compensation for the owners of lost goods. The Russian Association of E-commerce Market Participants asked the government to provide affected entrepreneurs with a six-month tax deferral.

Among the affected were not only Russian companies. The Turkish clothing seller Koton reported that part of its products was also located at the damaged Wildberries facilities.

It became clear after the attacks how vulnerable sellers remain. Many of them did not insure their goods against military risks, and the terms of the marketplaces allow limiting liability for property destroyed as a result of hostilities or drone strikes.

It is impossible to claim that the strikes will immediately lead to the bankruptcy of hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs. But for hundreds or thousands of sellers who stored a significant part of their stocks in the affected warehouses, the consequences could be critical.

Will the strikes drive up prices

In the short term, the attacks may increase the cost of delivering certain goods and cause delays in certain regions.

If such strikes continue, Wildberries and other Russian marketplaces will have to invest additional funds in security, anti-drone protection, insurance, construction of backup warehouses, and decentralization of stocks.

The company may partially pass these costs onto sellers through increased commissions, storage costs, and logistics tariffs. Sellers, in turn, will raise final prices.

There is currently no basis to claim that the attacks on four warehouses have already become an independent factor in nationwide inflation. But they create additional price pressure in an economy that is already bearing growing military expenses.

War has come to the Russian consumer rear

Kotovsk is located about 360 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Elektrostal is only 50 kilometers east of Moscow. The strikes on Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk expanded the geography of attacks even further.

From a military point of view, this forces Russia to protect not only airfields, oil refineries, and defense enterprises but also a vast network of commercial facilities.

It is impossible to install air defense systems near every warehouse, sorting center, railway hub, and industrial site. The more territories need to be covered, the more resources of the Russian air defense are dispersed.

But even more important is the psychological effect.

Damage to a military plant in a remote region may go unnoticed by most Russians. A strike on Wildberries immediately appears on the phone: the product disappears from sale, the order is delayed, the entrepreneur loses warehouse stocks, and the pickup point is left without supplies.

This is how war ceases to be a television story about events somewhere far away and becomes part of the everyday life of Russian society.

Reuters directly notes that the attacks on Wildberries may signify a new stage in the Ukrainian strategy: pressure on Russian military capabilities is simultaneously accompanied by an attempt to bring the consequences of the war into the lives of ordinary Russians.

Civilian object or part of military logistics

The question of the legality of such strikes cannot be resolved solely on the basis that Wildberries is a civilian company.

International humanitarian law defines a military target by two main criteria: the object must make an effective contribution to military actions, and its destruction must provide a definite military advantage. For dual-use objects, it is additionally necessary to consider possible harm to civilians and adhere to the principle of proportionality.

Therefore, the presence of bulletproof vests or drone parts on the marketplace does not in itself turn all the company’s warehouses into legitimate targets.

The decisive factors are intelligence data: what exactly was passing through a specific object, in what quantity, to whom it was intended, and how important its destruction was for disrupting military supply.

Publicly, Ukraine has disclosed only a general explanation — the supply of components for drones and navigation equipment. Full evidence allowing for an independent legal assessment of each strike is not yet available.

Meanwhile, since February 2022, Russia has repeatedly struck Ukrainian postal terminals, warehouses, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure.

This does not negate the need to assess each Ukrainian operation from the perspective of international law and does not make the death of warehouse workers any less tragic. But it is the full-scale Russian invasion that created a reality in which civilian logistics systems are increasingly integrated into war support.

Why these strikes are truly important

The destruction of individual warehouses will not destroy the Russian economy and will not stop Wildberries. The company has enough resources to temporarily redirect goods and restore part of its operations.

The strategic significance lies in the cumulative effect.

Each destroyed center means lost goods, damaged equipment, new security expenses, overloaded routes, and the need to build a more expensive decentralized system.

Each new attack forces Russian companies to consider that the deep rear is no longer guaranteed to be safe.

Each delayed batch of electronics, communication means, or dual-use components potentially complicates the work of Russian manufacturers and units dependent on fast commercial supplies.

And every entrepreneur who lost products in a warehouse faces the real cost of war, which the Russian leadership has tried for years to hide from the population behind the formulation of a “special military operation.”

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency emphasizes: Russia itself has turned its own economy, industry, and logistics into elements of a protracted war against Ukraine. Without the invasion, the killing of civilians, and the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cities, there would be no Ukrainian campaign of strikes on facilities deep within Russian territory.

Wildberries became a target not because it is a popular online store. It became vulnerable because in modern Russia, the largest civilian trade network simultaneously became a channel for the movement of goods, money, electronics, and equipment, some of which support the state’s ability to continue the war.

That is why burning Wildberries warehouses are not just lost parcels. They are evidence that the distance from the Ukrainian border no longer guarantees Russia economic, logistical, or psychological security.

Israel, from the very beginning of the full-scale war, took a cautious position regarding military assistance to Ukraine. Officially, Jerusalem refused to supply Kyiv with lethal weapons, fearing deterioration of relations with Moscow for a number of reasons — which are not the subject of this article.

Nevertheless, under pressure from Western allies and against the backdrop of the Iranian Shahed drone threat, Israel gradually softened its stance on “defense-related equipment”.

Export Licenses

In February 2023, according to Walla and Times of Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Galant and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen for the first time approved export licenses for two Israeli companies to supply Ukraine with electronic warfare systems against drones with a range of up to ~40 km. Officials emphasized that this was not a change in policy, but a one-time permit for “non-lethal, purely defensive systems that do not kill Russian soldiers”.

It is known that one of these systems was a multi-purpose radar produced by the Israeli company RADA (now part of the American Leonardo DRS). When making this decision, Israeli officials also considered their own interest: to obtain data on how their technology would perform against Iranian drones on the Ukrainian front.

Moscow reacted painfully to such plans: already in early February 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly warned Israel against supplying weapons to Ukraine. That is probably why Israel chose an indirect path of assistance.

It was announced that Israel would help Ukraine create an early warning system for missile and drone attacks (an analogue of the Israeli “Tzeva Adom”), which formally pertains to civil defense and not the transfer of weapons. In March 2023, meetings were reported between representatives of Israel’s Home Front Command and Ukrainian officers in Poland to implement this warning system. In May 2023, testing of the Israeli warning system began in Kyiv: it was supposed to start in the capital and then expand to other cities. Thus, Israel demonstrated its readiness to help protect Ukraine’s population from attacks, but not by supplying weapons directly.

As already known, “צבע אדום‎” — in the Kyiv region on July 24, 2025, the Israeli-provided alert system was activated for the first time against missile attacks.

At the same time, there were behind-the-scenes negotiations on supplying anti-drone systems via third countries. Already at the beginning of 2023, a group of Lithuanian NGOs (Blue/Yellow, Laisvės TV, and others) launched a campaign Radarom! to raise funds for tactical radars for Ukraine.

Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas stated that they “reached an agreement with Israeli manufacturers, the radars are ready – only money is needed”. In fact, Israel’s Ministry of Defense did not object to such radars being sold to Ukraine at the expense of Lithuanian donors. This unofficial supply channel allowed Jerusalem to formally maintain neutrality while responding to US calls to help Ukraine close its skies. The Israeli press noted that the deal became possible under allied pressure and was presented as an exception for humanitarian purposes — to protect civilians from shelling.

RADA RPS‑42: Technology and Capabilities

RADA RPS‑42 is a mobile multifunctional radar station with an active phased array antenna (AESA), designed to detect small UAVs, missiles, artillery shells, and other aerial targets at short and medium ranges. It has been produced by the Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries Ltd. since the early 2010s.
Since 2022, RADA has been part of the American defense holding Leonardo DRS. The station is widely used to protect military facilities and critical infrastructure in various countries, including Ukraine since 2023.

Technical specifications:

• Detection range for drones and artillery shells: up to 10–30 km (depending on target type)
• Detection of aerial targets (aircraft, helicopters): up to 100 km
• Weight of one radar panel: about 23 kg
• Deployment time: several minutes, can be installed on a vehicle, tripod, or stationary
• Technology: active phased array antenna (AESA), operates in the X-band
• Coverage: up to 360° (with four panels)
• Operating mode: stand-alone or integrated into complex defense systems

Purpose and applications:

• Detection and tracking of small and medium aerial targets: kamikaze drones, UAVs, rockets, and artillery shells, mortar bombs, missiles
• Protection of assets and troops from aerial threats: early warning of raids and missile attacks
• Integration into air defense and C-RAM systems (protection from artillery strikes)
• Application flexibility: suitable for protecting military convoys and bases as well as urban objects, infrastructure, and critical communications

RADA RPS‑42 is used in many armies around the world as part of modern anti-drone and counter-artillery complexes.

“Mobility, compactness, and multifunctionality — that’s why the RPS‑42 is so in demand in modern conflicts,” write analysts at Israel Defense (Israel Defense, July 2024).

Logistics and Supply Channels

The main channel through which Israeli RADA RPS-42 radars reached Ukraine was via Lithuania. On January 30, 2023, a large-scale fundraising campaign “RADAROM!” (“To the Radar!”) was launched in Vilnius to purchase tactical air target detection radars.

Within just a few weeks, Lithuanians raised about €14 million, enough to acquire 16 new-generation radar stations. The Israeli company RADA Electronic Industries (headquartered in Netanya) agreed to sell these radars. Officially, the transactions were processed through the American corporation Leonardo DRS, with which RADA merged in 2022.

This legally simplified re-export: in fact, the radars were supplied as products of the American branch (DRS RADA Technologies), and not directly from Israel. However, as Israel Defense emphasized, such transfers still required approval from Israel’s Ministry of Defense — which was obtained.

The Lithuanian side handled all the logistics.

In February–March 2023, Ukrainian military crews arrived for training on operating these radars: first in Lithuania, at ranges in Kaunas, and then part of the preparation took place in Poland together with Israeli specialists.

At the beginning of May 2023, the first stations arrived on Ukrainian soil.

On May 4, 2023, volunteers reported the delivery of the first three out of 16 radars to Ukraine.

The remaining sets were delivered as documents and equipment were prepared throughout May–June. Lithuanian TV channel LRT published footage of radar unloading and a joint photo of Ukrainian military and Radarom project volunteers in front of one of the stations. Ukrainian officials did not publicly disclose details of these deliveries (likely at Israel’s request), but Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda openly declared on February 24, 2023 that:

“Lithuania, to mark the anniversary of resistance, is buying modern radars for Ukraine.”

Thus, the delivery of RADA radars was carried out not directly by Israel, but through the acquisition by a third party (a NATO country) and transfer as a donation to Ukraine.

It is important to note that RADA RPS-42 radars are an integral part of the Israeli anti-drone system Drone Dome (by Rafael). The Drone Dome system uses up to four such radars for 360° coverage, electro-optical cameras, and electronic warfare equipment to suppress drones.

However, according to available information, Ukraine received specifically radar modules (RPS-42 and some newer ieMHR), without electronic warfare modules. They are integrated with other components of Ukrainian air defense.

According to reports, the company “Systems of Electronic Export” (SEE) — the Ukrainian radar integrator — together with Leonardo DRS representatives at the MSPO-2023 exhibition discussed equipping these radars with additional devices and integrating them into the national air defense system. Interestingly, SEE’s report noted: the delivered RPS-42s were regarded as “material and technical aid provided by the US government.”

Apparently, after the radar was purchased from Israel with Lithuanian money, their delivery and integration were coordinated with the US (possibly through the International Support Fund for Ukraine or directly via the Ukrainian Armed Forces command). In any case, by summer 2023 all 16 Israeli radars were in service with Ukraine.

Neither Israel nor Ukraine officially commented on this topic, but the presence of these advanced Israeli radars at the front became public knowledge thanks to volunteer reports and media publications. For example, the newspaper Haaretz on May 8, 2023 reported that “for the first time, Israeli anti-drone radars were deployed in Ukraine”, highlighting Lithuania’s role in their purchase. Walla reported that 16 units of RADA radars were acquired for Ukraine with Lithuanian funds to give citizens timely warnings of Russian attacks and provide the military with a chance to intercept threats.

Use of RPS-42 on the Ukrainian Front

After receiving the new Israeli radars, Ukrainian air defense forces quickly put them into service. According to the Lithuanian Blue/Yellow fund, the first RPS-42 units were “already deployed in their operational sectors” as of early May 2023.

According to open data, these radars are used both to cover major cities and strategic rear facilities, as well as directly on the front line. Their main function is detecting short-range air targets and issuing target designations. The multifunctional RADA radars can detect a wide spectrum of threats: from artillery mines and rockets to UAVs and aircraft. Under Ukrainian conditions, the main threats were Russian cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The RPS-42 stations were integrated into a unified air defense network for early detection of launches and flybys of such targets. The radar data allow operators to quickly calculate the trajectory and probable impact point of a missile, after which the warning system activates sirens precisely in those areas threatened by the attack. This sharply increases the effectiveness of civil defense: people get several extra minutes to seek shelter, and air defense units can better allocate resources.

There are photos showing Ukrainian crews training in Lithuania: a mobile RPS-42 radar on a tripod, soldiers learning to use the station interface. After training, these crews deployed radars in Ukraine.

According to OSINT observers, the first systems were installed in central regions of Ukraine in May 2023—likely to protect the capital region and energy infrastructure. Their geography later expanded.

RPS-42 radars are mobile: they can be towed on trailers, mounted on armored vehicles, or installed stationary on towers. Israeli sources note that these ground-based tactical radars can operate on the move and are adapted for field use (resistant to interference and portable). Walla reported that RADA radars can be quickly redeployed and used to protect maneuvering units on the front line. It is likely that some of the 16 systems were transferred specifically to the air defense units of ground brigades in key sectors—to detect enemy UAVs (recon and loitering munitions) as well as for counter-battery operations (detecting artillery fire).

RADA radars can detect mortar bombs and MLRS rockets at ranges up to 20–25 km, enabling rapid warning of their own units about incoming fire. Unsurprisingly, in official Ukrainian materials, these stations are referred to as “air and artillery reconnaissance radars”.

There is evidence that several RPS-42/ieMHR radars were integrated into some of Ukraine’s mobile anti-aircraft systems. For example, social networks discussed a mysterious Ukrainian counter-drone system based on a vehicle, using the Israeli radar together with Ukrainian or Western electronic warfare equipment. Details were not publicly disclosed, but logically, the targets detected by radar could be automatically handed off to fire or jamming assets (anti-aircraft guns, EW).

Ukrainian military and volunteers have repeatedly published photos and videos of RPS-42 in use.

In particular, on May 5, 2023, OSINT analyst OSINTdefender published images from central Ukraine showing the Israeli radar deployed and a Ukrainian soldier beside it. These images also appeared on Reddit and attracted wide attention. Lithuanian volunteers proudly noted that “all these radars were bought with donations from Lithuanians”, highlighting successful international cooperation.

Mobile radar reconnaissance posts allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to monitor the airspace around the clock: a typical tactic is to place the radar on a hill or forest edge, briefly turn it on to scan the area, and then quickly change position to avoid enemy strikes. The Russian side has confirmed the effectiveness of these measures: according to the ZALA concern, Ukrainians try to minimize radar operating time, “turning them on briefly, camouflaging or placing them on mobile platforms” to make detection harder. However, as will be shown below, Russian intelligence is actively hunting for these Israeli radars.

Israeli radar use at the front was also noted by officials. For example, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Korniychuk in June 2023 said that Ukraine had started piloting the Israeli warning system and “the same ‘Red Alert’ system that has protected Israel for years has been adapted to our realities”.

This system, being implemented in Kyiv, is based on a network of short-range radars (including RADA) and electro-optical sensors to detect missile and drone launches. Korniychuk stressed that Israeli technology allows for local activation of sirens, saving air defense resources. Thus, on the front line, the RPS-42 fulfills a dual mission—military (detecting and tracking targets for engagement) and humanitarian (warning civilians about incoming attacks).

Effectiveness and Role of RPS-42 in Air Defense

The appearance of Israeli radars significantly enhanced Ukraine’s ability to counter drones and missile strikes. These radars belong to the class of multifunctional 4D AESA radars with electronic scanning, capable of simultaneously tracking dozens of targets. Here are the key advantages noted in various sources:

• Detection of small targets. The RPS-42 can detect objects with a very low RCS—such as quadcopters or loitering munitions—at ranges around 10 km. Larger drones (the size of “Orlan”) are detected at 40–45 km, and airplanes or helicopters up to 100–150 km (in some cases up to 200 km in ideal conditions). Previously, Ukraine lacked such small tactical radars, so many enemy drones could approach at low altitude undetected. Now, a radar “cocoon” of RPS-42 units surrounds critical assets, covering the blind spots of larger radars.
• Integration with air defense systems. Data from RPS-42 feeds into the unified information space of Ukraine’s air defense. The stations work in real time, instantly relaying coordinates and trajectory data of detected targets. This allows anti-aircraft crews (MANPADS, ZU-23-2, Gepard, Hawk, etc.) to get advance targeting and prepare to engage the target on approach. According to Israel Hayom, RADA radars “are not intended for interception, but serve as targeting systems for short-range air defense”. In effect, RPS-42 became the “eyes” of anti-aircraft complexes, increasing their effectiveness.
• Reduction in expensive missile expenditure. Israeli experts note that an early warning system based on these radars helps conserve expensive munitions. For example, knowing the exact course and target of a missile, there’s no need to use a surface-to-air missile if the forecast shows it will fall in an uninhabited area. Israel’s “Iron Dome” operates similarly, ignoring rockets heading for empty spaces. Now, Ukraine’s air defense can manage ammunition more wisely, intercepting only truly dangerous targets. Amid Russia’s mass drone and missile barrages, this is a vital factor for air defense survivability.
• Increased survivability of forces and assets. As mentioned, RPS-42 units are integrated with local alert systems. They allow the impact point of an enemy missile or UAV to be determined in seconds, activating sirens only in the specific locality at risk. Previously, lack of such data meant that air raids would be declared across multiple regions (covering huge areas), even if the real threat was to a single city. Now, the warning zone is narrower, support services can respond more efficiently, and people don’t spend unnecessary hours in shelters. Estimates suggest that the Israeli system (including RADA radars and Israeli algorithms) has already saved many lives by giving timely warnings of missile attacks in autumn 2023. For example, during a massive strike on power infrastructure in October 2023, sirens and mobile alerts in Kyiv were triggered precisely and in advance—thanks to the new detection system.

Ukrainian military personnel highly value the Israeli radars they’ve received. At a meeting with Leonardo DRS representatives in September 2023, the Ukrainian side presented a detailed report on combat experience with RPS-42. This feedback, according to SEE, will help improve the systems to suit Ukraine’s specifics.

Discussions covered further equipping the radars (possibly with power supplies, anti-UAV protection, compatibility with national IFF systems, etc.). The parties also agreed to organize expanded overseas instructor training so more radar crews could be trained in Ukraine. All this demonstrates that RADA radars have been successfully integrated into Ukraine’s air defense and will be used for the long term. Moreover, further acquisitions of similar systems are being considered: for example, in July 2023, the Lithuanian government decided to purchase additional mobile radars for Ukraine worth €13.5 million under a pan-European air defense initiative. Some of these funds may go to new Israeli ieMHR (upgraded RPS-42 with extended range).

The RADA company itself (Leonardo DRS ISR Division) has indirectly confirmed a surge in demand due to the war in Ukraine. Its 2022–23 financial reports record a sharp rise in tactical radar orders. Israeli press noted that “RADA shares soared 30% on expectations that the war in Ukraine would bring the company major orders”. While there was no direct report of deliveries to Ukraine, investors clearly associated RADA’s success with this situation.

Russian Claims of Destruction: Truth or PR?

Russian military forces quickly perceived the threat posed by Israeli radars in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

From summer 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense and pro-government media began regularly claiming to have destroyed Israeli RADA RPS‑42 radar stations (or their export ieMHR variants) in the combat zone in Ukraine.

What exactly did the Russian side publish (some examples):

• July 14, 2024: The Russian Ministry of Defense press service announced the destruction of a RADA radar complex in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The official summary mentioned the strike location and claimed the station was hit by Russian artillery or a missile (TASS, 14.07.2024). No details—such as photos, videos, or coordinates—were provided.
• August 24, 2024: The ZALA media group published a video allegedly showing a Russian “Lancet” kamikaze drone striking an ieMHR radar complex. The video description did not include precise coordinates, and the clip lasts only a few seconds, making it impossible to clearly identify the object.
  The very next day, Israeli outlet Israel Defense published a review that explicitly pointed out: the video contains no convincing evidence, no characteristic details of the RADA casing, no geolocation, and it’s impossible to say whether an Israeli radar was really destroyed (Israel Defense, 25.08.2024).
• August 2, 2025: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed in its daily briefing to have destroyed two Israeli RADA complexes—one in Donbas, the other in Sumy region. As before, there were no photos, videos, serial numbers, or geolocation (Russian MoD, 02.08.2025; direct link unavailable, only reported through internal briefings and Russian-language MoD Telegram channels).

How did Western and Ukrainian sources react?

• All of these statements were rapidly spread across Russian and Belarusian Telegram channels, as well as various military blogs, where the mention of Israeli-made equipment was presented as proof of direct military cooperation between Israel and Ukraine.
• However, not a single independent source—neither Western OSINT analysts (such as OSINTdefender, Ukraine Weapons Tracker, GeoConfirmed) nor Ukrainian specialized media—has confirmed any of these alleged losses.
• According to widely accepted standards for military verification, confirming the destruction of equipment should include:
  1. geolocation of the strike site;
  2. photos or videos with clearly identifiable equipment details;
  3. time-stamped evidence;
  4. ideally—independent analysis from multiple experts.

In the case of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR, none of this was published:

• OSINT groups either did not attempt to analyze the Russian-reported footage due to low quality and impossibility of identification,
• or stated outright that they found no confirming materials (OSINTdefender, August 2025).

Why does this situation stand out compared to other battlefield losses?

• For Russian systems—such as S-300, S-400, etc.—in every high-profile case of destruction, Ukrainian forces and the OSINT community post photos and videos from the strike site, as well as satellite images and expert analysis of debris.
• Typically, such publications appear within a day of the incident, complete with geolocation, casing details, expert commentary, and wide discussion in open sources.
• With Israeli radars, this has never happened—all reports of RADA RPS‑42/ieMHR losses exist only at the level of official Russian statements, without real proof.

Conclusion:
As of August 2025, none of Russia’s claimed losses of RADA RPS‑42 or ieMHR have been confirmed by independent analysts, OSINT groups, or Western media. Therefore, any such claims should be treated with maximum skepticism—unlike truly verified cases of Russian equipment losses, for which details and evidence are always available.

Overview of Sources and Media Coverage

The topic of Israeli radar deliveries to Ukraine attracted significant attention both in the West and in Israel, Russia, and Ukraine itself. English-language sources provided detailed coverage of the appearance of RPS-42s in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For example, The Kyiv Independent and Euromaidan Press reported on May 5, 2023, about the arrival of the first three radars, noting that the Radarom campaign had raised €14 million for 16 Israeli radars to protect Ukraine’s skies. Industry media (Army Recognition, Israel Defense) described technical details: what the system is, how the Israeli Red Alert works in Ukraine, what types of threats it can detect. Israeli press also actively covered the issue. Even before the delivery, Haaretz published an article, “For the First Time, Israeli Anti-Drone Radars Deployed in Ukraine”, describing the purchase of 16 systems through a Lithuanian organization. Popular publications like Israel Hayom and the site Walla ran stories on how Israel’s Defense Ministry approved the deal and how this affected the IAI state conglomerate’s radar monopoly. After reports of Israeli radar losses in Ukraine, Israeli media responded: for example, Israel Hayom in August 2024 wrote about the “Lancet” drone strike video on a RADA radar and mentioned the 16 radar deliveries to Ukraine in 2023. Thus, Israeli society was aware of these supplies, even if the government did not publicize them.

Russian media made the RPS-42 issue a part of their propaganda narrative.

Major agencies (RIA Novosti, TASS) regularly include phrases about the destruction of the “Israeli RADA radar” in their dispatches, sometimes to emphasize: look, Israel is secretly helping Kyiv, but we are destroying these “Western deliveries.” In October 2024, when the Russian army first “struck” an ieMHR radar, RIA “Novosti Krym” published a separate piece, “Israeli Radar Complex Destroyed for the First Time in the SVO Zone.” It described the radar’s characteristics in detail and even noted that RADA’s headquarters is in Israel with branches in the US.

This indicates an attempt by Russia to use the episode for diplomatic pressure—to signal to Israel that its equipment in Ukraine “will burn.”

In addition, pro-Kremlin military bloggers (Telegram channels) enthusiastically picked up the story: they posted footage of strikes on RPS-42s, called them “hunters of our drones and aircraft”, and praised “Lancets” for scoring a new high-profile target. Some of these videos later made it into Western platforms (Twitter/X, Reddit), adding to the overall picture.

Ukrainian officials do not directly comment on the Israeli radars in the media—likely due to the sensitivity for Israel. However, Ukrainian military regularly thank partners for strengthening air defenses. In Ukrainian Air Force briefings, mentions of “new tactical radars” appeared without details. Volunteers and journalists in Ukraine cover the subject more openly. For example, the Militarnyi portal reported in May 2023: “RADA ieMHR radars are on combat duty in Ukraine”, citing a report by Israeli volunteer N. Flyer. Ukrainian news sites (UP, Novoye Vremya) republished information from Haaretz and Lithuanian sources, explaining to readers what radars were received and why it matters.

Overall, the international reaction to the RPS-42 supply was positive. These radars were seen as “purely defensive assistance”, not causing direct harm to Russia, but saving Ukrainian lives. The US and allies approved Israel’s step.

Meanwhile, Israel tried to keep a balance: helping Ukraine within limits, while assuring Moscow that lethal weapons (such as missiles or the “Iron Dome”) would not be provided to Kyiv.

Nevertheless, a precedent was set—Israeli military technology on the Ukrainian front.

Their combat experience showed that RADA RPS-42/ieMHR radars have substantially strengthened Ukraine’s air defense, though they themselves have become a target in the high-tech duel of “radar versus drone.”

Ukraine received a much-needed tool for early threat detection, while Israel gained valuable experience and a real-world test for its systems amid modern drone and missile warfare.

Conclusion: Summary of the RADA RPS‑42 Issue

• Ukraine received 16 RADA RPS‑42 radars—all delivered via Lithuania with funding from Lithuanian citizens and companies, and with Israel’s formal approval.
• The complexes protect cities, infrastructure, and frontline positions, and are integrated into the national early warning system.
• No new deliveries have been recorded for 2025.
• Reports of radar losses come only from Russian sources and have not received any independent Western verification so far.

As of August 2025, despite some damage, at least eight to ten of the original sixteen radars remain in service with Ukrainian air defense, according to open sources. The remaining units continue to perform core missions—early detection of kamikaze drones, missiles, and artillery—minimizing civilian casualties and preserving critical infrastructure.

At the same time, international experts emphasize that Ukraine’s experience operating the RADA RPS‑42 has been valuable for the Israeli defense industry. Israel, despite isolated incidents, continues to adhere to a policy of limited defensive support for Ukraine and does not transfer offensive weapons.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor this topic and publish only data that can be genuinely confirmed by open sources.

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Essence of the method

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In Uman on July 20, 2026, a ceremonial event was held in honor of the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine, Michael Brodsky, who is concluding his diplomatic tenure after five years of service.

This is about the farewell to the diplomat in connection with the end of his term.

The event was hosted by the Breslov Center in Uman and the city’s chief rabbi, Yaakov Jan. Participants thanked Brodsky for strengthening relations between Israel and Ukraine, his attention to the Jewish community, and his work during the particularly difficult years of the full-scale war, – reported the Israeli bhol.co.il on July 20, 2026, and posted many photos from the ceremony.

Michael Brodsky continues to serve as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine. His diplomatic mission is expected to conclude in August 2026, but the exact date of the end of his term has not yet been publicly announced. The ceremony held in Uman on July 20 was a pre-arranged farewell to the diplomat before the end of his tenure.

Formally, the ambassador’s powers will cease after Israel notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine about the end of his mission. The appointment of a successor does not in itself terminate the powers of the current ambassador.

Who participated in the ceremony

Representatives of several Jewish communities, Israeli organizations, diplomatic structures, and the Uman municipality attended the meeting.

Among the participants were:

• Chief Rabbi of Uman Yaakov Jan;
• Chairman of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Rabbi Meir Stambler;
• Chief Rabbi of Vinnytsia Shaul Horowitz;
• Chabad emissary in Kyiv and head of the Simcha school, Rabbi Moti Levengartz;
• Representative of the Federation of Jewish Communities Levi Edri;
• Representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich;
• Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Eli Ifrah;
• Israeli Consul in Moldova Sagi Rabovsky;
• Representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine Nahman Steinenberg;
• General Director of the Breslov Center Michael Pinto;
• Deputy Mayor of Uman Oleg Ganis;
• Public figure of Uman Shlomi Elisha.

During the ceremony, words of gratitude were expressed for Brodsky’s activities throughout his tenure, especially during the war. The meeting concluded with wishes of success to the diplomat and hope for further strengthening of relations between Israel, the Jews of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people.

What Brodsky was gifted and why

In a photo from the ceremony, it is seen that representatives of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ presented Michael Brodsky with a silver model of an emergency medical vehicle encased in a transparent case, as well as a certificate of appreciation.

The certificate in Hebrew bears the diplomat’s name and reads:

“To Michael Brodsky — with gratitude and appreciation.”

The model of the vehicle symbolizes the work of ‘Ichud Hatzalah’ — the Israeli volunteer emergency medical service. Its representatives, Matityahu Shapira and Naftali Rabinovich, were among the official participants of the ceremony.

During the pilgrimage on Rosh Hashanah in Uman, tens of thousands of people are present simultaneously. Therefore, rescuers set up medical points, provide first aid, are on duty near prayer complexes, and interact with Ukrainian emergency services.

The original message does not state that the award is related to a specific rescue operation. Therefore, it is more accurate to explain it as a symbol of the long-term cooperation of the Israeli embassy with medical and rescue structures serving Israeli pilgrims.

Five years of Michael Brodsky in Ukraine

Michael Brodsky began his duties as the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in August 2021.

On October 1, 2021, he presented his credentials to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. The meeting discussed bilateral relations, cooperation between Israel and Ukraine, the preservation of historical memory, and issues of Jewish life.

Brodsky was born on August 19, 1972. He graduated from Tel Aviv University with a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in diplomacy and national security.

From 2003 to 2006, he worked as the press attaché of the Israeli embassy in Moscow, and from 2006 to 2008, he was a political advisor there. From 2009 to 2013, he headed the public diplomacy direction at the Israeli embassy in the United Kingdom.

From 2015 to 2018, Brodsky was the Israeli ambassador to Kazakhstan and a non-resident ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, and from 2019 to 2021, he served as the director of the First Eurasian Department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

February 24, 2022: the embassy’s work turned into evacuation

Most of Brodsky’s tenure coincided with the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.

The embassy was moved from Kyiv to Lviv a few days before the invasion. After February 24, 2022, the diplomats relocated to Poland and for several months operated essentially as an ’embassy in exile’.

According to Brodsky himself, at the start of the war, more than 10,000 Israeli citizens remained in Ukraine. Diplomats opened a hotline, received calls around the clock, and helped people leave by buses and cars through Ukraine’s western borders.

On March 4, 2022, Michael Brodsky was involved in a car accident in Poland on his way to Warsaw. He sustained minor injuries and was taken to Israel for treatment. Temporary leadership of the diplomatic work was assumed by Simona Galperin, who then headed the Eurasian direction of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After treatment, Brodsky returned to work.

On May 17, 2022, he arrived in Kyiv and raised the Israeli flag near the embassy building. Together with Deputy Yoav Bistritzky, he led the first group of Israeli diplomats to return to the Ukrainian capital after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Why the ceremony was held in Uman

Uman is one of the most challenging areas of work for the Israeli embassy in Ukraine.

Every year on Rosh Hashanah, tens of thousands of Jews, many of whom hold Israeli citizenship, come to the city. They head to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

After the closure of Ukrainian airspace in February 2022, pilgrims have to travel through Moldova, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and other neighboring countries.

The Israeli embassy has to coordinate work with the Ukrainian government, the State Border Guard Service, the National Police, the authorities of the Cherkasy region, the Uman municipality, and transit countries.

On July 22, 2022, Brodsky urged Israelis to refrain from traveling to Uman. He warned that Ukraine is at war, and the embassy would not be able to guarantee the safety of pilgrims or provide full consular assistance in the event of a large-scale emergency.

Despite the warnings, the pilgrimage continued.

On September 9–10, 2023, Brodsky held talks with the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Israel and Ukraine agreed on measures to facilitate the entry of tens of thousands of pilgrims through the borders of neighboring countries.

On September 14, 2023, Ukrainian authorities reported the round-the-clock operation of seven police posts in places of mass gathering of pilgrims. About 30,000 guests were expected in Uman, and Israeli police assisted Ukrainian law enforcement.

At the end of September 2024, Brodsky reported the arrival of another group of Israeli police in Uman. According to him, more than 30,000 pilgrims were expected, although the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs again recommended citizens refrain from traveling to the warring country.

Following the pilgrimage on October 2–4, 2024, Ukrainian officials reported that about 35,000 people arrived in Uman.

This is why the Breslov Center viewed Brodsky not just as an ambassador in Kyiv, but as the main official intermediary between Israel, the Ukrainian authorities, and tens of thousands of pilgrims.

Who are the Breslov Hasidim

Breslov, or Breslov Hasidim, are followers of the teachings of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov.

Rabbi Nachman was born in 1772 in Medzhybizh and was the great-grandson of the Baal Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism.

In September 1802, he moved to Breslov, a town in modern-day Vinnytsia region. The name of the movement comes from the name of Breslov. It should not be confused with Bratislava or the Polish Wrocław.

At the center of Rabbi Nachman’s teachings are personal prayer, spiritual joy, overcoming despair, and belief in a person’s ability to change their life.

One of the most well-known practices is hitbodedut — a solitary conversation with God in one’s own words.

Rabbi Nachman did not create a hereditary dynasty or appoint a successor. His closest disciple, Reb Natan Sternhartz of Nemirov, recorded and published the teachings of his mentor, supported the communities, and effectively led the movement, but did not proclaim himself the new rebbe.

Therefore, Breslov Hasidim still do not have a single supreme contemporary leader. There are different rabbis, communities, yeshivas, and organizations that recognize the spiritual authority of Rabbi Nachman.

Why they go to Uman

In the spring of 1810, the seriously ill Rabbi Nachman moved to Uman.

He spent the last months of his life there, addressed his followers on Rosh Hashanah 1810, and died on October 16, 1810, at the age of 38. He was buried in the old Jewish cemetery of Uman.

In the spring of 1811, Reb Natan organized an annual gathering of followers in Uman. Thus, the tradition of celebrating Rosh Hashanah near Rabbi Nachman’s grave began. In 1834, Reb Natan built a large synagogue for the gathering participants.

During the Soviet era, the pilgrimage was banned or conducted underground. Mass trips began to revive in the late 1980s and especially after Ukraine regained independence in 1991.

However, not every person who comes to Uman today is a Breslov Hasid in the strict sense. Among the guests are representatives of other religious directions, traditional Israelis, people who have returned to religious life, public figures, and those who perceive the trip as a one-time spiritual journey. Breslov sources also note that a significant portion of the pilgrims do not belong to the core of the movement.

Where they live and where they travel besides Uman

Most modern Breslov Hasidim do not live in Ukraine but in Israel.

The main communities and institutions operate in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, Safed, and Yavneel. In Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, there are several thousand families that form the core of the movement. Synagogues, yeshivas, rabbinical educational institutions, and charitable foundations operate there.

Breslov centers and communities also exist in New York, Los Angeles, Lakewood, Montreal, London, and Paris. However, they do not have a single administrative structure that governs all the communities worldwide.

Uman is the main pilgrimage site for Rosh Hashanah, but Breslov Hasidim also visit:

• Breslov, where Rabbi Nachman lived and taught;
• Nemirov, associated with Reb Natan;
• Medzhybizh, where Rabbi Nachman was born and the Baal Shem Tov is buried;
• Berdychiv and other historical centers of Jewish life in Ukraine;
• Safed, Tiberias, and Mount Meron in Israel.

What is the Breslov Center in Uman

The Breslov Center in Uman, which hosted the ceremony in honor of Michael Brodsky, is a local religious, public, and coordination structure working with the Breslov community, pilgrims, Ukrainian authorities, and official representatives of Israel.

The origins of the organized activities of the center are linked to the work of Rabbi Yechiel Michel Dorfman. After leaving the USSR in 1969, he began preserving Rabbi Nachman’s grave, developing pilgrimage infrastructure, and building a large kloyz and mikvahs in Uman. This work was later continued by his students and representatives of Breslov communities.

The Israeli association ‘World Breslov Center’ was officially registered on June 24, 2003. It participated in maintaining the religious infrastructure of Uman, organizing pilgrimages, and negotiating with Ukrainian authorities.

The current ‘Breslov Center in Uman’, headed by the city’s chief rabbi Yaakov Jan and represented by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg, has been actively operating since at least 2024. However, open sources do not confirm that it is the direct legal successor of the association registered in 2003.

It is not the worldwide headquarters of Breslov Hasidism and does not own all the infrastructure near Rabbi Nachman’s grave. The center mainly deals with public relations, negotiations with authorities, pilgrimage preparation, coordination with police, diplomats, medics, and rescue organizations.

Who leads the center

The center operates under the leadership of the chief rabbi of Uman, Yaakov Jan.

Michael Pinto is listed as the general director of the Breslov Center. He is involved in organizational, public, and external work.

Nahman Steinenberg, a representative of the World Zionist Organization in Ukraine, also participates in the leadership and organization of the center’s external contacts.

In July 2024, the Breslov Center organized the first official visit of Uman’s mayor, Iryna Pletneva, and her deputies to Israel.

The Ukrainian delegation met with Minister of Culture and Sports Miki Zohar, Minister of Religious Services Michael Malkieli, and Minister of Internal Affairs Moshe Arbel. They discussed Uman’s preparation for Rosh Hashanah, security, municipal cooperation, and the reception of tens of thousands of Israeli citizens. The visit was organized by Michael Pinto and Nahman Steinenberg.

Where the center is located and what is in the quarter

The center’s work is concentrated in the area of the Jewish pilgrimage quarter around Rabbi Nachman’s grave.

Officially, the grave is located at: Uman, Hryhoriya Kosynky Street, 1.

On July 2, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine elevated the status of the site and recognized Rabbi Nachman’s grave as a monument of national historical significance. Before that, it had the status of a local significance monument.

However, a confirmed separate postal address for the administration of the Breslov Center itself is not specified in open publications. The center is better perceived as a coordination organization rather than just a single building.

In the pilgrimage quarter, there are:

• Rabbi Nachman’s grave;
• Synagogues and prayer halls;
• A large Breslov kloyz — a house of prayer and study;
• Mikvahs for religious purification;
• Hotels, apartments, and hospitality houses;
• kosher kitchens and dining rooms;
• medical points;
• charitable organizations;
• bookstores and centers for the distribution of religious literature.

However, all this does not belong to one structure.

The complex directly near the grave is managed by a separate organization — “Ihud Breslov in Uman”, or Breslov Union.

On August 25, 2025, this organization announced a project to reconstruct the complex costing more than two million dollars. The plan includes separate prayer halls for Ashkenazi and Sephardic rites, a women’s section, a dance hall, new sanitary facilities, and rest areas.

According to the organizers, the annual maintenance of the complex exceeds 800 thousand dollars, and preparation for Rosh Hashanah alone costs more than 350 thousand dollars.

Thus, the “Breslov Center” Pinto and Jan is primarily engaged in public relations, coordination, and interaction with the authorities, while “Ihud Breslov” manages the grave complex itself. These are different structures, although they may cooperate.

How the center works before Rosh Hashanah

Before the annual pilgrimage, center representatives participate in negotiations on:

• border operations and transport routes;
• accommodation for tens of thousands of people;
• sanitary conditions;
• water and electricity supply;
• police and rescue operations;
• medical points;
• access to shelters;
• actions during air raids;
• consular assistance to Israeli citizens.

In 2024–2025, the center also interacted with “Ihud Hatzalah” in preparing medical units and volunteers for the mass arrival of pilgrims. Organization representatives named Yaakov Jan as one of the center’s leaders, Michael Pinto as the general director, and Nachman Steinenberg as the coordinator of relations with the authorities.

The center’s work is not limited to the pilgrimage.

On September 6, 2025, the Israeli international cooperation agency MASHAV announced the installation of a water purification system at the Central City Hospital in Uman. The project was implemented jointly with the Israeli embassy and is intended to provide clean drinking water to the hospital and residents of nearby areas.

Michael Brodsky personally opened the installation during a visit to Uman. Michael Pinto and Nachman Steinenberg also participated in the event.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that in this way, the center gradually transformed from a structure associated only with religious pilgrimage into a mediator between the Jewish community, the city of Uman, and Israeli governmental and public organizations.

How Brodsky was connected to the Breslov Center

Michael Brodsky did not publicly call himself a Breslov Hasid.

His connection with the center was diplomatic and practical.

Through the embassy, issues of entry for Israeli citizens, interaction with Ukrainian border guards, the arrival of Israeli police and medics, missile threat warnings, consular staff work, and contacts with the Uman municipality were resolved.

After the war began, these tasks became significantly more complicated. The pilgrimage effectively turned into an annual international operation involving the authorities of Ukraine, Israel, Moldova, and other transit countries.

Brodsky simultaneously warned citizens of the danger and continued negotiations, understanding that even after official recommendations, tens of thousands of people would still head to Uman.

That is why the Breslov Center organized a separate ceremony for him. For the center’s leadership, he was the main representative of Israel, with whom pilgrimage, security, medical, and humanitarian cooperation issues were resolved over five years.

The last weeks of the term and the new ambassador

Even before the ceremony in Uman, Michael Brodsky received official recognition from the Ukrainian capital.

On July 8, 2026, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko awarded him the “For the Defense of Kyiv” medal for supporting the Ukrainian capital during the war.

Klitschko thanked the diplomat for five years of service, open dialogue, partnership, and participation in joint projects. The parties discussed Israel’s assistance after the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

Brodsky, for his part, recalled the support Ukraine expressed to Israel after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

The name of Brodsky’s successor has been known since the end of 2025.

On November 23, 2025, the Israeli government approved the appointment of career diplomat Roi Rosenblit as the new ambassador to Ukraine. Previously, Rosenblit was Israel’s ambassador to Senegal, worked as deputy head of diplomatic missions in Moscow and Cairo, and represented Israel in the Pacific region countries.

The formal transfer of powers is completed after diplomatic procedures and the presentation of credentials by the new ambassador to the Ukrainian side.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency notes that Michael Brodsky’s term was one of the most challenging in the history of the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ukraine.

He arrived in Kyiv in August 2021, when relations between the two countries were developing peacefully. Already six months later, the embassy had to evacuate citizens, leave the Ukrainian capital, and work from Poland.

Brodsky returned to Kyiv on May 17, 2022, continued working under air raid alerts, coordinated humanitarian projects, and simultaneously was responsible for the safety of tens of thousands of Israelis who annually come to Uman.

The ceremony on July 20, 2026 was not just a farewell to the ambassador. It summed up five years of cooperation, during which diplomacy was associated not only with negotiations between governments but also with the evacuation of people, medicine, community work, and citizen safety during the war.

In the tenth part, we will analyze platforms that help small businesses in Israel tackle several tasks at once: business reputation, publications, simple pages, mini-sites, digital showcases, blog archives, and additional profiles in various online environments.

At first glance, such platforms may seem different and even random. XING is associated with professional contacts, Academia.edu with the academic environment, Tistory with blogs, BigCartel with online stores, Mobirise with simple sites, and My Mail.ru or Mlife.by with the old Russian-speaking social environment. But for promoting small businesses, they can serve one common function: enhancing the brand’s digital footprint.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how different external pages can work around one central idea.

The project itself is related to Israel news, Ukraine topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. For small businesses, the principle is the same: each platform should help the client understand who you are, how you are useful, where the main site is, and why you can be trusted.

XING Page: business page for the European professional audience

XING is a professional social network founded in 2003 and particularly notable in the German-speaking region: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. In its role, XING is similar to LinkedIn but historically more closely connected to the DACH market, business contacts, careers, companies, recruiting, and professional profiles.

Globally, XING lags behind LinkedIn, but in its regional niche, it remains a recognizable platform. It is used by specialists, entrepreneurs, consultants, companies, recruiters, B2B projects, and organizations that value business connections in Europe.

For small businesses in Israel, XING can be useful if the company works with European partners, German-speaking clients, tourists, investors, B2B services, medical tourism, real estate, technology, consulting, or international projects.

The page XING Page — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can function as a business page of the project in the professional European environment. For small businesses, this is an example of how a brand can be taken beyond local social networks and presented in a more business context.

Litsy: books, culture, and the reading community

Litsy is a social platform for readers, books, quotes, notes, book recommendations, and literary communication. It can be considered a niche environment for people who love to read, discuss books, share impressions, and find new texts.

In terms of market share, Litsy does not compete with large social networks or major book services. But its value lies in its thematic focus: the audience is initially closer to reading, culture, literature, author notes, and intellectual content.

For small businesses in Israel, Litsy may not be useful for everyone. But if the business is related to books, education, culture, history, media, language courses, publishing projects, or author content, such a platform can become an additional point of trust.

The profile Litsy — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as a cultural and reader point of the project. For NAnews, this is especially logical because part of the materials is related to historical memory, books, culture, and human stories.

Mlife.by: niche social environment and additional profile

Mlife.by is a niche social platform from the Russian-speaking internet environment. There is little open data about its large market share, so it should not be considered the main promotion channel. But for the brand’s digital map, such platforms can be useful as additional profiles and points of presence.

The main task of such platforms is not to replace Facebook, Telegram, LinkedIn, or Google, but to secure the brand in yet another environment. For businesses, this can be especially important if they work with Russian-speaking audiences, local communities, media projects, culture, or services for repatriates.

For small businesses in Israel, Mlife.by can be an additional page: company description, website link, brief information about activities, news, or publications. Even if the platform does not bring many transitions, it helps expand the overall digital footprint.

The profile Mlife.by — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work exactly like this: as another point of presence for the project in the Russian-speaking online environment.

My Mail.ru: old social ecosystem and Russian-speaking audience

My Mail.ru is part of the large Russian-speaking internet ecosystem Mail.ru, associated with profiles, photos, blogs, groups, comments, and social activity. The platform was particularly notable in the era of old social networks and can still hold significance for part of the Russian-speaking audience.

In terms of market share, My Mail.ru today is not the main competitor to modern social networks and messengers. But its value lies elsewhere: it can provide access to an audience accustomed to old Russian-speaking services, profiles, groups, and personal pages.

For small businesses in Israel, such a platform can make sense if the company works with Russian-speaking clients, older audiences, cultural projects, local services, or materials in Russian. It is not the main channel for applications, but an additional layer of trust.

The profile My Mail.ru — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional Russian-speaking page of the project.

Academia.edu: expertise, research, and intellectual context

Academia.edu is a platform for researchers, authors, teachers, students, and people who publish or read academic and analytical materials. It is not a social network in the usual sense but works as a professional environment for texts, research, profiles, and scientific interests.

In the market, Academia.edu is in the niche of academic networking and research sharing. It is used by university teachers, independent researchers, article authors, students, analysts, historians, cultural experts, and specialists who want to showcase the intellectual or research side of their work.

For small businesses in Israel, Academia.edu can be useful if the company is related to education, analytics, history, culture, research, law, international relations, media, or consulting. Such a profile helps show that the project works not only with advertising and short posts but also with more serious content.

The profile Academia.edu — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an intellectual point of the project, especially for materials on historical memory, Jewish-Ukrainian connections, culture, politics, and social processes.

JustPaste.it: quick publications, notes, and external pages

JustPaste.it is a simple platform for quickly publishing text, images, links, and notes. It is used when you need to quickly create a page without complex registration, design, or technical setup. Essentially, it is a tool for quick publications and external text materials.

In terms of market share, JustPaste.it cannot be compared to Medium, WordPress, or Substack. Its task is different: to quickly publish material, share text, create a temporary or permanent page, place a project description, instruction, link collection, or information block.

For small businesses in Israel, JustPaste.it can be useful as an additional publication platform. For example, you can place a service description, FAQ, press release, brief presentation, client instruction, temporary event page, or link list.

The page JustPaste.it — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a simple external archive of project materials.

Tistory: blog platform and additional publication channel

Tistory is a blog platform from the Korean internet environment, suitable for publishing articles, notes, reviews, personal blogs, and thematic materials. It is not a global giant like WordPress or Medium but remains a notable blog platform in its niche.

For businesses, Tistory can be useful as an additional blog, especially if you need to create another external page with materials, project description, links to main language versions, articles, and context.

In promoting small businesses, such blogs are important not only because of direct traffic. They help search engines and people see that the brand is represented in different environments, knows how to publish explanations, and is not limited to one social page.

The blog Tistory — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional publication and project description channel.

DCMS: simple external page for the project

DCMS is a platform for creating a simple page or small site. Such tools are usually needed when a project requires quick external presence: brief description, links, sections, visual structure, and contact information.

In the mass market, DCMS should not be compared to Wix, WordPress, Webflow, or Tilda. Its role is more auxiliary: to provide another page that can be used as an entry into the project’s digital ecosystem.

For small businesses in Israel, such a page can be useful as an additional business card. For example, you can briefly tell about services, put a link to the main site, add language versions, explain the geography of work, and give a person a quick way to contact.

The page DCMS — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an external presentation point of the project.

BigCartel: small store and digital product showcase

BigCartel is a platform for small online stores, independent authors, artists, designers, brands, musicians, and projects that need a simple showcase for selling goods or digital materials. It has been operating since 2005 and has historically been popular among independent creators and small stores.

In the market, BigCartel does not compete with Shopify or WooCommerce in scale but occupies its niche: simple stores, small collections, author products, merch, art products, zines, digital publications, and independent projects.

For small businesses in Israel, BigCartel can be useful if there is a small assortment: books, guides, digital files, tickets, author products, merch, postcards, templates, consultations, or special publications. A large online store is not always needed — sometimes a simple showcase is enough.

The page BigCartel — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as a digital product showcase or project presentation. For businesses, this is an example of how content can be formatted not only as an article but also as a separate product.

Mobirise: offline builder and simple sites without complex CMS

Mobirise is a website builder that differs from many cloud platforms in that it works as an offline website builder. It is used to create simple sites, landing pages, portfolios, company pages, presentations, and small projects without programming.

In terms of market share, Mobirise is not the main competitor to WordPress, Wix, or Shopify. But it has its niche: users who need a visual builder, control over files, simple structure, and the ability to build a site without constant work in a large online CMS.

For small businesses in Israel, Mobirise can be useful as a tool for quick landing pages. For example, you can create a page for a separate service, event, project, promotion, language audience, or temporary campaign.

The page Mobirise — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as another external page of the project, enhancing the overall digital footprint.

How to use these platforms without chaos

The main mistake of small businesses is creating profiles and pages without a common logic. If a company has XING, Litsy, Mlife.by, My Mail.ru, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, and Mobirise, but nowhere has a proper description, link to the main site, and clear direction, the client will simply get lost.

Each platform should have its task.

• XING — professional reputation.
• Litsy — books and cultural audience.
• Mlife.by and My Mail.ru — Russian-speaking digital footprint.
• Academia.edu — expertise and research.
• JustPaste.it — quick publications.
• Tistory — blog.
• DCMS and Mobirise — simple external pages.
• BigCartel — showcase of digital products or small goods.

For businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is diverse. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English, a fourth in Ukrainian. One wants to see a business profile, another a blog, a third a store page, a fourth a short description and a link to the main site.

Why this is important for small businesses in Israel

The Israeli market is fast and practical. A client can check the site, social networks, reviews, map, profile, publications, and the brand’s external footprint in a few minutes. If they see empty pages and random names, trust decreases. If they see a neat system, the likelihood of engagement increases.

Additional platforms do not replace the main site but help it work stronger. They create more entry points, expand visibility, show different audiences different sides of the business, and help a person be convinced that the company is real, active, and understandable.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even diverse platforms can lead to one logic. A reader can find the project through XING, Litsy, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, or Mobirise, but everywhere they should understand: this is one project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real engagements: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site transitions, and clients from the desired city or region.

The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the tenth part: XING Page, Litsy, Mlife.by, My Mail.ru, Academia.edu, JustPaste.it, Tistory, DCMS, BigCartel, and Mobirise help small businesses in Israel expand their digital footprint, showcase expertise, publish materials, create simple pages, and design digital showcases. This is not a replacement for the main site, but an additional system of trust around it.

US President Donald Trump faced a choice that could determine the further course of the war with Iran and change the situation throughout the Middle East. American and Israeli officials believe that Washington has two realistic paths left: agree to a ten-day ceasefire proposed by mediators or move with Israel to a significantly larger military campaign against Tehran.

A final decision has not yet been made in the White House. However, Axios sources claim that a choice may be made in the next few days. The possibility of continuing the current exhausting war without a clear political goal is diminishing: American airstrikes have failed to restore normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran continues to attack commercial ships and American facilities, and the region’s economy is suffering increasingly heavy losses.

At the same time, Washington is acting on two fronts. The Trump administration is considering a diplomatic proposal from Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and other mediators, but is simultaneously deploying dozens of combat aircraft and aerial refuelers to the region. Israeli sources report that the IDF is on high alert in case the war expands into a full-scale coordinated operation.

Two scenarios Trump is choosing between

The first option involves a temporary halt to hostilities for ten days. During this time, the US and Iran must restore movement through the Strait of Hormuz and attempt to salvage a temporary agreement previously reached but effectively destroyed after new attacks on commercial ships and the resumption of American strikes.

The second scenario is a transition to a large joint campaign by the US and Israel. According to Axios, this is not about isolated retaliatory strikes, but an attempt to inflict such military damage on Iran that the country’s leadership will accept American terms. However, neither the White House, the Pentagon, nor the Israeli government has officially announced a decision to start such an operation. Reports of campaign preparations are based on information from American and Israeli officials, some of whom speak on condition of anonymity.

Possible scenario	Main goal	Primary risk
Ten-day ceasefire	Open the Strait of Hormuz and return parties to negotiations	Iran and the US may use the pause to regroup, after which hostilities will resume
Joint US-Israel operation	Use military pressure to force Tehran to accept Washington’s terms	Expansion of the war to Israel, Gulf countries, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Red Sea
Continuation of the current campaign	Weaken Iran without sharply expanding the war	Protracted conflict, new losses, rising oil prices, and lack of clear results

American officials acknowledge that the space for a third option—a prolonged war of medium intensity—is practically disappearing. For ten consecutive nights, American planes have struck Iran, but Tehran has retained the ability to restrict movement through the Strait of Hormuz and attack ships.

For Trump, this is becoming not only a military but also a domestic political problem. He has repeatedly stated that the United States has achieved victory over Iran, but ongoing attacks, the death of American servicemen, and rising fuel prices contradict claims of a completed campaign.

What regional mediators propose

The proposal for a ten-day ceasefire was conveyed to Washington and Tehran by representatives of Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and other regional states. Reuters confirmed that Iran received the relevant document and is considering the possibility of a temporary halt to the war to restore the agreement reached in the previous month.

The plan provides for the cessation of attacks, the resumption of movement along two main routes of the Strait of Hormuz, and the start of negotiations on a long-term shipping order.

The southern route passes through the territorial waters of Oman. Under the proposed scheme, Iran must cease attacks on ships using this corridor. The northern route is closer to the Iranian coast. To open it, the US must ease or lift the naval blockade imposed against Iran.

Within ten days, the parties must agree on the rules for the further passage of commercial ships. One of the options being considered provides for allowing Iran to receive limited fees for specific services—security, environmental control, and navigational support.

This is fundamentally different from Tehran’s demands to charge a general fee for passage through the strait. As a possible model, mediators are considering the Strait of Malacca, where coastal states receive money for separate services but do not impose a transit fee. The creation of a joint fund with the participation of the International Maritime Organization is also being discussed.

Diplomatic efforts involve Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari envoy Ali Al-Tawadi, Pakistan’s army commander Field Marshal Asim Munir, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty, and Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi.

Why the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz is almost insoluble

The main contradiction is not just about shipping safety, but about who will actually control the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends.

Washington demands that Tehran publicly declare that the strait is open for international shipping and that commercial ships will no longer be attacked. The Iranian side, on the contrary, insists that the opening of the strait, its demining, and regulation of movement should be exclusively within Iran’s competence.

Iran’s representative to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, stated that attempts by external states to establish their own order of management of the strait would violate the temporary agreement and lead to further tension. Tehran also promotes the idea of charging passing ships, although for decades the Strait of Hormuz has been considered by the international community as a crucial international maritime route.

Before the war began, about one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas trade passed through Hormuz. After the effective halt of a significant portion of shipping, energy prices have sharply increased, and Gulf countries have begun seeking alternative export routes.

NANews — Israel News notes that the dispute over the strait has gradually turned into a struggle for the future security architecture of the entire Persian Gulf. If the US agrees to a special role for Iran, Tehran will be able to present this as recognition of its regional power. If Washington tries to completely deprive Iran of control, achieving this without a prolonged military operation will be extremely difficult.

Why the previous ceasefire collapsed

The United States and Iran have already reached temporary agreements. In April, Trump agreed to a two-week ceasefire, which was then extended. In June, the parties signed another preliminary agreement providing for the cessation of war and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, a permanent peace treaty was not concluded.

After new attacks on ships, Trump declared the previous ceasefire over, although he agreed to continue negotiations. The American side claimed that the attacks could have been organized by a radical group within the Iranian system, not fully controlled by the central leadership. For the White House, this explanation was not a reason to refrain from retaliatory strikes.

The situation highlights another problem: even if Iranian negotiators sign an agreement, Washington doubts that all regime structures, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, will comply with it.

Iranian Foreign Ministry representative Esmail Baghaei confirmed receiving new proposals through mediators but refused to disclose their content. At the same time, he stated that the Iranian armed forces would continue to respond to American strikes. Thus, Tehran has not yet demonstrated a willingness to cease fire without additional political and economic guarantees.

The US is building up forces, Israel is preparing for war expansion

Simultaneously with diplomatic negotiations, the United States is strengthening its military presence in the Middle East. According to Axios, dozens of fighters and refueling aircraft have been sent to the region. Reuters separately confirmed that the deployment of additional aviation forces began even before the latest Iranian attacks on American servicemen.

Refueling aircraft are of particular importance. They allow American fighters and bombers to stay in the air longer, strike targets deep within Iran’s territory, and conduct prolonged operations without the need to station all aviation directly near the combat zone.

The US Central Command stated that the latest series of strikes targeted Iran’s military command centers, naval forces, missile and drone launch positions, and air defense systems. The goal of the operation, Washington says, is to protect commercial shipping and punish the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units for attacks on American servicemen.

However, after ten consecutive nights of strikes, Iran retained the ability to attack ships. On July 21, Iranian forces struck a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, forcing the crew to abandon the ship. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for two more attacks on ships carried out the day before.

This poses an unpleasant question for the Trump administration: can an air campaign alone force Iran to relinquish control over the strait? So far, the results of the strikes show that destroying individual radars, launchers, and command posts does not guarantee the restoration of safe shipping.

US losses increase pressure on the White House

An additional factor has been the losses of the American army. As a result of Iranian attacks in Jordan, two American servicemen were killed, and another went missing. Separately, it was reported that a serviceman died in Iraq while defusing a munition left from a downed Iranian drone.

Since the resumption of American strikes on July 7, nearly 100 US servicemen have been injured. A Pentagon representative claims that most of the injured suffered mild concussions, and 96% have already returned to duty. Since the start of the war on February 28, 17 American military personnel have died.

Trump stated that for every American soldier killed, Iran will pay “many times more.” According to Axios, the advancement of the truce project slowed down precisely after the strike on Americans in Jordan. One official reported that the president has not yet completed retaliatory actions and may continue strikes before returning to serious discussions of a ceasefire.

For Israel, the situation means the need to prepare for several options at once. If Washington chooses negotiations, the Israeli leadership will try to secure guarantees that the truce will not allow Iran to restore its military infrastructure. If Trump decides to expand the operation, Israel may become a full participant in the new campaign and simultaneously the main target for retaliatory Iranian missile and drone strikes.

Axios sources claim that the IDF is on high combat readiness and can transition to a full-scale coordinated campaign within a few days. However, there is no official announcement of the start of such an operation.

The war could engulf the entire region

The risk of conflict expansion is not limited to Israel and the Persian Gulf. Yemeni Houthis have declared a naval blockade of Saudi ports and threatened to attack ships in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait area, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.

This creates a threat of simultaneous disruption of movement on two of the world’s most important energy routes. The Strait of Hormuz provides the exit of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf, while Bab-el-Mandeb is used by ships heading through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia has begun to use the oil pipeline to the Red Sea coast more actively to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthi threat puts pressure on this alternative route as well. Saudi military officials stated that they intend to ensure freedom of navigation and will consider attacks on ships as acts of maritime piracy.

Iran has also struck states where American forces are stationed. Reports have been made of attacks against facilities or airspace in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Jordanian military officials reported on July 21 about intercepting five Iranian drones.

Thus, the new phase of the war could quickly spread to countries that formally do not seek to become participants in the conflict but provide the US with military bases, airspace, or logistical infrastructure.

The economic cost of a protracted war

Military escalation is already affecting global energy markets. On July 21, the price of Brent oil remained above $88 per barrel, and earlier briefly exceeded $90. The average gasoline price in the US reached about four dollars per gallon.

The rise in fuel costs creates additional pressure on Trump ahead of the midterm elections in Congress. The president built his political position on the promise not to drag the US into prolonged Middle Eastern wars, but the conflict with Iran is becoming increasingly large-scale, expensive, and difficult to end.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes that the economic factor may be as important as the military one. Even if American strikes continue to destroy Iranian infrastructure, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will harm US allies, global markets, and American consumers themselves.

A decision has not yet been made, but time is running out

Currently, the existence of a proposal for a ten-day ceasefire, the diplomatic activity of Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and Oman, the deployment of American aviation, and Israel’s heightened readiness have been confirmed.

However, the assertion that Trump has already chosen a large-scale joint operation with Israel is premature. The White House continues to explore the diplomatic option and urges the Israeli leadership not to take actions that could completely close the window for negotiations. Simultaneously, the US is demonstrating to Tehran that it is ready to move to a much heavier military campaign if mediation efforts fail.

In the coming days, three key signals are possible. The first will be the official agreement of Iran and the US to a ceasefire. The second will be a real reduction in the number of attacks on commercial ships and American facilities. The third will be the further deployment of aviation and Israel’s transition from heightened readiness to open strikes.

The main problem is that the parties are trying to improve their positions directly before possible negotiations. The US continues bombings, trying to force Iran to make concessions. Tehran attacks ships and military facilities, showing that air pressure cannot deprive it of influence over the Strait of Hormuz.

That is why the ten-day pause could become either the first step towards ending the war or a short respite before its most dangerous phase. If diplomacy fails, Trump may face the necessity to fulfill threats and move to a campaign whose consequences will affect not only Iran and Israel but the entire Middle East.

“Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” continues its project about famous Israelis of Ukrainian origin – Natan Sharansky.

Today, Natan Sharansky remains a good friend of Ukrainians at the level of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Israel. His clear stance on international support for Ukraine after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion became a call for the Israeli government to decisively condemn the attack on Ukraine. Natan Sharansky firmly emphasized that Israel must unwaveringly stand on the side of the Ukrainians.

Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky (b. 1948) is one of the most prominent human rights activists, a well-known Israeli political figure of Ukrainian-Jewish origin.

In addition, he actively participated in the Jewish movement in the USSR, demonstrations, and protests. In 1977, Natan Sharansky was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation, and the following year he was sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of espionage for the USA.

Only thanks to numerous petitions from influential world politicians and demonstrations in 1986, through an agreement between the USSR and the USA, Natan Sharansky was freed from the repressive grip: he was exchanged for one of the Soviet spies arrested in the West. Immediately after the exchange, Natan was honorably received by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yitzhak Shamir.

In the same year, Sharansky founded the public organization “Zionist Forum,” which aimed to unite repatriates from the Soviet Union, and already in 1995, he started the political party “Israel for Aliyah.” In Israel, Natan Sharansky continued his active human rights activities, gaining experience as a recognized, influential Israeli politician. He was a member of the Knesset for a long period and also had experience working as a minister and deputy prime minister in the Israeli governments, chaired the executive council of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the supervisory board of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center.

In January 2023, Natan Sharansky turned 75 years old. He dedicated almost his entire conscious life to active human rights struggle, the protection of human rights, political activity, as well as the development of close diplomatic and interethnic ties between Israel and Ukraine.