Israel News

Many Russian-speaking Israelis hear the word “pension” and immediately think of Bituach Leumi. This is understandable: it is the state old-age benefit that is most often discussed in families, social groups, and conversations with those who have already gone through the paperwork. But in Israel, “pension” is not always the same payment, and confusion between Bituach Leumi and the pension fund can cost a person money, time, and peace of mind.

One person is waiting for the old-age benefit and thinks that until then, nothing needs to be done with the pension fund. Another is sure that if he has pension savings through work, then Bituach Leumi is no longer so important. A third continues to work after 60 and does not even know that the pension fund in some cases should be checked separately — even before the official age for receiving benefits from Bituach Leumi.

In practice, these are two different systems.

1. Bituach Leumi — the state part.
2. Pension fund — savings accumulated through work.

They may meet in one family budget, but they do not replace each other and are not automatically processed by one action.

We have covered this topic in detail in a separate material:

Are you 60+ in Israel and still working? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money – https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

Bituach Leumi: state old-age benefit

Bituach Leumi is Israel’s national insurance system. The old-age benefit is paid not because a person has a pension fund, but because they meet the conditions of the state system: age, insurance record, resident status, income in a certain period, and other criteria.

It is important to understand: the old-age benefit does not always start being paid automatically. To receive it, you need to apply to Bituach Leumi, and the right to payment at retirement age may depend on an income check. If a person does not pass such an income check, the right to the full benefit usually comes at age 70.

For men, the retirement age in Israel is usually 67, and for women, it depends on the date of birth and gradually ranges from 62 to 65. But it is important not to confuse “retirement age” with “age that gives the right to an old-age benefit without an income check.” These are different points in the system, and because of this, many people incorrectly assess when and what money they will be able to receive.

Why the benefit from Bituach Leumi is not the entire pension

The old-age benefit can be an important part of income, especially for people with small savings or incomplete work records. But it does not show the entire pension picture. A person may have pension funds, old programs from previous employers, Bituach Menahalim, Kupat Gemel, Keren Hishtalmut, pitzuyim, and other savings that need to be checked separately.

If a person looks only at Bituach Leumi, they see only the state part. They may not know where their savings are, what commissions they pay, what happens with pitzuyim, and what monthly payment they can receive from the pension fund. As a result, the family plans the future budget based on one figure, although the real picture may be broader — or, conversely, weaker than it seems.

For Russian-speaking Israelis, this is a particularly sensitive topic. Many are accustomed to the idea that a pension is primarily a state payment. But in Israel, a working person forms a separate pension capital over the years, and this capital requires attention even before a letter arrives from Bituach Leumi.

Pension fund: savings through work

Pension fund is not the same as Bituach Leumi. These are the funds created through employment relationships: part was withheld from the salary, part was transferred by the employer. In the payslip, these amounts may look like familiar lines, but behind them stands the future income of a person after stopping work.

The size of the future payment depends not only on how much money is accumulated. Commissions, the pension route, the age of starting payments, pitzuyim, tax decisions, and family conditions that a person chooses before starting to receive a pension are important. Sometimes even a small misunderstanding of documents leads to a person making a decision “by eye,” although the consequences will affect them for many years.

In some pension funds, you can start receiving payments from the age of 60. This does not cancel the rules of Bituach Leumi and does not mean that everyone needs to urgently start receiving money, but it shows an important thing: the pension fund should be checked separately, not waiting for the age of the state benefit.

Why people over 60 may miss an opportunity

A separate situation arises for people 60+, who continue to work. They receive a salary, see pension deductions, but often believe that until dismissal or official retirement age, “the pension fund is still not touched.” Sometimes this is true, sometimes not — that is why a check is needed.

If you are already 60+ and continue to work, it is worth separately checking whether the pension fund can already give a monthly payment and how it will affect the future. We have covered this topic in detail in a separate article:

We have covered this topic in detail in a separate material:

Are you 60+ in Israel and still working? Perhaps the pension fund can already pay you money – https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

It is important here not to create false expectations. The possibility of receiving payments from the pension fund after 60 is not a universal recommendation. For one person, it may increase the current family income, while for another, it may reduce future pension, change the tax picture, or affect payments to a spouse.

Where the most expensive confusion arises

The first mistake is to think that Bituach Leumi will show the entire pension picture. It does not. Bituach Leumi is responsible for the state benefit but does not collect all pension funds for a person, does not check commissions, does not evaluate pitzuyim, and does not explain whether it is beneficial to start payments from the pension fund now.

The second mistake is to think that the pension fund will automatically solve everything when a person “reaches the age.” In practice, a person needs to understand where the money is, which programs are active, which old funds may have remained from previous employers, and what documents will be needed before starting payments.

The third mistake is to look at the pension only as a matter of age. In Israel, age is important, but it is not the only factor. Income, insurance record, work after 60, pitzuyim, taxes, and marital status can change the picture. Even at the same age, two people can get different answers.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency writes about this topic precisely because for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel, the pension system often looks like a set of disparate words: Bituach Leumi, ktsvat zikna, pension fund, pitzuyim, tlush, old programs, taxes. But behind these words are real family money, and they cannot be put together “by eye.”

What needs to be checked separately

Before retiring or after 60, it is important to understand whether a person has the right to a benefit from Bituach Leumi, when it can start, and whether it depends on an income check. But at the same time, it is necessary to separately check pension savings: in which funds they are located, how much money is there, what commissions are withheld, and what the forecast of the monthly payment is.

You need to see what is happening with pitzuyim. This money cannot be perceived simply as an amount that can be withdrawn without consequences. In some situations, pitzuyim are related to future pensions, taxes, and the size of the monthly payment.

It is also worth checking if there are old funds from previous employers. For people who have worked in Israel for many years, changed jobs, or were self-employed for part of their lives, the pension history may be scattered across several programs.

Why you need to see the whole picture first

The pension decision should not start with the phrase “I was told.” It should start with documents, calculation, and understanding. Where is the state part? Where is the savings part? What can already be received? What is better not to touch? What will happen with taxes? What decision will protect not only the person themselves but also their family?

Sometimes a check shows that with Bituach Leumi you need to wait, but the pension fund should already be studied. Sometimes the opposite: a person should deal with the state benefit, and pension payments from the fund are better not to start yet. Sometimes the main thing is not to touch pitzuyim. Sometimes it is to find old savings that the family did not even know about.

Therefore, the most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision here:

Pension in Israel is not a single payment and not a single age. It is several systems that need to be put together into one understandable map before signing documents or postponing the decision “for later.”

The most sensible first step is not to guess, but to check.

Read in detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, pitzuyim, and important checks before making a decision and get competent advice – here: https://pension.nikk.co.il/

Russia may be preparing a new large-scale mobilization after the September elections to the State Duma. According to the Ukrainian side, it could involve at least 500,000 people, some of whom the Russian command plans to send to the most difficult sections of the front with almost no preparation.

There is no official decree on new mobilization yet. The Kremlin publicly avoids this topic, and Russian officials continue to claim that the army’s needs are supposedly covered by contract soldiers. However, growing losses, a decrease in voluntary enlistment, and the prepared system of electronic summonses indicate that the ability to continue the war by previous methods is gradually being exhausted.

The most dangerous period may begin after the voting scheduled for September 18–20, 2026. The main day of the State Duma elections will be September 20, but the Russian Central Election Commission decided to hold the voting for three consecutive days.

Why mobilization is expected in the fall

On July 18, Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, reported on the possible mobilization of at least 500,000 people.

According to his information, part of the mobilized may be sent to the front by the Russian command within the first two weeks. These people are intended to be used for urgent replenishment of units that have suffered significant losses in eastern Ukraine. Another part may be prepared for about a month to strengthen existing groups or form forces in a new direction.

However, the figure of 500,000 remains an estimate by the Ukrainian side. It is not confirmed by a published Russian document or an officially announced mobilization plan. Therefore, it is premature to talk about the inevitable conscription of exactly this number of people.

However, the likelihood of a new wave of mobilization is recognized not only by the Center for Countering Disinformation.

Andrey Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, stated that the Kremlin will avoid any discussions about mobilization as much as possible before the elections. It is not advantageous for the Russian authorities to inform the population about mass conscription in advance, as this may cause fear, discontent, and a new wave of attempts to leave the country.

According to the GUR, the likelihood of such a decision being made after the elections remains. The Russian army does not need to build a large number of new training centers: existing ranges and military infrastructure are sufficient for the mass reception of recruits, especially if it involves shortened training.

The political logic of the Kremlin in this case is quite clear. Until September 20, Putin is interested in maintaining at least an external sense of stability. After the voting is completed, the need to consider the mood of voters will significantly decrease, and the next federal campaign will not create immediate restrictions.

That is why the elections may become a kind of starting point for a new stage of the war.

Why Russia needs another 500,000 people

The main reason is the huge losses of the Russian army, which are increasingly difficult to compensate with money and the recruitment of contract soldiers.

According to the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, from February 2022 to June 2026, Russian troops may have lost about 1.4 million people killed, wounded, and missing. Researchers estimate the number of dead at 400,000–450,000 people.

In 2026, Russian losses exceeded 30,000 people per month, while the average recruitment of new servicemen was estimated at about 27,000 people. Thus, even with the maintenance of an expensive payment system, Moscow does not have time to fully compensate for the outgoing personnel.

Separate studies based on data from the Russian Ministry of Finance indicate that in the first quarter of 2026, the rate of recruitment of contract soldiers decreased by approximately 20% compared to the same period in 2025. Independent Russian publications also reported that the issue of new mobilization is being discussed at various levels of government, although a final decision is allegedly not yet made.

Until recently, the Kremlin tried to buy people for the war. Regional authorities increased one-time payments, conducted aggressive advertising campaigns, and increased pressure on debtors, prisoners, migrants, and residents of economically disadvantaged regions.

But the financial resource has a limit. The fewer people willing to voluntarily go to the front, the higher the cost of a new contract soldier must become. At the same time, Russian regions face budget problems, a shortage of workers, and the need to pay compensation to the families of the deceased.

NAnews — Israel News notes that potential mobilization does not necessarily mean the creation of a new army of 500,000 people. The Kremlin may stretch the draft over several months, conduct it by regions, and call what is happening “additional staffing,” “military gatherings,” or an expansion of contract recruitment.

For the Russian system, it is important not only to get people but also to hide the scale of the operation as much as possible.

Where the mobilized may be sent

It is most likely that the first groups will be sent not to a completely new direction, but to already existing Russian units in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The Russian army continues to use small infantry groups that try to penetrate between Ukrainian positions, identify firing points, and gradually deplete the defense. Such actions are supported by FPV drones, artillery, guided aerial bombs, and reconnaissance drones.

This tactic allows for constant pressure but requires a huge amount of infantry. Poorly trained assault groups suffer high losses, after which they need to be regularly replenished.

CSIS notes that in the first half of 2026, Russian offensive actions on a number of key directions advanced extremely slowly — on average, tens of meters per day. Researchers associate high losses with the Russian strategy of attrition warfare, poor training, ineffective interaction of different branches of the military, and the use of soldiers to identify Ukrainian positions.

Therefore, the main directions for the use of the mobilized may be:

• Donetsk region and areas around the Ukrainian defensive belt;
• Zaporizhzhia direction;
• the border of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions;
• northeast Ukraine;
• formation of reserves for a possible new offensive;
• protection of rear facilities and occupied territories, allowing more prepared units to be freed up.

It cannot be ruled out that an attempt may be made to create a threat in a new direction. But for a large-scale offensive operation, the mobilized alone are not enough. Equipment, ammunition, transport, commanders, engineering units, communication means, field hospitals, and months of preparation are needed.

If people are indeed sent to the front line two weeks after the draft, this will primarily mean an attempt to quickly cover losses, rather than creating a qualitatively new strike force.

What is known about the threat from Belarus

Special attention is paid to the northern direction and the possible use of Belarusian territory.

As of mid-July, Ukrainian military intelligence did not observe signs of the formation of a new Russian strike force there. GUR representative Andrey Chernyak spoke of about 50,000 Belarusian army servicemen and Russian support units, but no threatening concentration of Russian forces was recorded.

At the same time, Russia is capable of transferring additional troops to Belarus within a few weeks. Therefore, the absence of a large grouping today does not mean that it cannot appear later.

The northern direction can be used not only for a real offensive. Even a demonstrative transfer of troops will force Ukraine to hold additional forces near the border, strengthen the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, and divert reserves from the eastern front.

For the Kremlin, this may already be an independent military goal.

Does mobilization mean preparation for an attack on NATO

In the Ukrainian and European information space, the possibility is also being discussed that the new Russian mobilization will be connected not only with the war against Ukraine but also with preparations for provocations against the Baltic countries or Poland.

Such a threat cannot be completely ruled out, but there is no direct evidence yet that the supposed 500,000 people are intended for an attack on NATO.

A large-scale war against the Alliance would require Russia to deploy a large grouping, move aviation, air defense systems, warehouses, field hospitals, engineering equipment, and command posts. Such preparations are difficult to completely hide from satellite and electronic intelligence.

In the short term, hybrid operations remain more likely: sabotage, cyberattacks, airspace violations, border provocations, strikes on critical infrastructure, and attempts to test how quickly and coherently NATO countries are ready to respond.

The Alliance has already significantly strengthened the eastern flank. As of June 2026, NATO multinational battle groups are deployed in nine countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

In addition, NATO is developing air and missile defense, round-the-clock airspace patrols, protection of underwater infrastructure, and a system for the rapid transfer of reinforcements. In September 2025, the Alliance launched a multi-level operation Eastern Sentry, strengthening the eastern direction with fighters, helicopters, surveillance aircraft, ships, and air defense systems.

For Russia, this means that even a limited military provocation against Poland or the Baltic countries carries the risk of unpredictable escalation.

How Ukraine can respond to new Russian mobilization

Ukraine cannot prevent the Kremlin from announcing a draft, but it can make the use of the mobilized as costly and ineffective as possible.

This primarily involves strengthening defense, expanding drone production, saturating the front with reconnaissance means, striking Russian training centers, warehouses, railway hubs, headquarters, and troop concentration sites.

It is equally important to destroy Russian reserves before they reach the front line. The longer the path from the military enlistment office to the front and the more problems arise with preparation, transport, and supply, the less military value the mass draft has.

The experience of recent years has shown that numerical superiority alone does not guarantee a rapid offensive. On a drone-saturated battlefield, large concentrations of people and equipment become noticeable targets. Poorly trained infantry without stable communication, engineering support, and competent command can increase pressure but simultaneously sharply increase the losses of the attacking side.

At the same time, 500,000 potential recruits should not be underestimated. Even low-quality training can be partially compensated by quantity, especially if Russia uses people in waves, trying to constantly deplete Ukrainian units.

NAnews — Israel News notes that for Ukraine, the key will be not only the availability of its own reserves but also the stability of Western supplies: ammunition, air defense systems, electronic warfare means, long-range weapons, equipment, and components for drone production.

Russia’s mobilization resource can be stopped not by one decision, but by a combination of defense, technology, intelligence, strikes on logistics, and political pressure on the Kremlin.

Why mobilization is dangerous for Russia itself

A new wave of conscription will be a serious internal test for the Russian regime.

The first “partial mobilization” was announced on September 21, 2022. At that time, the Russian authorities announced the conscription of 300,000 people. The decision caused queues at the borders, a sharp rise in air ticket prices, and a mass departure of men.

Since then, the Kremlin has significantly expanded control capabilities. Electronic registers have been created, electronic summonses and restrictions for citizens trying to evade appearance have been introduced.

This reduces the likelihood of a mass escape on the previous scale but does not eliminate the economic consequences. The conscription of hundreds of thousands of men will exacerbate the labor shortage, increase the burden on regional budgets, and create new obligations for payments to the military and the families of the deceased.

In addition, mobilization destroys one of the main unspoken principles on which Putin built the Russian society’s attitude towards the war: the state conducts military operations, but most residents of large cities can continue their usual lives.

As long as mainly contract soldiers, prisoners, residents of poor regions, and people attracted by high payments were sent to the front, a significant part of Russian society perceived the war as a distant television event.

Mass forced conscription can bring the war directly into Russian families.

Main points

As of July 21, 2026, the decision to mobilize 500,000 people has not been officially announced. This figure is based on information from Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, and media reports about discussions within the Russian government.

However, the prerequisites for such a decision do exist. Russia is suffering losses that may exceed the current rate of contract recruitment. At the same time, elections to the State Duma are approaching, after which political risks for the Kremlin will temporarily decrease.

The most likely goal of the new mobilization will be to continue the war of attrition against Ukraine: replenishing battered units, creating reserves, and increasing pressure on the eastern and southern directions.

A full-scale attack on NATO does not yet seem to be the main scenario, but the increase in the size of the Russian army could raise the threat of hybrid provocations and force the Alliance to further strengthen the eastern flank.

Autumn and winter 2026 may become a new difficult stage of the war. And the main question is not only whether Putin will announce mobilization, but whether Ukraine and its partners will have time to prepare for the appearance of hundreds of thousands of new soldiers in Russia.

The Israeli government unanimously recognized the Armenian genocide, but parliamentary approval did not occur. According to Haaretz and Maariv, Azerbaijan engaged in direct contacts with Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and influenced ultra-Orthodox parties.

On June 28, 2026, the Israeli government unanimously supported Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s proposal for the official recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Sa’ar called this step a moral and historical duty of the Jewish state, but less than a month later, it became clear that the decision could not be secured by a Knesset vote.

The issue was removed from the parliamentary agenda twice, after which the vote ultimately did not take place. Israeli media link this not to a usual lack of time, but to active pressure from Azerbaijan — one of Israel’s most important strategic, energy, and military partners.

Publications by Haaretz and Maariv reveal two parallel channels of influence on the Israeli leadership. The first went through the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the second through deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, without whose support the government could not guarantee a majority in the Knesset.

What exactly did the Israeli cabinet decide

At the meeting on June 28, the Israeli government unanimously recognized the mass extermination of the Armenian people as genocide. Materials prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that systematic persecution began on April 24, 1915, with the arrests of representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia, clergy, and social elite in Constantinople.

After the destruction or deportation of the Armenian community leaders, the Ottoman authorities began mass expulsion of the population. Men were separated from their families, sent to forced labor, and killed, while women, children, and the elderly were driven towards the Syrian desert, where many died from hunger, thirst, disease, and violence.

According to the most common historical estimates, about 1.5 million Armenians became victims of this policy. Gideon Sa’ar stated that Israel must call what happened by its name, as the Jewish people cannot demand recognition of their own tragedy while simultaneously avoiding recognition of crimes against other peoples.

The Foreign Minister also emphasized that the decision is not revenge against Turkey for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s hostile policy. According to him, the recognition is based not on current political circumstances but on historical facts and Israel’s moral responsibility.

After the meeting, it was reported that the government’s position should receive confirmation from the Knesset. It was at this stage that the process stopped, although the cabinet’s decision was not officially canceled.

Why the dispute over the status of recognition arose

The Israeli government presented the resolution on June 28 as official recognition of the Armenian genocide. At the same time, several media outlets reported that a separate Knesset vote was required to complete the political procedure, which would give the decision parliamentary legitimacy and make it less dependent on the position of a specific government.

Moreover, there were separate initiatives in parliament to recognize the genocide and establish an official day of remembrance. None of them had previously passed all the necessary stages, so the cabinet’s decision became Israel’s most serious step on this issue in the state’s history.

The difference between a government resolution and a parliamentary decision has not only legal but also political significance. The cabinet can change or revise its position, whereas Knesset support would turn recognition into a more stable state line.

Therefore, claiming that Israel completely abandoned recognition after pressure from Baku is incorrect. The government’s decision remains in force, but its parliamentary consolidation was halted.

Azerbaijan demanded a review of the decision

On June 29, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan officially expressed dissatisfaction with Israel’s position. In Baku’s statement, the recognition was called a ‘distortion of historical facts,’ and the expression ‘Armenian genocide’ was replaced with the phrase ‘events of 1915.’

The Azerbaijani side claimed that such decisions allegedly hinder reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and complicate the achievement of sustainable peace in the region. Baku openly called on Israel to reconsider the decision made by the government of Gideon Sa’ar and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Such a reaction was expected, as Azerbaijan traditionally supports Turkey’s position, which refuses to recognize the extermination of Armenians as genocide. However, judging by Israeli media publications, the official statement did not limit diplomatic pressure.

Baku’s contact with Netanyahu’s office

On July 19, Haaretz reported that Hikmet Hajiyev, the Azerbaijani president’s foreign policy advisor, contacted the Israeli Prime Minister’s office. According to an unnamed Israeli source, after this, Netanyahu ordered not to bring the issue to a Knesset vote.

However, there is no confirmation of a personal conversation between Netanyahu and Hajiyev. It is more accurate to say that the Azerbaijani representative approached the head of government’s office, after which a political decision was made to stop the parliamentary procedure.

According to Haaretz, the Israeli side assured Baku representatives that the vote would not take place. Netanyahu’s office and Hikmet Hajiyev did not publicly confirm this information, so it remains a media report based on sources within the Israeli political system.

However, a Maariv publication that appeared on July 20 supplemented this version and explained why Netanyahu might indeed have had problems with the majority.

Pressure through Shas and United Torah Judaism

According to Maariv political observer Anna Barsky, representatives of the Azerbaijani Jewish community approached deputies of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism. They were persuaded that recognizing the Armenian genocide at the Knesset level would harm relations between Israel and Azerbaijan.

During these contacts, the strategic ties between the two states, security cooperation, Azerbaijan’s proximity to Iran’s northern border, and Israel’s dependence on Azerbaijani oil were emphasized. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, these arguments apparently proved significant enough.

Representatives of Shas and United Torah Judaism informed the Likud leadership that they would not support recognition and might vote against it. After this, Netanyahu’s advisors concluded that there was no guaranteed majority for the decision in the Knesset.

The issue was removed from the agenda twice. As a result, the Prime Minister decided not to risk a public defeat and to limit himself to the already adopted government resolution.

For Netanyahu, losing the vote could have been worse than its complete absence. If the Knesset rejected the cabinet’s position, it would look like an official refusal by the Israeli parliament to recognize the Armenian genocide, despite the unanimous decision of the ministers.

NAnews — News of Israel notes that the versions of Haaretz and Maariv do not contradict each other. Most likely, pressure was exerted simultaneously on several levels: through direct contacts between Baku and the Prime Minister’s office and through work with parties on which the parliamentary majority depended.

Oil, weapons, and the border with Iran

The importance of Azerbaijan for Israel is hard to overestimate. According to Reuters, in 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for about 46.4% of all Israeli oil imports, the highest figure in the last decade.

Oil is delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and then shipped by sea from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Supplies continued even after Turkish authorities announced the cessation of trade with Israel.

Azerbaijan is also a major buyer of Israeli weapons. Israel supplied Baku with drones, missile systems, reconnaissance technologies, and other military equipment that played a significant role in the conflicts around Nagorno-Karabakh.

For Jerusalem, the geographical location of Azerbaijan, which borders Iran, is also significant. For many years, relations between the two countries have been viewed in Israel as part of a regional system to contain Tehran.

That is why the issue of historical memory collided with specific interests of energy and national security. Recognizing the Armenian genocide was capable of jeopardizing relations that the Israeli leadership considers strategic.

Reaction of Turkey and Armenia

Turkey sharply condemned the decision made by Israel. Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the definition of the events of 1915 as genocide and accused Israel of trying to use historical tragedy in the current political confrontation.

Ankara continues to assert that Armenians died in conditions of war, unrest, and interethnic clashes, not as a result of a pre-planned policy of extermination. This position contradicts the conclusions of most genocide researchers and documents indicating the systematic nature of deportations and killings.

Unexpectedly restrained was the reaction of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He stated that he does not want to participate in using the memory of the Armenian genocide as a political tool.

This position is related to the Armenian government’s attempts to normalize relations with Turkey and complete the peace process with Azerbaijan. Yerevan fears that recognition by third countries may be used not for historical justice but as a means of pressure in regional politics.

Why Israel avoided recognition for decades

The issue of the Armenian genocide has been repeatedly discussed in Israel. Over the years, corresponding initiatives have been supported by deputies of various parties, historians, public figures, and representatives of the Armenian community in Jerusalem.

In 2016, the Knesset’s Education, Culture, and Sports Committee recognized the genocide and called on the government to follow its example. However, the parliamentary committee’s decision did not become the official position of the entire state.

In 2018, another initiative reached discussion in the Knesset, but the vote was not completed. Bills submitted later also did not receive the necessary support.

The main reason for Israel’s caution for a long time was its relations with Turkey. After the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations, Azerbaijan came to the forefront, becoming Israel’s most important oil supplier, arms buyer, and partner in countering Iran.

In August 2025, Netanyahu personally stated in an interview with American host Patrick Bet-David that he recognizes the Armenian genocide. However, this statement was not an official state decision, and the Prime Minister mistakenly assumed that the Knesset had already adopted the corresponding resolution.

The government’s decision on June 28, 2026, became Israel’s most serious advancement on this issue. Nevertheless, it again stalled at the last political stage.

What is known as of July 20

The government decision to recognize the Armenian genocide has not been officially canceled. There are no reports that the cabinet has reviewed the June 28 resolution or abandoned the formulations contained in it.

At the same time, the Knesset did not approve the decision, no new voting date has been set, and the issue was removed from the agenda twice. Therefore, there is still no parliamentary or legislative consolidation of recognition in Israel.

The phrase ‘Azerbaijan forced Israel to abandon recognition of the Armenian genocide’ simplifies the situation. It is more accurate to say that Baku, according to Haaretz and Maariv, managed to stop the recognition’s approval in the Knesset but did not achieve the cancellation of the government’s decision.

NAnews — News of Israel considers it important to separate these two levels. The Israeli cabinet did indeed recognize the Armenian genocide, but strategic interests, oil dependence, and domestic political calculations did not allow this recognition to become a stable position of the parliament.

Gideon Sa’ar stated that recognition is Israel’s moral and historical duty. But when this moral duty collided with oil, arms contracts, relations with Azerbaijan, and opposition to Iran, the Israeli leadership preferred not to bring the decision to a final parliamentary vote.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine confirmed the death of at least 293 civilians during June 2026. Another 1,990 people were injured.

The total number of confirmed civilian casualties for one month reached 2,283 people. This is the highest monthly death and injury toll among civilians since April 2022. The corresponding UN report was published on July 14, 2026.

It is important to understand the wording of the report accurately. June was not necessarily the deadliest month solely by the number of deaths, but the most severe by the combined number of killed and injured civilians.

According to the UN, in April 2022, 842 deaths and 1,905 injuries were confirmed. After that, for more than four years, the monthly figure did not reach the June 2026 level.

Losses continue to grow for the second consecutive month

In May 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 282 and injuries to 1,794 civilians. Thus, the June figure was 10% higher.

Compared to June 2025, the increase was 37%. A year earlier, during the same month, 249 deaths and 1,416 injuries were confirmed.

Period	Killed	Injured	Total
June 2026	293	1 990	2 283
May 2026	282	1 794	2 076
June 2025	249	1 416	1 665

The statistics for the first half of the year look particularly alarming.

From January to June 2026, the UN confirmed the death of 1,396 civilians and injuries to another 7,978 people. In total, over six months, at least 9,374 civilians were killed or injured.

This figure is 37% higher than the data for the first half of 2025 and 114% higher than the results for the same period in 2024.

The head of the UN Monitoring Mission, Danielle Bell, called the situation a worrying escalation. According to her, the increase in losses is associated with the more intensive use of powerful types of weapons, which are especially dangerous when used in densely populated urban areas.

Missiles and long-range drones became the main cause of losses

Almost half of all civilian casualties in June were related to the use of long-range weapons.

Russian missiles and long-range strike drones killed 126 civilians and injured 907. In total, this type of weapon accounted for about 45% of all confirmed losses for the month.

The most severe consequences of such attacks were observed not near the front line, but in large cities, including Kyiv and Dnipro.

The number of civilian casualties from long-range Russian attacks in the first half of 2026 increased by 60% compared to the first six months of 2025.

This means that the danger to residents of Ukrainian cities is determined not only by proximity to the ground combat zone. Russian missiles and drones allow strikes on residential areas, transport infrastructure, and other targets at a significant distance from the front.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, this detail is especially important. Air alerts, the presence of air defense systems, and the city’s distance from the front do not mean a complete absence of threat. However, the Ukrainian situation has its own scale and specifics: the country’s territory is vast, and the ability to completely close the sky over all cities remains limited.

Frontline areas have turned into a zone of constant hunting

Another factor in the sharp increase in losses was the strike drones of a small radius, which Russian troops systematically use near the front line.

In June, such drones killed 89 people and injured 588. This is the highest monthly figure of civilian casualties from close-range strike drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

According to Danielle Bell, residents of frontline settlements increasingly tell UN staff that they feel like targets of hunting.

People are attacked during ordinary daily activities: when going for groceries, riding a bicycle, working in the yard, walking the dog, or trying to leave a dangerous area.

Such tactics change the very nature of life near the front. Previously, the main threat was artillery shelling and air bombs, the use of which could at least partially be assessed by the direction of hostilities. Small drones can observe roads, yards, and individuals for a long time, then deliver a pinpoint strike.

Aerial bombs, artillery, and mines

Long-range attacks and close-range drones were not the only causes of civilian losses.

In June, the UN recorded:

• 44 deaths and 280 injuries as a result of aerial bombs;
• 27 deaths and 171 injuries due to artillery shelling and attacks by multiple launch rocket systems;
• 7 deaths and 44 injuries from mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Mines and unexploded ordnance remain a long-term threat. They continue to kill people even where the intensity of hostilities has decreased or the front line has shifted.

Which regions suffered the most

In June, civilians were killed or injured in 13 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv.

The highest number of confirmed losses was recorded by the UN in four regions:

• Zaporizhzhia region — 23 deaths and 229 injuries;
• Kherson region — 18 deaths and 236 injuries;
• Dnipropetrovsk region — 25 deaths and 77 injuries;
• Kyiv — 11 deaths and 112 injuries.

The overwhelming majority of victims were in territory controlled by the Ukrainian government.

Of the 2,283 killed and injured, 2,226 people were affected in Ukraine-controlled territory. Another 57 confirmed cases occurred in territories occupied by the Russian Federation.

Therefore, the assertion that the main cause of the record increase in losses was precisely Russian strikes is based not only on the overall context of the war but also on the geography of UN-confirmed incidents.

UN statistics do not reflect the full scale of the tragedy

The figures presented are not final.

The UN includes a case in the official statistics only after verifying the information. Confirmation is based on interviews with witnesses and victims, medical documents, investigation materials, photographs, videos, information from local administrations, and other available data.

Some cases can be confirmed weeks or months later. Therefore, figures for previous periods may be revised in subsequent reports.

At the same time, the actual number of dead and injured is likely significantly higher. It is especially difficult to obtain verifiable information from occupied cities and areas where international observers do not have full access.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, the UN has confirmed the death of at least 16,431 civilians, including 803 children.

Another 48,613 civilians, including 2,960 children, were injured.

Thus, the total number of confirmed dead and injured civilians exceeded 65,000 people. However, even this huge figure reflects only those cases that the UN was able to independently verify.

June became a warning of a new phase of the war

The statistics for June 2026 show that the war is not becoming less dangerous for the civilian population.

Russia is expanding the use of long-range missiles and drones against cities, and in frontline areas, small strike drones are turning civilian daily life into a constant risk.

The increase in casualties is not occurring in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion when the front was rapidly moving, but after more than four years of war. This is what makes the UN’s conclusions particularly alarming.

NAnews — News of Israel highlights: behind the dry numbers of the report are people who died in their own apartments, on the streets, in cars, and during evacuation attempts. June 2026 showed that the scale of danger for the civilian population of Ukraine continues to increase, and the Russian war increasingly affects cities and people far from the immediate line of combat.

Steven Spielberg is one of the most famous directors in human history! Category 🔯 — Jews from Ukraine #jewsukraine

📍 Born: 12/18/1946, Cincinnati 🇺🇸

💙💛 Spielberg’s grandparents were Jews from Kamenets-Podolsky and Sudilkov, Khmelnitsky region. Ukraine

🔯 His mother ran a kosher halawi (dairy) restaurant. All of his immediate family were religious Jews. Stephen attended Hebrew school and also celebrated his bar mitzvah. His family was involved in the synagogue and had many Jewish friends.

🤔Spielberg had a hard time accepting his heritage

“I hate to admit it… but as a child, God forgive me, I was ashamed because we were Orthodox Jews. I was ashamed of the external perception.”

At school, anti-Semites broke his nose twice. “It was terrible.”

💍Spielberg met actress Kate Capshaw when he filmed her in the film Indiana Jones. They married in 1991, and the bride converted to Judaism at the time of their marriage.

Stephen said:

“Kate is a Protestant and she insisted on converting to Judaism. She spent a year studying, doing the mikveh, all of this. She decided to convert completely before our marriage. This, more than anything else, brought me back to Judaism. This shiksa (non-Jewish in Yiddish) made me a better Jew than my parents.”

🕯About the Holocaust, he said that his parents “talked about it all the time, and so it was always in my mind.”. His father lost at least 16 relatives in the Holocaust. In 1993, Spielberg directed Schindler’s List about a businessman who helped save 1,100 Jews from the Holocaust. The film was included in all major ratings of the best films in history.

🇮🇱 Spielberg’s Munich (2005) tells the story of the Israeli government’s retaliation against Arab terrorists after 11 Israeli Olympians were kidnapped and killed during the 1972 Olympics.

📝 The Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive is dedicated to the preservation and research of Jewish documentaries. The archive is run by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the World Zionist Organization. The archive contains more than 16,000 pieces of content.

🕎 Together with Victor Pinchuk (Ukraine), he produced the documentary film “Say Your Name”. The film tells about the survivors of Babi Yar, and was filmed based on the testimony of the Holocaust Survivors Foundation. The fund contains 55,000 video testimonies in 43 languages ​​from 65 countries, making it the largest archive of its kind in the world.

🇺🇦In 2006, Spielberg visited Ukraine for the first time in his life at the premiere of this film. The film had a significant impact on Ukrainian-Jewish relations and changed the understanding of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

👾In Spielberg’s film “War of the Worlds” the events of the alien attack begin with anomalies in Ukraine.

🤝 In addition to cultural influence, Spielberg has repeatedly supported Israel and Ukraine:
❤️Donated $1 million to help Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War
❤️His sister Nancy is the founder and director of the Children of Chernobyl charity organization. Stephen also supports this company.
❤️In 2022, in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he and his wife donated $1 million to Ukrainian refugees.
❤️ In 2023, following the Hamas attack on Israel, the Shoah Foundation, founded by Spielberg, collected more than 100 video testimonies from survivors of the October 7 attacks to add to the Holocaust Survivors collection. He said: “I never thought I would see such unspeakable barbarity against the Jews in my lifetime.”

🏆 Spielberg is one of the most awarded cinema figures and officially the most commercially successful director in history. He alone has received a Best Director nomination for six consecutive decades:

• Oscar: 3 awards / 23 nominations
• Emmy: 12 / 27
• Golden Globe: 9/24
• BAFTA: 2 / 14
• And hundreds more.
• He also received a special medal from the President of Israel 🥇

🎬 Featured films:

• Jaws;
• Alien;
• Indiana Jones film series;
• Jurassic Park;
• Schindler’s List;
• Saving Private Ryan;
• Catch me if you can;
• Terminal;
• Munich.
  —

This article was prepared specifically for the site NAnews — Israel News, where you will find even more interesting stories about prominent Jews from Ukraine, such as Steven Spielberg.

Veda section @davidkrutonog — Jew from Ukraine and founder of a marketing agency tlv.agency

#jewsukraine

Leave a comment on Telegram – channel NAnews ↓ — Israel News

On July 16, 2026, the first store of the Ukrainian DUNA network officially started operating in Rishon LeZion, Israel.

Israelis from Ukraine and just customers familiar with the brand can now purchase DUNA products directly in Israel, without waiting for parcels or asking acquaintances to bring the necessary items from Ukraine.

The new store is located at:

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street, 40

Rishon LeZion, Rothschild Street 40 – here on the map – https://maps.app.goo.gl/21cH2AvHRnZirm8c6

Official pages of Duna.Israel:

Facebook – https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61591690269847

Instagram – https://www.instagram.com/duna_israel/

Before the opening, DUNA Israel announced that the first Israeli outlet would start operating on July 16. After the launch, a message appeared on the brand’s page in Hebrew: שלום ישראל! פתחנו באופן רשמי! — “Hello, Israel! We are officially open!”

Ukrainian industry publications also reported on DUNA’s entry into the Israeli market.

On July 15, the publication “Ukrainian network DUNA opens its first store in Israel” was posted by the Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers. The publication indicated that the store would open in Rishon LeZion on Rothschild Street, and DUNA belongs to the company “Duna-Vesta,” whose factory has been operating in the Lviv region since 1965.

On July 16, the material “DUNA network enters the Israeli market with its first store” was published by the Ukrainian publication AllRetail.ua, specializing in retail and the development of retail networks.

What is sold in the first Israeli DUNA store

DUNA Israel presents the new outlet as a family store of everyday textile products.

The first publications on the Israeli page announced:

• women’s, men’s, and children’s socks;
• tights for women and children;
• basic plain models;
• colored socks and items with patterns;
• children’s underwear;
• everyday and gift options.

In the opening announcement, the brand emphasized that the store would feature comfortable socks and tights for children and adults, as well as everyday models. After the opening, DUNA Israel announced a wide selection of products for the whole family.

Store opening hours:

Day	Working hours
Sunday — Thursday	09:30–19:30
Friday and holiday eves	09:00–14:00
Saturday	Not specified in the published schedule

The address and opening hours are published on the official DUNA Israel page.

It cannot yet be claimed that the entire Ukrainian DUNA catalog is presented in Rishon LeZion. The company’s official website also offers women’s and men’s underwear, pajamas, T-shirts and tank tops, thermal underwear, stockings, children’s items, and products for infants. The brand has not specified in detail which categories are already available in Israel.

DUNA immediately addressed the Israeli customer in Hebrew

The DUNA Israel page and advertising publications are predominantly in Hebrew.

This is an important detail: the store is targeting not only Israelis from Ukraine and people familiar with the brand from previous purchases. DUNA is trying to present itself to the wider Israeli audience as a family brand of comfortable socks, tights, and underwear.

For customers who already know DUNA, the appearance of the store means the opportunity to purchase familiar products near home. For those who have not encountered this brand before, the new outlet becomes the first direct acquaintance with the Ukrainian manufacturer.

Where DUNA is located: a busy commercial part of Rishon LeZion

For its first store in Israel, DUNA chose a section of Rothschild Street with a large number of retail outlets and service enterprises.

At the address Rothschild, 40, in addition to DUNA, Israeli business directories indicate the jewelry store Keter David — כתר דוד, a dog grooming salon “המספרים של עידו”, as well as offices and service enterprises. This is a commercial address around which there is already a constant flow of visitors.

In the neighboring building at Rothschild, 38, there is a shoe store Disco Rosso and Bukhari Bakery — a bakery with Bukharian pastries and dishes.

At the address Rothschild, 37, there are jewelry stores and workshops Mi ORO, Cami Designs, and Kisufim.

At the address Rothschild, 41, there is a lingerie and gift store Beit Hava — בית חוה and a jewelry store Pirov Diamonds — יהלומי פירוב.

Thus, DUNA opened in an already established commercial environment. Shoppers can combine a visit to the new store with buying shoes, lingerie, jewelry, groceries, or visiting a cafe and bakery.

Not far from DUNA, at the address Rothschild, 45, is the shopping center G Rothschild, which additionally makes the location convenient for shoppers.

Choosing such a place seems logical. Israelis from Ukraine and customers who already know DUNA can come purposefully, and the presence of other stores and G Rothschild nearby allows the brand to also count on the usual urban shopping flow.

What DUNA represents and how many stores the network operates

DUNA belongs to the Ukrainian company “Duna-Vesta”.

The factory is located in the city of Sheptytsky in the Lviv region and has been operating since 1965. The company calls itself a leader in the Ukrainian hosiery market and reports that it produces up to 1.2 million items monthly.

The declared production capacity of the enterprise is 15–20 million pairs per year. The products are tested in its own accredited laboratory, and the company reports working according to OEKO-TEX Standard 100 and ISO 9001:2015 standards.

In addition to the family brand DUNA, the company develops two more lines:

ACCENT — models with an emphasis on classic design, quality, and comfort;

FURIA — women’s tights and stockings.

The official DUNA website states that the network has more than 100 stores in 17 regions of Ukraine and expands annually by 5–8 outlets.

NAnews — Israel News separately recounted the addresses on the network’s official page. The catalog lists 105 address entries, but the store in Lutsk at Sobornosti Avenue, 22B is listed twice with the same phone number and schedule. Therefore, there are 104 unique addresses in Ukraine. The catalog also includes a section for Zaporizhzhia, but at the time of verification, no address was listed under it.

Most points are concentrated in Kyiv and the Kyiv region — 23, as well as in Lviv and nearby suburbs — 22. In Lutsk, seven unique stores are listed, in Dnipro — five, in Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, and Ternopil — four each, in Uzhhorod — three.

Two points are listed in Zhytomyr, Izmail, Mukachevo, Sambir, Khmelnytskyi, and Sheptytsky. Stores also operate in Berdychiv, Drohobych, Irpin, Kalush, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Kovel, Kolomyia, Kremenchuk, Poltava, Rivne, Stryi, Kharkiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi.

With the new store in Rishon LeZion, we can talk about at least 105 unique physical DUNA points in Ukraine and Israel. The Israeli address has not yet been added to the main catalog of stores on the company’s Ukrainian website.

The Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers also reported that DUNA management is considering development potential in Poland and Germany. According to CEO Serhiy Vyshnevskyi, the company planned to increase the Ukrainian network to more than 200 points within five years and was simultaneously preparing to enter foreign markets.

The store may operate with a local partner

The description of the Israeli DUNA profile contains the words שותפות | זכיינות, which translate as “partnership | franchise.”

This may indicate a partnership or franchise model of launch. However, the company has not yet publicly named the Israeli store operator or disclosed the legal structure of the project. Therefore, it is premature to talk about a specific owner or franchisee.

There is also no confirmed information in the public domain about the size of investments, store area, number of employees, prices in shekels, delivery across Israel, a separate online store, or plans to open subsequent points.

It is also unknown whether DUNA is considering Haifa, Ashdod, Netanya, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, or other cities for further expansion.

The opening in Rishon LeZion shows that the Ukrainian manufacturer has entered the regular Israeli retail market and is addressing the market in Hebrew from the very beginning.

For Israelis from Ukraine and those familiar with the brand, this is an opportunity to buy familiar products directly in Israel. For DUNA, it is a test of whether the well-known Ukrainian brand can interest a wider Israeli audience.

NAnews — Israel News will monitor the development of the first point and the possible expansion of the DUNA network in the country.

In 12 days of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation, Ukrainian drones, according to the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, hit 159 vessels of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Azov and Black Seas. The campaign’s goal is not the mass sinking of tankers, but the paralysis of Russia’s maritime logistics, the supply of occupied Crimea, and the transportation of oil, fuel, and goods circumventing sanctions.

On July 17, 2026, the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar’, summarized the interim results of the ‘MoLoChKa’ operation.

According to him, from July 6 to 17, Ukrainian units hit 159 vessels used in Russian maritime logistics:

• 117 vessels — in the Azov Sea;
• 42 vessels — in the Black Sea.

On the night of July 17 alone, 12 more vessels were attacked in the Black Sea: nine dry cargo ships, one tanker, one gas tanker, and one tugboat.

These figures are already being called one of the largest episodes of drone use against Russian maritime logistics. However, it is important to understand: 159 affected vessels do not mean 159 sunken ships.

What does the name of the operation ‘MoLoChKa’ mean

The name of the operation turned out to be an abbreviation.

On July 15, Robert Brovdi deciphered it as follows:

MLChK — ‘Moscow Will Lie Through Crimea’, meaning ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

According to the Ukrainian command’s plan, it is not about a single series of strikes, but a systematic campaign against the infrastructure that allows Russia to hold the occupied peninsula and use it as a military base.

It includes attacks on maritime transport, oil depots, energy facilities, railway hubs, bridges, substations, and other elements of supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine.

The strategy’s meaning is to gradually turn Crimea from a convenient military foothold into a territory whose maintenance requires more and more fuel, equipment, ships, air defense systems, and repair resources from Moscow.

Crimea holds not only military but also symbolic significance for the Kremlin. Its capture has been portrayed by Russian propaganda for many years as one of Putin’s main achievements. Therefore, the destruction of the peninsula’s logistical connections can simultaneously inflict military, economic, and political damage.

159 affected vessels — not 159 sunken ships

Headlines about ‘knocked out’ or ‘destroyed’ vessels can create the false impression that Ukrainian forces sent almost one and a half hundred ships to the bottom in 12 days.

The SBS command describes the operation’s goal differently.

Ukrainian drones are supposed to deprive the vessel of the ability to move normally, navigate, and maintain communication. Robert Brovdi stated that the task is to turn a self-propelled vessel into a drifting ‘blind and deaf’ barge.

At the same time, according to him, operators try not to pierce the hulls of tankers to prevent large-scale oil spills and pollution of the Azov and Black Seas.

Drones can hit:

• the captain’s bridge;
• radar equipment;
• satellite communication antennas;
• navigation systems;
• control elements;
• engine and steering mechanisms;
• equipment necessary for safe passage through straits and ports.

After such a strike, the vessel may not sink but lose the ability to continue the voyage independently. It has to be towed, repaired, have its crew changed, or be taken out of service for a long time.

That is why Ukrainian targets include not only tankers and dry cargo ships but also tugboats. Russia uses them for rescuing and evacuating already damaged vessels.

How the operation developed

The operation began on July 6 with attacks on vessels in the Azov Sea, after which Ukrainian units quickly increased the number of strikes.

Date	Declared result
July 6–7	First attacks on tankers transporting fuel towards occupied Crimea
July 10	Russia restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal
July 11	Ukraine reported dozens of affected tankers, dry cargo ships, tugboats, and other vessels
July 14	The number of affected vessels in the Azov Sea reached 116
July 15	The operation spread to the Black Sea
July 16	The total result increased to 147 vessels
July 17	It was announced that 12 more vessels were affected; the total result — 159

By July 14, the Ukrainian command reported 116 affected vessels in the Azov Sea. Reuters confirmed that maritime movement in the region was seriously disrupted, although the agency could not independently verify the condition of each vessel from the Ukrainian list.

After that, the operation moved to the Black Sea. In a few days there, according to SBS data, tankers, gas carriers, dry cargo ships, and tugboats were attacked, increasing the total to 159.

Why the Azov Sea is so important for Russia

The Azov Sea is one of the key links in Russia’s system for transporting oil, oil products, grain, and other goods.

Through the Don River and the Volga-Don Canal, it is connected to Russia’s internal waterways. Small ‘river-sea’ class tankers can pick up cargo in internal Russian ports, pass through the Don, and enter the Azov Sea.

Further, oil can be transshipped onto larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Large sea vessels cannot always enter Azov ports due to limited depth and large draft. Therefore, Russia needs an intermediate feeder fleet — relatively small tankers, dry cargo ships, and auxiliary vessels.

Strikes on this fleet disrupt several logistical chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine;
• transportation of oil and oil products;
• export of Russian goods through the Azov Sea;
• operation of ports and transshipment points;
• movement through the Kerch Strait;
• schemes to bypass international sanctions.

In NAnews — Israel News they note: the operation against vessels is not an isolated maritime campaign. It is connected with a broader Ukrainian strategy of strikes on oil refineries, oil depots, energy, and transport infrastructure of Russia.

If maritime delivery becomes too dangerous, Moscow is forced to transfer cargo to road and rail. But these routes are closer to the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.

What happened to shipping

The consequences of the operation are recorded not only in reports from the Ukrainian command.

Reuters reported that after the start of the strikes, Russia temporarily stopped or seriously restricted movement through the Don-Azov Canal. This route connects the Don with the Azov Sea and is used for transporting oil, grain, and other goods.

Satellite images also showed a sharp decrease in the number of vessels near the Kerch Strait.

According to Reuters, in early June, more than 40 vessels were waiting to pass in the strait area. After a series of Ukrainian attacks, satellite images showed only a few noticeable vessels in the same zone.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that for Russian logistics, the Azov Sea is effectively turning into a closed water area. According to him, Russian vessels began moving to the Taman area and looking for safer anchorage spots.

But the concentration of dozens of vessels in a limited area creates new problems: they are easier to detect, harder to disperse, and more difficult to protect simultaneously with air defense and electronic warfare means.

Impact on oil, Crimea supply, and the Russian budget

Russian oil exports remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the budget, which finances the war against Ukraine.

Some vessels are used directly for delivering fuel to Crimea and occupied territories. Others are involved in transporting oil, oil products, and goods between Russian ports and external markets.

Ukrainian Navy representative Dmytro Pletenchuk called oil the ‘blood of war’ and the Russian economy. According to him, small Azov tankers delivered oil to large ships in the Black Sea, but now this scheme has been disrupted.

At the same time, the term ‘shadow fleet’ should be used cautiously.

The Ukrainian side applies it to vessels involved in Russian oil, sanction, and military logistics. However, not every affected vessel is necessarily under personal sanctions by the EU, USA, or UK.

Reuters previously checked part of the first attacked tankers and found that not all of them were officially listed in international sanctions lists. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of vessels that Ukraine refers to as the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ or the system supporting the Russian economy and military logistics.

Why the strikes affected the grain market

The Azov Sea is used not only for oil transportation.

A significant portion of Russian grain exports passes through this region. According to Reuters, routes through the Azov Sea and the Don-Azov Canal may be linked to up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports.

After shipping restrictions, European wheat futures rose by about 4% and reached their highest level in several weeks.

This shows that the Ukrainian operation can have consequences far beyond the combat zone.

Increased risks affect:

• freight costs;
• marine insurance;
• delivery times;
• global grain prices;
• the willingness of foreign companies to send ships to Russian ports;
• Russia’s ability to fulfill export contracts.

Russian authorities began considering redirecting part of the grain cargo to other ports in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, this increases distances, transportation costs, and the load on railway infrastructure.

Legality of strikes and Ukraine’s position

Russia called Ukrainian attacks ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’.

Ukraine rejects these accusations and states that the vessels are used to support the Russian army, supply occupied Crimea, and finance the war.

Dmytro Pletenchuk reminded that Crimea, according to international law, remains the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, vessels entering the ports of the occupied peninsula without Kyiv’s permission are considered violators by the Ukrainian side.

At the same time, there is no independent international legal assessment of each of the 159 episodes yet. Nor has a complete list of all vessels with their names, owners, flags, cargo nature, and damage degree been published.

What is confirmed, and what remains Ukraine’s statement

As of July 17, several levels of confirmation can be confidently stated.

The Ukrainian command stated:

• 159 ships affected;
• 117 targets were in the Sea of Azov;
• 42 — in the Black Sea;
• the task is to paralyze Russian logistics;
• ships are predominantly disabled, not sunk.

Independent sources confirm:

• a sharp reduction in ship movement;
• restrictions in the Kerch Strait and the Don-Azov Canal;
• concentration of ships in safer areas;
• disruption of Russian export routes;
• the impact of events on grain prices;
• the need to redirect cargo through other ports.

It is currently impossible to independently confirm:

• the exact damage to each of the 159 ships;
• the number of ships completely decommissioned;
• the number of ships that have already been towed and repaired;
• the affiliation of each ship to the internationally recognized ‘shadow fleet’;
• the full composition of the cargo they carry.

A new stage of the war at sea

Over several years, Ukraine, with virtually no classic large military fleet, managed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea with the help of sea and air drones.

Now this tactic is spreading to the Sea of Azov and the internal Russian transport system.

Operation ‘MoLoChKa’ shows a transition from single strikes on individual ships to the systematic destruction of the entire logistics chain: tanker, tugboat, port, oil depot, canal, railway, substation.

For Russia, the problem is not only the cost of damaged ships. Each new strike forces route changes, increased security, dispatch of tugs, equipment repairs, higher insurance costs, and delivery delays.

NAnews — News of Israel notes: even if most of the 159 ships remain afloat, the strategic effect of the operation is measured not by the number of sunken hulls. It is measured by how many Russian routes have ceased to function normally and how many additional resources Moscow is forced to spend on ensuring occupied Crimea.

The main result of the operation at the moment is not ‘159 sunken ships’, but the actual transformation of the Sea of Azov and the adjacent part of the Black Sea into a zone of constant risk for Russian logistics.

This is what lies behind Robert Brovdi’s formula: ‘Moscow will lie through Crimea’.

The Historical and Toponymic Commission of the Odessa City Council unanimously supported the initiative to establish a monument-bust in the city to the outstanding Odessan, writer, poet, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, without whom it is impossible to imagine the political history of the future State of Israel.

The discussion is currently about supporting the idea itself: the final location has not yet been approved, and the final decision must be made by the city council deputies, reported Odessa media on May 15, 2026.

For Odessa, this is not just a question of urban sculpture. For Israel, it’s not just news from Ukraine. Jabotinsky was born in Odessa, formed in its multilingual and Jewish intellectual environment, and then became a figure whose legacy is directly connected with the history of Zionism, Jewish self-defense, and the future statehood of Israel.

Initiative from Odessa and Jerusalem

The proposal to install a bust of Vladimir Jabotinsky was submitted to the city hall by the World Club of Odessans and the Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem. This very connection shows that it is about a memory that has long gone beyond the boundaries of one city.

Odessa gave Jabotinsky language, character, urban optics, and literary memory. Israel received from his ideas one of the important lines of political Zionism, which influenced decades of Jewish history.

The initiators proposed placing the monument near the Odessa Opera House — in Palais-Royal or on Lanzheronovskaya Street. The argument was not accidental: it was in this area that the editorial office of the “Odessa Leaflet” was once located, where Jabotinsky worked. Moreover, his novel “The Five” begins at the Opera building — one of the main symbols of old Odessa.

However, it was the location that became the main subject of debate.

Why Palais-Royal raised questions

At the meeting of the historical and toponymic commission, some participants considered the proposed locations “unsuccessful.” Palais-Royal and the space near the Opera House are the historical core of the city, associated with the protected architectural environment of Odessa.

Despite the absolute support for the idea of creating the monument, the question of its exact location remains open. Members of the historical and toponymic commission voted to recommend alternative locations for the bust together with the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning.

The main argument of the opponents of such a location was not about Jabotinsky himself, but about preserving the historical appearance of the center. A new monument in this area may raise questions about the visual balance of the space, especially considering the status of Odessa’s historical center and the requirements for protecting the urban environment.

“We must approach this issue in a balanced way, considering Odessa’s status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site,” emphasized the relevant department.

Since the historical and toponymic commission is an advisory body, its decision is of a recommendatory nature. The final decision on the location and permission for the construction of the monument must be made by the deputies at a session of the Odessa City Council.

As a result, the commission supported the idea of the monument but recommended looking for other possible locations together with relevant city structures. That is, the political and cultural “yes” has already been voiced, but the architectural point on the map has not yet been set.

Why Jabotinsky is important for Odessa, Ukraine, and Israel

Vladimir, or Ze’ev, Jabotinsky was born in Odessa in 1880. He was a writer, journalist, translator, publicist, political thinker, and one of the leaders of the Zionist movement. His name is associated with Revisionist Zionism, the idea of Jewish self-defense, and the creation of the Jewish Legion within the British Army.

For Israel, Jabotinsky is not a museum figure. His legacy continues to be part of the country’s political memory, especially in the right-wing Zionist camp. The Menachem Begin Institute in Jerusalem, as a participant in the initiative, makes this bridge between Odessa and Israel particularly noticeable.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this story in this context: Odessa is returning to the public space not just a famous compatriot, but a person whose ideas became part of the road to Jewish statehood.

For the Ukrainian context, this initiative is also important. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Odessa continues to rethink its urban space, deciding which names should be visible in the city center and which symbols of the past require reconsideration. The monument to Jabotinsky in this sense can become part of a broader work with memory — not imperial, but urban, Jewish, Ukrainian, and European.

Odessa in Jabotinsky’s biography

Jabotinsky always remained connected with Odessa, even when his life took place far beyond its borders. His novel “The Five” became one of the most famous literary texts about old Odessa, its Jewish environment, family memory, and the disappearing world of the early 20th century.

Therefore, the debate about the monument’s location does not cancel the main thing: the city has effectively recognized the need to return Jabotinsky to its visible historical space.

This is especially symbolic for Odessa, where Jewish history was not an external addition to the city’s image, but one of its foundations. Odessa’s Jews created newspapers, schools, theaters, literary circles, trade networks, political movements, and charitable structures. Jabotinsky grew up in this complex urban environment — multilingual, argumentative, ambitious, and very Odessan.

Memory has already been attempted to be preserved — and it has been destroyed

In Odessa, this is not the first attempt to perpetuate the memory of Jabotinsky. A commemorative bas-relief was installed on the house on Yevreyskaya Street, where he lived, back in 1997. Later it was damaged and then stolen by vandals. Currently, the city maintains a mural depicting Jabotinsky on Bazarnaya, 33 — in the house where he was born and raised.

This detail gives the new initiative additional meaning.

The monument to Jabotinsky is not only a question of bronze, pedestal, and city commission. It is a question of protecting memory. Especially in a region where Jewish heritage often exists between respect, oblivion, political disputes, and direct vandalism.

What will happen next

After the decision of the historical and toponymic commission, city structures need to select a suitable place for the monument. Then the issue must go through further procedures and be submitted for consideration by the deputies of the Odessa City Council.

It is not yet possible to say that the bust has already been installed or that the point near the Opera House has been finally approved. It is more accurate to formulate it this way: the commission supported the initiative to install a monument to Vladimir Jabotinsky in Odessa, but the location is still being agreed upon.

For Israel, this story is important already now.

It shows that Ukraine, despite the war, continues to work with historical memory not only through renaming streets and dismantling imperial symbols but also through the return of names associated with Jewish history, Zionism, and the future of Israel.

In the case of Jabotinsky, this is especially true. He was a son of Odessa and at the same time one of those people whose ideas became part of the great Jewish path to statehood.

Therefore, the future monument in Odessa is not just a bust of a famous native of the city. It is a sign that between Ukraine, Israel, and the Jewish people, there is a memory that cannot be reduced to diplomatic statements. It stands in biographies, books, streets, houses, stolen bas-reliefs, and new decisions of city commissions.

On July 15, 2026, a small USSR flag that participated in the historic Apollo 11 mission was sold at a Sotheby’s auction.

According to published data, a piece of red fabric approximately 10 by 15 centimeters was sold for 80 thousand dollars.

But the value of this item lies not in the sickle, hammer, or Soviet symbolism. The flag is a reminder of a time when two rival superpowers could simultaneously compete, converse, and leave room for gestures of goodwill.

Today the contrast looks especially sharp.

In 1969, an American astronaut voluntarily took the USSR flag to the Moon to emphasize that space exploration should unite humanity.

Decades later, Putin’s Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, cooperating with the Iranian regime, hosting representatives of Hamas in Moscow, politically shielding Hezbollah, and using international platforms to pressure Israel.

The story of the small flag became a story of what path could have been chosen — and where Putin’s Russia actually led.

The flag was a gesture, not a Soviet victory on the Moon

At the Sotheby’s auction, the item was listed as lot №45 under the title:

Flown to the Moon on Apollo 11 — Buzz Aldrin’s USSR Flag.

The flag belonged to Buzz Aldrin’s family trust. It retained the astronaut’s signature and a blue pen inscription:

FLOWN TO THE MOON ON APOLLO XI.

The preliminary estimate was 7–10 thousand dollars. Sotheby’s public card confirms that the auction ended on July 15, 2026, but the final result is available only to registered users.

It is important to understand: this was not a flag planted by Soviet cosmonauts on the lunar surface.

It was taken by Buzz Aldrin, one of the first two people to set foot on the Moon.

The flag was in his Personal Preference Kit — PPK, a small personal set of items allowed for each astronaut. Along with the Soviet flag, Aldrin took flags of the USA, Texas, and his native New Jersey.

In a letter accompanying the lot, Aldrin explained his choice as an act of diplomacy and a gesture of goodwill between the USA and the Soviet Union. According to him, he wanted to show that Apollo 11 was an achievement of humanity that transcended national borders.

The flag flew aboard the command module Columbia. It reached lunar orbit and returned to Earth, but there is no evidence of it being transferred to the lunar module and the Moon’s surface.

Thus, it is not about Soviet presence on the Moon, but about a personal gesture of an American astronaut towards his country’s main rival.

Even at the height of the Cold War, there was room for contact

The Apollo 11 mission was primarily an American victory in the space race.

The USSR was the first to launch an artificial satellite, the first to send a human into space, but the USA was the first to land people on the Moon.

Despite this, the American side tried to give the flight an international meaning.

On board were flags of American states, territories, and other countries. A silicon disk with messages from leaders of 73 countries was left on the Moon. A plaque with the words: “We came in peace for all mankind” was attached to the landing stage of the Eagle.

Six years later, symbolic gestures turned into real cooperation.

On July 17, 1975, the American Apollo spacecraft docked in orbit with the Soviet Soyuz. Astronaut Thomas Stafford and cosmonaut Alexei Leonov exchanged a historic handshake. The joined spacecraft remained together for about 47 hours, with crews visiting each other, conducting experiments, and practicing technologies for future joint missions.

The USA and the USSR did not cease to be adversaries.

They still had nuclear missiles, intelligence, propaganda, competition for allies, and fundamentally different political systems. But even in such conditions, they understood that there were areas where cooperation was necessary for the safety of the entire world.

Buzz Aldrin’s small Soviet flag was one of the first symbols of this possibility.

Putin’s Russia chose the opposite path

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia had a chance to become part of the system of international cooperation.

However, the Putin regime gradually built a state for which external aggression, blackmail, propaganda, and the search for enemies became a way to maintain power.

The culmination was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The Russian army began destroying Ukrainian cities, attacking residential buildings, hospitals, power plants, and other civilian infrastructure. In June 2026, the European Council again stated that Russia had intensified large-scale missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and energy facilities.

On November 23, 2022, the European Parliament recognized Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state using terrorist methods.

The decision was supported by 494 deputies. The European Parliament pointed to deliberate attacks by Russian forces on civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. This was a political resolution, not an inclusion in a pan-European legal list, as no such mechanism existed in the EU. But the assessment was crystal clear: the actions of the Russian regime are considered terrorism.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also recognized the Russian regime as terrorist and condemned Russia’s use of energy terrorism against the population.

Therefore, the expression “Russia is a terrorist” did not arise as an emotional slogan of social networks. It became a political and legal assessment of a state that turned missiles on cities into a tool of pressure.

The war tied Russia with Iran

For Israel, it is especially important who Putin’s Russia has built a new system of alliances with.

One of Moscow’s main partners became the Iranian regime.

Iran supplied Russia with drones, missiles, ammunition, and technologies related to their production for the war against Ukraine. The European Union repeatedly imposed sanctions against Iranian companies, military, and intermediaries involved in supplying weapons to the Russian army.

In January 2026, the EU imposed new restrictions, emphasizing that Iran’s military support for Russia continues and poses a direct threat to European security.

Cooperation works both ways.

According to the US State Department, in response to Iranian military assistance, Russia began offering Tehran an unprecedented level of defense cooperation — in the fields of missiles, electronics, and air defense. The British parliamentary committee also indicated that Moscow is likely helping Iran’s missile program in exchange for support in the war against Ukraine.

On January 17, 2025, Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a twenty-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The document provides for the development of military and military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, exchange of intelligence information, interaction in energy, finance, and nuclear technologies. It is not a treaty of unconditional mutual defense, but it consolidates the strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran.

For Israel, this is not a distant European problem.

Iran uses Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other armed formations for attacks on Israel and destabilization of the Middle East region. The European Council directly calls Hamas and Hezbollah part of the system of Iranian-supported terrorist and armed groups.

It turns out to be a vicious circle.

Iran helps Russia destroy Ukrainian cities.

Russia strengthens the regime that arms and finances Israel’s enemies.

Hamas gains political legitimacy in Moscow

Russia does not recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and has been receiving its leaders at the official level for many years.

Moscow’s behavior after the massacre on October 7, 2023 is particularly telling.

Already on October 26, 2023, less than three weeks after the attack on Israel, a Hamas delegation arrived in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed the visit. Simultaneously, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran was in the Russian capital.

In January 2024, the Russian Foreign Ministry again received a Hamas delegation. Moscow claimed it demanded the release of hostages, including Russian citizens, but the very fact of an official reception after the mass killing of Israelis provided the terrorist organization with an international platform and political legitimacy.

Contacts continued in 2025: a delegation led by Mousa Abu Marzouk again held talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.

There is no confirmed open-source data on direct Russian arms supplies to Hamas.

However, assistance is not only military.

Official meetings, refusal to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization, diplomatic protection, and providing a Moscow platform allow the group’s leaders to demonstrate that after October 7, they were not in complete international isolation.

Moscow protects Hezbollah too

The situation with Hezbollah is similar.

It was Iran that created and armed this organization for decades, turning it into one of the largest missile threats to Israel.

The Russian Foreign Ministry not only refused to take a tough stance against Hezbollah but also publicly emphasized its resilience.

In October 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that Hezbollah, including its military wing, retained control and demonstrated organization. Simultaneously, Moscow accused Israel and its Western partners of expanding the conflict.

This does not prove direct Russian financing of the organization.

But such rhetoric shows whose side the Kremlin’s political sympathy is on. Instead of unconditionally condemning the group that shelled northern Israel with rockets and drones, Russian officials effectively assessed its combat capability and blamed Israel.

At the same time, strengthening strategic partnership with Iran objectively strengthens the state that finances, arms, and directs Hezbollah.

In the UN, Russia systematically opposes Israel

The assertion that Russia votes against Israel in absolutely all cases would be inaccurate.

But Moscow’s overall line is clear: on international platforms, it systematically supports documents directed against Israel and resists attempts to hold Hamas accountable for the war.

In October 2023, Russia submitted its own draft resolution on Gaza to the UN Security Council. The text condemned violence against civilians, but Hamas was not mentioned at all, despite the massacre on October 7 and the hostage-taking. The project did not receive the necessary number of votes.

In June 2024, Russia was the only member of the Security Council to abstain from voting on Resolution №2735, which supported a ceasefire plan, the release of hostages, and a negotiation process. The other 14 members of the Security Council voted in favor.

Moscow seeks to present itself as a mediator, but its practical actions speak otherwise.

It receives Hamas, cooperates with Iran, politically shields Hezbollah, and uses the UN primarily to pressure Israel and oppose the USA.

This is no longer neutral mediation.

It is part of a broader strategy in which any force capable of weakening the West, Ukraine, or Israel is seen by the Kremlin as a useful partner.

What the sold flag really symbolizes

The Soviet flag that flew to the Moon with Apollo 11 does not remind of the greatness of the USSR.

It reminds of the possibility of dialogue between adversaries.

Buzz Aldrin did not support the Soviet regime. The USA did not abandon competition and did not forget the threat from Moscow. But the American astronaut considered it possible to take the symbol of a rival state on a flight as a sign that there are achievements belonging to all humanity.

In 1975, this gesture continued with a handshake between an American and a Soviet cosmonaut in orbit.

Today, Putin’s Russia offers a completely different symbolic series:

• rockets over Kyiv;
• Iranian drones over Ukrainian cities;
• agreements with a regime threatening Israel’s destruction;
• Hamas delegations in Moscow;
• political shielding of Hezbollah;
• and votes in the UN, where condemning Israel is almost always more important for the Kremlin than condemning the terrorists who attacked it.

For NAnews — Israel News, the story of the flag is important precisely because of this contrast.

Once, even during the Cold War, a small flag could become a sign of respect between rivals.

Putin, with his war against Ukraine, has turned modern Russia into a state that seeks not cooperation, but alliances with dictatorships, terrorist structures, and enemies of Israel.

Buzz Aldrin’s red flag remains an artifact of a lost opportunity.

And today’s Russia chose not a handshake in space, but rockets, terror, and partnership with those who fight against Ukraine and Israel.

On July 15, 2026, Israeli lawyer Alex Zernopolsky announced the conclusion of a case that his office had been handling for about three years: the Jerusalem District Court ordered the Population and Immigration Authority to grant permanent status to Liza K. and her mother Oksana K.

This decision comes after four years of struggle, numerous appeals, administrative procedures, and a court appeal. In 2022, Israeli authorities demanded that the mother and her minor daughter leave the country and return to Ukraine — at a time when their native Kherson was under Russian occupation.

Now the court has recognized that serious errors were made in the consideration of the case, and the family’s real connection to Israel was not properly assessed.

Deportation to Kherson during a full-scale war

Oksana K. first came to Israel in 2011. She later married an Israeli citizen, and in 2012 began the process of legalizing her status based on marriage. Her daughter Liza, who came to the country as a child, lived with her in Israel.

The family settled in Petah Tikva. Liza attended an Israeli school, spoke Hebrew fluently, and spent almost her entire conscious life in Israel.

Oksana’s husband died in August 2019. After his death, the usual procedure for obtaining status was halted, and the mother and daughter appealed to the Ministry of Interior to allow them to stay under special humanitarian circumstances.

The review was delayed.

On February 24, 2022, a few hours after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oksana and Liza attended a scheduled meeting at the Population Authority. They waited about six months for a response to their appeal.

In early September 2022, the Ministry of Interior reported that it did not consider their situation sufficient humanitarian grounds. The women were ordered to leave Israel within 14 days and return to Kherson, which was then under Russian control. Oksana’s eldest son was serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and participating in combat at that time.

At the time of the decision, Liza was still a minor. She was born on December 6, 2004, so in September 2022 she was 17 years old, not 15, as stated in some later retellings of this story.

Why the Ministry of Interior denied the family

The Population Authority argued that long-term residence in Israel alone is not sufficient reason to grant status.

In its official response, the agency stated that Oksana, besides her daughter, had no close relatives in Israel, while her son and sister remained in Ukraine. The Ministry of Interior also cited Oksana’s trips to Ukraine and questioned whether Israel was truly the center of the family’s life.

Some officials’ doubts concerned Oksana’s relationship with her deceased Israeli husband. According to the Population Authority, the legalization process was stopped and resumed several times, and the circumstances presented were insufficient to grant humanitarian status.

However, the agency’s formal approach almost did not take into account the daughter’s life.

Liza grew up in Israel, graduated from school here, spoke mainly in Hebrew, had friends, a team, coaches, and a professional future in the country. Ukraine remained her country of birth, but practically all her social and sports life was connected to Israel.

Israeli team — without Israeli status

Liza began playing handball shortly after arriving in the country. In the second grade, she enrolled in the Maccabi Petah Tikva sports school and later joined the youth and reserve teams of Israel.

The Israeli Handball Federation publicly supported the athlete back in September 2022. The women’s team coach, Reuven Yosfolski, described her as a tall, strong, and athletic handball player with serious technical capabilities and prospects in Israeli sports.

An absurd situation arose: Liza trained in the Israeli team uniform and was supposed to represent Israel in competitions, but the state itself refused to recognize her as a permanent resident.

Due to the lack of regulated status, she could not work normally, serve in the IDF, use regular medical insurance, or freely travel to international tournaments. In 2023, the athlete said she missed the European Championship, although she remained on the team until the last moment: the lack of documents prevented her from traveling with the team.

Liza also could not fulfill another dream — to undergo military conversion. Her school friends received draft notices and began service, while the girl who wanted to voluntarily serve Israel remained without official status.

Meanwhile, her sports career continued. Liza played for the adult team Maccabi Petah Tikva, was recognized as one of the breakthrough athletes of the season, and during her loan to Bnot Herzliya, participated in the club’s championship playoff matches.

Three years of administrative struggle

Alex Zernopolsky’s office got involved in the case at the stage of appealing the deportation decision.

After filing the appeal, the initial decision was overturned, and the mother and daughter’s application was sent for consideration by the interdepartmental humanitarian commission. However, this did not mean immediate receipt of documents.

According to Zernopolsky, the Ministry of Interior continued to delay the process. Family representatives were told that the police’s position was awaited, then claimed that the decision was under review by the central office. The internal appeal remained unanswered for a long time.

On July 31, 2023, the humanitarian commission reviewed the case again, but by September, a final decision had still not been made. The mother and daughter continued to live in Israel without regulated status, medical insurance, or certainty about the future.

The case then went through the Appeals Tribunal for Entry and Stay in Israel and reached the Jerusalem District Court.

What the Jerusalem District Court recognized

The final turn occurred on July 5, 2026.

Judge Tamar Bar-Asher of the Jerusalem District Court granted the administrative appeal of Liza K. and Oksana K. The court ruled that the Appeals Tribunal incorrectly assessed their connection to Israel.

The judge noted that Oksana’s trips to Ukraine could not automatically be used as evidence that the center of the family’s life was outside Israel. These trips needed to be considered in the context of her marriage, family situation, and many years of living in the country.

One of the key violations was that the Population Authority staff did not conduct a separate full interview with Liza. Her individual story — childhood in Israel, education, language, sports career, social connections, and desire to serve in the IDF — was not properly studied.

The court also took into account the conclusion of the representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, who recommended granting the mother and daughter’s request.

As a result, the court not only sent the case for another review but ordered the Population Authority to grant both women permanent resident status in Israel.

“As if I was released from prison”

After the decision, 21-year-old Liza told Israeli media that for the first time in many years, she felt solid ground under her feet.

She compared the years of uncertainty to being in detention and said she now finally feels part of the country. Obtaining permanent status allows her to voluntarily enlist in the IDF, begin the conversion process, and continue her professional sports career without previous restrictions.

Alex Zernopolsky called the decision the end of years of injustice against the widow of an Israeli citizen and her daughter — an athlete representing Israeli handball.

“I am glad that justice for the mother and daughter was achieved, even if delayed by several years,” the lawyer said after the court’s decision.

Why this decision is important for Israel

Liza K.’s story shows how serious the consequences of a formal approach to humanitarian cases can be.

A person can grow up in Israel, graduate from an Israeli school, speak Hebrew, represent the national team, aspire to serve in the IDF, and still remain a temporary foreigner to the state system for years.

The court’s position on minor children included in their parents’ immigration cases is especially important. Their circumstances cannot be considered only as an attachment to the mother’s or father’s documents. State bodies are obliged to separately assess where the child grew up, what language they speak, where they study, with which society they are connected, and which country they truly consider their home.

For Liza and Oksana K., the court decision ended almost four years of struggle against deportation.

For the Israeli system, this decision served as a reminder: humanitarian circumstances consist not only of passport stamps, entry and exit dates, or formal procedural stages. Behind each such case is a human life that cannot be put on hold for four years.

Page – Law Office of Alex Zernopolsky