In his native Buchach, a monument was erected in his honor, one of the city’s streets is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer is at the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”
Shmuel Agnon (born July 17, 1888, Buchach, Ukraine) is a famous Jewish writer whose life and work are closely connected with Ukraine. The events of his most famous novels, “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, take place in his native Buchach and its surroundings.
In Ukrainian Buchach
To date, not many of Agnon’s works have been translated into Ukrainian, but interest in them is growing in Ukraine, which means that Ukrainian readers are in for an acquaintance with his books.
The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate of 1966 “For his profoundly original narrative art with motifs from Jewish folk tales.” He became the first laureate of one of the Nobel Prizes representing Israel. He wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish.
The influence of the Talmud on Shmuel Agnon’s work was significant. He was born as Shmuel Yosef Halevi Czaczkes in July 1887 in Buchach, now Chortkiv district of Ternopil region. His father, Shalom Mordechai Halevi Czaczkes, was a rabbi and fur trader, knowledgeable in the Torah and Talmud, and often explained them to the local Jewish community.
Shmuel’s mother, Esther Farb, and grandfather, Yehuda Farb, were also educated people. Shmuel attended a cheder and received a good home education, studying Yiddish, Hebrew, German, and Ukrainian languages, as well as the Talmud under his father’s guidance.
Starting to write early, at the age of 8, Shmuel published stories in local newspapers. At 19, he moved to Lviv and worked in a Jewish newspaper. In 1907, his first novella “Forsaken Wives” was published, which in Hebrew sounds like “Agnon,” becoming his pseudonym and official surname since 1924.
Palestine and Berlin
In the same year, Agnon went to Palestine, and then to Berlin, where he wrote, lectured, gave private Hebrew lessons, and published works in the newspaper Jude.
He was supported by patron Zalman Schocken, who provided a five-year scholarship for organizing an anthology of Jewish literature and writing new works. Agnon’s works were published in German at Schocken’s publishing house in Berlin.
Love Against All Odds
In Berlin, Shmuel Agnon found true love — Esther Marks, or “dear Esterlein,” as he called her. The girl’s father was against their marriage, but they married anyway, and the ceremony was conducted by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg.
They had a daughter, Emuna (“faith”), and a son, Shalom Mordechai, whom they called Hemdat (“soul’s desire”) at home.
Three Destroyed Homes
In 1924, the family moved to Jerusalem. The move was preceded by tragedy: the writer’s house in Hamburg burned down, destroying the library and manuscripts, including the novel “The Community of the Ever-Living.”
Agnon decided to return to the Promised Land. He moved to Jerusalem first, and a year later called for Esther and the children. In 1927, an earthquake occurred in Jerusalem.
“The disaster did not destroy our souls,” Agnon wrote, “only the house we lived in.”
Two years later, in 1929, the new Agnon home in Jerusalem was looted during Arab riots. “Esterlein,” he wrote to his wife, “we need to start everything anew: the house is ruined, things are stolen or broken. But… do not grieve and do not think about it.”
World Fame and the Nobel Prize
Agnon gained world fame in the late 1940s when his works began to be published in English. In 1966, Agnon became the first writer writing in Hebrew and Yiddish to receive the Nobel Prize for the novels “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night.”
In his speech, he noted that he draws inspiration from spiritual literature.
“Keep Quiet! Agnon is Working!”
Israel is proud of its Nobel laureate. When a construction site was opened in the Talpiot area, Mayor Teddy Kollek installed a sign saying: “Keep quiet! Agnon is working!” European critics compared him to Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and William Faulkner.
Agnon wrote in various genres but was wounded by the fact that many of his readers became victims of the Holocaust. His last novel, “Just Recently,” set in Palestine during the Second Aliyah, is dedicated to the catastrophe of European Jewry.
Memory of the Writer
Shmuel Agnon died of a heart attack on February 17, 1970, in Jerusalem at the age of 82. He was buried on the Mount of Olives, and his apartment became a memorial museum.
In his native Buchach, which he last visited in 1930, a monument was erected in his honor, a street is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer adorns the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”
A series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ships in the Azov and Black Seas has escalated from isolated sabotage operations into a large-scale campaign against Russia’s military and economic logistics. The restriction of navigation, the destruction of an FSB ship, rising wheat prices, and the search for new routes for grain export have even led pro-Kremlin military bloggers to publicly question why Russian ports and the fleet have been left virtually defenseless.
There has been no literal uprising in Russia yet. There are no protesting sailors on the streets, and the Black Sea Fleet command has not turned against the Kremlin.
However, something unusual has happened in the Russian information system: pro-military Telegram channels, which for years justified the war against Ukraine, have begun openly accusing officials and military leadership of failing to protect their own fleet.
The trigger was a series of Ukrainian strikes conducted from July 6 to 15, 2026. Over nine days, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit 116 ships in the Azov Sea, after which the operation moved to the Black Sea, where on the night of July 14-15, another 20 Russian ships were struck.
Nine days that changed the situation in the Azov Sea
Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar,’ reported that Ukrainian units consistently attacked Russian tankers, bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, and other vessels involved in transportation between the Azov Sea, the Volga-Don Canal, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea.
The goal was not necessarily to sink every vessel. The Ukrainian side aimed to disable ships, force crews to abandon them, and leave damaged vessels adrift without the ability to continue operations.
Special attention was paid to the so-called feeder fleet — small and medium tankers that deliver petroleum products from Russian river and Azov ports to larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.
Strikes on such a system can disrupt several logistics chains at once:
fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
supply of Russian military facilities;
export of petroleum products;
transportation of grain and other agricultural cargo;
movement of ships between the Don, Azov, and Black Seas.
Reuters notes that the exact location and timing of each strike shown by the Ukrainian military could not be independently verified. The number 116 is also based on Ukrainian command data and does not mean that all these ships were sunk. However, subsequent navigation restrictions, satellite images, and admissions by Russian regional authorities confirm that the operation had real consequences.
Russia itself closed key maritime routes
On July 10, 2026, Russian border services effectively halted passage through the Azov-Don Canal — a shipping route connecting the Don River with the Azov Sea.
Simultaneously, shipping companies received notification that applications for passage through the Kerch Strait from 18:10 local time would not be accepted. The Russian side did not specify the duration of the restrictions.
The Kerch Strait is the only maritime exit from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. The Azov-Don Canal, in turn, connects the Azov Sea with Russia’s internal waterways system.
As a result, commercial vessels could move within the Azov Sea but could not normally leave it through the Kerch Strait or go through the canal towards the Don and Volga. Russian authorities did not officially announce a complete closure of the area, but industry sources confirmed the presence of restrictions.
Satellite images show a sharp change in maritime traffic. On June 6, 2026, more than 40 ships were waiting to pass near the Kerch Strait. In images from July 11, only a few ships remained in the same area.
Reuters examined more than 30 satellite images and noted that before the start of the Ukrainian campaign, ship clusters near the strait were regularly observed. After the restrictions were introduced, the usual picture disappeared.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, the number of Russian ships in the Azov Sea decreased from 267 on June 30 to approximately 120 by July 11 — about 55%. Some ships left before the routes were closed, some may have turned off their transponders, and damaged ships were sent for repair or remained in the area.
Russian grain exports were hit
The Azov Sea is important for Russia not only from a military standpoint.
Up to a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports pass through the ports and routes of this region. The Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai are among Russia’s main grain-producing regions, and nearby ports are used for exporting grain, sunflower oil, and other goods.
After information about navigation restrictions emerged, Euronext wheat prices rose by almost 4%, reaching a six-week high.
On July 14, 2026, the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Rostov region, Anna Kasyanenko, acknowledged that the region, along with exporters, began working on alternative routes for grain export due to ‘temporary difficulties’ with navigation in the Azov Sea.
The Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture simultaneously claimed that the events would supposedly not affect the domestic market and the country’s export capabilities. But the very fact of urgently seeking bypass routes shows that the problem has gone far beyond military reports.
Redirecting cargo to rail or distant ports means additional costs, a shortage of wagons, overloading of transport infrastructure, and increased delivery times. Even if Russia can partially restore exports, its cost inevitably rises.
The destruction of the ‘Izumrud’ and questions to Russian command
A separate symbol of this campaign was the destruction of the Russian border patrol ship of the second rank ‘Izumrud’, belonging to the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service.
The Ukrainian Navy reported that the ship was attacked near Novorossiysk by a marine drone Sargan-3000. According to Ukrainian data, there were casualties and injuries among the crew.
On July 14, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published a satellite image of the damaged ship near the quay wall. The Ukrainian side stated that the image confirms the destruction of the ‘Izumrud.’ Russia did not provide detailed official information about the ship’s condition.
This ship was already known in Ukraine.
On November 25, 2018, the ‘Izumrud’ participated in a Russian operation in the Kerch Strait when Russian forces attacked Ukrainian military boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol,’ as well as the tug ‘Yany Kapu.’ At that time, 24 Ukrainian sailors were captured.
Almost eight years later, the ship that participated in that operation itself became the target of a Ukrainian marine drone.
Even Kremlin supporters began asking questions
It was the strike on the FSB ship that caused an especially sharp reaction in the Russian pro-military community.
A military blogger associated with the Kremlin publicly asked why the entrance to the port was not blocked by protective nets and why Russian forces could not detect Ukrainian drones in advance.
He also accused officials of insufficient attention to protecting Russian ports from marine and aerial drones.
Another Russian milblogger posed an even more unpleasant question for the command: how did Ukrainian devices manage to approach the FSB ship unnoticed and strike near one of the most important basing areas of the Russian fleet.
The Institute for the Study of War notes that such criticism does not come from the Russian opposition but from people who support the war and demand that the Kremlin conduct it even more harshly. Therefore, their outrage cannot be considered an anti-war protest.
This is a different type of conflict — a clash between Russian propaganda, which for years told of the country’s complete security, and the reality in which Ukrainian drones reach ships, ports, and logistics facilities far from the front line.
The Black Sea became the next stage
After the active phase of the operation in the Azov Sea was completed, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces shifted strikes to the Black Sea.
On the night of July 14-15, 2026, according to Robert Brovdi, another 20 Russian ships were attacked:
17 oil tankers;
two gas carriers;
one tug.
Brovdi stated that the previous phase with 116 targets in the Azov Sea was completed, and the new phase will focus mainly on the Black Sea.
Thus, Russia faced not isolated attacks but a consistent campaign covering the entire connected maritime system: internal waterways, the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the attacks ‘terrorism’ and stated that Ukraine’s actions allegedly go beyond piracy.
The Ukrainian side responds that the targets are ships and vessels that support the Russian military machine, ensuring the transportation of fuel, petroleum products, and other resources used to continue the war.
Robert Brovdi responded to Lavrov with the phrase:
‘No piracy, Lavrov — just business. Your bloody business.’
Reuters quotes a source in the Russian shipping industry who compared the ships in the Azov Sea to targets before a firing squad and suggested that soon there may be almost no undamaged ships left in the area. Several grain carriers attacked on July 13 and 14, according to industry sources, caught fire.
Why this story is important for Israel
For Israel, events in the Azov and Black Seas have not only military significance.
Russia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and sunflower oil. Any prolonged restrictions on maritime trade can affect global prices, insurance rates, freight costs, and supply routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
The first consequences have already manifested in the European wheat market, although it is too early to assert that the July campaign will lead to a long-term increase in food prices in Israel.
The strategic aspect is no less important.
Ukraine demonstrates that relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can paralyze ship movement, force the enemy to close straits and canals, and pose a threat to a larger fleet without classical sea superiority.
For Israel, which simultaneously faces threats from drones, missiles, attacks on maritime routes, and attempts to disrupt trade through the Red Sea, the Ukrainian experience is of particular interest.
NANews — Israel News views the events not as a story of a sudden ‘rebellion’ by Russian propagandists, but as a sign of a deeper crisis.
The Kremlin promised that the war would not approach Russian cities and ports. Now Russian ships are burning in the Azov Sea, an FSB ship is destroyed near a base, exporters are seeking bypass routes, and war supporters are asking where the protection they were told about four years ago has gone.
The Ukrainian operation has not yet completely destroyed Russian maritime logistics. There is no independent confirmation of the defeat of each of the claimed 136 ships.
But the main result is already clear: Russia is forced to change routes, restrict its own navigation, and spend more resources on protecting ports that were recently considered a safe rear.
And the public panic of pro-military Russian channels shows that marine drones hit not only ships.
They destroy one of the Kremlin’s main myths — the myth of a state capable of controlling the sea, protecting its own territory, and continuing the war against Ukraine with impunity.
Representatives of Ukraine were among the participants of the international educational seminar of Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, which brought together 209 educators, teachers, and leaders of Jewish schools from 26 countries in Israel.
Over eight days, participants familiarized themselves with modern life in Israel, visited historical and natural sites, met with Israeli educators, local authorities, security personnel, and community members who have experienced difficult events in recent years.
The international program took place in Israel from July 7 to 14, 2026 under the leadership of the educational division of KKL — Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, also known as the Jewish National Fund.
Ukraine among 26 countries — but the names of the participants have not yet been announced
The Israeli publication Yeshuvnik reported that representatives from the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other countries participated in the annual seminar.
Thus, the participation of the Ukrainian delegation is officially confirmed by the organizers.
However, KKL and Israeli media have not yet reported how many educators came from Ukraine, which cities and educational institutions they represented, nor have they published their names.
It is only known that among the 209 participants were teachers, directors, and leaders of Jewish schools, as well as specialists in formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education.
For Ukraine, participation in such a seminar is of particular importance.
Ukrainian Jewish schools and communities continue to operate under conditions of full-scale war, air raids, forced family migration, and partial transition to distance learning.
Therefore, the opportunity for direct communication with colleagues from Israel and other countries becomes not only a professional exchange but also a way to maintain the connection of Ukrainian Jewish youth with Israel, Jewish history, and international communities.
The very fact of the presence of representatives from Ukraine shows that Ukrainian Jewish education remains part of the global Jewish space even under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression.
What was included in the educational program
The seminar was not an ordinary familiarization trip but a week-long educational program across different regions of Israel.
Participants visited natural, archaeological, and historical sites, learned about the work of KKL, met with educators, security personnel, municipal leaders, and local residents.
Special attention was paid to communities affected after the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war.
Educators were told not only about the consequences of the tragedy but also about the restoration of Israeli settlements, mutual assistance, the return of residents, and the work of educational institutions in crisis conditions.
The organizers aimed to show participants modern Israel not only through media reports and political debates but through direct meetings with people.
Educators were to see a country that simultaneously faces military, social, and educational challenges and continues to restore affected communities.
For many foreign teachers, such meetings become the basis for future lessons and conversations with students.
NANews — News of Israel notes that educators often become the main source of systematic knowledge about Israel for children in the diaspora.
The perception of Israel by the next generation of Jewish youth depends on the materials and personal stories they bring home.
Education after October 7
The official program of the American delegation allows for a more detailed understanding of the main directions of the international seminar.
Participants were offered lectures, discussions, and practical sessions dedicated to teaching Jewish history and Zionism after October 7.
The program also included familiarization with KKL educational materials, visits to Jewish National Fund sites, historical places of the Jewish people, and participation in volunteer work.
The issue of how to talk to children and teenagers about Israel in conditions of war, rising anti-Semitism, and harsh international debates was separately considered.
For educators, this is a challenging task.
They need to talk about the terrorist attack, hostages, casualties, and war, but at the same time not turn the study of Israel solely into a conversation about violence and tragedy.
That is why the organizers included topics of Israeli society’s resilience, mutual responsibility, community restoration, ecology, the country’s history, and modern educational work in the program.
KKL also provided educators with materials they could use after returning to their own schools.
American participants, for example, had previously committed to preparing educational projects for their educational institutions in collaboration with JNF-USA representatives.
They were expected to talk about the trip on social media, speak to their community, and incorporate the experience gained into school programs.
These conditions apply directly to the American delegation, but they show the general approach of the organizers: the seminar should continue in the form of lessons, events, and projects after the participants return home.
Educators are called ‘messengers of Israeli history’
KKL Chairman Eyal Ostrinsky stated that the decision of hundreds of Jewish educators to come to Israel during a difficult period is an expression of trust, responsibility, and shared destiny.
According to him, educators become a kind of ‘messengers of Israeli history’ in their communities.
Direct acquaintance with the country, its people, and the values of Zionism should provide them with tools for educating the next generation of the Jewish people.
KKL emphasizes that such educational programs help strengthen ties between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.
The task is not only to transmit knowledge.
Participants from different countries get to know each other, discuss teaching methods, and have the opportunity to create joint educational programs.
After the seminar, they return to their countries with materials, personal impressions, and contacts of colleagues.
For representatives of Ukraine, this experience can be especially important, as Ukrainian Jewish schools are simultaneously part of Ukrainian society, the international Jewish space, and the system of relations between Ukraine and Israel.
Ukrainian educators participate in KKL programs not for the first time
The participation of the Ukrainian side in the KKL international seminar has a long history.
In July 2023, a similar program was attended by 250 educators from 22 countries and 27 educational institutions.
At that time, KKL separately reported that Ukraine was represented by 14 teachers.
One of the participants was Ukrainian educator Natala Androshenko.
She said that materials from previous KKL seminars were used in her school in geography, ecology, history, Jewish tradition lessons, and in the study of nature.
According to her, such classes helped students become closer to Israel and better understand Zionism.
Androshenko also noted the value of communication with directors and educators of Jewish schools from different countries.
There is no confirmation that she participated in the 2026 seminar.
However, her story shows how the knowledge gained by Ukrainian educators in Israel is subsequently used in working with children in Ukraine.
This practical result is one of the main meanings of the program.
Educators do not just visit Israel but return to their schools with ready-made methodological materials, new contacts, and personal stories.
For NANews — News of Israel, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the seminar is also important as an example of the ongoing dialogue between Israel and Ukraine at the level of education and Jewish communities.
Such connections do not always receive noticeable attention in major media, but they are the ones that form long-term relationships between countries.
Political statements change, governments argue, but the work of teachers with children continues for years.
What remains unknown
KKL confirmed the presence of representatives from Ukraine but did not publish the composition of the delegation.
At the time of publication, the following are unknown:
— the exact number of participants from Ukraine;
— their names and positions;
— the cities they represented;
— the names of Jewish schools and organizations;
— the separate program of the Ukrainian group;
— the topics or projects that Ukrainian educators plan to implement after returning.
Therefore, it cannot yet be asserted that a certain number of Ukrainian teachers or representatives of specific organizations arrived in Israel.
But the very fact of Ukrainian participation is confirmed by both the Israeli publication and the KKL announcement.
From July 7 to 14, 2026, representatives of Ukraine, along with educators from 25 other countries, studied Israel’s experience, exchanged educational practices, and discussed how to preserve the Jewish identity of the next generation in a world that has become even more complex and divided after October 7.
Ukrainian center Dmitry Skapintsev completed his performances for the basketball club Hapoel Jerusalem after one season in Israel. The contract with the 28-year-old basketball player was not extended, and now the former New York Knicks player has gained free agent status.
Hapoel Jerusalem officially announced the departure of the Ukrainian on July 14, 2026.
“Dima, thank you very much for your dedication, commitment, and fight in every minute spent on the court. We wish you great success in the future,” reads the farewell message from the Jerusalem club. The Israeli sports channel Sport5 emphasizes that Skapintsev leaves the team after one season and that his departure is another element of a large-scale roster overhaul.
At the same time, this is not about a scandal, disciplinary conflict, or early termination of the agreement.
In August 2025, Skapintsev signed a one-season contract with an option to extend for another year. Hapoel decided not to use the option provided by the agreement, so the cooperation ended after the first season.
From the NBA and G League to Jerusalem
Dmitry Skapintsev was born on May 12, 1998, in Cherkasy. The height of the Ukrainian basketball player is about 216 centimeters. He plays as a center and is capable of covering the position of a power forward.
Before moving to Israel, Skapintsev went through an unusual path for a Ukrainian basketball player.
He played in Ukraine and Lithuania, after which he went to the USA. Skapintsev spent most of his American career in the NBA G League, where he played for the farm teams of the New York Knicks, Boston Celtics, and Portland Trail Blazers.
On December 23, 2023, the New York Knicks signed a two-way contract with Skapintsev. The Ukrainian played two games in the NBA regular season, getting a few minutes of playing time, and then returned to the G League.
In the 2024/25 season, Skapintsev averaged 9 points, 7.9 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in the G League. At the time of his transition to Israel, he was considered a physically powerful center with experience in training and games in the North American basketball system.
Hapoel’s head coach Yonatan Alon noted his toughness, rebounding ability, decision-making under the basket, and potential to strengthen the team in the paint after signing the Ukrainian.
However, Skapintsev failed to become a stable player in the main rotation in Jerusalem.
“I don’t fully understand my role”
Problems with playing time became noticeable during the season.
In February 2026, Skapintsev admitted that he did not fully understand his role in Hapoel. According to the Ukrainian, at the beginning of the season, he received more minutes, but later his participation in games decreased.
The center explained that he tries to do everything he can to return to a stable rotation. At the same time, he noted that the head coach preferred players he had worked with for more than a year.
These words help to better understand the club’s subsequent decision.
Skapintsev’s departure cannot be called a surprise solely because of his statistics. The Ukrainian was useful in rebounding and rim protection but did not secure a stable role in the team and rarely spent significant stretches on the court.
At the same time, Hapoel did not officially name the player’s professional performance as the reason for not extending the contract. In the farewell message, the club, on the contrary, emphasized his attitude to work, dedication, and fight.
What the official statistics show
Ukrainian sports media publications presented different figures regarding Skapintsev’s performances in Israel.
Football24 reported that in 14 Israeli championship games, the Ukrainian averaged 6.1 points, 2.1 rebounds, and 0.6 assists.
However, the official statistics of the Israeli Basketball Super League show different results for the regular season:
14 games;
8 starts;
16.9 minutes on the court;
5.4 points;
5.8 rebounds;
0.5 assists;
1 block;
0.6 steals per game on average.
Skapintsev made 66.7% of his two-point shots and 71.4% of his free throws. In total, he scored 75 points and grabbed 81 rebounds in the regular season.
Thus, the figure of 2.1 rebounds provided by the initial Ukrainian source does not match the data from the Israeli league. Rebounding was one of the most noticeable strengths of the Ukrainian center.
In the playoffs, Skapintsev participated in two more games. On average, he scored 5.5 points and grabbed 3.5 rebounds in 13.5 minutes.
In the EuroCup, the Ukrainian played 15 games. His stats were 4.4 points, 3.2 rebounds, and 0.3 assists in about ten minutes of playing time.
Considering the Israeli championship, playoffs, EuroCup, and Winner Cup, Skapintsev played about 34 official games for the Jerusalem club.
Not a failure, but not a breakthrough
Skapintsev’s first season in Israel is hard to call a failure.
When the Ukrainian received playing time, he regularly helped the team in rebounding, created physical pressure under the basket, and used his height advantage. The figure of 5.8 rebounds in 16.9 minutes in the regular season confirms that the center remained quite effective in a limited stretch.
But the modern Hapoel, aiming for leading positions in Israel and Europe, needed a player who could either consistently play in the starting lineup or become a key element of the second unit.
Skapintsev found himself between these roles.
He started in eight regular-season games but spent less than 17 minutes on the court. In the EuroCup, his playing time was even less — about ten minutes. This meant that the coaching staff did not consider the Ukrainian as the team’s main center.
As noted by NAnews — News of Israel, in this case, it is more accurate to talk not about the failure of the Ukrainian basketball player, but about the mismatch of his playing qualities with the role the coaching staff was ready to offer him.
Hapoel began a major overhaul
The decision not to extend the contract with Skapintsev was made against the backdrop of significant changes in the Jerusalem club.
In the Israeli regular season, Hapoel finished third, winning 18 out of 26 games. In the playoffs, the team reached the semifinals, where they lost to Hapoel Tel Aviv in a series with a score of 0:3.
In the EuroCup, the Jerusalemites took first place in their group but ended their performances in the quarterfinals. In the decisive match, Hapoel lost to the Turkish Turk Telekom with a score of 90:91.
After the end of the season, Yonatan Alon, who had led Hapoel for three years, left the team.
Experienced Serbian specialist Sasha Obradovic was appointed as the new head coach. The club’s management announced its intention to build a team capable of competing for all Israeli titles and potentially entering the EuroLeague.
Against this backdrop, Skapintsev’s departure looks like part of the overall restructuring of the roster to meet the new coach’s requirements.
The club has already started signing new basketball players, including front-line players. Therefore, the decision to forgo the option in the Ukrainian’s contract is likely not related to one specific game or episode but to the formation of a new team model.
Hapoel has not officially confirmed this, so it is a conclusion drawn from the sequence of the club’s personnel decisions.
The Ukrainian stayed in Israel during the escalation
Skapintsev’s behavior during the security escalation in Israel deserves special attention.
In June 2026, several foreign basketball players from Hapoel decided to leave the country. Skapintsev was among the legionnaires who stayed in Israel after the club’s management provided players with additional security guarantees.
For the Ukrainian basketball player, the topic of war and security holds special significance.
Back in February, Skapintsev said that he studied the situation in Israel before moving. He emphasized that what was happening in the country at that time could not be compared to the full-scale war in Ukraine.
The decision to stay with the team in a difficult moment partially explains why Hapoel specifically mentioned the Ukrainian’s dedication, commitment, and fight in the farewell address.
One of the best matches for Ukraine — before leaving the club
It is symbolic that the announcement of Skapintsev’s departure from Hapoel came shortly after one of the center’s best matches for the Ukrainian national team.
On July 2, 2026, Ukraine defeated Georgia with a score of 95:76 in a nominally home match of the 2027 World Cup qualification held in Riga.
Skapintsev started in the starting five, scored 17 points, and grabbed 14 rebounds, achieving a double-double. Thanks to this victory, the Ukrainian national team advanced to the second stage of the World Cup qualification ahead of schedule.
This match showed that the Ukrainian remains capable of being a noticeable and productive basketball player with sufficient playing time and a clear role on the court.
Therefore, leaving Hapoel should not be perceived as the end of his career at a high level.
Skapintsev is 28 years old — for a center, this is an age when basketball players often reach the peak of their physical capabilities and professional stability.
What will happen next
After Hapoel’s refusal to use the extension option, Dmitry Skapintsev became a free agent.
At the moment, the new club of the Ukrainian center has not been officially announced.
Considering his NBA and G League experience, performances in the EuroCup, playing for the Ukrainian national team, and rare physical attributes for European basketball, Skapintsev may interest teams from the championships of Israel, Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, or other European countries.
The main question for the Ukrainian will be not only the level of the next club but also the role they can offer him.
The season in Jerusalem showed that Skapintsev is capable of effectively rebounding and protecting the space under the basket, but he needs stable minutes and the trust of the coaching staff.
For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is important not only as another transfer news.
Dmitry Skapintsev became one of the few Ukrainian basketball players in recent years to play simultaneously in a leading Israeli club, a European tournament, and the Ukrainian national team.
He leaves Jerusalem without scandal and public mutual claims. Hapoel thanked the Ukrainian for his professionalism and fight, and Skapintsev himself gets the opportunity to find a team where his height, experience, and play under the basket will be used much more actively.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry reminded that on November 10, 1975, the USSR achieved the adoption of Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism a “form of racism”. Today, Russia, relying on Iran and its allies, repeats the same rhetoric under the guise of “fighting Nazism” in Ukraine.
“Today marks the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the disgraceful UN Resolution No. 3379 (XXX). On the night of November 10-11, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution by 72 votes in favor, 35 against, and 32 abstentions, declaring Zionism a form of racism.
The Soviet Union, with the support of Arab states, finally achieved its goal.”
For Israel, it was not just a diplomatic blow — it was a moment when the false Soviet myth received the UN’s seal.
In his speech, Israeli representative Chaim Herzog publicly tore up the text of the resolution, declaring that “persecutions will only strengthen Zionism.”
How Moscow Fabricated the Narrative
The Israeli Foreign Ministry directly reminded how Moscow laid the foundation of anti-Zionism:
“The first significant attempts to link Zionism with racism, and particularly with fascism (which in the USSR became synonymous with Nazism), on the international stage were made by Moscow in 1964. At that time, in response to a proposal to include condemnation of anti-Semitism in a resolution on racial discrimination, Soviet representatives unofficially threatened that they would be ‘forced’ to bring their amendment condemning Nazism, fascism, and Zionism to general discussion.”
Later, in 1965, the USSR fulfilled its threat and introduced an amendment to the UN equating anti-Semitism and Zionism:
“The Soviet Union, fulfilling its previous year’s threat, introduced the following amendment: ‘UN member states condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, as well as any manifestations of colonial policy and ideology, national and racial hatred, and pledge to do everything possible for their speedy elimination.’”
“Subsequent attempts to bring the condemnation of anti-Semitism to the UN General Assembly always encountered counter-attempts from the USSR to condemn Zionism,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry statement said.
From Ideological Campaign to Diplomatic Blackmail
The break in relations with Israel lifted all restrictions on comparing Zionism with racism, and the USSR embarked on large-scale propaganda.
“Over 8 years (1967–1975), more than 120 books and brochures were published, aimed at ‘revealing’ the racist nature of Zionism. Not only Marx but also Hitler and Goebbels were called as witnesses,” notes the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
In December 1973, with Moscow’s support, an amendment appeared in the UN condemning “Israeli Zionist imperialism,” and in 1975, the Third Committee of the UN supported an anti-Zionist resolution prepared by Arab countries.
“As a result, personal and state terror from Arab states, fueled by Moscow, bore fruit: on October 17, 1975, the Third Committee adopted resolution A/C.3/L.2519 condemning Zionism,” the Foreign Ministry publication states.
After the adoption of Resolution 3379, the USSR perceived it as international legitimization of its anti-Zionist line.
In Soviet propaganda of the 1970s-80s, a huge number of publications appeared where:
“Zionism” was presented as an ideology of Jewish world domination, closely linked with US imperialism;
Israel was depicted as a “racist military outpost” of the West in the Middle East;
the term “Zionism” was used as a veiled form of anti-Semitism.
Propaganda was conducted through all channels — from films to academic works of the Academy of Sciences. In special publications, like the journal “Asia and Africa Today”, Israel was systematically equated with apartheid and colonialism.
For the USSR, it was not a fight against Israel but a tool for controlling the Middle East and Africa.
Under the slogan of “anti-racism,” the Soviet Union built political alliances and sold weapons to dozens of Arab regimes.
1991: Repeal Without Repentance
Only on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/86 repealed the assertion of “Zionism as a form of racism.”
But in Russia, anti-Zionist rhetoric survived the USSR.
In the newspapers of the 90s, they still wrote about the “Zionist lobby,” and in the UN, Moscow played the role of a “balancing factor,” using the old Soviet lexicon.
Nevertheless, at the level of rhetoric, nothing changed:
Russian newspapers of the 1990s (especially of a patriotic and nationalist nature) continued to use the phrase “Zionist lobby”;
in textbooks and media, the term “Zionism” was often presented as something “aggressive” and “anti-Arab”;
some former Soviet diplomats and journalists continued to claim that “the repeal of the resolution was a mistake under US pressure.”
After 2022: “Zionism = Nazism” — A New Turn in Kremlin Rhetoric
With the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Moscow returned to the Soviet method of ideological inversion: accusing others of what it does itself.
Now the role of “global evil” in Kremlin narratives is shared by two targets — Ukraine and Israel.
The formula has changed, but the essence remains the same:
Israel is accused of “double standards” and “supporting neo-Nazis in Kyiv”;
the word “Zionism” is once again used in the rhetoric of Russia’s allies — Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorists — as a synonym for aggression;
federal TV channels and propagandists broadcast claims like: “Israel copies Nazi methods”, substituting historical meanings and distorting the memory of the Holocaust.
In reality, the Kremlin itself is building around itself a axis of anti-Zionism and anti-Ukrainianism, where old Soviet narratives and new geopolitical alliances have merged.
Russia uses the UN and diplomatic platforms of the “Global South” to once again instill the myth: Israel is the “oppressor,” Ukraine is the “puppet,” the West is the “source of evil.”
This scheme works as an ideological weapon:
in the Arab world, it legitimizes an alliance with Iran and Hamas,
inside the country — justifies repression and anti-Western mobilization,
and in relation to Ukraine — creates a pseudo-historical justification for aggression.
Fifty years ago, on November 10, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the disgraceful Resolution No. 3379, declaring Zionism a form of racism. This lie, spread by the USSR and its allies, dealt a heavy blow to Jews worldwide and Israeli diplomacy. But the truth prevailed — in 1991, the resolution was repealed.
Today we must remember: anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.
This phrase today sounds like a warning: when lies become diplomacy, the path to aggression begins.
Exactly what Russia is doing in relation to Ukraine — accusing it of “Nazism” and “Russophobia” to justify occupation, destruction, and killings.
Thus, Moscow repeats the model of the USSR of the 1970s, when anti-Zionism was used as a shield for anti-Semitism, and now anti-Ukrainianism has become a cover for war crimes.
“New Slogans” of Old Ideology
Modern Russian anti-Zionist formulas almost literally repeat Soviet ones, but the mask has changed.
Then they spoke of “colonialism,” today — of “globalism.”
Then they fought against “Israeli imperialism,” now — against “Western neo-Nazism.”
The same method, the same addressee — the Arab world, African countries, and now also the “Global South.”
Russia tries to implant its agenda in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and African media, portraying Israel and Ukraine as part of a “Western conspiracy.”
Conclusion: Lies Do Not Die If Not Exposed
The USSR began by imposing the idea of “Zionism = racism” on the world.
Modern Russia, in alliance with Iran and anti-Israeli forces, continues to exploit the same narrative — only under new slogans:
now it is “fighting neo-Nazism,” “denazification,” and “protection of traditional values.”
Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on — in the propaganda plots of Russian media, in the speeches of diplomats, and in the strategic alliance with Iran, which openly calls for the destruction of Israel.
What was once called “anti-Zionism” today returns as a policy of total denial of the right to exist — both for Israel and Ukraine.
Israel will always oppose attempts to once again defame Zionism and rewrite history. We remember and will not allow the past to be repeated.
That is why the Israeli reminder of the disgrace of 1975 is not just history.
It is a warning to both Kyiv and Jerusalem:
lies, not condemned in time, return in a new form,
and once again serve as justification for aggression.
Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on in Moscow’s statements and in the Kremlin’s alliances with the same circle of states that were “warmed up by Moscow” half a century ago.
On the morning of July 15, 2026, Russian forces dropped six guided aerial bombs on the Sumy urban community. One of the bombs exploded near medical facilities where people were present and transport was moving. Three civilians were killed, and another 17 people were injured.
The Russian attack on Sumy continued practically all night and morning.
Initially, Russian forces used a cluster munition against a private housing area, then attacked city gas stations and residential buildings with drones, and around 09:00 began dropping guided aerial bombs on the regional center.
According to the head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration, Oleg Grigorov, Russian aviation carried out six strikes with guided bombs on the territory of the Sumy community.
One of the aerial bombs hit near medical facilities — in an area with heavy movement of people, cars, and public transport. The other five strikes, according to preliminary data, targeted infrastructure facilities.
Three dead, among the injured — a 16-year-old teenager
Initially, authorities reported three dead and seven injured. However, as people sought medical help, the number of injured increased to 17 people.
Among the injured is a 16-year-old boy.
He and two other seriously injured individuals underwent surgery. The remaining injured were examined by doctors, and some people were discharged from hospitals after receiving medical assistance.
Among the dead are confirmed a man and a woman.
The third deceased suffered such severe injuries that specialists could not even determine the person’s gender immediately after discovering the body. The identities of all the deceased are being clarified.
Oleg Grigorov called the incident another deliberate strike by Russian forces on the civilian population.
At the epicenter of one of the explosions were civilians and transport. This means that the Russian side could not have been unaware of the consequences of using a heavy aerial bomb in a busy urban area.
The bomb fell near the sidewalk
Journalists from the local publication ‘Kordon.Media’, who worked directly on the scene, reported that one of the Russian aerial bombs hit a flowerbed near the sidewalk.
In the nearby buildings, the blast wave shattered windows. Cars near the impact site were damaged.
After the first explosions, eyewitnesses reported a fire and burning cars. Medics, rescuers, police, and utility services were working on the scene.
The exact names of the medical facilities were not disclosed by the authorities for security reasons.
It has also not been officially reported which specific modification of guided aerial bombs was used by Russian aviation. In the regional administration’s reports, the munitions are referred to as guided bombs.
The air raid alert lasted from early morning
The air raid alert in the Sumy district was announced around 05:12.
The military warned of the threat of Russian drones and the possible use of guided aerial bombs.
The first powerful explosions, associated with a series of strikes with guided bombs, sounded around 09:00. For more than 30 minutes afterward, city residents continued to hear explosions.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported several times about the launches of aerial bombs towards Sumy, including repeated launches.
Thus, people were under the threat not of a single strike, but of a prolonged series of aerial attacks.
For the border regional center, this creates an especially dangerous situation: the distance to the launch site is small, and the time between the warning and the possible impact of the bomb can be extremely short.
Before the aerial bombs, the city was attacked by drones
The strikes with six guided bombs were a continuation of attacks that began at night.
Russian FPV drones and ‘Molniya’ type drones struck gas stations in the Kovpakovsky and Zarechny districts of Sumy.
As a result of one of the hits, a 63-year-old suburban minibus driver received severe multiple injuries. The man was hospitalized.
A fire broke out at one of the gas stations, which was extinguished.
Around 07:20, a Russian drone hit a residential building in the Kovpakovsky district.
A fire started in the house, the roof of the building and the garage were damaged. In the neighboring house, the blast wave shattered windows.
There was no one in the attacked house at the time of the hit. However, in the neighboring building, there was an elderly immobile woman. She was taken to the hospital with an acute stress reaction.
About an hour later, another Russian drone struck nearby, causing a new fire.
Cluster strike on the evening of July 14
In fact, the current attack on Sumy began on the evening of July 14, 2026.
According to preliminary conclusions of specialists, Russian forces shelled the outskirts of the city with a long-range multiple launch rocket system, using a cluster combat element.
The strike hit a private residential area.
At least ten households were damaged. Seven residents of Sumy were injured in the attack, including an 11-year-old boy.
Two adults — a 30-year-old man and a 59-year-old woman — received severe injuries.
Unexploded cluster elements were found in the affected area. Explosive technicians examined the area and neutralized the found munitions.
The use of cluster elements in a residential area poses a threat not only during the shelling itself.
Unexploded parts of munitions can remain on streets, in yards, near houses and cars, turning into delayed-action mines for residents and rescuers.
The third deadly airstrike in less than two weeks
The attack on July 15 was already the third heavy strike with guided aerial bombs on Sumy in less than two weeks.
Strike on July 11
On July 11, during the day, Russian aviation dropped three guided bombs on the Zarechny district of Sumy.
One of the strikes hit a road and a public transport stop. Another hit an infrastructure facility.
As a result of the attack, five people died immediately after the strike, including a 13-year-old girl. Later, a 48-year-old woman who received critical injuries died in the hospital.
Thus, the number of dead increased to six people.
A total of 44 injured required medical assistance. As of July 14, 17 injured remained in hospitals, including four children. Two adults were in serious condition.
The blast wave damaged residential high-rise buildings, hundreds of windows and balcony structures, cars, and civilian infrastructure facilities.
Strike on July 3
On the evening of July 3, Russian forces also attacked Sumy with guided aerial bombs and drones.
One of the bombs hit the central part of the city — in the area of a high-rise residential building, a store, and a road where many people were present.
Four civilians were killed: two men, a young woman, and her five-year-old daughter.
The deceased woman’s older daughter was injured and hospitalized.
According to updated data, 36 people were injured. Twenty high-rise residential buildings, three private houses, and three non-residential buildings were damaged.
Sumy is being turned into a constant zone of aerial terror
The strikes on July 3, 11, and 15 show that these are not isolated random hits.
Russian forces are consistently using guided aerial bombs, drones, multiple launch rocket systems, and cluster munitions against the regional center.
The targets and impact zones include roads, public transport stops, residential buildings, gas stations, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure.
In just the three mentioned guided bomb attacks in Sumy, at least 13 people have been killed, and dozens of civilians have been injured.
NAnews — Israel News highlights: what is happening in Sumy should be considered not only as another front-line report.
This is a systematic use of powerful aerial munitions against a large city where families continue to live, hospitals operate, public transport runs, and people are forced to go out on the streets daily.
The Israeli audience is well aware of how important early warning systems, protected spaces, and the time available to the civilian population after an alarm signal are.
However, in the case of guided aerial bombs, Sumy residents often have only a few minutes, sometimes even less, to find a safe place.
After the strikes on July 15, rescue and medical services continued to work at the impact sites. Authorities warned residents not to approach damaged areas due to the risk of new attacks and the possible presence of unexploded munitions.
NAnews — Israel News continues to monitor updates on the condition of the injured and the consequences of the Russian attack on Sumy.
The data on the number of dead and injured may be updated.
In the eighth part, we will analyze platforms that rarely become the main promotion channel but can enhance the digital presence of small businesses in Israel. These are decentralized social networks, story platforms, alternative video hosting, author communities, monetization channels, and additional profiles that help the brand appear broader and more sustainable.
It is important for small businesses to understand a simple thing: the client does not always come from the first click.
Sometimes they first see a publication, then check the profile, then open a video, then look at an additional page, then search for the main site, and only after that write. Therefore, external platforms do not work as random “extra accounts” but as part of a large trust system.
Not only big social networks: how small businesses in Israel can use alternative platforms and author communities. Part 8
The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how such a network can be built. The project itself is related to Israeli news, Ukrainian topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same principle applies to small businesses: each platform should explain who you are, what you are useful for, where the main site is, and how to contact you.
Friendica: decentralized network and connection with Fediverse
Friendica is a decentralized social network and software platform for communication between different servers. It appeared in 2010 and became part of the broader Fediverse environment, where different independent nodes can interact with each other.
Unlike regular social networks, Friendica is not built around one central corporate site. Its idea is distributed communication, control over one’s own profile, connection with other networks, and the ability not to depend entirely on one platform.
In terms of market share, Friendica does not compete with Facebook, X, or LinkedIn. It is a niche platform for users who value independence, open code, federation, privacy, and alternative social infrastructure. It is used by technical communities, independent authors, activists, media projects, and people interested in the development of the open web.
For small businesses in Israel, Friendica can be useful as an additional point of presence. It is not a channel for quick sales, but a good signal for an audience that values independent digital solutions and a freer network architecture.
Wattpad: stories, texts, and working with the reader audience
Wattpad is a platform for reading and publishing stories. It has been operating since 2006 and became known as a space for authors, readers, fan stories, teenage literature, novels, short prose, and original texts.
In terms of scale, Wattpad holds a strong position specifically in the storytelling sphere. It is not a regular social network for news or business, but a huge reader environment where people come for stories. The platform is used by authors, aspiring writers, fan communities, publishing projects, and readers looking for long texts, serialization, and an emotional connection with the author.
For small businesses, Wattpad may not be useful for everyone. But if the business is related to culture, education, personal branding, books, creativity, history, media, or storytelling, such a platform helps to show not only the service but also the voice of the project.
For example, an educational project can publish short stories, an author — book fragments, a cultural initiative — essays, and media — texts that work not as news but as a narrative.
The profile Wattpad — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an additional platform for the project’s textual presence and work with an audience that loves to read stories, not just short publications.
Parler: alternative social network and niche audience
Parler is an alternative social network that became known as a platform for users seeking a different environment for public discussions outside of major social platforms. It appeared in 2018 and was especially actively discussed in the context of American political and media agendas.
In terms of market share, Parler is significantly smaller than the largest social networks. It cannot be considered a mass promotion channel for any business. Rather, it is a niche platform where the audience is specific, and the perception of the platform itself depends on the political and social context.
For small businesses in Israel, Parler may make sense only as an additional external profile, not as a basis for promotion. If a business builds a wide digital map, it is sometimes useful to secure the brand name on different platforms, but the main focus should still be on the website, Google, maps, Facebook, LinkedIn, Telegram, video, and local channels.
GETTR: short publications and alternative public feed
GETTR is a social platform launched in 2021. It was positioned as an alternative network for public messages, short publications, subscriptions, comments, and political discussions. In format, it is closer to microblogging and a public feed.
GETTR does not occupy a market share comparable to X, Facebook, Instagram, or TikTok. Its audience is more niche, and the platform itself is more associated with an alternative political and social environment. For businesses, this means that expecting a large flow of clients from GETTR is not advisable.
But as an additional profile in the overall presence system, such a platform can be used. Especially if the project works with an international audience, public topics, media agenda, or wants to secure its brand on different network platforms.
PayChute: support for authors and connection with the audience
PayChute is a platform for authors and communities related to content support, feedback, and direct interaction between the creator and the audience. Its logic is close to the creator economy: the author or project receives a separate page where they can collect support, publish materials, and build relationships with subscribers.
In terms of market, PayChute is not a mass social network and does not compete with Patreon, Ko-fi, or Gumroad in terms of popularity. It is a more niche platform that should be considered as an additional support channel, not as the main sales tool.
For small businesses in Israel, PayChute can be useful if the project is related to independent content, media, educational materials, cultural initiatives, author programs, or community. In such cases, audience support becomes not just a donation but a way to show that the project is alive and has people who care about it.
BitChute: alternative video hosting and additional video archive
BitChute is an alternative video platform launched in 2017. It became known as a video hosting for authors who want to post materials outside of YouTube and other major video services. The platform is often discussed as part of the alternative media environment.
In terms of mass market share, BitChute is much smaller than YouTube, TikTok, Instagram Reels, or Vimeo. Its audience is more niche, and the platform’s reputation is ambiguous due to content often associated with alternative politics, controversial topics, and weak moderation.
For small businesses, BitChute should not be the main video channel. But as an additional video archive, backup platform, or another external point of presence, it can be used if the project wants to expand coverage beyond standard video services.
The channel BitChute — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an additional video page of the project, but the main video strategy of the business is better built around more familiar and mass platforms.
Diaspo.it: Diaspora pod networks and distributed communication
Diaspo.it is one of the pod servers of the Diaspora network. Diaspora itself appeared in 2010 as a distributed social network where there is no single central owner of the entire platform. Users create accounts on different servers but can interact within the overall network.
In terms of mass market share, Diaspora did not become a competitor to Facebook or X. Its significance is different: it is one of the early attempts to create a social network where privacy, distribution, data control, and independence from a large platform are important.
For small businesses, such a network is not suitable for everyone. But if the project is related to media, IT, culture, independent communities, international audience, or digital freedom issues, such a profile can become a useful element of the overall presence map.
Locals: subscription community and independent audience
Locals is a platform for subscription communities created for independent authors, podcasters, video bloggers, experts, and media projects. It was founded in 2019 and later became part of the Rumble ecosystem. The main idea of Locals is to give the author a space for direct connection with a supportive audience.
In terms of market, Locals is not a regular social network and does not compete directly with Facebook or Telegram. Its niche is creator communities, subscriptions, closed materials, author support, and closer connection with the audience. The platform is interesting for those who build not just a post feed but a community around the project.
For small businesses in Israel, Locals can be useful if there is a client club, educational program, author newsletter, media, podcast, closed materials, or community around an event, service, or topic.
Clip.place: video, channels, and short visual content
Clip.place is a video platform with channels and short visual materials. There is little open data about its scale, so it is better considered as a niche tool for additional video placement, not as a competitor to YouTube, TikTok, or Vimeo.
For businesses, such platforms can be useful as a backup or auxiliary video channel. There you can place short clips, material fragments, visual announcements, video explanations, or additional versions of content.
It is important for small businesses not to spread themselves too thin. If the video is created with quality, it can be adapted: the full clip on YouTube or Vimeo, short fragments on TikTok, Reels, or Shorts, and additional copies on niche video platforms. This way, one material works longer and wider.
Gumroad: digital products, publications, and direct sales
Gumroad is a platform for selling digital products, publications, files, books, courses, templates, subscriptions, consultations, and other author materials. It was created in 2011 and became popular among independent authors, designers, developers, writers, educational projects, and small teams.
In terms of market, Gumroad is related not to regular social networks but to digital commerce and creator economy. It is used by people and projects that need to quickly sell a digital product without a complex online store: e-book, PDF, template, mini-course, recording, design file, research, media package, or paid material.
For small businesses in Israel, Gumroad can be useful if there is a digital product or simple service that can be formatted as a purchase: consultation, guide, instruction, presentation, template, course, checklist, webinar recording, ticket, material archive, or publication.
The page Gumroad — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a showcase of the project’s digital materials. For businesses, this is an example of how content can not only be published but also turned into a separate product.
How to use such platforms without unnecessary noise
The main mistake of small businesses is to open accounts on all platforms in a row and not link anything together.
If a company has Friendica, Wattpad, Parler, GETTR, PayChute, BitChute, Diaspo.it, Locals, Clip.place, and Gumroad, but nowhere has a clear description and link to the main site, the client will not understand where to go next.
Each platform should have its own role. Friendica and Diaspo.it — federated presence. Wattpad — stories and texts. Parler and GETTR — alternative social profiles. PayChute and Locals — support and communities. BitChute and Clip.place — additional videos. Gumroad — digital products and sales.
For businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is multilingual and heterogeneous. One client searches in Hebrew, another in Russian, a third in English, a fourth in Ukrainian. One wants to see the site, another video, a third profile, a fourth — the opportunity to buy digital material or subscribe to a community.
Why this is important for small businesses in Israel
The Israeli market is very fast. A person can see a publication in the evening, check the company in the morning, and write via WhatsApp in five minutes. But they will just as quickly go to a competitor if they see chaos, empty profiles, or unclear pages.
Therefore, external platforms should not scatter the brand but strengthen it. The main site remains the center, and additional profiles help to show: the company is alive, active, present in different environments, able to explain its services, and gives the client several paths to contact.
The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even niche platforms can be part of the overall system. A reader can find the project through Friendica, Wattpad, Locals, Gumroad, BitChute, or a Diaspora server, but everywhere they should see one clear logic: this is a project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.
Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.
For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region.
Conclusion of the eighth part: Friendica, Wattpad, Parler, GETTR, PayChute, BitChute, Diaspo.it, Locals, Clip.place, and Gumroad do not replace the main site and main social networks. But they help small businesses in Israel expand their digital footprint, work with niche audiences, preserve content, create communities, host videos, and turn materials into digital products.
The leaders of Israel’s largest opposition parties made a rare joint statement against a bill that aims to stop the arrests and criminal prosecution of tens of thousands of yeshiva students who have not reported for military service. IDF Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir warned: the initiative contradicts the needs of the army, exacerbates inequality, and could divide servicemen during the ongoing war.
In Israel, the debate over the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men has moved from coalition negotiations to a direct conflict between the country’s political leadership and the IDF command.
July 13, 2026 Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, Gadi Eisenkot, Avigdor Lieberman, Yair Golan, Chili Tropper, and the reservist movement of Yoaz Hendel published a joint appeal to the deputies of the ruling coalition.
They demanded not to support the temporary law that effectively blocks the application of the military service law to tens of thousands of Haredim.
The opposition emphasized that the vote is taking place not in peacetime, but against the backdrop of an ongoing multifaceted war and an acute shortage of servicemen.
“We urge coalition deputies to show responsibility and not vote for a law that will cause serious damage to the IDF during the war, contrary to the unequivocal warning of the Chief of General Staff,” the statement said.
The authors of the appeal warned that politicians who supported the initiative will “forever bear the shame of this vote” in the eyes of Israeli citizens who serve in the army, attend reservist gatherings, and work.
Who united against the law
The joint statement became a rare example of a coordinated position of almost the entire opposition camp.
It was signed by:
Yair Lapid — leader of the parliamentary opposition and chairman of the Yesh Atid party;
Naftali Bennett — former Prime Minister of Israel and leader of the Beyahad movement;
Gadi Eisenkot — former Chief of General Staff of the IDF and chairman of the Yashar! party;
Avigdor Lieberman — leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party;
Yair Golan — former Deputy Chief of General Staff and chairman of the Democrats party;
Chili Tropper — opposition deputy, previously representing Benny Gantz’s political camp;
Yoaz Hendel’s reservist movement.
The joint appeal did not include the signature of Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan party. Gantz separately opposed the Basic Law on Torah Study related to this initiative.
He stated that Torah study is an essential part of Jewish heritage, but the state is obliged to protect the value of military service as well. According to him, there can be no rights without responsibility, and the defense of the country should not be placed solely on one part of the population.
What exactly does the coalition propose
The bill is officially framed as a temporary amendment to the Security Service Law.
It is important to understand: the document does not formally exempt yeshiva students from the obligation to serve and does not grant them a legal deferment.
Instead, it deprives the state of the main tools of coercion to fulfill this obligation.
The law provides that for yeshiva students who meet its conditions, it will be impossible to:
initiate arrests;
conduct investigations;
apply enforcement measures for draft orders;
initiate new criminal cases;
continue already open criminal procedures.
Immunity is expected to be granted to tens of thousands of Haredim who received draft notices but did not report for service. Formally, the temporary provision is supposed to be in effect until November 30, 2026.
However, due to the upcoming parliamentary elections and the rules for extending temporary laws, its actual effect may last at least seven months. Eyal Zamir also indicated in his letter that the term is likely to be extended after the start of the election period.
In other words, an unusual legal construct arises: a person remains obliged to report to the IDF, but the state is prohibited from arresting and prosecuting him for refusing to fulfill this obligation.
This is why opponents of the initiative call it not a temporary settlement, but a law on draft evasion or an amnesty for evaders.
How will it be determined who is eligible for immunity
Protection from prosecution is expected to be provided to men who are officially registered as students of recognized yeshivas.
To do this, it will be necessary to submit declarations that the person:
is indeed studying in a yeshiva or kollel;
is engaged in Torah study for 40 to 45 hours a week;
does not engage in other work or professional activities;
has received confirmation from the head of his religious educational institution.
At the same time, the bill weakens the ability to financially penalize yeshiva leaders and their staff for false declarations about the status of students. Legal advisors warned that real control over tens of thousands of statements would be practically impossible.
The most controversial part of the law provides for the creation of a special commission of three senior IDF officers.
They are supposed to review the documents of yeshiva students and decide whether the applicant meets the criteria for protection from arrest and criminal prosecution.
In essence, army officers are being asked to confirm with their own signatures that a specific person who did not comply with the order to report for service should not be prosecuted temporarily.
Eyal Zamir: the law contradicts the needs of the army
July 12, 2026 IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir sent an unusually sharp letter to three recipients:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu;
Defense Minister Israel Katz;
Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Boaz Bismuth.
Zamir emphasized that the law is being advanced in the midst of a multifaceted war, when the shortage of personnel is already directly affecting the IDF’s ability to perform operational tasks.
According to him, the proposed scheme will not bring additional people into the army. On the contrary, it will create an incentive to ignore draft notices, as potential conscripts will understand that they are not threatened with arrest and criminal prosecution for non-appearance.
“The bill does not meet the needs of the IDF — this is clear and unequivocal,” warned the Chief of General Staff.
Zamir highlighted three main problems.
Blow to the trust of servicemen
The IDF is simultaneously expanding the call-up of reservists, considering extending service terms, and trying to use all available human resources.
In such a situation, Zamir believes, the military system cannot demand unprecedented dedication from some Israelis while simultaneously formalizing mass protection from prosecution for others.
According to his warning, this will create a deep divide among the military, who have been bearing the brunt of the war for about two and a half years, and will further increase inequality.
The army has no authority and expertise
The Chief of General Staff emphasized that IDF officers do not have the necessary tools to verify whether a person is indeed studying the specified number of hours, not working, and meeting the internal criteria of a religious educational institution.
Such work is administrative and legal, not military.
Therefore, including officers in the procedure has no professional justification and merely attempts to shift political responsibility onto the army.
Distracting commanders during the war
Creating new commissions, checking thousands of declarations, and participating in a politically explosive process will require officers, time, and managerial resources.
Zamir warned that in the conditions of ongoing hostilities, this will become a heavy organizational burden and distract the command from operational tasks.
He demanded at least to exclude from the law the provision forcing army officers to participate in granting immunity.
The IDF needs 12,000 servicemen
The conflict around the law is occurring against the backdrop of an unprecedented personnel burden.
According to available estimates, about 80,000 ultra-Orthodox men aged 18 to 24 are subject to conscription but have not enlisted.
At the same time, the IDF states that it urgently needs about 12,000 additional servicemen to perform current tasks on various fronts. A significant portion of the new people is required for combat units.
Earlier, Zamir warned government members that without resolving the personnel crisis, the army risks “collapsing inward.”
At a ceremony at the National Security College, he stated that the IDF’s numbers need to be significantly increased: the army must perform all the missions assigned to it, and therefore it needs representatives from all parts of Israeli society.
For NANews — Israel News it is fundamentally important to clarify: the discussion is no longer reduced to a dispute between secular and religious citizens.
It is about the actual number of fighters, the duration of reservist service, the combat readiness of units, and the trust of those who are already bearing the military burden.
What did Boaz Bismuth respond
Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Boaz Bismuth rejected the criticism of the Chief of General Staff.
He stated that army representatives participated in discussions for three weeks and could have presented their objections earlier. Bismuth called the timing of Zamir’s letter suspicious, noting that the document appeared after the committee had already approved the bill.
The chairman of the committee also claims that the arrests of yeshiva students do not lead to their actual enlistment. According to him, IDF representatives could not provide an example where the detention of an evader resulted in his conscription.
However, reports from meetings show that officers repeatedly warned deputies: the initiative does not meet the army’s personnel needs.
The position of ultra-Orthodox parties is that arrests increase confrontation with the community and allegedly reduce the willingness of young Haredim to voluntarily enlist.
Critics respond that for two years the state has conducted very few active arrests anyway.
Following the 2024 Supreme Court decision, more than 79,000 draft notices were sent to ultra-Orthodox men, but about 2,100 people enlisted in the army. From January 2025 to January 2026, the police conducted only 17 active arrests of Haredim for draft evasion.
Therefore, the claim that mass arrests hinder conscription seems questionable: there were practically no mass arrests.
Lawyers warned of discrimination
Before advancing the bill, the legal advisor to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee warned that the document violates the principle of equality before the law.
One specific group of citizens receives protection from arrest and criminal prosecution for failing to fulfill an obligation that continues to apply to others.
Knesset legal advisor Sagit Afik also called the legislative process itself illegitimate.
The coalition used an old bill that had already passed the first reading, then removed most of its original content and turned a small element of the document into its main goal.
Such a method of advancing the law could become a separate basis for its annulment by the High Court of Justice.
In parallel, the Basic Law on Torah Study has already been adopted
The law on suspending arrests is only one part of a broader coalition scheme.
On the evening of July 13, 2026, the Knesset finally approved the Basic Law, proclaiming Torah study as a “fundamental value of the heritage of the Jewish people and the State of Israel.”
The document was voted for by 63 deputies, against — 52. The discussion and opposition obstruction lasted about ten hours.
The final version removed the provision that directly equated Torah study with military service. However, critics believe that the law creates a constitutional basis for further protection of the mass non-conscription of yeshiva students.
Likud deputies Yuli Edelstein and Dan Illouz voted against.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was absent at the final vote. Gadi Eisenkot called his absence cowardice and stated that the new law would become another indelible stain on the government’s activities.
The Movement for Quality Government immediately appealed to the High Court, claiming that the coalition is trying to turn draft evasion into a constitutionally protected value.
The organization warned that the Basic Law and the temporary ban on arrests together represent a de facto law on exemption from conscription, passed “through the back door.”
Political deal before elections
The promotion of initiatives is taking place in the last week of the Knesset’s work before its dissolution and the elections scheduled for October 27, 2026.
Ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism demand to stop the prosecution of yeshiva students and to enshrine the special status of Torah study.
In exchange, they support laws important to Benjamin Netanyahu, including changing the procedure for creating a commission to investigate the failure of October 7, 2023 and weakening the powers of the government’s legal advisor.
Against this backdrop, the debate over conscription has turned into part of a major pre-election deal.
The coalition seeks to maintain the support of ultra-Orthodox parties, while the Haredim receive laws that can mitigate the consequences of Supreme Court decisions and stop the ongoing enforcement of service.
The law has not yet been finally adopted.
As of July 14, 2026, the temporary amendment on immunity for yeshiva students was approved by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and forwarded to the plenum for second and third readings.
Legislators have already begun discussing it, but at the time of preparing the material, the final voting result had not yet been officially published.
Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that immunity has already come into force.
Only a separate Basic Law on the study of Torah has been adopted. The law stopping arrests, investigations, and criminal procedures against draft-dodging yeshiva students is still undergoing the final parliamentary stage.
The debate is no longer just about the Haredim.
The study of Torah remains a central value of the Jewish people, and the recognition of this role itself does not cause controversy among most participants in the discussion.
The conflict begins where the state requires one part of society to serve in the regular army and reserves for years, while providing actual protection from fulfilling the same duty to another part.
That is why not only politicians but also the current Chief of Staff, former IDF leaders, reservists, and Knesset legal advisors opposed the law.
NAnews — Israel News views this story primarily as a matter of national security and equality of responsibility.
The IDF states that it lacks thousands of servicemen. Reservists spend hundreds of days on duty. The families of servicemen bear an increasingly heavy burden.
At this moment, the Knesset is not discussing how to bring additional groups of citizens into the army, but how to prohibit the state from prosecuting tens of thousands of people who have already ignored summonses.
This is what made the bill a point of unification for the opposition and the reason for one of the most sharp public statements by the Chief of the General Staff against the initiative of the current government.
Hanna Andriienko shares the story of transforming a karaoke club into the restaurant “SHO?”, the wave of challenges she faced, and how her project brings together the Ukrainian and Jewish communities in Tel Aviv and Israel.
On July 9, 2025, the second episode of the “Balachky” podcast was released on the UDM Israel channel, in which Hanna Andriienko, owner of the “SHO?” restaurant, spoke about her journey from economist to the hostess of one of the most heartfelt Ukrainian establishments in Tel Aviv.
Below we will reveal the main topics of the conversation and recommendwatching the full video to hear all the details firsthand:
Main Topics of the Conversation
The story of turning a karaoke club into the “SHO?” restaurant
Adapting “SHO?” to wartime restrictions and switching to takeout and delivery
Cultural mission: gastronomic evenings, “Territory Show” and “Odessa Courtyard”
The role of “SHO?” in the life of the Ukrainian community in Israel: support, gatherings, and traditions
Challenges and achievements of Ukrainians in Tel Aviv: how the community unites and develops
The “SHO?” Restaurant – A Home for the Ukrainian Soul in Israel
Origin story: a sudden call from the former owner of a karaoke club and Hanna’s bold decision to create a “place of strength.”
Atmosphere and menu: interior with Ukrainian rushnyky, family recipes for borscht, varenyky, deruny, and six types of signature nalivky.
Supporting guests: the switch to takeout and delivery during the crisis when it was important to keep warmth in the community.
The Ukrainian Community in Israel: Challenges and Achievements
Community Challenges
Emotional burnout after intense months, lack of coordination among initiatives, adaptation of new arrivals, and the need to preserve traditions.
Main Achievements
Regular “Zdybanka” gatherings with hundreds of participants, cultural projects “Territory Show” and “Odessa Courtyard,” volunteer campaigns, and the growth of the UDM Israel channel, confirming keen interest in the topic.
UDM Israel and the “Balachky” Podcast
UDM Israelhttps://www.youtube.com/@udmIsrael is the first Ukrainian-language channel from Israel where activists and entrepreneurs share stories of resilience and support in the “Balachky” format.
The high production quality and live format make this project a true bridge between cultures.
On the NAnews — Israel News website, we continue to tell stories of resilience and mutual aid. The stories of “SHO?” and UDM Israel inspire and show: together we are stronger.
Israel’s main airport faces the threat of a new transportation crisis. Due to the resumption of military escalation between the US and Iran, Washington has suspended the withdrawal of tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion. If the previously agreed schedule is not restored, the airport may run out of parking spaces for passenger liners as early as July 23.
The Israel Airports Authority warns: in such a case, about ten flights will have to be canceled daily. In terms of passengers, this means approximately 50,000 canceled airline tickets each month.
The situation is especially dangerous because the crisis is unfolding at the height of the summer season, when Ben Gurion is supposed to serve from 80,000 to 94,000 passengers a day.
Four planes returned, eight refused to withdraw
The new escalation became known on July 14, 2026.
The US was supposed to withdraw another eight tanker aircraft from Ben Gurion by the end of the week. This stage was part of an agreement reached after several months of pressure from the Israeli Ministry of Transport and the Airports Authority.
However, due to the resumption of hostilities against Iran, the American command suspended the withdrawal of aviation.
Moreover, four tankers that had previously left the airport returned to Ben Gurion.
The Israel Airports Authority stated that such a change of plans has “immediate and serious operational significance.” If American aviation does not start freeing up parking spaces, starting from July 23, there will be a significant shortage of spaces for civilian aircraft at the airport.
Israeli Transport Minister Miri Regev ordered not to allow the landing of additional American tankers without prior coordination.
Thus, the conflict between Israeli civilian agencies and the American military has reached a new level. Israel does not refuse strategic cooperation with the US but demands that military needs do not paralyze the country’s civil aviation.
The problem is not only in the number of aircraft.
Tankers are significantly larger than many passenger planes, require larger parking spaces, special ground services, security, fuel, and separate procedures for departure. Their landing or urgent takeoff during peak hours forces dispatchers to rearrange the civilian schedule.
In March or May, such an operation could delay other flights by about half an hour. In July and August, when planes take off and land almost continuously, one such disruption can cause a multi-hour chain of delays affecting hundreds of flights.
From the first tankers to an actual military base
American planes began arriving at Ben Gurion even before the start of the large-scale war with Iran.
On February 23, 2026, American tanker aircraft and C-17 military transport planes were spotted at Israel’s main civilian airport. By that time, military aviation observers had counted more than 85 tankers and over 170 transport aircraft sent by the US to the Middle East region since mid-February.
On the night of February 27, at least nine more American tankers arrived at Ben Gurion. Simultaneously, American F-22 fighters and accompanying aircraft were stationed at the Ovda airbase.
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched a large-scale military operation against Iran.
Aerial tankers became one of the most important elements of the campaign. They allowed American and Israeli fighters and bombers to stay in the air longer and strike targets deep within Iranian territory.
After the start of the war, Israel’s airspace was closed. On March 2, Ben Gurion began gradually resuming operations, initially in a very limited format and mainly for Israeli airlines.
However, American tankers did not disappear from the airport.
According to satellite images studied by the Financial Times, there were about 36 military tanker aircraft at Ben Gurion in early March.
After the ceasefire, which came into effect on April 8, their number did not decrease but increased to about 47.
By mid-May, there were already at least 52 American military aircraft at the airport. The reasons for placing such a large group specifically at Israel’s main civilian airport, rather than at military bases, were not fully explained officially.
By this time, Ben Gurion had effectively ceased to cope simultaneously with civilian and military tasks.
The head of Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority, Shmuel Zakai, stated that Ben Gurion had turned into an American military airfield with limited civilian activity.
The Director General of the Airports Authority, Sharon Kedmi, reported on May 28 that the airport was using only about one-third of its operational capacity. According to him, approximately 70% of Ben Gurion’s activities were limited due to the space and resources occupied by American aviation.
In two months, the Airports Authority lost about 700 million shekels. If the situation continued as it was, losses could grow to several billion.
The passenger traffic forecast for 2026 had to be reduced from 18 million to 15 million people. Up to three million passengers risked facing cancellations or being unable to purchase tickets.
Many El Al, Arkia, and Israir planes had to be kept outside Israel. This meant additional expenses for parking, crews, and maintenance, as well as reducing the number of flights Israeli companies could perform daily.
NAnews — Israel News notes that it’s not just about inconveniences for tourists. For Israel, which effectively has one main international aviation hub, the overload of Ben Gurion quickly turns into a national economic and transportation problem.
Foreign carriers also received another reason not to return to Israel. The reduction in supply amid high demand created conditions for further increases in ticket prices.
June crisis: 2.4 million trips were at risk
By mid-June, the number of American planes reached maximum levels.
According to Miri Regev, there were about 72 American tankers and military transport aircraft at Ben Gurion. The Airports Authority cited the figure of 74 aircraft.
Another 26 American machines were stationed at Ramon Airport in southern Israel, occupying about 90% of the available parking spaces there. Meanwhile, according to Israeli officials, at that time, not a single American tanker was stationed at Israeli Air Force bases.
On June 10, Miri Regev publicly criticized the situation, stating that if US President Donald Trump does not intend to continue the war against Iran, American planes should vacate Ben Gurion.
On June 14, the minister sent an urgent letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
She demanded the relocation of at least 30 American aircraft to Israeli Air Force bases or outside the country. Otherwise, Regev warned, about 2.4 million tickets sold for the summer months and the period of the autumn Jewish holidays would be at risk of cancellation.
This figure included trips of Hasidim to Uman for Rosh Hashanah.
The critical date was announced as June 16, 2026.
It is in mid-June that the Airports Authority allocates summer slots to airlines — the time during which a carrier has the right to land or take off a plane.
If an airline does not receive the necessary slot, it is forced to cancel the flight. At the same time, Israeli law allows the carrier not to pay standard compensation if the passenger was warned of the cancellation at least 14 days in advance.
Therefore, on June 16, foreign companies could begin to massively cancel July flights without incurring additional compensation costs.
Miri Regev warned of direct damage in billions of shekels to airlines, the tourism industry, and Israel’s economy. She also noted that mass cancellations would harm the country’s reputation as an aviation destination and could deter carriers just beginning to return after the April ceasefire.
At the last moment, Israel and the US managed to find a temporary solution.
On June 16, Israeli media reported that in the coming days, 20 planes would be transferred to Israeli Air Force bases, and another 17 machines would leave Ben Gurion by the end of the month. At the time of publication, there was no official confirmation of the full schedule.
By June 24, about 20 American planes had indeed been withdrawn.
But this was still not enough. Of the 99 parking spaces intended for civilian passenger aircraft, only 65 remained free.
For normal operations in July, at least 80 parking spaces were required, and for the August peak — all 99.
Sharon Kedmi warned that without freeing up at least 15 more spaces, cancellations could affect about 100,000 passengers. In June, Ben Gurion served more than 65,000 people a day, while in August, between 70,000 and 100,000 passengers were expected daily.
By early July, the situation began to improve.
On July 1, Lufthansa and ITA Airways resumed flights to Israel. Austrian Airlines had previously returned, and Air Europa restored service to Madrid. The Ministry of Transport announced an agreement to accelerate the withdrawal of American aviation: about 30 planes were to be moved in the first stage and another 20 later.
However, the achieved normalization proved to be unstable.
On July 7, 2026, the US resumed strikes on Iran after attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The American command announced the targeting of more than 80 targets, including ships and objects of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran responded with strikes on American targets in the Persian Gulf countries.
On July 13, Donald Trump officially notified the US Congress that hostilities had resumed on July 7.
Amid this escalation, the American military decided to keep the tankers in close proximity to the operations zone again. That is why the previously agreed withdrawal of eight planes was stopped, and four machines returned to Ben Gurion.
Now the consequences of the military decision may become noticeable as early as July 23.
By the end of the month, passenger traffic is expected to exceed 80,000 people almost every weekday.
On July 16, about 91,000 passengers were forecasted.
On July 26 — about 90,000.
The maximum load is expected on July 30: approximately 94,000 passengers and about 560 takeoffs, landings, and other aviation operations.
In total, about 2.3 million passengers are expected to pass through Ben Gurion in July, which is approximately 25% more than in July 2025.
Therefore, even the daily cancellation of ten flights will have a cumulative effect. Over the month, this is about 300 flights and 50,000 unrealized flights.
The main question now is whether Israel and the US can find alternative places for the tankers — at military bases or outside the country — without weakening American capabilities in the war against Iran.
NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: the history of American tankers has shown how closely Israel’s security is now linked to the daily lives of citizens.
The decision made by the American military command due to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on Iran may determine in a few days whether tens of thousands of Israelis can go on vacation, return home, or meet with relatives.
Ben Gurion has simultaneously become an international airport, a logistics center for war, and one of the most vulnerable points of the Israeli economy. As long as American tankers remain on its parking spaces, each new turn of the conflict with Iran will directly affect passengers, airlines, the tourism industry, and ticket prices.
