Author: Карабас Барабас

Benjamin Netanyahu wrote to Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence on August 24, but the document became public only on the evening of the 26th, when the Ukrainian president himself showed it. The letter contains two details that go far beyond a protocol congratulation: a direct definition of Iran as a common threat and a handwritten line about a brief meeting between the two leaders in Washington. Netanyahu’s office had not reported the congratulation until that time.

Author: Stas Shifer

Jerusalem, Israel — August 27, 2026.

If you are looking for “Netanyahu congratulated Ukraine,” “Netanyahu’s letter to Zelenskyy,” or “Iran is a common threat to Israel and Ukraine,” two dates are immediately important here. The letter from the Israeli Prime Minister’s office is dated August 24, 2026, Ukraine’s Independence Day, but Volodymyr Zelenskyy published it on X only on August 26 at 17:43. It was only after this publication that the document entered the open information field.

I received warm congratulations for the people of Ukraine from Prime Minister @netanyahu of Israel. Our countries share deep bonds – between our people in the first place, but also in the economy, culture, and other areas. It is therefore good to hear of Israel’s desire to… pic.twitter.com/WjhLg37ai6

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) August 26, 2026

In the letter, Netanyahu congratulates Zelenskyy and Ukrainians on the 35th anniversary of independence, talks about building a strong independent state in the face of serious challenges, notes Ukraine’s national unity, courage, and resilience, and wishes the country a “future of freedom and lasting peace”. But the most politically substantive phrase is not in the final wish: the Israeli Prime Minister directly writes that Israel and Ukraine face a “common threat from Iran”.

I separately checked the public Israeli side of this story. As of the preparation of the material on August 27, I did not find a separate publication with this letter among the available messages from the Prime Minister’s office on gov.il, in Netanyahu’s official Telegram, or in the available output of his official X. This does not prove that the document was deliberately not published: such a conclusion would require an explanation from the office itself. But the available public chronology looks exactly like this — the letter is dated August 24, and Zelenskyy made it publicly available on the evening of the 26th.

For NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency this changes the angle of the story. We are not just looking at another festive address to Kyiv, but a document that the Ukrainian side decided to make public itself — and in which Netanyahu connects relations with Ukraine to the central theme of Israeli security, Iran.

And what happened in previous years: did Netanyahu congratulate Ukraine at all?

I separately looked at previous Ukrainian Independence Days — and Netanyahu’s current letter looks even more interesting.

In 2025, among the officially listed congratulations from world leaders from Israel was President Isaac Herzog. In the list published on August 25 by the Office of the President of Ukraine, Netanyahu is not mentioned. This does not prove that there was no non-public letter, but I did not find a public congratulation from the Prime Minister.

In 2024, the situation was similar. I also did not find a public congratulation from Netanyahu on Independence Day. However, a few days later, on August 28, Netanyahu himself called Zelenskyy. The conversation already concerned the war, the situation in the Middle East, and support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, The Times of Israel separately noted an interesting detail: the Israeli side did not publish its own message about this conversation at all — Kyiv reported it.

So the current story with the letter, which we learn about from Zelenskyy, already has some parallel.

But 2023 is especially indicative.

Then, around the absence of a personal congratulation from Netanyahu, there was real irritation in Kyiv. Israeli Hebrew-language media retold a message from the public broadcaster Kan: an unnamed Ukrainian official complained that Netanyahu did not personally congratulate Ukraine on Independence Day.

According to this source, a message from the official account of the Prime Minister’s office appeared late in the evening, but the Ukrainian side perceived it quite differently:

“A tweet from the Prime Minister’s office account late at night is not a congratulation from a friend”.

The story then developed against the backdrop of another painful issue — the annual trip of tens of thousands of Israeli Hasidim to Uman for Rosh Hashanah. Kyiv discussed possible restrictions for Israelis, and dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s government’s attitude was cited as one of the reasons for the tension.

2022: Netanyahu is not the Prime Minister — Israel is led by Yair Lapid. And he congratulates Zelenskyy on Independence Day only on September 1, after the holiday. Moreover, this was their first phone conversation after Lapid took office as Prime Minister.

It turns out to be almost a mirror image.

2023: in Kyiv, they ask — why didn’t Netanyahu personally congratulate Zelenskyy?

2024: I do not find a public congratulation; a few days later, Netanyahu calls Zelenskyy, and the Ukrainian side is the first to report the conversation.

2025: Herzog publicly congratulates Ukraine, Netanyahu is absent from the official Ukrainian list of congratulating leaders.

2026: Netanyahu not only congratulates. He writes a personal letter, talks about Ukraine’s courage, wishes it freedom and lasting peace, calls Iran a common threat to Israel and Ukraine, and even personally adds a line about meeting Zelenskyy in Washington.

And yet the familiar oddity arises again: the Israeli side itself does not publicly show the letter — we see it only on August 26, when Zelenskyy publishes the document.

For comparison: when in 2021 Naftali Bennett was the Prime Minister of Israel, there was no mystery with the timing. On August 24, he personally called Zelenskyy and congratulated Ukraine on the 30th anniversary of independence. The Office of the President of Ukraine reported this on the same day at 14:14.

Therefore, the current question becomes broader than just “where did the letter wander for two days?”

I am more interested in another: why, after several years when Netanyahu’s personal public congratulation was either absent or at least not a noticeable part of public communication, in 2026 he writes such a warm and politically substantive letter — but again does not publish it himself?

Coincidence? A feature of the office’s work? Changed attitude towards Ukraine? Internal Israeli politics before the elections? New significance of Ukrainian experience for Israel after the war with Iran?

There is no answer yet.

But now we at least see that the two-day pause in 2026 is not the only oddity in the history of Netanyahu’s congratulations to Zelenskyy.

The letter from August 24 appeared with Zelenskyy only on the 26th

The chronology is important because congratulations from the leadership of Israel did not come in one package. On August 24, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar publicly congratulated Zelenskyy, his Ukrainian colleague Andriy Sybiha, and the Ukrainian people. NANews has already analyzed this address by Sa’ar: the minister spoke about the resilience of Ukrainians, freedom, and lasting peace, but did not directly mention Russia in the congratulation.

The next day, Zelenskyy separately thanked Israeli President Isaac Herzog. He wrote about solidarity, trade, ties between people, and the upcoming 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations. This story was also analyzed separately by NANews.

It is easy to confuse two anniversaries here. On August 24, 2026, Ukraine celebrated 35 years of Independence. And the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Israel and Ukraine will only come in December: Israel recognized Ukraine’s independence on December 25, 1991, and diplomatic relations were established the next day.

And only in the evening of August 26 did Zelenskyy show Netanyahu’s letter.

Therefore, the wording “Netanyahu congratulated Ukraine on August 27” would be incorrect. The congratulation is dated the 24th. But for the general public, the document itself became visible two days later.

Why did this happen?

I do not find grounds to invent an answer. The letter could have been ordinary diplomatic correspondence that was not initially intended to be published immediately. A political decision not to bring the Ukrainian topic into the Prime Minister’s communication on August 24 is also possible. But there is no confirmation of any of these versions in open sources now.

This is exactly the boundary where fact ends and hypothesis begins.

What Netanyahu actually said — and what is not in the letter

The document itself is short, but its composition is more interesting than a standard congratulation.

First, Netanyahu talks about three and a half decades of Ukrainian independence and building a strong state despite severe trials. Then he links the current anniversary to Ukraine’s continued defense of its national security and speaks of national unity, courage, and resilience.

After this, Israel appears: historical ties, the desire to continue joint work and make the two countries even closer.

And only then — Iran.

Netanyahu writes:

“Our two countries face a common threat from Iran”.

The Prime Minister then explains his thought: Tehran’s destabilizing activities, he says, threaten security far beyond the Middle East, and Israel intends to continue countering this threat and achieving greater stability.

This is a strong political formulation.

But turning it into a headline “Israel and Ukraine created an alliance against Iran” would be wrong. The letter does not announce a military agreement, arms supplies to Ukraine, intelligence sharing, a joint air defense system, weapons production, or a new sanctions package.

There is not even a date for the next full meeting between Netanyahu and Zelenskyy.

It turns out to be an interesting construction: the political formula has become stronger, practical commitments — not yet.

In Zelenskyy’s response, there is another detail. The Ukrainian president thanked Netanyahu, wrote about the deep ties between the peoples, the economy, culture, and Israel’s desire to strengthen relations, and concluded with hope for fruitful joint work for greater security.

But the word “Iran” Zelenskyy did not repeat in his own text.

I would not turn this into a sign of disagreement. There is no basis for such a conclusion. It is merely a difference between two public formulations — and that is why it should be preserved, not smoothed over by retelling.

The phrase about Iran did not arise out of nowhere

For an Israeli who does not follow Ukrainian politics daily, the very construction “common Iranian threat to Israel and Ukraine” may initially seem strange.

Ukraine is in Europe and is at war against Russia. Israel builds a significant part of its security strategy around Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, drones, and Tehran-supported armed structures in the Middle East.

But between these two wars, there has long been a technological bridge.

Shahed — a family of Iranian-developed one-way attack drones: the device carries explosives and itself becomes part of the munition. Russia began to massively use such drones against Ukraine in the fall of 2022, and then deployed the production of its own Russian versions.

Therefore, for Ukrainians, the word Shahed became part of the everyday air war long before the current stage of the confrontation between Israel and Iran. Reuters noted that Russian forces launched thousands of such devices at Ukraine, and Russian production gradually became independent.

But the political rapprochement between Kyiv and Jerusalem on this topic also did not begin yesterday.

On July 23, 2025, Foreign Ministers Gideon Sa’ar and Andriy Sybiha in Kyiv officially agreed to start a strategic dialogue between Israel and Ukraine on the Iranian threat. Sybiha is Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, that is, Sa’ar’s direct Ukrainian counterpart. During the same negotiations, the parties discussed security, cyberspace, defense technologies, medicine, energy, agriculture, and trade.

In February 2026, after a conversation between Zelenskyy and Herzog, the official website of the President of Ukraine again directly linked Iran with the Russian war. Kyiv reminded that the Iranian regime supported Russia and supplied it with Shahed for attacks against Ukrainians.

In the spring, the connection became even more complex. Zelenskyy publicly claimed that now Russia was helping Iran, including supplying Russian versions of Shahed and transferring intelligence information. Reuters reported these statements. Here a caveat is required: the Ukrainian president’s statement about a specific current transfer of equipment or intelligence does not equal independent confirmation of each individual operation.

At the same time, the strategic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is no longer an assumption. In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement, providing for closer cooperation in defense and security, military-technical sphere, joint exercises, and interaction of special services. It is also important to clarify the opposite: the agreement does not automatically obligate to enter the war on the partner’s side.

That is why I would not turn Russia and Iran into a formal unified military bloc modeled on NATO.

NANews recently analyzed this link between Russia, Iran, Israel, and Ukraine separately. Netanyahu’s letter adds a new detail to the already existing picture: the formula of a common Iranian threat now comes not only from Ukrainian diplomats.

The handwritten line returns us to Washington

At the bottom of the official letter, there is something that is usually not in diplomatic documents of this kind.

Netanyahu added in blue pen:

“I enjoyed meeting you, however briefly, in Washington”.

That is: “I enjoyed meeting you in Washington, albeit very briefly”.

This small note returns the story to July 28, 2026.

Then Zelenskyy and Netanyahu were simultaneously in Washington. Their teams tried to organize a full bilateral meeting, but in the end, it did not take place. The Times of Israel initially reported attempts to coordinate negotiations, and later — about a short personal conversation and handshake between the two leaders before the farewell ceremony for American Senator Lindsey Graham.

Before that, Netanyahu and Zelenskyy had not met in person since September 2023 and, according to the Israeli publication, had not spoken by phone since January 2025. Therefore, the words however briefly here acquire additional meaning: the Israeli Prime Minister himself decided to note even this very short contact.

NANews wrote about the Washington day when Trump separately received Zelenskyy and Netanyahu. In the White House, the Ukrainian president discussed his own war and Ukraine’s defense, the Israeli Prime Minister — primarily Iran. There was no full-fledged trilateral negotiation format.

But nearby, an episode occurred that was not planned as a separate diplomatic summit: Zelenskyy and Netanyahu talked personally.

On the same day, Sa’ar called Sybiha and again discussed the Iranian threat with him. The Ukrainian minister also accepted an invitation to visit Israel. The Times of Israel noted both details in its chronicle of that day.

If you put the events in the correct order, there is no sudden “turn of Israel towards Ukraine” on August 24.

Another sequence emerges: the strategic dialogue on Iran was launched back in 2025; in 2026, the topic became much more practical due to the development of the war around Iran; in July, ministerial contacts revived, and a short personal conversation between Netanyahu and Zelenskyy took place; now the formula of a common threat appeared directly in the Prime Minister’s letter.

Russia makes this formula less abstract for Israel

There is a simple way to verify Netanyahu’s diplomatic formulation: look not at the congratulatory card, but at the events around it.

On the night of August 27, already after Zelenskyy’s publication, Russia conducted another large-scale air attack against Ukraine. Reuters, citing Ukrainian authorities, reported 258 drones, as well as ballistic and other missiles. Strikes and falling debris affected several regions, infrastructure facilities, a school, and a medical institution.

However, here one cannot make the reverse mistake and automatically sign all 258 devices with the word “Iranian”.

Russia has long been producing its own derivatives of Shahed. Moreover, different types of drones, including decoys, can be used in a specific mixed attack. Therefore, the correct connection looks like this: Iranian technology has become one of the most important elements of the Russian air war, not “Iran personally launches every Russian drone at Ukraine”.

It is in this difference that the real value of Ukrainian experience for Israel appears.

Reuters in March 2026 visited the production of Ukrainian interceptor drones — cheap devices that were created specifically to destroy attacking drones. Against the backdrop of the war around Iran, Ukrainian companies reported interest from the US and Middle Eastern countries. One of the manufacturers estimated the ability to produce up to 50,000 interceptors per month, with part of the production capacity potentially being used for export without reducing Ukrainian needs.

The cost also changes the military math. According to Reuters, individual Ukrainian interceptors cost about several thousand dollars or even around a thousand dollars, while a PAC-3 missile for Patriot can cost about $4 million. These are not interchangeable means: Patriot is also intended for much more complex targets, including ballistic missiles. But against cheap attack drones, the economics of interception becomes a separate strategic issue.

For Israel, it is here that the words “common threat” cease to be a diplomatic metaphor.

Ukraine has accumulated a mass of combat experience in detecting low-flying targets, organizing mobile fire groups, using cheap interceptors, protecting energy, and distributing air defense means. Israel has accumulated its own experience in countering Iranian missiles and drones.

This is not yet a joint system.

But it is already an understandable area where the two countries have something to talk about besides congratulations.

What the letter changes — and what will have to be checked further

After the events of August 24–26, relations look warmer, but I would not yet announce a new Israeli policy towards Ukraine.

Sa’ar publicly congratulated Ukraine. Herzog received Zelenskyy’s gratitude and the wording about the “friendly people of Israel.” Netanyahu in his letter took another step in the security sphere and called Iran a common threat.

These are three different levels of communication, not one collective decision of the Israeli government.

But there is still a shift.

Previously, it was the Ukrainian side that especially persistently proved to Israel that Russian-Iranian cooperation links two wars through drones, missiles, technologies, and exchange of experience. Now a similar logic is used in his own formulation by the Prime Minister of Israel.

This does not mean that Netanyahu agreed with Ukraine’s demands for weapons. It does not mean that Israel has changed its policy towards Russia. Nor does it mean the emergence of a common Israel-Ukraine front.

But it is no longer just a Ukrainian argument.

For NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency the next check will therefore be very specific. Will Sibiga’s visit to Israel take place? Will the strategic dialogue on Iran receive a permanent working format? Will there be projects to counter drones, civil defense, infrastructure protection, or exchange of technological experience? Will these issues be raised in December when Israel and Ukraine will already celebrate the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations?

And there remains one more question in today’s story: why did a letter with such substantive wording about Iran not appear on Ukraine’s Independence Day in Netanyahu’s public communication?

I deliberately do not turn the absence of the found publication into proof of political intent.

But this detail cannot be discarded.

As of August 27, 2026, the established sequence looks like this: the letter was signed by Netanyahu on August 24; Zelensky published it on August 26 at 17:43; in the document, the Prime Minister of Israel called Iran a common threat to both countries and personally reminded of the brief meeting with the Ukrainian president in Washington.

Therefore, this story no longer fits into the standard three lines of a festive greeting.

Behind one letter are almost three years of rare personal contacts between Netanyahu and Zelensky, the dialogue on Iran launched back in 2025, Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation, Ukraine’s experience of war with Shahed, and the still unanswered main question: will the convergence of interests between Israel and Ukraine turn into concrete cooperation or remain a strong diplomatic formula on paper.

The CIA Director warned Russia not to attack NATO during a rare visit to Moscow on August 25. New data shows: the main focus was on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the second sensitive topic was Russian assistance to Iran.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

Moscow, Russia — August 25, 2026. CIA Director John Ratcliffe warned Russia not to attack NATO during an unannounced visit to the Russian capital. Moreover, a detail that was not known in the first hours after the trip is now revealed: the American side was not talking about an abstract ‘NATO in general.’ According to Politico, the main focus was on three specific countries — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Simultaneously, Ratcliffe demanded that Moscow reduce military and economic support to Iran.

This significantly changes the understanding of the whole story.

As of August 26, it was only possible to confidently talk about the fact of the rare trip by the director of American foreign intelligence, contacts with Russian special services, and the existence of a new American assessment of the NATO threat. Now several American media independently report: the warning about NATO was indeed one of the tasks of the visit. ABC News confirms this version with reference to its own sources, and The Wall Street Journal links the trip to new intelligence assessments of the risk of a limited Russian attack on a US ally.

For NAnews — News of Israel another detail is important here. In one closed conversation, the Americans linked two directions, which are conveniently viewed as different wars: the European — Russia, Ukraine, and NATO — and the Middle Eastern — Russia, Iran, the US, and Israel.

I grew up in Ukraine and live in Israel, so I consider this connection central. Not because any conflict should automatically be ‘tied to Israel,’ but because this connection was made by the American side itself: in Moscow, the CIA chief simultaneously spoke about the security of NATO’s eastern flank and Russian support for a state that is at war with Israel and the US.

Ratcliffe did not meet with Putin — but the warning reached him

First, an important clarification to the formulations that are already spreading in headlines.

John Ratcliffe did not meet with Putin personally.

On August 26, 2026, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the CIA director spoke with representatives of Russian special services. According to Peskov, Putin was then fully briefed on the outcomes of these contacts. The Kremlin did not disclose the content of the negotiations.

Therefore, the phrase ‘Ratcliffe warned Putin’ oversimplifies what happened. It would be more accurate to say: the CIA chief conveyed a warning to the Russian leadership through the intelligence channel, after which the content of the negotiations was communicated to Putin.

The method of delivering the message was also unusual.

An American military transport C-17 took off from the Washington area, made a stop in Riga, and on the morning of August 25, 2026, headed to Moscow. According to open flight tracking data, the plane left the Russian capital about eight and a half hours later. The Washington Post also geolocated a video of a motorcade in central Moscow published on social media.

This does not resemble a casual phone conversation between mid-level officials.

But the unusual nature of the trip does not imply that Washington received a ready Russian plan for a new war. I consciously separate these things: the visit and the warning are confirmed by several sources; a specific Kremlin order to attack a NATO state has not been publicly established.

Why Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were specifically named

Politico cites a source familiar with the content of the negotiations: the meeting was primarily intended to warn Russia against further escalation regarding the Baltic states. This refers to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

For the Israeli reader, it is useful to look at the map here, not just the name NATO.

Estonia and Latvia have land borders with Russia. Lithuania is located near the Russian Kaliningrad region and Belarus. Between Lithuania and Poland lies the narrow Suwalki Corridor — the territory through which the Baltic states have a land connection with the main part of NATO space.

Kaliningrad itself is a Russian enclave, separated from the main territory of the Russian Federation and located between Lithuania and Poland.

This creates a geographical knot where Russia, Belarus, and NATO countries are literally next to each other. A local provocation here does not require a Russian army march across half of Europe.

That is why American intelligence, as previously reported by WSJ, talks not only about a classic invasion. A wider spectrum is considered — from a cyberattack to a limited ground operation. The meaning of a potential action may not be so much in capturing a large amount of territory as in testing the political reaction of allies.

What it means to ‘test NATO’ and why Article 5 is not a magic button

Here it is worth explaining a term that is often used too freely.

NATO — the North Atlantic Alliance, a defensive alliance of European and North American states. Its foundation is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In simplified form, its meaning is this: an armed attack on one ally is considered an attack on all.

But this does not imply an automatic scheme ‘attacked Lithuania — within five minutes all NATO armies start the same war’.

NATO’s official explanation states that each ally is obliged to provide assistance, but the form of necessary actions is determined independently. It may include military force, but the treaty does not establish a single pre-written military response for all participants. Article 5 has been formally applied only once in NATO’s history — after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against the US.

And here arises the space for a dangerous experiment.

What is considered an armed attack if it is not a hundred Russian tanks with flags?

What to do with a major cyberattack?

With sabotage?

With a drone?

With armed people without obvious state affiliation?

With a small captured piece of territory if Moscow simultaneously declares that Russian troops have nothing to do with it?

That is why a limited provocation may be potentially more interesting for the Kremlin than a full-scale invasion. It tests not only NATO’s army but also the political ability of 32 countries to quickly agree on what exactly happened and how far they are willing to go in response.

This is already an analytical conclusion from the nature of the described risk, not a report on an adopted Russian plan.

The Baltic states have their own reasons for concern

Ratcliffe’s warning did not arise in a vacuum.

On August 6, Reuters reported: Lithuanian intelligence believes that Russia is considering using captured Ukrainian drones for provocations against the Baltic region states. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas spoke about such a risk.

This is a scenario of the so-called false flag operation — an action organized in such a way that responsibility appears to belong to another party.

Let’s imagine the practical meaning. A Ukrainian-type drone appears over a NATO state. The first photos appear on social media. Moscow declares: ‘This is Ukraine.’ Kyiv denies it. Technical expertise begins, politicians demand evidence, part of society argues about whom to believe.

Even without a big war, the adversary gains the main thing — time, uncertainty, and internal conflict among allies.

On July 30, three Baltic European Commissioners, together with representatives from Poland and Finland, sent a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen about the ‘deteriorating security situation,’ including increased airspace violations and drone intrusions. Today RFE/RL linked this accumulated concern with Ratcliffe’s subsequent visit on August 25.

However, the same material contains a limitation that cannot be discarded for the sake of a scary headline: Baltic diplomats do not speak of a proven inevitable full-scale Russian invasion.

This is a fundamental difference.

‘Russia will attack NATO’ — not yet an established fact

Searches are already appearing with the formulations ‘Russia will attack NATO,’ ‘Putin is preparing an attack on the Baltic states,’ ‘Ratcliffe warned Putin,’ ‘when Russia attacks Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’.

All these queries relate to today’s news, but not all describe an established fact.

Something else is established.

On August 25, Ratcliffe was in Moscow.

He spoke with Russian special services.

Putin was informed of the content of the negotiations.

Politico, WSJ, CBS, and ABC, citing sources, report that the American director warned Russia against an attack or escalation regarding NATO.

Politico specifically names Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

American intelligence has indeed revised previous assessments and allows for a limited Russian operation against a NATO state in the coming years.

But there is no public evidence of an approved Kremlin order to ‘attack the Baltics’ at this time.

I do not have access to closed American intelligence information and therefore do not intend to turn the probability from an intelligence assessment into an accomplished fact. But after the personal delivery of the warning by the CIA director, the probability is clearly perceived in Washington seriously enough to discuss it through one of the most sensitive communication channels with Moscow.

Trump says almost the opposite

This story has another line that does not allow for a convenient unambiguous version.

US President Donald Trump publicly downplayed the significance of the trip.

In an interview on August 26, he called it ‘semi-routine’, meaning approximately ‘semi-routine,’ and stated that Washington wants to achieve the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

When Trump was asked if the visit was related to a possible Russian test of NATO or increased pressure on Iran, the president responded negatively.

But several media outlets, using different sources, describe a different picture.

WSJ: Ratcliffe warned Russia not to attack NATO.

ABC: sources confirm the warning about NATO and say that the topic of Iran was raised.

Politico: the goal was primarily to warn against escalation against Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Moscow also received a demand to reduce military and economic support to Tehran.

Here you cannot simply choose the more liked version and discard the second.

Perhaps Trump is consciously describing the public diplomatic part of the negotiations, while sources talk about the closed agenda of the intelligence services. Perhaps different participants highlight different topics of one meeting. It is also possible that part of the information from anonymous sources is incomplete.

To date, there is no public American protocol of the meeting — readout, as it is called in Washington.

Therefore, the contradiction remains part of the story itself.

The CIA Director warned Russia to reduce assistance to Iran

The second part of John Ratcliffe’s mission in Moscow directly concerns Israel.

According to Politico, during the negotiations on August 25, 2026, the CIA director urged the Russian side to reduce military and economic support to Iran. Moreover, this is not just a supposition about a possible topic of conversation: the publication refers to a source familiar with the content of the negotiations and separately to a British official informed about the trip.

From the published details, it follows that the US demand was quite specific.

According to the British official, Ratcliffe urged Moscow to stop supplying Iran with weapons and defense technologies. Simultaneously, he warned the Russian side against an overly harsh reaction to the expansion of American sanctions against states continuing economic relations with Tehran.

Thus, during one visit, the CIA director conveyed at least two different signals to Moscow.

The first concerned European security directly: not to undertake escalatory actions against NATO members, with special attention given to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The second concerned the Middle East: not to strengthen Iran with weapons, defense technologies, and economic support.

For the Israeli reader, this part of the Moscow negotiations is especially important. Washington, judging by the published information, discussed Russian assistance to Tehran not at a separate diplomatic meeting months later, but included the issue of Iran in the agenda of the rare personal visit of the CIA director to Moscow.

At the same time, it is necessary to separate the reports of sources from the officially confirmed part of the trip.

The Kremlin confirmed Ratcliffe’s visit and his negotiations with Russian colleagues through the intelligence line, but did not disclose the topics of conversation. There was no personal meeting with Putin. Dmitry Peskov stated that the Russian president was then briefed on the content of the negotiations.

The CIA itself has not published a public report on the negotiations.

Moreover, Donald Trump on August 26 attempted to significantly downplay the significance of what happened. He called Ratcliffe’s trip ‘semi-routine’ — ‘semi-routine’ and stated that the US is trying to achieve the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine. When asked about versions linking the trip to a possible NATO threat and the situation around Iran, Trump publicly rejected this interpretation.

This results in an unusual discrepancy.

Officially Washington has not disclosed the content of the negotiations, the Kremlin is also silent, and Trump speaks mainly about Ukraine.

According to Politico and other American media, the closed agenda was broader: NATO, the Baltic states, and Russian support for Iran.

I would therefore not write that the US has already achieved any agreement from Moscow regarding Iran. At the moment, it is publicly unknown what exactly the Russian side responded to Ratcliffe, whether it agreed to reconsider relations with Tehran, and whether any counter-conditions were put forward.

The practical result of the trip is also unknown.

But the very fact that the issue of Russian assistance to Iran, according to sources, was raised by the CIA director personally in Moscow, shows the level of Washington’s concern.

And only after this arises the next question, already directly important for Israel:

what exactly is Russia giving Iran today and why is the US trying to force Moscow to reduce this cooperation?

Why Iran appeared in the conversation about the Baltic states

At first glance, Iran seems like an alien element here.

In fact — no.

Russia and Iran signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17, 2025. In the official text, the relationship is directly defined as long-term and strategic.

But cooperation has long gone beyond diplomatic declarations.

Iran transferred Shahed to Russia, which were then massively used against Ukraine. Russia, in turn, provided Tehran with various types of support.

In April 2026, Reuters reviewed a Ukrainian intelligence assessment, according to which Russian satellites conducted imaging of objects in Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, and the obtained information could help Iran in target selection. Moscow denied part of such accusations. The same assessment described cooperation between Russian and Iranian cyber groups.

This is already a direct Israeli context.

NAnews — News of Israel previously detailed how the military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran turned Russia’s war against Ukraine into a source of practical experience, which then returns to the Middle East. Iran and Russia: how the war in Ukraine became a testing ground for a future war against Israel and the USA

Now a new fact is added to this chain: the CIA director, who came to warn Moscow about a possible escalation against NATO, simultaneously demanded a reduction in Russian support for Iran.

Washington, judging by these reports, also considers the two threats not as completely isolated from each other.

Ukraine, the Baltics, Iran, and Israel are beginning to compete for a single American security system.

There is another connection here, less noticeable but very important for Israel.

WSJ draws attention to the state of American weapons stocks. The US simultaneously supports Ukraine, must ensure the defense of NATO allies, and is engaged in a protracted confrontation with Iran. In August, the American publication separately wrote that the consumption of missiles and other high-tech munitions in different theaters creates pressure on American deterrence capabilities.

For Israel, this is no longer a theoretical European problem.

If Washington has to simultaneously count interceptors for the Middle East, support Ukraine, and prepare for a potential NATO crisis in the Baltics, these conflicts begin to compete for the same production capacities, missiles, air defense systems, intelligence resources, and political attention.

This is one of those cases where the world map is deceiving.

Haifa is far from Tallinn.

Tel Aviv is far from Vilnius.

But a Russian drone at the border of Lithuania and Russian data that may be useful to Iran in the Middle East pass through the same larger system of Moscow’s relations with the West.

That is why an Israeli should look at Ratcliffe’s warning not as news about three small European countries somewhere near Russia.

The previous visit of the CIA head to Moscow ended quite differently from what Washington wanted.

There is another date that is hard to get rid of.

November 2021.

At that time, the CIA director was William Burns — a former American ambassador to Russia. President Joe Biden sent him to Moscow after US intelligence received data on the preparation of a large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine.

Burns was supposed to show the Russian leadership how much Washington knows about military planning and warn about the consequences.

On February 24, 2022, Russia still began a full-scale invasion.

Ratcliffe became the first known CIA director to visit Moscow after Burns’ visit.

It is impossible to equate these events.

In 2021, the Americans had a specific intelligence picture of the preparation for a big war. In August 2026, it is about assessing a possible limited action against NATO, not a publicly confirmed invasion plan.

But one lesson from 2021 is already known for sure.

The very fact that the CIA director personally brings a warning to Moscow does not mean that Moscow will necessarily listen.

And this is perhaps the most unpleasant historical detail of the current trip.

Yesterday the main question was “why did he come”. Today the question is already different.

On August 26, NAnews separately analyzed Ratcliffe’s unusual visit and two intelligence lines around it — a possible new Russian mobilization and a change in the American risk assessment for NATO. At that time, the content of the negotiations was still unknown. The CIA head flew to Moscow amid warnings about Russia and NATO

In a day, the situation changed.

Now the main question is no longer “why did the CIA director fly to Moscow?”.

We received a fairly specific answer from several sources: Washington warned Moscow about NATO, and in the most detailed version — specifically about the Baltic countries. Iran was raised in parallel.

The next question is much more complicated:

what exactly did American intelligence see if a personal visit from the CIA director was needed to deliver the warning?

There is no public answer to it yet.

And here I would look not at new loud statements, but at actions.

Will additional Russian units appear near the Baltic direction?

Will there be new provocations with drones?

Will sabotage and cyberattacks in Europe intensify?

Will Russian support for Iran change after the American warning?

Will new mobilization decisions follow within Russia?

And finally — will Moscow behave more cautiously after Ratcliffe’s visit or, as after Burns’ warning in 2021, decide that the cost of escalation can be accepted?

So far, the established fact is simpler than any forecast: on August 25, 2026, the CIA head came to Moscow to talk with a state that is waging war against Ukraine, is in a strategic partnership with Iran, and is now considered by American intelligence as a source of a possible direct test for NATO.

For Israel, there is no “foreign European front” in this story.

If Moscow is simultaneously capable of pressuring NATO countries and strengthening Tehran, then the question of Israel’s policy towards Russia ceases to be solely a matter of diplomatic balance.

It becomes part of Israel’s own security.

Editorial source verification: Politico, August 26, 2026; The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 25, and 26, 2026; Reuters, August 6, 25, and 26, 2026; ABC News, August 26, 2026; The Washington Post, August 25–26, 2026; RFE/RL, August 27, 2026; official NATO materials on Article 5; official text of the Russian-Iranian treaty from January 17, 2025; previous NAnews materials.

The Chief Rabbi of Kyiv, Yonatan Markovich, came to the anti-corruption court and offered to personally vouch for Irina Mudra. Moshe Asman responded with the phrase: “This is not the position of the Jewish community as a whole.” I analyzed why Asman is not Markovich’s superior, what connected Mudra with the rabbi long before the criminal case, and why 150 million hryvnias brought this story directly to Israel.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

On August 25, 2026, Moshe Reuven Asman publicly reacted to the decision of the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv, Yonatan Binyamin Markovich, to act as a guarantor for Irina Mudra — the former deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, for whom the High Anti-Corruption Court was selecting a preventive measure. Asman formulated the most important phrase on August 25, 2026 in a comment to RBC very clearly:

“Rabbi Markovich’s statement about his readiness to act as a guarantor was his own initiative and is not the position of the Jewish community as a whole.”

I separately checked the structure of rabbinical organizations, the history of Markovich’s relationship with Mudra, and what was happening simultaneously in the anti-corruption court. It turned out that the short formula “the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine condemned the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv” is rather misleading here. Asman indeed uses the national title, Markovich — the capital one, but this is not a “superior-subordinate” system. Moreover, in Ukraine, there has been competition among several religious centers for the right to use the very concept of “Chief Rabbi of Ukraine” for decades.

If you are looking for who is more important — Asman or Markovich, why the Rabbi of Kyiv vouched for Irina Mudra, what exactly Asman said, whether it is related to the Jewish community of Ukraine, and what Timur Mindich has to do with it in Israel, all these questions indeed relate to one story. But they cannot be mixed: personal trust of a rabbi is not proof of innocence, suspicion by NABU is not yet a verdict, and Jewish origin or ties with Israel are not the subject of criminal charges at all.

What exactly did Asman say — and why there are two different boundaries in his statement

In a comment to RBC-Ukraine, Asman did not demand punishment for Markovich and did not state that the Rabbi of Kyiv had no right to become a guarantor at all. The wording was more subtle. According to Asman, when a person during a high-profile court case reminds of their religious status, it can be perceived by society as using the authority of the religious community. He called such a mixing of roles erroneous and stated that he categorically does not support it.

This is a significant difference. Markovich could trust Mudra personally. He could believe that she would not hide and would fulfill the court’s requirements. The Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code just provides for personal guarantees of people whom the court is ready to trust. But Markovich explained his trust not only by professional acquaintance: in court, the community, prayer, his relationship with Mudra as a rabbi were mentioned. After this, the personal recommendation inevitably acquired a religious dimension.

Asman tried to cut it off. Not “Markovich has no right to have such an opinion,” but “this is Markovich’s opinion, not the collective position of the Jews of Ukraine”.

But then he drew a second boundary — in the opposite direction.

Asman stated that he categorically condemns the wave of anti-Semitism that, in his assessment, arose after Markovich’s decision. He emphasized: the act of an individual rabbi does not give the right to insult the Jewish people, spread anti-Semitic stereotypes, or accuse the entire community. At the end of his statement, three principles appeared: the law should be the same for everyone, responsibility should be personal, anti-Semitism has no justification.

Here I deliberately do not turn Asman’s words about the “wave of anti-Semitism” into independently established statistics by us. The source records that Asman characterized the reaction this way. For a separate conclusion about the scale of anti-Semitic manifestations, it would be necessary to study a mass of publications and comments. But the principle of his statement does not change from this.

In essence, Asman refused two collective generalizations at once. You cannot say: “since Markovich is the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv, it means the Jewish community vouched for Mudra.” But you also cannot say: “since the rabbi vouched for the suspect, it means the responsibility lies with the Jews.”

In a short news story, these two thoughts easily turn into one. For me, their separation is the first important detail that cannot be discarded from this story without losing meaning.

Markovich did not intend to pay for Mudra: what does the guarantee mean

On August 24, Yonatan Markovich personally came to the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine. HACC is a separate specialized court created to consider criminal proceedings on corruption at a high state level. For an Israeli reader, there is no exact analogue here: it is not just another district court and not a division of the regular police.

Markovich offered to take Mudra on personal guarantee.

This did not mean that he was going to deposit 20 or 150 million hryvnias instead of her. Personal guarantee in the Ukrainian criminal process is an independent preventive measure. The guarantor undertakes before the court to control the fulfillment of procedural obligations by the suspect and to assist in their appearance upon summons. The court, in turn, must decide whether a specific guarantor deserves sufficient trust.

Markovich stated that he had known Mudra for several years and was confident in her. At the meeting, it was mentioned that she came to the community, came to pray, and maintained a connection with the rabbi. He said that, in his conviction, Mudra would not let down the community, him personally, or the state. Reports of his speech confirm that the court separately clarified whether the rabbi understood the obligations of a guarantor. Markovich answered affirmatively.

There was more than one guarantor. Therefore, representing Mudra’s defense as a story built solely on Markovich’s religious authority would also be incorrect. But it was the rabbi’s participation that gave the meeting a public dimension that would not have arisen around an ordinary former colleague or acquaintance.

The court ultimately did not agree to leave Mudra only under guarantee.

On August 25, HACC sent her into custody for 60 days with the possibility of posting bail in the amount of 20 million hryvnias. This is about 1.33 million shekels or $448 thousand at the exchange rate on August 25. The prosecution requested an alternative bail of 150 million hryvnias — approximately 10 million shekels or $3.36 million.

The difference between 20 and 150 million is also important. The court did not support the entire financial risk assessment proposed by the prosecution, but also did not consider the personal trust of the guarantors sufficient grounds for a milder measure.

This is not a verdict for Mudra.

In Ukrainian news lexicon, the words “arrested,” “taken into custody” easily create the impression that guilt has already been established. Here we are only talking about a preventive measure during the investigation. Mudra disputes the charges, and the final conclusion about her guilt can only be made by the court after considering the evidence.

For NANews — News of Israel this separation is also fundamentally important because Israel appears further in the material. The surname of a person living here, the family ties of the suspect with Israel, and the biographies of the two rabbis should not imperceptibly turn into a substitute for evidence.

Who is more important — Asman or Markovich: Israeli logic does not work here

When I first saw the two titles side by side — “Chief Rabbi of Ukraine” and “Chief Rabbi of Kyiv,” — the most obvious answer seemed simple: the chief of the country should be above the chief of the city.

For a person living in Israel, such logic is natural.

We have the Chief Rabbinate of Israel — a state-organized system. The Council of the Chief Rabbinate operates on the basis of law, has specific powers in the field of kashrut, rabbinical qualifications, the preparation of dayanim, and other religious issues. The council includes two chief rabbis of Israel, and one of them is also connected with the leadership of the rabbinical court system. This is a real institutional structure enshrined by the state.

In Ukraine, there is no such unified state pyramid of Jewish religious authority.

And this is not a nuance of terminology.

History shows that the title “Chief Rabbi of Ukraine” has been used for decades by representatives of different structures. Yaakov Dov Bleich was widely recognized as the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine back in the early 1990s. Then in 2003, the national title was received by Azriel Haikin, associated with another Chabad structure. In September 2005, Moshe Reuven Asman was elected Chief Rabbi of Ukraine — and this decision immediately caused a public dispute. JTA then described the situation with a formula almost incredible for an Israeli reader: “one country — three chief rabbis”.

The reason was not that someone forgot to cancel the old appointment.

Different religious associations, communities, and Hasidic networks defined differently who exactly had the right to represent the Jews of Ukraine. The position of Chief Rabbi there gave public weight, access to state leaders, and a symbolic role as a community representative, but did not arise from a single Ukrainian analogue of the Israeli law on the Chief Rabbinate.

And today this is not just a story from the archives.

Forward in 2022 detailed the ongoing rivalry between Moshe Asman and Yaakov Bleich for the national title. The publication directly noted that both appear in the media as Chief Rabbis of Ukraine. JTA later also called Asman one of several people claiming this title.

Markovich is in yet another position.

He is the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and the official Chabad emissary in the Ukrainian capital. For more than two decades, he and his family have managed their own community infrastructure. Times of Israel in 2025 described his work with the Ukrainian army to create procedures that allow for Jewish burial of fallen soldiers; for consultations, Markovich met with the Chief Rabbi of the IDF, Eyal Karim.

There is also another detail here that I would not discard as a historical trifle. Asman himself is associated with Chabad but is not part of the official structure of Chabad emissaries in Ukraine, whereas Markovich is an official shaliach — an emissary of the movement in Kyiv. Forward noted this structural peculiarity, and old JTA publications show that relations between various Chabad centers in Ukraine and around the national title have long been complicated.

Therefore, the correct answer to the question “who is more important?” consists of two parts.

By the scale of the declared title, Asman is higher: Ukraine versus Kyiv. Administratively, Asman is not Markovich’s superior.

He cannot cancel his guarantee, remove him from the position of Chief Rabbi of Kyiv, or issue an order binding on his community just because he uses the national title.

This completely changes the meaning of the statement on August 25.

Asman spoke not as a superior publicly reprimanding a subordinate. He spoke as another influential Jewish leader and told society: do not transfer Markovich’s decision to all of us.

Why does Markovich trust Mudra at all: the story did not start in court

If you leave only the frame from HACC, you might decide that a well-known rabbi unexpectedly appeared in court and stood up for a high-ranking official.

But their relationship began long before Operation “Forrest Gump.”

In the previous material NANews — News of Israel I checked Mudra’s public Jewish biography with her interviews and official events. In an interview recorded on January 19, 2026 — about seven months before the searches — Mudra herself talked about her acquaintance with Markovich.

According to her, the rabbi once came to her office. They talked about Israel, and Markovich noticed that there was no mezuzah on the door.

During the next visit, he brought a mezuzah and installed it. Mudra said that after this, Markovich and his wife, Rebbetzin Inna, continued to visit her from time to time, and her family celebrates Jewish holidays. This backstory is detailed in the NANews material from August 25.

A completely different logic of guarantee emerges.

Markovich did not evaluate bank documents and did not conduct his own investigation. He vouched for a person he considered part of a familiar circle and with whom he had long-standing relationships.

This simultaneously explains his action — and shows the limit of such testimony.

If the rabbi knows that Mudra came to the community, fulfilled promises in personal communication, and regularly maintained contact, this may give him grounds to believe that she will appear in court.

But from this, it is impossible to conclude whether she knew the origin of the specific 150 million hryvnias, participated in a financial scheme, gave instructions to bank employees, or committed other actions mentioned by the investigation.

Personal trust answers one question.

Criminal proceedings — another.

Mudra also has real family ties with Israel. Her mother repatriated and lives in Rishon LeZion. Mudra’s daughter has Israeli citizenship and studied here. Ukrainian declaration data also included assets in the Israeli banking system. At the same time, I did not find confirmation of Mudra’s own Israeli citizenship, and in the previous check by NANews, we deliberately separated this unconfirmed media thesis from established family facts.

This is especially important now.

After Asman’s statement, it is very easy to build a toxic chain: Jewish official — Israel — rabbi — guarantee — money.

But the criminal case is not arranged like that.

The investigation speaks of specific actions by specific people. A family in Rishon LeZion proves nothing. A mezuzah in the office proves nothing. Israeli citizenship of the daughter proves nothing. Just as the rabbi’s guarantee itself proves nothing.

These circumstances explain the human and public part of the story. Evidence must explain the criminal one.

From 150 million hryvnias to Timur Mindich: why Israel stopped being just a biographical background

Irina Mudra held a position that an Israeli should also decipher.

Until August 19, she was the deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine. This is not an analogue of the office of the President of Israel. The Ukrainian Office of the President is an influential administrative-political center under the head of state, involved in decision preparation, legal policy, international processes, and interaction with other branches of power.

Before moving there, Mudra worked as the Deputy Minister of Justice. Among her public directions were the international legal responsibility of Russia, work with frozen Russian assets, and the creation of compensation mechanisms for Ukraine.

That is why her appearance among NABU suspects became a politically loud event.

The operation was given the code name “Forrest Gump.” NABU — the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, a special body investigating corruption of high-ranking officials. SAP — the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, which procedurally accompanies such proceedings and supports the prosecution.

In one of the key episodes, the investigation speaks of 150 million hryvnias.

This is not a random round sum.

In June 2026, it was exactly 150 million hryvnias that were posted as bail for the former Minister of Energy, Herman Galushchenko — a figure in another high-profile case known as “Midas.”

The investigation’s version is that cash of alleged criminal origin needed to be processed through legal entities and banking infrastructure, turning them into non-cash money that could be transferred to an official court account.

I emphasize: this is the version of NABU and SAP, not an already established court fact of Mudra’s guilt.

But on August 25, this version received a new continuation.

At the hearing on the preventive measure for the head of Sense Bank, the SAP prosecutor stated that the cash for Galushchenko’s bail was given to Mudra by Timur Mindich. Publications from the hearing are dated August 25; it is about the same 150 million hryvnias.

According to the version presented by the prosecutor, Mudra was supposed to help find a mechanism for legalizing funds through banking operations.

Here Israel first appears not as the place of residence of the suspect’s mother and not as part of the rabbis’ biography.

Timur Mindich is in Israel.

And this is not a separate coincidentally matched plot. He is a figure in the “Midas” case, for which Ukraine has already sent an official extradition request to Israel. NANews tracked this procedure separately: documents, after correcting technical deficiencies, were sent to the Ministry of Justice of Israel on March 31, 2026, and on August 10, SAP head Oleksandr Klymenko said that the Ukrainian side is still waiting for a response.

At that moment, 132 days had passed.

The lack of a response cannot be called a refusal by Israel to extradite Mindich. We do not know this. The Israeli extradition procedure includes a legal review and, under certain circumstances, a court hearing.

But the new prosecutor’s statement on August 25 adds another material to the extradition plot: according to SAP, Mindich’s money now appears not only within “Midas” but also in the “Forrest Gump” episode, where Mudra is involved.

And here it is already impossible to reduce the story to “the rabbi stood up for the official.”

During the day, Markovich tells the court about personal trust and the community.

The court sends Mudra into custody.

Asman separates the rabbi’s act from the entire Jewish community.

And almost simultaneously, the prosecutor in another hearing names a person located in Israel as the alleged source of cash at the center of the criminal episode.

These events do not legally prove each other. But journalistically, they change the context.

Now any careless mixing of religion, Jewish identity, Israel, and criminal suspicions becomes even more dangerous.

Why the words “not the position of the Jewish community” are more important here than the dispute between two rabbis

After checking all the lines, I would not call what is happening a “split among the Jews of Ukraine.” There are no grounds for such a conclusion.

We have a specific decision by Yonatan Markovich, a specific public reaction by Moshe Asman, and a long-existing system of different Jewish centers, within which no national title creates a single administrative authority over all communities. The story of Irina Mudra should be resolved in a completely different plane — by the court, bank documents, conversations, testimonies, and other evidence, not by the origin of the participants.

Therefore, Asman’s phrase “not the position of the Jewish community as a whole” turned out to be more accurate for me than any headline about a conflict between rabbis. It simultaneously returns responsibility to the specific guarantor and protects the community from the collectivization of this responsibility. Markovich vouched in his own name. Asman has the right to publicly say that he does not share such a step. But neither of them turns the criminal case into a “Jewish case,” just as the appearance of Timur Mindich in the prosecutor’s version does not turn it into a case of the state of Israel.

And there remains a question that is now more important than finding out “who is the more important rabbi.” The court will have to figure out whether the chain described by SAP from Mindich’s cash through Mudra and banking infrastructure to the 150 million hryvnias bail existed, and Israel will have to decide on a separate procedure around the extradition request for Mindich.

Against this background, Asman’s statement establishes a useful boundary even before the future verdict: the law evaluates people’s actions personally. A religious community cannot be a collective guarantor or a collective defendant.

Google Title: Russia attacked Ukraine with 162 drones: a 4-year-old girl died in Chernihiv

At night, Russia sent 162 drones of various types to Ukraine, including jet-powered Shahed. Ukrainian air defense reported 134 targets shot down or suppressed, but simultaneously confirmed hits at 18 locations. In Chernihiv, one drone hit a residential building: a woman and a four-year-old girl died.

The queries ‘Russia’s attack on Ukraine on August 26, 2026’, ‘162 drones over Ukraine’, ‘strike on Chernihiv’, and ‘jet-powered Shahed’ describe one night, but not the same number. 162 is the number of drones launched in the morning report of the Ukrainian Air Force, 134 is the number of targets that air defense considered shot down or suppressed by 08:00, and 18 is the number of locations where hits were recorded. These figures cannot be mechanically subtracted from each other.

Author: R.Verter

August 26, 2026. Around five in the morning, a Russian drone struck a private residential house in Chernihiv, a regional center about 140 kilometers north of Kyiv. Three people were in the house. A fourteen-year-old girl was hospitalized. During search operations, rescuers found a 49-year-old woman and a four-year-old girl dead. The house was almost destroyed by fire, which also affected outbuildings and a nearby store.

I start with Chernihiv, not with the number of launched devices. The figure 162 looks good in the headline and allows for comparing one mass attack with another. But it is insufficient for understanding what is happening. This night involved different types of drones, electronic suppression, jet targets, reports of ballistic threats, strikes on several regions, and very different consequences on the ground.

162 drones — and the figure 134, which is easily misleading

According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the air attack began around 18:00 on August 25. Russia launched 162 drones of the Shahed, ‘Gerbera’, ‘Parody’, and other types. Among the Shahed, the military specifically noted jet variants. Launch areas were near Kursk, Orel, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Russia, as well as in occupied territories — in the Donetsk and Gvardeiskoye areas in Crimea.

By 08:00, the Ukrainian military reported 134 drones shot down or suppressed. A UAV is an unmanned aerial vehicle; in everyday Israeli speech, the closest understandable word is כטב”ם. But the wording ‘shot down or suppressed’ is crucial here.

Some devices are indeed destroyed by fire: anti-aircraft means, mobile groups, aviation, or other systems. Some may be neutralized by electronic warfare — a complex of means that interfere with the drone’s navigation and communication. For the Israeli reader, it is important not to imagine each ‘suppression’ as a classic interception by an air defense missile.

There is also a second arithmetic trap. From 162, you cannot simply subtract 134 and write: ’28 drones broke through’. The Air Force reported hits at 18 locations and debris falling at three more. One location can receive more than one hit; some targets may be lost, fall, or be finally classified only after the first report. The morning report itself was called preliminary.

For NAnews — Israel News, this difference is also important because the Israeli audience is used to seeing air defense effectiveness in percentages. The Ukrainian reporting formula is arranged differently, and the conditions of war do not allow transferring one Israeli interception indicator to the Ukrainian situation without reservations.

In Chernihiv, one drone hit a private house

In the morning statistics, Chernihiv is one of the 18 hit locations. On the ground, it looks completely different.

City authorities reported that after the strike, a private residential house caught fire. The fire almost destroyed the building. Inside were a 49-year-old woman and two girls — four and fourteen years old. I deliberately do not call them mother and daughters or sisters: in the official reports published by this hour, which I checked, the age and number of people in the house are indicated, but family relationships are not recorded in all reports. Adding them myself would be wrong.

The fourteen-year-old girl was taken to the hospital. During search and rescue operations, the bodies of the woman and the four-year-old girl were found. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine — SES, roughly corresponding in function to the Israeli fire and rescue service כבאות והצלה in terms of rescue and firefighting operations, confirmed two dead and one injured child.

The Chernihiv City Council indicated the age of the deceased woman — 49 years. This same figure is now cited by other sources with reference to local authorities. Therefore, the previous version that appeared in some retellings about 39 years should not be used as equivalent.

August 26 was declared a Day of Mourning in Chernihiv. The city ordered the lowering of state flags and the cancellation of entertainment events.

At this point, it is especially noticeable why I do not like turning air defense reports into a sports score. Even a high percentage of neutralized devices does not answer the question of where the one that could not be stopped hit.

Chernihiv region: if you look not at one night, but three days

The strike on August 26 looks different if you open police reports not only for this morning.

On August 24, a Russian drone hit a multi-story residential building in Chernihiv. According to preliminary police information, 16 people were injured. Among them were children aged 12 and 17. Ukrainian bomb technicians initially identified the device used as ‘Geran-5’.

That same evening, the strike hit the center of Mena — a small town in the Chernihiv region. For the Israeli reader, this name itself says little: Mena is located about 65 kilometers east of Chernihiv and is the administrative center of the local community. ‘Community’ in the Ukrainian administrative system is a municipal territorial association; the closest Israeli reference is a local municipality or regional administrative unit, although legally the systems are different.

In Mena, the police initially reported 12 injured, including four children. Administrative buildings, residential houses, shops, and cars were damaged.

The next night, around three o’clock on August 25, drones attacked Koryukivka. A 15-year-old girl was injured there and taken to the hospital. Enterprises, residential houses, and transport were damaged.

This results in a sequence that cannot be seen in the single figure ‘162’: August 24 — children among the injured in a multi-story building in Chernihiv and in Mena; August 25 — a fifteen-year-old injured in Koryukivka; morning of August 26 — a fourteen-year-old girl in the hospital and a four-year-old deceased in Chernihiv.

I do not turn this sequence into a statement about a specifically chosen Russian tactic against children — there is not enough data for such a conclusion. But as a factual chronology of civilian consequences in one region, it is significant in itself. And this is already the part of the material that disappears if limited to the morning air defense report.

Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk region show why ‘drone attack’ is too simple a name

While rescuers were working in Chernihiv, air targets continued to be recorded in other parts of Ukraine.

In Kharkiv, authorities reported drone strikes on urban areas. Separate attention was drawn to reports of jet drones. This is important not because of a new loud term, but because of interception practice: a jet device flies differently than the usual propeller-driven Shahed, and the air defense crew has a different time window for detection and reaction.

At night, the Air Force also warned of a ballistic threat and reported a ballistic missile heading towards Sumy. This is a separate class of weapon. I do not include such a missile in the number of 162 drones and do not mix these episodes into one statistic.

The same must be done with the Dnipropetrovsk region. According to regional authorities, overnight Russian forces attacked three districts more than 20 times with drones, artillery, and an aerial bomb. In Nikopol, a 26-year-old woman was injured; an agricultural enterprise, market, apartment buildings, and cars were damaged. In Pavlograd, a 20-year-old woman was injured, and a private house was damaged. A fire broke out in the Synelnykove district.

Here, another Ukrainian military term appears — KAB, which means a guided aerial bomb. It is dropped by an aircraft; it is not a type of Shahed. For residents of frontline Ukrainian regions, a drone, artillery shell, and KAB can appear in one daily report, but technically these are three completely different threats.

This distinction had to be explained in previous materials of NAnews — Israel News. For example, in an article about the strike on Ukraine on August 20, it was about a combination of drones and missiles, and on August 21 — about a new large drone wave. If you put these episodes next to August 26, you see not a repetition of the same attack, but a constant change in the combination of attack means.

Jet-powered Shahed: a Ukrainian problem that Israelis are already familiar with

The word Shahed does not need to be explained from scratch to Israelis. In April 2024, during a direct attack by Iran on Israel, among more than 300 launched aerial means, there were about 170 drones. Israel then acted not alone: part of the targets were intercepted by Israeli aviation and air defense systems, part by allied forces even before the targets entered Israeli airspace.

But from this, one cannot conclude that Ukrainian air defense should show the same result. Geography, territory depth, availability of aviation, density of air defense means, the number of simultaneously protected objects, and international participation are completely different.

There is another connection, and it is much more useful for understanding what is happening. The Iranian line of drone technologies, which first became obvious to many Israelis precisely through Shahed, has been developing within the Russian war against Ukraine for several years. Russia is not just using a familiar basic concept. New variants are appearing, routes, altitudes, navigation methods are changing, false targets and jet devices are being used.

‘Gerbera’ and ‘Parody’ are also important not because the reader needs to remember two more names. A decoy drone can make the air defense system treat it as a potential threat: the target needs to be seen, tracked, classified, and a decision made on how to respond to it. In a mass attack, the load is created not only by explosives but also by the sheer number of objects in the air.

This is where the Ukrainian experience should be read in Israel carefully. Not as an instruction ‘they have it — so will we’, but as a long testing ground for changing drone warfare. Some technologies and suppliers overlap, defense systems and conditions do not.

What is confirmed by the morning of August 26 — and where the facts end

By 08:00, the Ukrainian Air Force confirmed 162 Russian drones and 134 targets shot down or suppressed. Hits were confirmed at 18 locations and debris falling at three. The attack was still ongoing at the time of this report.

In Chernihiv, the death of a 49-year-old woman and a four-year-old girl and the hospitalization of a 14-year-old girl were officially confirmed. A direct drone hit on a residential house and the subsequent fire were confirmed.

The longer Chernihiv chronology is also confirmed: August 24 — 16 preliminarily injured after a strike on a multi-story building, including two children; the same day — 12 injured in Mena, including four children; August 25 — a 15-year-old girl injured in Koryukivka.

In the Dnipropetrovsk region, local authorities confirm two injured and more than 20 attacks by various means — not only drones. In Kharkiv, the use of jet drones was recorded. A ballistic threat was also announced at night.

However, the exact number of drones that physically reached their targets cannot be determined from the formula ‘162 launched — 134 shot down or suppressed’. This arithmetic cannot determine the number of warheads that exploded on the ground. The morning report does not provide such data.

Therefore, at this stage, I would leave exactly this boundary: it is known how many air targets the military recorded, how many they preliminarily consider neutralized, how many locations received hits, and what human consequences local services have already confirmed. Everything beyond this boundary requires further official clarifications.

From the editors of NAnews: The ties between Israel and Ukraine are not built only through diplomacy, aid, or security cooperation. Since 2022, thousands of people have carried professional experience, business connections, and technological knowledge between the two countries. In this guest column for NAnews, Mark Ginsberg looks at how Ukrainian immigrants have become part of Israel’s tech ecosystem — and whether that human bridge could outlast the wars that created it.

By Mark Ginsberg
Mark Ginsberg is an Israel-based digital marketer and commentator on technology and artificial intelligence, with over two decades of firsthand perspective on the country’s innovation economy. Originally from South Florida and now based in Efrat, he analyzes the growth of Israel’s tech ecosystem and the broader implications of AI on business, policy, and society.

Two Wars, One Arrival Hall

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Israel absorbed tens of thousands of Ukrainian immigrants alongside a larger wave from Russia. Immigration hit a 23-year high that year, with more than 70,000 new arrivals, many of them engineers, developers, and founders who packed careers into suitcases. The community of Israelis with Ukrainian roots, which NAnews has covered for years, suddenly included thousands of technologists who could build companies in two languages and handle two business cultures without a translator. They arrived into an Israeli tech sector that was itself entering a period of contraction and then war.

That collision produced something neither country planned for, a working bridge between two economies under fire.

The bridge is real, and it runs in both directions.

Engineers Who Understand Both Battlefields

Israel’s technology sector has spent the past decade selling the world defenses it built for its own threats, and the past two years showed how that experience travels.

Ukrainian engineers who joined Israeli firms brought fluency in the realities of drone and electronic warfare, the daily testbed of the Ukrainian front. Israeli companies, blocked by regulation from selling defense products directly to Kyiv, have still built channels into Ukraine’s defense-tech scene, and the Jerusalem Post reported that Jerusalem is now shifting from humanitarian aid toward forward-looking defense tech cooperation between the two countries. Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha confirmed in July 2025 that Kyiv and Jerusalem intend to launch joint projects in security and technology. The people best positioned to staff those projects are the immigrants who hold both contexts in their heads.

A defense technology sector that has become a shield for others grows stronger when it absorbs engineers who spent years thinking about the threats on the other side of the continent. None of this was the plan when these families boarded flights in Warsaw and Bucharest. It is the result.

What the Bridge Carries Now

The traffic is wider than defense. Ukrainian-Israeli teams work in cybersecurity, agricultural technology, and medical systems, fields where Israeli firms had already built a global reputation and where Ukrainian STEM graduates are historically strong. Innovation flowing out of Israel has become one of the country’s main strategic exports, and the diaspora engineers now inside that pipeline give Ukrainian product thinking a seat at the table. American firms have noticed.

US defense planners talk openly about wanting integration with allied innovation, and the list of allies producing battlefield-tested technology now includes both Israel and Ukraine.

Both wars are winding down at different speeds, and the bridge now faces its real test. Some immigrants will return to rebuild Ukrainian industry, and Israel should wish them well, since the strongest version of this relationship is two healthy tech sectors with dense personal ties between them. Others will stay, build companies in Herzliya and Haifa, and keep the corridor open from the inside.

The scenario to watch is the middle one, the founder who commutes between Kyiv and Tel Aviv with investors in both. Ten years from now, the most important tech relationship in the region may not be traced back to any treaty. It will be traced back to the 2022 arrival hall, and the thousands of engineers who walked out of it into both futures at once.

From the editors of NAnews: Ginsberg’s argument points to a relationship that is still taking shape. The technological connection between Israel and Ukraine is not yet a single organized system, and its long-term scale remains uncertain. But the people who moved between the two countries after 2022 have already created professional networks that did not exist in the same form before the war.

For NAnews, that is the part worth watching next: whether these personal and professional ties turn into lasting companies, joint projects, investment channels, and research partnerships. If they do, one of the most durable consequences of the 2022 migration wave may be something neither government originally designed — a working technological bridge between Israel and Ukraine.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry has begun preparations for the year 2030, which the authorities and church leaders of Jordan call the 2000th anniversary of the Baptism of Jesus Christ in the Jordan River. However, there is no unified decision from the Vatican, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, or all Christian churches regarding such a jubilee. Moreover, the date 2030 itself is historically contentious.

On July 15, 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar ordered the creation of a special task force to prepare for events related to the supposed two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism of Jesus Christ.

The group was headed by Ambassador George Deek, Israel’s special envoy for relations with the Christian world. In a statement from the Foreign Ministry, the event was described as having deep spiritual significance for more than two billion Christians. Israel expects that millions of pilgrims may arrive in the region.

At first glance, a logical question arises: why is the Foreign Ministry of the Jewish state involved in preparing for a Christian jubilee?

The answer is that Israel did not set the date, did not establish a religious holiday, and does not plan to conduct church rituals. The task of the Foreign Ministry is diplomatic contacts with churches, Christian organizations, religious leaders, and foreign governments, as well as coordination with other Israeli agencies ahead of the possible mass arrival of foreign citizens.

Israel joined an already existing project

The wording that the Israeli Foreign Ministry “began preparations for the celebration” creates the impression that it was Jerusalem that declared 2030 a jubilee year.

In reality, Israel joined an initiative that Jordan began promoting much earlier.

Jordanian shore and UNESCO site

The main center of future events, Jordan considers the place “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” — Al-Maghtas, located on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, nine kilometers north of the Dead Sea.

The archaeological area includes two main zones:

• Tell al-Kharrar, also known as Jabal Mar Elias, or the hill of the prophet Elijah;
• the area of the churches of John the Baptist near the river.

On the territory, remains of Roman and Byzantine churches, chapels, a monastery, hermit caves, water collection systems, and ancient baptismal pools have been discovered. In 2015, the site was inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Most Christian denominations recognize this area as the probable site of Jesus’ Baptism by John the Baptist.

On the opposite, western bank of the Jordan is Qasr al-Yahud, located in the Jericho area on the West Bank and under Israeli administration.

The Jordan at this point is quite narrow: pilgrims on both banks essentially look at each other. But each bank promotes its own version of pilgrimage infrastructure and its own access to the Baptism site.

This is where religious history simultaneously turns into a matter of tourism, diplomacy, transportation, security, and international influence.

And Yardenit?

Yardenit is another well-known baptismal complex in the waters of the Jordan, located in northern Israel, near Kibbutz Kinneret, where the river flows out of Lake Kinneret and heads south.

It appeared in 1981 as a safe and convenient alternative to Qasr al-Yahud. After the Six-Day War of 1967, the traditional Baptism site of Jesus near Jericho ended up in a closed border zone: surrounded by minefields, military barriers, and free access for pilgrims was practically impossible.

In Yardenit, stairs and platforms for descending to the water, changing rooms, showers, places for worship, and group baptisms were equipped. Thanks to this, the complex quickly became popular among Christian pilgrims from around the world.

However, Yardenit is not considered a historical site of the Baptism of Jesus Christ. The evangelical event is traditionally associated with Qasr al-Yahud on the Israeli bank and Bethany Beyond the Jordan on the Jordanian side. Yardenit is a modern pilgrimage center that arose due to the long-term lack of safe access to the traditional site.

A $100 million project appeared back in 2022

On December 13, 2022, it became known that Jordan is launching a master plan worth about $100 million, aimed at attracting approximately one million Christian pilgrims in 2030.

The project was not presented by the Vatican or an ecumenical council, but by a non-profit foundation created with the participation of the Jordanian state to develop the “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” area.

The chairman of the foundation, businessman and former Jordanian Minister of Labor Samir Murad, explained that the area should retain its spiritual and natural character. The developers abandoned the idea of building luxurious five-star hotels and chose the concept of a “biblical village,” which should remind pilgrims of life two thousand years ago.

The first phase of the project was estimated at approximately $15 million. The second — up to $85 million.

The plan included creating comfortable tent accommodations, affordable lodging for pilgrims, establishments with local organic food, a three-star hotel, restaurants, a shopping area, a museum, a wellness center, botanical gardens, and a nature reserve on the bird migration route.

Electrical cables and communication lines were planned to be buried underground so that modern infrastructure would not disrupt the visual atmosphere of the historical site.

Nine religious organizations received the right to create their own facilities for receiving pilgrims. Among them was the World Baptist Alliance, cooperating with the Jordanian Baptist Convention.

At a dinner dedicated to the launch of the project, about 250 guests were present, including King Abdullah II of Jordan, his two sons, and the country’s prime minister. The Secretary-General of the World Baptist Alliance, Elijah Brown, stated that both phases should be completed by 2029 so that the area is ready for the 2030 events.

Thus, the first public presentation of the 2030 date was primarily associated with a specific Jordanian investment and pilgrimage project.

How a tourist date turned into a religious initiative

The next stage began in January 2025.

At the beginning of the month, a new Catholic Church of the Baptism of Jesus was consecrated on the Jordanian side of the Jordan. The ceremony was attended by the Vatican’s Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin, who arrived as a special representative of Pope Francis, and the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa.

The construction of the church took about 15 years. The first stone was previously blessed by Pope Benedict XVI in the presence of King Abdullah II and Queen Rania.

On January 28, 2025, Father Rifat Bader, director of the Catholic Center for Studies and Media in Jordan, stated in an interview with Vatican News that Jordan is beginning a five-year preparation for its “Great Jubilee.”

He explicitly said that in 2030, Jordan intends to celebrate 2000 years since the Baptism of Jesus. However, this was a statement from a representative of the Latin Patriarchate in Jordan, published by Vatican News, not a papal bull or an official act of the Holy See establishing a worldwide jubilee year.

In other words, the presence of high-ranking Vatican representatives gave the project significant ecclesiastical weight, but in itself did not turn 2030 into a mandatory jubilee for the entire Christian world.

Pizzaballa linked 2030 and 2033

On December 17, 2025, in Amman, at the Al-Husseiniya Palace, King Abdullah II met with Christian and Muslim religious leaders of Jerusalem and Jordan.

At this meeting, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa stated:

• 2030 should mark 2000 years since the Baptism of Christ;
• 2033 should mark 2000 years since the Resurrection.

Pizzaballa added that representatives of churches from around the world should come to Jordan, primarily to “Bethany Beyond the Jordan.”

Here, the overall structure of the project became visible: the period from 2030 to 2033 should be presented as a symbolic path from the Baptism and the beginning of Jesus’ public ministry to the crucifixion and Resurrection.

But even this statement was not a decision of all Christian churches. It was support for the Jordanian program from one of the most influential Catholic hierarchs of the Holy Land.

Official state support appeared on May 18, 2026

On May 18, 2026, King Abdullah II visited the Baptism site at “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” and opened the International Orthodox University Baptism Site International Orthodox University — BIO University.

This is a non-profit educational institution created by the Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate. The university is designed to accommodate 40 students, provides for the possibility of distance learning, and was supposed to start accepting students in September 2026.

During the event, the king instructed the Jordanian government to adopt and support the Baptism 2030 initiative.

And here is the precise answer to the question of who officially put forward the current initiative: it was proposed by the Council of Church Leaders of Jordan.

The chairman of the Council, Greek Orthodox Archbishop Christoforos Atallah, thanked the king for his support and stated the need to develop programs and strategic plans jointly with churches.

Cardinal Pizzaballa called 2030 not just a historical date, but an opportunity to strengthen unity, mutual understanding, and harmony.

The Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem and Primate of the Episcopal Church of Jerusalem and the Middle East Hosam Naoum stated that the preparation should include infrastructure development, service improvement, staff training, and work with churches and Christian organizations worldwide.

The state plan of Jordan covers religious events, the development of pilgrimage routes, the promotion of “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” and other Christian sites, infrastructure renewal, and the creation of services for foreign visitors.

NANews — Israel News compared the dates: the Israeli task force appeared almost four years after the first public presentation of the Jordanian project and two months after King Abdullah II’s official directive.

What Israel was preparing on its shore

Israel was not just observing Jordan’s actions.

On February 10, 2026, after extensive reconstruction, the Qasr al-Yahud complex on the western bank of the Jordan River reopened.

The cost of the work amounted to 25 million shekels, or approximately 8.1 million dollars at the exchange rate at the time of opening. Funding was provided by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism and the Civil Administration, and the work was carried out by the State Tourism Company.

The project included:

• road and parking repairs;
• landscaping;
• construction of a prayer pergola;
• a large air-conditioned sanitary facility;
• hot showers and changing cabins;
• a wide wooden deck for safe access to the water.

There were also plans to create an air-conditioned hall for prayers and events in any weather and separate water access for people with disabilities.

Qasr al-Yahud is called the third most important Christian site in Israel and the West Bank after the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.

Thus, by the time of the Foreign Ministry’s decision, infrastructure preparation on the Israeli side was already in full swing.

Why George Deek headed the task force

On April 23, 2026, Gideon Sa’ar appointed George Deek as Israel’s first special envoy for relations with the Christian world.

Deek is an Arab-Christian from Jaffa, a career diplomat, and a former Israeli ambassador to Azerbaijan. He became the first Christian to head an Israeli embassy. His father, Yousef Deek, led the Orthodox Christian community of Jaffa and Israel.

The appointment came amid a serious deterioration in Israel’s relations with some Christian leaders.

During military restrictions, the police did not allow Cardinal Pizzaballa and other high-ranking clergy to attend the Palm Sunday service at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. After international reaction, the authorities reversed the decision, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the patriarch be granted access.

Additionally, in April 2026, an IDF soldier was filmed smashing a statue of Jesus with a sledgehammer in the Christian village of Debel in southern Lebanon. The soldier and the colleague filming the incident were removed from combat duties and punished after an investigation. Catholic leaders of the Holy Land called the incident a grave insult to the Christian faith.

There were also reports of attacks by radical settlers on Christian communities in the West Bank and increasing cases of insults, spitting, and attacks on Christians in the Old City of Jerusalem.

Therefore, preparation for 2030 has not only tourist but also diplomatic significance for Israel. It is an opportunity to restore relations with Christian churches and demonstrate that the state guarantees freedom of religion and access to holy sites.

Who actually “declared” 2030

Based on the documents found, the following chain can be reconstructed.

On December 13, 2022, a Jordanian state-affiliated foundation publicly presented a $100 million project and named 2030 as the time to celebrate the two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism.

In January 2025, representatives of the Catholic Church in Jordan announced the start of a five-year preparation for the “Great Jubilee.”

On December 17, 2025, Cardinal Pizzaballa publicly linked 2030 with the Baptism and 2033 with the Resurrection.

On May 18, 2026, King Abdullah II instructed the Jordanian government to support the Baptism 2030 initiative proposed by the Council of Church Leaders of Jordan.

On July 15, 2026, the Israeli Foreign Ministry joined the already existing project.

However, no single document was found by which the Pope, the Ecumenical Patriarch, the World Council of Churches, or any other body representing all of Christianity officially declared 2030 as the worldwide year of the two-thousandth anniversary of Christ’s Baptism.

Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of a jubilee recognized by the entire Christian world, but of a Jordanian church-state initiative, supported by a number of influential Christian leaders and later picked up by Israel.

Why the date 2030 itself raises questions

The Gospels do not specify the exact calendar year of Jesus’ Baptism.

The main chronological reference is found in the Gospel of Luke. The beginning of John the Baptist’s ministry is attributed to the fifteenth year of the reign of the Roman Emperor Tiberius. Jesus’ Baptism occurred shortly after John’s ministry began.

The problem lies in how exactly to count the years of Tiberius’ reign.

His independent reign is usually counted from the death of Emperor Augustus in 14 AD. By this calculation, the fifteenth year of Tiberius falls between the second half of 28 and 29 AD.

A study by Andrew Steinmann, published in the Tyndale Bulletin in 2022, compares Roman, Jewish, and early Christian written sources, coins, and inscriptions. The author concludes that contemporaries counted Tiberius’ reign from 14 AD, and Jesus’ Baptism most likely occurred in 29 AD.

In scientific and theological literature, there are other calculations that date the beginning of the ministry to 28 AD or, when counting Tiberius’ co-regency with Augustus, to an even earlier period. But there is no exact historical basis specifically for the year 30.

If the Baptism occurred in 29 AD, the two-thousandth anniversary falls in 2029. To get 2030, one must assume a conditional date of Baptism in 30 AD.

Therefore, 2030 is not a proven historical date, but a convenient symbolic marker.

It allows for a clear four-year concept:

2030 — Baptism and the beginning of ministry;
2033 — crucifixion and Resurrection.

For an international pilgrimage campaign, such a scheme is convenient. For strict historical chronology, it remains controversial.

Conclusion

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indeed begun preparations for the events of 2030, but Israel did not invent this anniversary.

The date appeared in the public domain no later than December 2022 as part of the Jordanian development project ‘Bethany Beyond the Jordan’. It was then supported by Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican leaders of Jordan and Jerusalem. In May 2026, King Abdullah II turned the Baptism 2030 initiative into a state program.

Israel joined later when it became clear that Jordan intended to turn the eastern bank of the Jordan into a global center for Christian pilgrimage.

On the western bank, Israel has already invested 25 million shekels in the reconstruction of Qasr al-Yahud, created the position of a special envoy for relations with the Christian world, and is now forming a diplomatic infrastructure to work with churches and future pilgrims.

Therefore, behind the religious formulation are several processes: faith, historical memory, relations with the Christian world, restoration of Israel’s reputation, competition with Jordan, and the struggle for a huge international pilgrimage flow.

And the year 2030 itself remains primarily a symbolic, church-tourist, and politically convenient date, rather than an indisputably established two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism of Jesus Christ.

Young Israelis still feel the pain of losing a Ukrainian comrade with whom they created a Zionist project — an organic farm at the foot of Mount Carmel. In memory of their friend, who heroically died repelling Russian aggression against Ukraine, they named a new wine made from the vineyards he planted.

On March 12, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded Kostyantyn Mrochko the title of Hero of Ukraine — the country’s highest military honor for courage and heroism.

His body was not buried as it burned along with the tank.

“In Israel, Kostya was spiritually reborn and restored. He was not Jewish, but we held a memorial ceremony for him in March 2023. We remember his quick reactions, his work ethic, courage, all his human qualities.”

Kostya, known as Kostyantyn Mrochko, was a tank operator, builder, and craftsman with golden hands. He was a nature and agriculture enthusiast, as well as a joker and inventor with a kind heart. After participating in tank battles in Donbas, he moved to Israel, where he worked in construction and joined the “Lev Adam” organic farm. Kostya was a respected and beloved comrade, leaving a deep impression on everyone who knew him. He was interested in Jewish customs, and his friends remember his courage, quick reactions, and work ethic.

When Kostya’s visa to stay in Israel expired, he returned to Ukraine in August 2021.

“It was clear to him that he would stay to defend Ukraine. And it was clear to us that even if he had stayed in Israel, he would have flown to fight for his country in 2022,” says Elia Aaron.

Israeli friends continue to communicate with his family — Kostya left behind a mother and a teenage son, Vasyl, from a previous marriage in Ukraine. Elia shared plans to build a small pool in memory of Kostya Mrochko.

This is reported by Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter.

Yoav Sason, the creator of the “Lev Adam” farm, talks about Kostya, who was a special person. Kostya quickly learned Hebrew and had extensive experience in agriculture. He was a patriot of Ukraine and planned to return there after his time in Israel. He had a military spirit that inspired him to return to Ukraine for its defense. Yoav recalls how Kostya gently held his newborn daughter and how he loved children.

Israeli friends from the “Lev Adam” farm harvested red and white grapes in the summer and fall of 2022 — just months after Kostya Mrochko’s death defending Kyiv from Putin’s aggression in March 2022.

These friends decided to combine red and white wine — just as Kostya symbolically combined Ukraine and Israel, Ukrainian and Jewish.

Thus, the new rosé wine “Kostya” of the 2022 harvest was born. Friends from “Lev Adam” made a limited edition — only 650 bottles, each with its own number. Each bottle features a story about Kostya, his wonderful human qualities, and his heroism.

The Last Battle

Kostyantyn Mrochko was born on April 9, 1984, and lived in the village of Blahodatne, Volodymyr district, Volyn region of Ukraine. He served in the tank troops and later enrolled in distance learning at the Kyiv University of Food Technologies. In 2014, he went to defend the country in eastern Ukraine and participated in various military operations. His feat in Debaltseve became known and recognized as significant in Ukraine’s history. In February 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he once again stood to defend his country. During a battle on March 8, 2022, he died when his tank was hit by a missile.

But Kostya did not disappear without a trace.

“The rosé wine “Kostya” is dedicated to the memory of our dear friend Kostya Mrochko. He was the backbone of our organic farm “Lev Adam,” a strong man with a big heart and unmatched skill. Unfortunately, Kostya will never have the privilege to enjoy it. The memory of his strong hands and gentle heart lives in this wine, in its unique refreshing taste,” reads the label of the Israeli wine.

In the fall, new bottles will be filled with the young rosé wine “Kostya” of the 2023 harvest.

Hero of Ukraine Kostyantyn Mrochko remains not only in the memory of Ukrainian and Jewish friends but has become wine in Israel.

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On August 23, 2026, the CEO of JNF-KKL Eurasia, Igal Yasinov, recorded a congratulatory message in Ukrainian to Ukraine from the ‘Ukraine’ forest in Israel’s Negev. I checked the history of this place—from the Odessa Grove of 2014 and Petro Poroshenko’s olive tree to the memorial stele, fires near Dorot, and the old Google Maps point by which the Ukrainian section can be searched today.

Author of NANews – Israel News: Pavel Shveyko

On August 23, 2026, on the eve of Ukraine’s Independence Day, the CEO of JNF-KKL Eurasia, Igal Yasinov, recorded an address to Ukrainians from the ‘Ukraine’ forest in the Negev. At first glance, it’s a few minutes of festive video. But the place chosen for the recording changes the meaning of the address: Yasinov stands among the trees of a project he was involved in more than ten years ago. The official website of JNF-KKL Eurasia still lists his position as the organization’s CEO.

“Look around, trees grow slowly, but they withstand storms.

This is exactly how Israel is. This is exactly how Ukraine is. This is exactly how people are, who continue to build the future even under shelling.

Today I congratulate the worthy Kharkiv, I congratulate Ukraine on Independence Day. I greet everyone who believes in freedom more strongly than the enemies believe in their weapons.

Eternal memory to those who gave their lives for freedom. Glory to the heroes defending Ukraine today. Glory to the heroes defending Israel today. Glory to Ukraine and glory to Israel.

Peace to our countries. And may the day come when our children know the sound of the wind in the trees better than the sound of sirens.

Friends, we are united. Victory to us!”

JNF-KKL is the Jewish National Fund, in Hebrew קרן קיימת לישראל, Keren Kayemet Le-Israel. The organization has existed since 1901; today its areas include forests and the environment, water, land development, education, tourism, and research projects. Therefore, the word ‘forest’ in this story is not a conditional name for a monument: it is indeed about a KKL project within the Dorot forest massif in the Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council. KKL itself has called it both יער אוקראינה-דורות — ‘Ukraine-Dorot Forest’ and ‘Ukraine Grove’ within the Dorot forest at different times.

I was born and raised in Ukraine, and Israel became my new home.

Therefore, for NANews — Israel News, I decided not to limit myself to retelling the congratulation. I compared the transcript of the current video with KKL materials from 2015, 2017, and 2018, the ‘Ukrainians in Israel’ page about the planting on April 6, 2016, publications of the World Odessa Club about the events of 2014, and reports from Israeli media about the fires in the Dorot forest.

The biography of Yasinov himself also turned out to be part of this story: Kharkiv in his address is not a Ukrainian city chosen by an editor, but the place of his birth.

It is in such a comparison that details are discovered that are not in the short congratulation. For example, in December 2015, KKL planned to transfer the presidential olive tree to the Ukrainian forest for the upcoming Tu BiShvat, but the documented planting took place only on April 6, 2016. And the official KKL material from 2018 again tells about the transfer of one of the olives to Dorot. This is no longer a smooth anniversary chronicle, but a story where documents from different years have to be read side by side.

Why August 23 turned out to be no less important for a native of Kharkiv than the 24th

Yasinov’s address does not start with Kyiv or even Independence Day. He talks about Kharkiv: the city where he was born, where liberation from Nazi occupation was once celebrated, and which during the current war lives again under sirens and explosions. In the video transcript, it sounds: ‘August 23 for Kharkiv is not just a date.’ After this, Yasinov talks about the ability of Kharkiv residents to withstand ‘then’ and ‘now’.

The Israeli reader needs context here. August 23 in Kharkiv traditionally marks City Day and the day of liberation from Nazi occupation in 1943. Ukrainian official regional sources continue to associate this date with both events. At the same time, there is a separate historical discussion around the wording ‘liberation on August 23’: the fighting around the city did not end in one moment, so today Ukrainian historians discuss how accurately the Soviet calendar formula describes what happened on the ground. For Yasinov’s speech, something else is more important: for a person of his generation, this date has been part of Kharkiv’s memory for decades.

And on August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. This is not analogous to Israel’s Yom Ha’atzmaut in calendar logic—the two countries have completely different historical trajectories—but for an Israeli, the function of the holiday is clear: it is the main state day of modern Ukraine. In 2026, it marks 35 years since the adoption of the Act.

Therefore, the sequence in the address is not accidental: on August 23, Yasinov remembers his city, and then talks about the state. ‘And the next day Ukraine will celebrate Independence Day,’ he continues. In his speech, the holiday is immediately associated not with a parade or official protocol, but with the price of freedom during the war.

Former Knesset member from Kharkiv: who is Igal Yasinov

Igal Yasinov was born on April 27, 1966, in Kharkiv, then part of the Ukrainian SSR, and repatriated to Israel in 1993 from independent Ukraine. He is now 60 years old. In the current video, he says he has lived in Israel, ‘in Holy Jerusalem,’ for more than 33 years, and draws a personal conclusion from this: Kharkiv and Jerusalem are closer to each other today than they seem on the map.

Before his current work at KKL, Yasinov went through Israeli parliamentary politics. In the elections on January 28, 2003, the secular party ‘Shinui’ received 15 mandates; Yasinov was fifteenth on its list and entered the 16th Knesset. For a reader who does not remember the political map of Israel in the early 2000s: ‘Shinui’ was a secular middle-class party that advocated, among other things, for limiting religious pressure on civil life. Yasinov himself spoke about ecology, student rights, reservists, and workers’ rights in interviews before the elections.

In the Knesset, he also dealt with aliyah issues. Here the word aliyah means the repatriation of Jews to Israel based on the Law of Return. On the current official KKL page, among Yasinov’s previous positions, chairmanship in the structure supporting scientist-repatriates is indicated; he was also part of the leadership of the organization of teacher-repatriates. Therefore, working with immigrants from the former USSR appeared in his biography long before his current position at JNF-KKL Eurasia.

His political career ended quite unusually. On February 1, 2006, Yasinov left ‘Shinui’ and created the ‘Ha-Olim’ faction—the name can be translated as ‘Repatriates’. During the same period, it merged into the ‘National Unity — Our Home Israel’ bloc, after which ‘Our Home Israel’ separated into an independent parliamentary faction. The official Knesset database maintains this sequence by dates.

After parliamentary politics, his work became increasingly connected with KKL. Over the years, he held leadership positions in the fund, and today the official structure of JNF-KKL Eurasia calls him the CEO. Therefore, the phrase from the current video ‘I had the honor of leading its creation’ about the ‘Ukraine’ forest, I decided to verify not as a beautiful memory of a former politician, but by the documents of the time itself.

From the Odessa Grove to 1200 dunams: how the Ukrainian forest appeared in the Negev

The first trace leads to April 2014, and this is important: the official ‘Ukraine Forest’ project took shape later, but Ukrainian trees appeared in this place earlier. On April 23, during the international OdessAviv festival, the creation of the Odessa Grove began in the north of the Negev, designed for about a thousand trees. Publications of the World Odessa Club and ‘Evening Odessa’ of that time directly call it the beginning of the future Ukrainian forest.

It is here that a direct connection with Yasinov appears.

The World Odessa Club wrote that the decision to lay the Ukraine forest was made at the initiative of the former Kharkiv resident Igal Yasinov, who headed the relevant direction of the fund, and the Odessa Grove became the first stage. The head of the Israeli branch of the club, documentary filmmaker Boris Sobolev, insisted on the grove project and, according to the club itself and the Odessa press, paid for the planting of a thousand trees. This allows us to draw an important line: Sobolev’s funding of the Odessa Grove is documented, but I found no basis to attribute to him the funding of the entire future ‘Ukraine Forest’.

The first olive tree was planted in honor of Mikhail Zhvanetsky. The ceremony was attended by Yasinov, Sobolev, and a representative of the World Odessa Club, Arkady Kreimer; there also appeared a tree on behalf of Odessa and a tree in memory of Boris Litvak, an Odessa philanthropist, creator of the famous Children’s Rehabilitation Center ‘House with an Angel’. In one of the reports of that time, an almost everyday detail was preserved: when Yasinov was asked what connection he himself had to Odessa, he replied that his grandmother Sofia Mostovaya was an opera singer there.

Why Odessa became the first city within the Ukrainian project is explained not only by the activity of the modern Odessa community. In today’s video, Yasinov also mentions two other people. In Odessa, Yona Krementsky was born, elected as the first head of KKL after the fund’s creation in 1901; KKL writes that he led it until 1907 and was one of the people who turned the idea of a national fund into a practical organization.

There, too, was born Ze’ev Jabotinsky, one of the most influential Zionist leaders of the 20th century, founder of Revisionist Zionism and the BETAR movement. For the Israeli reader, Jabotinsky is well known from the streets, parks, and political history of the country; the connection of the first head of KKL with Odessa is much less known.

But it is important not to confuse causes and later explanations. Sources from 2014 show the direct role of the World Odessa Club and Sobolev in the appearance of the grove. The historical link with Krementsky and Jabotinsky is real, but I did not find a 2014 document in which it is named as the reason for the choice of name. In the current address, Yasinov adds this historical layer twelve years later.

In December 2015, the scale becomes different.

The official JNF-KKL already writes about the ‘Ukraine Forest’ with an area of 1200 dunams in the Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council. For an Israeli, a dunam is a familiar unit of area; 1200 dunams correspond to about 120 hectares, and it was the figure of 120 hectares that Ukrainian reports on the project cited. In publications from the Ukrainian side of those years, it was called the first forest in Israel dedicated to another state.

On December 22, 2015, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko planted an olive tree during an official visit in the Grove of Nations of the Jerusalem Forest. This is another object, in Jerusalem, and should not be confused with Dorot. At the same time, Poroshenko planted an additional seedling in a special vessel; the official KKL reported that later the Ukrainian ambassador Gennady Nadolenko was to plant it in the יער אוקראינה-דורות, the ‘Ukraine-Dorot’ forest in Sha’ar HaNegev.

Here begins the first small mystery of chronology.

KKL in December 2015 wrote that Nadolenko would plant this seedling on the nearest Tu BiShvat—the Jewish New Year of Trees, when plantings are traditionally held in Israel. However, the source ‘Ukrainians in Israel‘ records the ceremony only on April 6, 2016. Tu BiShvat had already passed by that time. This means the original calendar changed, although the reasons for the postponement are not explained in the available publications.

On April 6, Nadolenko transplanted the presidential olive into the ground, and the staff of the Ukrainian embassy planted the first seedlings nearby, which became part of the ‘Ukraine Forest’. Yasinov then reported that by Ukraine’s Independence Day, it was planned to install a board with the forest’s name. A small post already stood at the presidential tree, which they planned to mark on Google Maps so that, as Yasinov said, anyone could find ‘a piece of Ukraine on Israeli soil’.

It turns out to be a rare opportunity to see the project not in hindsight. In 2014, participants only talked about the future Ukrainian forest. In December 2015, KKL already names the area and official location. In April 2016, embassy staff indeed stand there with seedlings, and Yasinov promises to put the name on the map. In August 2026, he is again among these trees—only now they do not need to be imagined as a plan.

Poroshenko’s olive, the Ukrainian language, and the fire in Dorot: the story after the first planting

The Ukrainian line of KKL continued beyond Dorot. On May 15, 2017, Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman planted an olive tree in the Grove of Nations in Jerusalem. Yasinov led the ceremony and separately explained why it was held in Ukrainian: KKL wanted to show respect for the Ukrainian state and remind of the first head of the fund, Yona Krementsky, born in Odessa. This is an important detail—the Ukrainian language was used by KKL in an official ceremony long before the current congratulation.

The next documented date of the forest itself is October 29, 2018. The official JNF-KKL reported a ceremony in southern Israel in the Dorot forest and for the first time clearly formulated the project’s structure: ‘part of the Dorot forest massif is a specially planted grove bearing the name of Ukraine’. Therefore, arguing whether this is a ‘forest’ or a ‘grove’ is essentially pointless. The name ‘Ukraine Forest’ became attached to the project, and territorially the Ukrainian memorial part is located within the larger Dorot forest.

On that day, a memorial stele was unveiled at the site of the established olive tree associated with Poroshenko’s visit. Ambassador Gennady Nadolenko, staff of the Ukrainian embassy, representatives of KKL, the public, and the media were present. And here appears the second discrepancy between archival texts, which I would not cover up for the sake of a beautiful chronology.

The 2016 source directly states that Nadolenko already transplanted Poroshenko’s olive into the ground on April 6, 2016. KKL in the 2018 material formulates the story differently: it was decided to transplant one of the two olive trees planted by the president in Jerusalem in 2015 into the Ukrainian grove, after which it talks about the stele at the site where the tree took root. From the available texts, it is unclear whether it was about a second relocation of the tree within the project, about the other of the two olives, or just an inaccurate retrospective formulation by KKL. Therefore, the two dates—2016 and 2018—are better left as two documented stages, rather than inventing a missing explanation between them.

Another phrase from the current address also had to be checked separately. Yasinov says: ‘This forest also came under fire, but it withstood and continues to grow’. I did not find reliable confirmation of a direct rocket hit specifically in the Ukrainian grove after October 7, 2023, so such a conclusion cannot be made on behalf of the editorial office.

But the Dorot forest did indeed burn as a result of attacks from the Gaza Strip. In July 2018, Israeli media reported fires caused by incendiary balloons and kites; on July 30-31, a fire broke out in the Dorot Forest in the Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council. The fires were extinguished by firefighters, KKL staff, and aviation. Thus, a forest massif affected by attacks, of which the Ukrainian grove is a part, is documented; a separate hit directly on the Ukrainian stele or presidential olive is not documented.

For NANews — Israel News, this distinction is fundamental. The speaker’s phrase remains part of his address, while the fact we verified has narrower boundaries. As soon as these two things are mixed, the symbolic story begins to replace the documentary one.

Where the ‘Ukraine’ forest is located and how to find the Ukrainian grove yourself

The most practical part of this story has been preserved thanks to publications from April 2016. When Yasinov said that Poroshenko’s tree would appear on Google Maps, the Ukrainian embassy indeed provided a link to a point near the Ukrainian section. The old ZN UA publication preserved the message about the link itself; the coordinates of the historical point are 31.5215, 34.6711.

Here it is on Google Maps – https://maps.app.goo.gl/cTrRY59ii1andyEQ7

You should orient yourself to Dorot Forest — יער דורות, in the Sha’ar HaNegev Regional Council — מועצה אזורית שער הנגב, near Kibbutz Dorot. A regional council is an Israeli form of local government that unites several small settlements, mainly kibbutzim and moshavim; it is not a separate city. The area is located in the western part of the northern Negev, near Sderot and the Gaza Strip.

If the navigator does not understand ‘Ukraine forest in Israel’, it does not mean the object has disappeared. We tried searching for יער אוקראינה-דורות, then יער דורות, and for the memorial point itself, we entered the coordinates 31.5215, 34.6711. The last option is more reliable than the old name because small groves and memorial sites of KKL are not always displayed the same way in Google Maps and Waze.

That is why queries like ‘where is the Ukraine forest in Israel’, ‘Ukraine Dorot forest’, ‘how to get to the Ukraine forest in the Negev’, and the Hebrew יער אוקראינה-דורות can lead to materials that at first glance contradict each other. On the KKL 2015 page, the name ‘Ukraine-Dorot Forest’ appears, in 2016 Ukrainian sources simply talk about the ‘Ukraine Forest’, and in 2018 KKL itself clarifies that it is a Ukrainian grove within the Dorot forest massif. This is one location with historically formed name variants, not three different Ukrainian forests.

For a car trip, it is more reasonable to first build a route to Dorot / יער דורות, and the last kilometers — already to the historical point of the Ukrainian section. The area is connected to the regional road 334, passing near Dorot. We would not promise that an ordinary passenger car can always drive right up to the stele: we did not find a separate modern KKL tourist page describing the approach specifically to the Ukrainian grove.

We also checked the current KKL page with warnings for travelers on August 23, 2026. It lists a number of closures and restrictions in the southern forests, but there is no separate notification of the Dorot forest closure at the time of verification. This should still not be perceived as an indefinite guarantee: Sha’ar HaNegev is located near the Gaza Strip, so before the trip, it is necessary to recheck KKL messages and current Home Front Command instructions.

‘Kharkiv and Jerusalem are closer than they appear on the map’: what remained behind the festive congratulation

The most political part of the three-minute video begins after the personal story. Yasinov says that Ukrainians and Israelis know what an air raid alert is, waiting for news from loved ones on the front, night explosions, and the need to lead children to shelter. For an Israeli, this experience does not need to be translated into the language of abstractions: it is about the same minutes when the family goes to the mamad—a protected room in the apartment—or to a public shelter.

Then he says: ‘The same Iranian and Russian weapons in the hands of terrorists bring death’. After it, Yasinov puts Kharkiv, Jerusalem, Kyiv, Be’er Sheva, Sumy, and Tel Aviv in one row.

But the connection itself did not come out of nowhere. Russia and Iran have become military partners over the years of wars, and since 2022, Ukraine regularly faces Iranian-origin strike drones used by Russian forces. Israel, for its part, directly encounters Iranian weapons, technologies, and Tehran-supported armed structures. That Yasinov connects these two realities in one address is already the political content of the congratulation, which is lost if only the phrase ‘congratulated Ukrainians on the holiday’ is left from the video.

Equally important is where these words are spoken from.

Yasinov did not just come to a Ukrainian KKL event. In 2014, his name appears near the Odessa Grove and the idea of the future Ukrainian forest. In 2015, he participates in Poroshenko’s ceremony. In 2016, he explains how to find the new section on Google. In 2017, he conducts a ceremony with Prime Minister Groysman in Ukrainian. In 2026, he returns to this same plot already as the CEO of JNF-KKL Eurasia. This is a sequence that cannot be seen in the shortest video.

At the end of the address, Yasinov talks about trees: they grow slowly, withstand storms, and continue to grow. Then he wishes that children someday know the sound of the wind in the trees better than the sound of sirens.

After checking the archives, this phrase is perceived not as an independent metaphor. The first trees of the Odessa Grove were planted in April 2014; the official history of the large Ukrainian project continued in 2015-2016; in 2018, a stele appeared near the olive, and the Dorot forest in the same period indeed burned after incendiary attacks from Gaza. Therefore, the address on August 23, 2026, can be dated to one day, but the history of the place from which it was recorded is already more than twelve years.

Here is the ‘Ukraine’ forest on Google Maps – https://maps.app.goo.gl/cTrRY59ii1andyEQ7

In his address on the 35th anniversary of independence, Volodymyr Zelensky linked the fates of specific Ukrainians with the production of long-range weapons and the refusal to give up Donbas. His words about ‘Flamingo’ missiles, possible Russian mobilization, and Putin’s mortality require separating the political signal from the confirmed fact.

Zelensky announced mass production of ‘Flamingo’ and the refusal to give up Donbas

Victoria Katsman

Kyiv, Ukraine — August 24, 2026. In the morning address on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of independence, Volodymyr Zelensky spoke not only about the front and armaments. In 21 minutes, he connected in one speech those freed from captivity, teachers, athletes, military personnel, Ukrainian missiles, strikes on Russian targets, and the demand for partners to stop waiting for the war to end on its own.

The address was delivered on the 1643rd day of the full-scale Russian invasion. This number is important not as a calendar formality: independence, which in 1991 was perceived as an accomplished political fact, is now confirmed daily by people, weapons production, the work of cities, and the decision not to agree to an imposed division of the country.

It is easy to extract three loud quotes from the speech — about ‘Flamingo’, Donbas, and Putin’s mortality. But then its internal structure disappears. Zelensky first showed the people for whom the state exists, then listed the tools of resistance, and only after that moved on to warnings to Russia and the outside world.

The teacher who went for the wounded

One of the central heroes of the address was 29-year-old Vladyslav Polishchuk, call sign ‘Teacher’, commander of the assault company of the 475th separate assault regiment CODE 9.2. Before the full-scale war, he taught in Zaporizhzhia, and in 2022 he voluntarily went to serve.

During one of the operations, two Ukrainian soldiers were wounded. Initially, they tried to evacuate them using an NRC — a ground robotic complex, that is, an unmanned platform capable of delivering ammunition or evacuating people. The robot was attacked by a Russian FPV drone — a small device controlled by the operator via video signal almost from the first person.

Then Polishchuk got into a pickup truck and went to the wounded himself. According to his story, in some sections, the car accelerated to about 160 kilometers per hour, and the entire operation took about 30–40 minutes. He believed that another 10–15 minutes of waiting could have cost the soldiers their lives.

On August 19, 2026, Vladyslav Polishchuk was awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine. Zelensky included this episode in the festive address not for military romance. The story shows that behind technological terms — robots, FPV drones, and evacuation means — there is still a person who has to make a decision after the equipment has stopped working.

Next to the military man in the speech appeared 18-year-old gymnast Taisia Onofriychuk. At the 2026 World Championship, she scored 30.700 points for her hoop exercise, ahead of Italian Sofia Raffaeli by two-tenths. For Ukraine, this became the first individual gold in the world championship in rhythmic gymnastics since Anna Rizatdinova’s victory in 2013.

The teacher behind the wheel of a pickup and the gymnast on the podium exist in completely different realities. But Zelensky deliberately put them in the same row: the state, according to his logic, is preserved not only by the front line. It continues to live when a person returns the wounded, when an athlete performs under the Ukrainian flag, and when a family meets a freed captive in their own yard.

What does the promise of mass ‘Flamingos’ mean

The most notable military part of the address was the statement about the FP-5 ‘Flamingo’ missile. Zelensky made it clear that it should no longer be about individual tests or rare applications, but about mass production and regular use of Ukrainian long-range weapons.

The FP-5 is described by the developer Fire Point as a Ukrainian ground-launched cruise missile with a declared range of up to 3000 kilometers. In open publications, its warhead mass is estimated at about one — 1.15 tons. These are characteristics declared by the manufacturer and presented in open materials; they do not yet mean that every parameter and every supposed combat application is independently confirmed.

A cruise missile flies most of its route in the atmosphere along a controlled trajectory. It differs from a ballistic one in the nature of the flight: a ballistic missile, after acceleration, travels a significant part of the way along a high arc and approaches the target at high speed, leaving the missile defense system very little time to react.

The speech mentioned Moscow, Tuapse, Tula, Ryazan, Omsk, and Olenya airbase. This list cannot be read as a statement that all the named targets have already been hit specifically by ‘Flamingo’ missiles. Zelensky was talking about the geography of Ukrainian strikes in general and that the new complex should expand the country’s capabilities.

He also divided strikes of medium depth and so-called deep strikes — operations on targets far beyond the front line. The first are primarily aimed at warehouses, headquarters, airfields, and logistics directly supporting Russian troops. The second allows impacting oil refineries, military industry, strategic aviation bases, and other targets deep in Russia.

In August, several Russian regions indeed reported queues at gas stations and restrictions on fuel sales. But it would be wrong to explain the entire deficit solely by Ukrainian attacks. The market was simultaneously influenced by damage and shutdowns of refineries, planned repairs, seasonal demand, transportation problems, and state price regulation.

This is where the line between a political statement and verifiable reality lies. Zelensky seeks to show that the war is returning to those who expected to watch it on TV. How massive the FP-5s will become and how sustainable their effectiveness will be will depend on serial production, components, navigation, the ability to overcome Russian air defenses, and the quality of intelligence data.

Why Donbas was again at the center of the speech

Zelensky once again ruled out the transfer of Donbas as a price for a ceasefire. For the Ukrainian authorities, this is not only a matter of territory. Agreeing to a forcible change of borders would mean recognizing the principle that a state with greater military resources can gain captured land in exchange for a temporary pause.

For the Israeli reader, it is important not to mechanically transfer the Ukrainian situation to the Middle East. Geography, conflict history, international agreements, and military capabilities differ. However, the very dispute about what happens after rewarding aggression is well known to a society that constantly evaluates the cost of deterrence and the consequences of an unfinished war.

Zelensky did not present a new peace plan or name a date for the end of hostilities. His position was already: Ukraine should not agree to conditions that would allow Russia to restore its forces, consolidate the occupation, and return to war later.

Search queries ‘what did Zelensky say on August 24, 2026’, ‘what is the ‘Flamingo’ missile’, and ‘will Russia announce a new mobilization’ often appear together, although they require different answers. The first is confirmed by the full text of the address, the second by open technical data with a mandatory caveat about their origin, and the third remains a forecast by the Ukrainian president, not a published decision by the Russian authorities.

‘Russia wants mobilization’ — an assessment, not an announced decree

Zelensky stated that Russia is not striving for real peace and is preparing for further mobilization. In this form, it is an assessment by the Ukrainian side, based on the ongoing recruitment of military personnel, losses of the Russian army, and the absence of signs of the Kremlin abandoning maximalist goals.

At the time of the address, there was no official announcement of a new general mobilization in Russia. Therefore, the wording cannot be turned into an already accomplished fact. The political meaning of the statement is different: Kyiv warns partners that a pause without guarantees and pressure can be used by Russia to replenish units and launch a new offensive.

The phrase ‘Putin is mortal’ is also not a message about the health of the Russian president and does not contain a prediction of his death. It is a political metaphor: rulers and the regimes they create are not eternal, while the state and society must count on a longer historical distance.

This argument is addressed simultaneously to Ukrainians, the Kremlin, and Western capitals. Ukrainians are offered to evaluate resistance not only by the position of the front in a particular week. Partners are reminded that trying to adapt the entire European security system to the desires of one Russian leader cannot be a long-term solution.

Controversial line about Dnipropetrovsk region

In some early textual transcripts of the address, there was a phrase about the complete liberation of the Dnipropetrovsk region. In the current official text of the speech, this line is absent. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that it is part of the final version of the presidential speech.

Two days before Independence Day, Zelensky said that about ten square kilometers and three small settlements remained under Russian control in the region. Even this assessment needs careful reading: the line of combat contact changes, and the concepts of ‘cleared’, ‘liberated’, and ‘under stable control’ do not always describe the same military situation.

For a journalistic text, this is not a minor editorial detail. Between ‘almost liberated’ and ‘completely liberated’ lies the fate of specific villages, the positions of units, and the safety of people who may remain near the fighting. That is why the later official version of the document is more important than the most striking early quote.

‘Shaheds’, interceptors, and a debate familiar to Israel about the cost of protection

Zelensky separately spoke about the development of Ukrainian interceptor drones. He cited a figure of more than 90% of ‘Shaheds’ destroyed, but it should be perceived as the president’s declared assessment, not as the unchanging effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense in all attacks and in all directions.

‘Shaheds’ in Ukraine refer to Iranian-developed strike drones, the Russian localized versions of which received the designation ‘Geran’. Russia changes their design, communication channels, altitude, and tactics of use. Simultaneously, reactive strike devices and complexes like the S8000 ‘Banderol’ appear, while ballistic missiles remain a separate, significantly more complex threat.

For readers of NANews — News of Israel, this part of the address is especially understandable. Israel also faces combined attacks, where cheap drones can be launched together with cruise and ballistic missiles, forcing the defense to simultaneously track targets with different speeds and trajectories.

The main problem here is not reduced to the interception percentage. If the attacking side can massively launch relatively cheap devices, and the defender is forced to respond with expensive missiles, an economic war of attrition arises. Therefore, Ukraine is developing cheaper interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, electronic warfare means, and its own long-range systems.

The Ukrainian and Israeli experiences cannot be declared identical, but there is a real technological connection between the theaters of war. Iran transferred the original Shahed platform to Russia, the Russian army refined it under conditions of large-scale use, and the accumulated experience can return to Iranian structures.

On the pages of NANews — News of Israel, we have already analyzed this connection in the article ‘Iran and Russia: How the War in Ukraine Became a Testing Ground for Future War Against Israel and the USA’. Zelensky’s new address adds another layer to this topic: the defending country is trying not only to shoot down aerial targets but also to deprive the enemy of the ability to endlessly produce and launch them.

Decisions by the US and European countries to release missiles, air defense systems, and ammunition therefore affect several regions at once. The same shortage of production capacities is felt by both Ukraine, repelling daily Russian attacks, and Israel, which needs to maintain a reserve of means to counter Iran and its allies.

Why I read this speech through the fates of people

I am originally from Ukraine and belong to the Jewish diaspora. For me, the connection between Ukrainian and Israeli reality does not pass through convenient political analogies, but through families, languages, memory, concern for people, and understanding of how quickly the words ‘distant war’ cease to correspond to reality.

I am not a military expert and cannot determine the real characteristics of a missile or the state of a specific position from open video. Therefore, in this material, I compared the official text of the address, the message about the awarding of Vladyslav Polishchuk, the open results of the World Rhythmic Gymnastics Championship, statements about the situation in the Dnipropetrovsk region, and published data on the FP-5. Where there is only a statement by the president or manufacturer, I maintain this boundary and do not present it as an independently established fact.

I think something else is important. The festive speech could have been constructed as a set of slogans about inevitable victory. Instead, its framework was people forced to act in circumstances where guaranteed salvation does not exist: a teacher goes for the wounded after the robot is defeated, an athlete steps onto the international podium, and engineers try to turn a single product into a series.

It is this human layer that cannot be replaced by a list of weapons. Without it, ‘Flamingo’, interceptor drones, and long-range strikes turn into a catalog of equipment, although their political meaning is determined by whether they will give people time — to evacuate the wounded, take cover during an alarm, save a city, and not accept the loss of their land as a final verdict.

…

I did not hear in this address a promise of an easy finale. Zelensky spoke about mass production of weapons precisely because the war does not end with a beautiful formula, and Russia does not show readiness to abandon the captured territories and the use of force.

The words that Ukraine will not fall in this speech are not based on optimism or Putin’s biology. They are based on the country’s ability to survive a specific day: produce an interceptor, find parts for a missile, return a person from captivity, evacuate two wounded, and not erase from the official language the difference between ‘almost’ and ‘completely’.

For me, this is the main meaning of the 35th Independence Day of Ukraine. Independence has ceased to be only a date, a border, or a state document. It has become a daily, costly, and very human work that cannot be done once and considered finished.

Ukraine opposed the participation of DAU director Ilya Khrzhanovsky in the main competition of the 83rd Venice Film Festival. Khrzhanovsky was born in Moscow, but today, according to his own data, he is not a citizen of Russia: he holds citizenships of Israel, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and renounced his Russian passport in protest against Russia’s policies and the war against Ukraine. This is why a contradiction arises in the very first sentence of this story: Kyiv speaks of Russian cultural influence, while Russia officially considers the director himself a ‘foreign agent.’

For Ukraine, this dispute is not just about cinema and not just about Khrzhanovsky. After the full-scale Russian invasion, Kyiv consistently proceeds from the fact that the war is waged not only with missiles and tanks: simultaneously, Russia tries to maintain its presence in European culture, return artists and projects associated with it to international platforms, and gradually restore the feeling that dealing with the Russian state ‘as usual’ is possible again. Therefore, Ukraine views the appearance of DAU in the main competition in Venice through a broader framework — military aggression, cultural influence, and subsequent international legitimization do not exist separately for Kyiv. In this logic, the question is not ‘is this a good film?’, but ‘does a prestigious European festival help normalize people, money, and cultural ties formed within the Russian system?’

For those searching for ‘Ukraine demands to remove DAU’, ‘Ilya Khrzhanovsky Venice 2026’, or ‘Russian funding for DAU’, a clarification is needed immediately: in the joint statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, there is no literal demand to ban the film. Kyiv writes that it does not call for censorship, but asks international cultural platforms not to legitimize projects it considers connected with the Russian state.

The 83rd Venice International Film Festival is one of the oldest and most prestigious film festivals in the world, organized by La Biennale di Venezia; films in the main competition compete for the ‘Golden Lion’. In 2026, it will be held from September 2 to 12 on the Lido island in Venice, Italy.

I, Elena Gunko, started analyzing this story not to justify Khrzhanovsky or argue with Ukraine. I was interested in something else: does the short formula ‘a Russian project received European legitimization’ withstand the test of dates. Not completely. But the director’s own version also requires adjustments.

What exactly Ukraine presents

On August 17, 2026, Ukrainian agencies called the inclusion of DAU in the main competition in Venice a reason for ‘deep concern’. As arguments, they cited former financier Sergey Adonyev, conductor Teodor Currentzis, Khrzhanovsky’s work on a project with Russian billionaires, and the filming of DAU in Kharkiv from 2008 to 2011.

But the dispute began before the world premiere. Venice lists DAU as a 195-minute film produced by Germany, France, and Sweden; the first public screening is scheduled for September 9. This means that Ukraine is currently assessing primarily the origin of the project and the biographies of the people around it, rather than the content of the new film.

It is important for me here not to substitute one question for another. Ukraine has the right to ask about the project’s money and connections. But the answer to this question is not yet equal to the answer to what is in the film.

DAU indeed had Russian money — but not only that

DAU began in the mid-2000s as a project about Soviet physicist Lev Landau and then grew into a huge artistic experiment. The main filming took place in Kharkiv from 2008 to 2011; various films and installations were later created from the accumulated material.

In 2015, Screen Daily wrote that the Russian Ministry of Culture demanded through the court to return 22.5 million rubles previously allocated for the production of DAU, plus about 8 million rubles in interest. In the same material, the project was called a co-production of Russia, Sweden, Germany, and France, and among the structures that supported it was the State Agency of Ukraine for Cinema — a Ukrainian state structure supporting film production.

Here I disagree with Khrzhanovsky’s maximally broad formula that the Russian state ‘did not finance the film’. But first, it is important to understand where this formula came from.

On August 21, 2026, four days after the joint statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, Ilya Khrzhanovsky published on his Facebook page a large public response to the Ukrainian agencies.

The director consistently dismantled their claims in ten points and posted the text immediately in three languages — English, Ukrainian, and Russian. At the beginning of the publication, he thanked the Venice Biennale and the festival’s artistic director Alberto Barbera for their support, and then stated that the Ukrainian statement contains factual errors and distortions of the history of DAU’s origin, its funding, relations with the Russian state, and his own biography. The Ukrainian version of the response begins in the same publication separately, followed by the Russian one.

It is in this response that Khrzhanovsky claims that the Russian state did not finance the film and did not participate in its creation. The publication appeared on August 21 — this is also confirmed by Italian media, which quoted his Facebook post on the same day.

And here I have a reservation. If we are talking about the entire history of DAU, there was Russian state funding. However, if Khrzhanovsky is speaking specifically about the completion of the 2026 version and its current production structure, I have not found direct confirmation of Russian state funding for this version.

Khrzhanovsky himself formulates this even more narrowly: for the past seven years, according to him, DAU has not received money from the Russian state, Russian state institutions, companies associated with the state, or private investors currently living in Russia. Sergey Adonyev, as the director claims, financed the large artistic project DAU from 2008 to 2019 but did not pay for the completion of the film selected for the Venice competition.

Adonyev is currently under US sanctions. The American OFAC registry indicates his Russian and alternative Israeli citizenship, Israeli passport, and address in Herzliya. For me, this is another reminder: a passport proves little here; dates of money and real connection with the current production are needed.

Currentzis, Kharkiv, and old claims to DAU

Ukraine separately points to Teodor Currentzis. He received Russian citizenship in 2014 and worked for many years within the Russian cultural system. But Khrzhanovsky draws attention to the chronology: most scenes with Currentzis were filmed from 2008 to 2011 when he was a citizen of Greece. The director also acknowledges: Currentzis did not publicly support the war, but he also did not publicly oppose it.

The dispute with Kharkiv is even more complex. Ukraine believes that the city is shown through a Soviet lens that erases its Ukrainian identity. Khrzhanovsky responds that the closed ‘Institute’ was specifically created as a Soviet world, and the film’s theme is the destruction of personality by a totalitarian system.

The project also has a heavy prehistory. In 2020, Ukraine investigated the circumstances of the participation of children from a Kharkiv orphanage in the filming of DAU. Later, the production was closed: investigators reported that they found no signs of a criminal offense. For me, this is an important boundary — ethical questions about the project’s methods remain, but the investigation cannot be turned into a proven crime.

How ‘Babi Yar’ appeared in the dispute — and why Israel cannot be forgotten here

The Ukrainian statement reminds that Khrzhanovsky led a cultural project funded by Russian billionaires associated with the Kremlin. The director himself clarifies: it is about the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center in Kyiv, where he was the artistic director.

Yes, among the donors were Mikhail Fridman and German Khan. But the center’s supervisory board was headed by Natan Sharansky; the events marking the 80th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy in 2021 were attended by the presidents of Ukraine, Israel, and Germany. The Ukrainian state publicly interacted with the center at that time.

That is why I would not call the entire project ‘Kremlin’ without reservations. There were Russian money and disputes around Khrzhanovsky’s concept, but there was also an official Ukrainian-Israeli line.

For NANews — News of Israel, this is not an accidental historical insert. We wrote in detail about how the Soviet authorities displaced Jewish memory of Babi Yar in the material ‘Soviet Ban on Memory’. We also talked about the current ‘Research Space’ in Babi Yar and separately analyzed why the history of the Holocaust in Ukrainian cities remains little known. These materials show why the dispute over who shapes the memory of Babi Yar is not foreign to Israel.

Khrzhanovsky today — a citizen of Israel and a Russian ‘foreign agent’

In the Ukrainian statement, Khrzhanovsky is called a director from an aggressor state. He was born in Moscow, and the early history of DAU is closely linked to the Russian cultural environment. But legally, the situation today is different.

Khrzhanovsky writes that he renounced Russian citizenship in protest against the war and is a citizen of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel. He recalls supporting Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and speaking out against the full-scale Russian invasion. Russia has listed him as a ‘foreign agent’.

I do not consider the status of ‘foreign agent’ a universal justification. A person can conflict with the Russian state and maintain old connections with people from the Russian elite. But if the current state network of influence is being discussed, the attitude of the Russian authorities themselves towards the director cannot be excluded from the analysis.

Director’s son Andrey Kh: from Russia to Israel, and then to Palestinian activism

There is another character in Ilya Khrzhanovsky’s Israeli story — his son Andrey Khrzhanovsky, born in 1998, known on social media as Andrey X or Andrey Kh. And his path turned out to be perhaps even more paradoxical than his father’s.

In February 2022, Andrey came from St. Petersburg to Israel to visit his grandparents. His return ticket was for February 24 — the day Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He did not return to Russia, applied under the Law of Return, and received Israeli citizenship. Before that, Andrey studied anthropology at University College London, engaged in journalism, and participated in Russian opposition activities. In the first months after the invasion, he said he raised money for Ukrainian charities and wrote for ‘Novaya Gazeta’.

But quite soon, the center of his activity was no longer Russia and Ukraine, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Andrey began traveling to Palestinian villages in Judea and Samaria — the West Bank in international terminology — and filming clashes between local residents and settlers and the IDF. Later, he practically moved there: in an interview with NEWSru.co.il, he said he lives among Palestinians and collaborates with organizations of so-called ‘protective presence’. The Irish Times in 2025 described him as an independent journalist and activist who is filming a documentary about the Palestinian village of Ras al-Auja and funds his work, including through donations from subscribers.

Andrey calls what is happening in Judea and Samaria ‘ethnic cleansing’, Israel — a system of ‘apartheid’, and the war in Gaza — ‘genocide’. These are his political definitions, not established facts in this article and not the position of NANews. Moreover, in a 2025 interview, he stated that he rejects the Zionist model of the state and believes that the existing political system should be radically changed. At the same time, he does not intend to renounce Israeli citizenship.

And he began to conflict with the Israeli authorities quite specifically.

In October 2024, the military detained him and several other journalists on the way to the Nablus area. Khrzhanovsky later claimed that the detainees were beaten, kept blindfolded, and left in the sun for several hours. This is precisely his version of events. Among the group was American journalist Jeremy Loffredo from The Grayzone, who previously worked at RT and was detained in Israel after publishing about the locations of Iranian missile falls.

This episode had a completely unexpected continuation. The Russian-speaking activist association ‘Compass’, with which Andrey was associated, after the story with Loffredo, excluded Khrzhanovsky himself. The organization explained the decision by saying that cooperation with a journalist from a publication it considered connected with the pro-Russian information environment contradicted its principle of rejecting any imperialism — including Russian.

For our article, this is an especially curious detail. While Ukrainian agencies today discuss possible Russian networks around the father, the son was already excluded from an ultra-left association for contact with a journalist whom his own associates considered connected with the pro-Russian agenda. The world of the Khrzhanovskys clearly resists attempts to neatly categorize it politically.

The loudest Israeli episode occurred in December 2024. Andrey published a video from Sderot, where he stuck a sticker with the Palestinian flag and the inscription Free Palestine on an object that simultaneously served as a memorial to IDF Captain Shilo Cohen, who died on October 7, 2023, in battle in Kibbutz Be’eri. After complaints and public reaction from politicians, Andrey was detained in Tel Aviv.

The police requested to extend his arrest for five days. Judge Sabina Cohen disagreed: she pointed out that the sticker itself did not pose a threat to public safety and was within the limits of freedom of expression. The court ordered Khrzhanovsky’s release, although it set bail at 15,000 shekels and banned him from visiting memorial sites for a month. The father of the deceased officer publicly called Andrey’s act malicious.

This was far from the only conflict with law enforcement. In a September 2025 interview with NEWSru.co.il, Andrey himself said that 13 administrative and criminal cases had been initiated against him, some of which had already been closed by that time. Among the remaining proceedings, he mentioned a case after an action at the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv, when he poured red paint on the building in protest against the war in Ukraine, as well as a civil lawsuit for 160,000 shekels from a settler accusing him of defamation. These are Khrzhanovsky’s figures and descriptions, not data from a single official registry, so they should be presented as such.

By 2025–2026, Andrey had turned this activity into a full-fledged media project. He regularly shoots videos from Palestinian villages, publishes them for an international audience, and appears in European media. In June 2026, The New Arab described him as a journalist and activist who has been documenting the actions of settlers and the Israeli army in the West Bank for over two years.

About Andrey himself, NANews has already reported. And a related topic — why part of the ultra-left anti-Israeli rhetoric can intersect with the Russian information agenda — NANews — News of Israel separately analyzed in the material about the slogan Free Palestine and the ‘Kremlin axis’.

I specifically do not make the political views and actions of the son an argument against Ilya Khrzhanovsky. That would be a typical manipulation by the principle of guilt by association. Moreover, father and son do not agree politically on everything: Andrey himself said that Ilya Khrzhanovsky does not share his position, although he supports him as a son.

But for the family’s biography, this line is important. The father renounced Russian citizenship, opposes the war, and became a Russian ‘foreign agent’. The son did not return to Russia after the Russian invasion, received an Israeli passport — and then became one of the most prominent Russian-speaking ultra-left critics of Israel itself.

This proves nothing about the funding of DAU.

But it clearly shows why the Khrzhanovsky family cannot be described with a single word ‘Russian’.

How Khrzhanovsky became an Israeli citizen and what connects him with Israel

I did not find the exact date of Ilya Khrzhanovsky obtaining Israeli citizenship in reliable open sources. But it is known that he had an Israeli passport before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. In interviews, he said that he came to work in Kyiv on the Babi Yar Memorial Center already as an Israeli citizen and was processing a Ukrainian work permit with an Israeli, not a Russian passport.

Khrzhanovsky himself recalled that after receiving the Israeli passport, he asked acquaintances what he, as an artist, could do for Israel. Shortly after that, he was offered to participate in creating the concept of the Babi Yar Memorial Center, where he later became the artistic director.

At the same time, Israel did not become his only place of residence: Khrzhanovsky continued to work between Europe and Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, the war caught him in Israel, and after the invasion began, his elderly parents moved here. Today, his main base is considered Berlin, but Israeli citizenship in his biography is clearly not a formality.

Therefore, the formula ‘director from an aggressor state’ requires clarification: Khrzhanovsky was born in Moscow, but long before the current dispute, he had Israeli citizenship, and later renounced his Russian passport.

What remains after verification

After verification, I cannot call the Ukrainian statement unfounded. DAU had Russian state support, Adonyev indeed financed the project for many years, Currentzis is connected with the Russian cultural system, and there were serious disputes around Khrzhanovsky in Ukraine.

But I do not see a proven chain that would turn DAU 2026 into today’s project of the Russian state. For this, data on current money, control, management, or political order are needed. Old connections raise questions; they do not automatically answer them.

This is the main nuance. Ukraine looks at the entire twenty-year biography of DAU and sees the accumulated Russian infrastructure. Khrzhanovsky separates the current film from it and shows a new European production structure. Both sides choose a time frame that strengthens their argument.

After September 9, what almost all participants in the discussion currently lack will appear — the film itself. Then it will be possible to argue not only about passports, sanctions, old money, and Kharkiv as a filming location, but also about whether DAU really reproduces the Russian imperial lens or, as the director claims, shows the mechanism of totalitarianism.

Why Ukraine is fighting for culture at all

Here I understand Ukraine’s logic, even if I believe that specific accusations against DAU need to be checked much more accurately. The country has been living under full-scale Russian aggression for the fourth year and simultaneously observes how Russia continues to claim not only territories but also the right to determine what is considered ‘Russian’ in the history, culture, and memory of neighboring countries. Ukraine sees this as a continuation of the same imperial model: first political and military pressure, then appropriation of common history, language, artists, cities, and cultural heritage.

Therefore, for Kyiv, an international film festival is not a neutral showcase. When a film appears in the main competition in Venice, its author receives prestige, press attention, and symbolic return to the European cultural norm. This is what Ukraine calls the problem of legitimization: not necessarily direct Kremlin propaganda, but a gradual restoration of the acceptability of the Russian cultural environment while Russia itself continues the war.

There is also another reason. For decades, Russia represented Ukrainian writers, scientists, cities, and cultural achievements as part of a single ‘Russian’ or ‘Soviet’ space. After 2022, Ukraine reacts especially painfully to any situations where this framework, in its opinion, is reproduced without explanation that it is about Ukrainian territory and a separate Ukrainian history. That is why Kharkiv in DAU is not just a place of old filming for Kyiv.

But here I would still separate the principle and the specific case. Ukraine’s right to resist Russian cultural normalization is understandable to me. However, if a specific director or a specific film is called part of the current Russian network of influence, this already requires not a general logic of war, but specific evidence — modern money, control, institutional connection, or political order. This boundary in the DAU story seems important to me not to lose.

Sources: joint statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine; La Biennale di Venezia; public statement of Ilya Khrzhanovsky; Screen Daily; OFAC of the US Department of the Treasury; Suspilne Kharkiv; materials of NANews.