Russia may be preparing a new large-scale mobilization after the September elections to the State Duma. According to the Ukrainian side, it could involve at least 500,000 people, some of whom the Russian command plans to send to the most difficult sections of the front with almost no preparation.
There is no official decree on new mobilization yet. The Kremlin publicly avoids this topic, and Russian officials continue to claim that the army’s needs are supposedly covered by contract soldiers. However, growing losses, a decrease in voluntary enlistment, and the prepared system of electronic summonses indicate that the ability to continue the war by previous methods is gradually being exhausted.
The most dangerous period may begin after the voting scheduled for September 18–20, 2026. The main day of the State Duma elections will be September 20, but the Russian Central Election Commission decided to hold the voting for three consecutive days.
Why mobilization is expected in the fall
On July 18, Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, reported on the possible mobilization of at least 500,000 people.
According to his information, part of the mobilized may be sent to the front by the Russian command within the first two weeks. These people are intended to be used for urgent replenishment of units that have suffered significant losses in eastern Ukraine. Another part may be prepared for about a month to strengthen existing groups or form forces in a new direction.
However, the figure of 500,000 remains an estimate by the Ukrainian side. It is not confirmed by a published Russian document or an officially announced mobilization plan. Therefore, it is premature to talk about the inevitable conscription of exactly this number of people.
However, the likelihood of a new wave of mobilization is recognized not only by the Center for Countering Disinformation.
Andrey Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, stated that the Kremlin will avoid any discussions about mobilization as much as possible before the elections. It is not advantageous for the Russian authorities to inform the population about mass conscription in advance, as this may cause fear, discontent, and a new wave of attempts to leave the country.
According to the GUR, the likelihood of such a decision being made after the elections remains. The Russian army does not need to build a large number of new training centers: existing ranges and military infrastructure are sufficient for the mass reception of recruits, especially if it involves shortened training.
The political logic of the Kremlin in this case is quite clear. Until September 20, Putin is interested in maintaining at least an external sense of stability. After the voting is completed, the need to consider the mood of voters will significantly decrease, and the next federal campaign will not create immediate restrictions.
That is why the elections may become a kind of starting point for a new stage of the war.
Why Russia needs another 500,000 people
The main reason is the huge losses of the Russian army, which are increasingly difficult to compensate with money and the recruitment of contract soldiers.
According to the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, from February 2022 to June 2026, Russian troops may have lost about 1.4 million people killed, wounded, and missing. Researchers estimate the number of dead at 400,000–450,000 people.
In 2026, Russian losses exceeded 30,000 people per month, while the average recruitment of new servicemen was estimated at about 27,000 people. Thus, even with the maintenance of an expensive payment system, Moscow does not have time to fully compensate for the outgoing personnel.
Separate studies based on data from the Russian Ministry of Finance indicate that in the first quarter of 2026, the rate of recruitment of contract soldiers decreased by approximately 20% compared to the same period in 2025. Independent Russian publications also reported that the issue of new mobilization is being discussed at various levels of government, although a final decision is allegedly not yet made.
Until recently, the Kremlin tried to buy people for the war. Regional authorities increased one-time payments, conducted aggressive advertising campaigns, and increased pressure on debtors, prisoners, migrants, and residents of economically disadvantaged regions.
But the financial resource has a limit. The fewer people willing to voluntarily go to the front, the higher the cost of a new contract soldier must become. At the same time, Russian regions face budget problems, a shortage of workers, and the need to pay compensation to the families of the deceased.
NAnews — Israel News notes that potential mobilization does not necessarily mean the creation of a new army of 500,000 people. The Kremlin may stretch the draft over several months, conduct it by regions, and call what is happening “additional staffing,” “military gatherings,” or an expansion of contract recruitment.
For the Russian system, it is important not only to get people but also to hide the scale of the operation as much as possible.
Where the mobilized may be sent
It is most likely that the first groups will be sent not to a completely new direction, but to already existing Russian units in eastern and southern Ukraine.
The Russian army continues to use small infantry groups that try to penetrate between Ukrainian positions, identify firing points, and gradually deplete the defense. Such actions are supported by FPV drones, artillery, guided aerial bombs, and reconnaissance drones.
This tactic allows for constant pressure but requires a huge amount of infantry. Poorly trained assault groups suffer high losses, after which they need to be regularly replenished.
CSIS notes that in the first half of 2026, Russian offensive actions on a number of key directions advanced extremely slowly — on average, tens of meters per day. Researchers associate high losses with the Russian strategy of attrition warfare, poor training, ineffective interaction of different branches of the military, and the use of soldiers to identify Ukrainian positions.
Therefore, the main directions for the use of the mobilized may be:
- Donetsk region and areas around the Ukrainian defensive belt;
- Zaporizhzhia direction;
- the border of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions;
- northeast Ukraine;
- formation of reserves for a possible new offensive;
- protection of rear facilities and occupied territories, allowing more prepared units to be freed up.
It cannot be ruled out that an attempt may be made to create a threat in a new direction. But for a large-scale offensive operation, the mobilized alone are not enough. Equipment, ammunition, transport, commanders, engineering units, communication means, field hospitals, and months of preparation are needed.
If people are indeed sent to the front line two weeks after the draft, this will primarily mean an attempt to quickly cover losses, rather than creating a qualitatively new strike force.
What is known about the threat from Belarus
Special attention is paid to the northern direction and the possible use of Belarusian territory.
As of mid-July, Ukrainian military intelligence did not observe signs of the formation of a new Russian strike force there. GUR representative Andrey Chernyak spoke of about 50,000 Belarusian army servicemen and Russian support units, but no threatening concentration of Russian forces was recorded.
At the same time, Russia is capable of transferring additional troops to Belarus within a few weeks. Therefore, the absence of a large grouping today does not mean that it cannot appear later.
The northern direction can be used not only for a real offensive. Even a demonstrative transfer of troops will force Ukraine to hold additional forces near the border, strengthen the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, and divert reserves from the eastern front.
For the Kremlin, this may already be an independent military goal.
Does mobilization mean preparation for an attack on NATO
In the Ukrainian and European information space, the possibility is also being discussed that the new Russian mobilization will be connected not only with the war against Ukraine but also with preparations for provocations against the Baltic countries or Poland.
Such a threat cannot be completely ruled out, but there is no direct evidence yet that the supposed 500,000 people are intended for an attack on NATO.
A large-scale war against the Alliance would require Russia to deploy a large grouping, move aviation, air defense systems, warehouses, field hospitals, engineering equipment, and command posts. Such preparations are difficult to completely hide from satellite and electronic intelligence.
In the short term, hybrid operations remain more likely: sabotage, cyberattacks, airspace violations, border provocations, strikes on critical infrastructure, and attempts to test how quickly and coherently NATO countries are ready to respond.
The Alliance has already significantly strengthened the eastern flank. As of June 2026, NATO multinational battle groups are deployed in nine countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
In addition, NATO is developing air and missile defense, round-the-clock airspace patrols, protection of underwater infrastructure, and a system for the rapid transfer of reinforcements. In September 2025, the Alliance launched a multi-level operation Eastern Sentry, strengthening the eastern direction with fighters, helicopters, surveillance aircraft, ships, and air defense systems.
For Russia, this means that even a limited military provocation against Poland or the Baltic countries carries the risk of unpredictable escalation.
How Ukraine can respond to new Russian mobilization
Ukraine cannot prevent the Kremlin from announcing a draft, but it can make the use of the mobilized as costly and ineffective as possible.
This primarily involves strengthening defense, expanding drone production, saturating the front with reconnaissance means, striking Russian training centers, warehouses, railway hubs, headquarters, and troop concentration sites.
It is equally important to destroy Russian reserves before they reach the front line. The longer the path from the military enlistment office to the front and the more problems arise with preparation, transport, and supply, the less military value the mass draft has.
The experience of recent years has shown that numerical superiority alone does not guarantee a rapid offensive. On a drone-saturated battlefield, large concentrations of people and equipment become noticeable targets. Poorly trained infantry without stable communication, engineering support, and competent command can increase pressure but simultaneously sharply increase the losses of the attacking side.
At the same time, 500,000 potential recruits should not be underestimated. Even low-quality training can be partially compensated by quantity, especially if Russia uses people in waves, trying to constantly deplete Ukrainian units.
NAnews — Israel News notes that for Ukraine, the key will be not only the availability of its own reserves but also the stability of Western supplies: ammunition, air defense systems, electronic warfare means, long-range weapons, equipment, and components for drone production.
Russia’s mobilization resource can be stopped not by one decision, but by a combination of defense, technology, intelligence, strikes on logistics, and political pressure on the Kremlin.
Why mobilization is dangerous for Russia itself
A new wave of conscription will be a serious internal test for the Russian regime.
The first “partial mobilization” was announced on September 21, 2022. At that time, the Russian authorities announced the conscription of 300,000 people. The decision caused queues at the borders, a sharp rise in air ticket prices, and a mass departure of men.
Since then, the Kremlin has significantly expanded control capabilities. Electronic registers have been created, electronic summonses and restrictions for citizens trying to evade appearance have been introduced.
This reduces the likelihood of a mass escape on the previous scale but does not eliminate the economic consequences. The conscription of hundreds of thousands of men will exacerbate the labor shortage, increase the burden on regional budgets, and create new obligations for payments to the military and the families of the deceased.
In addition, mobilization destroys one of the main unspoken principles on which Putin built the Russian society’s attitude towards the war: the state conducts military operations, but most residents of large cities can continue their usual lives.
As long as mainly contract soldiers, prisoners, residents of poor regions, and people attracted by high payments were sent to the front, a significant part of Russian society perceived the war as a distant television event.
Mass forced conscription can bring the war directly into Russian families.
Main points
As of July 21, 2026, the decision to mobilize 500,000 people has not been officially announced. This figure is based on information from Andrey Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, and media reports about discussions within the Russian government.
However, the prerequisites for such a decision do exist. Russia is suffering losses that may exceed the current rate of contract recruitment. At the same time, elections to the State Duma are approaching, after which political risks for the Kremlin will temporarily decrease.
The most likely goal of the new mobilization will be to continue the war of attrition against Ukraine: replenishing battered units, creating reserves, and increasing pressure on the eastern and southern directions.
A full-scale attack on NATO does not yet seem to be the main scenario, but the increase in the size of the Russian army could raise the threat of hybrid provocations and force the Alliance to further strengthen the eastern flank.
Autumn and winter 2026 may become a new difficult stage of the war. And the main question is not only whether Putin will announce mobilization, but whether Ukraine and its partners will have time to prepare for the appearance of hundreds of thousands of new soldiers in Russia.