Iran considers purchasing Russian tanker aircraft: why Tehran wants to expand its aviation capabilities

In Russian media, information appeared about a possible purchase by Iran of Russian tanker aircraft. According to available reports, the Iranian Air Force is considering acquiring such machines to expand the capabilities of refueling combat aviation directly in the air. This will allow fighters to perform longer flights and operate at a significant distance from their own airfields.

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky

There is no official confirmation of the contract conclusion yet. The proposed number of aircraft, cost, and delivery timelines are unknown. Iranian official sources as of September 27, 2026, have also not provided details of the possible deal.

However, this story has a quite specific background. And it’s not just about Russian aircraft.

Russia has already announced export contracts for the Il-78

On September 7, 2026, the general director of Rosoboronexport, Alexander Mikheev, stated that the company’s portfolio, exceeding 60 billion dollars, includes contracts for new Il-78MK-90A tanker aircraft.

The statement was made before the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt. At the same time, the Russian side did not disclose the buyers, so directly linking the announced contracts with Tehran is premature.

Source: Interfax, September 7, 2026.

Back in August, footage of the new Il-78MK-90A, presumably manufactured for a foreign customer, appeared in Russian social networks. Among the potential buyers, China and Algeria were mentioned at the time, and Iran was mentioned as another potential client.

The publication Defense Express on August 24 drew attention to the absence of Russian state symbols and the unusual three-digit tail number of the aircraft. These details indicated a possible export designation of the machine but did not allow establishing its future owner.

What Iran might get

The Il-78MK-90A is an export modification of the new Russian tanker aircraft, created based on the heavy military transport Il-76MD-90A.

It is equipped with four PS-90A-76 engines, modern digital avionics, and three refueling units. The machine can simultaneously service two fighters or one large military aircraft. The maximum takeoff weight is about 210 tons, and the amount of fuel transferred depends on the range and flight conditions.

If necessary, the Il-78 can also be used as a transport aircraft after removing special equipment.

Source: United Aircraft Corporation.

The practical significance of such equipment is quite simple. A fighter does not need to return to base just because it is running out of fuel. It can continue patrolling, change its route, or make a longer flight.

For a country with a large territory like Iran, this is especially significant. But why has the issue arisen right now?

Israel has already struck Iranian tanker aircraft

Iran used aerial tankers long before the current reports. Even under the Shah, before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the country received American Boeing 707 and Boeing 747, some of which were equipped for refueling combat aviation.

After breaking relations with Washington, servicing American equipment became increasingly difficult. Despite this, individual aircraft continued to be used for decades.

On June 15, 2025, during an Israeli operation against Iran, the Israeli Air Force struck the airport of Mashhad — a major city in the northeast of the country, approximately 2300 kilometers from Israel. The IDF reported the destruction of a tanker aircraft located there.

But the story did not end there.

On March 6, 2026, military and logistical facilities at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran came under Israeli attack. The Persian-language fact-checking project Factnameh later studied satellite images and concluded that several transport and tanker aircraft were damaged or destroyed.

Researchers separately established that at least one Boeing 707, equipped for refueling, survived the attack. So, it would be incorrect to talk about the complete destruction of the Iranian tanker fleet.

Source: Factnameh, March 10, 2026.

Against this background, the possible purchase of Russian machines looks not only as a way to modernize the Air Force but also as an attempt to restore lost capabilities.

What does this have to do with Russian Su-35s

There is another significant factor — Russian fighters.

On January 27, 2025, senior Iranian military official Ali Shadmani confirmed the acquisition of Su-35s. Reuters then clarified that the number of aircraft and the fact of their delivery were not officially disclosed.

NANews previously detailed this deal and the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership.

Now a quite logical question arises: why purchase modern fighters if not to create the appropriate infrastructure for them?

The Su-35 is capable of refueling in the air. The Russian Il-78 is designed to service aircraft of this family. Their joint use potentially allows the Iranian Air Force to increase patrol duration and conduct more complex operations away from permanent bases.

At the same time, the purchase of tankers alone does not yet create a full-fledged aviation system. Trained crews, maintenance, spare parts, compatible equipment, and protection of sufficiently vulnerable large aircraft will be required.

For Israel, the difference is fundamental. It’s one thing to restore a few old machines. It’s another to create an infrastructure that allows modern Iranian fighters to operate for extended periods without landing.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the possible purchase in this context: Tehran is interested not just in new aircraft, but in expanding the practical capabilities of its military aviation.

Russian-Iranian cooperation: connection with the war in Ukraine

Behind this story lies a broader process.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Tehran became one of the suppliers of drone technologies for Moscow. Russia established its own production of strike devices of the “Geran” family, based on Iranian Shahed, and continued their modernization.

Today, military-technical cooperation is developing in both directions. We have detailed how the war in Ukraine linked Russian and Iranian military developments.

On September 20, 2026, Fox News published information from a 44-page Russian document on cooperation with Iran for 2024–2026. Among the planned directions are the production of Russian aviation components at Iranian enterprises and the development of joint industrial infrastructure.

The document does not confirm a contract for tanker aircraft. But it shows that aviation cooperation between Moscow and Tehran was considered a long-term project.

For Ukraine, this means the need to consider not only the supply of Iranian technologies to Russia but also the possible movement of Russian military technologies in the opposite direction. Especially if it concerns aviation, weapons, and systems for long-range operations.

What is known about the possible deal as of today

Talks about Russian tankers for Iran have arisen before. In July 2015, the Iranian agency Tasnim retold a report from the Israeli DEBKA about a supposed order for the Il-78. However, confirmation of that purchase did not subsequently appear.

The current situation differs by the presence of a specific Russian statement from September 7, 2026, about export contracts for the Il-78MK-90A.

Nevertheless, the customers have not been officially named.

Several options for further developments are possible: Iran may limit itself to studying the proposal, the parties may announce a contract, or reports of interest may remain at the level of preliminary discussions. So far, none of these options can be considered an established result.

For the Israeli audience, the direction of the possible purchase is important. After the loss of American Boeings, which had provided Iranian aviation for decades, Tehran is considering the possibility of acquiring new-generation Russian machines. Combined with the acquisition of the Su-35, this could be part of the restoration and modernization of the Air Force.

The actual appearance of tankers in service, their number, and readiness for operation will determine the real scale of changes.

Cinema about Ukraine at the Haifa Film Festival: the road to war-torn Kharkiv, people separated by war, and two singers from Israel and Iran – September 26 – October 3, 2026

The 42nd International Film Festival opened in Haifa on September 26, 2026. Until October 3, audiences can expect Israeli premieres, international competition films, and documentary stories. The program also includes Ukraine: a journey of a mother and daughter to the shelled Kharkiv and the story of Ukrainian emigrants whose lives are divided between Kyiv and Israel.

Author: Victoria Katsman

Haifa has once again become the capital of cinema

On Saturday, September 26, the official opening ceremony of the 42nd International Film Festival took place at the Haifa Auditorium. It traditionally takes place during Sukkot — one of the main Jewish holidays, when Israelis have the opportunity to spend a few days with family, travel, or go to the movies.

The main events take place in the cultural complex on HaNassi Blvd, 142, in the Merkaz HaCarmel area. Films are also shown at the Haifa Cinematheque, Rappaport Halls, Tikotin, and other festival venues.

At the opening, an event occurred that deserves special attention. Two singers took the stage — Israeli Yuval Raphael and Iranian exiled performer Golazin Ardestani, known by the stage name Gola.

The musical program featured New Day Will Rise — the song with which Raphael represented Israel at Eurovision 2025 and took second place, scoring 357 points. The performance took place with the participation of the Haifa Symphony Orchestra conducted by Eran Rimi.

Two women from countries whose relations are defined by years of confrontation met on the Israeli stage. The words about the coming of a new day in such a performance took on a completely different context. The organizers officially confirmed the participation of both singers, although the published program does not specify the distribution of vocal parts in the composition itself.

The evening was hosted by Lior Ashkenazi. The opening film was chosen as “Our Loves” by Avi Nesher — a drama in which the personal stories of several characters intertwine with the tragic events of October 7, 2023. The director himself was awarded for his outstanding contribution to Israeli cinema.

Cinema about Ukraine at the Haifa Film Festival: the road to war-torn Kharkiv, people separated by war, and two singers from Israel and Iran - September 26 - October 3, 2026
Cinema about Ukraine at the Haifa Film Festival: the road to war-torn Kharkiv, people separated by war, and two singers from Israel and Iran – September 26 – October 3, 2026

But for those from Ukraine living in Israel today, there are two more particularly close stories in the current program.

“Journey Dreams”: the road to Kharkiv during the war

One of the films in the Israeli cinema competition program is the documentary film Journey Dreams directed by Mani Lozovsky. Its duration is 60 minutes, production — Israel, 2026.

It is the story of a mother and daughter who embark on a journey through Ukraine during the full-scale Russian war.

Their road leads to Kharkiv — the second-largest city in Ukraine, located near the Russian border. Since February 2022, it has been regularly shelled by Russia and has become one of the symbols of Ukrainian resistance.

But the film is not only about the destroyed city.

The daughter tries to understand her own roots, her attitude towards Ukraine and Russia, and what it means to belong to a certain place. The mother has a more defined position: her home is Israel. She goes to visit a childhood friend in Kharkiv, and along with that, returns to memories of life in the Soviet Union.

Their views do not always coincide. Through ordinary conversations on the road, the story of the family, emigration, and the difficult search for identity gradually unfolds.

For the Israeli audience, there is a quite recognizable conflict here. Many families of repatriates from the former USSR live in several cultural spaces at once: parents remember the Soviet past, children grew up in Israel, and relatives and friends remained in Ukraine.

The full-scale Russian invasion has given these family ties a completely different meaning. Returning to the city of childhood can now mean a trip to a place where sirens and explosions continue to sound.

When and where to watch:

September 27, Sunday, 16:00 — Haifa Cinematheque.

The film is in Russian and Hebrew, with English and Hebrew subtitles provided.

Journey Dreams — film description and tickets.

“Stars”: he returned to Kyiv, she stayed in Israel

The second story related to Ukraine is the short film Stars directed by Hila Elena Roizenman.

It is a 17-minute Israeli film from 2026, shot in Russian. It is included in the short film competition program Women: Fragments and Dreams.

The main characters are Ukrainian emigrants Yana and Sasha, who were once united by dance and romantic relationships.

Then their paths diverged. Sasha returned to Kyiv and managed to build his life, Yana stayed in Israel, giving up her former hopes.

Ten years later, they meet again. They have only one day and one night ahead to try to overcome the distance accumulated over the years of separation and figure out if there is anything left of their former love.

Everything happens in a world already changed by war.

This is not a documentary chronicle of hostilities and not a story about the front. Here, Ukraine is present through the fates of people who found themselves in different countries, through an unfulfilled joint future, and questions that remained unanswered for years.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly addressed how the Russian war affects families with Israeli citizenship. Recently, we reported on the death of a 14-year-old Israeli during a Russian strike on Kyiv on September 25. The festival addresses another side of these relationships — human stories, memory, love, and lost closeness.

The film “Stars” stars Lenna Freifeld, Anatoly Weissman, and Svetlana Demidova.

The screening will take place on September 29 at 18:30 in the Tikotin Hall. Russian audio track, subtitles in Hebrew and English.

Official program page and tickets.

It is important to clarify: both films are Israeli productions. They are connected to Ukraine primarily by their plots and characters, not by the country of production.

What else will be shown at the 42nd Haifa Film Festival

This year’s program combines major Israeli cinema, European premieres, documentaries, short films, and retrospectives.

Among the notable participants in the international program is French director François Ozon with an adaptation of Albert Camus’ famous novel “The Stranger.” The action takes place in French Algeria in the 1930s, and the central figure remains Meursault — a man whose behavior raises uncomfortable questions about morality and social expectations.

Andrey Zvyagintsev presents “Minotaur” — a drama about a Russian businessman whose usual life begins to crumble in 2022. The film is a co-production of France, Latvia, and Germany. It is shown in Russian with Hebrew and English subtitles.

British director Danny Boyle brought the film INK, dedicated to the rise of the tabloid The Sun and Rupert Murdoch’s media business. It is a story about journalism, power, commercial interests, and the transformation of the press into a tool of mass influence.

The program also includes “The Wizard of the Kremlin” by Olivier Assayas — a political drama related to the formation of the modern Russian political system.

Israeli competition films occupy a special place. This year, seven feature films and five documentary feature films are competing for festival awards.

Special screenings, meetings with filmmakers, family programs, and outdoor events are provided for viewers. Many foreign films are accompanied by Hebrew and English subtitles, although the language conditions of each session need to be checked separately.

From a small beginning to one of Israel’s main film festivals

The Haifa International Film Festival appeared in 1983. It became Israel’s first international film festival and gradually turned into an annual event that attracts audiences from all over the country.

Its holding during Sukkot has long become a city tradition. For a few days, Carmel turns into a large cinematic quarter, where ordinary walks in Haifa are combined with premieres, film discussions, and meetings with directors.

According to the municipality, the festival annually gathers about 80,000 viewers in cinemas, and thousands more attend street events and open screenings.

Since 2022, the festival has also gained special significance for Israeli short filmmakers: the winner of the corresponding competition category can qualify for participation in the Oscar selection.

Haifa is generally different from other major Israeli cities with its cultural environment. Here, Jewish and Arab communities coexist, numerous repatriates live, and the Russian language has long become a familiar part of the city’s space.

Therefore, two stories about Ukraine in the festival program look quite organic. This is cinema not only about war but also about people for whom the question “where is my home?” does not always have a simple answer.

Where to watch films and how to purchase tickets

The 42nd International Haifa Film Festival will last until October 3, 2026.

The main venue is located at: HaNassi Blvd 142, Haifa — Haifa Auditorium on Carmel.

The official website offers schedules, film descriptions, language and subtitle information, and ticket purchases.

Full program of the 42nd Haifa Film Festival.

For those living in Haifa and northern Israel, this is an opportunity to see international premieres almost next to home. And two films related to Ukraine allow us to look at the war through the fates of people who left, returned, or continue to live between two countries, preserving the memory of both.

“Ukrainian” buses in Israel: who are Polly Tour / פולי תור and why companies and organizers should pay attention to this carrier

It all started quite ordinarily. On Facebook, we came across a post with photos of a bus in Israel: a large tourist Mercedes, blue-yellow coloring, and right above the windshield — the Ukrainian trident. On the side — the name Polly Tour / פולי תור.

Author: Editorial Staff of NANews

The author of the photo wrote in Ukrainian: “Ось такі в Ізраїлі є автобуси! Дякую Тобі Боже за Твій народ” (These are the buses in Israel! Thank You God for Your people). We paused at the photo, then opened the carrier’s page, the official website, old Facebook posts — and as a result, instead of one beautiful photo, we got quite an interesting story of an Israeli company that seems to have something to offer to enterprises, event organizers, and tourist groups.

Let’s immediately say why we decided to talk about Polly Tour not only because of the trident. The company turned out to have a serious set of charter transportation: regular routes for organizations, employee transportation, buses for conferences and corporate days, tourist groups, weddings, excursions, Ben-Gurion, vehicles for passengers with limited mobility. This is no longer a story about a symbol on a bus, but about a service that many in Israel really need.

"Ukrainian" buses in Israel: who are Polly Tour / פולי תור and why companies and organizers should pay attention to this carrier
“Ukrainian” buses in Israel: who are Polly Tour / פולי תור and why companies and organizers should pay attention to this carrier

The section for the Israeli reader should be made deeper — so that the reader understands that the buses of Polly Tour do not just have “Ukrainian colors,” but symbols with a history long before the emergence of modern independent Ukraine in 1991.

Blue, yellow, and trident: what the symbols on Polly Tour buses mean

Polly Tour buses are noticeable from afar: the fleet’s design features a lot of blue and yellow, and on some vehicles, a golden trident is placed above the windshield. Today, such a combination is almost unequivocally associated with Ukraine, but both the colors and the sign itself appeared in Ukrainian symbolism long before the proclamation of modern Ukraine’s independence in 1991.

The most common modern explanation of the flag’s colors is very simple: blue — sky, yellow — wheat field. This is how the combination is often perceived today. However, this is more of a popular symbolic interpretation rather than a meaning enshrined by law. The resolution of the Verkhovna Rada, which approved the modern state flag, defines the colors and proportions of the canvas but does not establish the official interpretation of “sky and wheat.”

The blue and yellow themselves appeared in the symbolism of the lands of modern Ukraine much earlier. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory points to the combination of a blue background and golden or yellow images even in medieval heraldry. For example, the golden lion on a blue field is associated with the Galician principality. Later, especially in the 17th–18th centuries, Cossack regimental and company banners featured blue canvases with yellow or golden crosses, stars, weapons, and images of saints.

But it was precisely as Ukrainian national colors that the blue-yellow combination was established much later — during the European “Spring of Nations” in 1848. In June of that year, such a flag was raised over the town hall of Lviv. After that, blue-yellow banners were increasingly used by Ukrainian organizations and participants in national events in Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. In the territories of the Russian Empire, their open use spread after the revolution of 1905–1907.

In 1917, the blue-yellow flag was already widely used by the Ukrainian movement. Under such banners, thousands of Ukrainian demonstrations took place in Kyiv and Petrograd, and in the summer of 1917, the Ukrainian regiment named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky went to the front under the blue-yellow flag. Ukrainian flags began to be raised on individual ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

During the period of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the colors turned from a national sign into an element of state symbolism. In January 1918, the blue-yellow canvas was enshrined in the legislation of the UPR on the fleet. In the documents of the Ukrainian authorities of 1918, the order familiar to us today was used: blue or light blue stripe on top, yellow on the bottom. The blue-yellow symbolism was preserved under the Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, used by the Directorate of the UPR, and in November 1918, the blue-yellow flag was declared the state flag of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic.

After the establishment of Soviet power, this symbolism was no longer the state flag of the Ukrainian SSR, and in the USSR, its public use was prosecuted. The blue-yellow flag continued to exist in Ukrainian emigration and various movements associated with the idea of Ukrainian independence. At the end of the Soviet period, it began to appear publicly again. After the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence, the Verkhovna Rada on January 28, 1992 officially approved the state flag as a canvas of two equal horizontal stripes: blue on top and yellow on the bottom.

The history of the trident is even older.

What is today called the trident originates from the princely signs of the Rurik dynasty during the times of Rus. The sign of Prince Volodymyr the Great, who ruled Kyiv at the end of the 10th — beginning of the 11th century, is especially well-known. Similar signs were found on princely coins and other items of that period. At the same time, historians do not have a single indisputable answer to what this sign originally depicted: there are several interpretations of its form and origin. Therefore, it is more correct to speak not of a proven ancient meaning of the word “trident,” but of a princely sign that much later received this name and modern state significance.

It was returned to during the Ukrainian revolution of the early 20th century. Already on January 6, 1918, Volodymyr’s sign appeared on the first UPR banknote with a denomination of 100 karbovanets, created by artist Heorhiy Narbut. And on February 25, 1918, the Small Rada officially approved the “sign of the Kyiv State from the times of Volodymyr the Saint” as the coat of arms of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. On March 22, the large and small coat of arms of the UPR, developed by Vasyl Krychevsky, were approved.

The choice was not accidental. The leaders of the UPR thus emphasized the historical continuity of the new Ukrainian statehood from medieval Rus. The trident was used on state seals, documents, money, and other official attributes. Under Hetman Skoropadsky, it also did not disappear from state heraldry, and after the loss of Ukrainian statehood, it continued to be used by the UPR government in emigration.

After the restoration of independence, modern Ukraine returned both historical symbols. On January 28, 1992, the blue-yellow state flag was officially approved, and on February 19, 1992, the Verkhovna Rada approved the golden trident on a blue shield as the small State Emblem of Ukraine and the main element of the future large state emblem.

Therefore, the design of Polly Tour buses looks especially characteristic. Here, two recognizable Ukrainian symbols are simultaneously present: the combination of blue and yellow, which has centuries-old heraldic roots and became national in the 19th century, and the trident, which dates back to the princely signs of Kievan Rus and was officially used by Ukrainian statehood as early as 1918.

Polly Tour has not been operating since yesterday: what we managed to verify

On its official website, Polly Tour writes that it has been operating in Israel for over 20 years and serves private clients, businesses, and institutions. The company is primarily based in the center of the country but carries out transportation throughout Israel.

We went to check the history ourselves.

The oldest post on the official Facebook page that we managed to find is dated November 5, 2014. Even then, Polly Tour offered transportation throughout the country on new buses. In June 2015, a large blue-yellow bus appeared on the page, and then such vehicles were regularly visible in photos from 2016, 2017, and 2018.

And on December 9, 2016, on one of the buses published by the company, the Ukrainian trident was already clearly visible above the windshield. In the same publication, Alex Polykov was noted. Later in Polly Tour’s history, Kosta Polykov appears: in 2022, he posted an announcement on behalf of the carrier about looking for a driver.

We also found an even more illustrative photo. On the side of one of Polly Tour’s buses, two contact names and numbers are directly applied:

Kosta — 052-……..
Alex — 053-……..

Next to it is the name Polly Tour / פולי תור. In the old publications of the page, we also see Alex Polykov and Kosta Polykov, so their direct connection with the carrier’s work is almost beyond doubt.

There is also an interesting detail here that is hard not to notice: Polykov is a surname, and the company is called Polly Tour. We did not ask the carrier’s representatives whether the name Polly Tour is indeed derived from the surname Polykov, and therefore we cannot assert this as an established fact. But the similarity of the name with the surname of people who have been associated with the company for many years looks obvious enough to draw attention to it.

Who exactly among them is or was the owner of the business, it would also be incorrect to establish based on some Facebook posts and inscriptions on the bus. But we can say something else with certainty: Kosta and Alex were not random people next to Polly Tour, but its long-term contact persons — their names and phone numbers were directly applied to the company’s buses.

At the same time, the current legal entity פולי תור בע”מ / Polly Tour Ltd., №516448453 was registered on August 11, 2021, and has the status of an active private Israeli company. The legal address in the registry data is Beit Aryeh.

There is no contradiction here. An Israeli business can well operate for many years in one organizational form and then register a new LLC. But that’s why we separate two statements: Polly Tour itself talks about more than 20 years of experience; the independently traceable public history of the company is confirmed at least since 2014.

And even these twelve years of continuous public history for a small private carrier are already not a page opened yesterday with three photos.

What exactly can be ordered from Polly Tour

Here it becomes practical for organizations.

On the Polly Tour website, there is a separate direction for regular transportation of employees and organizations. The company offers both permanent routes and one-time trips, and on the page of regular transportation, enterprises, schools, and day centers are separately listed. You can agree on the schedule, route, and boarding points for a specific organization.

For businesses, there are transportation services for corporate events, leisure days and team building, seminars, training, and conferences. That is, you don’t have to gather employees in twenty cars, worry about parking, and who will drive back after the event. The company itself offers to build a route with several collection points and adjust the schedule to the event program.

There is a separate service for bus rental with a driver — from a one-day trip to long-term support of an organized group. According to Polly Tour’s description, this includes vehicle selection, driver, route planning, and trip logistics. This format is suitable for companies, educational institutions, excursion organizers, conferences, and group outings.

Another large direction is tourism and excursions. Polly Tour works with tourist groups, organized groups, and delegations, including when a bus is needed for several consecutive days. On the tourist transportation page, the company separately mentions inbound tourism and group support throughout Israel.

There are excursion trips and one-day tours: collection points, stops, and places to visit are determined in advance. For a group, several boarding points can be made and then passengers can be taken back.

Separately declared are transfers to Ben-Gurion Airport for families and groups. For a large team, this is sometimes simply more convenient than ordering a dozen taxis, especially when there are suitcases and several collection points. The company refers to this service as one of its main directions.

There are transportation services for weddings, bar and bat mitzvahs, family celebrations, and corporate events. For a wedding, for example, the site allows you to set a route there and back, several boarding points, return time, and intermediate stops.

And this is the case when the Israeli specifics are understandable without long explanations: a wedding somewhere out of town, relatives coming from Tel Aviv, Rishon LeZion, and Petah Tikva, parking is unknown where, then still have to drive back at night. One properly organized bus sometimes solves half the headache.

From 19 to 60 passengers — and a separate accessible bus

According to Polly Tour, the fleet includes minibuses for up to 19 passengers, buses for about 55 people, and a large bus for up to 60 passengers. The company also declares a specialized accessible bus with places for up to ten wheelchairs in addition to regular seats.

For organizations, this is not a trifle. When the team consists of 45 people, there is no point in paying for two random vehicles. When 15–18 people are traveling, a large bus, on the contrary, may be excessive. And if there is a passenger in a wheelchair in the group, the availability of truly adapted transport becomes one of the first questions when choosing a carrier.

The company writes that its buses undergo regular maintenance, and some pages separately indicate transport control by a קצין בטיחות בתעבורה — transport safety officer/specialist, a position provided for by the Israeli system of supervision over commercial fleets.

For Israelis: this is not Egged and not a city bus

Here is a small point that may not be obvious to the reader.

Polly Tour is not a public transport operator. It does not have a city route where you come with a Rav-Kav and board at the nearest stop. This is a charter carrier: an enterprise, family, school, tourist group, conference or excursion organizer pre-arranges a vehicle, time, route, and number of passengers.

The company’s main market is the center of Israel, but Polly Tour itself declares transportation throughout the country. The site has separate pages for Tel Aviv, Holon, Rishon LeZion, Lod, Petah Tikva, Shoham, Hadera, and other directions.

Therefore, an organization’s request can look very different: picking up employees from several cities every day and bringing them to the enterprise; taking the entire office to the north for a יום גיבוש; meeting a foreign delegation at Ben-Gurion; organizing a bus for a conference; picking up guests from the train station and returning them after a wedding.

That’s what Polly Tour is tailored for.

And what about the Ukrainian trident?

We still return to it because that’s where this story began.

Polly Tour’s blue-yellow buses appeared at least in 2015. By December 2016, one of the vehicles already had the Ukrainian trident. In modern photos on the official website, this sign is visible on several buses.

Why the owners chose the Ukrainian emblem, the company itself does not explain on the pages available to us. Therefore, we will not invent a family biography or declare its origin.

But the fact remains: the Israeli carrier has been using the Ukrainian trident on its fleet for many years.

For NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, this fits well into the part of Israeli life that we constantly talk about. Ukraine exists here not only in big politics: there is a Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, events, communities, businesses, and thousands of ordinary human connections.

Why it makes sense for organizations to at least request a proposal

We will not write that we personally tested every Polly Tour vehicle or conducted a control trip — that did not happen. Therefore, evaluating the company with the words “the best in Israel” would be advertising noise.

But adding Polly Tour to the list of carriers from whom to request a proposal, we can recommend quite specifically.

The business has a long-standing public trail, a visible fleet, vehicles of different capacities, transport for passengers in wheelchairs, regular transportation for organizations, tourist and event routes, and the ability to work not only with a one-time order but also with the permanent logistics of an enterprise. This set is what matters to someone who is really responsible for transporting twenty, fifty, or a hundred people, not choosing a bus based on a beautiful photo.

For the company, we would immediately pass on to Polly Tour the number of passengers, cities and boarding points, date, departure and return time, the need for several stops, luggage volume, and accessibility requirements when requesting. Then the carrier will be able to select a vehicle and calculate a proposal without endless message exchanges.

Currently, the official website lists the office at HaYotzrim 6, Or Yehuda, phone 073-8022252, e-mail Pollytour1@gmail.com. Office hours: Sunday–Thursday 07:30–19:30, Friday and pre-holiday days 07:30–15:00.

You can submit a request directly through the company’s website: there is a form with departure and destination points, dates, time, number of passengers, and additional stops.

Official Polly Tour website — request transportation

Official page – https://www.facebook.com/pollytour1/

And we started with just a photo of a bus on Facebook. Then it turned out that behind the blue-yellow vehicle with the trident is a carrier with a large fleet and quite a wide range of services.

So if your company, organization, tourist group, or event organizers need a bus in Israel — Polly Tour is at least worth adding to the list of those to call and request a quote. And let the Ukrainian trident above the windshield remain a pleasant bonus to this story.

From Jerusalem – following the traces of Jewish Podolia: scientists surveyed more than 30 synagogues in Ukraine

September 2, 2026 The United Jewish Community of Ukraine reported on the results of the expedition “Synagogues of Podolia — 2026”, conducted in the second half of August together with the Center for Jewish Art of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Researchers traveled through dozens of Ukrainian cities and towns and surveyed more than 30 historical synagogues: photographing facades, recording the current state of buildings, studying preserved architectural details, and where possible, entering inside.

Author: Elena Gunko

For the Israeli reader, a map is immediately needed here. Podolia is not Kyiv’s Podil and not a modern administrative region of Ukraine, but a large historical region in the southwest of the country. Today, its core is primarily in the Vinnytsia and Khmelnytsky regions, and the western part covers the Ternopil region and neighboring territories. Looking from Israel at the map of Ukraine, it is a belt southwest of Kyiv, stretching towards the Dniester and the Moldovan border.

It was here that one of the densest networks of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe existed for several centuries. From here came religious ideas, surnames, and Hasidic courts, whose names are now more familiar to hear in Jerusalem or Bnei Brak than in a Ukrainian village or small town where it all once began.

This is not a tour of old buildings

From Jerusalem - following the traces of Jewish Podolia: scientists surveyed more than 30 synagogues in Ukraine
From Jerusalem – following the traces of Jewish Podolia: scientists surveyed more than 30 synagogues in Ukraine

The expedition is called “Synagogues of Podolia — 2026”, but its task is broader than a usual inventory. The collected materials should become part of a separate study “Synagogues of Ukraine: Podolia”, which is being prepared by the Israeli Center for Jewish Art — the Center for Jewish Art at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Simply put, researchers are now trying to preserve as much information as possible about buildings that may look different tomorrow. For a historical synagogue, not only beautiful walls are important: the layout of the prayer hall, the shape of the windows, the place of the Aron ha-Kodesh — the cabinet where Torah scrolls were kept, remnants of paintings, Soviet-era reconstructions. Sometimes a single bricked-up arch tells a specialist more than a modern plaque on the facade.

The expedition route passed through Mogilev-Podolsky, Chechelnik, Kodyma, Balta, Kryve Ozero, Brailov, Bershad, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Dunaivtsi, Khmelnytskyi, Sataniv, Medzhybizh, Letychiv, Khmilnyk, Vinnytsia, Zhmerinka and a number of smaller settlements. These are all different points of what was once a vast Jewish space.

Most of these names mean nothing to the average Israeli. And this is part of the problem: modern Jewish life has long moved to Israel, the USA, and Western Europe, while the places where families and communities were formed have gradually fallen out of living memory.

Medzhybizh: a small Ukrainian town without which it is difficult to imagine Bnei Brak

One of the main points of the route is Medzhybizh, a small settlement in the current Khmelnytsky region in western Ukraine. Today, very few people live there, but in Jewish history, its scale is incomparable to the size of the town.

It was here, approximately from 1740 until his death in 1760, that Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer — Baal Shem Tov, or Besht, lived, a figure around whom early Hasidism formed. His grave is located in Medzhybizh and remains a place of Jewish pilgrimage.

For a reader far from the religious environment, it is worth explaining the word itself. Hasidism emerged in Eastern Europe in the 18th century as a religious movement within Judaism, placing special emphasis on emotional prayer, spiritual joy, mystical tradition, and the role of a charismatic spiritual mentor — the Rebbe. Through Besht’s disciples, the movement quickly spread across the Jewish communities of the region.

Today, the consequences of that 18th-century process are literally visible on the streets of Israel. NANovosti has already detailed the Ukrainian roots of the largest Hasidic dynasties: Chernobyl, Skvira, Rachmastrivka, Machnovka, Boyan, Sadigura, Vizhnitz, and other historical lines now have major centers in Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, the USA, and other countries.

That’s why a photograph of an old synagogue in Ukrainian Medzhybizh is not quite a photograph of “foreign antiquity” for Israel. Historically, the road from there leads directly to modern Israeli neighborhoods, yeshivas, synagogues, and Hasidic courts.

What is a shtetl and why were there so many of these towns

In the history of Eastern European Jews, the word “shtetl” often appears. It comes from Yiddish and literally means a small town or settlement, but in Jewish history, it acquired a more specific meaning: a town with a large, sometimes predominant Jewish population, its own communal life, synagogues, houses of study, schools, craftsmen, and merchants.

Podolia was covered with such settlements. Therefore, researchers today find synagogues not only in large cities like Vinnytsia or Kamianets-Podilskyi but also in settlements whose names even Ukrainians from other regions do not always recognize at first glance.

Before the Catastrophe of European Jewry — the Shoah — such a map looked completely different. In the same Medzhybizh, according to the 1897 census of the Russian Empire, 6,040 Jews lived, making up about 70% of the town’s population. It was not a “Jewish monument among a Ukrainian town,” but to a large extent, a Jewish town itself.

Then this world was broken several times. Pogroms and wars, the Catastrophe, Soviet struggle against religion, emigration — and many buildings were left without the communities for which they were built.

Sataniv: why a synagogue needed walls like a fortress

Another stop of the expedition is Sataniv, a small settlement in the Khmelnytsky region. It is located in the western part of Podolia, far from the major centers of modern Jewish life, but here is preserved one of the most famous examples of the so-called fortress synagogue.

The name is not artistic. In the 16th–17th centuries, this part of Eastern Europe often experienced wars and raids, so the massive stone synagogue sometimes also served the community as a refuge. Hence the thick walls, high windows, and the architecture itself, more reminiscent of a defensive structure than a city synagogue familiar to today’s Israeli.

There is also a scientific debate here that well illustrates the meaning of the current expedition. In tourist publications, the Sataniv synagogue is often dated to 1514 or 1532, but researchers do not consider such an early dating indisputable and associate the current stone building with a later period.

For history, this difference is fundamental. It’s one thing to write next to a photograph “16th-century synagogue,” another to take measurements, compare the architecture with analogs, check materials, and understand when exactly the preserved structure appeared.

Kamianets-Podilskyi: not just a fortress from tourist postcards

Kamianets-Podilskyi is a more well-known Ukrainian city, located in the southwest of the current Khmelnytsky region, near the Dniester. Tourists know it primarily for its huge medieval fortress and the Smotrych River canyon, but the city has a long and very complex Jewish history.

Here in 1757, the famous dispute involving Frankists took place. For the non-specialist, this word requires explanation: Frankists were followers of Jacob Frank, an 18th-century Jewish religious leader who created a radical messianic movement and came into conflict with traditional rabbinic Judaism.

By rabbinic Judaism here is meant the main historical tradition of Judaism, based on the Torah, Talmud, and Halakha — Jewish religious law. After the Kamianets dispute, the local Catholic bishop Nicholas Dembowski ordered the confiscation and burning of copies of the Talmud.

So the old Podolian synagogues do not tell just one cozy story about a peaceful shtetl. Behind these walls were religious disputes, struggles of different currents, attacks, wars, economic prosperity, poverty, migration — the normal, complex life of several centuries.

Jerusalem collects what remains

The Center for Jewish Art at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem itself appeared in 1979. It was created by Professor Bezalel Narkiss, and over the decades, the Center has turned into an international system for documenting Jewish material culture.

Today, the Center is headed by Vladimir Levin, who also participated in the current Ukrainian expedition. His specialists work not only with synagogues: manuscripts, ritual objects, cemeteries, paintings, works of art, and other things that can restore the physical world of vanished communities are included in the archive.

For the Israeli reader, it is easier to imagine the scale on the previous Ukrainian project of the Center. In 2017, Vladimir Levin and researcher Sergey Kravtsov released a two-volume study “Synagogues in Ukraine: Volhynia”. Volhynia is another historical region of present-day Ukraine, located north of Podolia; today it is primarily the territory of the Volyn, Rivne, and neighboring regions.

In these two volumes, there were 848 pages and 1,220 photographs, and the researchers described 39 preserved and 302 already lost synagogues in 23 cities and towns. The ratio of numbers itself — 39 against 302 — quite well explains why it is necessary to document Podolia now.

What does “lost synagogue” mean

This does not always mean a pile of stones. Under Soviet rule, religious institutions were closed, and buildings were adapted for warehouses, clubs, production facilities, sports halls, or administrative institutions.

Somewhere the walls remained, but the interior disappeared. Somewhere a floor was added, windows were bricked up, and after several reconstructions, the old synagogue is already difficult to recognize. Other structures were destroyed during the Shoah or disappeared later due to neglect and construction.

And today, old threats are joined by the Russian war against Ukraine. NANovosti published a list compiled by the United Jewish Community of Ukraine of damaged and destroyed Jewish objects — synagogues, cemeteries, schools, community buildings, and memorial sites. It includes about 40 objects affected after the start of the full-scale war.

Here, a careful boundary is important. The fact of a synagogue being damaged by a Russian strike does not yet prove that it was chosen as a target precisely because it is Jewish. But the result for the heritage does not become easier from this: an old object can disappear due to an explosion nearby just as definitively as from a direct hit.

Uman is familiar to Israelis. But Uman is just one point

Most Israelis, even those not connected to the Hasidic world, have at least heard of Uman — a city in central Ukraine, where tens of thousands of followers of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov come annually for Rosh Hashanah. This is the most noticeable point of contact between Israel and Jewish Ukraine today.

Tzadik in this context is a revered righteous person and spiritual leader. Rabbi Nachman, the great-grandson of Baal Shem Tov, died in Uman in 1810, and his grave became the main pilgrimage site for Breslov Hasidim.

In 2025, Ukraine increased the protection status of this place: Rabbi Nachman’s grave received the category of a national monument. NANovosti explained in detail what this status means and why it is important for pilgrims from Israel.

But if you look only at Uman, the scale of the connection is lost. Uman is one living and very famous point, and the expedition from Jerusalem actually shows dozens of other addresses of the same history.

From a Ukrainian shtetl to today’s Israel

For the author of this article, Elena Gunko, this seems to be the main thing in the current expedition. You can list thirty names of Ukrainian towns — and the Israeli reader will scroll through them because they have never been there and probably never intended to.

But if you translate these names onto a familiar Israeli map, the picture changes. Medzhybizh is Besht and the beginning of Hasidism. Breslov is Rabbi Nachman and today’s Uman. Vizhnitz is one of the large Hasidic courts of modern Israel. Machnovka today has a center in Bnei Brak. Rachmastrivka is a living court in Jerusalem. Boyan and Sadigura have also long been part of the Israeli Haredi world. Some of these names have been preserved in Israel much better than in their places of origin.

It turns out to be almost a paradox. In a Ukrainian town, sometimes only a cemetery and one building remain from the old community, while in Jerusalem or Bnei Brak, the name of the same town is borne by thousands of living people, their synagogues, and religious institutions.

Therefore, the work of Israeli researchers in Podolia is not an attempt to study the distant past of another state. They document part of the prehistory of modern Jewish society in Israel.

Memory has a quite physical size

Sometimes the word “memory” sounds too abstract. In the expedition, everything is much more concrete: the width of a wall, a photograph of a ceiling, a window, old masonry, a remnant of a painting, an archival plan, the coordinates of a building.

If this is not done, in a generation there may only be the phrase “there was once a synagogue here.” And proving its structure, age, and significance will already be impossible.

In Medzhybizh, such fixation returns us to the very beginning of Hasidism. In Sataniv, it shows why a Jewish community needed practically a fortress. In Kamianets-Podilskyi, it leads to the religious conflicts of the 18th century. In dozens of smaller places, it does no less important thing — it returns existence to people whose names no one remembers anymore.

After all, before the war, the Catastrophe, and emigration, these were not “monuments of Jewish heritage.” There, people simply prayed, argued, married, taught children, traded, celebrated Passover and Rosh Hashanah. Lived.

Why this expedition is taking place right now

Ukraine continues the war, and researchers from Jerusalem, meanwhile, travel through its southwestern regions and measure old synagogues. At first glance, activities from completely different worlds.

In fact, the connection is quite direct. The war has once again shown how quickly physical history can turn into an archival photograph. A well-known house today may be damaged tomorrow, burn down, or simply end up in a zone where a researcher can no longer visit.

But the threat is not only from missiles. Old Jewish cemeteries face illegal construction work, historical buildings collapse without repair, and the sites of former communities sometimes simply disappear under new development. Preservation requires not general words about heritage, but documents, protection status, and precise fixation.

Israeli specialists are essentially taking the first step of this chain: establishing what exactly still exists and what exactly should be preserved.

Not a museum of Ukraine, but a family archive of Israel

Perhaps the easiest way to explain the significance of the expedition is precisely this way. For Ukraine, these synagogues are part of the history of its cities and citizens. For world Jewry, they are the remnants of a vast Eastern European civilization. For Israel, there is a third layer: it is to a large extent the family history of a society that later built its life here.

Surnames have changed, Hebrew has become the language, children and grandchildren were born in Haifa, Ashdod, Jerusalem, or Bnei Brak. But if you go back along family and religious lines, the road very often unexpectedly leads to a small town in present-day Ukraine.

And then the old synagogue ceases to be just a beautiful ruin somewhere “there.” Sometimes it is the last physical address of a world from which people came out, whose descendants live next to us today.

The study “Synagogues of Ukraine: Podolia” is still being prepared, its final volume and publication date have not yet been announced. But the August expedition has already done an important thing: more than thirty such addresses have been rediscovered, inspected, and documented by specialists from Jerusalem.

In ten or twenty years, some of these buildings, hopefully, will be restored. Some will change, some may not be preserved at all. But their current state will remain in the archive.

And in this, perhaps, lies the most Israeli meaning of the whole story. Jerusalem today is collecting traces from Ukrainian shtetls of a world from which a significant part of Jewish Israel once grew.

14 senators demanded that Trump cancel Putin’s invitation to the G20 – ‘Russia is helping Iran attack American military personnel’

In Washington, Republicans and Democrats issued a joint appeal to the President of the United States. They demand not to allow Putin to attend the December G20 summit in Miami and directly link this issue to the Russian war against Ukraine and military support for Iran. For Israel, there is a separate aspect in this story: Moscow’s alleged assistance to Tehran is now featured in the official appeal of American lawmakers as an argument against diplomatic rapprochement with the Kremlin.

Author: Anton Pshedynsky

Seven Republicans and seven Democrats. Why they appealed to Trump

On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published an appeal from fourteen senators to President Donald Trump. The authors of the letter demanded a review of the invitation to Vladimir Putin to the G20 summit, which is to be held on December 14-15 in Miami, Florida.

The initiators of the appeal were two representatives from different parties: Jeanne Shaheen, a senator from the Democratic Party elected from New Hampshire and representing the Democratic minority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Roger Wicker, a Republican from Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

They were joined by twelve more senators.

From the Republican Party, the letter was signed by Mitch McConnell (Kentucky), John Cornyn (Texas), Jerry Moran (Kansas), Thom Tillis (North Carolina), John Curtis (Utah), and Alan Armstrong (Oklahoma).

From the Democratic Party — Sheldon Whitehouse (Rhode Island), Michael Bennet (Colorado), Chris Coons (Delaware), Richard Blumenthal (Connecticut), Tim Kaine (Virginia), and Ruben Gallego (Arizona).

There is one peculiarity: unlike the other signatories, Alan Armstrong was not elected by the voters of his state. On March 24, 2026, Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt appointed him as a temporary senator in place of Markwayne Mullin, who moved to the position of U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. Armstrong represents the Republican Party and holds the position until the end of the current term in January 2027.

Thus, the appeal bears the signatures of seven Democrats and seven Republicans representing fourteen different American states. Among the Republican signatories is former party leader in the Senate Mitch McConnell and current chairman of the Armed Services Committee Roger Wicker.

For understanding the American political system: senators are elected by the population of their entire state, not a separate electoral district, like members of the House of Representatives. One state is represented in the Senate by two legislators.

There are exactly equal representatives of both parties. This is significant for understanding the political context: the document cannot be considered solely an initiative of the Democratic opposition to Trump. Among its authors are influential Republicans, including the head of the committee directly dealing with American defense issues.

The letter states that allowing the Russian president to participate in the summit on U.S. territory raises serious questions against the backdrop of ongoing Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets.

However, the war in Ukraine is not the only argument. The senators specifically point to reports that Russia is helping Iranian military forces identify targets for strikes on American troops in the Middle East.

Original appeal — U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Why Iran unexpectedly appeared in the letter about Putin

For the Israeli audience, this part of the American document is of particular interest.

The senators did not limit themselves to describing Russian actions in Ukraine. They linked them to events in the Middle East and reminded of public reports regarding Moscow’s assistance to Iranian armed forces.

The story began long before the current appeal.

On March 6, The Washington Post published an investigation based on information from three American officials familiar with intelligence data. According to the publication, Russia provided Iran with information about the location of American military facilities, ships, and aircraft in the region.

It was not about supplying conventional weapons, but about information that could potentially be used in selecting targets and preparing strikes.

The Russian side did not confirm the information about the transfer of intelligence data at that time. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on the American intelligence information.

Later, other reports emerged about Russian-Iranian cooperation, including the alleged transfer of satellite images, drone technologies, and technical support.

It is important to distinguish the degree of confirmation. The senators’ letter itself does not contain new declassified intelligence documents. The lawmakers refer to previously published reports, and Moscow’s specific involvement in certain Iranian strikes remains the subject of investigations.

But now this information is used not only in journalistic investigations. It is included in the official argumentation of American parliamentarians addressed directly to the President of the United States.

NANews previously detailed this story in the article “How Russian Frontline Experience Now Works Against Israel”.

From Ukrainian Shaheds to American facilities in the Middle East

To understand the Israeli component of the current appeal, it is worth returning to 2022.

After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Iran became one of the suppliers of drone technologies for the Russian army. Iranian Shaheds, designated as “Geran” in Russia, gradually became one of the main tools for massive attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure.

Initially, it was about transferring ready-made devices. Later, Russia established its own production and began modifying the drones’ design based on accumulated combat experience.

On January 17, 2025, Moscow and Tehran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. The document provides for the interaction of intelligence services, information exchange, military training, and the development of military-technical cooperation.

This is not an agreement on automatic mutual military protection. But it created an official basis for further interaction between the two states.

In the spring and summer of 2026, reports emerged that military cooperation was developing in the opposite direction as well. According to Western journalists and intelligence sources, Moscow began helping Tehran with technologies and information of direct value in confronting the U.S. and Israel.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency thoroughly explored this interconnection in the article “Iran and Russia: How the War in Ukraine Became a Testing Ground for Future War Against Israel and the U.S.”.

There is also a material aspect to the interaction. In August, NBC News reported on Russian military supplies to Iran via the Caspian Sea. Among the mentioned cargoes were drone components, ammunition, and TNT — trinitrotoluene, an explosive used in the manufacture of ammunition.

More details — in our investigation “Russia Supplies Weapons to Iran via the Caspian: TNT, Ammunition, and Drone Parts”.

It is this connection of two directions that now appeared in the Senate letter. Lawmakers consider Russian strikes on Ukraine and reports of assistance to Iranian military forces in the context of the overall security interests of the U.S.

In Miami, they have already started inviting Russian officials. Senators are also dissatisfied with this

The current appeal has its own backstory, and it is quite specific.

American lawmakers remind Trump of several G20 events where official representatives of Moscow were already present.

In Asheville, North Carolina, the Russian delegation at the financial meeting was headed by Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. Russian representatives also participated in the innovation meeting in Chapel Hill and the energy event in Houston.

All three cities are in the U.S. Therefore, for the authors of the letter, the question is not only about Russia’s presence at international negotiations but also about allowing Russian officials under American sanctions directly onto the country’s territory.

Senators remind that Putin and Siluanov fall under restrictions imposed in accordance with Executive Order No. 14024. This sanction mechanism is applied by Washington in connection with actions of the Russian leadership affecting American interests and security.

As early as April 3, American lawmakers raised the issue of allowing sanctioned deputies of the Russian State Duma into the U.S.

Now the dispute has moved to the level of inviting the Russian president himself.

However, sanctions should not be automatically interpreted as an unconditional ban on any diplomatic meeting. There are special legal procedures and exceptions for official international events. Senators primarily challenge the political decision of the administration to provide such an opportunity to Russian representatives.

In the concluding part of the letter, they demand to withdraw the invitation to Putin and limit the participation of other sanctioned Russian officials in upcoming G20 meetings.

What the Trump administration responds and why the invitation appeared at all

On September 23, 2026, two days before the publication of the Senate appeal, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Washington invited Putin to the December summit.

The statement was made in New York after Rubio’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Rubio explained the administration’s position by the need to maintain contacts even with those state leaders with whom the U.S. has serious disagreements. According to him, participation in the G20 would provide Putin with the opportunity to communicate not only with Trump but also with other world leaders.

This is fundamentally different logic than that outlined in the Senate letter. The White House views the invitation as a possible diplomatic tool, while the lawmakers who signed the appeal point to the risk of political normalization of relations with the Russian leadership before the end of the war.

As of September 26, there is no public confirmation of Putin’s agreement to come to Miami.

Here arises the Ukrainian question.

On September 12, Volodymyr Zelensky announced his readiness to personally meet with the Russian president at the American summit. However, Ukraine itself is not part of the G20, and the participation of its leader requires a separate invitation from the host country.

NANews has already analyzed this situation in the publication “Zelensky Invites Putin to Miami: G20 Could Be the First Personal Meeting Since 2019”.

Now, to the uncertainty regarding the possible meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, there is added open disagreement from part of the American Senate with the very invitation of the Russian leader.

What has changed for Ukraine and Israel

For Kyiv, the appeal means that within the American political establishment, there remains a bipartisan group of lawmakers advocating for continued pressure on Russia. However, their position is not identical to the decision of the entire Senate and does not obligate the president to automatically cancel the invitation.

For Israel, the significance of the document is somewhat different.

Russian-Iranian military interaction now appears in the American political debate not as an additional regional problem but as one of the arguments related to Washington-Moscow relations.

Such consideration creates a new diplomatic framework: Russia’s actions are evaluated by American senators simultaneously through the war against Ukraine and through reports of support for Iranian military operations against American forces in the Middle East.

These processes also have a practical dimension. Israeli and American air defense systems face the development of drone technologies, and Ukraine has accumulated years of experience countering their mass use. The exchange of weapons, production technologies, and intelligence information between Moscow and Tehran affects the security interests of both countries.

But the current letter itself does not mean the introduction of new sanctions, a revision of American policy towards Israel, or the cancellation of Russia’s participation in the G20.

The December summit now depends not only on the Kremlin

As of today, three open questions remain: will the Trump administration keep the invitation, will the Russian president agree to come to the U.S., and will the idea of a personal meeting between Zelensky and Putin develop.

The authors of the Senate appeal propose linking the participation of the Russian leadership in international events with achieving peace in Ukraine. The Trump administration, on the contrary, publicly explains the invitation as an opportunity for direct negotiations.

The summit in Miami is scheduled for December 14-15. There are still almost three months to go, and new diplomatic decisions may emerge during this period.

However, the letter published on September 25 has already recorded an important detail: when discussing Russia’s place at the international negotiating table, American lawmakers separately raise the issue of its alleged military assistance to Iran.

In this story, Ukraine and the Middle East are not two independent topics of American foreign policy but parts of one document addressed to the President of the United States.

9 kilometers to Kherson, 20 to food: how the Russian occupation turned the Ukrainian Oleshky into a city on the brink of starvation

In the Russian-occupied Oleshky of the Kherson region, people are making soup from wild greens, trying to walk twenty kilometers on mined roads for food, and the hospital is asking residents to bring at least some grains for bedridden patients. The last successful food delivery took place on May 26, 2026. Since then, normal supply has not been restored.

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky

On September 25, 2026, the American TV channel ABC News published a major report on the humanitarian catastrophe in the city. On the same day, new testimonies from residents, volunteers, and representatives of the Ukrainian administration appeared. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, demanded the safe evacuation of civilians and the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid.

In Oleshky itself, according to the Ukrainian city military administration, about two thousand people remain. Together with the surrounding villages — about six thousand, including 182 children. The exact number cannot be established: communication is almost nonexistent, people disappear from the sight of relatives, some manage to get through minefields on their own.

All this is happening literally opposite the liberated Kherson. Approximately nine kilometers in a straight line, the Dnipro River and the front line separate the two Ukrainian cities.

What Oleshky was like before the Russian invasion

Oleshky (here it is on Google Maps – https://maps.app.goo.gl/Ee37c5txzzY2pryDA) is an ancient city on the left bank of the Dnipro, known for its Cossack history. From 1711 to 1728, the Oleshkovskaya Sich existed nearby. Later, the city was named Tsyurupinsk, and in 2016 it officially regained its historical name.

Before the full-scale war, about 24,000 people lived here. The Oleshkovskaya community — an administrative association of the city with twelve surrounding settlements — had about 40,000 residents.

People from Kherson used to come here to relax, buy groceries, visit the famous Oleshky Sands — a large natural area of sandy landscapes surrounded by forests and Dnipro floodplains. There were hospitals, schools, shops, enterprises, and regular transport communication with the regional center.

In February 2022, normal life ended.

February 24 — April 14, 2022: How Russia captured Oleshky

On the morning of February 24, Russian troops began advancing from occupied Crimea into the Kherson region. Oleshky was on one of the routes of military equipment movement towards the Antonovsky Bridge — a strategic crossing over the Dnipro connecting the left bank with Kherson.

Russian units appeared in the city area on the first day of the invasion. There were battles for the bridge and adjacent territories. Later, Russian military began entering residential areas directly.

But the Ukrainian local government continued to operate. The city head, Yevhen Rishchuk, and municipal service employees tried to maintain city management, ensure utilities, and uphold order.

On March 8, 2022, hundreds of residents protested against the Russian occupation. People marched through the streets with Ukrainian flags, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops. At that time, it was still possible to publicly express dissent, although the situation quickly became more dangerous.

On April 14, Russian military removed the Ukrainian flag from the city administration building and hoisted the Russian tricolor.

On that day, Rishchuk reported that Russian units were fully entering the city and independently starting to patrol the streets. Local patrols refused to work with them.

Gradually, Russian occupation structures appeared, detentions, checks, and pressure on residents began. Thus, the military occupation of the territory began on February 24, and April became the time of the final expulsion of Ukrainian municipal governance from the city.

November 2022: Kherson was liberated, but Oleshky remained opposite

In September, Russia held a so-called referendum in the occupied territory of the Kherson region, after which it announced the annexation of the region. Ukraine and the overwhelming majority of the international community did not recognize the legality of the border changes.

On November 11, 2022, Ukrainian troops liberated Kherson. The Russian army retreated from the right-bank part of the region but held Oleshky and neighboring settlements on the eastern bank.

The Dnipro became the front line. The Antonovsky Bridge was destroyed, and regular communication between the cities ceased.

For the remaining residents, this became a separate tragedy. Kherson was very close, but it was no longer possible to reach it by the usual road. Many hoped that Ukrainian troops would soon liberate the left bank as well. Some families decided not to leave for this reason.

In March 2023, the Russian occupation administration even announced the return of the Soviet name Tsyurupinsk to the city. For Ukraine, its official name remained and remains Oleshky.

June 6, 2023: The city was flooded

After the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, a massive amount of water rushed down the Dnipro. Oleshky was among the most affected settlements.

According to then Ukrainian local authorities’ estimates, water flooded about 90% of the city’s territory. In many areas, it reached the roofs of houses. People were saved on attics, upper floors, and trees.

The Kakhovka HPP had been under Russian military control since February 2022. Ukraine accuses Russia of blowing it up, while Moscow denies responsibility. Investigations into the circumstances of the dam’s destruction pointed to a high likelihood of an explosion inside the structure.

In December 2023, the Associated Press published an investigation into the consequences of the flooding and the occupation administration’s attempts to conceal the number of deaths.

Medical workers interviewed by journalists estimated the number of victims directly in Oleshky at 200–300 people. Russian occupation authorities reported significantly lower figures for the entire flooded territory under their control.

This is an assessment by witnesses and medics, not a final named statistic. Establishing the full number of deaths until independent access to the territory is restored is impossible.

The flood destroyed the property of thousands of families, ruined roads and utility infrastructure. Many lost documents, which became an additional obstacle when trying to escape the occupation three years later.

2024–2025: The city gradually loses normal living conditions

After the flood, full recovery did not occur. Oleshky remained in close proximity to the front, fighting continued in the area, and mining and drone use increasingly restricted civilian movement.

Electricity and gas disappeared from the daily lives of most residents. Water was drawn from wells, generators and solar panels were used. In winter, houses had to be heated with firewood.

In July 2026, Human Rights Watch published the results of interviews with six residents who managed to leave Oleshky between October 2025 and May 2026. Their stories describe the gradual collapse of the utility system, food shortages, lack of normal medical care, and the danger of moving through the streets.

Russian occupation did not mean the end of hostilities: Russian unit positions and Ukrainian forces on the opposite bank remained in close proximity. Civilians found themselves in the middle of this war.

2026: Two million problems and not a single normal food supply

The situation began to deteriorate sharply in January 2026, when the last regular grocery store stopped operating regularly due to a lack of goods.

On March 2, NANews wrote about the growing food isolation of Oleshky. At that time, individual entrepreneurs still managed to occasionally bring in products, although each trip was accompanied by risk.

On May 26, two commercial vehicles with food arrived in the city. According to the Ukrainian administration, this was the last successful delivery.

Already on June 25, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission confirmed that after this date, no food was delivered to Oleshky. By September, the situation had not fundamentally changed.

In the summer, gardens saved the residents. People ate grown vegetables, fruits, homemade preserves, exchanged small stocks. Some caught pigeons and pheasants.

By autumn, these opportunities were also exhausted.

In testimonies published on September 25, residents say they are making soup from lamb’s quarters, purslane, and amaranth — wild plants previously considered weeds.

A small spontaneous market emerged near the hospital. According to locals, a dozen eggs could cost about 800 hryvnias. Other products were sold at equally inaccessible prices for the remaining residents.

The head of the Oleshky city military administration, Tatyana Gasanenko, reported that she received confirmation of individual cases where families began eating dogs. This is an official’s testimony from a person in the city; conducting an independent verification of these specific cases is currently impossible.

Twenty kilometers for food. Sometimes people don’t return

One of the few places where food can still be purchased is Radensk, located approximately twenty kilometers from Oleshky.

It takes about five hours to walk there. The return journey, with food, becomes significantly harder.

One local resident said she went to Radensk by bicycle and returned on foot. She carried almost 85 kilograms of purchases — grains, vegetables, pasta, and other necessary items. The food was intended for three families.

But not everyone manages to return home.

Relatives of residents told journalists about two men who were carrying food from Radensk and died after a drone attack. The food remained lying near their bodies. It has not yet been possible to independently establish the circumstances of this particular strike.

The roads are littered with mines. Drones, including FPV — small operator-controlled devices transmitting real-time camera images — constantly operate above them.

Moreover, it is dangerous not only to move along the roads. People are also afraid to go into the forest for mushrooms or to the river for fish: mined areas may be located even near residential neighborhoods.

Vehicles with humanitarian aid also cannot reach

On June 2, 2026, a civilian convoy with food and humanitarian aid hit a mine on the approach to Oleshky.

According to UN-established data, one person died, and three were injured. After this, attempts to organize full-fledged supply became increasingly dangerous.

On September 1, another serious incident occurred. A convoy of four vehicles heading to the city with food was attacked.

The Ukrainian and Russian sides blamed each other. Volunteers talk about damaged vehicles and drivers who had to return on foot. However, it is not possible to reliably establish who exactly attacked the specific convoy based on available open testimonies.

Russia accuses Ukrainian military of blocking supplies. Ukrainian representatives claim that Russian units are hindering the passage of humanitarian transport, laying mines, and using the civilian population to cover military positions.

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch separately recorded credible testimonies of possible use of drones and mines by Ukrainian units on roads around Oleshky. However, researchers have not been able to establish responsibility for specific attacks.

The presence of hostilities on both sides does not negate Russia’s obligations as the state controlling the occupied territory to provide the population with food and medical assistance.

The hospital that asks for food from patients and their relatives

The Oleshky hospital remains practically the last place in the city where at least limited medical assistance can be obtained.

However, there is a shortage of medicines and antibiotics, and the generator is started only occasionally due to a lack of fuel. Volunteers report that the hospital asks residents to bring grains and other products to provide hot meals for bedridden patients.

Ambulances have almost stopped responding to calls. Sometimes the wounded have to be transported on ordinary garden carts.

The UN recorded a situation in June with four patients needing transfer from Oleshky to the Skadovsk hospital. Organizing transportation was not possible. One person died without receiving the necessary help.

There are also testimonies about the bodies of the deceased that remain unburied for a long time.

Gasanenko told ABC News that more than a hundred bodies are in the basement of one of the hospital buildings after the morgue was destroyed. Some residents are forced to bury their loved ones directly in the yards of their homes.

The named number of bodies has not yet been confirmed by independent verification. But numerous testimonies from residents, the administration, and volunteers allow us to speak of a severe violation of the usual system of medical assistance and burial of the deceased.

What the UN established: 29 dead and 54 injured civilians

On June 25, 2026, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission published a separate report on the situation in the occupied left-bank Kherson region.

Mission staff interviewed more than twenty residents of frontline settlements, including Oleshky and Hola Prystan.

As of the publication date, the UN received reports of at least 29 dead and 54 injured civilians in these two cities for 2026. Many episodes were independently confirmed.

Among them was a drone attack on March 5 on people waiting for food distribution. Two civilians died, and several others were injured.

In another case, a drone injured a local medical worker traveling on a scooter. A subsequent strike killed him and a man who came to help.

The UN notes that most recorded civilian losses are associated with short-range drones, but responsibility for each individual episode could not be established.

It is important not to mix different indicators: 29 dead is the recorded minimum by the end of June for two settlements, not the total number of deaths in Oleshky over four and a half years of occupation.

Why people can’t just evacuate

The situation is paradoxical: Ukrainian Kherson is a few kilometers away, but there is no direct safe communication with it.

The Dnipro remains the front line. Crossing without an agreed cessation of hostilities is practically impossible. Clashes continue in the area of river islands.

Therefore, residents who decide to evacuate on their own first go to Radensk or other settlements in the occupied territory. Then they try to find transport towards the Black Sea coast, reach Russia or Belarus, and from there get to Ukraine-controlled territory.

Volunteer Ksenia Arkhipova told ABC News that such a departure sometimes costs up to $500 per person.

In addition to money, documents are needed. Many were burned or destroyed during the 2023 flood. At Russian checkpoints, people undergo checks and interrogations, and men fear detention and forced conscription into the Russian army.

There are also those who are physically unable to overcome such a route. The UN cited the story of a family where a man stayed in Oleshky because his 84-year-old father could not walk ten kilometers to the supposed gathering place.

Others do not want to leave their homes, fear the lack of housing after evacuation, or simply do not have the means for the journey.

So the claim that residents could freely leave but chose to stay does not correspond to the conditions described by international observers.

358 verified people are waiting for help. When will the humanitarian corridor open?

According to Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets, his office received 176 appeals regarding the humanitarian situation in the occupied left-bank Kherson region and verified data on 358 people in urgent need of evacuation assistance.

These 358 are specific identified people, not the total number of all those wishing to leave Oleshky.

In May, during a temporary decrease in hostilities from the 9th to the 11th, volunteers managed to organize the departure of 32 people. By the end of June, approximately 180 civilians had left dangerous settlements thanks to separate informal evacuation efforts.

Ksenia Arkhipova told ABC News that in September she helped 47 people escape. About 300 more were on waiting lists. Gasanenko separately mentioned eleven residents who independently passed through dangerous areas.

These data relate to different periods, organizations, and evacuation methods, so they cannot be added as independent groups without additional verification.

According to Lubinets, the Ukrainian side agreed on civilian lists and readiness to ensure a ceasefire — a temporary cessation of hostilities for a humanitarian operation.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an independent humanitarian organization, confirmed that it is in contact with the Ukrainian and Russian sides and is ready to facilitate safe departure.

However, as of September 22, Moscow has not confirmed readiness to conduct an agreed evacuation.

September 2026: Appeals reached the Pope and the Council of Europe

The situation in Oleshky gradually became the subject of international appeals.

On September 19, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations appealed to Pope Leo XIV, the World Council of Churches, and other international religious organizations to assist in saving the population.

The All-Ukrainian Council includes representatives of various religious communities of Ukraine, including Christian denominations, Muslim and Jewish organizations.

On September 20, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha officially stated that Russia is hindering the supply of food and medicine, the work of humanitarian organizations, and the evacuation of civilians.

On September 25, the World Council of Churches publicly supported the appeal of Ukrainian religious leaders.

On the same day, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty stated the need for an immediate local ceasefire, humanitarian access, and safe evacuation.

The Council of Europe is a separate international organization dealing with the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; it should not be confused with the European Union.

O’Flaherty emphasized that international humanitarian law obliges Russia, as the occupying power, to provide the civilian population with food and medical assistance.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency already on September 20, detailed the situation with 358 residents awaiting evacuation and the appeal of religious organizations. New evidence shows that over the past week, living conditions in the city have continued to deteriorate.

Israeli connection: Rabbi Asman helped save residents of Kherson region back in 2023.

For the Jewish and Israeli audience, this story is directly connected to the events following the destruction of the Kakhovka HPP.

On June 8, 2023, Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Reuven Asman arrived in Kherson on a humanitarian mission and participated in the evacuation of people from flooded areas.

During one of the rescue trips, the group, which included the rabbi, came under fire. Asman published a video from the scene. People managed to escape.

NANews reported on this trip of Moshe Asman back on June 8, 2023.

Three years later, Jewish religious representatives, along with other communities in Ukraine, are again participating in international appeals regarding the humanitarian situation in the Kherson region.

There is also a diplomatic connection.

On September 23, 2026, Israel joined a joint statement by 51 UN member states calling on Russia to agree to a complete, immediate, and unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine. It was about a general initiative in support of ending the war, not a separate decision on Oleshky.

NANews wrote more about this in the article “More than 51 countries in the UN, including Israel, called on Russia to agree to a ceasefire”.

Winter is coming. What might happen to the remaining residents?

There is less and less time before the cold sets in. In the summer, people could grow vegetables, collect fruits, and exchange products with neighbors. In winter, these opportunities will almost disappear.

Tatyana Gasanenko warns that after the ground freezes and snow appears, detecting mines will become even more difficult. The twenty-kilometer road to Radensk may become inaccessible even to those who can walk it today.

At the same time, the need for heating, fuel, medicines, and electricity will increase. And these resources are already lacking in the city.

There are several possible directions for solving the problem: coordinated mass evacuation, safe humanitarian supplies, and the restoration of medical assistance for people who cannot or do not want to leave their homes. All this requires real security agreements, not just public appeals.

Organizations involved in evacuation continue to insist on the need for demining routes and a temporary ceasefire. So far, there are no such guarantees.

In four and a half years, Oleshky has experienced the Russian invasion, the establishment of an occupation administration, separation from Kherson by the front line, catastrophic flooding after the destruction of the Kakhovka HPP, and the gradual collapse of infrastructure.

Now residents are forced to decide whether to go in search of food on a mined road or try to survive a few more days on the remaining supplies.

Liberated Kherson is nine kilometers away. But for the people remaining in Oleshky, this path is still closed.

$2.45 billion, 66 projects, and the disarmament of Hamas: The Peace Council showed how it plans to begin the reconstruction of Gaza

On September 23, 2026, in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the Peace Council presented the first detailed program for the recovery of the Gaza sector. It is designed for six months after the actual launch, includes 66 projects, and is estimated at approximately $2.45 billion. But a caveat is immediately needed here: the money has not yet been fully collected, the start date of the program has not been determined, and the construction itself is tied to an issue that Israel and mediators have not yet resolved — how exactly the disarmament of Hamas should take place.

Initial reports claimed that the recovery should begin in 2027. This is not in the published document of the Peace Council. It states otherwise: programs are ready to launch “as soon as funding and access allow”, and the six-month period is counted from the moment the executors enter Gaza. Tony Blair, involved in the leadership of the Council, indeed spoke about the transition from preparation to implementation “within the next year,” but he did not name a fixed start date.

The material was prepared by the author of NANews Lev Varshavsky. The basis for the analysis was the official 6-Month Gaza Recovery Program, reports from Israeli media, and Israeli data on the future Palestinian police.

This is not a plan to restore the entire Gaza for $2.45 billion

Here, the numbers are easy to confuse. The Peace Council estimates the direct physical damage in Gaza at approximately $35.2 billion, and the total cost of recovery and reconstruction over the next decade at approximately $71.4 billion. The current $2.45 billion is only the first package, designed to launch basic services, temporary housing, infrastructure, new administration, and security system.

The six blocks of the program look like this: about $1.205 billion is allocated for infrastructure, $303 million for humanitarian and social recovery, approximately $35 million for economic launch, $17 million for digitalization, about $10 million for legal system recovery, and at least $885 million for security and new power infrastructure. The last figure explains a lot: almost every third dollar of the starting budget is related not to concrete and hospitals, but to the question of who will control Gaza after Hamas.

$400 million for temporary housing, $275 million for debris and ammunition

The largest civilian item is approximately $400 million for temporary housing. This primarily refers to insulated residential modules for people who are still in tents. Another $275 million is planned to be spent on dismantling, sorting, and recycling debris, simultaneously clearing the area of unexploded ordnance.

About $100 million is allocated for transport, $78 million for the repair of partially damaged houses. The restoration of five more hospitals is estimated at $67 million, a separate program for the repair and equipment of medical institutions at another $50 million. About $35 million is allocated for generators and fuel, $30 million for roads, and $20 million for emergency water supply and sewage restoration. The official document of the Council claims that more than 85% of the road network in the sector is damaged.

There are also smaller but quite indicative projects: desalination plants, solar panels, restoration of the fishing port, border crossings, land cadastre, warehouse center, and power grids. The UAE separately proposes to build a pilot residential area for approximately 50 thousand people currently in tents.

The media write about another scale of the housing problem. One of the projects should provide mobile housing for approximately 400 thousand residents, while more than a million people are still estimated to live in tents or other temporary structures. Turkey promised about 70 thousand mobile homes, and another 5 thousand homes provided by Egypt and Qatar remain on the Egyptian side of the border due to the lack of Israeli permission for their import.

So even a six-month program, if fully implemented, does not close the housing issue.

The money is promised. But a promise and the transfer of money are not the same

The Peace Council does not yet have all the $2.45 billion specified in the program. At the February donor meeting, about a dozen countries promised approximately $17 billion, but by September 23, about $280 million had actually been transferred. Nikolay Mladenov explains the difference by saying that the Council requests money gradually, as specific programs are ready to launch.

The official document itself has a rather practical wording: states and other partners can finance a separate project, an entire block, or provide equipment and property instead of money. In other words, we are not looking at a $2.45 billion check lying on the table, but a catalog of already calculated projects for which funding still needs to be collected and physical access obtained.

This is where NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency separates the presentation from what is happening on the ground: 66 budget lines already exist, but the very possibility of fulfilling them depends not so much on excavators and cement, but on the arrangement of power and security in Gaza.

Blair says: Hamas agreed. Israel sees the situation as more complex

The most politically sensitive part of the presentation came from Tony Blair.

He stated that under the cities of Gaza there remain kilometers of tunnels, weapons depots, and weapons production facilities, and that the new civilian administration will not be able to manage the sector until this system is destroyed. Then Blair said: Hamas agreed to this, and the implementation should proceed step by step.

But the wording “Hamas agreed to lay down arms” without continuation would be too simple.

On July 30, the movement agreed to the demilitarization roadmap proposed by the Peace Council. However, implementation stalled due to a dispute over the sequence of actions. The Council’s scheme involves gradual disarmament and inspection of individual areas in parallel with the phased withdrawal of the IDF. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demands a different sequence: first, complete and verifiable disarmament of Hamas, then further changes in the deployment of Israeli troops.

NANews thoroughly analyzed this conflict around the 15-point roadmap: the dispute is no longer so much about the ultimate goal — a demilitarized Gaza — but about who takes the first irreversible step.

Later Jared Kushner discussed the same scheme directly with Hamas representatives in Cairo. The American side is trying to link disarmament, the transfer of power to a technocratic administration, the advancement of international forces, and the phased change in the deployment of the IDF into one verifiable process.

$20 million even provided for voluntary surrender of weapons

In the published budget, a separate line is Decommissioning Program — about $20 million. This is a program to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons and ammunition with their subsequent destruction or safe disposal.

Simultaneously, about $15 million is planned to be used for the physical elimination and filling of tunnels under objects necessary for the first recovery projects. This does not yet mean that the entire underground complex of Hamas can be neutralized for such an amount: the program relates to sites that will be needed directly for the launch of the first wave of construction.

In the May report of the Peace Council to the UN Security Council, it was mentioned about 350 kilometers of tunnels that will need to be neutralized, and about 70 million tons of debris, part of which contains unexploded ordnance. The same report estimated that about 85% of the buildings and infrastructure in the sector were damaged or destroyed.

This also explains the figure “70% of Gaza is destroyed” appearing in publications. Blair himself used a similar estimate during the current presentation, but such an indicator is not specified in the official two-page document of the Peace Council. Other metrics are used there — $35.2 billion in physical damage and more than 85% of the damaged road network. Therefore, turning “70%” into an official statistical estimate of the entire document would be incorrect.

International forces: first 500, then thousands

The commander of the International Stabilization Forces, American General Jasper Jeffers, presented a five-stage demilitarization scheme.

The initial group should consist of about 500 military personnel from Morocco and Kosovo. Further, it is planned to join military personnel from Albania, Kazakhstan, and other countries. A broader initial structure, which Israeli sources reported earlier, provides for about 2,500 military personnel, and a permanent facility in the Rafah area is already being designed with the possibility of accommodating up to 5,000 ISF personnel.

About $140 million is allocated for the mobilization, training, and equipping of the ISF in the six-month plan, and another approximately $275 million for permanent infrastructure in Rafah. The overall Peace & Security block exceeds $885 million.

Jeffers’ logic is movement district by district. Weapons and tunnels are neutralized, international structures verify the result, the new Palestinian administration enters the territory, and after confirmed demilitarization, the next stage of IDF withdrawal should occur. It is this last link that causes the main objections of the current Israeli government.

220 thousand applications to the new police — Israel approved about 16 thousand

The Peace Council is simultaneously trying to create a Palestinian police force that should be responsible for internal civil security instead of Hamas.

According to published Israeli data, approximately 220 thousand applications were received. Israel checked the candidates and preliminarily approved about 16 thousand people, who were deemed not connected with Hamas. The final police strength is expected to be at the level of 10–12 thousand officers. Training is planned to be conducted in Egypt.

But here again, the same political deadlock appears. The media report that Israel has not yet allowed some of the already verified candidates to leave Gaza for training in Egypt. About $120 million is allocated in the six-month program for the mobilization and initial training of the police.

So the future police already exist in the budget, there is a huge base of candidates, and an Israeli check has been conducted. But the structure itself is not yet functioning in the form in which it should replace the armed power of Hamas.

Who should manage Gaza at all

Civil administration is supposed to be transferred to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza — NCAG, a Palestinian technocratic structure operating within the Peace Council system.

The head of the committee, Ali Shaat, described the future model with the formula: “one authority, one law, one weapon”. The committee plans to audit the existing administration, personnel, finances, property, and public services, and even before the full entry of NCAG into management, five urgent directions are planned: garbage removal, winter preparation, water and sewage restoration, medical evacuations, and temporary housing.

Blair simultaneously touched on a much more distant political perspective. According to him, the issue of Palestinian statehood is not being resolved now, but the possibility of such development should remain open, provided Israel’s security is ensured. This is Blair’s position and the architects of the current international mechanism, not the agreed position of the Israeli government.

4G, digital ID, Gaza Tech Park — and even Palestinian Airlines

Some of the 66 points are more like an attempt to immediately build a new economic system rather than emergency aid.

The plan provides for the restoration of 4G, digital identification of residents, an electronic healthcare system, digital payments, cloud storage of government data, e-learning, small business grants, a regional production park, and Gaza Tech Park. It is also proposed to create a special fund to attract private investment.

There is even a point of about $1 million to preserve the license and the last plane of Palestinian Airlines to ensure pilgrimage flights to Mecca.

The idea of turning Gaza into an open tax-free economic zone is indeed being discussed by the Peace Council. It was mentioned even during the presentation of the overall model in February: it was proposed to reduce corruption and intermediary costs, transition to transparent digital payments and trade. But in the current official list of 66 six-month programs, there is no separate project “tax-free Gaza.” Therefore, this is still a concept of the future economic structure, not an approved line of the current budget.

Ukrainian perspective: $2.45 billion clearly shows the difference between damage, need, and real money

For Ukraine, there is no direct political connection here, and comparing the wars themselves would be incorrect. But the recovery mechanism provides a rather illustrative example of why the figures “cost of destruction,” “cost of recovery,” “promised aid,” and “money actually reaching projects” cannot be mixed.

According to the latest joint assessment by the Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the EU, and the UN, Ukraine’s recovery needs for a decade are estimated at almost $588 billion, while the direct physical damage by the end of 2025 was about $195 billion. Separately, almost $28 billion is required for debris clearance and the elimination of explosive items.

In Gaza, the scale is different, but the financial logic is similar: there is an assessment of damage, there is a ten-year cost of recovery, there is a first set of projects, there are donor promises — and there is a completely different amount that is actually available today.

That is why the phrase “$2.45 billion was allocated for the recovery of Gaza” would be incorrect.

Explanation for Israeli readers: who is who

Peace Council, Board of Peace — an international mechanism created within the framework of US President Donald Trump’s plan, also receiving a UN Security Council mandate for transitional management and recovery of Gaza. It does not replace the Israeli government and is not a UN subdivision.

NCAG — a Palestinian technocratic committee, which is supposed to gradually take over the civil administration of Gaza. It should work without Hamas and gain control over public services, budget, border crossings, and civil police.

ISF — International Stabilization Force. Their task is to ensure a transitional security regime, participate in demilitarization, support the new police, and be located between territories transferred to the new administration and Israeli forces.

Demilitarization in the Council’s documents is not just the transfer of rifles. It includes the weapons of armed groups, depots, production of rockets and ammunition, as well as the neutralization of tunnel infrastructure.

What happens next

There is now a fairly detailed scheme of what to build, how much it approximately costs, and who should manage Gaza. There is no other — agreed mechanism that would allow transitioning from the scheme to construction.

If Hamas begins verifiable disarmament, and Israel and the Peace Council agree on the order of further IDF actions, international forces and NCAG can move district by district. Then the first humanitarian and infrastructure programs can start without waiting for the full ten-year reconstruction.

If the dispute over the sequence remains, 66 projects may continue to exist for a long time as ready budget lines.

And this is perhaps the main result of the presentation on September 23: the problem of Gaza’s recovery is no longer in the absence of a blueprint. The blueprint has appeared — down to the number of buses, mobile homes, police officers, solar panels, and servers.

But it is built around one condition that currently exists mainly on paper: post-war Gaza must remain without an independent armed structure of Hamas, and the new authority must gain a real monopoly on weapons and governance. As long as Israel, Hamas, and the Peace Council understand the order of reaching this point differently, $2.45 billion remains the cost of a prepared program, not a started reconstruction.

Eight dead overnight: while New York talked about peace, Russia once again massively attacked Ukraine

On the night of September 24, 2026, Russian strikes on Ukraine resulted in at least eight deaths and more than twenty injuries. Not only Kyiv and major cities were hit. In the Kharkiv region, a missile hit a farm where people were working at the time; in the Odesa region, a hospital, an educational institution, residential buildings, and a shopping center were damaged.

In Kyiv, after a combined attack, two deaths and eight injuries were confirmed. A maternity hospital was damaged — no patients or staff were injured — nine private houses, two post offices, more than 30 cars, and office buildings were damaged. The consequences were recorded in four districts of the capital.

In the village of Stara Hnylytsia, Kharkiv region, a Russian strike hit a farm. According to updated data, six workers — two men and four women were killed, and another 12 people were injured. All the victims worked at the same enterprise. Later, local authorities clarified that the missile hit a vegetable storage where people were present at the time.

In the Odesa region, two more people were injured. A hospital, a gymnasium, residential buildings, warehouse facilities, and a shopping center, which had already been attacked by Russia before, were hit. The roof of the city hospital department and food warehouses were damaged, windows in the school and residential buildings were broken, and cars were damaged.

This is how the beginning of September 24 looks even before discussing the number of drones launched and types of missiles. Maternity hospital, farm, hospital, school, residential buildings, cars. Ukrainian authorities call such strikes a continuation of attacks on civilian infrastructure; the circumstances of each hit are separately documented by the police and the prosecutor’s office.

Author — Elena Gunko, NANews. Author’s page.

282 drones plus ballistic and ‘Zircons’

Now the scale of the entire attack.

It began in the evening of September 23, around 18:00, and continued into the morning of September 24. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia used 282 drones of various types, along with them — ‘Zircon’ anti-ship missiles, ‘Iskander-M’/KN-23 ballistic missiles, S-400 missiles in strike application, and ‘Banderol’ and ‘Dany-T’ type munitions.

The main directions of the strike were named as Kyiv and Odesa regions.

By 08:00, the Ukrainian side reported 227 destroyed or suppressed air targets: 219 UAVs, four ‘Zircons’, three ballistic missiles, and one ‘Banderol’/’Dany-T’ munition. Hits were recorded in 13 locations, and debris from intercepted targets fell in ten other locations. The attack was not over at that time — some drones were still in the air.

And then the map began to spread westward.

After the night ballistic strikes, groups of drones moved through the central regions of Ukraine towards Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Ternopil, and Volyn regions. Explosions were reported in Khmelnytskyi, in Vinnytsia, near Kremenets, in Rivne, and Lutsk. In Khmelnytskyi, a drone hit a multi-story building, damaging apartments, balconies, and cars.

So the morning did not mark the end of the night attack. The air raid alert simply shifted further westward.

Kyiv: missiles arrived during Zelensky’s meeting with American congressmen

There is a coincidence in this night that seems almost too obvious, although nothing needs to be inferred here.

When the ballistic strike on Kyiv began, Volodymyr Zelensky was in New York meeting with members of the US House of Representatives. And he was discussing sanction pressure on Russia and Ukraine’s protection against ballistic missiles with them.

This is not a journalistic reconstruction. The time of the strike was directly reported by the Office of the President of Ukraine.

The conversation involved American congressmen Brian Fitzpatrick, Mike Quigley, Marcy Kaptur, Jared Golden, Joe Wilson, and Gregory Meeks. After the attack began, Zelensky again spoke to the Americans about the need for additional missile interceptors.

Does the coincidence of timing prove that Russia specifically scheduled the launches for this meeting? No. There is no such data, and attributing such a plan to Moscow would already be an assumption.

But the sequence itself is quite harsh. In New York, they discuss where Ukraine can get additional means against ballistics. At the same time, ballistic missiles fly to Kyiv.

And this is already the second heavy strike on the capital in a row

Kyiv did not have time to recover from the previous attack.

September 23, a day before the current strike, two people also died in the capital. By evening, the number of injured had risen to 43 people, more than twenty were in hospitals.

Now — another two dead and eight injured.

In the Podil district, a maternity hospital was damaged. Cars caught fire in the parking lot near the medical facility, where one of the deceased was found. The diagnostic center located nearby was also damaged.

In the Dniprovskyi district, a private house was destroyed, neighboring buildings were damaged. In the Solomianskyi district, warehouses were partially destroyed, and the fire spread to the basement premises. In the Darnytskyi district, missile debris fell on the roadway.

And already against this background, the second half of the current story begins — diplomatic.

Because in New York, they are now trying to talk about stopping the strikes

September 22, Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump during the UN General Assembly. They discussed possible steps for de-escalation and how Ukraine will get through the upcoming winter.

One of the options is quite narrow. Not trying to solve the entire war with one agreement, but first stopping at least part of the strikes.

Primarily on energy.

The scheme looks roughly like this: Ukraine stops strikes on agreed Russian oil refining and energy facilities if Russia, on its part, stops strikes on Ukrainian power plants, networks, and other energy infrastructure.

NANews detailed this option back on September 11 in the article ‘Trump’s Plan B: Energy, Black Sea and a Chance for a Winter Break’. At that time, it looked more like American intelligence of possibilities. Now the conversation has become more specific.

And here it is easy to make a mistake in words. Energy truce is not peace and not even necessarily a ceasefire across the entire front. Soldiers do not disappear, territorial disputes remain, regular combat operations may continue.

Just one piece of the war is being temporarily removed.

The next piece is the Black Sea and grain

In New York, Zelensky also met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The conversation again returned to the sea: shipping safety, Ukrainian ports, grain export.

This direction for Israel is no longer theoretical.

Ukrainian ships leave the Odesa region into the Black Sea, pass the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles — and end up in the Mediterranean Sea. In September, Ukrainian wheat reappeared among shipments on the Israeli route.

We detailed this route in the article ‘Ukrainian Wheat is Going to Israel Again: Export Accelerated Almost Twice Under Russian Port Blockade’. The specific volume of September shipments to Israel was not disclosed, but the Israeli direction is present in the documents.

Therefore, damaged warehouses and infrastructure in the Odesa region are not just a local Ukrainian story.

For Israel, the distance from Odesa to the Mediterranean Sea ends quite quickly: the Bosphorus — and then already the very maritime market on which Israel heavily depends.

Russia, meanwhile, does not close the negotiation channel

This is where it gets strange.

On the night of September 24, missiles and hundreds of drones fly. People die on a farm, a maternity hospital is damaged, objects in the Odesa region are burning.

And almost simultaneously, Russian representative Kirill Dmitriev heads to New York for negotiations with Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and other representatives of the Trump administration.

The meetings are supposed to concern Ukraine, energy, Russian-American relations, and further diplomacy.

So Moscow does not break the American channel. On the contrary, it continues to work even against the backdrop of another major air attack.

For readers of NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, there is a familiar thing from the Middle East: negotiations and hostilities can quite coexist. The mere fact of a meeting of intermediaries does not yet mean that the parties have already agreed to reduce the intensity of the war.

And the names of the intermediaries are well known to Israel. Steve Witkoff worked for Trump on the Middle East direction, Jared Kushner was one of the architects of Trump’s first-term diplomacy and the Abraham Accords. Now the same American link is involved in the Russian-Ukrainian direction.

Israel joined the call for a ceasefire a few hours before the attack

There is another direct Israeli episode.

September 23, before the night attack, a group of states at the UN made a joint statement in support of Ukraine and called on Russia to agree to a complete, immediate, and unconditional ceasefire.

Israel participated in this initiative.

NANews already separately analyzed the document in the article ‘More than 51 Countries at the UN, Including Israel, Called on Russia to Agree to a Ceasefire’. There is also an important legal reservation: the collective statement of states is a political position, not a UN Security Council resolution and not a legally enforced ceasefire.

The document concerns not only the cessation of hostilities itself. It includes the return of deported Ukrainians and children, prisoner exchange, and Black Sea security.

The last point for Israel is again quite practical.

If Ukrainian ports operate worse, if ships are forced to change routes, if insurance becomes more expensive — the consequences gradually reach the Eastern Mediterranean.

What weapons might be unclear to the Israeli reader

For a person in Israel, the word Shahed no longer requires a long explanation. But 282 Russian UAVs this night — these are not 282 identical Iranian drones.

In one attack, Russian-made strike Shaheds, ‘Gerberas’, decoys, devices of other types, and new jet versions can be used. Some are launched specifically to overload air defense: radars, mobile groups, and anti-aircraft systems must simultaneously track many targets, not all of which carry the same combat charge.

Reuters separately noted that the appearance of faster jet drones complicates the work of Ukrainian air defense. They are faster than the usual propeller-driven Shaheds, which means there is less time for detection and interception.

With ballistics, there is another problem.

‘Iskander-M’ and North Korean KN-23 fly along a ballistic trajectory at very high speed. That is why Ukraine constantly requests additional Patriot systems and interceptor missiles for them.

The S-400 is more familiar to the Israeli reader as a Russian air defense system. But missiles of this family are also used by Russia against ground targets.

And ‘Zircon’ was primarily created as high-speed anti-ship weaponry. Russia has already used such missiles for strikes on Ukrainian territory.

Hence the complexity of the combined attack: slow drones, fast jet UAVs, decoys, ballistics, and missiles of other types appear almost in one time window. For the air defense system, these are completely different tasks.

And yet negotiations continue

After everything that happened this night, it is easy to write that diplomacy is over.

But that is not true yet.

The American negotiation channel is active. Dmitriev is going to talk with Witkoff and Kushner. Ukraine confirms its readiness to discuss energy restrictions and the sea. The US is trying to understand if the conversation can at least be translated into a technical format.

Even a future trilateral meeting of Zelensky, Trump, and Putin was discussed. Among the possible venues, the December G20 summit in Miami was mentioned, but as of September 24, such a meeting has not been scheduled. There is an idea — there is no agreement on the meeting yet.

And therefore, the night of September 24 does not prove that negotiations are disrupted.

It shows something else.

There remains a huge distance between the very fact of negotiations and the real reduction of the war.

What remains after this night

Eight dead in just three episodes that started this morning. Two — in Kyiv. Six — on the farm in Stara Hnylytsia. More than twenty injured. Damaged maternity hospital, nine private houses, post offices, hospital, school, shopping center, warehouses.

And simultaneously — New York, the UN, negotiators, talks about an energy truce and a safe Black Sea.

Perhaps this is now the most accurate picture of the process.

Diplomacy exists. But so far, it has not stopped anything.

Its results will need to be checked not by the number of meetings and statements, but by much simpler things: will missiles stop flying at energy, will strikes on ports cease, will civilian ships be able to pass through the Black Sea, and will at least one regime appear that both sides will truly observe.

As of the morning of September 24, 2026, such a regime does not exist.

In Tel Aviv, the first sukkah will be built by the Ukrainian-Jewish youth community PROSTIR: “Shalash-party” will open the new season on September 24, 2026

On Thursday, September 24, at 18:00, at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, the Ukrainian-Jewish youth community PROSTIR will unusually open the new season: participants will build a sukkah themselves, decorate it, prepare treats, and then hold a festive l’chaim in the finished hut. The organizers named the meeting “Sukkah Party and Opening of the PROSTIR Season”.

Author: Victoria Katsman

The event is called “Sukkah Party and Opening of the PROSTIR Season” and will take place at Yirmeyahu St 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo. Participation costs 50 shekels, pre-registration is mandatory.

The organizers warn: registration continues until September 23 or until all spots are filled. So those planning to attend should not delay registration any longer.

First build — then celebrate

In Tel Aviv, the first sukkah will be built by the Ukrainian-Jewish youth community PROSTIR: 'Sukkah Party' will open the new season on September 24, 2026
In Tel Aviv, the first sukkah will be built by the Ukrainian-Jewish youth community PROSTIR: ‘Sukkah Party’ will open the new season on September 24, 2026

This will not be an ordinary party where guests arrive at a set table. PROSTIR decided to link the opening of the season with the upcoming Sukkot and make the process of building the sukkah part of the meeting.

At the beginning, participants will get to know each other and the renewed community team, talk about the meanings of the holiday. After that, they will build the first PROSTIR community sukkah in Israel, decorate it, and prepare snacks together.

In the built hut, there will be a festive treat and l’chaim. Then — music, dancing, and informal communication.

This format was chosen here for a reason. Sukkot is associated with ideas of hospitality, a temporary common home, and being together. The organizers of PROSTIR formulated it even more simply: if you are opening a new season of the community, why not literally build the space where this community will gather first.

What is PROSTIR and what does Ukraine have to do with it

PROSTIR is a Ukrainian-speaking Jewish youth community in Israel for people approximately 18 to 40 years old. The Ukrainian word простір translates to “space”.

The project brings together people who want to maintain a connection with Ukrainian culture, learn more about Jewish tradition, and find their place in Israeli life.

The community has been active since the fall of 2024. More about how it appeared, who joins it, and why a separate Ukrainian-speaking space was needed in Israel, was told by NAnovosti in an interview with the founder of PROSTIR Olga Brodskaya.

The project remains volunteer-based. The organizers emphasize that its events are non-commercial, and the main goal is to create an environment where Ukrainian, Jewish, and Israeli parts of identity do not have to be opposed to each other.

NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has already reported on such initiatives of the Ukrainian community in Israel: the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, where the current meeting will take place, has turned into a permanent venue for exhibitions, lectures, public meetings, and events of the Ukrainian community over the past years.

In August, for example, a large “Zdibanka Nezalezhnih” for the 35th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence was held here. Now the same venue will host the opening of the new PROSTIR season.

Newcomers are also welcome

The organizers specifically address people who have not attended PROSTIR meetings before.

You can come alone. A significant part of the program is specifically built around joint work in small teams: some are involved in construction, some in decoration, some in preparing treats.

According to the organizers’ plan, acquaintance should therefore occur not at an awkward moment near the table when everyone has already broken into groups, but directly during the joint work.

As promised by PROSTIR, even a person who comes completely alone will quickly find themselves inside a small team.

Why they are building a sukkah

For those who have recently moved to Israel or have not yet encountered this tradition: sukkah — סוכה — is a temporary hut built for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot.

In Israel, such structures appear literally everywhere before the holiday — near houses, on balconies, in yards, at restaurants, public centers, and synagogues. It is customary to eat, host guests, and spend time in the sukkah during the holiday days.

In 2026, Sukkot begins on the evening of Friday, September 25, and the first festive day falls on September 26. Therefore, the PROSTIR meeting will take place the day before the holiday begins.

For the community, there is also a second meaning here. PROSTIR is building its own sukkah for the first time, and the project itself is built around people who, in a certain sense, continue to build a new home for themselves — already in Israel.

Without unnecessary pathos, this parallel is self-evident.

Where, when, and how much it costs

Date: Thursday, September 24, 2026
Start: 18:00
Place: Ukrainian Cultural Center
Address: Yirmeyahu St 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo
Participation cost: 50 shekels
Community age: approximately 18–40 years

To participate, you need to fill out the registration form.

After filling out the form, a payment link appears on the screen. The organizers also provided a separate link for the payment of 50 shekels.

After registration closes, participants are promised to receive a final confirmation and reminder with details via email.

If there are problems with registration, you can contact the organizers by phone at 055-976-3069.

Participants are also asked to familiarize themselves in advance with the PROSTIR Code of Conduct and Safe Space. Adherence to these rules is a condition for participating in community events.

What an Israeli reader needs to understand

PROSTIR is not a political organization or another official Ukrainian center. It is a youth community that tries to connect three environments — Ukrainian, Jewish, and Israeli.

Sukkah — סוכה — a temporary hut built specifically for Sukkot.

L’chaim — לחיים — a traditional Jewish wish and toast, literally “to life”.

And the Ukrainian Cultural Center at Yirmeyahu 22 is already an active public and cultural venue in Tel Aviv, not a space rented just for this party.

Therefore, the name “Sukkah Party” quite accurately describes what is happening. On September 24, guests are invited not to look at a ready-made sukkah, but to come, get acquainted, build it together, and only after that celebrate the beginning of the new season under the roof they just made with their own hands.

To participate, you need to fill out the registration form

“We run and walk together with Israel”: RUN 7.10 will take place in Ukraine in memory of those who died on October 7

Ukrainian cities will join the memorial event for the victims of the October 7, 2023 attack — RUN 7.10. The All-Ukrainian Association of Maccabi Organizations announced runs and walking routes in various cities of Ukraine and opened registration for everyone interested. The organizers’ wording here says more than a usual sports announcement: “We run and walk together with Israel”.

This is not a competition for seconds, places, and medals. “Maccabi-Ukraine” calls RUN 7.10 a decentralized and completely voluntary civil memory project, aimed at creating a shared moment of memory, unity, and hope through movement. The material for NANews was prepared by Stas Shifer, and this story has an Israeli part, without which the very name RUN 7.10 can be understood too literally — just as the date of another event.

RUN 7.10 is already being prepared in Israel itself

In Israel, on October 7, 2026, there is an initiative with almost the same name — רצים 7.10, “Running 7.10”. The idea is not built around a single central start: in different parts of the country, people gather in local groups to remember the deceased, walk or run the route, and do it simultaneously with others.

This format does not have the usual structure of a large commercial race with timing and competition for results. The distance has symbolic significance — 7.10 kilometers, meaning the date itself, October 7, is turned into a route.

The Ukrainian announcement is built very similarly: the same decentralized principle, voluntary participation, and almost literal connection of memory, unity, and hope. At the same time, there is no confirmation in open sources that the Ukrainian RUN 7.10 is formally a subdivision or official continuation of a specific Israeli organizational team. Therefore, merging the two initiatives into one project would be incorrect. But the cultural and symbolic connection is obvious here, especially since “Maccabi-Ukraine” itself writes: “We run and walk together with Israel”.

Why exactly 7.10 kilometers

For Israel, the distance of 7.10 km did not appear yesterday. After the attack by Hamas and other armed groups on October 7, 2023, running communities began dedicating this distance to the deceased, hostages, and affected settlements in the south of the country.

One of the formats involved runs specifically through kibbutzim, moshavim, and cities that were attacked. People ran 7.10 kilometers not so much as a sports distance but as a memorial route. The date ceased to be just a calendar entry and gained a physical dimension: seven kilometers and one hundred meters that a person covers themselves.

Therefore, 7.10 in the name of the current Ukrainian event is not just a beautiful number next to the word RUN. In Israeli practice in recent years, it has already become a separate symbol of memory.

From the Maccabiah in Israel to RUN 7.10 in Ukraine

There is another line, without which the current announcement looks much narrower than it is. Just a few months ago, the Ukrainian team participated in the XXII World Maccabiah in Israel.

Ukraine was represented by 50 athletes from 11 cities, competing in 13 sports. The delegation included participants from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Khmelnytskyi.

NANews has already reported on the “Maccabi-Ukraine” delegation at the XXII World Maccabiah and the participation of Ukrainian athletes in Israeli competitions.

It turns out to be a fairly short time chain. In the summer, Ukrainian athletes come to Israel for the main international event of the Maccabi movement, and in September, the same Ukrainian organization announces a memorial event on October 7 within the country.

And for NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this connection makes the story more than just a sports announcement: here, the connection between Ukraine and Israel is manifested not through another diplomatic protocol, but through a public organization and people who are simply invited to go out, walk or run the route.

What is “Maccabi-Ukraine”

“Maccabi-Ukraine” is the Ukrainian part of the large international Jewish sports movement Maccabi. The All-Ukrainian Association of Maccabi Organizations has been officially operating in Ukraine since the 1990s, but the history of Jewish sports societies “Maccabi” on the territory of present-day Ukraine is much older.

Such organizations existed as early as the beginning of the 20th century, including in Odesa and Bukovina. The modern international movement unites sports and public structures in dozens of countries, and the World Maccabiah in Israel remains its largest event.

After October 7, the memory of the deceased and affected became a separate part of the work of the global movement. Therefore, the Ukrainian initiative is in a context understandable for “Maccabi”: sports are used not instead of memory, but as one of the ways to preserve it.

What happened on October 7

On the morning of October 7, 2023, Hamas and other armed formations from the Gaza Strip attacked southern Israel. Militants infiltrated Israeli settlements, military bases, and the territory of the Nova music festival.

As a result of the attack, about 1,200 people were killed, and 251 people were captured and taken to the Gaza Strip. For Israel, October 7 became not only the beginning of the ensuing war but also a separate national trauma, around which memorials, archives of testimonies, public ceremonies, sports events, and local memory initiatives appeared in subsequent years.

Therefore, for the Israeli reader, the phrase RUN 7.10 is perceived somewhat differently than just the name of a race. The numbers here already carry their own meaning.

Explanation for Israeli readers

The Ukrainian RUN 7.10 is not a state day of remembrance in Ukraine and does not replace official Israeli ceremonies. It is a public initiative of “Maccabi-Ukraine”, which invites people in different Ukrainian cities to simultaneously join the memorial action.

At the same time, the organizers appeal not only to members of Jewish communities and not only to athletes. The original announcement mentions everyone interested, and the format itself provides the opportunity not only to run but also to walk.

This is significant: a person does not need a sports rank, club affiliation, or participation in a Jewish organization. The meaning is in the very presence.

At the time of publication, the full list of Ukrainian cities, starting points, and local schedules have not yet been listed in the public announcement. Those wishing to join are invited by the organizers to fill out the RUN 7.10 registration form.

Ukraine and Israel — one date, different cities

On October 7, people in Israel will once again take to the memorial routes. Now a similar gesture is being prepared in Ukraine — a country that itself lives within a great war, with casualties, destroyed cities, air raids, and its own experience of loss.

There is no need to compare the two wars here, and the organizers do not do so. The meaning of RUN 7.10 is much simpler: on a day that for Israel is associated with killings, abductions, and destroyed families, there will also be people in Ukrainian cities who will take to the streets.

And the formula “Maccabi-Ukraine” in this case explains the event better than any long slogan: “We run and walk together with Israel”.