Category: nanews

The night of May 24, 2026, became one of the hardest for Kyiv since the beginning of the full-scale war. Russia launched a massive combined strike on Ukraine — with missiles of various types, ballistics, and hundreds of drones. The main target was once again the capital.

The strikes did not hit military parades or ‘decision-making centers’ from Russian propaganda, but ordinary city life: a dormitory, schools, a business center, a shopping center, a supermarket, residential buildings, water supply facilities, a market. This is what real Russian ‘strength’ looks like today — missiles against apartments, entrances, children’s rooms, and people who were just trying to survive another night.

According to preliminary data, at least 83 people were injured since the beginning of the day. There are fatalities. The scale of the attack was enormous: about 90 missiles of various types, including 36 ballistic ones, and approximately 600 drones. Some targets were shot down, but not all ballistics can be stopped with the available air defense systems.

Kyiv became the main target of the night attack.

The largest number of hits and destructions occurred in Kyiv. Strikes and falling debris were recorded in different areas of the city. Residential high-rises, private houses, public buildings, commercial facilities, and transport infrastructure were damaged.

The strike on the everyday urban environment looks particularly painful. In one area, a dormitory was damaged. In another — a school. Somewhere, floors of a residential building caught fire. Elsewhere, windows and doors were blown out, facades were destroyed, and apartments were buried under debris.

Such a strike cannot be explained by military logic. This is not a strategy for victory. It is an attempt to sow fear, anger, fatigue, and a sense of helplessness.

But in the fifth year of the great war, Putin still hasn’t understood the main thing: strikes on Ukrainian cities do not make people ‘surrender.’ They make society tougher, more collected, and angrier. Every destroyed house becomes another proof that concessions to terror do not stop terror.

What was under attack

According to available data, residential buildings, a business center, a shopping center, a supermarket, schools, a market, infrastructure, and water supply facilities were affected in Kyiv and the region. In several places, rescuers, medics, utility services, police, and emergency crews were working.

It is these people who first bring the city back to life after a night of terror.

They clear the debris, evacuate residents, extinguish fires, help the wounded, cover broken windows, restore movement, check shelters and communications. In such moments, it becomes clear what the state really relies on: not on loud statements, but on people who go to work immediately after the explosions.

Russia once again showed weakness, not strength.

Moscow tried to present this attack as a demonstration of capabilities. In reality, it once again showed political and military weakness. When a state cannot achieve results on the battlefield, it starts to fight with high-rises, markets, and schools.

This is the essence of the current Russian tactic. Not to defeat the army — but to punish civilians. Not to change the course of the war — but to make the world get used to night attacks. Not to offer peace — but to raise the stakes of blood again.

Ukraine was not only hit in Kyiv. Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, and Zhytomyr regions were also under attack. There were separate reports of an attack on Bila Tserkva using a missile associated with the Russian ‘Hazel’.

The name of this weapon is used by Moscow as an element of psychological pressure. But behind the beautiful propaganda packaging remains the same reality: missiles fly over cities, not ‘mythical threats’.

For the Israeli audience, this picture is too familiar. Israelis know what it means to live under the threat of rockets, to count minutes to shelter, to check news about hits, and to wait for messages from loved ones. That is why the attack on Kyiv should be perceived not as a distant European news, but as part of the overall picture of the war against civilian life.

In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such events not only as a Ukrainian tragedy but also as a signal for Israel: a world that gets used to strikes on cities becomes more dangerous for everyone.

Why the silence of international structures seems especially loud

After such nights, it becomes especially noticeable how devalued many international institutions have become. Formally, they exist. They have buildings, budgets, positions, statements, meetings, and the usual diplomatic language.

But when hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles, including ballistics, fly over a European capital, too little real action is heard from them again.

One can talk endlessly about ‘deep concern’, ‘calls for restraint’, and ‘the need for dialogue’. But if the aggressor strikes schools, homes, and life-support facilities again, and the consequences for him remain limited, it means only one thing: the deterrence mechanism does not work as it should.

What should change after this attack

The main conclusion is simple: support for Ukraine needs to be strengthened, not softened. After such strikes, talks about ‘pauses’, ‘fatigue’, and ‘compromises’ look not like diplomacy, but like an invitation to the next attack.

Ukraine needs additional air defense systems, more means to protect against ballistics, sustainable financing of the defense industry, long-range capabilities, and political decisions that will show Moscow the cost of continuing the war.

It’s not just about weapons. It’s about sanctions, using frozen Russian assets, restrictions against Russian military and those who service the military machine. The world has levers of influence. The only question is whether it is ready to use them not after another tragedy, but before the next one.

Israeli perspective

For Israel, this attack is also important because it shows: the Russian war has long gone beyond the Ukrainian front. It is a war against the very idea that civilian cities should be protected from rocket terror.

If such an approach remains without harsh consequences, it will be copied by other regimes and forces. Including those who already threaten Israel, Ukraine, and Jewish communities in different countries.

Iran, which is an enemy of both Ukraine and Israel, has long been embedded in this war through drone technologies and support for the Russian military machine. Therefore, every attack on Kyiv is not only a Russian story. It is part of a broader axis of violence, where different enemies of the free world learn from each other.

Ukraine is now defending not only its cities. It is defending the principle that a missile on a residential building cannot be an ‘argument’ in politics.

And so, after this night, the question should not be: ‘How much more can Ukraine endure?’

The right question is different: how much longer will the world allow Moscow to test the resilience of other people’s cities, other people’s families, and other people’s patience?

This is the first case in world practice where a street in a city outside of Israel has been named after a fallen IDF soldier.

A street in Kharkiv has been named after Sergeant of the Israel Defense Forces Alexei (Asher) Neikov, who saved dozens of children from death during a terrorist attack on a school bus. This was reported by Israeli journalist Shimon Briman in his article on the website “Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter”.

In September 1996, 17-year-old Alexei independently repatriated to Israel from Kharkiv. He was preparing to study at the Technion — dreaming of the department of astronautics and aerodynamics. But he decided to first serve in the IDF — the Israel Defense Forces.

On October 29, 1998, terrorists directed a car filled with explosives at two school buses carrying Jewish children near the settlement of Kfar Darom.

Israeli soldiers guarding the buses managed to turn their jeep across the road — and took the hit themselves. The children were unharmed, two soldiers were injured. One died. It was Sergeant Alexei (Asher) Neikov.

Sergeant of the Israel Defense Forces Alexei (Asher) Neikov — a hero, writes Shimon Briman, who saved dozens of children from death during an attack by Arab terrorists on a school bus, received the highest posthumous honor in his hometown: a street in Kharkiv — the second-largest metropolis in Ukraine, is named after him. This is the first case in world practice where a street in a city outside of Israel has been named after a fallen IDF soldier.

Kharkiv is located just 30 kilometers from the border with Russia and is subjected to daily rocket attacks from the aggressor country. The city, which had a population of one and a half million people before the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, has been defending itself not only on the front lines but also in the sphere of culture and ideology for the third year.

The toponymic commission of the Kharkiv municipal council recently decided to rename 367 street names, alleys, and squares associated with Russia and the USSR. Kharkiv Mayor Igor Terekhov signed this decision, and it came into effect on May 1, 2024.

Among the new street names are the names of 35 fallen defenders of Ukraine who were born in Kharkiv or defended the city; 13 of them were awarded the highest title of Hero of Ukraine.

In addition to the fallen Ukrainian soldiers and officers, the name of one Kharkiv native — Alexei Neikov, an IDF sergeant who died defending Israeli children in 1998, is now eternally glorified on the streets of Kharkiv.

Against the backdrop of anti-Semitic demonstrations and anti-Israel unrest on university campuses in the USA and cities in Western Europe, such a clearly pro-Israel step by the municipal council and mayor of Ukrainian Kharkiv deserves special respect.

As part of the implementation of the Law of Ukraine “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy and Decolonization of Toponymy,” 510 street names and other toponymic objects have been renamed in Kharkiv since the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

History laughed at Putin: the president of Russia attacked Ukraine using the beacon ideas of “protecting and spreading the Russian World,” but in reality, Putin led to a colossal reduction in the zone of influence of Russian culture and the Russian language.

In Kharkiv, which was previously considered the most Russian-speaking city in Ukraine, almost all names associated with Russia and the USSR, with Russian and Soviet culture, were erased from the map from 2022 to 2024. More and more residents of Kharkiv are demonstratively switching to the Ukrainian language, unwilling to speak the language of the occupiers.

“The author of these lines, writes Shimon Briman, has been following these renamings for almost two years. As a historian and author of the article “Kharkiv” in the Jewish Encyclopedia, in the summer of 2022, I prepared a list of 25 outstanding Jews in the history of Kharkiv at the request of the Jewish community. This list was submitted to the municipal council as options for renaming streets. One of the main names on this list was Alexei Neikov.

The name Neikov was supported by municipal council deputy Irina Goncharova-Bagalei and the chief rabbi of Kharkiv, Moishe Moskovich. Letters in support of this initiative were written by the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine, Michael Brodsky, public organizations “Israeli Friends of Ukraine” and “Orthodox Union Israel.”

Today I can proudly say that three personalities from this list of outstanding Jews have become streets in Kharkiv, where my childhood and youth passed.”

In addition to the name of Alexei Neikov, the names of architects Viktor Estrovich and Alexander Ginzburg, whose masterpieces still adorn Kharkiv, were also approved in the renaming list, despite being endangered by Russian missile and Iranian “shahid” attacks.

Viktor Estrovich was shot by the Nazis in December 1941 in Drobitsky Yar. Putin’s occupiers continued the tragedy of the Holocaust at this place in March 2022, shelling the memorial complex in Drobitsky Yar, where almost 15,000 Jews of Kharkiv, killed by Nazi occupiers, lie in two mass graves.

The outstanding urban planner Alexander Ginzburg led the Jewish community of the city after the liberation of Kharkiv from the Nazis in 1944-1945, under pressure from Stalin’s punitive organs.

The irony of today, writes Shimon Briman, is that some Jewish or quasi-Jewish names were removed from the map of Kharkiv in the spring of 2024 during the liquidation of Russia’s legacy. Thus, four (!) Birobidzhan passages, named after the “Jewish Autonomous Region” of the Russian Federation, were renamed.

The street of Isaac Dunaevsky, a Soviet composer-Jew of the 1920s-1950s, was also renamed. Kharkiv did not forgive Dunaevsky, who studied and began his career in this city, for such pro-communist songs as “My Moscow,” “My Wide Native Land,” “Oh, It’s Good to Live in the Soviet Country,” “Song of Stalin,” “Song of Kakhovka.” Especially in wartime, when this Moscow tries to expand its possessions by barbaric methods at the expense of a neighboring country, and Kakhovka was captured by Russian occupiers who blew up the Kakhovka Reservoir in southern Ukraine.

But, writes Shimon Briman, let’s return to the fate of the Kharkiv Jewish youth Alexei Neikov, which connected Ukraine and Israel.

He studied for several years at Jewish school No. 170 under the leadership of Grigory Shoikhet, then graduated from the senior classes of the religious-Zionist lyceum “Sha’alvim,” which at that time had the highest percentage of graduates repatriating to Israel in the world.

Now, after the renaming of the former Gastello Street, Jewish secondary school No. 170, which has a room in memory of Alexei Neikov, will be located on a street named after its student Neikov.

In September 1996, 17-year-old Alexei arrived in Israel without his parents. He was preparing to study at the Technion — dreaming of the field of astronautics and aerodynamics. But he decided to first serve in the IDF — the Israel Defense Forces.

On the tragic day of October 29 (9th of Heshvan) 1998, at 07:30 am, Arab terrorists directed a car filled with explosives at two school buses carrying 48 Jewish children near the settlement of Kfar Darom in Gush Katif.

Israeli soldiers guarding the buses managed to turn their jeep across the road — and took the hit themselves. The children were unharmed, two soldiers were injured. One died. It was Sergeant Alexei (Asher) Neikov — forever a 19-year-old new repatriate from Kharkiv.

The evening before, Asher called home.

“Tomorrow I have my first combat mission: to escort a bus with children. I’ll be in the first jeep.” “Why necessarily in the first?” — his mother worried. “Because in the first. I decided so.”

Thanks to his feat, in the children he saved, who have grown over 25 years, more than 120 of their own children — young Israelis — were born. So, Asher Neikov preserved lives for them too. Some of them named their children in his honor with the names Asher and Ashrat. They still maintain contact with the soldier’s parents — Klara and Semen Neikov, who live in Haifa.

In memory of Neikov, a Torah scroll was written for the synagogue in the Jewish settlement of Kfar Darom, which was destroyed in 2005 by order of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during the so-called “disengagement from the Gaza Strip.” The Jewish settlements destroyed then later became bases for Hamas terrorists, against whom Israel is now waging a heavy war.

The children he saved and who grew up created a touching video clip “Children of the Ninth of Heshvan” in memory of Sergeant Neikov in 2014.

In 2022, Neikov’s parents were presented with a portrait of Alexei, assembled from hundreds of photographs of the saved children, their families, and the children born to them.

“Naming a street after our student Asher Neikov is a huge achievement! At first, I couldn’t believe that in the conditions of war, Kharkiv remembers a person born in the city who became a true hero of Israel. Therefore, I perceive this decision of the municipal council and Mayor Igor Terekhov as a historic event and as an important stage in the context of Ukraine-Israel relations,”

– Israeli rabbi and lawyer Shlomo Asraf, who was the founder and spiritual leader of the “Orthodox Union” Center in Kharkiv and the religious-Zionist lyceum “Sha’alvim” from 1993-2009, told me, writes Shimon Briman.

Kharkiv resident Irina Sherstobitova, Asher Neikov’s English teacher at the “Sha’alvim” lyceum, noted:

“Every year we tell our students about his feat. The lyceum has a memorial board about Asher’s amazing act. A bright and righteous guy, polite and erudite, he spoke French, English, Russian, Ukrainian, and Hebrew, brave and physically fit, with an incredibly attractive smile. We must believe in the bright future that such brave guys as he give us.”

Klara Neikov, Alexei’s mother, received the news from Kharkiv with great gratitude.

“I just have no words. Thank you very much to everyone who supported this initiative. My husband and I would be happy to visit Kharkiv and unveil a memorial plaque on the street named after our son. If only the situation around the city improved, and if the war ended,” — Klara Neikov told me, writes Shimon Briman, in a phone conversation.

In the Israeli organization “Yad Le-Banim”, which coordinates work on commemorating fallen IDF soldiers, in response to my request, writes Shimon Briman, they replied that they are not aware of other cases of naming streets in cities outside of Israel after fallen Israeli soldiers, and that, likely, the decision of the Kharkiv authorities is the first example of this kind in the world.

The Kharkiv street in honor of Alexei Neikov will become another bridge of friendship and interpersonal connections, linking Ukraine and Israel — two countries fighting for the freedom, independence, and physical survival of their citizens.

This bridge works both ways. In the same days when the Kharkiv municipal authorities were deciding on renaming streets, the Kharkiv National University named after Vasyl Karazin was selecting the first laureate of the Mark Azbel Prize in theoretical physics.

We wrote about this — “The Prize of Israeli Scientist and Dissident Mark Azbel Will Help His Alma Mater in Kharkiv, Ukraine”.

This prize was established in the spring of 2024 in memory of the outstanding physicist — Professor of Tel Aviv University Mark Azbel, who began his scientific career at Kharkiv University.

Irina Kolodna from the Israeli city of Ramat HaSharon, the widow of the scientist, allocated $25,000 for five years to support young researchers at Kharkiv National University. The first laureate of the Azbel Prize became 39-year-old Dr. Zakhar Maizelis, a professor of the Department of Theoretical Physics; his award ceremony will take place on May 16, 2024, in honor of Israel’s Independence Day.

In all this, I, writes Shimon Briman, see great symbolism — and timeliness. Precisely now, when Ukraine and Israel are repelling attacks from the global axis of evil.

It was from Kharkiv that the BILU ensemble (1882) came — Jewish students of the University who were the first in the world to begin reviving the Land of Israel with their labor. It was the Kharkiv Zionist Conference (1903) that in an ultimatum demanded the creation of a Jewish state only on the ancient Land of Israel, rejecting the “Uganda Plan.”

It was the Kharkiv industrial giant “Turboatom” that refused in 1997 — at the request of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Industry and Trade Natan Sharansky — to supply turbines for a nuclear reactor in Iran, which delayed the Iranian nuclear program for many years.

It was in Kharkiv in 2024 that for the first time in the world a street was named after a soldier of the Israel Defense Forces.

And it is precisely to Kharkiv National University that an award named after an Israeli scientist-physicist — a student of Academicians Landau and Lifshitz — comes from Israel.

 

“Well, shall we go?”

In Israel, a new non-profit community for lovers of routes, nature, and live communication is rapidly developing. The initiative “Well, shall we go?”, created in November 2025 by “Ukrainians” in a broad cultural sense, gradually unites various Israelis — from new immigrants to those who grew up here but maintain a connection with the Ukrainian language, as well as people of any origin who feel closer to the Ukrainian cultural atmosphere.

The group is open to everyone. There are no and never have been any nationality restrictions. The only rule is communication takes place in Ukrainian, because the language here is not a “filter” but a cultural center of gravity. It helps to create a comfortable environment but does not exclude anyone who respects the format.

We are launching the Ukrainian Hiking Community in Israel!

Who is this channel for:

For those who can’t live without movement.

For beginners who want to start hiking but don’t know the routes.

For those looking for active Ukrainian friends.

We gather groups, share coordinates, organize picnics, and just have a great time.

Why now

Relocations, adaptation, new realities — all this creates a need for a space where you can move, communicate, and feel part of something alive. Many “Ukrainians” in Israel have long sought a format where they could combine nature recreation and cultural identity. But it turned out that around this idea, other Israelis easily unite: some are interested in routes, some in communication, and some just in the format of going out into nature together.

The community is built entirely on voluntariness: no commercial elements, no formal structures. Someone suggests routes, someone helps gather a group, someone just comes and goes along. This organic approach makes the initiative lively.

Hiking without complex explanations

In Israel, hiking is not an elite activity or a sport for the prepared. It’s a format where everyone chooses their level — from easy one-day walks to dynamic ascents.

Short routes take about an hour and are suitable for absolutely everyone. Medium ones range from 6 to 12 kilometers, usually 2.5–5 hours, with moderate ascents. Difficult ones can stretch up to 20 kilometers or include steep climbs lasting 5–8 hours.

The group selects hikes so that no one feels “too weak,” “too inexperienced,” or “too prepared.” The balance forms naturally.

What is available for hiking in Israel: a live overview, not a catalog

Israel surprises people who are just beginning to get acquainted with the country’s nature. Several climatic zones fit within a compact distance, and each offers its own routes.

In the north, in Galilee and the Golan, routes usually take three to five hours — about 7–12 kilometers. These are green gorges, waterfalls, terraces, forest areas, and views of the Kinneret. The climate here is milder, the trails vary in level, and many Israelis start their hiking acquaintance from here.

In the Haifa and Krayot area — short walks of 3–5 kilometers that can be completed in an hour or two. The routes are warm, shady, simple in terrain, making them suitable for beginners, families, and those who want to immerse themselves in nature gradually. Carmel is one of the most comfortable regions for calm yet rich hiking.

Further — the Judean Desert. Contrasting, sunny, sharp. Here you can walk 2–3 kilometers to the Ein Gedi waterfalls in just an hour, or choose a three to four-hour route along the Nahal Arugot stream. The ascent to Masada takes about an hour but requires more strength: the elevation change is significant, the terrain rocky.

The southern part of the country — Negev and Makhtesh Ramon — is a completely different experience. Routes here are usually 8–12 kilometers, lasting three to five hours. The ascents are steeper, but this area offers “Martian” landscapes that attract people from all over the country.

There are also gentle options: the Mediterranean coast, where walks of 3–7 kilometers take an hour and a half, maximum three, and are suitable for absolutely everyone. These are the routes you can take even after a workday.

The Eilat Mountains offer routes for all levels: short canyons for an hour, panoramic ascents for two to four hours, and a desert atmosphere that becomes especially comfortable in winter.

Such a range of formats makes Israel an ideal country for people who want to hike regularly and without logistical complexity.

Why the community turned out to be important for “Ukrainians” and Israelis alike

Hikes create a space where boundaries disappear: age, cultural, professional. People walk side by side, exchange experiences, discuss news, share how they are adapting or how long they’ve lived here.

The Ukrainian language has become in the community not a “divider” but a unifying factor: it helps those culturally connected to Ukraine feel safe. And Israelis who find the language interesting or close join as naturally as any other participant.

Participants say: “When you walk the trail and hear Ukrainian speech in Israel, it creates a sense of cultural support. But more importantly, you see people of very different backgrounds next to you.”

This combination explains why the group grows without advertising and formal structures.

The Ukrainian community “Well, shall we go?” has become one of the warmest nature movements in Israel. It unites people of different origins, cities, and biographies — through trails, forests, deserts, coasts, through conversations and support. Israel is ideally suited for such initiatives, and the cultural foundation in the Ukrainian language makes this space special.

NANews will continue to report on projects that strengthen the connection between “Ukrainians” and Israeli society.
NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

How to join

Everything is organized as simply as possible:
👉 https://t.me/nyshogoo

New routes, landmarks, equipment recommendations, start times, and photos appear in the chat. Any participant can suggest their trail or join a planned hike.

The community is dynamic, open, multicultural — and at the same time retains the Ukrainian language as its foundation.

Life is unpredictable: yesterday everything was calm, and today you or your loved ones urgently need a lawyer.

Where can you find a qualified specialist in Haifa or Tel Aviv? What should you pay attention to during the first meeting? How can you tell if a lawyer is truly working for results? Below is a clear guide and practical action plan from the office of attorney and notary Ariel Katsman.

Why a Russian-speaking lawyer means real results

Legal wording is subtle: one word in a contract can change the outcome of a dispute. When a specialist explains the nuances in Russian and also shows how it reads in Hebrew, you make informed decisions and avoid paying for someone else’s mistakes. For those looking for a Russian-speaking lawyer in Haifa or planning a consultation in the center of the country, this is critical.

How to choose a good lawyer: client checklist

• — Ask about experience and practical cases: how many years in practice, and how similar cases were resolved.
• — Clarify education and qualifications: which university, additional licenses, special permits.
• — Check specialization: does it match your needs — family law, real estate, status, criminal/traffic cases, etc.
• — Discuss communication: how often you’ll get reports, who will be in touch, how decisions are made step-by-step.
• — Review “practical” details: is the location convenient, are there offices in Haifa and Tel Aviv, how quickly do they respond.

Experience and licenses: why Ariel Katsman’s office

Ariel Roman Katsman — member of the Israel Bar Association since 31.05.1999 (Attorney License No. 25942), notary (License No. 218510). Holds a special license to represent in military courts and an Israel Bar permit to train interns. Over 20 years of practice: from civil and family disputes to criminal, traffic, immigration cases, and real estate transactions.

Office locations: Haifa and Tel Aviv

— Haifa: 43 Ha’atzmaut St. (5th floor).
— Tel Aviv: 32 Ben Yehuda St. (7th floor, Office 725).
— Appointment phone: 077-869-9526.
— Website: www.katsmanlaw.co.il

Key practice areas

Family law (family attorney)

Marriage and divorce, alimony, property division, child visitation, travel abroad. In Israel, civil and religious courts operate in parallel; it’s important to choose the right jurisdiction, collect evidence, and prepare agreements so that the court understands exactly “what we ask” and “why it’s fair.”

Real estate and transactions

Buying/selling/renting involves registry checks, mortgages and easements, spousal and bank consents, accurate calculations, and deadlines for property transfer. We assess risks in advance, set protective clauses, oversee payments, and register rights so that the client’s interests are protected on paper, not just “in words.”

Repatriation, citizenship, STUPRO, residence status

Status issues are about checklists and evidence: family ties, dates, certificates. A “STUPRO lawyer” helps navigate narrow procedures without delays or refusals: which documents are critical, common mistakes, filing order, and how to respond to official requests.

Criminal and traffic law

From initial statements and motions — to plea negotiations and courtroom defense. In traffic matters — working with fines, license revocation, accidents, compensation, insurance companies, and medical records.

Corporate and civil law

Company registration, contracts, claims work, dispute resolution. In civil matters — debt collection, debtor protection, negotiations, and litigation support.

Inheritance and wills

Bilingual wills, application filing, assisting heirs with deadlines and procedures. Conflicts often arise from small mistakes: wrong signature, missing notifications, incorrect dates. Careful document preparation saves months.

How the process works: clear steps

1. Initial review: brief description of the situation, documents, goal.
2. Plan: where to file, what evidence is needed, order and deadlines.
3. Implementation: prepare documents, submit, track status, report each step.
4. Communication: explain decisions in plain language, avoid “legalese,” keep a responsible lawyer in contact.
5. Finalization: confirm results, provide the client with all documents and future instructions.

When you should have called “yesterday”

Received a summons, a draft settlement agreement, or a contract draft? Don’t delay. Fixing someone else’s mistakes is almost always more expensive than prevention. One poorly worded clause in a contract can “fire back” six months later in court — our job is to catch it early.

Frequently asked questions

Can it be resolved without court?
Often — yes. Negotiations, mediated settlements, and well-drafted letters resolve half of conflicts. The key is a legally correct form so that the “peace” doesn’t fall apart in a month.

How long will the case take?
It depends on the court, workload, and the other party’s willingness to negotiate. We outline stages and realistic timelines upfront, without “tomorrow” promises.

Do you work with Russian-language documents?
Yes. We translate meaning, not just words, clarifying disputed points in both Russian and Hebrew to prevent misinterpretation.

Who is this page for and what searches does it answer
If you searched for “lawyer in Israel” or “Haifa lawyer,” need a “family attorney” or a specialized “STUPRO lawyer,” or want a “Russian-speaking lawyer in Tel Aviv” — this is for you. We handle real-life legal needs: property division, alimony, status and repatriation, real estate deals, inheritance, accidents, debts, and corporate matters.

What to do right now
Write briefly: what happened, what documents you have, and what result you need. We’ll offer the nearest available slot for an in-person meeting in Haifa or Tel Aviv, or schedule a video call. Then — we’ll check, advise, prepare, and see your case through to a clear resolution.

Contacts and consultation booking
— Haifa: 43 Ha’atzmaut St. (5th floor).
— Tel Aviv: 32 Ben Yehuda St. (7th floor, Office 725).
— Tel.: 077-869-9526.
— Website: www.katsmanlaw.co.il

Alexander Filippenko, one of the most recognizable theater and film actors, will perform in Israel in the fall of 2026 with the program “Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?” The tour will take place in Netanya, Ashdod, Haifa, and Tel Aviv.

This is not an ordinary creative evening and not a standard meeting with an artist.

In the program, Filippenko combines literature, theater, personal memories, and a conversation about time — the very time that for many people was divided into “before” and “after” after February 24, 2022.

For the Israeli audience, this visit is important not only as a cultural event. Filippenko is an artist with a significant Soviet and Russian biography, but recent years have added another context to his name: a public anti-war stance, departure from Russia, support for Ukraine, and continued performances beyond the official Russian stage.

Where and when will Alexander Filippenko’s performances take place in Israel

The tour schedule covers four cities in Israel. All performances will start at 19:00.

Netanya

October 7, 2026, Wednesday
Hechal HaTarbut – Auditorium
4 Raziel St.

Ashdod

October 9, 2026, Friday
Matnas Duna-Yud
90 Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St.

Haifa

October 11, 2026, Sunday
Rappoport Hall
138 HaNasi Ave.

Tel Aviv

October 13, 2026, Tuesday
Tel Aviv Museum – Recanati Hall
27 Shaul HaMelech Ave.

Tickets

Tickets – are already available for purchase via the link

For Netanya, Ashdod, Haifa, and Tel Aviv, such evenings usually become not just part of the program but a meeting point for different audiences: people who remember Filippenko from cinema and theater, repatriates from Ukraine, the Ukrainian community in Israel, viewers for whom the topic of culture after the war is no longer neutral.

What is ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’

The program ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ is structured as a monologue and personal conversation with the audience. Alexander Filippenko takes the stage not only as a performer of texts but as a person who lives these texts together with the audience.

The evening will be composed of prose, poetry, theatrical memories, and life stories. The program includes excerpts from Nikolai Gogol’s ‘Dead Souls’, Mikhail Zoshchenko’s works ‘The Steamboat’ and ‘Product Quality’, Sergey Dovlatov’s ‘The Reserve’, Boris Pasternak’s ‘Christmas Star’, as well as poems by Semyon Kirsanov, Yuri Levitansky, and Zhenya Berkovich.

The intonation itself is important here. Filippenko has long been known as an actor who can work on the edge of grotesque, irony, and tragic depth. His manner is not limited to beautiful reading of the text: he turns literary material into a living scene, where behind every word lies experience, memory, and inner freedom.

A special place in the program will be occupied by the artist’s personal stories — about filming in two versions of ‘The Master and Margarita’, working with Sergey Yursky, Alexei German, Sergey Loznitsa, and other directors. For the audience, this is a chance to hear not only famous texts but also the backstage story of an era, told by a person who was its direct participant.

Filippenko: why this evening sounds different

Alexander Filippenko was born on September 2, 1944, in Moscow. He graduated from MIPT, then the Shchukin Theater School, worked at the Taganka Theater, the Vakhtangov Theater, the Mossovet Theater. His filmography includes more than a hundred works, including ‘Visit to the Minotaur’, ‘Hard to Be a God’, ‘The Master and Margarita’, ‘Our Armored Train’, ‘Throw’, ‘Steps of the Emperor’, and other films.

At the same time, the Ukrainian trace in his biography is also noticeable.

Filippenko acted in films and TV projects related to Ukrainian cinema and Ukrainian studios: ‘Bumbarash’, ‘Born by the Revolution’, ‘The Last Resort of Kings’, ‘The Black Arrow’, ‘The Bridge Through Life’, ‘The Pit’, ‘A Woman for All’, ‘I Am Alone’.

For many viewers, he is remembered as one of the most striking performers of ‘dark side’ roles in Soviet and post-Soviet cinema. Filippenko played characters with sharp, almost grotesque energy: Koschei the Immortal, Death, Koroviev, and Azazello in versions of ‘The Master and Margarita’. Later, the wide audience also remembered him for the role of Andrey Zabaluev in the series ‘Poor Nastya’.

But today, Filippenko’s biography is read not only through the list of roles.

Back in March 2014, after the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, he, along with a number of well-known Russian figures in science and culture, expressed disagreement with the Russian government’s policy in Crimea. This position was outlined in an open letter.

In 2018, Filippenko also supported Ukrainian director Oleg Sentsov, who was in Russian custody.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the artist openly spoke out against the war. Ukrainian and emigrant media reported that his departure from Russia was related to his political position. The Mossovet Theater did not renew his contract in 2022, and concerts in Russia began to be canceled.

In his interview with DW, Alexander Filippenko stated that for him, February 24, 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine, is one of the most shameful days in his life. He left his native country without hesitation and settled with his family in Lithuania.

The actor stated that he is ashamed of Russia and does not want to return to a country where dictatorial times have returned, against which he spoke out even during the USSR.

Moreover, Alexander performed a concert in Vilnius, where all proceeds from ticket sales were directed to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The actor also criticizes Russian propaganda and disinformation about the war.

A special symbol was his photograph in an embroidered shirt, published on Ukrainian Embroidery Day. In the caption, the artist recalled Kyiv, the Dovzhenko studio, chestnuts, friends, coziness, and warmth. For many, this gesture was important precisely because it came from a person whose professional life had been associated with the Russian stage for decades, but who did not hide behind it after the start of the war.

Together with his family, he lives in Vilnius (Lithuania) and is engaged in volunteer activities, participating in fundraising to help Ukrainians.

After moving to Europe, the artist did not stand aside and actively helps to raise funds for Ukrainians affected by the war.

The artist speaks sharply about dictatorial regimes and has repeatedly stated that he does not intend to return to Russia.

In a number of publications, it was also reported that Filippenko performed literary concerts in Europe, and the proceeds from certain events were directed to help Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In addition, the actor criticized Russian propaganda and disinformation about the war.

For NAnovosti — Israel News – Nikk.Agency, Alexander Filippenko’s visit to Israel looks not only as a point on the cultural program. This event is at the intersection of theater, memory, war, and personal choice. In Israel, where a large Ukrainian community lives and many people are connected with the culture of the former USSR, this context is especially acute.

The name of the program ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ in this sense sounds almost biographical. It is a question not only literary but also human. Where is the exit for an artist when the familiar country becomes a source of war? Where is the road if the old stage closes and silence becomes a form of consent?

Filippenko answers this not with a slogan, but with a stage. Literature. Voice. Memory.

That is why the Israeli performances in October 2026 may become more than just a tour of a famous actor. For some viewers, it will be a meeting with a master of theater and cinema. For others, an evening about the price of personal position. For others, an opportunity to hear how classical literature suddenly begins to speak about today without direct political declarations.

‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ — a question that each viewer may hear in their own way. But in Alexander Filippenko’s story, it has already received a specific continuation: not to be silent, not to return to a convenient role, and to go where the word can still sound free.

Tickets are already available

The tour schedule covers four cities in Israel. All performances will start at 19:00.

Netanya

October 7, 2026, Wednesday
Hechal HaTarbut – Auditorium
4 Raziel St.

Ashdod

October 9, 2026, Friday
Matnas Duna-Yud
90 Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St.

Haifa

October 11, 2026, Sunday
Rappoport Hall
138 HaNasi Ave.

Tel Aviv

October 13, 2026, Tuesday
Tel Aviv Museum – Recanati Hall
27 Shaul HaMelech Ave.

Tickets

Tickets – are already available for purchase via the link

On the western map of Ukraine, there is a city whose name has become a symbol of cultural memory — Buchach. It was here that the future Nobel laureate Shmuel Yosef Agnon was born, a writer who combined Jewish spirituality and European philosophy. A century later, this city resonates again — now as the site of a literary residency and the book “Islands of Memory”, where Ukrainian authors reflect on time, identity, and Agnon’s legacy. The publication has become a cultural bridge between Ukraine, Israel, and the diaspora, uniting texts in three languages — Ukrainian, English, and Hebrew.

Return to the origins: the city where it all began

Buchach is a small town in the Ternopil region, once the center of Galicia, where Ukrainian, Jewish, and Polish traditions intertwined. It was here in 1888 that Shmuel Yosef Agnon was born — a future classic who became one of the creators of modern Israeli literature.
His childhood was spent among ancient synagogues, baroque churches, and river slopes, where every place held traces of prayers and songs in Hebrew and Yiddish. Later, these motifs came to life in his books, and Buchach itself became a kind of archetype — a city of memory where the past breathes through words.

After emigrating to Palestine and living in Germany, Agnon gained worldwide fame, but the thread connecting him to Buchach was never broken. That is why, years later, this city once again became a center of cultural dialogue — now in a new century.

Agnon Literary Residency: a city that teaches listening

In 2016, the organization Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter (UJE) together with the Agnon Literary Center created a project capable of returning Buchach its voice.

This is how the Shmuel Yosef Agnon Literary Residency appeared — a space for writers, artists, and translators seeking their own stories in the city.

Here, literature becomes not a genre but a way of dialogue: with memory, with place, with people. Participants — contemporary Ukrainian authors — live in Buchach, explore archives, meet residents, and record their stories. Each new residency is like the city’s breath, a new layer of understanding its multilingual past.

2021: the birth of the book “Islands of Memory”

The third season of the residency, held in 2021, was pivotal. At that time, Borys Khersonsky, Diana Klochko, and Markiyan Prokhasko came to Buchach. Three authors from different generations — a doctor and poet, an art critic, a young essayist — wrote texts inspired by time, place, and silence.
The result was the book “Islands of Memory”, published in three language versions.

This project is not just a collection of essays but a living structure of memory, where each text becomes an island, and together they form an archipelago of human experience.

Borys Khersonsky: memory as breath

A psychiatrist and poet, Khersonsky writes that memory is not chronology but a way to remain human. His essays are about the silence of Buchach, where every street becomes a metaphor for the inner world. He sees the city as a living organism, pulsating with traces of prayers and conversations.

Diana Klochko: the city as text

An art critic and philosopher, Klochko speaks of Buchach in the language of architecture. For her, walls are pages, and stones are letters with which history is written. She sees the city as a manuscript inscribed with three alphabets — Cyrillic, Latin, and Hebrew, where everything — from baroque facades to old bridges — carries meaning.

Markiyan Prokhasko: a look at the present

The youngest participant in the project looks at Buchach through the eyes of an observer. His essays are a quiet diary of walks: the smell of coffee, the creak of doors, conversations at the market. Through details, he connects the past and the present day, proving that memory lives not in archives but in everyday life.

Three languages — three mirrors of memory

The main feature of the publication is its trilingualism.
Ukrainian language — as the voice of modernity.
English — as a window to the world.
Hebrew — as a return to Agnon’s roots and Jewish spirituality.

Each language reflects its own perspective, but together they create a complete picture.
Editors and translators — including Anna Nekrasova and Tatyana Nepipenko — made translations not mechanically but intonationally: so that each text sounds natural in its cultural environment.

Thus, “Islands of Memory” became not just a book but a model of how Ukraine sounds when it speaks in several languages at once.

The dialogue of cultures continues: Lviv Forum 2025

Four years later, the theme of Buchach resonated again at the 32nd Lviv Book Forum.
At the discussion “Listen, Read, Understand” Diana Klochko, together with translators Anna Nekrasova (Hebrew) and Tatyana Nepipenko (Yiddish), discussed how Ukrainian literature learns to sound alongside Hebrew and Yiddish without losing its melody.
The conversation became a natural continuation of the book — a new bridge between eras and languages.

Buchach today: a city where memory is alive

Modern Buchach is not an open-air museum but a living organism. Here, the old synagogue is being restored, cemeteries are being explored, tours and thematic festivals are held. The city learns to speak about its multinational past — without nostalgia, but with respect.

Travelers can see the Agnon monument, a bas-relief in the ART-yard, his family home, and ancient streets where time seems to have stopped. Every detail is part of a new cultural map where Ukrainians and Jews meet again.

UJE — an organization that connects stories

The project Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter (UJE) has been operating since 2008 and has already become a platform for open dialogue. Its mission is to restore mutual understanding, to show that Ukrainian and Jewish histories are not parallel lines but intertwined threads of one fabric.

Thanks to UJE, dozens of projects, exhibitions, films, and books have appeared, in which memory is not a requiem but life.
“Islands of Memory” is one of the most significant examples of this approach.

Literature as a form of healing

The book “Islands of Memory” shows that culture can heal.
It connects eras, turns silence into words, and gives a voice to those who were forgotten.
Through three languages and three authorial perspectives, it restores respect for the past and hope for the future.

There is no pathos here — there is breath.
Buchach resonates again.
And this sound is heard in Kyiv, Jerusalem, Paris, and Toronto.

Shmuel Agnon — a symbol that lives again in the Ukrainian context

His books are not only the heritage of Israel but also part of Ukrainian cultural memory.
Buchach gave the world a writer, and Ukraine — a space where this heritage can be understood anew.
Agnon reminds us that literature is a bridge by which one can return home, even after a century.

“Islands of Memory” can be read here .

Sources:
The material is based on the publication of the Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter (UJE) website — https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/uk/ostrovi-pamyati/,
as well as a reference article Nikk.Agency — Shmuel Agnon.

As is known, in 2022 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as “temporarily occupied” and condemned the genocide of the Chechen people — an important symbolic bridge between Ukrainians and the Chechen resistance.

In the photo — Jewish volunteers and representatives of the Chechen battalion hold the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria — the official symbol of the unrecognized Chechen state, which in 1991–2000 actually existed on the territory of Chechnya and declared independence from Russia. Today it is mainly used in the diaspora and among supporters of Chechen independence, including Chechen volunteers in Ukraine.

The suppression of the Chechen resistance by Russia in the 1990s–2000s was accompanied by mass civilian casualties and large-scale destruction.

In the First Chechen War (1994–1996), Russian troops used carpet bombing, especially in Grozny, which was practically wiped off the face of the earth; thousands of civilians were killed, tens of thousands were wounded.

In the Second Chechen War (since 1999) the scale of violence increased even more: extrajudicial executions, “cleansing” operations with disappearances of people, torture and deportations took place. According to human rights activists, the total number of dead in the two wars ranges from 80 to 150 thousand people, including women and children, and hundreds of thousands became refugees.

These events made the flag of Ichkeria not only a symbol of independence, but also a reminder of the tragedy of a people who experienced ethnic extermination.

How are the Chechen volunteer battalions of the AFU connected to the Jewish communities of Ukraine?

The Jewish community of Shostka handed over humanitarian aid to the Chechen battalion of the AFU

In Shostka, the Jewish community handed over another batch of humanitarian aid to Ukrainian servicemen, including the Chechen battalion, which is heading to one of the most dangerous sections of the front.

This was reported by the Shostka Jewish Community on its account on August 12, 2025.

“The Shostka Jewish Community continues to support our defenders by providing tactical stretchers made using Israeli technology. These stretchers are in great demand among the military, as they are reliable, comfortable, and help save lives.

This time, the aid went to the Sheikh Mansur Chechen Battalion, which will head to the hottest direction to defend our indestructible Ukraine. Along with the stretchers, paracord bracelets, protective gloves, neck pillows, fire starters, and, of course, amulets were handed over to protect our warriors in the hottest spots.

We believe that every contribution brings us closer to victory. Victory is not far away — Ukraine will definitely win!”

Volunteer work of the Shostka Jewish Community

The Shostka Jewish Community is known for producing tactical stretchers using Israeli technology.

The production is organized by volunteers at the community base. Modern materials are used to ensure reliability and convenience. Such stretchers can withstand significant loads and allow transportation of the wounded even in difficult conditions. They can be used not only to evacuate soldiers from the battlefield but also in rescue operations — they can hold up to 200 kg.

In addition to stretchers, the community purchases and sends to the front protective gloves, warm clothing, neck pillows, fire starters, and small amulets.

Sergey Katsman, head of the Jewish community, said that the Shostka Jewish Community is the only one in Ukraine producing such stretchers, but they are ready to share the sewing technology with other cities because all Ukrainians now have one common goal — Victory.

Since February 24, 2022, Shostka, a city in the Sumy region 25 kilometers from the Russian border, has been regularly shelled. Already in the first days of the invasion, the city found itself in the zone of direct threat. In March 2022, as a result of artillery strikes, residential buildings and infrastructure were damaged.

The Shostka Jewish Community, numbering several dozen active members, from the beginning of the war organized volunteer aid together with other residents. They coordinate the collection of food, clothing, medicines, and hygiene products for those affected.

In the summer of 2025, Shostka, Sumy region, was the focus of massive attacks by Russia. Aviation, guided bombs, and Shahed drones were used, with strikes on residential neighborhoods and infrastructure.
Chronology of shelling:

Against the backdrop of constant threat, the Shostka Jewish Community continues to act: organizing collections of food, medicines, and essential items for those affected, and providing assistance to the wounded and to families who have lost their homes.

On July 28, 2025, the Shostka Jewish Community (Sumy region) appealed to city residents to support community members — Serhii and Iryna Starostenko, whose house was completely destroyed as a result of shelling, and all property was destroyed.

Chechen volunteer battalions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine

For more than ten years, Chechen volunteer formations, created from natives of Chechnya who emigrated after the First and Second Chechen Wars, have been fighting as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Their main goal is to continue the struggle against Russia, which they consider their historical enemy. For them, the war in Ukraine is not only support for the Ukrainian people but also part of their own national liberation struggle for the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Sheikh Mansur Battalion

It was to this battalion that the Shostka Jewish Community has now provided assistance.

Formed in 2014, mainly from Chechens who left Chechnya after the Second Chechen War. Initially part of the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps “Right Sector,” later — of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army. Named after the late 18th-century Caucasian leader Sheikh Mansur, who led the highlanders’ uprising against the Russian Empire. This is one of the largest volunteer battalions in Ukraine, which took part in battles in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and after 2022 — also in the southern directions.

Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion

Also created in 2014. Composed mainly of Chechen emigrants who left their homeland after the Second Chechen War. Named after the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed by Russian troops in 1996. The battalion’s motto is “Freedom or Death!”. The unit is actively fighting on the fronts, seeing Ukraine’s victory as an important step towards the possible liberation of Chechnya.

Khamzat Gelayev Battalion

A formation created in 2022, named after Chechen field commander Ruslan (Khamzat) Gelayev, one of the symbols of resistance to Russia. The battalion quickly became part of the AFU’s combat operations, participating in assault actions and reconnaissance.

Other Chechen formations

In addition to these three main battalions, the following fight on Ukraine’s side:

• Separate Special Purpose Battalion of the Armed Forces of the ChRI;
• Special Operations Group “SOG”;
• Assault Battalion “Shalena Zgraya” (“Mad Pack”);
• Volunteer Battalion “Crimea”;
• Muslim Corps “Caucasus”.

Why Chechen battalions fight for Ukraine

For the fighters of these units, the war in Ukraine is a chance to continue the struggle they began on their native land against Russian occupation. They believe that Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will also bring the liberation of Chechnya closer. Many fighters have combat experience gained in the Caucasus mountains and use it to help Ukrainian troops with reconnaissance, sabotage operations, and urban combat.

As of the end of 2022, the number of Chechen volunteers in the AFU was estimated at about 2,000 people, but there are no exact and up-to-date figures for 2025 — many formations do not disclose their numbers for security reasons.

Historical connection between Mountain Jews and Chechens

The ancestors of the Mountain Jews (Juhuri) arrived in the Caucasus presumably in the 5th century CE from Persia, where their forebears had settled in the 8th century BCE from ancient Israel. Their language — Mountain Jewish (Juhuri) — belongs to the southwestern group of Judeo-Iranian languages. The Mountain Jews practiced Judaism according to the Sephardic rite and had their own writing, literature, and religious books, including the prayer book “Rabbi Yechiel Sevi.”

From the 19th century, during the Caucasian War and the annexation of the region by the Russian Empire, Mountain Jews lived in Chechnya, Dagestan, and neighboring areas, including Grozny, Vedeno, Itum-Kali, and mountain auls. Their neighbors were Chechens — Sunni Muslims — with whom relations of mutual respect and trust were established. Trade routes, crafts, and common enemies (first the tsarist, then the Soviet repressive authorities) brought the two peoples closer.

Chechens valued Jewish blacksmiths, gunsmiths, jewelers, and winemakers, and Mountain Jews used the services of Chechen craftsmen and farmers. In bazaars, the trading rows stood side by side, and deals were often sealed by a spoken word. In case of an external threat, Chechens protected Jewish families, and Jews helped their neighbors with food and craft products.

During the Second World War, the Mountain Jews of Chechnya and Dagestan avoided the mass extermination that befell their communities in Crimea and the Kuban, largely thanks to the resistance of the local population, including the Chechens. In 1944, when the Soviet authorities deported the Chechens to Central Asia, some Mountain Jews of Grozny and the surrounding areas looked after their homes. After the return, the Chechens helped their Jewish neighbors amid the postwar devastation.

The cultural life of the Mountain Jews suffered greatly from Soviet policy: in 1948–1953, schools teaching in the Judeo-Tat language were closed, literature in Juhuri ceased, and communities were pressured. Nevertheless, until the end of the 20th century, several thousand Mountain Jews continued to live in Chechnya.

Cultural revival began only after 1991; however, new problems arose due to instability and religious pressure from the Muslim environment. The period of the Chechen wars of the 1990s–2000s was especially difficult, when almost all Mountain Jews left Grozny and Nalchik.

Today the number of Mountain Jews is estimated at approximately 110,000 people. The largest communities live in Israel (50–70 thousand), Azerbaijan (12–37 thousand), as well as in the USA, Germany, and Austria. In Russia, they remain in Dagestan (3–18 thousand) and partly in other regions. Traditional centers of residence include Derbent, Makhachkala, Buynaksk (Dagestan), Baku and Kuba (Azerbaijan). In Chechnya now only a few elderly representatives of this community remain, and most descendants of the Mountain Jews from Chechnya live in Israel, the USA, and Europe.

Despite the loss of former neighborhood, the memory of peaceful coexistence is preserved. Chechens and Mountain Jews who met in Israel or in the diaspora often recall the times when they were connected by shared courtyards, markets, mutual assistance, and respect — that which allowed two different peoples to live side by side for more than a century.

Relations between Jews and Chechens in Ukraine from 2014 to the present

Since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, the interaction between the Jewish community of Ukraine and Chechen volunteers has acquired practical and symbolic significance.

In the autumn of 2014, a volunteer battalion named after Beni Krik was created in Odesa — a Jewish-Chechen humanitarian formation. Commander Dmytro Nudel stated that Odesa Jews would collect aid for fighters in the ATO zone and for the wounded, and that volunteers would be trained with the help of fighters from the Chechen battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev. The battalion had a symbolic character and did not participate in battles, but demonstrated the alliance of the two communities: the Chechens shared military experience, and the Jews — resources and a volunteer network. The unit was supported by Amina Okuyeva, the wife of the commander of the Dudayev battalion.

In 2014–2015, a significant part of the assistance to Chechen volunteers was coordinated through the Dnipropetrovsk region, where, with the participation of Governor Ihor Kolomoyskyi and the Jewish community, a powerful volunteer center was created. Private patrons provided fighters with uniforms, transport, and equipment.

In February 2016, commander Adam Osmayev and Amina Okuyeva, at the invitation of city council deputy Asher Cherkassky, visited the central synagogue “Golden Rose” and the “Menorah” center in Dnipro. The guests toured the Museum “Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine,” where special attention was paid to the deportation of Chechens in 1944. Cherkassky emphasized the spiritual kinship of peoples united by a common struggle against imperial aggression.

At the state level, Jewish support was also noticeable. In the Verkhovna Rada of the 8th convocation (2014–2019), deputy Heorhii Lohvynskyi, deputy chairman of the Human Rights Committee, repeatedly raised the issue of the deportation of Chechens by the Stalinist regime, drawing parallels with the Holocaust. He welcomed the recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and supported pro-Ukrainian Chechen formations. These actions strengthened the moral and political legitimacy of the Chechen presence in Ukraine.

In September 2022, the words of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed to the peoples of the Caucasus with an appeal not to fight for Russia, received a wide response in the Jewish diaspora and strengthened informational support for Chechen allies.

The Chechen volunteers themselves note the respect and assistance from the Jewish community. Osmayev and Okuyeva emphasized that Ukraine became a home for people of different nationalities united by the desire for freedom. After 2022, the symbols of Ichkeria began to appear at Jewish public events, and some Chechen fighters wear a six-pointed star on their uniforms along with the flag of their republic.

From NAnews

The story of assistance from the Shostka Jewish community to the Sheikh Mansur Chechen Battalion is not a one-off gesture, but part of a long line of mutual support stretching from the days of peaceful neighborhood between Mountain Jews and Chechens in the Caucasus to today’s joint struggle in Ukraine.

Since 2014, Jewish communities across the country — from Odesa to Dnipro — have not only shared resources with Chechen volunteers, but have also publicly recognized them as allies in resisting Russian aggression. The Chechens reciprocate, seeing Ukrainian Jews as partners in arms and fate.

Today, when the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is raised alongside the Ukrainian and Israeli flags, it symbolizes not only resistance to a single aggressor, but also the historical solidarity of peoples who survived genocide and refused to give up the right to freedom. For us at NAnews — News of Israel, this is a reminder that brotherhood, forged through blood and mutual aid, can outlast centuries and borders.

“Wait, doesn’t all the land in Israel belong to the state? How then is it transferred to someone?”

This is the most common and absolutely logical question.
And the short answer to it is — no, not all the land in Israel belongs to the state.

…

Let’s say right away, in Israel, a petition/open appeal by Israeli citizens to the government is gaining momentum, demanding “to stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Russia and related IPPO structures“, because they believe that such a transfer “threatens Israel’s security” and poses “risks associated with external influence and the political interests of Moscow and related organizations”.

“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters“
“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters”

here it is (Hebrew) – https://www.atzuma.co.il/threatfromrussia

…

Let’s return to land ownership.

Where did this myth come from

In Israel, indeed:

• most of the land is under state management;
• there is the Israel Land Authority;
• land is often not sold, but leased long-term.

Because of this, there is a feeling that

“everything state-owned means the state decides everything.”

But this is not quite so.

What actually belongs to the state and what does not

In Israel, there are three different types of land:

1. State land
   Yes — belongs to the state.
   This is simple.
2. Private land of citizens and organizations
   Yes — it exists.
   With documents, registers, and property rights.
3. Historical and foreign private property
   This is where the whole story with courtyards, churches, and old objects begins.

Many such plots:

• were purchased even before 1948,
• during the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate,
• by private societies, churches, foundations.

And Israel did not automatically nullify these rights.

Why didn’t Israel say: “Everything is ours, period”

When Israel was being re-established, it consciously did not go down the path of confiscating all private property.

The reasons are simple and harsh:

• it wanted to be a state of law, not a revolutionary regime;
• it inherited the British legal system, not destroyed it;
• mass confiscation would mean:
  • endless courts,
  • international isolation,
  • destruction of its own legitimacy.

Simply put:

Israel could have taken it — but decided not to become one who takes by force.

Then what does “transfer” mean in such disputes

When it is said that an object is “transferred”, it does not mean that:

• Israel is giving away “its land”,
• or making a gift to someone.

In fact, Israel:

• is not the owner of such objects,
• acts as an arbiter,
• decides whom to recognize as the legal owner between disputing parties.

Can Israel take it for itself?

Theoretically — yes:

• if the object is recognized as ownerless,
• if no party proves the right,
• or for exceptional reasons of public interest.

“Public interest” — these are rare cases when the state can intervene in private property for the sake of security, vital infrastructure, or protection of unique heritage, for example, for road, railway, or metro construction, creating a security zone, or preserving a historical object.

But this is a extreme scenario, which Israel almost does not resort to, because it:

• creates a dangerous precedent,
• hits international reputation,
• undermines the very logic of a state of law.

The shortest explanation

Land under the sovereignty of Israel — yes.
But ownership — not always state-owned.
Therefore, Israel does not “give away its own”, but decides, whose it is by law (Israeli and international).

Let’s start.

What is the Alexander Courtyard today — in fact

The Alexander Courtyard, here it is on Google map, is a historical-archaeological, cult, and museum complex in the Old City of Jerusalem, located approximately 40–50 meters from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (1–2 minutes walk). It is not a hotel or commercial lodging: accommodation for tourists or pilgrims is not provided.

Area and location.
The complex occupies a plot of about 1,300–1,500 m², which is a significant size for the dense development of the Old City. Nearby are key shrines and locations:

• Church of the Holy Sepulchre — 40–50 m;
• route Via Dolorosa — directly adjacent (the Judgment Gate Threshold is part of it);
• district Muristan — about 100 m;
• Jaffa Gate — approximately 250–300 m.

What exactly is on the territory of the courtyard:

• House Church of St. Alexander Nevsky — a small Orthodox church of the late 19th century; services are held periodically, there is no permanent monastic community.
• Judgment Gate Threshold — an authentic archaeological object of the Roman era (1st century AD), a fragment of an ancient pavement and threshold; according to Christian tradition, associated with the path of Jesus Christ to the trial of Pontius Pilate and included in the Via Dolorosa route.
• Archaeological site — elements of ancient city walls and buildings of Jerusalem, discovered during 19th-century excavations and preserved.
• Small museum and exhibition rooms, dedicated to the history of the complex and findings.
• Inner courtyard and historical buildings, forming a closed architectural ensemble within the Old City.

What is happening there now:

• the courtyard is open to visitors as a cultural-historical object;
• tours and archaeological site inspections are conducted;
• there is a museum exhibition;
• the cult function of the church is maintained;
• work is being done on the maintenance, protection, and conservation of monuments.

What is fundamentally absent there:

• there is no hotel or hostel;
• there is no commercial tourist service;
• there is no diplomatic or state institution.

Who manages the object:

Management and daily activities are carried out by the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — a non-governmental public association operating in Jerusalem within the Israeli legal framework. Administrators, guides, and caretakers work on-site; restorers and monument protection specialists are involved as needed. The State of Israel does not directly manage the courtyard but oversees it within the framework of heritage protection and security legislation.

It is the combination of significant area, archaeological value, and extreme proximity to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre that makes the Alexander Courtyard an object of special attention and explains why the dispute around it goes far beyond a usual property issue.

Let’s continue.

In November 2025, a new round of hearings on the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard took place in the Jerusalem District Court — from the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IPPO) — to whom — Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IPPO).

No, this is not a typo.

Why “IPPO ≠ IPPO”, if OPS was in between

(in the international-legal sense, considering the role of OPS)

In practice, it is about not two, but three different entities, which creates the main confusion. Two of them bear the same name — the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, and the third — Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — occupied an intermediate position during the legal gap period.

Imperial IPPO (1882–1917)

The pre-revolutionary “Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society” (IPPO) was a private public association, founded in 1882 and operating within the legal framework of the Russian Empire.

Principally important legal clarification:
the imperial IPPO did not belong to the state of the Russian Empire and was not the property of the royal family or the House of Romanov.

• the society was not a state body;
• was not part of the structure of ministries or departments;
• its property was not state property;
• it was not in the personal property of the emperor or members of the dynasty.

Imperial patronage was expressed exclusively in:

• approval of the charter,
• moral and political support,

but not in ownership rights.

All land plots and buildings in “Palestine”, including the Jerusalem courtyards, belonged to the society itself as an independent legal entity, not to the state and not to the royal family.

The term “Palestine” is used here exclusively in a historical-legal sense, as it appeared in Ottoman, European, and mandate documents of the late 19th — early 20th century, and has no relation to modern political realities or issues of Israeli sovereignty. For clarity, this name will be used strictly in the form and meaning in which it is recorded in official acts of the corresponding period.

After 1917, the Russian Empire and the imperial legal order ceased to exist. As a result, the imperial IPPO lost its legal personality and ceased to exist as a legal entity. There was no formal act of liquidation, but in the international-legal sense, the society ceased to exist.

Important for the IPPO case

Already in 1918, Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, officially renounced succession in relation to the Russian Empire, which was recorded by the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the annulment of state debts and the rupture of imperial legal and contractual obligations. This renunciation meant not only the non-recognition of imperial state debts but also the absence of succession for private imperial societies, including the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. Accordingly, the property of the IPPO abroad was not considered inherited by the USSR and was not under the protection or management of the Soviet state, which cemented the international-legal gap in the fate of the society and its property.

OPS as a period of factual continuation

In the legal vacuum that arose after 1917, the activities and management of the property of the former IPPO in the Holy Land effectively passed to the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS)— a Jerusalem Orthodox organization formed in the emigrant community from the Russian Empire in the 1920s. People, local structure, archives, and actual management of the courtyards moved to OPS.

Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) — is a non-governmental public association operating in Jerusalem and associated with the historical tradition of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, but legally independent and not representing any state. It operates within the Israeli legal framework and manages historical objects, including the Alexander Courtyard. In this article, OPS is mentioned only as one of the parties to the property dispute, without delving into its history.

At the same time, OPS was not and was not recognized as the legal successor of the imperial IPPO. It did not receive the property by an act of inheritance or transfer and acted in the international-legal logic as a factual holder and custodian, not as a legal owner.

Russian IPPO (since the 1990s)

The modern Russian “Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society” (IPPO) was created in the 1990s and registered under Russian Federation law. In a legal sense, this is a new legal entity, not identical to the pre-revolutionary society.

The Russian IPPO declares itself the successor of the imperial IPPO, relying on historical continuity, mission, traditions, and the restoration of the name. However, from the point of view of international and Israeli law, the coincidence of the name and appeal to historical identity does not create automatic succession.

International-legal conclusion

In international-legal logic, automatic succession is possible only if there is continuity of the same legal entity or an internationally recognized act of transfer of rights. In the case of the IPPO, such conditions did not exist. An additional factor cementing the gap is the existence of OPS as an independent factual holder of property in the period between 1917 and the 1990s.

Final formula

The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society was a private public association and did not belong to either the state of the Russian Empire or the royal family; its property was not state property. In the international-legal sense, the modern Russian IPPO is not an automatic successor of the pre-revolutionary IPPO, as there is no continuity of the legal entity and there was no internationally recognized act of transfer of rights.

What is the legal collision

In December 2019, Israeli media reported on the registration of the Alexander Courtyard for Russia in the Israeli real estate register. It was this entry that created the impression that the object had already been transferred. However, the registration was carried out administratively, without completing legal proceedings and without resolving objections from the Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS).

OPS, led by Nikolai Vorontsov-Hofman, filed a protest, after which the Jerusalem District Court imposed a temporary ban on the transfer of the object to the Russian IPPO, effectively freezing the situation.

Administrative decision of 2020

In 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed an administrative document categorizing the Alexander Courtyard as a “place of Christian worship”.

This decision was not an act of property transfer and did not replace legal proceedings, but it placed the object in a special legal regime, where questions of its status could be considered at the government level, not exclusively within the framework of ordinary civil litigation. Thus, the executive branch received an additional tool for resolving the dispute outside the classic judicial path.

Current legal status

The Jerusalem District Court ruled to maintain the status quo until a political-administrative decision is made.

According to the court’s decision, the courtyard temporarily remains under the management of the OPS (Orthodox Palestine Society) — that is, the structure that carries out the actual ownership and management of the object at the moment — until a special interdepartmental commission of the Israeli government makes a final decision on the ownership issue.

The court did not recognize any of the parties as the final owner, emphasizing the limited jurisdiction in this situation.

Positions of the parties

• The Russian side claims that Israel should fulfill previous political commitments and complete the transfer process in favor of the Russian IPPO, which is considered by it as a historical successor.
• OPS (Orthodox Palestine Society) insists that the courtyard is its historical property, which Russia or Russian structures never directly owned, and disputes the very idea of transfer.
• The Israeli government takes an intermediate position, trying to balance between external political pressure, internal legal risks, and international criticism, avoiding a unilateral decision without the conclusion of a specialized commission.

What’s next

The court directly indicated that the final decision is within the competence of the governmental interdepartmental commission, not the court and not the prime minister individually.

Until such a decision is made, the situation remains legally suspended. At the same time, continued pressure from the Russian side is expected, especially given the current geopolitical context, while the Israeli government continues to postpone the final decision, striving to minimize legal and political consequences.

By the way –

there is material about the modern Russian IPPO from the Israeli publication “Details”

“The Alexander Courtyard is wanted to be transferred to a structure, accusing Israel of the “October 7 massacre” and promoting more than 170 exhibitions about the “genocide of Palestinians”

And here is the video Sergey Auslender – Nikita Aronov on this issue:

Ancient Hebrew period (10th century BC — 70 AD)

Land was regulated by the norms of ancient Hebrew law (din Torah), as well as city and royal administration. The plot was outside the sacred zone of the Temple Mount, so the temple property regime (קדשי המקדש) did not apply to it. Ownership was secular and could be private, communal, or administrative within the framework of ancient Hebrew property law.

Specific owners are not known by name, as cadastral fixation of property in the modern sense did not exist. After the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD and the liquidation of the city structure, the former ancient Hebrew property titles effectively lost legal force.

Roman period (70 AD — 4th century AD)

After the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD, the territory came under the direct control of the Roman Empire and was regulated by the norms of Roman law (ius Romanum). Land was considered either state property (ager publicus) or private property (dominium privatum), transferred to Roman citizens or municipal structures of the city.

Specific owners of the plot are not recorded in surviving sources. Property rights of the previous population were terminated as a result of war and deportations, and subsequent ownership was determined by decisions of the Roman administration and city management (municipium).

Byzantine and early Christian period (326–637 AD)

In 326–335 AD, at the initiative of Empress Helena, mother of Emperor Constantine the Great, and by direct order of the imperial authority, the territory in the area of the future Church of the Holy Sepulchre was withdrawn from the usual city circulation. This decision was part of the state policy of Christianizing Jerusalem after the legalization of Christianity. Land, previously part of secular urban development, was transferred to the status of sacred property (res sacrae) according to the norms of Byzantine and Roman imperial law (ius Romanum, ius Byzantinum).

The legal holder of rights to the plot became the Jerusalem Church (ecclesia Hierosolymitana), that is, the local Christian institution under the management of the Bishop of Jerusalem, operating under imperial patronage (imperial patronage). The transfer was not formalized by a purchase-sale agreement, as the mechanism of imperial withdrawal and sacralization of land, characteristic of the 4th century, was applied. Private individuals were not owners, and the alienation of the plot was taken out of the civil circulation.

The formation of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the adjacent territory secured a stable Christian status for this area, which was maintained throughout the Byzantine period. Documentary confirmation of this is provided by contemporaneous sources of the 4th century, primarily the testimonies of Eusebius of Caesarea (Vita Constantini), as well as subsequent Byzantine church management practices. By the time of the Arab conquest of Jerusalem in 637 AD, the plot was recognized as church property, under institutional, not private ownership.

Early Islamic period (from 637 AD — 10th century)

After the capture of Jerusalem in 637 AD by the troops of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, the city came under the rule of the Rashidun, and then the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. Upon the change of sovereignty, Christian shrines and church possessions were not confiscated. The rights of the Jerusalem Church to the plot in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were preserved within the framework of Islamic law.

The legal basis was the granting of Christians the status of dhimmi (ahl al-dhimma), which guaranteed the protection of the person, cult, and property upon payment of a poll tax (jizya). Church property was recognized as legal and inviolable, and the land continued to be owned by the Christian institution as a religious collective. The caliphate did not convert such plots into waqf and did not include them in the state land fund (bayt al-mal).

Thus, in the early Islamic period, there was no redistribution of property, but a confirmation of the previously established Byzantine church title. By the 10th century, the plot remained part of the Christian confessional zone around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, with continuous institutional ownership and without a break in legal status.

Medieval period: Crusaders, Ayyubids, Mamluks (11th–15th centuries)

In 1099, Jerusalem was captured by the Crusaders, and the city came under the control of the Latin Kingdom. Christian property in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was redistributed within the Christian world: management and ownership of plots passed to Latin church institutions under canon law (ius canonicum). At the same time, the category of church sacred property was preserved, and the land was not turned into secular private property.

After the return of Jerusalem under the control of the Ayyubids in 1187 and the subsequent establishment of Mamluk control, there was a rollback of Latin dominance. Muslim authorities restored the principle of protecting Christian shrines and property within Islamic law. Church plots around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were preserved for Eastern Christian communities, including Greeks and Copts, as recognized religious corporations. Property was considered collective confessional ownership and was not included in the state land fund.

By the end of the Mamluk period, the plot on which the Alexander Courtyard later arose was part of a stable Christian property mass in the Old City. The legal status was determined not by a specific purchase-sale agreement, but by continuous recognition of religious property with the change of political regimes.

Ottoman period (1517 — mid-19th century)

After the conquest of Jerusalem by the Ottoman Empire in 1517, the city was included in the Ottoman administrative-legal system. Christian communities were recognized by the state as religious corporations within the millet system, which gave them the right to collective ownership of real estate and independent management of internal affairs. The property of Christian denominations, including land plots in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, was regulated by the norms of Ottoman law, combining sharia and imperial legislation (kanun).

At the early stage of Ottoman rule, the rights of religious communities were primarily fixed in fiscal-land registers (defter). These documents reflected the recognition of a specific community’s ownership of a plot and its responsibility to the state, but did not represent an individual title deed in the modern sense. It was about state confirmation of existing confessional ownership, not the creation of new property rights.

With the development of the Ottoman land system and the implementation of reforms in the 18th–19th centuries, religious possessions in Jerusalem were more formally registered in the tapu land certificate system. It was the tapu senedi that became the first type of document that can be considered a full-fledged title deed, recognized by the state and allowing for the alienation of property.

Within this registration, part of the Christian plots around the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was secured for the Coptic Orthodox community of Jerusalem as an independent legal entity.

It is important to emphasize that the Ottoman authorities did not “transfer” the land to the Copts. Their right was based on continuous confessional ownership, which the state recognized and formalized through registration. The Ottoman administration considered the Coptic community as a legitimate owner, capable of disposing of real estate, including its sale, subject to the established procedure and obtaining permission from the authorities.

By the mid-19th century, the Coptic community had a formalized and state-recognized title of ownership, confirmed by tapu documents. It was the emergence of this formalized Ottoman title deed that became the first case of documentary securing of property rights to the plot in a legal sense and created the legal possibility of its lawful sale to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in 1859–1860.

Purchase of the plot by the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission (1859–1860)

In 1859–1860, the land plot in the area of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, previously registered for the Coptic Orthodox community of Jerusalem, was alienated in favor of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. The transaction was formalized as a private purchase-sale between two religious corporations and was carried out within the framework of the existing Ottoman law. The seller was the Coptic church institution, possessing a formalized title of ownership, confirmed by the tapu system, and the buyer was the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, acting through its head, Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin).

The legal basis of the transaction was a purchase-sale agreement concluded under the norms of sharia and kanun with the mandatory administrative permission of the Ottoman authorities for the alienation of real estate to a foreign religious entity. Such a procedure was standard for Jerusalem in the mid-19th century and applied to all foreign Christian missions. The Ottoman administration considered the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission not as a state body of the Russian Empire, but as a church institution, which excluded the qualification of the transaction as interstate.

The financing of the purchase was carried out at the expense of donations and church funds, but the source of the money did not affect the legal status of the property. In Ottoman documents and registers, the owner of the plot was recorded as the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, not the Russian Empire, not the imperial family, and not the treasury. No acts transferring the plot to the state property of Russia were formalized.

The conclusion of the transaction in 1859–1860 created a new initial title of ownership, recognized by the Ottoman state and valid in subsequent periods. From this moment, the plot was in the private church ownership of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, which became the legal basis for the subsequent construction and formation of the Alexander Courtyard, but did not generate any rights for the Russian Empire as a state.

Development of the plot and formation of the Alexander Courtyard (1860s — 1890s)

After the completion of the purchase-sale in 1859–1860, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem began the development of the plot as the legal owner under Ottoman law. The use of the land was carried out based on the formalized tapu title and was not accompanied by any acts of alienation or change in the legal status of ownership. The Ottoman authorities considered construction and archaeological work as permissible disposal of private church property (mulk).

In the 1860s–1870s, the plot was cleared and adapted for religious and pilgrimage purposes. In the 1880s–1890s, an architectural complex was formed here, which received the name Alexander Courtyard. This name had a memorial character and did not reflect the form of ownership or state affiliation of the object. The right of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission to the plot continued to be preserved without changes and did not require re-registration.

Transfer of management of the Alexander Courtyard to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (late 19th century)

By the end of the 19th century, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem decided to transfer the economic and pilgrimage management of the Alexander Courtyard to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The basis for this was the statutory goals of the IPPO, aimed at organizing pilgrimages, maintaining Russian institutions in Palestine, and exploiting religious real estate. The transfer was carried out in the form of an internal order between affiliated church-public structures and was not formalized as a civil-law transaction of alienation.

From a legal point of view, it was about delegating management and use functions (administratio), not about transferring ownership rights (dominium). The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission retained the title of owner, based on the Ottoman tapu, while the IPPO acted as the managing organization, carrying out actual possession, maintenance, and exploitation of the object. No purchase-sale, donation, or other title deed in favor of the IPPO was formalized, and the change of owner was not registered in either Ottoman or subsequent registers.

The transfer of management did not require separate permission from the Ottoman authorities, as it did not affect the title of ownership and was considered an internal order of the owner within his powers. In legal terms, the IPPO acted as a lawful possessor (lawful possessor), having gained access to the object based on the owner’s consent.

It was this status that later became key for assessing the continuity of possession after 1917, but it did not itself turn the IPPO into an owner at this stage.

1917–1922: cessation of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, renunciation of succession, and creation of a legal vacuum

After the revolutionary events of 1917, the pre-revolutionary church-state order of the Russian Empire was destroyed. The Holy Synod, through which the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem operated, was abolished, centralized management and financing of the mission ceased, and the Soviet government refused to recognize pre-revolutionary church institutions as holders of property rights abroad. As a result, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission lost its legal personality and ability to act as an active owner of real estate.

The cessation of the mission’s activities was not accompanied by an act of liquidation, confiscation, or transfer of property. The Alexander Courtyard was not transferred to either the state or another church structure. In 1918–1922, Soviet Russia officially renounced succession for foreign private and church property of the Russian Empire, which excluded the emergence of a title for the RSFSR or the USSR. Thus, the title of ownership, formalized in the 19th century for the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, was “orphaned”: it was not annulled but lost its active holder.

The Moscow Patriarchate, restored in new conditions, did not become the successor of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in a property sense. It arose as a new church structure within the Soviet legal framework and did not receive automatic international recognition as the heir to pre-revolutionary foreign assets. Neither the Soviet state nor foreign authorities formalized acts of succession linking the patriarchate with the mission’s rights to real estate in Jerusalem.

In these conditions, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which even before 1917 carried out lawful management and use of the Alexander Courtyard based on the owner’s consent, continued actual possession of the object. This possession was qualified as lawful and continuous (lawful possession), as the IPPO did not enter arbitrarily, did not displace another owner, and acted within the framework of previously obtained powers. The absence of a successor for the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and the refusal of the USSR to make claims created a legal vacuum in which the IPPO remained the only subject exercising possession, forming the basis for subsequent recognition of the title based on the principle of continuity of possession (continuity of possession).

British Mandate period (1917–1948): administrative practice and recognition of the IPPO

During the British Mandate in Palestine (1917–1948), the new authorities adopted the principle of preserving existing property rights and titles formed before the change of sovereignty. Regarding the Alexander Courtyard, the British administration did not carry out expropriation, sequestration, or nationalization and did not declare the object ownerless (bona vacantia). The absence of an active owner, which arose after the cessation of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, was not filled by transferring the property to the mandate state.

The practice of management and administrative interaction was built directly with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. All official correspondence, permits, and orders for the operation and maintenance of the courtyard were addressed to the IPPO as the responsible owner and manager. British authorities did not require the IPPO to present an act of transfer of ownership and did not initiate re-registration of the title, which meant tacit recognition of the established possession through the administrative behavior of the authority (recognition by conduct).

Legally, this period became key for consolidating the status of the IPPO. Continuous and lawful possession (lawful possession) in the absence of a competing owner and in the absence of state actions to expropriate the property led to the crystallization of the title. The British Mandate did not create new property rights but confirmed the existing situation based on continuity of possession (continuity of possession), which was later accepted by subsequent sovereign authorities.

Jordanian period (1948–1967): preservation of the status quo of ownership and applicable law

After 1948, East Jerusalem came under Jordanian control, which applied the principle of preserving the existing property order (status quo), used in international practice during the change of sovereignty. The applicable law included the norms of Ottoman land law (Ottoman Land Code 1858), which continued to operate in East Jerusalem, as well as the provisions of mandate law, inherited from the British administration. These sources were considered as a continuing legal order and did not require automatic re-registration of ownership.

Regarding the Alexander Courtyard, Jordanian authorities did not carry out confiscation, sequestration, or recognition of the property as ownerless (bona vacantia). The absence of such actions meant the preservation of the previous title. Administrative interaction was carried out with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society as the factual owner and manager, without requiring an act of transfer of ownership. In these conditions, the principle of lawful and continuous possession (lawful possession, continuity of possession) was applied, where the right is not created anew but preserved in the absence of competing claims.

Former Russian state property in West Jerusalem after 1948

After the declaration of independence of the State of Israel in 1948 and the establishment of its control over the western part of Jerusalem, Israel came under its jurisdiction a number of objects that previously belonged to the Russian Empire as a state. The issue of their fate was not resolved automatically but under active external political pressure from the Soviet Union.

The USSR became one of the first states to recognize Israel and used this recognition as a tool of political pressure. Soviet diplomacy directly insisted on the transfer of former imperial state real estate to the USSR as the successor of the Russian Empire. For the young Israeli state, which was in international isolation and dependent on external support, this factor was decisive.

As a result, in 1949–1951, Israel recognized the USSR’s rights to objects that before 1917 were state property of the Russian Empire and were located within western Jerusalem. Such objects included the complex of the Russian Compound (Migraash ha-Rusim), buildings of the former Russian hospital, as well as administrative and representative buildings, constructed and registered to the state treasury. These objects did not belong to church property and were not owned by public or religious organizations.

Legal formalization was carried out by administrative decisions of the Israeli government and subsequent registration in property bodies. The basis was Israel’s recognition of the USSR as the state successor of the Russian Empire exclusively in terms of state property, as well as diplomatic agreements between the parties. A separate special law was not adopted; the legal effect was achieved through a combination of executive acts and international obligations.

This mechanism did not extend to objects that before 1917 belonged to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, monasteries, or public structures, as they were not state property and did not fall under the principle of state succession.

“Orange Deal”. Redemption by the State of Israel of former Soviet real estate in West Jerusalem (1964)

In 1964, the State of Israel redeemed from the Soviet Union a significant part of the real estate in West Jerusalem, previously recognized for the USSR as state property of the Russian Empire. The deal was formalized within the framework of an interstate agreement and received the unofficial name “orange deal”.

The subject of the redemption was exclusively objects that had the status of state (treasury) property before 1917 and were located on territory under Israeli control. These included the main buildings of the Russian Compound (Migraash ha-Rusim), administrative and economic buildings, as well as buildings of the former Russian hospital and accompanying infrastructure. After the completion of the deal, the USSR’s ownership of these objects was terminated, and they passed into the full ownership of the State of Israel.

The decision to redeem was due to several reasons. The formal ownership of the USSR of large objects in the center of Jerusalem was considered by Israel as a problem of sovereignty and internal security. Legally, Israel could not nationalize foreign state property without serious international consequences, so redemption was chosen as a legal way of final settlement. In addition, the USSR was interested in converting unused foreign real estate into economic compensation, and Israel — in gaining full control over the territory for the placement of state, judicial, and municipal institutions.

The 1964 deal did not extend to objects located in East Jerusalem, did not concern church and public property, and was not related to objects that before 1917 belonged to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, monasteries, or the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The Alexander Courtyard was not included in this process.

1967: extension of the Israeli land registration system and fixation of IPPO ownership

After the Six-Day War of 1967 and the establishment of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, Israel extended its civil and property law to this territory. For the first time for the Old City, a unified national system of real estate registration was applied — the Israeli land registry Tabu (Lishkat rishum mekarkein).

Before this, other forms of land accounting existed in Jerusalem: Ottoman tapu records, as well as mandate and Jordanian practices of preserving these records. However, none of them represented a modern state cadastre with mandatory fixation of the current owner. The Israeli Tabu, unlike previous systems, fixes property rights as a legal fact recognized by the state.

When including objects of East Jerusalem in Tabu, Israel did not carry out nationalization, did not create new titles, and did not change owners. The principle of preserving previously existing property rights (status quo / continuity of title) was applied: if an object had a legal owner and was not alienated, its right was preserved and subject to fixation in the register.

The Alexander Courtyard was entered into the Israeli real estate register (Tabu) with the indication of Orthodox Palestine Society (OPS) as the owner of the plot. The basis was Ottoman purchase-sale documents, the lawful entry of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society into possession, continuous actual management of the object by the local structure after 1917, and the absence of any act of alienation in favor of the state(?). The object was not registered for the State of Israel and was not considered state property.

Thus, after 1967, the property rights to the Alexander Courtyard were first formally fixed in a modern state register precisely for OPS. It was not about the emergence of a new right, but about the state fixation of an already existing historical title, which in Israeli law is a full confirmation of private property.

1967–1990: absence of disputes and the beginning of Russian claims

From the moment of the inclusion of East Jerusalem in the legal field of the State of Israel in 1967 until the early 1990s, the issue of the ownership of the Alexander Courtyard was not raised or disputed.

During this period, the Soviet Union did not make property claims to the Alexander Courtyard, which corresponded to its previously declared renunciation of succession for foreign private and church property of the Russian Empire.

1991–1996: first practical steps of Russia

In 1991–1992, after the collapse of the USSR, Russian diplomatic missions in Israel began raising the issue of the status of certain objects of so-called “Russian real estate”, including the Alexander Courtyard, within the framework of working contacts with Israeli departments. These actions were informal and consultative in nature and were not accompanied by the filing of lawsuits, official statements of ownership rights, or attempts to change the entry in the real estate register.

In 1993–1996, the Russian side sent administrative requests to Israeli bodies asking to clarify the legal status of the object and the possibility of its re-registration. In response, Israeli registering bodies pointed to the presence of a valid entry in Tabu, as well as the absence of title documents necessary for changing the register. Formal procedures for reviewing the entry were not initiated.

During this period, no legal proceedings were conducted, no transfer decisions were made, and no changes in the real estate register occurred. All actions were limited to correspondence and consultations at the interdepartmental level.

Late 1990s — early 2000s: transition to formalized demands

In the late 1990s — early 2000s, the Russian Federation moved from consultations to formalized appeals to Israeli bodies demanding a review of the status of the Alexander Courtyard.

During this period, the Russian side began officially declaring that the object is “Russian property” and insisting on its re-registration in the state registers of Israel.

Israeli registering bodies refused to change the entry in Tabu, citing:

• the absence of proper title documents;
• the absence of a continuous and recognized chain of title;
• the presence of a valid registration for another entity.

No legal decisions were made during this period, and the entry in the real estate register remained unchanged.

2019–2022: administrative decisions and their review

In 2019, an administrative process related to changing the status of the Alexander Courtyard was initiated in Israel. The consideration of the issue took place not in a judicial order, but at the level of executive power and registration bodies.

In December 2019, within this process, an attempt was made to administratively formalize the rights of the Russian Federation to the object. These actions were of a political-administrative nature and took place against the backdrop of negotiations between Israel and Russia on the case of Israeli citizen Naama Issachar, convicted in the Russian Federation.

It is important to emphasize that it was not about judicial recognition of ownership rights. Registration actions were carried out administratively, without considering the issue of a continuous chain of title and without canceling the previously existing entry in the real estate register, which created a legal collision.

In 2020, a separate administrative decision was simultaneously made to categorize the Alexander Courtyard as a “place of Christian worship”, which transferred the object to a special legal regime, but was not an act of property transfer and did not replace legal proceedings.

In 2022, Israeli bodies canceled the administrative decisions of 2019–2020 related to changing the status of the object. The cancellation was carried out administratively, based on the results of an internal review of the legality of registration actions, without issuing a court decision on the merits of the ownership dispute.

During the review, it was established that the changes in the status of the Alexander Courtyard were made:

• without proper legal basis;
• without a court decision;
• without confirmation of a continuous and recognized chain of title.

After the cancellation of administrative decisions, the entry in the real estate register was returned to the state that existed before 2019.

2022 — present: status quo and awaiting decision

Currently, the legal status of the Alexander Courtyard remains uncertain. The object continues to be in a status quo mode until a final decision is made by the authorized bodies of the State of Israel. The process is not complete: further steps depend on the conclusions of the governmental interdepartmental commission and possible new legal actions.

Ultimately, the key decision remains with the government of Israel, not the court. The courts only fixed the status quo and directly indicated that the final answer should be developed by the interdepartmental commission and then approved by the executive branch. Thus, the issue goes far beyond a private property dispute and becomes a test of the ability of the Government of Israel to withstand external pressure without destroying the internal logic of a state of law.

Whether Benjamin Netanyahu will ultimately be able to protect the interests of the State of Israel — standing firm against the persistent demands of Putin — or whether the country will confirm its commitment to historical-legal facts, law, and democratic procedures, will be an indicator of which principle will be decisive: “political expediency” or “rule of law”.

This choice and its consequences continue to be closely monitored by NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency.

Public reaction: petition on risks to Israel’s security

Amid the ongoing dispute over the Alexander Courtyard, a public initiative emerged in Israel in the form of a petition posted on the Atzuma platform under the name Threat from Russia. The authors of the appeal urge the Israeli government to stop any forms of transferring the Alexander Courtyard to structures associated with the Russian Federation, considering such a step as a potential risk to national security.

“להגן על ישראל מהאיום הרוסי: לעצור את העברת חצר אלכסנדר לתומכי חמאס”
“Protect Israel from the Russian threat: stop the transfer of the Alexander Courtyard to Hamas supporters”

here it is (Hebrew) – https://www.atzuma.co.il/threatfromrussia

The text of the petition emphasizes that it is not just about a property or historical dispute. According to the initiators, the possible transfer of the object could lead to “institutional consolidation of Russian presence in a sensitive area of Jerusalem”, which is seen as a factor of political and symbolic influence, going beyond religious use.

A separate emphasis is placed on the risk of using religious and public structures as a “tool of external influence”, including promoting “political narratives and informal contacts that do not coincide with Israel’s interests”. The authors of the petition point out that similar “influence mechanisms” have already been used by Russia in other countries under the guise of cultural and religious institutions.

The appeal also emphasizes the geopolitical context: “active interaction of Russia with states and structures hostile to Israel, including Iran and related forces”. In this light, the transfer of the object in Jerusalem is perceived as a “potential channel of external pressure”, not as a neutral legal act.

Finally, the authors consider dangerous the very “precedent of a political decision bypassing a full legal procedure”, as it, in their opinion, “undermines trust in state institutions and creates vulnerability for future external pressure on Israeli decisions”.

At the same time, the petition is not a legal document and has no binding force. It reflects the position of part of Israeli society and serves as a form of public pressure on the executive branch, complementing the legal and political context around the Alexander Courtyard.

Touching footage remembered by all of Ukraine:

Exactly three years ago, the Defense Forces liberated Kherson. On November 11, 2022, Ukrainian troops entered the city, where they were greeted by locals with blue and yellow flags — the very ones that had been hidden from the occupiers. These fearless people immediately showed Putin’s army that it had come to the wrong place on tanks: “Kherson is Ukraine.” Many of them remain in the city today and do everything to ensure that, despite daily shelling by Russia, Kherson continues to live. Glory to all who fight! We remember those who gave their lives in battles for Ukraine.

Symbol of liberation: how the ATB truck appeared in the city

On the same day, November 11, 2022, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine entered liberated Kherson, residents saw an unexpected symbol of life returning on the streets — a truck with the logo of the Ukrainian retailer “ATB.”
The vehicle moved through the central streets, and people with flags waved at it and cried. This moment was captured on video, which spread across the country.

Everyone who saw the truck was joyful and confident that this was indeed the end of the occupation, even though Defense Forces units were only entering the outskirts of the city. Therefore, after some time, locals with blue and yellow flags were already waiting for Ukrainian defenders in the city center.

According to 24 Channel, behind the wheel was Eyal Israeli — an immigrant from Israel who has been living in Ukraine since the early 2000s.
When Russian troops left the city, he returned the truck stolen by the occupiers and drove through the streets with a Ukrainian flag.

Eyal and his friends drive around the city in the ATB truck, stopping at every billboard to remove the posters left by the Russians. “Kherson forever with Russia” — a fiction that disappears piece by piece from the streets to the cries of “Glory to Ukraine” and “Putin is a h***o!” On the billboards remain only the firmly glued pieces — the torn remnants of the “Russian world.”

We have already written about Eyal Israeli in the article – “Superhero ‘like from ‘Fauda” in the war against Russia: Israeli veteran on the banks of the Dnipro“

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Eyal Israeli — the man who returned the symbol

According to colleagues and locals, Eyal had long worked in logistics and was a partner of the ATB network in the region.
During the occupation, he refused to leave the city, helped residents, and on the day of liberation — simply took and returned the truck.

Some Ukrainian publications write that in Israel he served in special units and from the first days of the invasion helped Ukrainian military with intelligence and volunteering.
But for the residents of Kherson, he became not a scout, but a person who first opened the streets for life and flags.

“Eyal heard a lot about how Ukrainians are called ‘neo-Nazis’ and now he already knows that he saw Nazis in Ukraine while he was in occupation. While the Russians were in the city, he did everything to make their life unbearable. And when collaborators stole ATB trucks, Eyal decided he would return them. And now he drives around the city in one of them. And on it is the first Ukrainian flag that appeared in Kherson. The first banner of freedom on the truck of the company that Eyal will always be grateful to, because in Kherson he was hired by ATB long ago without knowing the language — they taught him and did everything so that he could work.”

“On the streets, Eyal is now met by joyful and surprised people. Those who have not yet seen the military in the city were definitely sure that Kherson was free if ATB had already entered here. The truck drove into Freedom Square. There are no military here yet, but there are already people waiting for them. All in flags. Seeing the truck, the crowd began to chant ‘ATB! ATB!’, and when men in balaclavas got out of it, people thought they were military and chanted ‘AFU!’. But it was not them yet. Or rather, they were not yet in the center.”

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Why this story is important

• Liberation is not only about the army and weapons, but also the courage of citizens who believe and act.
• The truck of the store chain became a symbol of the return to normalcy — food, work, life.
• An Israeli who decided to stay in a Ukrainian city during the occupation showed how the destinies of people from different countries unite in the struggle for freedom.
• For Ukrainians and the Jewish diaspora, this story is an example that true loyalty to a country is measured not by a passport, but by actions.

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Strength in people

Kherson residents continue to live under daily shelling, but blue and yellow flags still hang on the houses.
The ATB truck that day became a sign that life is returning, and the people are unbroken.

This story remains in the memory of millions: not only as a video with flags but as proof that liberation always begins with one decisive person.

What you need to know about the liberation of Kherson?

• Kherson was the only regional center of Ukraine that the Russians occupied after the start of the full-scale invasion.
• After a long operation by Ukrainian troops, the Russian defense collapsed, causing the enemy to begin a panicked retreat to the left bank of the Dnipro, where they entrenched. Now Kherson is separated from the occupiers by the river and islands where battles are taking place. The city is under daily artillery fire, MLRS, KABs, and especially drones.
• Recently, Angelina Jolie visited Kherson. This happened despite the fact that Kherson is currently one of the most dangerous cities in Ukraine.

NANews — News of Israel and Ukraine.

In the section “Jews from Ukraine” read the story of Solomon Frankfurt — a Jewish scientist and organizer of science, who in the early 20th century helped Ukraine build what today would be called “agro-innovation infrastructure”: laboratories, experimental fields, breeding stations, seed quality standards, and applied research tied to the real economy.

This biography (Ukr.) was compiled by Israeli author Shimon Briman on the website Ukrainian Jewish Encounter. He writes about Frankfurt without romanticizing — as a person who spoke equally confidently in the language of chemistry, agricultural practice, and state decisions. And that is why in Ukrainian agricultural history, Frankfurt has a figurative nickname: the network of scientific centers around Kyiv was later called the “Temple of Solomon” — not in a religious sense, but as a metaphor for a “built system” that survived the change of eras.

Who is Solomon Frankfurt — briefly, but to the point

Solomon Lvovich (Shlomo Meirovich) Frankfurt was born in 1866 in Vilno (now Vilnius). He received a European education and a doctorate in chemistry in Zurich, researching sugars in plants — a topic that directly intersects with Ukrainian beet growing and the sugar industry of the early 20th century.

But an “imperial career” for a Jewish scientist at the end of the 19th century often did not depend on abilities. Briman cites a telling episode: in 1898, Frankfurt was denied a professorship at the Moscow Agricultural Institute precisely because of his religion. In simple terms, it sounds like this: the road to universities is closed — so science must find a way through practice.

And Frankfurt found this way in Kyiv.

Kyiv: the laboratory from which the system grew

Moving to Kyiv was a turning point for Frankfurt. In 1901–1920 (Briman highlights this period as the most productive), he worked where science meets real production: sugar factories, agrochemistry, seed quality, yield.

Frankfurt headed the agrochemical laboratory of the Kyiv Agricultural Syndicate and began promoting what today seems obvious but was then new managerial thinking: seeds should not just be bought and sown, but checked, compared, improved, standardized. Science should measure results, not serve beautiful reports.

Briman emphasizes that from this laboratory over time grew a functioning scientific center at the specialized Institute of Agriculture. That is, it is not about a “flash of talent,” but about creating an institutional base: structure, people, methods, a habit of experimentation.

Experimental fields and fertilizers: work not in theory

Frankfurt did not confine himself to office chemistry. According to Briman, he participated in creating a network of experimental fields in several provinces — to test ideas not on paper, but in soil and weather. This is important: Ukraine is vast and diverse, and universal recipes in agriculture work poorly.

A separate direction was work with mineral fertilizers. At that time, it sounded like a “modernization tool” — an opportunity to increase yield and stabilize product quality. In the text, Frankfurt appears as a person who explained to producers and landowners: yes, it’s money, yes, it’s technology, but without it, the agro-economy will lag behind.

Briman essentially shows a “transition model”: from agriculture as a tradition — to agriculture as an industry where decisions are confirmed by data.

Myronivka and “Ukrainka”: when selection becomes part of the country

One of the key episodes is the organization in 1909 of the Central Research Station for Sugar Beet Culture near Myronivka. Briman writes that the station was supported by local sugar manufacturers: this is an important link between science and business, without which infrastructure usually does not survive.

Later, based on these initiatives, the Myronivka Breeding Station (today — the Institute of Wheat) appeared. And here Briman gives a detail that catches even people far from the agricultural topic: Frankfurt is credited with the authorship of the idea of naming the winter soft wheat variety “Ukrainka 0246.”

This is not a trifle. The name of the variety is a symbol that “Ukrainian” can be not only a political declaration but also a specific product of science: grown, tested, distributed.

Frankfurt and Ukrainian statehood: a choice that was not “neutral”

Briman shows Frankfurt as a person who did not hide from politics — although he was not a political tribune. During the Ukrainian revolution, Frankfurt participated in creating professional and scientific structures, worked in commissions, and dealt with what often remains behind the scenes: the institutional design of the industry.

The text contains a thought that Briman formulates harshly and without embellishments:
“He believed in Ukrainian statehood more than many Ukrainians” — writes Briman.

Separately noted is the work under the Hetman government, where Frankfurt dealt with agriculture and food issues and participated in preparing agricultural legislation. That is, it was not “sympathy in words,” but involvement in managerial routine: documents, norms, rules.

Negotiations of 1918: economic diplomacy and sugar

There is also an international layer. Briman cites the position of historian Ruslan Piroh: Frankfurt twice represented Ukraine in complex economic negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918. The essence — the Ukrainian side defended economic conditions, including a fair price for Ukrainian sugar.

Briman emphasizes: it was not a “symbolic trip,” but negotiation work where each figure had political weight.

The text also mentions Frankfurt being awarded a German order — as a marker of recognition of his role in these contacts.

Emigration and World ORT: continuation of the Ukrainian biography in the world

After the defeat of the UNR, Frankfurt, according to Briman, refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and emigrated at the end of 1920. Then another part of life begins — but it logically continues the first: building a system, only now at an international level.

For decades, Frankfurt worked at World ORT — an organization engaged in technological education and support for artisans and farmers. Briman lists the cities and stages of ORT’s European work, and then the move to the USA. From 1947, Frankfurt became the president of World ORT.

He died in 1954 and was buried in New York State. But the Ukrainian trace in his biography did not disappear: Briman builds the line so that the reader sees — the experience of creating agricultural infrastructure in Ukraine became part of his broader, global project.

Why “Temple of Solomon” sounds especially poignant today

The metaphor “Temple of Solomon” Briman associates with the assessment of academician Viktor Vergunov: it is about the agricultural scientific centers of Ukraine created by Frankfurt, which worked even after him. The meaning of the metaphor is in the built “architecture of science”: when the system continues to function, even if the creator is long gone.

The finale with Briman is modern and very direct: he reminds that Jewish school No. 141 in Kyiv, operating under the aegis of ORT, is experiencing a difficult military winter — with shelling, power, and heat outages. The story of a person from the early 20th century suddenly turns out to be close to the reality of 2026.

Main conclusions for the section “Jews from Ukraine”

Frankfurt is an example of a Jewish intellectual who became part of the Ukrainian modernization project not with slogans, but with infrastructure.

His contribution is not one “loud idea,” but a habit of scientific verification, standardization, and systematic experimentation in agriculture.

During the Ukrainian revolution, he made a conscious choice in favor of Ukrainian statehood and worked in real managerial mechanisms.

His subsequent work at World ORT shows the continuation of the same logic: education, applied skills, community support — through institutions, not declarations.

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Text: Shimon Briman (Israel). https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/uk/hram-solomona-bilya-ki%d1%94va-yak-%d1%94vrejskij-vchenij-prosuvav-agroindustriyu-ukra%d1%97ni/

The author is grateful to the employee of the World ORT Archive in London, Jennifer Brunton, for assistance in finding materials and providing a photograph of Solomon Frankfurt.