Israel News

In Israel, from June 18–21, 2026, an unusual story at the intersection of politics, war, television, and conspiracy theories gained widespread attention. At the center was Uri Geller — an Israeli illusionist and mentalist, known for many years for his claims of supernatural abilities, telepathy, and work with intelligence agencies.

This time, Geller linked the behavior of US President Donald Trump with Iran and claimed that the sharp changes in the American leader’s position could be the result of exposure to “low-frequency electromagnetic waves.”

The main thing here is accuracy. This is not an official statement from the Israeli government and not confirmed information from intelligence services. This is Uri Geller’s public version, voiced in the Israeli media space and then published by Channel 14 as a broadcast story.

What happened on June 18, 2026

On June 18, 2026, Israeli TV host Sharon Gal posted a video on Instagram with a caption in Hebrew: “אורי גלר במסר חד לנשיא טראמפ” — “Uri Geller with a sharp message to President Trump.” In this video, Geller addressed Trump and discussed his position on Iran.

The context was a sharp debate in Israel around the American line on Iran. In June 2026, the international press discussed US-Iran negotiations, a memorandum of understanding, and the controversy over how Washington tries to present the agreement: as a strategic victory for the US or as a concession to Tehran. The Soufan Center wrote on June 15, 2026, that the US and Iran are competing to shape the public perception of the agreement, with sanctions, assets, and the Strait of Hormuz remaining key issues.

For Israel, this was not abstract diplomacy. Any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran is directly perceived through the lens of security, the Iranian nuclear program, missile threats, Hezbollah, and Israel’s future freedom of action.

What was written on June 19, 2026

On June 19, 2026, the Israeli site “בחדרי חרדים” published an article with the headline: “נשמע הזוי לגמרי” — “Sounds completely insane.” The author of the article, Hani Levin, noted the publication time: 19.06.26.

The article stated that Uri Geller, in an interview with Sharon Gal on חדשות 24, offered a conspiratorial explanation for Trump’s behavior. According to Geller, the change in the US president’s position was not accidental and could be related to ELF — Extremely Low Frequency technology, meaning the impact of extremely low frequencies.

Geller claimed that with such technology, it is possible to “bombard the brains of leaders with low frequencies.” He also stated that he knows about this because, in the past, according to him, the American intelligence agency CIA asked him to perform various tasks. Host Sharon Gal reacted skeptically and said it “sounds completely insane.”

In the same retelling, it was noted that Geller suggested Trump might have been subjected to such exposure during visits to China or in Washington. After Sharon Gal’s question about whether the situation could be “reversed” with another signal, Geller stated that he is personally trying to act in this direction.

What Channel 14 published on June 21, 2026

On June 21, 2026, Channel 14 / C14 posted an article under the headline: “אורי גלר טוען: זה מה שקרה לנשיא — ‘הוא לא טראמפ האמיתי’”, which can be translated as: “Uri Geller claims: this is what happened to the president — ‘he is not the real Trump’.” The publication date on the C14 page is indicated as 21.06.26.

The C14 publication directly stated that Geller, on the program “ישראל הבוקר” with Tal Meir, put forward an “unusual theory” about changes in Donald Trump’s positions. According to Geller, hostile elements are using technology based on very low-frequency electromagnetic waves, which allegedly can influence the functioning of the human brain, behavior, and decision-making.

Channel 14 also cited Geller’s claim about the E-1000 technology. He stated that countries like Russia, North Korea, and Iran possess it. According to him, Trump could have been affected by such “emissions” during foreign visits or even through weapons operating from embassies.

Separately, Geller recalled a story from the past where he allegedly helped the US convince Russian representative Yulia Vorontsova to sign a nuclear disarmament agreement using a combination of telepathy and ELF weapons. This was also retold in the C14 material.

Why this story became notable

This story is important not because Geller’s version is proven. There is no evidence in the published materials that Iran is affecting Trump’s brain with low-frequency weapons.

It is important for another reason.

By June 18–21, 2026, part of the Israeli right-wing media space was clearly looking for an explanation as to why Trump, whom many in Israel considered the toughest ally on the Iran issue, began acting not as his supporters expected. When the behavior of the American president no longer fits into the usual political picture, not only analysis and criticism emerge, but also versions on the verge of fantasy.

That is why Sharon Gal’s phrase “sounds completely insane” became almost key in this story. The host did not present Geller’s words as a proven fact. He directly expressed doubt. But the very fact of such a conversation appearing in the Israeli broadcast shows the level of nervousness around American policy on Iran.

What is important for the Israeli audience to understand

For Israel, the main question is not whether “waves against Trump’s brain” exist. The main question is different: how reliable American policy remains if White House decisions on Iran can change quickly, sharply, and without a clear explanation for allies.

In June 2026, the American line on Iran was discussed against the backdrop of reports of a possible memorandum, sanctions, the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington’s attempt to present the diplomatic process as control over the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, in the Israeli discussion itself, the feeling was growing that US agreements with Iran might not align with Israel’s security interests.

NAnews — Israel News draws attention to this part of the story: behind the loud and strange wording about “electromagnetic weapons” lies real political anxiety. Israeli society is trying to understand whether it can continue to fully rely on the personal promises of the American president if his position on Iran can change within a few days.

Conclusion

The fact is: June 18, 2026, a video with Uri Geller and a message to Trump appeared with Sharon Gal; June 19, 2026, the site “בחדרי חרדים” retold this as an unusual and conspiratorial version; June 21, 2026, Channel 14 published material about Geller’s statement on the program “ישראל הבוקר.”

The claim that Iran is affecting Trump with low-frequency electromagnetic weapons remains precisely Uri Geller’s claim. There is no confirmation of this.

But the story itself became a symptom of a more serious issue: in Israel, there is growing concern that US policy on Iran may be determined not only by Israel’s security interests but also by the internal logic of the American administration, negotiations with Tehran, and Donald Trump’s personal style.

And when real politics becomes too unpredictable, versions that would have seemed like a joke yesterday begin to appear in the broadcast. Today they are already becoming part of the news agenda.

The material is prepared based on the interview with “Hromadske Radio” (published on January 15, 2026 (Ukr.)). Interviewees: journalist Yelyzaveta Tsaregradska and the president of the Ukrainian Association of Judaic Studies, senior research fellow of the Judaic Foundation of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, Vitaliy Chernoivanenko.

Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls are one of those topics where a successful name immediately sets both geography and intrigue. On one hand, it is a real point on the map near the Dead Sea in the Judean Desert, not far from Jerusalem. On the other hand, it is a huge corpus of texts found in caves and surroundings that changes the understanding of the religious and intellectual life of Judea at the turn of our era. That is why the question “what is Qumran” almost always leads to the next: “who wrote these scrolls and why did they end up in the caves.”

Why they are called “Dead Sea Scrolls”

In the interview, Chernoivanenko begins with a mundane but illustrative story: when he defended his dissertation on this topic (2012), one of the council members was surprised by the very phrase “manuscripts of the sea” — like, “how can there be manuscripts of some sea.” But the name “Dead Sea Scrolls” (as well as “Qumran Scrolls”) is an established term in different languages, including Ukrainian, English, French, and Hebrew.

The term is also important because it fixes the difference between “Dead Sea Scrolls” in a broad sense and “Qumran Scrolls” in a narrow sense. The Dead Sea Scrolls are finds from various locations near the Dead Sea, while “Qumran” refers to those found specifically in the Qumran area. At the same time, the largest array of finds is indeed associated with Qumran, so in the public consciousness, everything often “collapses” into one point.

Where is Qumran and what is this place

Qumran is not a city in the usual sense. Chernoivanenko emphasizes: debates about what exactly Qumran was (a settlement, the center of some group, an economic object, something else) continue to this day. But as a geographical location, it is described quite clearly.

We are talking about a territory that today belongs to the State of Israel. In ancient times, these lands were called differently in different eras: the Kingdom of Israel, the Kingdom of Judah, and in Roman times — Palestine (at the same time, the term “Palestine,” as the expert reminds, was not the original name of these lands but was fixed later and “stretched” to modern political lexicon).

Geographically, Qumran is located on the northwest of the Dead Sea, in the Judean Desert, near Jerusalem. In literature, the names Khirbet Qumran and Wadi Qumran are encountered. “Wadi” is an Arabic word for a dry riverbed of a seasonal desert river: in the region, rains occur mainly in winter, water appears, but then quickly disappears, the land dries up and cracks. “Khirbet” means “ruins” — that is, the name itself refers to something destroyed, to the remnants of a former structure.

What dates are associated with the scrolls and why is it important

If we “reduce” the finds to a historical range, Chernoivanenko names the period from the 2nd century BCE to the 1st century CE. At the same time, according to him, there are relatively few finds from the 2nd century BCE, the main array relates to the 1st century BCE and the 1st century CE.

This is a key point for explaining why the Dead Sea Scrolls became a global scientific “magnet.” We are talking about a time when different religious and political movements existed in Judea, complex internal processes were taking place, and in a broader context, an environment was forming from which early Christianity later emerged. The scrolls become an additional source, not reducible only to the texts of the New Testament or later retellings.

What languages are the scrolls written in

According to Chernoivanenko, three languages are recorded among the finds: ancient Hebrew, Aramaic, and a little ancient Greek. The appearance of Greek is associated with the post-Hellenistic era when Greek culture spread to the Middle East and became part of the regional reality.

This is not just a “detail for reference.” Multilingualism helps explain how heterogeneous the intellectual environment was and how different audiences could be involved in the production, reading, and copying of texts.

How and when were the scrolls discovered

The first discovery of the scrolls Chernoivanenko dates to 1947. He mentions the “legendary” story of a Bedouin who supposedly stumbled upon jars and found the first scrolls. Further interest in the finds grew: in the 1950s-60s, archaeologists and researchers became active, excavations and research continued then with interruptions, not only in Qumran but also in other points around the Dead Sea — finds “accumulated” over time.

Another important point: access to the scrolls was long restricted — almost until the 1990s. At the same time, the volume of scientific reaction was colossal. The expert says that in the first decade of Qumran studies, research on this topic in scale was second only to biblical studies (Bible research): it was about thousands of works, and he provides a benchmark — about six thousand studies in the first decade.

How many scrolls exist and in what form have they survived

Speaking of manuscript material, not everything has survived intact. Many texts have been preserved in fragments, sometimes very small. But in general, according to Chernoivanenko, more than a thousand “manuscript units” have been found.

This immediately affects how a researcher’s work looks: reconstruction, comparison of handwriting, materials, text variants, attempts to understand which fragments relate to what, and what exactly was in the hands of people two thousand years ago.

What’s inside: it’s not a “chronicle,” but a motley library

One of the most common mistakes is to expect that the Dead Sea Scrolls will be something like a coherent chronicle of events, a “diary of the era,” or systematic annals. Chernoivanenko speaks directly: there are no chronicles in this corpus. Yes, in the biblical tradition there are chronicle books or books of kings, where reigns and events are described, but there is almost none of this in the Dead Sea Scrolls.

But there is something else: extraordinary genre diversity and multilayeredness. The expert emphasizes that the corpus is heterogeneous not only in languages. There are many different handwritings — that is, a significant number of people were involved in the creation/copying of texts. There are also texts of an eschatological, apocalyptic, messianic nature, which, in his assessment, shows how society of that time lived with expectations of “end times.” This, in particular, helps to better understand the context in which early Christianity emerged: initially, it looked like one of the movements within Judaism of that era, and the scrolls demonstrate the diversity of such movements.

In addition, among the scrolls, there are very different types of documents: from actual biblical books (for example, prophetic) to texts that can be called non-canonical, as well as commentaries on biblical books (exegesis). Chernoivanenko mentions unexpected genres — for example, horoscopes. And another important feature: many texts work through allusions, so researchers sometimes tried to “read” historical events and characters of the era indirectly, through hints and images.

What editions are available and why translations are a separate problem

Chernoivanenko notes that today there are several editions of the entire corpus of the Dead Sea Scrolls. There are practically no Ukrainian translations (he says he translated a small volume in an appendix to his own book). In Russian, there were separate attempts back in Soviet times and later — in the post-Soviet period, publications with the most famous texts were released, but not the entire corpus.

The full corpus is published, according to him, in English and Hebrew, there are also bilingual versions, where the original and translation are side by side. He separately mentions the digital format: when high-quality scans of the scrolls are available, and the user can hover over a word and see a hint with reading, meaning, and translation. Importantly, this changes the accessibility of the material compared to the era when the scrolls were “closed” to most researchers.

Main debates: who are the authors and what is Qumran

The interview outlines the basic framework of the discussion, with which, according to Chernoivanenko, almost any serious conversation about the scrolls begins: there are two big questions.

The first is what Qumran was as a place.

The second is who wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls (and, in particular, the Qumran Scrolls).

Chernoivanenko explains that he systematically analyzed these questions in his book “Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship, Identification, Historiography,” where he collected and analyzed different theories and hypotheses.

The most famous version: the “Qumran-Essene” theory and its logic

The first, most popular in mass perception version arose very early — almost immediately after the 1947 finds. A group of researchers formed, and then an international team, where not everyone was admitted. Chernoivanenko separately emphasizes a characteristic detail: among this team, there was not a single Jew; key roles were played by Christians, including Catholic monks. The central figure of this early wave was the priest and researcher Roland de Vaux.

Their picture looked like this: Qumran was presented as something like an “ancient monastery” with a scriptorium — a place where scribes sat and copied/wrote scrolls. The image is clear: an ascetic group, discipline, text production, storage.

At the same time, Qumran as an archaeological point was known since the 19th century — Chernoivanenko mentions the French archaeologist Clermont-Ganneau, who paid attention to the place long before the discovery of the scrolls. And the “attachment” to a specific group early researchers tried to support with ancient authors: Josephus Flavius, Philo of Alexandria, and Pliny the Elder. In their texts, a group of Essenes is described — mysterious, marginal, ascetic, living in anticipation of the end times.

And then a logical “glue” occurs: ancient sources talk about Essenes in the area of the northwest Dead Sea; in this area, there is Qumran; therefore, Qumran is the place of the Essenes; therefore, they could be the authors/keepers of the scrolls.

Chernoivanenko, however, shows why this version raises questions. One of the sharp points: in ancient descriptions, it is said that the Essenes did not marry, which for Judaism looks marginal against the backdrop of the biblical commandment “be fruitful and multiply.” It can be assumed that a small ascetic group existed — but it can also be argued how accurate and “non-mythological” this image is.

Alternative: “Jerusalem theory” and arguments against the idea of a “small community of scribes”

Then Chernoivanenko moves to a position he considers an important alternative and without which the conversation would be incomplete. He associates it with the works of his scientific mentor — University of Chicago professor Norman Golb. Golb published a key article in 1980, and then developed ideas in subsequent works and in the book “Who Wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls?” in the 1990s.

The essence of the “Jerusalem theory” is that many features of the corpus point not to a small isolated community in Qumran, but to a large urban center — Jerusalem.

The arguments in the interview are presented step by step.

First, different content and different genre: within the corpus, there are texts that are sometimes simply incompatible with each other in spirit and ideas. This poorly fits the image of a “single community” with a single charter and uniform practice.

Second, the number of different handwritings and the scale of manuscript work. Chernoivanenko explains in detail who a professional scribe is in the Jewish tradition. This is not “a person who sat down and copied.” This is a trained specialist, a calligrapher, a profession with discipline and training. In Judaism, this practice has been preserved for centuries, and the profession of sofer — a scribe of sacred texts — still exists. He provides understandable examples from modern life: Torah scrolls in a synagogue, mezuzahs on doors, where inside lies a handwritten text — all this must be written professionally and according to the rules.

From here, the conclusion: it is hard to imagine a small community where there would be “incredibly many” qualified scribes — this would look like a statistically and socially unrealistic model. But in Jerusalem, the capital of Judea at that time, the existence of many groups, schools, traditions, and scribes looks much more plausible.

Then the next question arises: if “all roads lead to Jerusalem,” how did the scrolls end up in the caves near the Dead Sea, including the Qumran area?

The answer in the interview is tied to the historical context of the Jewish War of 66–73 CE. In 70, the Romans took Jerusalem. In Golb’s logic, this triggers a scenario of saving values: people flee the city, take out what they consider important, including scrolls. Chernoivanenko mentions that Josephus Flavius describes the directions of the movement of refugees from Jerusalem, and one of the directions was the area of the Dead Sea.

Then a simple human mechanism comes into play: life is more important than things. If a person understands that they may not escape pursuit, they may hide valuable things “for better times.” The caves near the Dead Sea could become such hiding places. In this model, the scrolls lay for almost two thousand years and “returned” in the 20th century as an archaeological sensation.

Why the topic is important today, including the Ukrainian context

Chernoivanenko emphasizes several times that the Dead Sea Scrolls are not “exotic for narrow specialists,” but a source that expands knowledge about what Jewish society of that time was like, what ideas circulated, what expectations and disputes looked like within the religious environment. This corpus provides material “from the side” of the New Testament and allows us to see that era differently, when messianic and apocalyptic motifs were part of everyday intellectual life.

A separate line in the original source states that the project (within which the conversation took place) was prepared with the support of the Canadian non-governmental organization “Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” (UJE). This emphasizes that the conversation about Qumran and the scrolls is not only an “Israeli” topic: it exists in both the academic and cultural agenda of Ukraine, where Judaic studies are developing as an independent direction, connected with libraries, universities, translations, and scientific discussions.

In a practical sense, the main outcome of the interview is this: Qumran is geography, and the Dead Sea Scrolls are a corpus that is too diverse to be “closed” forever with one convenient version. The more texts, technologies, and parallel studies are opened, the more noticeable it becomes that the answers here will be refined for a long time. That is why Qumran studies remain a living discipline — not museum-like, but working, arguing, and reassembling details anew.

And for the Israeli audience, it is also a reminder: the Judean Desert, Jerusalem, and the Dead Sea are not only tourist spots but also places where texts literally lay that defined the language of conversations about the Bible, Judaism, and early Christianity for two thousand years ahead — and these texts continue to influence how the world reads the region today. NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

A new Ukrainian space for children will appear in Tel Aviv this summer. Ukrainian Meetings in Israel are launching a children’s summer camp “Bright Summer” for the first time — a series of three thematic meetings for children 7–12 years old.

The camp will be held on Fridays — July 10, 17, and 24, 2026 — at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, located at Yirmeyahu / ירמיהו 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo. Each meeting will last from 11:00 to 14:00.

For Ukrainian families in Israel, this is not just another summer activity for the child. It is an opportunity to spend part of the holidays in a warm environment where children can meet, play, create, communicate, and feel connected to two important worlds at once — Ukraine and Israel.

What is “Bright Summer”

Organizers describe the camp as a series of thematic meetings during the summer holidays. The idea of the project is to create a safe, friendly, and lively space for children where they can find new friends from the community, try their hand at creativity, participate in team games, and simply have a good time among peers.

Participants can expect creative workshops, active and team games, activities for acquaintance and interaction, a light snack, and an atmosphere where the child feels comfortable being themselves.

It is particularly important that the organizers consciously make a small group — about 12–15 children. This format allows attention to be given to each child, without turning the camp into a noisy mass platform where someone quickly gets lost or stays on the sidelines.

For parents, this is especially important: in the summer in Israel, many families are looking not just for “where to take the child for a few hours,” but a place that is warm, calm, understandable in terms of values, and close in cultural environment.

When and where the camp will take place

The Ukrainian children’s camp “Bright Summer” will be held in Tel Aviv on three Fridays in July:

July 10, 2026
July 17, 2026
July 24, 2026

Time of each meeting: 11:00–14:00.

Venue — Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, ירמיהו 22 / Yirmeyahu 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo.

The event organizer is Ukrainian Meetings in Israel, a community that has long been creating a space for Ukrainian families in Israel. Now special attention is being paid to children — those who especially need communication, movement, creativity, and a sense of belonging during the summer holidays.

Why this is important for Ukrainian families in Israel

After moving, war, adaptation, and living between languages, children often lack their understandable circle. Israel provides safety and new opportunities, but it is important for children to maintain the Ukrainian part of their identity — not through heavy conversations, but through friendship, games, creativity, songs, shared memories, and simple summer meetings.

That is why the format of “Bright Summer” seems especially relevant. It is not a school lesson or an official event. It is a light summer program where a child can communicate, get to know other children, participate in activities, and feel that the Ukrainian community in Israel is not only adult meetings, news, and help, but also children’s joy.

For NAnews — News of Israel, such events are also important because they show the lively side of the Ukrainian-Israeli community. Behind big topics — war, politics, repatriation, security — there is the ordinary life of families, children, parents, and local initiatives.

The summer camp in Tel Aviv is just such a story: small in scale, but very human in meaning.

What will be in the program

Organizers promise participants:

• creative workshops;
• active and team games;
• activities for acquaintance and interaction;
• a light snack;
• a safe and friendly atmosphere;
• a space for communication for children 7–12 years old.

Details about the program of each meeting, the daily schedule, the team, participation conditions, frequently asked questions, and the registration form are published on the camp’s website. Parents can view the information and register their child on the project page: https://sites.google.com/view/bright-summer-camp

The number of places is limited, as the group is small. Organizers advise not to delay registration if the family plans to participate.

Event poster

Event: Ukrainian children’s summer camp “Bright Summer”

City: Tel Aviv

Dates: July 10, 17, and 24, 2026

Time: 11:00–14:00

Venue: Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv

Address: Yirmeyahu / ירמיהו 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo

Age: children 7–12 years old

Group: up to 12–15 children

Organizer: Ukrainian Meetings in Israel

Registration and details: https://sites.google.com/view/bright-summer-camp

Summer for children should not only be a time without school, but also a time of new acquaintances, discoveries, movement, and joy. In July 2026, Ukrainian families in Israel will have another opportunity to give children just such a summer — bright, warm, friendly, and connected with Ukraine.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, this event can be seen as part of a broader picture: the Ukrainian community in Israel not only preserves memory and responds to the events of the war but also builds everyday life in which children have their place, their circle, and their summer stories.

On September 2, 2025, Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov, on behalf of the entire city, presented Roman Shvartsman with the title of “Honorary Citizen of the City of Odessa”.

They congratulate him warmly and in a homely way, calling him “our Romochka”. They emphasize that he truly deserves this award.

As is customary in Jewish tradition, they wish him “Mazal Tov” and long life – “up to 120”.

It is noted that Roman Markovich managed to survive Nazism and the Soviet system, and there is confidence that he will cope with modern challenges, including Rashism.

 

Roman Markovich Shvartsman, born on November 7, 1936, in Bershad, Vinnytsia region, at the age of five, ended up in the Bershad ghetto, where he spent 3.5 years in inhumane conditions. This experience left an indelible mark on his fate and became the foundation of his struggle for truth and memory.

According to Odessa portal “Dumskaya”, the city council plans to confer this title on him in the near future.

Roman Shvartsman himself confirmed this information to a “Dumskaya” correspondent and shared his emotions.

“For me, it is a great honor and deep excitement to be presented for the title of Honorary Citizen of Odessa,” Shvartsman noted.

He added that this is the highest award from the city where he has lived his entire life after the war, and which has become for him a “source of revival and strength.”

“This is recognition not only of my work but of everyone whose memory I try to preserve. All those who passed through ghettos and concentration camps. All who gave their lives fighting Nazism. All who today fight for Ukraine’s independence… The title of ‘Honorary Citizen of Odessa’ is not just for me. It is for everyone who survived, who remembers, who passes the truth on. It is for Odessa, which has always been a multicultural, free, and strong-spirited city. I am grateful to everyone who supports this initiative. For me, this is not the end, but a new obligation: to work even harder, speak even louder, and remember even deeper,” said Roman Shvartsman.

After the war ended in 1955, he moved to Odessa, where he studied at Vocational School No. 2 as a “mechanic-assembler.” Later, he graduated from the Odessa Institute of Marine Engineers, becoming a mechanical engineer. His entire working life was connected to the “Poligraphmash” factory, where he worked for over 30 years, showing the highest professionalism and dedication.

Decades of community work

Since 1990, Roman Shvartsman has been actively involved in public life as the head of the Odessa Regional Association of Jews – former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps. In 1992, he became a member of the international organization of former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps, founded in Odessa. He remains an active member, uniting those who remember the tragic pages of history.

Shvartsman also serves as the Vice President of the All-Ukrainian Association of Jews – former prisoners of ghettos and concentration camps, led by Boris Zabarko. He is also Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Odessa Society of Jewish Culture and Head of the socio-cultural center.

The Holocaust Museum and monuments – a lifetime’s work

Shvartsman played a huge role in creating the Holocaust Museum in Odessa, which opened on June 22, 2009. In his words:

“This museum should become a school, a university for the young, so that they understand what the Holocaust was.”

Today, the museum has over 4,000 exhibits and, over the years, has been visited by about 20,000 people – diplomats, students, schoolchildren, tourists, and Israelis, for whom the memory of the Holocaust is inseparable from their identity.

Thanks to Shvartsman’s persistence, over 30 monuments and memorials have been established in Odessa, Odessa region, and Mykolaiv region. Among them is the Memorial Complex on Lustdorf Road, the site where 25,000 Jews were killed. In 2015, in the village of Hvozdivka2, a mass grave containing the remains of 3,500 Jews was discovered, above which a memorial was erected at Shvartsman’s initiative.

“Wherever you dig, you’ll find bones – teeth and skulls. It’s horrible.”

Speech in the Bundestag and international recognition

On January 30, 2025, Roman Shvartsman spoke at the German Bundestag during a session dedicated to the memory of the victims of National Socialism. His words to the deputies became a symbol of the parallel between the horrors of the Holocaust and the modern aggression of putin against Ukraine:

“At that time, Hitler tried to kill me because I was a Jew. Now putin is trying to kill me because I am Ukrainian,” he declared, speaking in the German parliament on January 29, 2025, during the session dedicated to the memory of the victims of Nazism.

Shvartsman also called on Germany to actively support Ukraine and increase arms supplies:

“I appeal to you: arm us so that putin ends this war of annihilation.”

He especially emphasized Ukraine’s need for long-range missiles.

Shvartsman reminded everyone that it is the duty of current generations to prevent new catastrophes and protect civilians from violence.

His speech received a standing ovation and the support of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. He urged Germany to increase support for Ukraine and stressed the moral duty of everyone – to stop new barbarism.

Awards and recognition

For decades of work and service to society, Roman Shvartsman has received numerous awards:

• Order of Merit III degree (2006) – for personal courage and the fight against fascism.
• Order of Merit II degree (2013) – for the development of the veteran movement and patriotic education of the youth.
• Order of Merit I degree (2018) – for outstanding contributions to the development of Ukraine and high professionalism.
• Title of “Honored Machine Builder of the Ukrainian SSR” (1989).
• Medals “For Labor Distinction” (1977) and “Veteran of Labor” (1985).
• Honorary award of the Odessa mayor “Labor Glory.”
• German Cross of Merit (2003).
• Jubilee medals for national and international merits.

Memories of the Holocaust

Recalling his childhood, Roman Shvartsman shared that in early July 1941, his mother tried to evacuate with eight children. However, due to the advance of German and Romanian troops, the evacuation attempt failed. In August 1941, the occupiers entered Bershad and created two ghettos, one of which housed Shvartsman’s family.

25,000 Jews from Bessarabia and Vinnytsia region were deported to the ghetto. During the years of occupation, the Nazis murdered 13,871 Jews.

In 1942, while Roman’s older brother was working on repairing a bridge over the Dokhno River, he was shot by Romanian guards. This tragedy formed the basis for one of the films by Israeli director Boris Mavtzer. Shvartsman recalls the unbearable living conditions, constant hunger, and fear. On March 29, 1944, the town of Bershad was liberated.

Odessa honors its hero

Today, the Odessa City Council is preparing to confer the title of Honorary Citizen on Roman Shvartsman. For Shvartsman himself, this is not just an honor, but a new challenge and responsibility:

“This is recognition not only of my efforts but of all those who survived the Holocaust and continue to fight for Ukraine’s freedom.”

The site NAnews – Israel News emphasizes: Shvartsman’s fate is an important example of the unity of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples, who together oppose hatred and aggression.

The story of Roman Shvartsman is a reminder that the Jewish people and Ukrainians, despite all trials, continue to fight for truth and freedom. The site NAnews – Israel News is confident: such heroes help us remember the lessons of the past and build a peaceful future.

Inside the ‘axis of evil’, where Russia, Iran, and North Korea have tried for years to appear as a unified anti-Western bloc, noticeable reshuffles have begun. And the most unpleasant for the Kremlin is that Russia no longer appears as the main center of power in this structure.

After another round of conflict with the US, it is Tehran that emerges from the situation more confidently than Moscow. For Ukraine, this may seem unexpected, but the weakening of Russia’s role within this group works to our advantage: the less influence the Kremlin has among its own allies, the harder it is for it to turn the war against Ukraine into a common agenda for the anti-Western camp.

Iran looks stronger than Moscow — and this changes the balance

Iran turned out to be the only capital in this bloc that withstood direct military-diplomatic pressure from the US and did not appear weaker afterward. Against the backdrop of Russia, bogged down in the war against Ukraine, Tehran, on the contrary, demonstrates resilience and tries to raise its political price.

Moscow, on the other hand, increasingly looks not like a leader, but like a state forced to cling to old threats, nuclear blackmail, propaganda, and dependence on partners it once tried to lecture.

This is an important shift. For years, Russia has sold itself as the main center of power for anyone who wants to oppose the West. But today, it itself needs Iranian technologies, North Korean ammunition, bypass schemes, and foreign political loyalty.

Why this might be beneficial for Ukraine

For Ukraine, any loss of Russian monopoly within such a bloc matters.

If the Kremlin is no longer perceived as the main player, it is harder for it to impose its agenda on partners. Moscow wants the war against Ukraine to appear as part of a large global confrontation. But when Iran begins to play more independently and confidently, the Russian war no longer appears to all of the Kremlin’s allies as the only topic.

This does not make Iran safe. Quite the opposite. But within the camp hostile to Ukraine and Israel, competition, jealousy, and a struggle for first place emerge.

For Kyiv, this is a window of opportunity. The less unconditional authority Russia has, the harder it is for it to gather weapons, technologies, money, diplomatic gestures, and silent consent around its aggression.

Israel faced a more dangerous regional reality

For Israel, this same situation looks much more alarming.

If Iran emerges from the conflict with the feeling that it withstood the pressure and did not lose, it may strengthen its positions in the Middle East. Tehran can perceive what is happening as proof of its own resilience, and therefore act more harshly through allied structures, political pressure, and proxy groups.

Therefore, it is important for the Israeli audience to look at this topic more broadly. This is not only the Ukrainian war and not only Russian weakness. It is a chain of crises where Ukraine, Israel, the US, Iran, and Russia are much more closely connected than it seems at first glance.

In this context, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views what is happening as a signal of a redistribution of forces: Moscow is weakening, Tehran is trying to take a higher place, and Israel and Ukraine are forced to assess the new reality without illusions.

Why this is unpleasant for the Kremlin

For many years, Russia built the image of a power supposedly capable of dictating terms to both the West and its own partners. But the full-scale war against Ukraine gradually destroyed this image.

The Kremlin spends enormous resources, suffers military and economic losses, depends on supplies of Iranian drones, North Korean shells, and gray schemes. Such dependence poorly matches the claim to the role of leader.

In this situation, Iran may already look at Russia not as a senior partner, but as a weakened ally that itself needs help.

The Kazan Declaration showed the limits of Putin’s influence

A telling example is the final Kazan Declaration after the ASEAN summit. Despite Putin’s personal attempts to achieve a clear position on Ukraine from the participants, the final document did not contain formulations that could be called support for the Kremlin’s version of the war.

Instead of Russian narratives, there remained standard references to the UN Charter and international law. The only thing that can be loosely linked to the Russian-Ukrainian war is a general phrase about the desire to resolve conflicts diplomatically.

For Moscow, this is a weak result.

The Kremlin wanted to get a political symbol and show that a significant part of the world is ready to accept its explanation of aggression against Ukraine. But instead, it received a cautious document without direct support for Russian demands.

Russia’s economy is entering a risk zone

Russia is losing even temporary economic advantages that previously helped the Kremlin maintain the situation.

For the Russian system to receive a serious financial respite, world oil prices would have to rise to about $200 per barrel and stay at that level not for a few days, but at least a year. Such a scenario now looks extremely unlikely.

That is why nervous movements within the Russian financial system become especially indicative. The decision of the Central Bank of Russia on June 19 to lower the key rate by 0.25% looks not like a sign of confidence, but as an attempt to respond to an approaching economic storm.

For Ukraine, this is important because Russia’s war is held not only on missiles, mobilization, and propaganda.

It is held on money. If the financial base begins to crack, it becomes harder for the Kremlin to simultaneously wage war, buy the loyalty of elites, maintain a repressive apparatus, and portray stability to the population.

What this means for us

We see a situation where Russia no longer appears as an unconditional leader even among its own allies. Iran is strengthening, North Korea is bargaining, and the countries of the global South are in no hurry to sign up for the Kremlin’s version of the war against Ukraine.

For Israel, this is an alarming signal due to the strengthening of Iran.

For Ukraine, it is an opportunity. Not an automatic victory and not a quick breakthrough, but an important strategic shift. The more contradictions within the hostile bloc, the weaker Russia’s ability to turn the war against Ukraine into a ‘common war’ of all anti-Western forces.

That is why the current reshuffles need to be read carefully. Behind diplomatic formulations, economic decisions, and changes in balance within this group lies a simple reality: the Kremlin is losing room for maneuver.

And this already works against Russia — and in favor of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian national team in League of Legends finished its performance in the Esports Nations Cup 2026 qualifiers and failed to advance to the main stage of the tournament. For the Ukrainian team, this qualification was short, tense, and very indicative: there were victories, there was a match against Israel, but the decisive game in the lower bracket closed the path further.

For the Israeli audience, this story is interesting not only because of the participation of the Israeli national team. Esports is gradually becoming part of the international sports agenda, where countries are already competing not only in football, basketball, or judo, but also in disciplines like League of Legends. This means that Ukraine-Israel meetings in such tournaments are also becoming part of the new sports geography.

How Ukraine went through the qualification and where everything was decided

The Ukrainian team started the qualification confidently. In the first match, the team defeated Slovenia with a score of 1:0 and got a good start in the bracket. In the format of short matches, such a victory is especially important: there is no long series here where you can correct a mistake in the second or third map.

But the next game changed the situation. Ukraine lost to Lithuania with a score of 0:1 and dropped to the lower bracket of the tournament. After that, each subsequent match became essentially a survival match.

The match against Israel was important but not the last step

It was in the lower bracket that Ukraine met with the Israeli national team. This match was won by the Ukrainians with a score of 1:0, keeping their chances of advancing to the main stage of the Esports Nations Cup 2026.

For Israel, this defeat is also important to consider more broadly. The Israeli esports scene is developing, but such tournaments show how tough the competition is becoming even at the regional level. It is no longer enough to just have strong players: stability, preparation, champion pick work, team discipline, and the ability to withstand the pressure of a decisive match are needed.

After the victory over Israel, Ukraine remained in the fight, but had no room for error.

Why the defeat by Serbia closed Ukraine’s path to the tournament

The decisive match for the Ukrainian team was against Serbia. Ukraine lost it with a score of 0:1, after which it ended its performance in the qualification. This game was the final point in the selection: the team could no longer continue the fight for a place at ENC 2026.

In such tournaments, the lower bracket often looks more dramatic than the upper one. A team can gather after a defeat, pass one opponent, bring back intrigue, but then one unsuccessful map completely breaks the path. This is what happened with Ukraine.

For readers in Israel, this story shows that esports has long ceased to be entertainment ‘for its own.’ It is a full-fledged international scene where national teams, federations, club players, and coaches work according to the logic of big sports. Therefore, НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers such events not as a random gaming news, but as part of a new sports and cultural connection between countries, where Israel and Ukraine can meet in various formats.

Who played for Ukraine

The Ukrainian national team at the qualification included Maynter, Jamie, Efias, Fogzy, and Maul. The substitute players were Ligant and Mafinayaz, and the team’s coach was WildHeart.

The most recognizable player in the lineup was Maynter, who currently plays for NAVI. His presence increased attention to the Ukrainian team because NAVI remains one of the most famous esports brands associated with Ukraine.

But even the presence of a notable player does not guarantee success in a national tournament. League of Legends requires not only individual skill but also the cohesion of the entire five. Especially in a format where one lost match can cost a place on the international stage.

What this means for Ukraine, Israel, and esports

Ukraine did not make it to the Esports Nations Cup 2026 in League of Legends, but the very fact of participation shows that national teams in esports are becoming more noticeable. These are no longer just club tournaments where fans follow organizations and individual players. The national team format adds another emotion — the country, the flag, regional rivalry, and the interest of those viewers who might not have followed the discipline before.

For Israel, participating in such a qualification is also important. Even the defeat by Ukraine is an experience of playing against a strong opponent, a test of the lineup’s level, and an understanding of what needs to be strengthened before the next international qualifiers.

The Ukrainian team went from a victory over Slovenia to a defeat by Lithuania, then defeated Israel, but stopped at Serbia. In a short formula, this looks simple. But in essence, it is a story about how esports is becoming another arena where Eastern European countries and Israel are already competing on an international level.

And in this new reality, even a Ukraine-Israel match in League of Legends can be no less important a signal than a meeting in traditional sports: the young audience watches, compares, discusses, and remembers who is already ready for the big stage and who still has to go through the path to a stable result.

On June 18, 2026, the story of Noah’s Ark once again entered the international agenda. The Noah’s Ark Scans project announced a new stage of research on the Durupınar geological formation in eastern Turkey, approximately 29 kilometers south of Mount Ararat.

This is not about a proven discovery of the ark, but about a controversial site that has intrigued geologists, archaeologists, biblical history researchers, and religious organizations for decades. Some consider Durupınar a natural formation. Others see it as a possible trace of an ancient artificial structure that resembles the description of Noah’s Ark in the Bible in shape and size.

What is known about the Durupınar formation

The Durupınar formation is located in eastern Turkey, in the Ağrı province area, near Mount Ararat and relatively close to the border with Iran. Externally, the object resembles the outline of a large ship, as if embedded in the ground. It is this shape that led to the site being associated with the biblical story of Noah’s Ark.

The history of the object did not begin in 2026. According to local reports, the unusual formation might have been discovered as early as May 19, 1948, after heavy rains and earthquakes made part of the terrain more noticeable. Later, in October 1959, Turkish captain İlhan Durupınar saw this object on an aerial photograph during a NATO mapping mission. It was his surname that became associated with the site.

By September 1960, the first research group arrived there. It included İlhan Durupınar himself, George Vandeman, and photogrammetry professor Arthur Brandenberger. The researchers conducted a brief inspection on site, dug inside the “boat-shaped” formation, and even used explosives. But in two days of work, they found only stones and soil. The official report concluded that there were no visible archaeological remains and that the object was a “quirk of nature,” not a man-made structure.

This is why Durupınar cannot be called a new discovery. It was known, visited, and debated. But the first inspection did not provide what is usually needed for a significant archaeological breakthrough: wooden structures, artifacts, datable material, traces of processing, or indisputable signs of an ancient ship.

Why the site was not fully explored earlier

After the 1960 inspection, the object remained on the periphery of scientific interest for a long time. The reason was not that it was completely forgotten, but that academic archaeology did not have sufficient grounds to start expensive and complex excavations.

Interest in Durupınar returned in 1977 when American amateur researcher Ron Wyatt began actively promoting the site. In the 1980s, other enthusiasts, including David Fasold and geophysicist John Baumgardner, joined the topic. They used ground-penetrating radar, took measurements, and claimed that there might be regular structures inside the formation. Fasold initially considered the object a possible remnant of a ship, and the length of the formation was linked to the biblical dimensions of the ark.

But it was this stage that made the topic problematic for academic science. Durupınar gained a reputation as a site more often promoted by “ark hunters” than by university archaeological schools. When an object is prematurely called Noah’s Ark, even before independent verification, scientists approach such claims much more cautiously.

In 1994, David Fasold visited the site with Australian geologist Ian Plimer and concluded that the formation was not a ship. In 1996, Fasold, along with geologist Lorence Collins, published a critical work describing Durupınar as a natural geological structure mistakenly taken for Noah’s Ark. The authors explained the “metal walls” as natural concentrations of limonite and magnetite, and other “traces” as features of rocks and minerals.

This significantly cooled the interest of the scientific community. For many geologists, Durupınar became an example of how an unusual landform, religious expectation, and the desire to find confirmation of an ancient text can lead to overly bold conclusions.

What has changed now

The new stage differs from past attempts in that the Noah’s Ark Scans project is not talking about immediate excavations but about a comprehensive research program. The project’s website states that this is a multi-stage plan, officially approved by several government bodies, and since 2019, the team has been using ground-penetrating radar, electrical tomography, LiDAR, and chemical analysis to determine whether the formation is a natural fold or the remains of a large destroyed wooden structure.

In the publication from June 18, 2026, attention was again drawn to the announcement of permission for large-scale work. According to the researchers, they plan to use non-destructive drilling, underground drones, remote sensing, and deeper processing of already obtained geophysical data.

Previously, the team stated that ground-penetrating radar scans revealed voids, angular lines, corridors, and multi-layered structures beneath the surface. According to supporters of the hypothesis, this may resemble the internal organization of a large ship. Some publications also mentioned data on a supposed tunnel that starts at a depth of about 4.3 meters, stretches almost 12 meters, then goes deeper and connects with a large square cavity.

But it is important to remain cautious here. Ground-penetrating radar shows anomalies, densities, voids, and contours, but by itself does not prove that we are looking at a ship. To make a strong conclusion, samples, dating, independent expertise, and an explanation of the site’s geology are needed.

Why excavations there are difficult

There are also practical reasons why Durupınar has not been fully excavated long ago. The site is located in eastern Turkey, in a complex region where any work requires permits, participation of local authorities, universities, and cultural heritage protection services. You cannot just come and dig there.

Moreover, the formation itself is in an area of unstable terrain, ground movement, and harsh winter conditions. If there is indeed an ancient structure underground, rough excavation could destroy it. If it is a natural formation, large-scale work could damage the geological object without significant scientific benefit.

This is why in recent years the focus has been on non-invasive methods: ground-penetrating radar, 3D scanning, soil analysis, core drilling, and underground devices. In 2025, it was also reported that fieldwork depends on protective measures and agreements with Turkish authorities and regional universities.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important. The story of Noah is part of the Tanakh and the shared biblical heritage of the region. But interest in the biblical plot does not negate scientific caution. In such topics, one cannot substitute fact with expectation, or hypothesis with a ready conclusion.

Why scientists debate about Durupınar

Supporters of the ark version primarily point to the shape and size of the object. Durupınar looks like an elongated “boat-shaped” structure, and its length is often cited as about 164 meters or 538 feet. This is close to the biblical description of the ark: 300 cubits long, 50 cubits wide, and 30 cubits high. Converted to the metric system, it is often said to be approximately 157 meters long, 26 meters wide, and 16 meters high, although the exact size of the ancient cubit depends on the chosen measurement system.

Supporters of the hypothesis also point to the results of soil analyses. Publications from the project and media mentioned differences in chemical composition, elevated levels of organic material, carbon, and potassium, as well as possible signs of decomposed wood. Some reports spoke of marine deposits and traces of ancient flooding, but these conclusions require careful independent verification.

Skeptics respond that the shape of the object may be the result of natural processes. In the critical work by Collins and Fasold, Durupınar is described as a natural rock formation, and “walls,” “metal,” and “wood” are explained by minerals, rock folds, and metamorphic structures.

Therefore, the main question remains open: are the underground anomalies traces of an artificial object, or is it a complex but natural geology? There is no definitive answer yet.

In this sense, Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views the story of Durupınar not as a ready-made sensation, but as an important example of how ancient text, archaeology, geology, and religious memory continue to argue with each other. For Israel, such a topic is not abstract: it is connected with the Tanakh, with the concept of the ancient Middle East, and with the question of where faith ends and verifiable science begins.

When to expect results

According to the project authors, the expanded research program should continue in 2026, and the first results will be presented after data processing and verification. This is an important caveat: a loud headline can appear in one day, but a scientific conclusion requires time, samples, analysis, and independent confirmation.

If new research shows the presence of artificial structures, it will be an event of global significance. Such a result will attract the interest of archaeologists, historians of religion, specialists in the ancient Middle East, researchers of biblical texts, and a wide audience in Israel.

If it is confirmed that Durupınar is a natural formation, this will also be an important result. Science is valuable not only when it confirms expectations but also when it helps separate a beautiful hypothesis from the real picture of the past.

At the moment, after the announcement on June 18, 2026, the most accurate formulation remains cautious: an international group has received permission for a new stage of studying the Durupınar formation, which supporters of the hypothesis associate with Noah’s Ark. There is not yet enough evidence for a definitive conclusion.

But the very fact of a new expedition already makes this story notable. One of the most famous biblical plots is once again being tested with 21st-century tools — in eastern Turkey, near Mount Ararat, where ancient text, faith, geology, and archaeology continue to ask each other uncomfortable questions.

Many laughed. Many twirled their fingers at their temples. Many, with the air of experienced ‘experts,’ explained that he would not succeed.

Ukraine, they said, would not be able to quickly create long-range drones. Would not be able to launch its own missile program. Would not be able to do what for decades was considered the domain of large defense corporations, closed institutes, and countries with huge military budgets.

While some wrote mocking comments, others worked.

Without unnecessary noise. Without daily excuses. Without trying to prove something to those who had already decided that everything was impossible.

Today, the name Denis Shtilerman sounds different. He is the co-owner and chief designer of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, which during the great war became one of the most notable producers of long-range strike systems in Ukraine. Associated Press described Fire Point as a company that showcased the FP-1 — a strike drone with a claimed range of up to 1600 km, and is also working on the FP-5 Flamingo — a cruise missile with a range of up to 3000 km.

For Israel, this story is especially clear.

A country that has lived for decades next to the threat of missiles, drones, ballistics, and the constant need to protect the sky understands well: an engineering school is not just a beautiful phrase. It is a matter of life, time, interception cost, production speed, and the state’s ability not to wait for a miracle, but to create its own solutions.

Who is Denis Shtilerman

Denis Shtilerman is not a classic product of a closed defense corporation. His biography does not begin with a military plant or loud government positions, but with an ordinary Ukrainian family story where technology, physics, and engineering thinking were part of everyday life.

He was born in Odessa and grew up in Kyiv. His mother was an engineer, his father a scientist, worked at a Kyiv scientific institute, and dealt with turbines. Shtilerman himself said in an interview that he studied at Kyiv school No. 79, which he called a school that was once part of a synagogue.

For a dry biography, this may seem like a detail.

But for an Israeli reader, such a detail sounds different. Odessa, Kyiv, physics and mathematics, a family of engineers, a school with a memory of a synagogue — all this forms a recognizable Eastern European story where Jewish, Ukrainian, and Soviet lines often intertwined in one destiny.

There is another important detail.

The Jewish line in his family is connected with his father and the surname Shtilerman. According to Denis, his father came from a Jewish family and bore this surname, but during Soviet times changed it to a Russian one to enter MEPhI. Later, as Shtilerman recounted, his father discovered his Jewish roots, which led to his expulsion. Denis himself later restored the surname Shtilerman, which he considered the true family name.

This should not be turned into a slogan.

But it is important for understanding the person. His biography includes not only technology and business. There is a surname that the family had to hide. There is a Soviet experience familiar to many Jewish families. There is the return of a name. And there is a new Ukrainian reality where a person with such family memory works not for a foreign empire, but for the defense of Ukraine.

From civilian life to defense development

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Shtilerman was not a public figure in the Ukrainian defense industry. Publications about Fire Point noted that the key people of the company came not from the classic military-industrial complex, but from civilian fields — business, IT, architecture, the film industry, and engineering projects.

After 2022, much changed.

Shtilerman said that together with friends he helped the Ukrainian military: purchased drones, handled logistics, supported artillery units. Then it became clear that there was either nothing to buy on the market or the prices became unacceptable for a war of this scale. Thus, the idea arose to make their own long-range drone — not an exhibition sample, but a working tool for the front.

This is the main difference between talk and action.

Some explained why it wouldn’t work. Others calculated, tested, searched for components, argued with metal, aerodynamics, electronics, and time.

Fire Point: from ridicule to long-range power

Not long ago, there was a lot of skepticism around Fire Point. The company was called too loud a project. The Flamingo missile was discussed with disdain. Long-range Ukrainian drones were perceived as either fantasy, PR, or another story that ‘wouldn’t fly.’

And then the conversation changed.

The FP-1 became one of the symbols of the Ukrainian long-range response. According to open publications, Fire Point showcased the FP-1 as a strike drone with a range of up to 1600 km. This is no longer the level of trench improvisation, but a tool that allows Ukraine to keep military and industrial infrastructure in Russia under pressure far beyond the front line.

But even more attention was drawn to the Flamingo.

It is important to speak accurately: the Flamingo is not a ballistic missile, but a cruise missile FP-5. Western publications linked it with a claimed range of up to 3000 km and a heavy warhead of about 1150 kg. Reuters also wrote that Fire Point produces the Flamingo and that Ukraine has already used this cruise missile against important Russian military-industrial targets.

For Ukraine, this is a fundamental story.

For years, Russia relied on the depth of its territory. Russian terrorists struck Ukrainian cities, energy, ports, hospitals, schools, and residential areas, assuming that the response would always be limited. That distance would protect factories, bases, refineries, airfields, and military logistics.

The Ukrainian long-range program breaks this confidence.

Ballistics, interception, and the new cost of sky protection

The next level of this story is the ballistic developments of Fire Point and the Freyja missile defense system project.

Reuters reported in June 2026 that Fire Point conducted a guided flight test of the FP-7.X — a missile that should become the basis of the future Freyja anti-ballistic interceptor. The agency also noted that the FP-7.X is a variant of the interceptor based on the FP-7, and Fire Point itself is working on the idea of a cheaper alternative to the American Patriot.

This is important not only for Ukraine.

For Israel, the question of interception cost has long been not theoretical. Any country living under the threat of missiles and drones faces tough arithmetic: how much the enemy’s missile costs, how much the interceptor costs, how many batteries are on the ground, how much ammunition is left in stock, and how quickly the industry can replenish the expenditure.

That is why НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers the story of Fire Point not as a Ukrainian internal sensation, but as part of a major restructuring of defense thinking. Ukraine, Israel, and Europe are in different geographies, but they have a common question: how to protect people if threats are increasing, and old systems are too expensive, too scarce, and too slow to produce.

At the Eurosatory 2026 exhibition near Paris, Fire Point no longer looked like a small startup asking for attention, but as a Ukrainian participant in the European security conversation. Le Monde wrote that Shtilerman is promoting the idea of a pan-European Freyja anti-ballistic shield, and potential partners included Hensoldt, Kongsberg, and Thales.

Why this story is important for Ukraine, Israel, and Europe

Today, there are still questions around Denis Shtilerman and Fire Point. They cannot be ignored.

Ukrainian and Western publications discussed his past, documents, business connections, and possible influence of people from the political-business environment. Such questions are normal when it comes to defense contracts, state money, and national security.

But there is another side.

Debates about biography do not negate the fact that Fire Point became one of the companies that changed the Ukrainian conversation about long-range weapons. And they do not negate the fact that Shtilerman transformed from a non-public engineer and entrepreneur into a person whose name is now mentioned in the context of European air defense, the Ukrainian missile program, and the future deterrence of Russia.

This is no longer a story about a ‘fake.’

This is a story about how a country at war stops being just a recipient of foreign aid and starts creating its own tools of power.

Ukraine is not just asking for missiles. Ukraine is making drones. Ukraine is developing cruise missiles. Ukraine is testing ballistic solutions. Ukraine is looking for a way to create a more affordable interceptor. And Europe, which not long ago viewed the Ukrainian defense industry as a forced military improvisation, is now forced to consider it as a source of real experience.

History is not changed by loudmouths

That is why mockery today looks especially petty.

Some wrote: ‘fake.’

Others made the FP-1.

Some said: ‘it won’t fly.’

Others showcased the Flamingo.

Some explained that Ukrainian ballistics were impossible.

Others launched the FP-7.X into testing and discussed Freyja with European partners.

History is not changed by know-it-alls from social networks. Not by professional critics who, after every success, pretend that ‘they understood everything anyway.’ Not by those who can only devalue someone else’s work and then quickly change their tone.

History is changed by engineers, manufacturers, military personnel, testers, and people who know how to work without applause.

Denis Shtilerman does not have to be an impeccable hero for a beautiful legend. In real war, there are rarely pure poster figures. Real people have complex biographies, controversial pages, questions, answers, mistakes, and turns.

But there is a fact that is already hard to cancel.

A person with an Odessa-Kyiv biography, a Jewish line in family history, a restored surname, and engineering thinking found himself at the center of the Ukrainian defense transformation. Not in theory. Not in a beautiful post. But in the production of systems that are now talked about in Ukraine, Israel, and Europe.

Ukraine stands precisely on such people.

On those who do not promise a miracle, but make a system. On those who do not argue with commentators, but argue with metal, aerodynamics, electronics, radar, fuel, logistics, and time. On those who understand: if not done today, tomorrow Russian missiles will again hit residential buildings, hospitals, schools, and energy.

Russia will lose not only on the battlefield.

It will lose where it long considered itself stronger: in technology, speed of decisions, engineering audacity, and the ability of free people to work for their country.

And if someone laughs again — let them laugh quieter.

Because tomorrow they may have to swallow their words again.

On June 19, 2026, in Kyiv, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky made a statement that effectively served as a direct warning to Alexander Lukashenko. At a joint press conference with the President of Honduras Nazry Asfura, Zelensky stated that equipment is operating on the territory of Belarus along the border with Ukraine, which helps Russian terrorists adjust strikes on Ukrainian cities and civilians.

This is not just about “equipment at the border,” as has already been reported in brief summaries, but about repeaters and equipment on towers, which, according to the Ukrainian president, are used to support Russian drone attacks.

Zelensky stated that Lukashenko has one week to remove these means. If Minsk does not do this, Ukraine, according to Zelensky, will do it independently.

What exactly Zelensky demanded

The essence of Zelensky’s statement was extremely specific: Belarus must cease technical assistance to the Russian war against Ukraine. According to the President of Ukraine, along the two Ukrainian regions bordering Belarus, there is equipment that helps adjust fire on the Ukrainian population. In open reports, these regions are not named, so it is more correct to speak specifically about two Ukrainian regions bordering Belarus, without substituting facts with guesses.

Zelensky emphasized that Lukashenko has one week. This is an important detail: Kyiv not only identified the problem but also set a deadline after which Ukraine reserves the right to act on these objects. For drone warfare, where communication, retransmission, and targeting are often as important as the drone itself, such equipment can have direct military significance.

For the Israeli audience, there is an understandable parallel in this statement. When a terrorist or hostile structure uses the infrastructure of a neighboring territory for strikes, the issue ceases to be only diplomatic. It becomes a matter of a state’s right to protect its citizens from attacks, even if the neighboring side formally tries to say: “we are not involved.”

That is why NAnews — Israel News draws attention not only to Zelensky’s phrase itself but also to its context. Ukraine is effectively telling Minsk: you cannot simultaneously claim non-involvement in the war and maintain technical elements on your territory that help the Russian army strike.

Why the statement was made now

Zelensky’s statement came a few days after Lukashenko gave an interview to the TV channel Al Arabiya, where he stated that Belarus allegedly does not intend to enter the war against Ukraine and apologized to Zelensky for previous harsh words. In these statements, Lukashenko tried to present himself as a party that does not want to expand the war and does not plan military actions against Ukraine.

But Kyiv views the situation differently. Zelensky responded that personal words can be forgiven, but Belarus’s involvement in Russian aggression cannot be forgotten. He reminded that from the territory of Belarus, Russian missiles flew into Ukraine from the first days of the full-scale invasion. Lukashenko also explained at the time that he allegedly “did not control” what was happening, but for Ukraine, this does not absolve the Belarusian regime of responsibility.

And here the chronology is important. On February 24, 2022, the Russian full-scale invasion began not only from the territory of Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine but also using the Belarusian direction. Belarus became a springboard for the advance of Russian troops into the Kyiv region and for missile strikes on Ukrainian cities. Therefore, any new reports of military infrastructure at the border are perceived in Kyiv not as a separate episode but as a continuation of the same line of Minsk’s involvement in the war.

The day before Zelensky’s statement, Lukashenko said that the southern border of Belarus with Ukraine “is burning like never before,” and emphasized the need for an enhanced security regime in this direction. He also mentioned the length of the southern border as approximately 1,500 kilometers.

Repeaters, drones, and the new logic of war

Modern warfare is increasingly less like just a clash of tanks and artillery. Drones, communication systems, antennas, repeaters, observation stations, and elements of radio-electronic infrastructure become part of the combat circuit. If a Russian drone gets the opportunity to better maintain communication, adjust its route, or transmit data through equipment on Belarusian territory, such infrastructure ceases to be neutral.

That is why Zelensky’s wording sounds harsh. He is not just talking about Lukashenko’s political responsibility. He is talking about specific equipment that, according to Ukraine’s assessment, is involved in striking civilian targets and people.

For Ukraine, this is especially sensitive because Russian drone and missile strikes on energy, residential buildings, hospitals, warehouses, ports, and urban areas have long become a systemic part of the war. In such a situation, any external assistance to Russian attacks is considered participation in aggression, even if it is presented not as a direct troop deployment but as technical assistance.

Zelensky also mentioned the topic of Belarusian oil products. According to him, Lukashenko can stop the supply of fuel used by the Russian army in the war against Ukraine. This is another important element: Kyiv points not only to the repeaters at the border but also to the economic channels through which the Lukashenko regime can help the Russian military machine.

What this means for Ukraine, Belarus, and the region

For Ukraine, this statement means a transition to a tougher public line on the Belarusian direction. Kyiv shows that it is no longer ready to limit itself to diplomatic warnings if technical assistance to Russian strikes continues from Belarusian territory.

For Lukashenko, this is an unpleasant situation. On the one hand, he tries to demonstrate that Belarus is not entering the war directly. On the other hand, Ukraine reminds that participation in the war is not only through sending soldiers. Territory, infrastructure, fuel, communication, repeaters, and logistics can also be part of aggression.

For the region, this is a signal of increased risk on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. So far, it is not about a new ground offensive, but about technical infrastructure, but the rhetoric itself is becoming harsher. If Lukashenko does not remove the equipment, and Ukraine indeed decides to act, this could open a new round of tension between Kyiv and Minsk.

For Israel, this story should not seem distant either. Israel well understands what it means to live next to territories from which rockets, drones, or attacks are launched through the infrastructure of third forces. Therefore, the Ukrainian logic here is understandable: the state has the right to demand that neighboring territory not be used for strikes on its citizens.

NAnews — Israel News will monitor what happens after the expiration of the week-long deadline set by Zelensky. The main question now is not whether Lukashenko apologized for his words. The main question is whether Belarus will stop practical assistance to the Russian war against Ukraine.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did Zelensky demand the withdrawal of Belarusian troops from the border?

No. Verified reports do not speak of troop withdrawal as such, but of dismantling or disabling repeaters and equipment on towers, which, according to Zelensky, help Russian drone attacks on Ukraine.

Where exactly is this equipment located?

Zelensky spoke about the territory of Belarus along two Ukrainian regions bordering Belarus. The names of these regions are not specified in published reports.

How much time did Zelensky give Lukashenko?

One week. If the equipment is not removed, Zelensky stated that Ukraine will do it independently.

Why does Ukraine link Belarus with Russian strikes?

Because from the first days of the full-scale invasion, Belarusian territory was used by Russia as a springboard against Ukraine. Kyiv also claims that there is currently equipment on Belarusian territory that helps Russian strikes.

Did Lukashenko acknowledge Belarus’s involvement in the war?

Lukashenko states that Belarus does not intend to enter the war and that Minsk should not be expected to take military action against Ukraine. However, Ukraine believes that technical and infrastructural assistance to Russia is already part of participation in aggression.

Conclusions

Zelensky’s statement on June 19, 2026, was not just an emotional reaction to Lukashenko’s words. It was a specific ultimatum regarding infrastructure that, according to Kyiv, helps Russian terrorists attack Ukraine.

Belarus once again found itself at the center of a question that has persisted since the first days of the full-scale war: can one speak of “non-involvement” if your territory, equipment, fuel, or communication is used by the Russian army?

Ukraine’s response is becoming increasingly tougher. If the equipment at the border indeed helps Russian drones, Kyiv intends to consider it not as Belarusian internal infrastructure but as an element of military threat to Ukrainian citizens.

In Dnipro, one of the most important Jewish centers in Ukraine, Rabbi Meir Stambler continues to work with the community amidst the protracted war. His words are important not only for Ukraine but also for Israel: they show how Jewish life is preserved where every day requires strength, faith, and responsibility.

Dnipro in the fifth year of the war: Jewish life has not stopped

In the fifth year of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the Jewish community of Dnipro continues to live, pray, help people, and maintain connections with the global Jewry.

In the Israeli religious publication Emess on June 18, 2026, a material was published about Rabbi Meir Stambler from Dnipro. The text was published as part of a special project for 3 Tammuz — the day of the passing of the Lubavitcher Rebbe. The project is dedicated to 32 Chabad emissaries from different countries, and the Ukrainian part of this story is connected specifically with Dnipro and Rabbi Stambler’s work.

For the Israeli audience, this topic has special significance. Dnipro is not just a major Ukrainian city. It is one of the symbolic centers of Jewish life in Ukraine, a place where Jewish educational, religious, and community projects have developed over many years.

After the start of the big war, life there changed radically. But the very fact that the Jewish community continues to operate shows an important thing: Jewish presence in Ukraine has not disappeared under the pressure of rockets, alarms, evacuations, and constant uncertainty.

Shlichut as life, not as work

The main idea of Rabbi Meir Stambler, conveyed in the Emess material, sounds very simple, but it is backed by great internal discipline: shlichut — mission — is not a part of life, but life itself.

It is not an administrative position, not a scheduled public activity, and not a set of religious duties. In the Chabad understanding, which Rabbi Stambler speaks of, every talent of a person, every ability, every character trait, and even personal difficulties can be directed towards serving a higher purpose.

In ordinary times, such a thought might sound like a spiritual formula. During war, it becomes a practical program for survival and responsibility.

When there is instability around, a person naturally begins to think about fear, fatigue, losses, family safety, the future of children. But Rabbi Stambler speaks of a different scale: if a person lives with a mission, then difficulties do not disappear, but they gain a different meaning.

That is why his words are important not only for the religious audience. They contain an answer to a question that concerns many Jews in Israel and the diaspora today: how can a community maintain itself when external circumstances press harder than usual?

The answer from Dnipro sounds like this: through purpose, through service, through constant presence alongside people.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, the war in Ukraine is often perceived through politics, diplomacy, security, aliyah, humanitarian aid, or relations with Russia. But there is another layer that should not be forgotten: Jewish communities in Ukraine continue to live within this war.

They are not an abstract topic of international agenda. These are real families, elderly people, children, teachers, rabbis, volunteers, community centers, synagogues, and schools.

When a rabbi from Dnipro says that people “are used to living with a purpose, not with difficulty,” it is not a beautiful phrase for publication. It is a description of everyday life in which the community must work even when the country is under constant threat.

For NAnews — News of Israel, the Israeli angle is important here. Israeli society understands well what it means to live under threat, mobilization, alarms, and uncertainty. Therefore, the story of Dnipro can be read in Israel not as a distant Ukrainian religious note, but as a close Jewish experience.

Israel and Ukraine have different wars, different circumstances, and different challenges. But the Jewish logic of resilience is largely similar: the community is held together not only by infrastructure but also by people who stay in place and continue to fulfill their role.

Dnipro as a point of Jewish resilience

The Emess material emphasizes that Rabbi Stambler continues to lead activities in Dnipro “under the complex reality of the ongoing war.” This is an important formulation. It does not dramatize the situation artificially, but it does not hide the context either.

Ukraine has been living in war for the fifth year after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. For Jewish communities, this means not only physical danger but also social burden: helping those in need, supporting the elderly, connecting with families, spiritual work, holidays, education, humanitarian issues.

Against this background, the rabbi’s mission is not only religious. It becomes communal, human, and historical.

Dnipro in this story is not just geography. It is a city where Jewish life has not paused, despite the war. And that is why the Ukrainian plot in the project for 3 Tammuz turned out to be connected with Rabbi Stambler.

Words about miracles and hope

At the end of the material, Rabbi Meir Stambler speaks of deep faith and the miracles that accompany the Jewish community. He also expresses hope for redemption and the coming of Geulah — complete spiritual liberation.

For a secular reader, such words may sound like the language of religious tradition. But for a community living within a war, hope is not an abstract idea. It is a resource without which it is difficult to endure a long distance.

War changes the sense of time. People stop waiting for a quick end, they begin to live in a mode of prolonged load. It is in such a situation that words about a mission acquire special strength. They help not only to explain what is happening but also not to lose the inner core.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is also important because it shows the living connection between Israel, Ukraine, and the Jewish world. While politicians discuss formats of support, diplomatic constraints, and strategic interests, on the ground there are people who do what they consider their duty every day.

Conclusions

The story of Rabbi Meir Stambler from Dnipro is not just a religious material for 3 Tammuz. It is a testimony of how the Jewish mission continues in Ukraine in the fifth year of the war.

There are several important meanings in this story.

First — the Jewish community of Ukraine has not disappeared because of the war. It has changed, endured severe trials, but continues to live.

Second — spiritual leadership in such conditions becomes not symbolic, but practical. A rabbi, a community leader, a volunteer, a teacher, and an organizer of assistance often become part of the same support system.

Third — it is important for Israel to see in Ukraine not only a field of international politics but also a space of Jewish responsibility. There remain communities connected with the global Jewish history, with Chabad, with memory, with today’s human destinies.

And fourth — Rabbi Stambler’s words that the mission becomes life itself well explain why Jewish life in Dnipro continues even when there is a war around.

The full source in Hebrew can be read here:
https://www.emess.co.il/radio/1887868

What is Emess

Emess / אמס is a Hebrew-language news and media site primarily oriented towards the Haredi and religious audience of Israel. The platform publishes news, interviews, videos, audio, podcasts, materials about the life of religious communities, politics, society, culture, and the world of Torah.

Emess is part of the media group “Kol Chai” / קול חי, associated with the Israeli Haredi radio station of the same name. It is a media environment primarily aimed at readers and listeners from the religious sector of Israel: Haredi communities, religious families, rabbis, public figures, and an audience that consumes news through a religious and community lens.

On the official page of Emess, it is stated that the site was created as a news and media platform for the public observing the Torah and commandments. The exact founding date of the site is not specified in the open description of Emess, so it is more accurate not to name a specific year without additional confirmation.

The main audience of Emess is in Israel. According to open estimates by Similarweb for May 2026, the site emess.co.il received about 1.8 million visits per month. This is not internal editorial statistics, but an external estimate by an analytical service, so it is correct to present it as approximate. According to the same data, the majority of the site’s traffic comes from Israel, while other countries contribute a significantly smaller share of visits.

According to Similarweb, about 95.7% of Emess’s desktop traffic comes from Israel. The USA, UK, France, and Germany follow with a large gap. The service also assesses the site’s audience as predominantly male, with the largest age group being 55–64 years. In the category Community and Society > Faith and Beliefs, the Emess site is among the notable Israeli platforms in the religious segment.

The issue of ownership should be formulated carefully. Emess itself associates with the media group “Kol Chai”. According to publications in Israeli media, control over the radio station “Kol Chai” belongs to businessman Yitzhak Mirilashvili, who is also known as the owner of the Israeli 14th channel. In 2025, it was reported that Mirilashvili gained full ownership of “Kol Chai” by buying out the last share from minority investors.

Thus, Emess can be described as a Hebrew-language Haredi news and media site from the “Kol Chai” ecosystem, primarily oriented towards the religious audience of Israel and having, according to external estimates, about 1.8 million visits per month.