Israel News

On Sunday, June 28, 2026, the government of Israel unanimously approved Foreign Minister Gideon Saar’s proposal for the official recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

For Israel, this decision was not just a historical formulation. It closes a long-standing political gap that has been discussed in the country for many years but was constantly postponed due to relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and overall regional diplomacy.

The approved text states that despite extensive and unequivocal historical documentation, the Armenian Genocide remains the subject of an organized campaign of denial and minimization. It particularly highlights the manipulative rewriting of history textbooks, primarily by Turkey.

What Gideon Saar said

After the vote, Saar stated that “it is never too late to do the right thing.” According to him, it is about a tragedy that occurred more than a hundred years ago, the facts of which do not provoke real historical dispute.

The minister emphasized that for the Jewish state, recognizing the Armenian Genocide is a moral and historical duty. This formulation is important for the Israeli audience: a country built after the Holocaust of European Jewry cannot indefinitely sidestep the topic of the mass destruction of another people just because of diplomatic caution.

Why Turkey is at the center of this decision

Saar’s proposal appeared on the government’s agenda at the end of last week. Israeli media immediately linked it to the sharp deterioration in relations between Israel and Turkey, as well as the aggressive anti-Israel rhetoric of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Saar himself rejected the interpretation that this was a “retaliatory action.” He stated that recognizing the Armenian Genocide is not revenge for Turkey’s hostility, rhetoric, and actions against Israel.

But the minister added another, more political phrase: if Turkey promotes false narratives against Israel, it does not grant it immunity from historical truth.

Here, the government’s decision goes beyond memory. It becomes part of the current regional conflict of meanings, where Ankara tries to pressure Israel with the issue of Gaza, and Jerusalem responds not only with diplomacy but also with questions of historical responsibility.

For readers in Israel, it is especially important to understand this in a broader context. NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views such decisions not only as separate news from the cabinet but also as signals showing how Israel’s foreign policy is changing against the backdrop of war, pressure from international institutions, and conflict with Turkey.

Why Israel took so long

In the Knesset, the issue of recognizing the Armenian Genocide has been raised repeatedly over the past 15 years. However, until today’s decision, the state had not moved to official recognition at the government level.

The reasons were political. Israel long avoided the direct formulation of “genocide” to not exacerbate relations with Turkey and also to not create additional problems in conjunction with Azerbaijan, which is an important regional player and opponent of the Armenian position on this issue.

Now the situation has changed. Relations between Israel and Turkey are in one of the most difficult states in recent decades, and the previous caution has lost much of its meaning.

What this means for Israel now

The Armenian Genocide is already officially recognized by 32 UN member states, including the USA, Canada, Russia, and Germany. It is also recognized by the Holy See and the European Parliament. It is estimated that around 1.5 million Armenians were killed in 1915 and the following years, along with the destruction of a significant part of the ancient cultural and historical heritage of the Armenian people.

For Israel, recognizing the Armenian Genocide has a dual meaning.

On one hand, it is a belated but important restoration of historical justice. Especially in light of the fact that back in 2000, 126 Holocaust researchers, including Yehuda Bauer, Israel Charny, and Elie Wiesel, declared the indisputability of the Armenian Genocide.

On the other hand, this decision is made at a time when Israel itself faces accusations of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Therefore, Ankara is likely to present the Israeli step as a political maneuver rather than an act of historical honesty.

Will this be a blow to Erdogan

This decision is unlikely to be a significant blow to Turkey. Ankara has been denying the recognition of the 1915 events as genocide for decades and will likely react sharply but predictably.

The main consequence for Israel is different: the state is officially doing for the first time what many Israeli historians, public figures, and politicians have demanded for many years. And now the question is not only about Turkey, Erdogan, or diplomatic calculation.

The question is whether Israel can speak about memory, genocide, and historical truth consistently — even when it is politically inconvenient.

While Israel discusses the threat of Iran, the US tries to maintain a diplomatic channel, and the Gulf countries consider the risks to oil terminals, LNG supplies, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Russia remains a less visible but highly interested participant in this story. In news about the Middle East, Tehran, Washington, Jerusalem, Doha, Riyadh, or Abu Dhabi are more often mentioned, but behind the line of diplomatic statements and military threats, there is another question: who benefits from the region not becoming too calm.

The answer is not limited to Iran.

Ukrainian economist Vitaliy Shapran in a column on June 27, 2026 for “Glavcom” (ukr.) draws attention to this layer of conflict: the Middle East is not only politics, religion, missiles, allies, and opponents, but also one of the energy hearts of the planet. Therefore, every new round of tension around Israel, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz affects not only the security of the region but also the price of oil, the price of gas, the income of exporters, and Russia’s ability to continue financing the war against Ukraine.

For Israel, this is not an abstract economic theory because the Iranian threat has long been part of the daily security strategy. For Ukraine, this is also not a foreign topic because the Russian military machine depends on money, and the Kremlin receives money, among other things, when global energy markets remain nervous and expensive.

That is why the conversation about peace in the Middle East today cannot be separated from the conversation about Russian oil.

The Middle East is not only war but also the price of energy.

When Israel talks about the Middle East, it is most often about things that have a direct impact on people’s lives: missile threats, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran’s nuclear program, the security of the northern and southern borders, hostages, IDF operations, cabinet decisions, US pressure, and the position of international organizations. This is natural because Israel lives within this reality, not observing it from the outside.

But this same reality has another level that often remains outside the usual news feed. This is energy.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most important maritime corridors in the world. The International Energy Agency indicates that in 2025, about a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade passed through it, and the possibilities of bypassing this route are limited: there are practically only working alternative pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, this route remains critically important for export.

Therefore, any threat in the Persian Gulf area instantly becomes not only military or diplomatic news but also a signal for global markets. If tankers go smoothly, fear decreases. If there are threats to the strait, ports, oil terminals, gas infrastructure, or shipping, the market begins to factor in risk, and risk almost always means a higher price.

It is at this moment that the Middle East becomes part of Russia’s war against Ukraine—not directly, not through the front map, but through the financial system of war.

Why instability benefits Russia

The Russian economy is still heavily dependent on energy exports. Sanctions, price caps, discounts for buyers, logistics restrictions, and the transition to new markets have complicated Moscow’s usual trade model but have not canceled the main thing: oil, petroleum products, gas, and coal continue to bring Russia huge money.

According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, in May 2026, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports rose to 726 million euros per day, despite the fact that export volumes remained roughly at the level of April. This is an important detail: revenue growth can occur not only due to an increase in physical supplies but also due to price conditions, which means any regional instability capable of supporting prices becomes an economic resource for Moscow.

For the Kremlin, this is not an accounting trifle. A full-scale war against Ukraine requires a constant flow of money: missile production, component purchases, military payments, occupation administration maintenance, equipment restoration, drone launches, mobilization expenses, and support for the defense industry. When oil and gas bring more income, the Russian system finds it easier to withstand sanctions pressure and continue the war.

Therefore, peace in the Middle East can be bad news for Russia.

If the region calms down, the Strait of Hormuz operates without threats, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries can more confidently plan supplies, and global markets stop living in anticipation of a big war, the energy risk premium decreases. For consumers, this is good; for importing countries, it is a relief; for Ukraine, it is additional pressure on the Russian budget, but for Moscow, it means losing part of the financial oxygen.

Here the main thesis appears: Russia may not control every episode of the Middle Eastern crisis, but it knows how to use instability and is interested in it not disappearing too quickly.

Iran and Russia: two different threats that increasingly work together

For Israel, Iran is a strategic threat associated not only with the nuclear program but also with a network of allies, proxy structures, and armed groups that have been acting against Israeli security for years. In the Israeli perception, Iran is not an abstract player but a source of real threats: from missiles and drones to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and pressure on regional routes.

For Ukraine, Iran has also long ceased to be a distant topic. Iranian Shaheds have become one of the symbols of Russia’s war against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and civilian population. Reuters reported that Shaheds imported by Russia from Iran appeared in Ukrainian skies shortly after the full-scale invasion of 2022, and now Russia produces thousands of such drones monthly at its own factories.

This means that Israel and Ukraine are not facing two completely separate stories. In one case, Iran threatens Israel through regional proxies, missile programs, and attempts to change the balance of power in the Middle East. In another case, Iranian technologies have become part of the Russian war in Ukraine, where drones attack cities, power plants, ports, and residential areas.

The Moscow-Tehran connection has become one of the key factors in the new international reality. Russia receives technologies, weapons, experience in circumventing sanctions, and political support from Iran, while Iran receives military cooperation, international cover, and the feeling that it is not left alone against the West, Israel, and their allies.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important: the Ukrainian front and the Middle Eastern front can no longer be considered as two unrelated lines on the map. They intersect through weapons, money, energy, sanctions, diplomatic deals, and the interests of authoritarian regimes.

Why peace may be postponed not only because of war

Peace is usually postponed because the parties are not ready for compromise, fear showing weakness, do not trust each other, or use the conflict in domestic politics. In the Middle East, all this is indeed present: historical traumas, religious symbols, the struggle for influence, fear of future threats, street pressure, interests of armies and intelligence services, competition of regional powers.

But today, another factor is added to this—economic benefit for external players.

When the region remains tense, global markets live in anticipation of a new strike, a new route closure, a new attack on infrastructure, or a new conflict between Israel and Iran. This fear can support oil and gas prices even when physical supplies continue. And if prices remain high, the Russian budget gets more opportunities to withstand sanctions and continue the war against Ukraine.

That is why the Kremlin benefits not necessarily from a big war, which can get out of control and hit Russia’s allies, but from managed instability: a sufficiently high level of anxiety for markets to be nervous, but not necessarily such a level of chaos that completely destroys trade and creates unpredictable consequences.

This is a subtle but important difference.

Russia does not need to be the director of every crisis to profit from its consequences. It is enough for it to maintain ties with Iran, strengthen anti-Western rhetoric, play on contradictions between countries in the region, use energy as a political tool, and present itself not as an aggressor but as a “necessary mediator” in a world it helps destabilize.

What this means for Israel

Israel is often forced to think in short cycles because the country’s security requires daily decisions. Alarm, strike, response, cabinet meeting, White House statement, conversation with allies, new threat from the north, new attack from the south—all this creates the feeling that the main thing is happening here and now.

But the big picture shows that the threat of Iran is not separated from Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Russia’s war against Ukraine is not separated from Iranian drones, sanctions, energy revenues, and the global struggle for influence. If Moscow and Tehran increasingly help each other, then Israel cannot view Russia as a neutral observer who simply “has relations with everyone.”

Russia is a participant in a big game where chaos can be a resource.

For Israel, this means the need to look more closely at any attempts by Moscow to act as a mediator or balancing force. When a state profits from expensive oil, cooperates with Iran, and wages war against Ukraine, its interest in “peace” in the Middle East cannot be perceived as automatically bona fide.

NAnews — Israel News considers this topic in exactly this context: Israel’s security today cannot be separated from the war in Ukraine because the same alliances, technologies, and financial flows work against democratic countries on several fronts at once.

What this means for Ukraine

For Ukraine, the Middle East is not a distant map and not a foreign regional drama. It is part of the same war for resources, the attention of allies, sanctions pressure, and the political will of the West.

When the world is distracted by a new crisis, it is harder for Ukraine to maintain the focus of international support. When energy prices rise, Russia gets more money. When Iran feels stronger, its cooperation with Moscow becomes more dangerous. When the Gulf countries and Israel live in a state of constant anxiety, the Kremlin gets additional space for diplomatic maneuvering and informational speculations.

In this sense, every conversation about peace in the Middle East has a Ukrainian dimension. If the region stabilizes, energy markets have less reason to panic, and the Russian budget loses part of the price support. If the conflict drags on, Moscow gets the opportunity to hold on longer to export revenues and simultaneously distract attention from its own crimes in Ukraine.

Therefore, Ukraine is interested not only in victory on the front but also in the world better understanding the economy of the Russian war. Missiles are not launched from thin air. Drones are not produced from statements. Armies are not maintained by propaganda but by money. And if part of this money comes from global fear of a new Middle Eastern war, then the Middle East becomes part of the Ukrainian agenda directly.

Why this is important for the Jewish and Israeli audience

For the Jewish and Israeli audience, this topic is painful also because Israel is used to living in a world where security often requires pragmatic relations with different countries. But pragmatism should not turn into illusion. When it comes to Russia, it is important to see not only its statements but also its real interests.

If Moscow benefits from high oil prices, if it cooperates with Iran, if it uses the war against Ukraine as a tool to pressure the West, then its interest in a stable Middle East looks at least questionable. It can talk about diplomacy but simultaneously benefit from diplomacy not working too quickly.

It is important for Israel to understand: Iran is not only an Iranian problem but part of a broader system of alliances and conflicts. Ukraine also faces not only Russia but a network of regimes that help Moscow bypass pressure, obtain technologies, produce weapons, and prolong the war.

It is here that the interests of Israel and Ukraine intersect not at the level of beautiful words but at the level of security.

Main conclusion

Peace in the Middle East is again postponed not only because the parties are not ready for compromise or because Iran continues to play on raising the stakes. It is also postponed because there are external players who benefit from the region remaining in a state of controlled anxiety.

For Iran, it is a matter of influence.

For Russia, it is a matter of money, sanctions survival, and continuation of the war against Ukraine.

For Israel, it is a matter of security.

For Ukraine, it is a matter of life and death.

When the Middle East is on fire, Russia can earn not only politically but also economically. When the region calms down, the Kremlin loses part of the pressure on the world and part of the financial space for war. Therefore, the conversation about peace between Israel, Iran, the US, and the Gulf countries today cannot be separated from the conversation about Russian oil, Iranian drones, the war in Ukraine, and the system of instability that Moscow uses as a weapon.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor how the Middle Eastern crisis affects not only Israel’s security but also Russia’s war against Ukraine, energy markets, and relations between countries that understand: peace in one region increasingly depends on who profits from war in another.

In the center of Tel Aviv, an evening is being prepared that will become not just a restaurant event for many guests, but a meeting with the atmosphere of a Ukrainian home, music, and celebration.

On July 3, 2026, the restaurant SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food celebrates 3 years of operation.

The celebration will take place at Karlibach 3, Tel Aviv.

Doors open at 19:00.

The evening program includes Diadele and Friends, DJ Samso, live music, a disco, and a festive atmosphere of Ukrainian cuisine in Israel.

Three years of taste, meetings, and Ukrainian atmosphere in Tel Aviv

For the SHO? restaurant, these three years have become more than just a period of operation.

These were years of meetings, conversations at the table, first dates, large gatherings, family dinners, warm evenings, and moments that you want to remember with a smile.

In their festive address, the restaurant team writes that these three years are primarily about the guests.

About the people who came, returned, brought friends, celebrated important dates, and gradually became part of the history of this place.

SHO? has grown as a space where Ukrainian cuisine in Tel Aviv has become not only about dishes but also about the feeling of closeness, familiar taste, and lively communication.

What will happen on July 3

The festive evening will begin on July 3 at 19:00.

Guests can expect:

Diadele and Friends — the musical part of the evening and festive performance.

DJ Samso — disco and mood after live music.

Ukrainian cuisine — the atmosphere of the SHO? restaurant, the dishes that people return for, and an evening at a large common table.

Celebration of the 3rd anniversary — meeting guests, friends of the restaurant, and everyone who wants to spend the evening in a Ukrainian atmosphere in the center of Tel Aviv.

The poster for the evening is marked as “святкуємо 3 роки разом” — “celebrating 3 years together”.

And this well conveys the idea of the event: not a formal date, but a celebration of people who over the years have become part of one big story.

A Ukrainian place in Israel to return to

In Israel, Ukrainian restaurants and cultural spaces have long become something more than just points on the gastronomic map.

For some, it is an opportunity to try familiar dishes.

For others, it is to maintain a connection with the language, music, memories, and people.

For others, it is to discover Ukrainian cuisine through the lively atmosphere of Tel Aviv.

SHO? has become exactly such a place in three years: a restaurant where people come not only to eat but also to meet, talk, celebrate, hear music, and feel among their own.

The restaurant team thanks the guests for these years and emphasizes: the best is yet to come.

Information for guests

Event: 3rd anniversary of SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food

Date: July 3

Time: doors open at 19:00

Place: SHO? — Ukrainian Traditional Food

Address: Karlibach 3, Tel Aviv, Israel

Program: Diadele and Friends, DJ Samso, live music, disco

Reservations and details – https://www.facebook.com/shotelaviv

 

The festive evening at SHO? is an opportunity to celebrate 3 years of Ukrainian taste, music, and meetings in Tel Aviv.

NANews — News of Israel follows events that unite people, culture, and the life of the Ukrainian community in Israel.

A new formula is emerging in US-Israel relations, which until recently seemed almost impossible for the right-wing Israeli camp: even under Donald Trump, Israel is no longer guaranteed to remain an ‘exception’ in American foreign policy.

This is the conclusion drawn from a Politico article published on June 27, 2026, under the headline “Israel’s Vance problem is bigger than JD Vance.” The authors of the article — Felicia Schwartz, Alex Gangitano, and Dasha Burns — cite numerous sources, including American and Israeli officials, as well as people familiar with the relations between the two governments. The key point of the article: Israel’s problem is not only with US Vice President JD Vance, but with a deeper change in Washington’s logic.

According to Politico, Israel expected that the America First doctrine in Trump’s second presidential term would have a special exception for Israel. But now, as sources say, Washington is increasingly operating on a different principle: if Israel’s interests and the interests of the US administration diverge, the American side is not obliged to automatically choose the Israeli line.

For Israel, this is a painful signal. In Jerusalem, it was customary to believe that under Trump, relations with the US would be not just close, but almost unconditional. However, recent weeks have shown: support may remain, but its political cost and conditions are changing.

What exactly did Politico write

According to Politico, there is a growing understanding in Israeli political circles that Israel’s status as a US ally is no longer placed above other foreign policy tasks of Washington. One Israeli political adviser explained it this way: Israel expected that it could remain an exception to everything America does in foreign policy for four years, but such logic could not continue indefinitely.

The meaning of this phrase is more important than the quote itself. It’s not about breaking the alliance or the US ‘abandoning’ Israel. It’s about something else: Israel can no longer be sure that any clash of interests will be resolved in its favor.

That is why the Politico article sounds alarming for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. If earlier many in Israel hoped that Trump would provide full support before future political developments, now, according to sources, such automatism is not yet present. One interlocutor familiar with the relations between the two governments said directly: Netanyahu expected full support from Trump before the elections, but so far this has not happened.

For the Israeli audience, this is an especially important moment. НАновости — Новости Израиля has repeatedly noted that Israel-US relations cannot be assessed only by public statements of friendship. Sometimes real politics is seen not in compliments, but in where Washington begins to set boundaries.

Why Vance became a symbol of the new approach

The figure of JD Vance found itself at the center of the crisis after his statement on June 18, 2026. At a White House briefing, he sharply warned Israeli critics of the US-Iran agreement. According to Axios, Vance said that Donald Trump is the only head of state in the world who currently treats Israel with sympathy, and that the Israeli cabinet should not attack the only strong ally Israel still has.

Le Monde also separately analyzed this speech and called it a stern warning to Israel. The French publication emphasized that Vance’s words came against the backdrop of criticism from Israeli right-wing politicians towards the American line on Iran.

At first glance, this could be seen as Vance’s personal harshness. But Politico offers another angle: Vance is not a deviation from the course, but its manifestation. He says out loud what part of the Trump administration already considers political reality.

According to information close to the vice president’s team, Vance’s rhetoric reflects a change in public sentiment in the US, including among young Republicans. This is fundamental: if earlier the pro-Israel position within the Republican Party was considered almost mandatory, now among part of the right-wing electorate the question is increasingly being asked — why should the interests of another country determine American policy?

It is here that the slogan America First begins to work not only against Ukraine, Europe, or international organizations, but also against traditional expectations of Israel.

The Iran deal as a point of contention

The main background of the current crisis is the American line on Iran. On June 17, 2026, the US and Iran reached a preliminary agreement, around which tension immediately arose between Washington and Jerusalem. Reuters writes that the Trump administration tried to defend this agreement, while in Israel it caused alarm and criticism.

For Netanyahu, Iran is not an ordinary diplomatic topic. His political biography has been built for decades around warnings about the nuclear threat, pressure on Washington, and attempts to persuade American presidents to act tougher. Therefore, any US deal with Iran is perceived in Israel not only as a foreign policy step but also as a test of Netanyahu’s influence on the American system.

Reuters on June 24, 2026, wrote that the new US-Iran deal could become a political blow to Netanyahu. According to analysts and diplomats, he risks being not the architect of the American line, but its hostage: Washington is playing its own game, and Israel is forced to react.

Against this background, Vance’s statements take on an even harsher meaning. He is not just asking Israeli ministers to be more careful with their words. He is effectively saying: if Israel interferes with the American deal, Washington may reconsider the level of support.

This does not mean an immediate cessation of military aid. But it does mean the emergence of a new lever of pressure.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, the alliance with the US is not a diplomatic luxury, but part of the national security system. American military aid, political protection in international institutions, arms supplies, diplomatic cover, and influence on regional players have been critically important elements of Israeli strategy for decades.

But the new American logic sounds different: support for Israel remains as long as it does not interfere with major US interests.

In this sense, Politico captures not just a conflict between Vance and Israeli ministers. The publication describes a deeper shift: Israel is facing the fact that its alliance with the US is becoming less emotional, less ideological, and more transactional.

That is, Washington can say: we support you, but not at any cost. We are your ally, but not your automatic tool. We take into account Israel’s security, but we are not obliged to subordinate all American policy in the Middle East to it.

For Netanyahu’s government, this is especially dangerous because its internal legitimacy largely rests on the image of a leader who knows how to talk to American power better than anyone else. If this image weakens, the problem becomes not only diplomatic but also political.

Within the Republican Party, attitudes towards Israel are changing

One of the most important elements of this story is the change in the American right-wing audience. Support for Israel in the US has been strong for decades among both Democrats and Republicans, although its forms differed. But in recent years, both parties have been experiencing internal splits.

Among Democrats, criticism of Israel has intensified on the left flank. Among Republicans, the influence of a camp that does not want new wars, new commitments, and new foreign policy expenses is growing. For this group, Israel remains an ally, but not necessarily an ally for whom the US should take any risk.

Reuters on June 26, 2026, separately wrote about the difference in tones between Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Vance spoke more harshly about how Israel’s actions could undermine US peace efforts, while Rubio emphasized Israel’s right to self-defense more strongly. The White House officially denied any split and claimed that the entire administration was acting within Trump’s line.

For Israel, this means that even within the Trump administration, there is no single simple intonation. There is support for Israel, but there is also irritation. There is a traditional Republican pro-Israel reflex, but there is also a new policy of restraint.

Netanyahu found himself in a difficult trap

Netanyahu needs Trump. But Trump does not necessarily need Netanyahu to the same extent.

This is the new asymmetry. The Israeli prime minister is interested in demonstrating full support from the White House, especially if political turbulence lies ahead within Israel. Trump, on the other hand, is interested in presenting himself as a president who ends wars, makes deals, and forces allies to take American conditions into account.

If Netanyahu criticizes the Iran deal too sharply, he risks irritating the White House. If he remains silent, he risks receiving criticism from the right within Israel. If he continues military actions that Washington considers harmful to its diplomacy, he may face even more open pressure.

That is why the phrase from the Politico source that ‘the worst is yet to come’ sounds not like emotional dramatization, but like a political forecast.

What this means for the Israeli audience

For readers in Israel, this story is important not only as another episode in the Trump-Netanyahu relationship. It shows that Israel is entering a period where familiar guarantees are becoming less obvious.

The US remains Israel’s main ally. This has not changed in one week and has not disappeared after one statement by Vance. But the quality of this connection is changing. Support will increasingly depend on how much Israel’s actions align with the American plan for the region.

If the US wants a deal with Iran, it will be harder for Israel to torpedo it.
If the US wants stabilization in Lebanon, it will be harder for Israel to explain continued strikes solely with internal security logic.
If Trump wants to show American voters that he is not dragging the country into new wars, Israeli expectations may become a political burden for him.

НАновости — Новости Израиля believes that the main question now is: can Israel maintain a strategic alliance with the US if Washington stops perceiving Israeli interests as an automatic extension of American ones?

The answer is not yet clear.

But it is already evident that the era of simple formulas is ending. The phrase ‘Trump will support Israel’ no longer explains the whole picture. It needs to be added: he will support — if it does not contradict his deal, his electorate, his understanding of America First, and his desire to show that he is in control of the situation.

Conclusion

The Politico article is important not because it reports a personal conflict between Vance and Israel. Its significance is deeper: it captures the moment when in American politics, Israel ceases to be an unconditional exception.

For Netanyahu, this is a diplomatic risk.
For the Israeli right-wing camp, it is an ideological blow.
For Washington, it is an attempt to regain control over the Middle East agenda.
For Israel, it is a reminder that even the closest ally can at some point say: first US interests, then everything else.

This is the new reality described by Politico: Israel’s problem with Vance is not just a problem with Vance. It is a problem with America, which increasingly demands that allies adapt to it, not the other way around.

The world has approached a dangerous line where talk of nuclear catastrophe no longer seems like an abstract scenario from the last century. Renowned Italian theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli in his book “85 Seconds to Midnight” warns: the current level of nuclear threat may be the highest in human history.

Rovelli is known not only for his work in the field of loop quantum gravity but also for his ability to speak about science in simple terms. This time, his topic goes far beyond physics. He talks about politics, fear, distrust between states, and how quickly the world can lose control over the logic of deterrence.

According to The Guardian, Rovelli’s key point is that modern leaders lack the caution and strategic foresight demonstrated by politicians during the Cold War. Back then, the world was also on the brink, but there was an understanding between superpowers: a nuclear war cannot have a winner.

Today, according to the scientist, this understanding has weakened.

Why Rovelli criticizes the new arms race

Carlo Rovelli opposes the buildup of arms in Europe and believes that the main risk arises not only from the strength of armies but from mutual fear. When states stop trusting each other, every new armament is explained as defense, but to the other side, it looks like preparation for an attack.

The physicist is particularly critical of talks about a possible large-scale invasion of Russia deep into Europe. In his opinion, such fears are exaggerated. Rovelli reminds that Russia could not quickly achieve its goals even in Ukraine, and NATO’s combined military expenditures significantly exceed Russia’s.

At the same time, his position does not negate the fact of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The point is different: the scientist tries to show that panic and the logic of constant strengthening can lead to an even more dangerous spiral.

The danger is not only in war but in nuclear arsenals

The main source of concern is the huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads, and the US also maintains a large arsenal and the right to retaliate. Of the three largest nuclear powers, only China officially adheres to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons.

Rovelli believes that the situation became especially unstable after Western weapons began to be used on targets in Russia. He is concerned about the very possibility that Moscow might interpret strikes with British missiles as direct strikes by the UK.

In the old logic of nuclear deterrence, there was an unspoken rule: if a state possesses nuclear weapons, its territory is not bombed directly. Now, according to Rovelli, this boundary is blurring.

For Israel, such a conversation is not something distant. Regional security, the Iranian nuclear program, wars in the Middle East, strikes on infrastructure, and the constant threat of escalation make the topic of nuclear deterrence part of the real political agenda. That is why НАновости — Новости Израиля | Nikk.Agency considers such warnings not as an abstract European discussion but as a signal for the Israeli audience: global instability quickly reflects on the Middle East.

What Europe, the Middle East, and the logic of fear have in common

Rovelli writes that militarization is often fueled not by strength but by a sense of vulnerability. When society is convinced that “if we don’t destroy them, they will destroy us,” the space for diplomacy narrows sharply.

He draws historical parallels with the aggression of the Third Reich and modern conflicts in the Middle East, emphasizing: violence often amplifies fear, and fear then justifies new violence. In such logic, each side considers itself defensive, even when it takes steps that bring catastrophe closer.

For the Israeli reader, this is a particularly recognizable formula. Israel lives in an environment where security is not a theory but a daily necessity. But that is why it is important to distinguish real defense, political hysteria, and decisions that can make the region and the world less safe.

“85 Seconds to Midnight”: why it sounds like a warning

The title of Rovelli’s book is related to the decision of the “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists”: in 2026, the Doomsday Clock was set at 85 seconds to midnight. This is the most alarming indicator in history.

The physicist places responsibility not on one country but on the entire circle of modern leaders — from the leadership of the US and NATO to Russia, Iran, and Israel. In his opinion, the world lacks politicians who are ready to think not only in terms of national strengthening but also in terms of the survival of humanity.

Rovelli reminds that it was scientists who once created nuclear weapons. But he also emphasizes: the voice of the scientific community helped Cold War politicians find a way out of dangerous confrontation. One such example was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, associated with the era of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

New threat: nuclear weapons in space

Amid these warnings, the topic of possible deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit sounds separately. The commander of the Bundeswehr Space Command, Major General Michael Traut, stated that Russia might be developing technologies to deploy nuclear weapons in space.

According to Politico, a nuclear explosion in orbit would not look like a familiar strike on a city or military base but could disable a significant portion of satellites in low Earth orbit. The consequences of such a scenario would be global: communication, navigation, military coordination, financial systems, and civilian infrastructure depend on satellites much more than it seems to the average person.

A separate risk is the Kessler effect. This is a chain reaction of space debris formation, where collisions of debris create new debris, and some orbital zones may become unusable for decades.

That is why Germany is already strengthening space defense, developing jamming systems, laser technologies, and its own protected satellite communication network for the Bundeswehr.

Rovelli’s final question sounds not like a scientific formula but as a political challenge: which leader today is ready to say that instead of endlessly strengthening their country, they want to make humanity safer?

For a world where Ukraine continues to live under strikes, Israel faces threats on multiple fronts, and Iran remains part of the nuclear agenda, this question can no longer be considered philosophical. It has become practical.

On June 23, 2026, the Democratic primaries concluded in New York, and their outcome proved more significant than the usual intra-party struggle.

This is no longer just a story about local districts, New York activists, and the fight for seats in the U.S. Congress.

For Israel, these elections signaled how quickly attitudes toward the Jewish state are changing within the American Democratic Party — especially in its urban, young, and left-wing factions.

New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, one of the most prominent representatives of the progressive camp, supported three candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives: Darializa Avila Chevalier, Brad Lander, and Claire Valdez.

All three won.

According to the Associated Press, Mamdani’s list effectively achieved a “clean sweep” in the New York primaries: his candidates won their races and ousted two incumbent congressmen.

For American politics, this means strengthening the left wing of the Democrats.

For Israel, it means the emergence of a new generation of politicians who increasingly view U.S.-Israel relations through the lens of pressure, sanctions, aid reduction, and accusations against Jerusalem.

Mamdani’s three victories: who won and why it matters

The most notable victory was the race in New York’s 13th district, NY-13.

There, Darializa Avila Chevalier defeated incumbent Congressman Adriano Espaillat — an influential Democrat who held strong positions in the party structure and chaired the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

NY-13 covers Harlem, Upper Manhattan, and part of the Bronx. It is a district with a large Latino, African American, and immigrant audience. Avila Chevalier’s victory was not just a personal success for the candidate but a blow to the old Democratic establishment of New York.

The second key result was Brad Lander’s victory in New York’s 10th district, NY-10.

Lander defeated incumbent Congressman Dan Goldman, who was considered one of the prominent pro-Israel Democrats. Goldman represented Lower Manhattan and part of Brooklyn — areas where the issue of Israel, Jewish security, and anti-Semitism has not symbolic but direct political significance.

The third victory was Claire Valdez in New York’s 7th district, NY-7, which includes parts of Queens and Brooklyn. She defeated Antonio Reynoso, the Brooklyn Borough President, and became another example of how candidates connected to left-wing activist networks are surpassing more traditional representatives of the party system.

The Guardian also notes: all three candidates supported by Mamdani won, strengthening his status as one of the leading figures of the left wing of the Democrats in New York.

Israel became one of the lines of division

At first glance, these were local primaries.

But in reality, the issue of Israel ran through these races as one of the main lines of conflict.

Zohran Mamdani has long been known for his harsh criticism of Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. In June 2026, he publicly defended his statement in which he called AIPAC “monsters.” Al Jazeera reported that Mamdani explained this wording as criticism of AIPAC’s role in American politics and in supporting Israel.

AIPAC — American Israel Public Affairs Committee — has been one of the key organizations influencing support for Israel in Washington for decades.

When the mayor of the largest city in the U.S. uses such rhetoric against AIPAC, it is no longer a marginal campus dispute.

It is part of a major political shift.

The case of Darializa Avila Chevalier is particularly indicative.

City & State NY wrote that she participated in a pro-Palestinian rally on October 8, 2023 — the day after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7. This was a date when Israel was still burying the dead, searching for the kidnapped, and trying to understand the scale of the massacre.

Times of Israel also reported that Avila Chevalier later defended her participation in this rally, explaining it as her long-standing support for Palestinian rights.

For the Israeli audience, the timing is important, not just the fact of the rally.

October 8, 2023, was not yet a time of a long war in Gaza, international campaigns, student camps, and months-long political mobilization against Israel.

It was the day after the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

And the candidate who later won the primaries in New York was part of a political wave supported by the city’s mayor.

NAnews — Israel News notes: such details show that this is not just about “criticism of Netanyahu’s government” or a debate about humanitarian policy. In part of the American left camp, the framework of the conversation about Israel, its security, and its right to self-defense is changing.

Brad Lander: a Jewish candidate against aid to Israel

Brad Lander deserves special attention.

He is Jewish, has been a prominent figure in New York’s progressive politics for many years, and previously held the position of New York City Comptroller.

But in the race against Dan Goldman, the issue of Israel became one of the main differences between the candidates.

Forward wrote in April 2026 that Lander opposed further funding for Israel’s Iron Dome — a system that protects Israeli citizens from rocket attacks.

This is a principled point.

The “Iron Dome” is not an offensive weapon.

It is a system that saves lives in Sderot, Ashkelon, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, and other cities in Israel.

When an American politician talks about stopping funding for such a system, for Israelis it does not sound like an abstract budget discussion.

It is a question of whether Washington will continue to help Israel protect its citizens from rockets.

Dan Goldman, whom Lander defeated, was considered a more traditional pro-Israel Democrat. Therefore, his defeat in NY-10 became symbolic: even in Jewish New York politics, the line of support for Israel no longer guarantees victory in Democratic primaries.

Where the left wave stopped: NY-12

At the same time, New York showed not only a left turn but also its boundaries.

In the 12th district, NY-12, Micah Lasher — a Jewish centrist and more moderate candidate — won.

This district is particularly important: NY-12 is considered the district with the largest share of Jewish voters among U.S. House districts. Times of Israel called Lasher a Jewish centrist and reported on his victory in the primaries for the seat vacated by Jerry Nadler.

It is here that Mamdani did not bet on his candidate.

This is an important detail.

Where the Jewish community has particularly significant political weight, a moderate and more pro-Israel line was able to hold.

But in other districts — NY-7, NY-10, and NY-13 — candidates associated with the left wave, criticism of Israel, and an anti-establishment agenda won.

Therefore, the conclusion should not be simplified.

It cannot be said that “all New York Democrats have become anti-Israel.”

But it can be said otherwise: in New York, there is already a political model where harsh criticism of Israel does not prevent winning, and in some districts even helps mobilize the active part of the Democratic electorate.

Why this matters for Israel

Israel is used to looking at Washington through the White House, the Senate, the Pentagon, and traditional support groups.

But future U.S. policy is formed not only in the administration’s offices.

It is formed in the primaries.

In the districts.

In urban party organizations.

In the university environment.

In activist networks that first bring candidates to the city council or state assembly, and then to Congress.

Today, these candidates are coming from New York.

In a few years, they may be voting on military aid packages, sanctions resolutions, missile defense funding, investigations against Israel, and pressure on the American administration.

NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: for Jerusalem, this is not a local New York news, but an early indicator of the Democratic Party Israel may have to deal with in the future.

Polls show: it’s not just New York

The political shift is also confirmed by public sentiment.

A Quinnipiac University poll published on June 24, 2026, showed that 48% of registered U.S. voters believe that America “supports Israel too much.” Another 38% consider the level of support appropriate, and only 7% say that the U.S. supports Israel insufficiently. Quinnipiac separately noted that this is the highest percentage of the response “the U.S. supports Israel too much” since 2017, when the university first began asking this question.

For Israel, this is an alarming figure.

Almost half of American voters already perceive American support for Israel as excessive.

This does not mean an automatic break in the alliance.

But it means that any future U.S. administration will take into account the growing pressure within American society.

Especially if this pressure comes from young voters, the left wing of the Democrats, the university environment, and urban districts where primaries often effectively decide the outcome of elections.

Main conclusion

The New York primaries on June 23, 2026, served as a warning.

Zohran Mamdani demonstrated that his political machine is capable of translating a left-wing, anti-establishment, and sharply critical of Israel agenda into real victories.

Darializa Avila Chevalier won in NY-13 after the scandal surrounding her participation in the rally on October 8, 2023.

Brad Lander defeated Dan Goldman in NY-10, despite his position against further funding for the “Iron Dome.”

Claire Valdez won in NY-7 as part of the same progressive wave.

Micah Lasher maintained a more moderate line in NY-12 — but precisely in a district with a particularly strong Jewish electorate.

The picture becomes clear: in the U.S. Democratic Party, the struggle around Israel is no longer a secondary issue.

It is becoming a marker of political identity.

And if Israel wants to understand what Washington might look like in a few years, it needs to pay close attention not only to the White House.

It needs to look at New York.

Нужно смотреть на Нью-Йорк.

Today, Wednesday, June 24, 2026, a large-scale protest by the Haredim is expected in Israel, which may significantly affect traffic in several areas of the country. According to preliminary data, about 2,000 vehicles are expected to depart from 19 different points and move in organized columns towards the Beit Lid area, near Kfar Yona.

The main reason for the protest is the detention of Haredim who evade military service. In recent weeks, similar actions have already taken place near prison No. 10, but the current situation differs in the composition of participants. Previously, the more radical ‘Jerusalem flank’ was at the forefront, but now large Hasidic communities, considered more numerous and moderate, are joining the protest.

This means two things simultaneously. On one hand, there may be significantly more participants. On the other hand, the organizers state that they do not plan widespread roadblocks or violent actions.

Where the columns are departing from

According to the plan, the columns will start moving around 16:00. Cars are expected to depart from about 19 points across the country: from Safed and Haifa in the north, through Bnei Brak, Jerusalem, and Modi’in Illit, to Kiryat Gat and Arad in the south.

The organizers claim that the movement is coordinated with the police. Each column should travel in the right lane at a constant speed of about 50 km/h. Participants were also reminded that stopping on the highway and intentionally blocking traffic could lead to fines from the police.

Where to expect traffic jams and which roads to avoid

Although the final routes are still being coordinated with the police, the general direction is clear: all columns will move towards the Kfar Yona area. Therefore, major traffic jams are expected not in one city, but on several key highways in Israel.

Special attention should be paid to Highway No. 1 near the Ben Gurion interchange, Highway No. 4 in the Geha, Ganot, Aluf Sade, and Em HaMoshavot areas, as well as Highway No. 6 near the Ben Shemen, Kesem, and Nahshonim interchanges. Additionally, congestion is possible on Ayalon, Highway No. 20, Highway No. 40, and Highway No. 440.

The most difficult situation is expected closer to the evening. From approximately 18:00 to 19:00, the main flow may shift to Highway No. 57 and the Netanya-Kfar Yona interchange area.

For the Israeli audience, this topic is important not only as news about the protest but also as a practical issue: how to get home today without getting stuck on the highway and avoiding the conflict zone between demonstrators, police, and local residents. This is why such materials are important to read in the context of real life in the country, where NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency pays attention not only to the political background but also to the consequences for ordinary people.

When it’s better not to travel

The most problematic period is from 16:00 to 20:00. During this time, it is better not to plan trips on central highways if possible, especially if the route passes through Gush Dan, the Ben Shemen area, Kesem, Netanya, or Kfar Yona.

In the morning and late evening, according to preliminary estimates, no serious unusual traffic jams are expected. The exception is the Kfar Yona area and its approaches, where tension may persist longer.

The Israel Police recommend postponing all non-essential trips in areas where the protest will take place. This is especially relevant for those who need to travel from the center of the country to the north or vice versa.

Is there an alternative and what could go wrong

The most obvious alternative today is the train. No blockages are expected on ‘Rakevet Israel’, and the railway is expected to operate as usual, without special reinforcements.

But there is also a nuance here. Many drivers may choose to forgo their cars in advance, so increased load is possible at railway stations and on the trains themselves. Those who choose the train should allow extra time for the journey to the station and boarding.

Main risks of the evening

Organizers describe the protest as an action of ‘order, responsibility, and sanctification of the name’. However, with such a number of people and vehicles, it is impossible to completely rule out disruptions.

Problems may arise if individual columns start moving slower than the agreed speed, if someone decides to stop on the highway, or if clashes occur with local residents and police. Organizers have already warned: if one of the columns is hindered, roadblocks may be the response.

There is also a separate point of tension — Kfar Yona. After the city was effectively isolated last week due to the protest, local residents do not intend to silently wait for events to unfold again. The mayor has already announced plans to block entry to the city and prevent the car action from entering.

Because of this, the police, according to the current position, require that the protesters do not reach prison No. 10 directly and remain outside the city. This section may become the main source of unpredictability.

The bottom line is simple: from 16:00 to 20:00, serious traffic jams are possible on central highways in Israel, and in the evening, the main risk will shift to the Kfar Yona area. Those who do not need to travel should postpone their trip. Those who must be on the road should check the route in advance, avoid major interchanges, and consider the train as a calmer alternative.

The Russian propaganda TV channel ‘Tsargrad’, amid fuel problems in the Russian Federation, called for learning from Iran how to provide the population with gasoline even during wartime.

At first glance, the thesis seems simple: fuel prices are rising in Russia, reports of ‘dry’ gas stations and sales restrictions are appearing, while in Iran gasoline is allegedly the cheapest in the world due to strict state control, limits, and subsidies.

But if you look at the dates, figures, and military context, the comparison becomes much less favorable for Moscow. The Iranian model is not based on an economic miracle, but on forced regulation, huge subsidies, limits, combating smuggling, and social fear of a new fuel explosion within the country.

Most importantly, Russia is facing not just a market problem. The Ukrainian army is methodically attacking precisely the oil refining, oil depots, logistics, and energy infrastructure, that is, the nodes without which no administrative prices turn into real gasoline at gas stations.

What ‘Tsargrad’ wrote

The ‘Tsargrad’ article was published on June 22, 2026, under a characteristic headline about the ‘gasoline fig’, empty gas stations in Russia, and gasoline in Iran ‘for 2 rubles per liter’.

The text claims that the shutdown of the Moscow Oil Refinery should not be a reason for price increases but should be a signal to the state. The authors explicitly state that during wartime, fuel prices should be frozen because gasoline, diesel, and gas are embedded in the cost of almost all goods — from essentials to medicines.

According to ‘Tsargrad’, there are already enough ‘dry’ gas stations in Russia: somewhere there is no AI-92, somewhere there is no AI-95, and at some gas stations, a liter of high-octane gasoline can cost up to 100 rubles.

Separately, the TV channel refers to the period from June 9 to 15: during this week, as stated in the article, gasoline prices rose in 78 regions of Russia. Among the leaders are Tuva with a growth of 9.4% and Chechnya with a growth of 8%. It is also mentioned that sales restrictions were introduced in more than 50 regions.

After this, ‘Tsargrad’ draws the main propaganda thesis: if in Iran gasoline costs about 2.5 rubles per liter, then Russia should also follow the path of strict price limits, quotas, and direct state intervention.

How the Iranian scheme actually works

Iran has indeed kept gasoline at an artificially low price for decades. But the low price at the pump is not proof of economic stability. It is the result of subsidies, a card system, limits, and a political decision to hold back social discontent.

In December 2025, an updated three-tier system was introduced in Iran. Ordinary drivers can buy up to 60 liters of gasoline per month at 15,000 rials per liter. Another 100 liters are available at 30,000 rials per liter. After the 160-liter mark, an increased rate of 50,000 rials per liter applies.

It is these 160 liters that became the basis for the Russian propaganda comparison. ‘Tsargrad’ claims that about 80% of Iranian drivers fit into the basic monthly quota. But in such a presentation, the main thing is lost: the Iranian system was created not because there are no fuel problems in the country, but because the problems are too sensitive for the authorities.

Iran is an oil country, but the domestic fuel market there has long been associated with several painful factors: high consumption, an outdated vehicle fleet, gasoline smuggling to neighboring countries, budget strain, and fear of protests. In 2019, the rise in fuel prices was one of the reasons for mass protests, which were harshly suppressed.

Therefore, cheap gasoline in Iran is not a free market and not a ‘management victory’. It is a political insurance of the regime.

Why the Iranian example does not work for Russia

The main problem with the Russian comparison is that Moscow is trying to present the fuel crisis as a matter of prices and speculation. But in 2026, it’s not just about prices anymore.

Ukraine is delivering long-range strikes on Russian oil infrastructure precisely because oil and petroleum products remain one of the key sources of war funding. Strikes on refineries, oil depots, pipeline nodes, and logistics hit not the ‘abstract economy’, but Russia’s ability to process raw materials, supply the army, maintain the domestic market, and simultaneously earn from exports.

In June 2026, reports emerged of new strikes on facilities in Crimea, including an oil storage facility near the Kerch TPP and infrastructure related to the supply of the occupied peninsula. Russian occupation authorities in Crimea imposed restrictions, including a ban on fuel sales to non-state users. This is no longer ordinary market volatility, but military pressure on the supply system.

Russian authorities also discussed the possibility of additional restrictions on diesel fuel exports to protect the domestic market. This is an important detail: if an oil power is forced to limit fuel exports, then the problem already goes beyond the propaganda explanation about ‘speculators’ and the ‘buckwheat effect’.

The Iranian experience shows not strength, but the vulnerability of an oil country

For the Russian audience, ‘Tsargrad’ tries to make Iran an example of resilience. But for Israel, Ukraine, and the entire region, this example is read differently.

Iran can keep cheap gasoline as long as it maintains control over production, distribution, and internal limits. But as soon as the oil infrastructure becomes a military target, the picture changes.

On the night of March 7-8, 2026, Israeli strikes hit fuel depots and oil refining facilities in the Tehran area and the neighboring Alborz province. Massive fires broke out, toxic emissions rose into the air, and authorities warned residents of health risks.

This is an important clarification to the widespread thesis that Iranian oil infrastructure was not hit at all. It was. But the difference is in another: against Iran, such strikes did not look like a prolonged, systematic campaign to completely disable all oil refining and internal fuel logistics.

In the case of Russia, the Ukrainian strategy looks precisely like methodical pressure. The goal is not a one-time fire, but constant vulnerability: so that each new strike forces Moscow to choose between the front, exports, the domestic market, and social stability.

Why this is important for Israel

For Israel, this story is important not only as a Russian internal problem. Here, three directions intersect: the Russian war against Ukraine, the Iranian model of a military economy, and Middle East security.

Iran has long become not just an ‘example’ in propaganda texts for Russia. Tehran helps Moscow with military technologies, drones, experience in circumventing sanctions, and the logic of a besieged fortress economy. Therefore, when a Russian propaganda channel calls for learning from Iran, it is not a random economic remark. It is a recognition of the political kinship of the two regimes.

Both regimes try to explain to citizens that war requires patience, control, restrictions, and submission. Both talk about an external enemy. Both want to maintain the military machine, even if it means suppressing the domestic market and lowering the quality of life for the population.

But there is a difference. Iran has lived in a sanctions model for decades and is used to distributing shortages. Russia has long sold its citizens the image of an ‘energy superpower’ that cannot have fuel problems. Now this picture is beginning to crack.

NAnews — Israel News considers it important to view such signals not as separate economic news, but as signs of a change in the entire war. When Russia’s oil infrastructure becomes a weak point, it affects not only prices within the Russian Federation but also Moscow’s ability to continue aggression against Ukraine.

Conclusions

‘Tsargrad’ wanted to show Iran as an example for Russia, but in fact showed something else: even an oil country during war can come to limits, card logic, manual price management, and fear of social irritation.

Russian propaganda talks about 2.5 rubles per liter in Iran but does not talk about the cost of this system for society. It talks about a quota of 160 liters but does not say that quotas appear not from abundance, but from the need to control shortages and consumption.

It proposes freezing prices in Russia but cannot answer the main question: what to do if refineries, oil depots, bridges, energy facilities, and logistics are under attack?

That is why the Iranian example for Russia is not saving, but alarming. It shows where a state is heading that tries to wage a long war, keep the population with cheap promises, and simultaneously hide the real cost of aggression.

For Ukraine, strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure have become one of the ways to bring the war back to where it started. For Israel, it is a reminder: the Russian-Iranian connection is not only military but also political. It is about regimes learning from each other not development, but survival under the pressure of war, sanctions, and their own aggressive policies.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor how Russian propaganda explains the internal consequences of the war and why Moscow increasingly looks to Iran not as an exception, but as a model for the future.

The defense of Azovstal lasted from March 18 to May 16, 2022, on the territory of the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant “Azovstal”. It took place as part of the battle for Mariupol during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces besieged the plant for a long time, and on May 16, 2022, the Ukrainian garrison surrendered by order of the country’s top leadership.

In March and April, the world learned about the civilians and soldiers trapped at Azovstal. While the evacuation of Mariupol civilians was successful, Ukraine was unable to liberate the military by force, and Russia refused any proposals except surrender. The soldiers had no choice but to continue fighting and hold their positions until the end.

The defenders of Mariupol held back 20,000 Russian troops, destroyed around 6,000 of them, approximately 78 tanks, and more than 100 armored vehicles. They helped the Ukrainian Armed Forces better prepare the defense of Donbas by delaying significant Russian forces for nearly three months.

As of early May, there were no civilians left at Azovstal.

On the evening of May 16, the commander of the Azov Regiment, Denys Prokopenko, delivered a statement:

“The defenders of Mariupol fulfilled their order. Despite all the difficulties, for 82 days they held back superior enemy forces and gave the Ukrainian army time to regroup, train more personnel, and receive a large amount of weapons from partner countries.”

A few days earlier, one of the defenders of Mariupol, Azov fighter Vitalii Barabash, recorded a video message on behalf of the Ukrainian Jews at Azovstal, appealing to the Israeli government for help in evacuating all remaining service members from the plant.

Barabash was seriously wounded and suffered a concussion. Another soldier helped him read the appeal on behalf of all Ukrainian Jews at Azovstal.

Full text of the appeal:

“I am Vitalii Oleksandrovych Barabash, call sign Benya. It is hard for me to speak due to serious injuries, concussions, and illnesses, so my brothers in arms will speak for me and on behalf of all Ukrainian Jews here at Azovstal.

Everyone needs a peaceful sky above.

I begin this appeal to Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, the Knesset, the people of Israel, journalists, the ‘Bein Stern Shulman’ synagogue in Kryvyi Rih, and Rabbi Liron Ederi.

I hope our plea will also reach Yuli Edelstein, Yulia Malinovska, Yevgeny Sova, and Alex Kushnir.

Here, in Ukrainian Mariupol, on the ruins of the Azovstal plant, are Jews just like me and you. We all remember how our Ukrainian ancestors suffered from Stalin’s genocide, and how our Jewish ancestors suffered from Hitler.

Today, we face a new threat — in the form of putin — who unites and revives the actions of those two tyrants of the past.

I speak on behalf of all Jews at besieged Azovstal. I am wounded, which is why I can record this video. The rest of my comrades are on the battlefield, defending every inch of land the Ukrainian people have always shared with our ancestors.

For the third consecutive month, Russians have been destroying everything connected to our shared roots and our history. Our peoples have endured terrible tragedies in the past, but today we must fight for our land and our country. Ukraine has never turned its back on Jews, and we believe that Israel will not turn its back on Ukrainians but will stand with us against the Russian occupiers who have brought a new tragedy to our land.

We need help from Israel to extract the Mariupol military garrison. We are asking you to save us.

You, more than anyone, have the power to do this. We, more than anyone, place our hopes in you. We are waiting for you. We are already writing history.”

At the time, Bennett asked putin “to consider various options for evacuation from the Azovstal plant in Mariupol.”

“President putin promised to allow the evacuation of civilians, including the wounded, through UN and Red Cross humanitarian corridors,” said Bennett’s office.

On that day, May 16, 2022, the withdrawal of Ukrainian defenders began from the underground shelters of Azovstal. Those who had endured hell during the defense of Ukraine’s last stronghold in destroyed Mariupol were ordered to lay down their arms to save lives.

The heroic defense of Mariupol and Azovstal lasted 86 days. The defenders, including Azov Regiment fighters, sacrificed themselves to hold back large Russian forces and delay their advance in southern Ukraine during the most difficult stage of the full-scale war. And they succeeded in that mission.

Hundreds of Azovstal defenders, including Azov fighters, are still held in Russian prison camps, subjected to inhumane torture.

More stories about the defenders of Azovstal:

Ukraine: In Uman, an Azov fighter with the call sign “Ravvin” embraces his Jewish pilgrim friend during Rosh Hashanah 5784

Azov Regiment delegation visits Israel: “Mariupol is our Masada”

From the Holocaust to Russian Bombings: The story of Elvira Borts and her grandson — an Azovstal defender — how a Jewish family in Mariupol survived two genocides + video

“Here, in Ukrainian Mariupol, on the ruins of the Azovstal plant, there are Jews just like you and me” — Azov fighters of Jewish descent appeal to the Israeli government

40 “Jewish heroes” are fighting at Mariupol’s Azovstal — says Davyd Arakhamia

NAnews — Israel — Ukraine believes:

• The defense of Azovstal became a symbol of resilience and self-sacrifice that changed the course of the war.
• The appeal of Jewish fighters to Israel was a historic cry for help that should not have been ignored.
• Israel must acknowledge the role of Jews in Ukraine’s defense and push for the release of prisoners.
• Silence in response to such pleas is a denial of historical memory.
• We must remember: among the heroes of Mariupol were Jews. And they believed in Israel.

In Tel Aviv, a screening of the film “Ціна правди” / Mr. Jones took place — a historical drama by director Agnieszka Holland about the Welsh journalist Gareth Jones, one of the first Western reporters who in 1933 tried to tell the world the truth about the Holodomor in Ukraine. The screening was organized by the Embassy of Poland in Tel Aviv in cooperation with the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel, reported Israeli Friends of Ukraine on June 24, 2026.

Why this film is important today

“Ціна правди” is not just a film about the past. It is a story about how truth can become dangerous when it is opposed by the state machine, diplomatic pressure, censorship, and fear.

The screenplay was written by American journalist of Ukrainian descent Andrea Chalupa, and directed by Agnieszka Holland. At the center of the plot is Gareth Jones, a journalist from Wales who in the early 1930s went to the Soviet Union and saw what the Soviet authorities tried to hide: mass famine, destroyed Ukrainian villages, death, silence, and the forced destruction of millions of people.

For the Israeli audience, this topic resonates particularly sharply. Israel understands well that historical memory is not an archival formality, but a part of national security, social resilience, and the people’s right to their own voice. When crimes are silenced, they do not disappear. They return in new forms — through propaganda, denial, cynicism, and attempts to rewrite history.

Gareth Jones and the price of testimony

A journalist who went against convenient lies

In 1933, Gareth Jones became one of those who dared to speak about the famine in Ukraine under his own name. His testimonies were especially important because they were not about rumors or political declarations, but about personal reporting experience: he saw the famine with his own eyes and tried to convey this truth to the Western press.

The Holodomor of 1932–1933 is considered an artificially created famine that claimed millions of lives in Ukraine. Britannica describes it as a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine, and research and educational materials on the Holodomor emphasize that it was one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century.

Holland’s film shows not only the tragedy itself but also the mechanism of its concealment. The world could have learned more and earlier, but the truth faced convenient political calculations, career interests, and the desire not to irritate Moscow. In this sense, “Ціна правди” speaks not only about Ukraine in the 1930s but about any era where journalism becomes a struggle for the right to call a crime a crime.

That is why such cultural events in Israel are significant not only for the Ukrainian community. They are important for everyone who understands: memory of the past is a way to recognize lies in the present. In this context, НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views such initiatives as part of a broader connection between Israel, Ukraine, and those communities for whom truth, testimony, and historical responsibility remain not abstract words, but personal experience.

Tel Aviv as a place for conversation about memory

Ukrainian history in the Israeli space

The screening of the film in Tel Aviv was a gesture of solidarity and memory. The participation of Polish and Ukrainian diplomatic missions emphasizes that the conversation about the Holodomor has long gone beyond just Ukrainian history. It is a European, Jewish, Israeli, and international topic — about totalitarianism, silence in the face of crime, and the price of indifference.

Today, as Ukraine once again defends its right to freedom and existence, the story of Gareth Jones sounds particularly contemporary. It poses a question that concerns every society: what to do when the truth is inconvenient, but silence becomes complicity?

The film “Ціна правди” reminds us that dignity begins with the refusal to close our eyes.

Gareth Jones could not stop the tragedy, but his testimony became part of the historical memory that the Soviet system tried to destroy. And decades later, this memory continues to speak — in Kyiv, Warsaw, London, Tel Aviv, and in every place where people are ready to listen not to propaganda, but to the truth.

For Israel, such events are also important because people with different family memories live here: from Ukraine, Poland, the countries of the former USSR, Europe, and the Middle East. When a film about the Holodomor is shown in Tel Aviv, it is not just a Ukrainian evening. It is a conversation about how society maintains a human face in the face of evil, which always first demands silence.