Israel News

Google has made one of the most noticeable changes to Search Console in recent years. The service, which was previously used mainly for site analysis, now allows connecting YouTube channels, as well as Instagram, TikTok, and X profiles as separate resources.

Google did not give businesses an automatic promotion button. It provided the opportunity to see the part of search demand that was previously hidden between the site and social networks.

What exactly did Google change

On July 7, 2026, Google introduced a new type of resource in Search Console — platform property, meaning a social or video platform resource. Initially, the feature was rolled out gradually, and on July 29, Google announced its global launch for all users. Four platforms are supported:

• YouTube;
• Instagram;
• TikTok;
• X.

The account owner can now add a channel or profile to Search Console in much the same way as a site was added before. After authorization, Google begins to show how individual videos, posts, channel pages, and profiles perform in Google Search, Discover, and, when content appears there, in Google News.

This means that an entrepreneur will be able to see not only the statistics of their site but also how posts, videos, Shorts, and Reels appear directly in Google. The system will show which queries users entered, how many times the content was shown, how many clicks it received, and which materials attract more search traffic.

For small and medium businesses in Israel, this is not just an additional report. The update changes the very approach to promotion: the site, social networks, video, and Google Search are increasingly difficult to consider as independent channels.

More about how to combine a site, SEO, Google Ads, Google Maps, social networks, lead generation, and promotion in AI search for small and medium businesses in Israel: https://nikk.co.il/

What exactly changed in Google Search Console

Google officially introduced a new type of resource — platform property — on July 7, 2026. The feature is being rolled out gradually, so some account owners received it earlier, while others may get access later.

Currently, four platforms are supported:

• YouTube;
• Instagram;
• TikTok;
• X.

Each channel or profile is added to Search Console separately. To connect, you need to log into the corresponding account and confirm the right to manage it. If a company has several YouTube channels or Instagram profiles, a separate resource is created for each.

Previously, an entrepreneur could see search queries only for their site’s pages. Now similar information becomes available for content published on external platforms.

Google explains this by the fact that authors and companies interact with the audience not only through their own sites. People find information in different formats: in short videos, posts, discussions, regular videos, and profile pages. Moreover, to connect a new resource, the content creator does not necessarily need to have their own site.

What data will the business owner receive

After connecting a profile in Search Console, several reports appear.

The main Performance report allows you to study impressions, clicks, and other search metrics. Data can be filtered by queries, dates, countries, devices, and specific publication URLs.

The entrepreneur will be able to find out:

• which words people use to find their videos and posts;
• which videos get more impressions in Google;
• which materials lead to real clicks;
• in which countries the search audience is located;
• from which devices users open content;
• which posts are growing and which are starting to lose visibility;
• which format works better — for example, YouTube Shorts or regular videos.

The Insights report provides a simpler overview for the last 28 days. It shows the overall traffic dynamics, the most successful posts, and groups of queries by which users find the account.

In the Achievements section, Google notes new achievements, such as overcoming the next level of clicks from search over 28 days.

Data may relate to Google Search, Discover, and Google News — if the specific account’s posts appear in these services. At the same time, the new resource does not show internal views in YouTube, Instagram, or TikTok. For such information, you still need to use the analytics of the social platform itself.

Why this is important specifically for businesses in Israel

The Israeli market is characterized by linguistic diversity. A company can run a site in Hebrew, publish videos in Russian, use English service names, and simultaneously work with clients who formulate queries completely differently.

Before the appearance of the new resource, a business owner could see view statistics within YouTube or Instagram but did not always understand which specific queries in Google led users to these posts.

Now there is an opportunity to see the real language of demand.

Suppose a Russian-speaking lawyer in Haifa publishes a video about inheritance. The video itself is recorded in Russian, but Search Console may show that some users find it through queries in Hebrew or English. This is a signal that the business should prepare a separate description, subtitles, a video continuation, or a site page in another language.

A similar situation is possible for realtors, cosmetologists, doctors, construction companies, teachers, restaurants, online stores, and repair specialists.

Google does not tell the entrepreneur who exactly will make a purchase. But it shows the words that people entered before accessing the content. It is this data that allows for a more accurate understanding of the potential audience’s needs.

A social post becomes a separate entry point from Google

Previously, the common promotion model looked simple: a person enters a query, goes to the site, and leaves a request.

Today, the client’s path may start differently. The user sees a short video in Google, opens YouTube or Instagram, gets acquainted with the expert, watches other posts, and only then goes to the site or writes on WhatsApp.

The new report allows you to see the first stages of this path.

For example, an air conditioning service company may discover that an old video about an unpleasant smell from the indoor unit started getting impressions during the summer heat. After this, the business can:

• update the title and description of the video;
• shoot a continuation;
• add answers to frequently asked questions;
• prepare an article on the site;
• place a link to the service page;
• add a clear way to contact;
• spread the material in other social networks.

This is no longer a publication ‘for activity.’ Content becomes an element of the search funnel.

As noted by NAnews — Israel News, the update will be especially valuable for small companies that cannot create large articles daily but regularly publish photos, tips, short videos, and examples of completed work.

More about how to combine a site, SEO, Google Ads, Google Maps, social networks, lead generation, and promotion in AI search for small and medium businesses in Israel: https://nikk.co.il/

Quick check of new posts within 24 hours

A filter for the last 24 hours is available in Search Console. With its help, you can see if a new video has quickly started gaining impressions in Google.

If a post experiences unexpected growth, the business can quickly develop the topic: shoot an additional video, publish it on another platform, prepare material for the site, or add a more precise call to action.

Google provides an example where a TikTok account owner notices a sudden growth of a certain search query and uses it to plan new posts or promote the topic through Instagram.

For businesses, this is especially important in seasonal directions. The demand for air conditioner repair, apartment preparation for winter, holiday services, food delivery, tourist offers, or certain legal consultations can change very quickly.

Instead of guessing the topic of the next video, the company receives data from real search.

You can compare Shorts, Reels, and regular posts

Google allows comparing different content formats.

For YouTube, you can separately analyze the URLs of regular videos and Shorts. In Instagram — compare standard posts and Reels. You can also study the effectiveness of YouTube playlist pages.

Such analysis helps answer the practical question: which format works better not within the social network, but specifically in Google?

One company may have short videos that get many impressions but few clicks. Another may have detailed ten-minute instructions that attract a smaller audience but bring more interested users.

Google recommends using the data not only to evaluate already published materials but also to adjust the titles, captions, hashtags, and content of future videos.

What to do if there are many impressions but few clicks

A large number of impressions does not necessarily mean a good result.

If a post regularly appears in Google but receives almost no clicks, it is necessary to check:

• how clearly the title is formulated;
• whether the headline matches the content;
• whether the cover explains what the user will get;
• whether the city and service area are specified;
• whether a specific service is mentioned in the description;
• whether the language of the post matches the audience’s language;
• whether there is a clear next step.

For example, the title ‘Our new work’ explains almost nothing to Google and the potential client. The wording ‘Apartment painting in Haifa: wall preparation and work result’ describes the content much more accurately.

However, mechanically adding keywords should also be avoided. The title should remain clear, natural, and correspond to the video itself.

How to find ideas for new materials

In Insights, queries are grouped into thematic groups. You can see the most popular topics, as well as groups of queries whose interest is growing or declining.

If a business notices growing demand, a whole series of materials can be created from one query:

• a short answer for Reels or Shorts;
• a detailed video for YouTube;
• an instruction on the site;
• a page for a specific service;
• a post with examples;
• a section with frequently asked questions;
• an ad for Google Ads.

NAnews — Israel News points out that this is where the update goes beyond ordinary statistics. Search Console allows using social posts as a tool for demand research.

Google also suggests tracking unexpected growth of old videos. If the material becomes relevant again, it can be pinned in the profile, supplemented with new information, spread in other channels, or a second part can be filmed.

Why one YouTube or Instagram is still not enough

A social network can attract attention, but it is not always able to fully replace a site.

In a profile, it is difficult to comprehensively present all services, conditions, prices, service areas, documents, guarantees, and responses to objections. Moreover, social platform algorithms are constantly changing, and the account is not on the company’s own resource.

Therefore, the most effective model looks as follows:

search query — post or video — site — client contact.

The video introduces a person to the company and demonstrates competence. The site provides details, builds trust, and offers a specific action: call, write on WhatsApp, fill out a form, or order a service.

That is why social networks, Search Console, the site, Google Maps, Google Ads, and analytics should work not separately, but as a single system. Such a comprehensive approach to SEO, lead generation, and internet marketing for businesses in Israel is presented on the Nikk.Agency website. The page also describes promotion in Google Maps, ad setup, site improvements, and working with business presence in AI search.

Does connection provide direct growth in positions

Simply adding a YouTube channel or Instagram profile to Search Console is not a promotion button.

In Google’s official documentation, the new resource is described as a measurement and analysis tool. Google does not claim that connecting an account automatically improves publication positions.

Therefore, a direct ranking bonus should not be expected. The benefit lies elsewhere: the entrepreneur receives information with which they can improve content and more accurately respond to search demand.

It is also important to understand that Search Console does not show all user actions. It does not replace:

• YouTube Analytics;
• Instagram Insights;
• TikTok Analytics;
• Google Analytics;
• call tracking;
• WhatsApp message accounting;
• form and application analytics;
• Google Business Profile data.

To assess the commercial result, it is necessary to combine several sources of information.

How to connect a social resource

The process takes several steps.

You need to open Google Search Console, click on the list of resources, and select adding a new one. Then you should choose one of the available platforms — YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, or X — and go through authorization.

For YouTube, Google will show channels associated with the current account. After selecting a channel, the resource addition button will become active.

Data does not necessarily appear immediately. Google warns that it may take several days to fill reports. Ownership is also periodically rechecked. If external account authorization ends or is revoked, access to the resource may be temporarily suspended until re-confirmation.

New model of business search presence

The Search Console update shows that SEO can no longer be limited to website pages.

A potential client may first see the company in Google Maps, then open Instagram Reels, watch YouTube Shorts, go to the site, and only then send a message. Each of these elements influences the final decision.

Google has not created an automatic client attraction system. But it has made visible part of the path that previously remained between search and social networks.

For small and medium businesses in Israel, this is an opportunity to:

• find real audience queries;
• consider different search languages;
• understand which videos work in Google;
• timely notice growing topics;
• revive old content;
• create website pages based on confirmed demand;
• link publications with services and inquiries.

The main conclusion is that a social network post can now be not only a way to gather views and reactions. It becomes an independent entry point from Google, which can be measured, analyzed, and included in the overall promotion strategy.

Such services in Israel are provided by the project partner agency NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because not just views are needed, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, site visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

In Israel, many people have the same practical problem: the main bank or credit card is literally linked to everything.

It is used to pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google, subscriptions to work services, hosting, domains, online stores, apps, trips, delivery, international platforms, and dozens of small regular payments.

As long as everything works, it’s convenient. But as soon as the advertising account charges more than expected, a subscription is automatically renewed, a foreign service rejects a payment, or the card needs to be reissued, it becomes clear: keeping all payments on one main card is not always wise.

Against this backdrop, more and more users are looking towards separate virtual cards. One of the services actively discussed in this topic is RedotPay.

It is often called a crypto card, but for the average user, cryptocurrency is not the only important thing.

RedotPay can be interesting as a separate payment tool: for online payments, advertising accounts, international services, mobile wallets, limits, as well as working with USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other supported digital assets.

Officially, RedotPay describes itself as a payment app and stablecoin-based card that connects digital assets with everyday payments, and the service’s help center states that to get a card, you need to download the app, register, pass identity verification, add crypto assets via on-chain deposit or buy crypto, and then apply for a virtual or physical card.

What is RedotPay in simple terms

RedotPay is not an ordinary bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on conditions, physical card.

It can be considered in several scenarios.

1. First scenario — RedotPay as a virtual card for online payments: advertising, subscriptions, stores, international services, work tools.
2. Second scenario — RedotPay as a card for payment via phone, it is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.
3. Third scenario — RedotPay as a crypto wallet and payment app, where the user can work with supported digital assets, top up the balance, transfer funds, buy crypto assets, and use them for payments.

In official descriptions, RedotPay mentions virtual and physical cards, payment with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets, mobile payments, the ability to pay online and in stores, as well as using the card with a large number of merchants worldwide.

But an important point: RedotPay should not be perceived as a “card without rules.” It is a financial payment tool with its limits, fees, identity verification, top-up rules, country restrictions, and possible questions about the origin of funds.

Why a separate virtual card is needed

The main benefit of a separate virtual card is control.

When the main bank card is linked to all sites and services, the user effectively opens access to their main payment tool to dozens of different platforms. This is not always dangerous, but often inconvenient.

For example, a small business owner launches advertising on Facebook and Google.

At the same time, he pays for domains, hosting, CRM, newsletters, design services, AI tools, Canva, Adobe, subscriptions, marketplaces, and apps. After a few months, it becomes difficult to understand where the business expenses are, where the personal payments are, where the advertising is, and where the automatic renewal of an old subscription is.

A separate virtual card RedotPay allows you to separate payments. One card can be used only for advertising. Another — for subscriptions. A third — for travel or online purchases. Even if something goes wrong, the main bank card will not be linked to every service in a row.

For users in Israel, this is especially relevant because many work with international platforms, pay for services abroad, run advertising accounts in different languages, and use services that do not always work perfectly with local cards.

Payment for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google

One of the main pains of business is advertising payments.

Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads charge money regularly. Sometimes the charge occurs after accumulating a certain amount, sometimes on a schedule, sometimes after changing limits in the advertising account. If the main card is linked to advertising, the advertising budget mixes with personal and other business expenses.

A separate RedotPay card can help bring order. It can be used only for advertising, topped up with the necessary amount, and control spending on the project.

RedotPay in the help center separately mentions that after activating the card, information is synchronized with platforms like PayPal, Google Pay, and Facebook, but this does not mean that every payment in every advertising account will always go through without rejections. Advertising platforms, banks, payment networks, and the service itself may have their own payment verification rules.

Therefore, the correct approach is this: first test small amounts, check how the card goes through in the desired advertising account, and only then use it for regular budgets.

Limits on one payment and per day

Another strong point of a separate card is the ability to limit expenses.

If the service allows setting a limit on a one-time payment and a daily limit, it is convenient for advertising, subscriptions, online purchases, and team expenses. The user can pre-limit the amount the card can spend at one time or per day.

This is important when the card is linked to an advertising account. For example, if you want to spend no more than a certain amount on an ad test, the limit helps reduce the risk of unexpected charges.

This is also useful for subscriptions. An old service will not be able to charge more than allowed by the limit. And if the card is used only for a specific project, expenses are easier to control.

In the help center RedotPay there are separate materials on card limits and fees, as well as a section on card usage, where among the questions is the setting of transaction limits. Before active use, you need to check the current limits in your account because conditions may differ by card type, country, verification level, and service rules.

Google Wallet and Apple Wallet: card in the phone

Many users no longer need plastic. They pay by phone: in stores, cafes, transport, apps, and services.

Therefore, an important question: can a virtual card be added to a mobile wallet?

RedotPay has separate instructions for linking a virtual card to Google Pay, as well as a help center section on digital wallets, where there are materials on Google Pay and Apple Pay. On the RedotPay website, there is also a separate page about RedotPay Card on Apple Pay.

For the reader, this means a simple thing: if the function is available for their card, country, device, and account, the virtual card can become a regular payment tool in the phone. For Israel – available.

But here you cannot promise too much. Before use, you need to check whether adding the card is supported specifically for you: in Israel (it can), on your device, with your account, with your card version, and in your mobile wallet.

If the card is added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, it is convenient for regular purchases. If not, it can still be considered as a card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, and international services.

Crypto wallet inside RedotPay: not just a card

RedotPay is interesting not only as a virtual card. Inside the service, there is the logic of a wallet and working with digital assets.

The official app download page RedotPay lists among the possibilities Personal: Card, Send to bank & e-wallet, Send to RedotPay user, Multi-Currency Wallet, Credit, Earn, Swap, and P2P Marketplace. This shows that the service covers not one scenario, but several: card, wallet, transfers, exchange, and working with different payment functions.

For the user, this can be convenient if they already work with USDT or other assets. For example, they can top up the balance, use the supported asset to pay with the card, transfer funds within available functions, or buy crypto assets through the app.

But the more functions, the more responsibility. You need to understand fees, networks, limits, transfer rules, withdrawal conditions, and identity verification requirements.

USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, and other assets

RedotPay in app descriptions indicates support for payments with BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. But the current list is always better to check inside the app because supported assets, networks, and conditions may change.

For most users, the most understandable scenario is USDT or USDC because these are stablecoins. But even here there is a risk of error: USDT can exist in different networks, and it needs to be transferred only to the correct address in the correct network.

Crypto top-up: where mistakes are most often made

In the RedotPay help center, a standard way to top up with cryptocurrency is described: open the app, go to Home > Deposit, select the currency, for example, USDT, and then choose the appropriate network for the selected currency.

The most dangerous mistake is thinking that “USDT is USDT everywhere.”

For the user, this can end in a problem. If you choose the wrong network or send the wrong asset, the deposit may not arrive. Therefore, before transferring a large amount, it is better to make a test transfer of a small amount and make sure that the address, network, and asset are chosen correctly.

This is especially important for people who have only used a regular bank card before and are not used to crypto wallets. In a bank, you can sometimes cancel or dispute a transaction. In crypto transfers, a network or address error can be much more complicated.

Top-up with a regular bank or credit card

For users from Israel, an important question sounds like this: can RedotPay be topped up not only by transferring cryptocurrency from an external wallet but through a regular bank or credit card?

In the RedotPay help center, it is stated that the user can buy supported cryptocurrencies in the app using a credit/debit card, as well as other available payment methods.

But for the Israeli user, this needs to be checked practically.

One card may pass and another may not. The bank may decline the transaction. The payment provider may charge a fee. There may be purchase limits, country restrictions, KYC requirements, or additional checks.

Therefore, the correct wording is this: RedotPay indicates the possibility of purchasing supported crypto assets with a credit/debit card, but before use, you need to check whether your specific Israeli bank or credit card passes, what fees apply, and whether there are any restrictions from the bank or service.

Transfers between wallets and users

Another scenario is transfers.

If the service allows sending funds to other RedotPay users, working with a multi-currency wallet, transfers to bank & e-wallet, or other functions, this can be convenient for those who often make international payments or separate business and personal funds.

But here again, it is important not to promise too much. Each function may have separate conditions: country, currency, fee, speed, limit, KYC, availability for a specific user.

Therefore, in the article, it is better to write not “everything is possible,” but “the app declares different functions for the card, wallet, transfers, and fund management; before using a specific operation, you need to check its availability and conditions.”

This approach is safer and more honest.

How RedotPay differs from a regular bank card

A regular bank card is linked to a bank account. RedotPay is a separate payment service.

There are advantages in this.

You can avoid linking the main bank card to all sites.

You can use a separate card for advertising.

You can separate business expenses from personal ones.

You can set limits.

You can use a virtual card for subscriptions and international services.

You can add the card to a mobile wallet if the function is available.

You can work with supported digital assets.

But there are also limitations.

It is not a bank in the usual sense.

There are service rules.

There are fees.

There is KYC.

There are limits.

There is a risk of payment rejections.

There is a risk of errors in crypto transfers.

There are tax and banking issues if significant amounts and digital assets are involved.

That is why RedotPay is better considered not as a replacement for an Israeli bank, but as an additional payment tool for specific tasks.

Who RedotPay can be useful for

RedotPay can be of interest to entrepreneurs, marketers, website owners, freelancers, digital specialists, and anyone who regularly pays for international services.

For example, if you launch advertising on Facebook, Instagram, or Google, a separate card helps separate the advertising budget from personal expenses.

If you pay for hosting, domains, SEO services, AI tools, CRM, newsletters, design platforms, and subscriptions, a virtual card helps avoid linking the main bank card to everything.

If you travel frequently or shop in foreign online stores, a separate card can be a convenient backup payment tool.

If you already have USDT, USDC, or other supported assets, RedotPay can be interesting as a link between digital assets and everyday payments.

If it is important for you to pay by phone, you should check the support of Google Wallet and Apple Wallet for your card and country.

Who should not rush

RedotPay should not be used on emotions.

Do not rush if you do not understand the difference between a bank, a card, a crypto wallet, an exchange, and a payment service.

Do not rush if you do not know what a transfer network is.

Do not rush if you think that USDT in any network can be sent to any USDT address.

Do not rush if you are looking for an “anonymous card,” “bank bypass,” or “payments without questions.”

Do not deposit large amounts until you have checked the fees, limits, support, withdrawal rules, and card operation on small payments.

And especially do not use such services for dubious operations. Any normal payment service operates with rules, checks, and restrictions.

What to check before registration

Before registering with RedotPay, a user from Israel should go through a small checklist.

Is the service available for your country and your document.

What documents are needed for identity verification.

What fees are there for issuing and using the card.

What limits are there for one payment and per day.

Can you set the necessary limits manually.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet.

Can the card be added to Apple Wallet.

Does the card work with Facebook Ads, Instagram Ads, and Google Ads.

Is the card suitable for your subscriptions and online services.

Can you buy supported crypto assets with your bank or credit card.

What fees does the payment provider charge when purchasing with a card.

What crypto assets are supported.

What networks are available for USDT or other assets.

Can funds be transferred to other users.

Can the balance be withdrawn.

How does support work.

What to do in case of a disputed charge.

What to do if the deposit did not arrive.

What are the terms of the referral program.

This is not bureaucracy, but normal financial hygiene. The sooner the user checks these questions, the fewer surprises there will be later.

RedotPay referral program: how to speak honestly

RedotPay has a referral program. A user can invite another person via a link or code and receive a reward if the invitee fulfills the service conditions.

For media, it is important to present this transparently. There is no need to disguise the referral link as a “neutral recommendation.” The reader should understand that the author or editorial team may receive a reward.

A normal formulation looks like this:

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

Main risks to remember

The first risk is fees. The card, purchasing crypto assets, exchange, withdrawal, payments, or service may have different fees. They need to be checked before the operation, not after.

The second risk is limits. If a payment does not go through, the reason may not be the store, but the card limit, service limit, account settings, or payment network rules.

The third risk is KYC. RedotPay requires identity verification to obtain a card, and this is a normal part of the operation of such services. In the help center, obtaining a card is directly linked to identity verification.

The fourth risk is errors in crypto transfers. The wrong network, wrong asset, or wrong address can create a serious problem.

The fifth risk is payment rejections. Not every service is obliged to accept a specific card. Advertising accounts, subscriptions, stores, and payment systems may have their own rules.

The sixth risk is questions from the bank or tax specialist. If it concerns digital assets and significant amounts, it is important to keep a history of operations, purchase confirmations, transfers, statements, and documents about the origin of funds.

How to start more safely

The most sensible way is not to start with a large amount.

First, you need to download the app, study the terms, register, and check which functions are available specifically to you.

Then you can issue a virtual card, look at fees, limits, and security settings.

After that, it is worth making a small test payment: for example, in an online service or where you actually plan to use the card.

If you want to use the card for advertising, first test it on a small advertising budget.

If you want to top up with cryptocurrency, first make a test transfer of a small amount.

If you want to buy crypto with a regular bank or credit card, first check if your Israeli card goes through and what the final fee is.

If you want to pay by phone, check adding it to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet.

This approach does not guarantee the absence of problems, but it significantly reduces the risk of unpleasant surprises.

Frequently asked questions

Is RedotPay a bank card?

No, it is not a regular bank card from an Israeli bank. It is a separate payment service with a virtual and, depending on the conditions, a physical card.

Can RedotPay be used in Israel?

Before registration, you need to check the availability of the service, KYC, and functions specifically for users from Israel. Conditions may depend on the country, document, account, and internal service rules.

Can you pay for advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and Google?

The card can be considered for advertising payments, but each advertising account needs to be tested separately. Payment may depend on the platform’s rules, card, limits, and verification.

Can you set a limit for one payment and per day?

RedotPay has reference materials on limits and card usage. Before use, you need to check what limits are available specifically in your account and whether they can be adjusted to your tasks.

Can the card be added to Google Wallet or Apple Wallet?

RedotPay has instructions for Google Pay and Apple Pay, but availability needs to be checked for your country, device, account, and specific card.

Can you pay in regular stores?

If the card is added to a mobile wallet and supported by a specific terminal, it can be used for contactless payment. But before that, you need to check the availability of the function and test the payment.

What crypto assets does RedotPay support?

The official app descriptions list BTC, ETH, USDT, USDC, and other assets. It is better to check the current list in the app.

Can RedotPay be topped up via USDT?

The RedotPay help center describes topping up via Deposit with a currency choice, such as USDT, and the corresponding network. The main thing is to choose the right network and not send a large amount without testing.

Can RedotPay be topped up with a regular bank or credit card?

RedotPay states that supported cryptocurrencies can be purchased in the app using a credit/debit card and other available payment methods. But a user from Israel needs to check if their specific card goes through, what fees apply, and if there are any bank restrictions.

Is this financial advice?

No. Such material should be an informational overview. The decision to register, top up, purchase digital assets, or use the card is made by the user independently.

Conclusion

RedotPay may be of interest to users in Israel not only as a crypto service but also as a separate virtual card for online payments, advertising, subscriptions, international services, and phone payments.

Its practical value lies in separating expenses and control. The main bank card does not need to be linked to all sites. A separate payment tool can be used for advertising. Limits can be set for subscriptions. A separate card can be kept for online purchases. A wallet, top-up, and supported payment functions can be used for digital assets.

But RedotPay should not be perceived as a “simple card without questions.” It is a service with KYC, fees, limits, rules, supported countries, networks, payment conditions, and possible risks.

Before registration, it is worth calmly checking the conditions, testing a small amount, understanding the limits, understanding the top-up rules, ensuring the availability of Google Wallet or Apple Wallet, and not storing large amounts without understanding all the conditions.

You can register and independently study the terms of RedotPay via the link:

https://url.hk/i/en/0h7rn

The material contains a referral link. If you register through it and fulfill the conditions of RedotPay, the author or editorial team may receive a reward. This is not financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

In the fourteenth part, we will analyze platforms that help small businesses in Israel work with video, audio, RSS feeds, link collections, social profiles, the open web, and additional content distribution channels. This is no longer just “another social network,” but a broader system: somewhere the business shows videos, somewhere it collects materials, somewhere it offers subscriptions, somewhere it pins a profile, and somewhere it creates an additional entry point for the audience.

For small businesses, this is especially important. A client can see the company through Google, through video, through bookmarks, through RSS, through a social feed, through a profile on a media platform, or through an external catalog. If all these points are styled consistently and lead to a clear central page, trust grows.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows how different platforms can support a single project. The project is related to Israel news, Ukraine topics, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, international politics, and historical memory. But the same principle applies to small businesses: each external page should strengthen the brand, not live separately from it.

GreenCast: author’s page and additional publication channel

GreenCast is a publishing and authoring environment that can be used as an additional platform for placing materials, project profiles, and external presence. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it not as the main promotion channel, but as an additional page in the overall digital map.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful when it is necessary to secure a brand description, provide a link to the main site, publish materials, and show that the project exists not only in one social network. This is especially important for companies that work with content, media, services, consultations, culture, or educational materials.

The author’s page GreenCast — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional publication point for the project. For businesses, this is an example of how to expand presence not only through mass social networks but also through small external platforms.

Surf.social: open social web, RSS, and feeds from different sources

Surf.social is a tool from the open social web environment, associated with the idea of uniting different sources: RSS, blogs, profiles, videos, social publications, and thematic feeds. Its purpose is not to replace all social networks, but to gather different sources into a convenient feed.

For small businesses in Israel, this can be very useful. A company can create its own feed, add a website, RSS feed, YouTube channel, social profiles, blog publications, and external pages. As a result, the client receives not a chaotic set of links, but a more understandable stream of updates.

The profile Surf.social — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as part of such a system. For NAnews, this is especially logical because the project publishes materials on different platforms, and Surf helps present them as a single information feed.

Raindrop: bookmarks, collections, and a neat map of links

Raindrop is a service for saving and organizing bookmarks, links, collections, materials, and visual selections. It is used by individuals, teams, editors, marketers, designers, researchers, and businesses that need not just to save links, but to organize them by topics.

In its role, Raindrop is not a social network. It is a tool for structure. It helps gather important pages, articles, profiles, documents, videos, publications, and sources in one place. For businesses, this is especially useful if the company has many external profiles and needs to present them neatly.

For small businesses in Israel, Raindrop can become a public showcase of links: website, social networks, articles, videos, maps, reviews, partners, services, pages in different languages. Such a collection helps the client not get lost and quickly find the necessary entry.

The page Raindrop — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as a neat catalog of external materials for the project.

Spotify: audio, playlists, and presence in the streaming world

Spotify is one of the largest global audio platforms. It has been operating since 2008 and has become an important service for music, podcasts, playlists, audio content, and author presence. For businesses, it is not only a music platform but also another way to be visible in the audio environment.

In the market, Spotify holds one of the leading positions in global audio streaming. It is used by musicians, podcasters, brands, media, playlist authors, educational projects, and people who work with voice, sound, or audio formats.

For small businesses in Israel, Spotify can be useful if there are podcasts, audio reviews, collections, music projects, event recordings, audio versions of materials, or branded playlists. For example, a cafe can create playlists for atmosphere, an educational project — audio lessons, media — podcasts, and an agency — short explanations for clients.

The profile Spotify — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be an additional audio point for the project.

Dailymotion: video hosting and additional video archive

Dailymotion is a video platform launched in 2005. It has become one of the older international video hosting services and is still used for placing videos, news, entertainment content, sports clips, media materials, and video archives.

In the mass market, Dailymotion does not compete with YouTube in scale, but it maintains its niche as an alternative video hosting. It is used by media, brands, authors, video projects, and companies that need an additional video placement channel.

For small businesses in Israel, Dailymotion can be useful as a backup or additional video archive. If a company is already shooting videos for YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, or a website, some materials can be adapted for other video platforms. This increases the lifespan of the content and expands the digital footprint.

The profile Dailymotion — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

Nicovideo: Japanese video environment and international presence

Nicovideo, also known as Nico Nico Douga, is a Japanese video platform operating since 2006. It is known for its culture of comments, fan communities, music, anime, games, streams, and user content.

In global reach, Nicovideo does not replace YouTube or TikTok, but it has strong cultural significance in the Japanese internet environment. For international projects, it can be an interesting additional point, especially if there are videos, cultural materials, music, media, or an audience interested in Japanese digital platforms.

For small businesses in Israel, Nicovideo is not suitable for everyone. But if the business is related to culture, video, creativity, international projects, anime, music, education, or media, such a platform can expand presence beyond familiar Western platforms.

The profile Nicovideo — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be used as an additional international video point for the project.

Trovo Live: live broadcasts and working with a live audience

Trovo Live is a platform for live broadcasts, especially known in the gaming and streaming environment. In format, it is closer to Twitch: broadcasts, channels, subscribers, chats, donations, reactions, and live communication.

In market share, Trovo Live is significantly smaller than Twitch, YouTube Live, or TikTok Live. But it can be considered a niche platform for additional broadcasts, especially if live broadcasts, discussions, events, gaming or youth communities are important to the project.

For small businesses in Israel, Trovo Live may not be useful for everyone. But if there is a format of live communication — consultations, analyses, events, lectures, creative broadcasts, gaming activities, educational broadcasts, or presentations — such a platform can become an additional contact channel.

Trovo Live — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be considered as a direction for future video presence if an active channel is created and designed.

FC2 Video: Japanese video platform and additional archive

FC2 Video is a video service in the FC2 ecosystem, a Japanese internet platform with various services for blogs, videos, hosting, and user content. FC2 Video can be used for placing videos and creating additional video presence.

In global scale, FC2 Video does not compete with YouTube or Dailymotion, but it has its niche, especially in the Japanese and international user environment. For a project that wants to have a wide map of video profiles, such a platform can be an additional archival channel.

For small businesses, this can be useful if there are already video materials and the task is to expand their availability. It is not worth building the main strategy around FC2 Video, but as an additional platform, it can strengthen the overall digital footprint.

The profile FC2 Video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be another video point for the project.

VHSky: video channels and presence in an alternative media environment

VHSky is a video platform with channels and user videos. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as a niche additional channel, rather than a replacement for YouTube, Vimeo, or Dailymotion.

For small businesses, such platforms are useful as a backup video archive. If a company shoots videos, interviews, explanations, announcements, or event fragments, they can be placed not only on one platform. This helps preserve content and increases the number of points where the brand can be found.

It is important not to turn such channels into empty pages. Even if the video platform is small, there should be a name, description, link to the main site, and a clear theme.

The channel VHSky — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video archive for the project.

Clip Place: short videos and additional content showcase

Clip Place is a video platform for channels and short visual materials. It can be used as an additional place for publishing videos, fragments, announcements, short explanations, and video covers.

In scale, Clip Place is not a competitor to YouTube or TikTok. But in a strategy of broad presence, such a platform can perform an auxiliary function: store videos, provide an additional brand page, support the project’s link map, and create another entry for the audience.

For small businesses in Israel, this is useful if the content is already created. One video can be used on several platforms: full format — on YouTube or Dailymotion, short version — on TikTok or Shorts, additional copy — on a niche video platform.

The page Clip Place — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can be one of such additional video showcases for the project.

Bark.video: video channels and distribution of visual materials

Bark.video is another video platform with the ability to place channels and video materials. There is little open data about its large market share, so it is better to consider it as an additional niche platform.

For businesses, such platforms make sense if video is already part of the content system. If a company does not shoot anything, opening many video channels is pointless. But if there are videos, explanations, posters, event recordings, interviews, or short visual fragments, they can be distributed across different platforms.

This approach helps not to depend on one video service and creates more points of presence in search. The main thing is that all pages are linked to the main site and a unified brand description.

The channel Bark.video — NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News can work as an additional video page for the project.

How to gather all this into a coherent system

The main mistake of small businesses is to open accounts and do nothing with them. If a company has GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video, but nowhere has a proper description, link to the site, and clear logic, the client will not see the benefit.

Each platform should have its own task. GreenCast — publication point. Surf.social — open feed and RSS. Raindrop — link map. Spotify — audio and playlists. Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video — video archives and additional channels. Trovo Live — live broadcasts and live communication.

For small businesses in Israel, this is especially important because the audience is multilingual and makes decisions quickly. One client wants to watch a video, another — subscribe to updates, a third — open a link collection, a fourth — find a profile, a fifth — check the main site.

Why this is important specifically for Israel

The Israeli market is practical and fast. A client can watch a video, open a profile, check a site, view a link map, and write on WhatsApp in a few minutes. If everything looks connected, neat, and understandable, trust grows.

External platforms should not replace the main site. They should lead to it, strengthen it, and help a person see the brand in different formats: text, video, audio, RSS, collections, live broadcast, profile, archive.

The example of NAnews – Nikk.Agency Israel News shows that even different platforms can work as parts of one system. A reader can find the project through Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, or Bark.video, but everywhere should understand: this is one project about Israel, Ukraine, Jewish communities, regional security, culture, and historical memory.

Who can help with such promotion in Israel

Such services in Israel are provided by the partner agency of the project NAnews and sTDe | NAnews — Israel event poster.

Nikk.Agency is engaged in website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel. The agency works with Google Ads, Google Maps, local promotion, websites, content, landing pages, and business visibility in AI assistants.

For small businesses, this is especially important because they need not just views, but real inquiries: calls, applications, WhatsApp messages, website visits, and clients from the desired city or region. The agency’s website is available in Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Russian: Nikk.Agency — website promotion, lead generation, and internet marketing in Israel.

Conclusion of the fourteenth part: GreenCast, Surf.social, Raindrop, Spotify, Dailymotion, Nicovideo, Trovo Live, FC2 Video, VHSky, Clip Place, and Bark.video help small businesses in Israel expand their presence through publications, RSS, bookmarks, audio, video, and live broadcasts. This is not a replacement for the main site, but an additional trust system that makes the brand more noticeable, understandable, and closer to the client.

July 29, 2026 The New York Times reported that Iran was considering a direct missile strike on Ukraine in response to an attack on an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea.

According to individuals familiar with intelligence data, Tehran discussed launching a ballistic missile with a relatively small warhead. The intended target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

Iranian leadership, as sources from the American publication claim, hoped to deliver a limited and mostly symbolic strike. The missile was meant to demonstrate that the attack on the Iranian ship did not go unanswered, while causing relatively minor damage.

The problem was that no one could guarantee a similarly limited reaction from Ukraine. Western officials warned that after the launch of an Iranian ballistic missile, Kyiv might perceive the event as the start of a direct war and retaliate.

Therefore, the events that unfolded over just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — brought Ukraine and Iran to the brink of open military confrontation.

July 25: Attack on the Anna ship in the Caspian Sea

The escalation began on Saturday, July 25, 2026.

On this day, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that a Ukrainian drone attacked an Iranian commercial ship in the Caspian Sea. The explosion resulted in the death of one sailor, and another person was injured.

Later, Iranian sources named the ship — Anna. According to Ahmad Heydarian, the Iranian Consul General in Russian Astrakhan, legal procedures were initiated after the attack.

Tehran claims that Anna was a civilian cargo ship and did not carry military products. Iranian representatives stated that rolled sheet steel was on board.

The Ukrainian version differed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces attacked a Russian warship and vessels used for transporting military cargo related to Iran in the Caspian Sea.

Thus, Iran called Anna a civilian ship, while Ukraine spoke of an operation against Russian-Iranian military logistics. There is no independent public confirmation of the cargo’s contents yet.

On the same day, July 25, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine in Tehran and delivered an official protest. In the Iranian statement, the attack was called a “hostile and criminal” act.

Tehran also stated that Kyiv was trying to expand the geography of Russia’s war against Ukraine and move it to the Caspian region.

July 26: Aragchi stated that the strike would not go unanswered

The next day, Sunday, July 26, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi moved to direct threats.

He stated that the attack on the Iranian ship “cannot go unanswered”. According to Aragchi, the incident allegedly violated the UN Charter and was aimed at expanding the war.

The Iranian minister also claimed that Ukraine acted in Israel’s interests and tried to draw European countries into the war between Iran and the United States.

It was after these statements that the threat stopped looking like mere diplomatic rhetoric. According to The New York Times, discussions began within Iran about specific military response options, including launching a ballistic missile at Ukraine.

July 26 Aragchi held separate phone conversations with the head of European diplomacy Kaja Kallas and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In the conversation with Kallas, he demanded a reaction from the European Union to the strike on the ship. With Lavrov, the Iranian Foreign Minister discussed the consequences of the attack and the assistance provided to the crew in Russia’s Astrakhan region.

Simultaneously, despite public threats, Aragchi spoke of diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing tensions.

July 26–28: Iran discussed a strike on a Ukrainian port

According to data published on July 29 by The New York Times, over the next two days, Iranian representatives considered the possibility of launching a single ballistic missile.

The discussion allegedly involved a missile with a small warhead to inflict limited damage and present the attack as a symbolic response.

Other sources reported that a likely target could have been one of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The specific name of the port was not disclosed.

Iranian officials hoped that after one retaliatory launch, the confrontation would end. However, Western representatives warned that Tehran could not independently determine where the exchange of strikes would end.

If the Iranian missile hit port infrastructure, a civilian ship, or a residential area, Ukraine could respond with strikes on targets within Iran itself.

Mehdi Rahmati, an Iranian analyst close to government circles, said that there were different positions within the country. Some political figures demanded an immediate attack on Ukraine, while others advised restraint.

“Ukraine is not a small, insignificant country. It has experience in warfare and logistical support from America and Europe. We gain nothing by creating a new front,” Rahmati stated.

July 28: Conversation between Sibiga and Aragchi

The turning point came on Tuesday, July 28, 2026.

On this day, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga held a phone conversation with Abbas Aragchi. The talks took place after several days of public threats and diplomatic attempts to prevent a direct Iranian strike on Ukraine.

According to Aragchi, Sibiga assured him that the hit on the Iranian ship was unintentional and Ukraine did not seek escalation.

Aragchi replied that Iran also did not want to expand the confrontation. However, he demanded compensation for the damage caused to the ship and its crew.

The Iranian state agency IRNA reported on the phone conversation late in the evening of July 28, and Aragchi’s statement on the need for compensation was published after midnight — July 29, 2026.

The Ukrainian side emphasized differently. Sibiga stated that Ukraine’s actions were solely aimed at protecting the country from Russian aggression, and civilian ships and peaceful people were not targets.

He also warned Tehran of the need to refrain from any steps leading to escalation and demanded an end to support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

July 28: Israel discussed the Iranian threat with Ukraine

On the same day, July 28, 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar spoke with Andriy Sibiga.

Saar reported that the parties discussed the threats faced by Israel and Ukraine, including the threat from Iran. The Israeli minister also expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Ukraine.

This conversation was particularly important against the backdrop of Aragchi’s statements, attempting to portray the Caspian Sea attack as an operation carried out by Ukraine in Israel’s interest. Kyiv and Jerusalem did not confirm this version.

As noted by NANews — Israel News, the events of July 25–28 showed how quickly Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation could turn into a single theater of military operations.

Russian-Iranian connection

The escalation occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s long-term use of Iranian-designed drones for strikes on Ukraine.

Kyiv also claims that Moscow and Tehran’s cooperation extends to intelligence information. July 25 Zelensky stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite images of US military facilities and Gulf states.

According to the Ukrainian president, only on July 19 and 20, 2026, Russian satellites observed four military bases: two in Bahrain, one in Jordan, and one in Kuwait. Zelensky claimed that these images were subsequently used by Iran in preparation and assessment of strikes.

Thus, Ukraine views the Caspian routes not as ordinary trade between Iran and Russia, but as part of a military infrastructure working against Ukraine and Western states.

July 29: Threat temporarily reduced, but not eliminated

On the morning of July 29, 2026, it became known that active diplomatic contacts had so far managed to stabilize the situation.

However, the phrase “Iran refused to strike” would be inaccurate. Tehran has not officially announced a refusal of retaliatory actions.

Iran continues to demand compensation, conducts legal procedures in connection with the attack, and retains the right to respond. Ukraine, in turn, does not renounce the right to target routes and ships that, according to its data, are used for Russian military logistics.

Therefore, the immediate threat of a missile launch may have been postponed or removed from the current agenda after the conversation on July 28, but the political cause of the confrontation has not disappeared.

For NANews — Israel News, the main conclusion is that in just four days — from July 25 to 29, 2026 — a strike on one ship almost led to the opening of a new front.

One Iranian missile on a Ukrainian Black Sea port could have been Tehran’s first direct strike on Ukrainian territory. And the further development of events would no longer depend solely on Iran’s intentions to make the attack “symbolic.”

July 29, 2026. Channel – Dmitry Doubov. What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? This episode thoroughly examines the possible developments around Iran, Israel, the USA, Ukraine, and Russia, analyzes hidden diplomatic signals, and assesses the likelihood of a major regional war.

 

 

Today, events in the Middle East and Ukraine are ceasing to be separate crises. After the meeting between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, new signals have emerged that could change the entire security architecture of the region.

Why did Trump publicly refrain from limiting Israel? What four scenarios for the development of the conflict around Iran are currently being considered? What does the unexpected meeting between Netanyahu and Volodymyr Zelensky mean after almost three years of virtually no contact? And why might Ukraine’s strike on an Iranian vessel have consequences far beyond the Caspian Sea?

 

September 22, 1939 an event took place that they still try not to remember in Russia – a joint parade of Nazis and communists in Brest. It was a symbol of cooperation between two totalitarian regimes, which became a dark spot in the history of World War II.

It is especially important to realize that the alliance between the USSR and Nazi Germany in 1939 also contributed to one of the worst tragedies of the 20th century: HolocaustThe Nazis used the resources they received from the Soviet Union to wage war and establish control over territories where they would later begin the extermination of millions of Jews, Roma and other minorities.

The parade in Brest symbolized the victory over Poland, a country in which about 3 million Jews. This parade was just one of the scenes preceding the tragedy, when German troops would later occupy Polish territories and set up a system of concentration camps there, including Auschwitz And TreblinkaPoland itself, divided and oppressed by two regimes, witnessed the mass extermination of its citizens.

The Soviet Union, collaborating with the Nazis in the early years of the war, turned a blind eye to the repressions against Jews and other minorities. Moreover, after the war ended, it actively hushed up the Holocaust, promoting the version that the victims of the war were exclusively Soviet citizens, thereby ignoring the scale of the Nazi genocide.

Today, when some countries try to deny or distort historical facts, such as the Holocaust or the Soviet-Nazi alliance, it is important to remember the lessons of the Brest parade. Totalitarian regimes, if not stopped in time, can lead to irreversible tragedies, and cooperation for short-term gain can lead to large-scale catastrophes, as happened in 1939.

Meeting on the Bug

September 1, 1939 Nazi Germany invaded Poland, starting World War II. Seventeen days later, under the pretext of defending “blood brothers,” the Soviet Union joined the aggression. About 30-50% of the defenders of Brest were Ukrainians and Belarusians, who fought to the last, but soon both armies captured the city.

According to the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Brest was given to the USSR. However, before the German troops were to leave the city, the two regimes decided to demonstrate their brotherhood to the public by staging a joint parade – a parade that was to become a symbol of the alliance.

Friendship Parade

On September 22, 1939, at 2:00 p.m., in front of the flagpole with the Nazi flag, the commanders of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, General Guderian And Brigade Commander Krivosheincame out onto the wooden platform. The procession began with the passage of German equipment, followed by Soviet equipment.

After the parade, the command of the two armies held a banquet. Toasts to the health of Hitler and Stalin were loudly sung, and soldiers from both sides fraternized, smoked cigarettes and drank beer. They were united by the joy of the joint partition of Poland. The Nazi flag was replaced by the Soviet one, as a symbol of the new government.

However, the Germans did not leave for long. After just two years, June 29, 1941Brest was again captured by the Nazis, becoming a symbol that this “union” was temporary, and the friendship put on display concealed preparations for future betrayals.

The Forgotten Truth

Soviet historiography carefully avoids mentioning collaboration with the Nazis from 1939 to 1941. After all, the USSR not only became an accomplice in unleashing World War II, but also actively helped Nazi Germany, supplying it with oil, copper, grain and timber in huge quantities. During this period, the Soviet Union handed over to the Nazis 856 thousand tons of oil, 14 thousand tons of copper, 1.4 million tons of grain and more than a million tons of timber.

Parade or march?

The facts of the meeting of Soviet and Nazi troops are not in doubt, but there is disagreement over what to call this event – a parade or a march. Historian Alexander Dyukov insists that it was a “routine march” because military formalities were not observed. However, it is clear that it was a military show, demonstrating the alliance of two totalitarian regimes who wanted to show the world that they were acting in concert.

Brest historian Vasily Sarichev states: “If this is officially recognized as a parade, then this will be a sanctioned recognition that Hitler and Stalin, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, acted together, demonstrating their unity.”

Propaganda campaign

Soviet propaganda always tried to hush up or distort the events of September 22, 1939. In Germany itself, this parade was actively filmed by Nazi propagandists, making it a show for the domestic audience and a message for the West, especially for England and FranceThe moment when Nazi and Soviet troops marched together was supposed to be a clear signal: “We are allies.” However, the Soviet side preferred to call it a “ceremonial procession” or ignore the event altogether.

Yuri Tsurganoveditor-in-chief of the magazine “Posev”, emphasizes: “Modern Russian propaganda is trying to erase this episode from memory, because it destroys their myth about the Great Patriotic War, where the USSR is depicted as a liberator and a victim of aggression.”

Poland – a victim of two tyrannies

For Poland, the events of September 22 are just one episode in a series of tragedies that began with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to Andrzej Nowakprofessor at the Jagiellonian University, “September 17, 1939 is the day when the USSR stabbed the Polish army in the back, becoming an accomplice in the destruction of Poland.” This blow became the final step on the path to the liquidation of the Polish state.

Projection onto today’s realities: the union of two regimes

When one recalls the joint parade of Nazis and Soviets in Brest, one cannot help but see parallels with contemporary world events. Today, many authoritarian regimes, like those led by Hitler and Stalin, are seeking allies to consolidate their power and suppress freedom in other countries. These new coalitions, as in the past, are based on implicit support for totalitarianism, with the suppression of human rights and the destruction of democratic values ​​becoming a common goal.

In the 21st century, for example, Russia has close ties with countries such as Iran, China, and North Korea. These regimes, supporting each other, oppose Western democracies, seeking global influence through confrontation and destabilization of the international order. Russia, like the USSR in the past, is again playing a double game, participating in international conflicts, supporting authoritarian regimes, and interfering in the affairs of other states.

Iranwith its nuclear ambitions and anti-Semitic rhetoric, is similar to the Nazi regime in its aims and methods, while receiving support from Russia in the form of weapons and political support. Russia, unleashing a full-scale war in Ukraine and seeking geopolitical expansion, once again finds itself in the role of an aggressor, as in 1939. The parallels between how the USSR helped Germany then and how Russia now supports terrorist organizations and authoritarian regimes are obvious.

Modern parallels and the role of the international community

The parade in Brest is not just a historical fact, it is a warning that any alliances built on violence and suppression will sooner or later lead to disaster. The international community should not turn a blind eye to the emerging alliances of totalitarian regimes, as was the case in 1939. Every step, every concession to aggressors and dictators leads to new wars and new genocides.

Ukraine, which is now at the forefront of the fight for its independence, understands this lesson better than anyone. That is why it is fighting not only for its freedom, but also to ensure that the world does not repeat the mistakes of the past. Totalitarian regimes always seek allies to strengthen their influence, but it is international support for democracies, the alliance of Israel, Ukraine and the Western world that must become a bulwark against resurgent threats.

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Ukrainian strikes on ships and Russian military facilities in the Caspian Sea may prove to be a significantly more important event than the destruction of several individual targets. For the first time, Ukraine has delivered a direct strike on a route that connects the military and economic systems of Russia and Iran, and Tehran has officially announced the death of its citizen and threatened Kyiv with consequences.

The incident shows that Russia’s war against Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States can no longer be viewed as completely separate crises. The same states exchange weapons, technologies, intelligence data, and combat experience. Now the confrontation has gone beyond indirect support: Ukraine and Iran have become participants in direct military escalation in the Caspian Sea.

What happened in the Caspian Sea

On July 25, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced successful long-range strikes on Russian targets in the Caspian Sea area. According to him, Ukrainian forces hit ships used to transport military cargo related to Iran, as well as a Russian warship.

The Security Service of Ukraine announced an attack on a Russian missile boat of the Molniya project, cargo ships Port Olya 2 and Begey, a radar station, the Filanovsky oil platform, the Tor-M2 air defense system, and drone warehouses.

The Ukrainian side claims that Port Olya 2 and Begey were under international sanctions and were involved in transporting military cargo between Iran and Russia. There is no independent confirmation of the full list of affected targets and the damage inflicted on them yet.

Tehran presented its own version of the events. The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the Ukrainian attack was directed against an Iranian commercial vessel. As a result of the explosion, one crew member was killed, and another was injured.

The temporary chargé d’affaires of Ukraine was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. There, the incident was called a “hostile and criminal act,” and it was stated that Iran reserves the right to defend its national interests and respond to Kyiv’s actions.

Thus, the confirmed elements of the story are the strike itself, the death of the Iranian sailor, Tehran’s diplomatic protest, and Ukraine’s statements about the defeat of Russian-Iranian logistics. At the same time, the status of the specific Iranian vessel and the nature of its cargo remain disputed: Iran speaks of civilian shipping, Ukraine of a military supply chain.

Why the Caspian is so important for Russia and Iran

The Caspian Sea has long been perceived by Moscow and Tehran as a relatively safe internal space. It is not directly connected to ocean routes controlled by Western naval forces, and most of its coastline belongs to states not participating in the sanctions blockade of Russia and Iran.

Iranian ports in the southern Caspian Sea are connected by sea routes to the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Olya. From there, cargo can be sent via the Volga, railways, and roads to central regions of Russia.

Through this corridor, the following can potentially be transported:

• drones and components for them;
• ammunition and missile components;
• electronics and dual-use goods;
• equipment for the defense industry;
• oil and other sanctioned goods.

The northern route becomes especially significant when Iran faces military pressure in the Persian Gulf, and movement through the Strait of Hormuz becomes dangerous and unstable. In such a situation, the Caspian becomes not just a trade route for Tehran but a strategic reserve artery connecting Iran with Russia and Eurasia.

The Wall Street Journal characterized the Ukrainian operation as a strike on the supply line between Iran and Russia and as a point where two wars converged in the Caspian Sea.

Why Tehran reacted so sharply

The death of an Iranian sailor could itself provoke a diplomatic protest. However, the harshness of Tehran’s statements is likely explained by a more serious concern: Ukraine has shown that the Caspian Sea can no longer be considered a guaranteed safe rear.

One strike cannot completely block trade between Russia and Iran. But regular attacks can create a constant risk for ships, terminals, oil platforms, and port infrastructure.

Russia will have to strengthen air defense over a vast territory, redeploy air defense systems from other directions, change ship movement schedules, and complicate transportation. Insurance and logistics costs will rise, and secret military cargo will be harder to disguise as ordinary trade.

Thus, Ukraine creates a problem not only by physically destroying cargo. It undermines the very sense of security of the route.

For Iran, this is especially painful. Tehran supported the Russian military machine, expecting that Ukraine’s retaliatory actions would remain limited to its territory and Russian targets. Now it becomes clear: participation in supplying Russia can lead to strikes directly on Iranian interests and communications related to Iran.

Russia and Iran are no longer fighting separately

Cooperation between Moscow and Tehran has long gone beyond ordinary diplomatic relations. Russia widely uses drones and technologies of Iranian origin against Ukraine. At the same time, Russian specialists gain practical experience using these systems and improve them.

Iran, in turn, is interested in Russian military technologies, electronic warfare means, aviation, intelligence information, and political support.

Volodymyr Zelensky also stated that Russia was providing Iran with satellite data on American and regional military facilities in the Middle East. According to the Ukrainian president, since early July, Russian satellites have been monitoring the states of the Persian Gulf and the American bases located there. He mentioned airbases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Public evidence of such a transfer has not yet been presented by Kyiv. However, the statement itself shows how Ukraine describes what is happening: not as two parallel wars, but as a single Russian-Iranian system in which Moscow helps Tehran in the Middle East, and Iran supports Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The second step towards a world war

The Financial Times views the events in the Caspian Sea as another stage in the escalation of regional wars into a global confrontation.

The first such step, the publication calls the direct involvement of North Korean military personnel in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Soldiers from the East Asian state have become involved in the European war on Moscow’s side.

The second step is the direct confrontation between Ukraine and Iran. Before this, Tehran helped Russia with weapons and technologies but formally did not fight against Ukraine. After the strike on the ship and the death of an Iranian citizen, the situation changed: Iran officially calls Kyiv’s actions hostile and promises to respond.

This does not yet mean that World War III has already begun. There is still no general officially declared military confrontation between the major powers. Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea have also not created a formal military alliance comparable to NATO.

But a system of interconnected fronts, in which the same states operate, is becoming increasingly apparent.

The formation of an “axis of adversaries”

In American political and analytical circles, the concept of an “axis of adversaries” is increasingly used. It includes Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea.

These countries do not have a unified command, a common army, or an obligation to automatically enter the war for each other. However, they consistently help partners resist the US and its allies.

State	Role in the emerging system
Russia	Wages war against Ukraine, cooperates with Iran and North Korea, receives foreign technologies and components
Iran	Supports the Russian military industry and opposes Israel and the US in the Middle East
North Korea	Transfers ammunition, weapons, and military personnel to Russia
China	Provides economic and technological resilience to Russia and Iran, avoiding direct involvement in wars

Each of these states has its own goals. Russia seeks to destroy Ukraine’s independence and restore its influence over former Soviet territories. Iran aims to oust the US from the Middle East and undermine Israel’s security. North Korea seeks military advantage over South Korea. China increases pressure on Taiwan and aims to change the balance of power in Asia.

But they share a common interest — weakening the US and the Western-created system of international alliances.

The Financial Times notes that the wars in Ukraine and Iran are already beginning to be perceived not as separate regional clashes but as parts of a broader confrontation.

China remains behind the line of direct confrontation

China is the strongest but at the same time the most cautious participant in the emerging system.

Beijing has not directly entered either Russia’s war against Ukraine or Iran’s war against the US and Israel. However, China’s economy, industry, and technological base help Russia and Iran recover losses and circumvent restrictions.

Russia receives electronics, industrial equipment, machinery, and dual-use goods from China. Iran uses Chinese components and navigation technologies to develop its missile and drone systems.

At the same time, China continues military pressure around Taiwan. If Beijing decides on a blockade or military operation, it could become the next and most dangerous stage of the globalization of current wars.

The US may then be forced to simultaneously support Ukraine in Europe, Israel and its partners in the Middle East, as well as Taiwan and regional allies in Asia.

This scenario could turn the system of interconnected regional conflicts into a full-fledged global confrontation.

Why Ukraine is expanding the front

For Ukraine, the strike on the Caspian has several levels of significance.

The first is immediate military. If the ships were indeed transporting weapons or components for the Russian military-industrial complex, their destruction reduces Moscow’s ability to strike Ukrainian cities.

The second is strategic. Ukraine shows that it can hit Russian targets at a great distance and create a threat to previously safe routes.

The third is diplomatic. Kyiv emphasizes that Russia and Iran are acting together, and therefore the defense of Ukraine is linked to the security of Israel, the US, the Persian Gulf states, and Europe.

Ukrainian actions in the Caspian Sea objectively coincide with the interests of states seeking to weaken Iran and limit its ability to circumvent sanctions. However, this does not prove the existence of a joint or secret operation by Ukraine, Israel, and the US.

A more cautious formulation is that Kyiv independently uses the coincidence of strategic interests and tries to show Washington: Ukraine can damage not only Russia but the entire Russian-Iranian military system.

The main weakness of the West

Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are not ideal allies. There are disagreements, competition, and mutual distrust between them. But they consistently help each other where it weakens their common adversaries.

The Western camp faces the opposite problem. The US, Europe, Ukraine, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have much greater combined economic and technological resources, but they often view each threat separately.

For part of Europe, Russia’s war remains exclusively a Ukrainian problem. Iran is perceived as a problem for Israel and the Persian Gulf states. Taiwan is considered a distant Asian issue. The threat of North Korea is a regional problem of the Korean Peninsula.

But the opposite side is already connecting these directions:

• Iranian drones attack Ukraine;
• North Korean military personnel help Russia;
• Russian combat experience and possibly intelligence data are used by Iran;
• Chinese components support Russian and Iranian production;
• Ukraine strikes Russian-Iranian communications in the Caspian Sea.

While democratic states discuss each war separately, authoritarian regimes create a common infrastructure of mutual support.

What might happen next

The further development of events will depend on Iran’s reaction.

Tehran may limit itself to diplomatic threats, as opening a new front against Ukraine will require additional resources and increase pressure on Iran itself.

But other scenarios are possible:

1. Iran may increase arms supplies to Russia.
2. Iranian intelligence services may attempt operations against Ukrainian interests outside Ukraine.
3. Russia and Iran may strengthen the protection of Caspian routes.
4. Moscow may more actively assist Tehran with intelligence data and technologies.
5. Ukraine may continue strikes on ships, ports, and infrastructure related to military transportation.

The most dangerous scenario is the formation of a sustainable cycle of retaliatory attacks, in which Ukraine will expand operations against Russian-Iranian logistics, and Tehran will begin to officially participate in actions against Kyiv.

Then Russia’s war against Ukraine will finally go beyond the European theater.

Not World War III — but no longer separate wars

It is premature to talk about the start of World War III. The US and China have not entered into direct military confrontation, Russia tries to avoid open war with NATO, and Iran, despite threats, has not yet declared itself a participant in Russian aggression against Ukraine.

But signs of globalization of the confrontation are already evident.

Wars are connected through weapons, people, technologies, satellite reconnaissance, supply routes, and sanctioned trade. Each new boundary becomes less distinct.

The Caspian strike showed that even a closed sea between Russia and Iran is no longer an isolated space. Ukraine has brought the fight to where Moscow receives resources to continue its aggression.

Conclusion for NANews

The Ukrainian operation in the Caspian Sea was a warning not only to Russia and Iran. It showed the whole world that the era of isolated regional wars is ending.

Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China already act as an interconnected system — albeit without an official alliance and common command. They exchange weapons, technologies, resources, and experience, simultaneously creating pressure on Ukraine, Israel, the US, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan.

In response, Western states and their allies must stop treating Russian aggression, Iranian terrorism, and Chinese pressure as separate problems.

Ukraine is not only defending its own territory. By destroying Russian-Iranian military logistics, it strikes at a system that simultaneously threatens Europe, Israel, and American interests in the Middle East.

For NANews — Israel News it is fundamentally important to emphasize: supporting Ukraine and countering Iran are not two different directions of foreign policy. These are parts of one struggle against the emerging axis of states that help each other wage wars, circumvent sanctions, and deplete the resources of the democratic world.

The strike in the Caspian Sea has not yet become the start of a world war. But it has become one of the clearest pieces of evidence that the Russian war against Ukraine and the Middle Eastern confrontation are already beginning to merge into a single global front.

On Wednesday, July 15, 2026, at 5:00 PM in the Chernivtsi space “Hub 82” – presentation of the book “Not About War” (translated from Ukrainian “Not About War”) — a posthumous collection of artistic works and frontline letters of serviceman, journalist, videographer, photographer, artist, and writer Maksym Shvartsman.

The date was not chosen by chance. The presentation is exactly on the third anniversary of Maksym’s death, who died on July 15, 2023, during a combat mission in the Bakhmut direction.

The book was published by the Chernivtsi publishing house “Bukrek”. The meeting is moderated by candidate of historical sciences Natalia Nechaeva-Yuriychuk. As the organizers emphasize, this is not just a literary presentation, but an evening of returning the voice of a person whom the war deprived of the opportunity to fulfill his long-standing dream — to publish his own prose.

The Chernivtsi Jewish newspaper Czernowitzer Zeitung calls Maksym Shvartsman a Jewish defender of Ukraine and emphasizes the special significance of his story for the Jewish community of Chernivtsi. He belonged to Ukrainian Jewry, worked in media, engaged in art, raised children, and from the first days of the full-scale Russian invasion voluntarily stood up to defend Ukraine.

Maksym Shvartsman: from Kalanchak to Chernivtsi

Maksym Shvartsman was born on October 17, 1987, in Kalanchak, Kherson region.

After finishing school, he entered the Odessa National University, where he chose the specialty of a historian. However, he could not complete his studies: after his mother’s death, he had to earn a living on his own.

At different times, Maksym worked as a courier, cook, and took on other jobs, but his true calling remained creativity. He was interested in history, architecture, and archaeology, participated in excavations, loved nature, photographed, painted, wrote stories and songs, played the guitar, came up with scripts, and made short films.

After moving to Chernivtsi, Maksym started working on local television. Initially, he filmed news stories, then TV shows, commercials, and author projects. Later, he worked as an operator and photojournalist in several Chernivtsi media, including the information agency ASS.

Colleagues knew him primarily as a talented videographer and photographer. However, not everyone guessed that for many years Maksym wrote artistic prose and dreamed of engaging not only in television journalism but also in artistic cinema.

According to his wife’s recollections, he took the image very seriously: he set up the lighting, framed the shot, experimented with visual effects. At the same time, he called his works amateurish because he was worried that he did not receive professional director’s education.

His true dream was his own cinema. He wanted not just to capture what was happening, but to tell stories — through the frame, literature, music, and drawing.

Family, which became the main meaning of life

Maksym met his future wife Marina while working in the media field. They traveled together for shoots, participated in creative projects, and gradually became close.

Maksym and Marina had two children — daughter Sofia and son Adam. The family became the main center of his life. Relatives remember Maksym as a caring father and husband who did not divide household duties into “male” and “female”, took care of the children, cleaned, and washed clothes by hand when there was no washing machine in the rented apartment.

He learned to cook borscht, which the children called tastier than their mother’s. For some time, Maksym was practically a “stay-at-home dad”: he stayed home with the children while Marina worked.

The Shvartsman family dreamed of their own small house near Chernivtsi — with a garden and a place where the family could gather by the fire. Maksym loved to take the children to secluded places, which he called “thickets”, told them about the history of the region, nature, architecture, and old buildings.

At the beginning of 2014, the family lived for some time in Maksym’s native Kalanchak, Kherson region. Already then, Russian aggression against Ukraine entered their daily life: the occupied Crimea was nearby, and Marina later recalled how she looked out the window, fearing to see military equipment.

Creativity that Maksym did not want to leave

Maksym Shvartsman was not only a television operator and photographer. He wrote artistic prose and songs, painted, played the guitar, was interested in history and archaeology, came up with scripts, and dreamed of engaging in artistic cinema.

Even many colleagues, who knew him well as a talented operator, did not suspect for a long time that Maksym wrote stories and worked on a fantastic novella.

He took each frame seriously, set up the lighting, looked for unusual visual solutions, and wanted not just to capture events, but to tell stories. At the same time, Maksym remained very demanding of himself and often called his own works amateurish because he was worried that he did not receive professional director’s education.

Creativity was not a hobby for him that could be engaged in from time to time, but an important part of his personality. It was the inability to write, shoot, and develop in his favorite direction that later became one of the reasons why the family’s life in Israel did not work out.

End of 2014 — 2015: seven months in Israel

At the beginning of 2014, after the birth of their eldest daughter Sofia, Maksym and Marina Shvartsman moved from Chernivtsi to his native Kalanchak, Kherson region.

In Kalanchak, the family lived for about half a year. It was a time of Russian occupation of Crimea: Marina recalled that she went to the window and checked if military equipment appeared near the house.

Around the second half of 2014, the Shvartsman family returned to Chernivtsi. Maksym started working again, and soon Marina became pregnant with their son. Due to constant housing rentals and limited income, the family decided to use Maksym’s right to repatriation and try to start a new life in Israel.

The exact date of the move is not mentioned in the published interview. However, from the sequence of events, it follows that the family most likely arrived in Israel at the end of 2014 or the beginning of 2015.

In Israel, the Shvartsman family lived for about seven months. During this period, presumably in 2015, their son Adam was born. This dating is consistent with Marina’s later story: on September 1, 2022, Adam went to first grade, which allows us to date his birth to around 2015.

Which Israeli city the family chose is not specified in the available memories. It is only reliably known that Maksym rode his bicycle to work daily along a route that passed by the Mediterranean Sea.

To support his pregnant wife, and then his wife and newborn son, Maksym worked in a production workshop. For a person accustomed to journalism, filming, literature, and creative projects, monotonous physical work became a difficult test.

According to Marina’s recollections, Maksym once said: “I ride my bike past the Mediterranean Sea every day, but I can’t swim there.” It was not just about the lack of free time. This phrase conveyed his feeling of living next to beauty and freedom, which he could not enjoy due to constant work and financial pressure.

About seven months later, approximately in 2015, the family decided to return to Chernivtsi. After returning, Marina went to work, and Maksym, unable to immediately find a suitable place, stayed home with the children for some time and, as the family put it, became a “stay-at-home dad”.

Thus, the Israeli period in the life of the Shvartsman family can be dated approximately the end of 2014 — 2015. The exact dates of arrival and return, as well as the name of the city, Marina did not name in the published interview, so a more precise dating cannot be indicated without her direct confirmation.

For NAnews — News of Israel, the Israeli part of Maksym Shvartsman’s biography has special significance. His fate directly connects Israel, Jewish Chernivtsi, and Ukraine.

Maksym had the right to repatriation, his son was born in Israel, and the family itself gained experience living in the country. However, the home with which his work, creativity, public life, and subsequently military service were connected became Chernivtsi and Ukraine for him.

…

He supported his wife’s literary creativity as well. In 2022, Marina published her first novel “Christmas Count”. Maksym was already in service and could not attend the presentation, but his wife sent him a copy of the book. Later it was found among his most cherished belongings along with children’s drawings, documents, and chevrons.

February 24, 2022: the operator exchanged the camera for a weapon

Maksym’s native Kalanchak was among the first Ukrainian settlements captured by Russian troops in February 2022.

There remained his family home, childhood memories, and the graves of his mother and stepfather. The footage of Kalanchak’s occupation was a personal blow to him.

On February 24, 2022, Maksym decided to go to the military enlistment office and voluntarily joined the Chernivtsi territorial defense. Before that, he had no military experience, but he believed he could not stand aside.

A photographer and videographer, accustomed to holding a camera, took up arms to defend Ukraine.

At first, his unit was located in the Chernivtsi region. At Maksym’s request, his wife and children went to relatives in Poland, but after two months the family returned. Until the end of summer, he could sometimes come home, but in early September 2022, the 92nd battalion was sent to the Kharkiv region.

Maksym served as a shooter in the 92nd battalion of the 107th separate brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His call sign was “Marvel”.

Initially, he performed combat missions in the Kharkiv direction, and then was transferred to the Donetsk region — one of the most difficult sections of the front.

For a long time, his wife did not even know his call sign. She accidentally saw the inscription Marvel on his uniform in one of the sent photos. Maksym himself tried not to tell his family the details of his service. During calls, he more often asked about the children, school, Marina’s work, and household matters than talked about what was happening at the front.

In Kharkiv, communication sometimes disappeared for periods ranging from three to ten days. Before going on a combat mission, Maksym usually only warned that he would not be able to write or call for some time.

Comrades remembered him as a person who did not look for excuses and did not refuse hard work. If it was necessary to dig positions, carry loads, or perform another task, he just went and did it.

When there was an opportunity to try to transfer to a safer position, Maksym refused to leave his unit. For him, it was a matter of responsibility to the people he served with and a matter of personal honor.

The last message and death near Bakhmut

The last message to his wife Maksym sent late in the evening on July 14, 2023. He warned Marina that the unit was moving to a new location and communication would probably be unavailable for one or two days.

The next day, July 15, 2023, a group of Ukrainian servicemen was performing a combat mission in the Bakhmut direction.

The unit took enemy positions but came under Russian artillery fire. Maksym Shvartsman was killed. He was 35 years old. Along with him, another serviceman was killed, and a third soldier was wounded.

In the first days, the family did not have complete information. Contradictory reports appeared, and Marina continued to hope that her husband might have survived.

Later, the unit reported that the bodies of the deceased were visible from a drone, but it was not possible to evacuate them immediately: the positions were temporarily occupied by Russian troops. After Ukrainian forces regained the territory, the bodies of the defenders were able to be retrieved.

Maksym was buried in the Alley of Glory at the Central Cemetery of Chernivtsi.

According to the Institute of Mass Information, Maksym Shvartsman became the 66th media worker killed as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Order “For Courage” and other awards

On November 16, 2023, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree posthumously awarding Maksym Shvartsman the Order “For Courage” III degree.

The decree noted the courage and selflessness shown in defending the state sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as Maksym’s contribution to the development of television, radio broadcasting, and communications. The public announcement of the state award to the family was made in July 2024.

Maksym was also awarded the medal “For the Liberation of Kharkiv Region”, the award “For Services to Bukovina”, the badge of the Chernivtsi City Council “For the Glory of Chernivtsi”, and other regional distinctions. Some awards were given posthumously.

However, for family and friends, the memory of Maksym is not limited to military uniform, call sign, and state awards.

Marina Shvartsman emphasizes: she wants her husband to be remembered primarily as a living, kind, and talented person — a father who walked with his children, a husband who dreamed of a house with a garden, an operator who saw the world through a frame, and a writer who did not live to see his own book.

What is included in the book “Not About War”

“Not About War” is not a military chronicle or a collection of works by different authors. It is a posthumously published author’s book by Maksym Shvartsman.

The confirmed composition of the printed edition includes:

• several artistic stories;
• an unfinished fantastic novella “Guardians of Continuity”;
• letters and messages to his wife Marina, written from the front line.

Before the full-scale invasion, Maksym was known in Chernivtsi primarily as an operator and photographer. His prose remained almost unknown. The Russian war did not give him the opportunity to realize himself as a writer and independently prepare his works for publication, so the book is compiled from the texts he managed to write during his lifetime.

In the fantastic novella “Guardians of Continuity”, Chernivtsi occupies an important place — a city that Maksym loved and considered his second home.

This is not a dry description of streets and buildings. In the novella, the city appears as a living, ironic, and almost fairy-tale space. Maksym wrote about it with good humor and attention to detail, combining his own love for history, architecture, and fantasy.

The work remained unfinished.

Marina decided not to finish it for her husband. Maksym did not talk about the concept of his works until he completed them, so it is impossible to reliably restore the supposed continuation or ending. His wife preserved the text as the author left it.

Letters in which there is almost no war

A special part of the book consists of Maksym’s letters to Marina.

Although they were written on the front line, they contain almost no descriptions of hostilities. Maksym tried to separate the war from family life and not transfer the frontline reality into conversations with his wife and children.

He wrote about love, cared for Marina, was interested in the children, joked, recalled ordinary life, and continued to think about the future.

One of the letters he began after his 35th birthday, addressing his wife as a person who writes to her for the first time at a new age. Another letter was prepared in case of his death. In it, Maksym explained how he would like to be buried, supported Marina, and convinced her that she is strong and can continue to live.

This letter especially fully reveals his character. Even thinking about his possible death, he worried not about himself, but about his wife and children.

Once from the front, Maksym sent Marina an artistic text and explained that it was “not about war”. This phrase became the key to the posthumous edition: the book was created against the backdrop of war and contains letters from the front line, but it tells primarily about life, love, family, Chernivtsi, creativity, and human dignity.

The book was preserved and prepared by Marina Shvartsman

The decisive role in the appearance of “Not About War” was played by Maksym’s wife.

Marina preserved his manuscripts, electronic files, letters, messages, drawings, paintings, script sketches, and unfinished prose. However, for a long time, she physically could not force herself to reread the texts left after her husband.

Only about a year after his death did Marina find the strength to return to the manuscripts and begin editing them.

As early as 2025, she talked about plans to prepare a book that could include stories, scripts, artistic works, an unfinished novella, and Maksym’s letters. The final, publicly confirmed composition of the printed edition included stories, the novella “Guardians of Continuity”, and frontline letters. Organizers have not yet reported separately on the publication of scripts and paintings in the current edition.

For Marina, publishing the book is the fulfillment of a dream that Maksym did not have time to realize himself.

But it is also an attempt to return to readers the real Maksym Shvartsman — not only a soldier with the call sign “Marvel”, who died near Bakhmut, but a person who loved children, cooked borscht, made films, was interested in archaeology, drew, played the guitar, wrote stories, and dreamed of a house with a garden.

Memory as the responsibility of the living

For the Jewish community of Chernivtsi, the presentation of “Not About War” will be not only a literary event.

It is an evening of remembrance for a representative of Ukrainian Jewry, who had the right to repatriation, lived with his family in Israel, raised a son born there, but after the start of the full-scale invasion voluntarily stood up to defend Ukraine.

His story shows that resistance to Russian aggression united Ukrainians of different nationalities, cultures, and religious traditions.

NAnews — News of Israel tells the story of Maksym Shvartsman precisely because it is part of the shared Israeli-Ukrainian memory. It combines Jewish origin, Israel, Chernivtsi, occupied Kalanchak, Ukrainian culture, and the struggle for Ukraine’s freedom.

In Jewish tradition, the memory of the deceased is not only a recollection of the past but also the responsibility of those who continue to live.

After the name of the departed person, it is said: זכרונו לברכה — “May his memory be blessed”.

Maksym Shvartsman continues to live in his children, in preserved frames, drawings, letters, and the book, the appearance of which became possible thanks to the love and strength of his wife.

The war was able to cut short his life.

But it could not silence his voice.

May the memory of Maksym Shvartsman be blessed.

A cemetery where history stands not in rows, but in wounds

The Jewish cemetery in Berdychiv is not just an old necropolis on the map of Ukraine. It is a place where the stones look as if the earth has been trying for many years to push out a memory that cannot be completely buried.

Here the matzevot stand unevenly, tilt, fall sideways, disappear into the grass, as if each stone has its own final pose. Some tombstones resemble heavy stone ‘boots’—such a shape can indeed be found in old Jewish burials. There are almost no images on them. Only letters, a dense weave of square Hebrew script, names, dates, blessings, traces of families that have long been absent from the living city conversation.

Sometimes you can see a short Cyrillic inscription on the stone: ‘Kloizner’, ‘Danzig’. For a casual passerby, these are just surnames. For descendants, a possible thread to a family that once lived, prayed, traded, argued, married, buried children and the elderly in a city that was called one of the symbols of Jewish life in Eastern Europe.

Berdychiv was not an ordinary Jewish shtetl. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were synagogues, prayer houses, schools, a hospital, an orphanage, libraries; the city remained a major Jewish center of Volhynia and Right-Bank Ukraine. According to ESJF, in 1907 the community maintained 6 synagogues and 72 prayer houses.

Why Berdychiv was called a Jewish city

The history of Jewish Berdychiv begins long before the catastrophe of the 20th century. The first mentions of the Jewish community of the city date back to the 16th century, and over time Berdychiv became one of the main centers of Jewish trade, Hasidic culture, and religious life in the region.

Not only local residents were buried here. Merchants who came to fairs, rabbis, tzaddiks, and people from smaller Jewish communities in the eastern part of the then Volhynia province found their final rest in the old cemetery. The most famous burial is associated with Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berdychiv, who died in 1809—his ohel remains a place of pilgrimage to this day.

That is why the cemetery in Berdychiv is perceived not as a local landmark, but as a fragment of a large Jewish map. For Israel, this is also not a foreign story: many families living in Israel today have roots that pass through Berdychiv, Zhytomyr region, Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Galicia.

Memory here is not museum-like. It is familial.

From matzevot to ghetto: how the city of memory became a city of disappearance

In the cemetery, the gap between those who were buried according to Jewish rites and those who disappeared without a grave is especially acute. This is the terrible line of Berdychiv: some received a stone, a name, and a place, others—only emptiness in family memory.

During the German occupation, Berdychiv became one of the places of mass extermination of Jews. The ghetto was created in the summer of 1941, and mass shootings took place in September. Yad Vashem indicates that on September 15, 1941, about 12,000 remaining Jews of Berdychiv were rounded up and destroyed with the participation of German units and local auxiliary police.

It was not a single tragic scene. It was a process of destroying an entire world.

In the Berdychiv area and near the village of Khazhin, there were places of mass shootings. The memorial project Connecting Memory writes that from mid-August 1941, the area near Khazhin was repeatedly used for the killing of Jews; only on September 4, 1941, 1,303 Jews from Berdychiv were shot there, and according to the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, by the end of 1943, 10,656 people were killed there.

Why the absence of a grave is sometimes scarier than death

Jewish tradition attaches great importance to the memory of the name and the burial place. A grave is not just a stone. It is an opportunity to come, read, place a pebble, say Kaddish, explain to a child: ‘here is our person.’

When a person disappears in a ghetto, in a shooting pit, in a nameless list or without a list at all, the family loses not only a relative. It loses a point of return.

That is why the old matzevot of Berdychiv look so painful. They stand not only for those whose names are engraved on the stone but also for those who did not even receive this. In such a place, personal genealogy, Holocaust history, and Jewish memory cease to be different topics.

In the middle of this story, it is important to talk not only about Ukraine’s past but also about today’s Israeli memory. For readers of Nikk.Agency—Israel News | Nikk.Agency Berdychiv is not a distant point on the map of the Zhytomyr region, but part of a large family route: from the shtetls of Eastern Europe to Israel, from the language of ancestors to modern Hebrew, from lost archives to an attempt to restore at least names.

What remains today: cemetery, pilgrimage, and the duty of memory

It is estimated that the Berdychiv Jewish cemetery once had more than 10,000 burials, but only part of the tombstones have survived. One of the specialized resources indicates that out of a huge number of graves, about 550 matzevot remain, representing historical value and showing different stages of Jewish burial culture.

This is an important detail: the cemetery is not just ‘old.’ It is damaged by time, wars, Soviet indifference, destruction, oblivion, and partial restoration. Each preserved stone here works as a document, although it is not written on paper.

Berdychiv as a warning for the 21st century

Today, when Ukraine is once again living in conditions of war, the history of Berdychiv sounds especially harsh. Because Jewish cemeteries, places of shootings, synagogues, old houses, and family archives on Ukrainian soil are not abstract heritage. It is a memory that has once again found itself near the front, rockets, occupation, destruction of cities, and attempts to erase Ukrainian identity.

For Israel, this plot is also not external.

It reminds that the Jewish history of Eastern Europe did not end with emigration. It remained in stones, surnames, photographs, the silence of older relatives, in accidentally found documents, and in those places where descendants come already from Jerusalem, Haifa, Be’er Sheva, Tel Aviv, or Ashdod.

The Berdychiv cemetery speaks quietly but very accurately: a people exist not only where they have a state, an army, and a parliament. A people also exist where someone, decades later, searches for a surname on a tilted stone.

Why this story is not only about death

You can look at these matzevot as a symbol of loss. But that will not be the whole truth.

They also speak of the life that was before the catastrophe. Of a city where Jewish culture was not an appendix to someone else’s history, but one of the main forces of urban life. Of families who built houses, educated children, argued about politics, went to fairs, observed traditions or deviated from them, believed, doubted, fell in love, grew old.

That is why such cemeteries cannot be perceived only as ‘places of mourning.’ They are also an archive of dignity.

The toppled cemetery stones, resembling a herd of frozen sea creatures, are a very accurate image. Because these stones indeed seem to be stopped in motion. They are not completely dead. They continue to speak as long as someone comes, reads, photographs, translates, searches, remembers.

And so, the story of Berdychiv is not yet closed.

It continues in descendants who try to understand where their relatives lay. In researchers who restore the names of the murdered. In pilgrims coming to the grave of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak. In Ukrainians who preserve Jewish heritage as part of their own history. And in Israelis, for whom such places remain roots, even if these roots have grown through pain.

Ukrainian long-range strikes have for the first time so clearly linked Russia’s war against Ukraine with the confrontation around Iran and American military facilities in the Middle East. Kyiv reported an attack on a Russian warship and vessels used to transport Iran-related military cargo in the Caspian Sea. Almost simultaneously, Tehran announced that an Iranian commercial vessel was damaged, one crew member was killed, and another was injured.

Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Ukrainian intelligence data indicating that Russia is conducting satellite surveillance of American military facilities and Gulf countries, after which the relevant images are transmitted to Iran for preparation and adjustment of strikes.

The events show that Russian-Iranian military cooperation is no longer limited to the supply of Shahed drones for strikes on Ukraine. According to Kyiv, Moscow is now helping Tehran with reconnaissance information in the Middle East, and Ukraine, in turn, has begun striking sea routes linking Russia and Iran.

What happened in the Caspian Sea on July 25, 2026

On Saturday, July 25, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky reported on successful operations by Ukrainian forces in the Caspian region.

According to him, vessels used to transport military cargo related to Iran, as well as a Russian warship, were hit. The President of Ukraine did not disclose all operational details but hinted that this is a continuation of Ukraine’s strategy of so-called ‘long-range sanctions’ — strikes on facilities serving the Russian military industry, energy exports, and international military logistics.

Ukrainian sources also reported attacks on two Russian vessels — ‘Port Olya-2’ and ‘Begey’. Kyiv claims these ships were involved in transporting military cargo along the Caspian route between Russia and Iran.

In addition, there were reports of a strike on Russian oil and gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, including the Vladimir Filanovsky field platform operated by Lukoil. Previously, Ukraine had already struck Caspian oil facilities, viewing oil and gas export revenues as one of the sources of financing Russian aggression.

As of the time of publication, Russia has not provided a detailed official report on the consequences of the attacks and has not confirmed the Ukrainian version regarding the nature of the cargo on the ships.

Iran announced an attack on its commercial vessel

The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported that early in the morning of July 25, 2026, a Ukrainian attack led to an explosion on board an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea.

According to Tehran’s official statement:

• one crew member was killed;
• another person was injured;
• the vessel was damaged as a result of the explosion;
• Iran attributed responsibility for the attack to Ukraine.

The Iranian foreign ministry called the incident a ‘hostile and criminal act’ and also stated that it violated Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states.

Tehran claims that the strike could ‘further ignite and expand the flames of war’ and declared the right to defend its national interests and security. The Ukrainian chargé d’affaires was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where an official protest was delivered.

However, Iran did not name the vessel allegedly damaged, did not disclose the nature of the cargo being transported, and did not report the exact location of the incident.

It is unclear whether it is the same ship

There remains a significant discrepancy between the statements of Ukraine and Iran.

Kyiv speaks of strikes on Russian ships and a Russian warship involved in transporting Iran-related military cargo. Tehran, in turn, claims that an Iranian commercial vessel was attacked.

It has not yet been independently established:

• whether the damaged Iranian vessel was one of the targets named by Ukraine;
• whether there were several separate attacks;
• under which flag the ship was sailing;
• who owned it;
• what cargo it was carrying;
• whether there was military equipment on board;
• where exactly the explosion occurred;
• what means of attack Ukraine used.

Therefore, claims about the ownership of the vessel and the nature of the cargo should be considered as statements by the parties, rather than a fully confirmed picture of the incident.

Why the Caspian route is so important for Russia and Iran

The Caspian Sea has become one of the key transport corridors between Russia and Iran. This route allows cargo to be transported directly between the ports of the two states, bypassing sea routes controlled by Western countries.

The Russian port of Olya in the Astrakhan region is of particular importance. Part of the cargo heading from Iran to Russia and back can pass through it.

Ukraine believes that this route is used to transport:

• drone components;
• ammunition;
• military systems and parts;
• dual-use equipment;
• components for weapons production;
• other cargo related to Russian-Iranian military cooperation.

On December 12, 2025, Ukraine reported a strike on two Russian ships, which, according to Kyiv, were transporting military equipment in the Caspian Sea. At that time, the first Ukrainian strike on a Russian oil platform in the region was also reported.

In March 2026, the Caspian Sea had already become the scene of attacks on cargo traveling between Russia and Iran. It was reported that Russia was trying to avoid open air deliveries to Iran and was increasingly using the sea corridor.

Zelensky announced the transfer of Russian satellite data to Iran

On the same day, July 25, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky reported on another aspect of Russian-Iranian interaction.

According to him, Ukrainian intelligence has established that Russia is transferring satellite images of Gulf states and American military facilities in the Middle East to Iran.

‘Since the beginning of July, we have been recording active Russian satellite surveillance of Gulf states and American military facilities located there. These images then end up with Iran,’ Zelensky said.

The President of Ukraine claims that there is a clear connection between Russian surveillance and subsequent Iranian attacks. This involves both photographing objects before strikes, which can help in target selection and guidance, and post-attack observation to assess the damage caused.

According to Zelensky, on July 19 and 20, 2026, Russian satellites monitored at least four airbases:

• two facilities in Bahrain;
• one airbase in Jordan;
• one airbase in Kuwait.

Zelensky stated that the relevant data would be passed on to the United States and other partners of Ukraine.

Why satellite reconnaissance can be crucial

Satellite images allow tracking the location of aircraft, air defense systems, warehouses, runways, temporary structures, and other military infrastructure.

Regular imaging of the same object can show:

• aircraft movement;
• changes in base operations;
• deployment of air defense systems;
• the appearance of new warehouses or equipment;
• preparation for a military operation;
• the consequences of a missile or drone strike.

Transferring such information to Iran, if Ukrainian data is confirmed, could mean direct reconnaissance assistance to Tehran from Russia.

However, Ukraine has not yet presented public evidence that can be independently examined. Zelensky refers to intelligence information that Kyiv intends to pass on to partners.

How the US reacts to Kyiv’s statements

According to American media, US intelligence agencies are studying the issue of possible Russian assistance to Iran in preparing strikes on American facilities in the region.

Particular attention was drawn to the accuracy of some Iranian attacks. Washington is checking whether Tehran could have received:

• satellite images;
• target coordinates;
• electronic intelligence data;
• information for strike adjustments;
• assistance in assessing the consequences of attacks.

However, as of the time of publication, US authorities have not publicly confirmed that Russia indeed provided Iran with specific data for strikes.

US President Donald Trump previously stated that he sees no evidence of direct Russian or Chinese involvement in Iranian operations. According to him, the leadership of both countries assured Washington of their non-involvement.

Thus, the positions of Kyiv and the White House currently differ. Ukraine speaks of systematic Russian reconnaissance assistance, while the American administration has not publicly confirmed the existence of conclusive evidence.

Ukraine offers the Middle East experience in combating Iranian drones

Kyiv links its confrontation with Iran to the long-term use of Shahed drones by Russia against Ukrainian cities.

Iran has long denied supplying drones to Russia for the war against Ukraine. Later, Tehran acknowledged the transfer of a limited number of drones but claimed it happened before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Ukraine and Western countries believe that Iran provided Russia not only with ready-made drones but also with technologies, components, and production solutions that allowed Moscow to launch serial production of Shahed analogs called ‘Geran’.

After several years of repelling massive attacks, Ukraine has accumulated significant experience in detecting and intercepting Iranian drones.

Zelensky previously stated that 11 Middle Eastern countries had approached Ukraine for consultations and assistance in countering Iranian drones.

Kyiv declared its readiness to provide:

• Ukrainian interceptor drones;
• air defense specialists;
• instructors;
• detection systems;
• electronic warfare technologies;
• practical experience in protecting cities and military facilities.

According to media reports, Ukrainian specialists could participate in the protection of American infrastructure in Jordan. However, Donald Trump later stated that American military personnel do not need Ukrainian assistance in this area.

An Iranian parliamentarian previously called Ukraine a ‘legitimate target’

Tensions between Kyiv and Tehran did not arise on July 25. On March 15, 2026, the chairman of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission, Ebrahim Azizi, made threats against Ukraine.

He stated that Ukraine allegedly helps Israel with the use of drones and thus ‘actually participates in the war.’

‘By supporting the Israeli regime with drones, the failing Ukraine is actually participating in the war. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, its entire territory has become a legitimate target for Iran,’ Azizi wrote.

This statement was made more than four months before the attack in the Caspian Sea and was related to reports of possible Ukrainian assistance to Israel and the US in combating Iranian drones.

Ukraine then reminded that it was Iran that supplied Russia with drones and technologies used for strikes on Ukrainian residential buildings, power plants, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure.

Does Article 51 make all of Ukraine a ‘legitimate target’

Ebrahim Azizi’s reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter does not mean that Iran gains the right to attack any point in Ukraine.

Article 51 indeed recognizes the right of states to individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack. However, international humanitarian law continues to apply even during war.

It requires distinguishing:

• military and civilian objects;
• military personnel and the civilian population;
• legitimate military targets and infrastructure not involved in hostilities.

Therefore, the statement that the ‘entire territory’ of a state becomes a legitimate target does not comply with the basic principles of international law. Even the right to self-defense does not permit indiscriminate attacks and strikes on the civilian population.

Iran’s position contains an obvious contradiction

After the attack in the Caspian Sea, Iran’s Foreign Ministry again stated that the Islamic Republic allegedly does not interfere in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

However, at the same time Tehran:

• transferred drones to Russia;
• provided Shahed production technology;
• developed military cooperation with Moscow;
• threatened Ukraine with strikes;
• called Ukrainian territory a ‘legitimate target’;
• opposed Ukrainian assistance to states attacked by Iran.

NANews — Israel News notes that this position appears contradictory. Tehran demands that Iranian ships be perceived as exclusively civilian objects, yet does not disclose the nature of the cargo transported on the Russia-Iran route and denies the significance of its own involvement in supplying the Russian military machine.

Possible response from Iran

After the strike on July 25, Iranian officials and media associated with the authorities spoke about a possible response to Ukraine.

Publications in pro-government resources reminded of the range of Iranian ballistic missiles and stated that Ukrainian territory is within their reach.

Some Iranian commentators mentioned the Khorramshahr-4 missile, whose range, according to Iranian statements, can reach about two thousand kilometers. However, to strike targets over a significant part of Ukraine’s territory, Iran would need to launch missiles from its own territory or use the territory of an allied state.

Tehran has not announced an official decision to strike Ukraine. Threats in the Iranian media should still be considered as an element of political and informational pressure.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, the developments have direct significance.

For several years, Ukraine has been studying Iranian drones in real combat conditions. Its specialists have information about the Shahed’s design, flight routes, control system vulnerabilities, and interception methods.

Such experience can be useful to Israel and other countries in the region in repelling attacks from Iran and related groups.

At the same time, the possible transfer of Russian satellite data to Tehran means that the military partnership between Russia and Iran could be used not only against Ukraine but also against Israel, the USA, and the Gulf states.

Russian satellites are capable of observing Israeli airbases, seaports, energy facilities, and military infrastructure. If the information is indeed being transferred to Iran, it creates an additional threat to the entire region.

Chronology of main events

December 12, 2025 — Ukraine reports strikes on Russian ships and an oil platform in the Caspian Sea.

March 15, 2026 — Ibrahim Azizi states that due to assistance to Israel, Ukraine’s territory has allegedly become a ‘legitimate target’ for Iran.

March 19, 2026 — reports emerge of an attack on a Caspian convoy transporting military cargo between Russia and Iran.

From early July 2026 — according to Zelensky, Russia is actively observing Gulf countries and American facilities via satellites.

July 19–20, 2026 — Russian satellites, according to the Ukrainian version, are monitoring four airbases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Early morning of July 25 — an explosion occurs on an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea. Iran reports the death of one sailor and the injury of another.

July 25 — Ukraine confirms strikes on a Russian warship and ships transporting Iran-related military cargo.

July 25 — Tehran summons the Ukrainian chargé d’affaires and delivers a protest.

July 25 — Zelensky reports the possible transfer of Russian satellite intelligence to Iran.

July 25–26 — Iranian officials and pro-government media discuss a possible response to Ukraine.

The Caspian Sea becomes part of a larger war

Strikes in the Caspian Sea show that Ukraine’s strategy is changing. Previously, the main targets were Russian airfields, military factories, oil refineries, and depots, but now Ukraine is consistently expanding operations to international supply routes of Russia.

The Caspian corridor is of particular importance as it connects Russia with Iran — a state that helped Moscow establish the mass use of strike drones against Ukraine.

At the same time, Russian-Iranian cooperation, according to Kyiv, goes far beyond the Ukrainian front. Russia may provide Iran with reconnaissance capabilities for actions against the USA and its allies in the Middle East.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes: it remains unknown which ship was damaged on July 25, to whom it belonged, and what cargo was on board. However, the political significance of what happened is already evident.

Ukraine has demonstrated that it considers the maritime logistics of Russia and Iran as part of military infrastructure. Tehran reported a human casualty for the first time as a result of a direct Ukrainian attack. And Zelensky’s statements about Russian satellite assistance to Iran link the war against Ukraine with a broader confrontation involving Israel, the USA, and the Gulf states.

Events in the Caspian Sea may mark the beginning of a new phase, where Russian-Iranian military routes will be subject to regular attacks, and relations between Kyiv and Tehran will finally shift from diplomatic tension to direct military confrontation.